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**REPORT OF THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE COMMISSION  
ON THE OUTCOMES OF THE FACT-FINDING/RECONNAISSANCE  
MISSION TO SOMALIA AND THE IGAD MILITARY PLANNING MEETINGS**

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**I. INTRODUCTION**

1. The 22<sup>nd</sup> meeting of the Peace and Security Council (PSC), held on 5 January 2005, accepted in principle the deployment of an AU Peace Support Mission (AU PSM) in Somalia, based on the conclusions of the Nairobi experts meeting that took place on 15 and 16 December 2004 to support the Transitional Federal Institutions, and its previous decisions. The meeting further requested the Commission to submit to it recommendations on the mandate, size, structure, tasks and funding requirements for such a Mission. In pursuance of the request of the PSC, the Commission dispatched a Fact-Finding/Reconnaissance Mission to Somalia, from 14 to 26 February 2005.

2. This report provides an overview of both the outcomes of the Fact-Finding/Reconnaissance Mission and the political, security and socio-economic situation in Somalia, as mainly informed by the Mission's consultations, visits and observations during its stay in the country, as well as the arrangements made thus far for the deployment of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Support Mission in Somalia (IGASOM), as authorised by the 24th meeting of the PSC, held on 7 February 2005.

**II. BACKGROUND TO THE DISPATCH OF THE FACT-FINDING/  
RECONNAISSANCE MISSION**

3. It will be recalled that Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, President of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, addressed the PSC in Addis-Ababa, on 25 October 2004, and requested the AU to support his Government through the deployment of a 15,000 to 20,000-strong peacemaking force in Somalia. The PSC requested the Commission to examine the request and make recommendations to it.

4. Towards the end of 2004, the Commission convened experts meetings to explore ways and means to support the Transitional Federal Institutions of Somalia, with respect to their relocation from Kenya to Somalia and their sustenance thereafter. In this perspective, the Commission convened a Planning Seminar for the Stabilization of Somalia, in Addis-Ababa, from 4 to 5 November 2004. The Seminar made a number of recommendations regarding the issues indicated above.

5. Furthermore, and in the spirit of building consensus and common effort among all the actors involved in the Somalia peace process, the Commission convened another meeting of experts from the AU, the TFG, the IGAD Secretariat and Member States, the European Union (EU), the League of Arab States (LAS), the United Nations (UN), Italy (as the Chair of the IGAD Partners' Forum supporting the peace process), Sweden (as the Chair of the Stockholm Donors' Conference on Somalia) and the Somalia Demilitarisation Planning Unit (SDPU – Nairobi-based), in Nairobi, from 15 to 16 December 2004, to develop a strategy for enhancing security in Somalia and for facilitating the training of Somali security forces under the TFG. The outcomes of the experts meeting were presented to the PSC at its 22<sup>nd</sup> meeting. Also, the experts meeting recommended the undertaking of a reconnaissance mission to Somalia, led by the AU and involving all the institutions/organizations and countries that were represented at the Nairobi experts meeting.

6. Notably, while the Commission was in the process of preparing for the dispatch of the Fact-Finding/Reconnaissance Mission to Somalia, other political developments having an impact on the undertaking of the Mission took place in Abuja, Nigeria. The IGAD Heads of State and Government met on the sidelines of the 4<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the AU, held at the same venue from 30 to 31 January 2005, to discuss the Somalia peace process, with respect to the delayed relocation of the TFG from Kenya to Somalia. The IGAD Heads of State and Government issued a communiqué expressing, among other things, *"the commitment of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda to provide troops and/or equipment for the deployment of a Peace Support Mission to provide security to the TFG of Somalia, in order to ensure its relocation to Somalia and guarantee the sustenance of the outcome of the IGAD peace process"*.

7. Subsequently, the Assembly adopted decision Assembly/AU/Dec. 65(IV) in which it welcomed *"the Abuja communiqué of the IGAD Heads of States and Governments of 31 January 2005, and requested the PSC to mandate IGAD to deploy such a peace support mission, pending the deployment of the envisaged AU PSM and requested further the Commission to provide support and assistance"*. It was in this perspective that the 24<sup>th</sup> meeting of the PSC, held on 7<sup>th</sup> February 2005, adopted decision PSC/PR/Com.(XXIV) in which it, inter alia, *"authorized IGAD to deploy a peace support mission in Somalia, to provide security support to the TFG, in order to ensure its relocation to Somalia, guarantee the sustenance of the outcome of the IGAD peace process, and assist with the establishment of peace and security, including the training of the police and the army."*

### **III. PREPARATIONS FOR THE DISPATCH OF THE FACT-FINDING/ RECONNAISSANCE MISSION**

8. The Commission undertook several preparatory steps ahead of the departure of the Fact-Finding/Reconnaissance Mission to Somalia. From 25 January to 2 February 2005, I sent a delegation to join my Special Envoy for Somalia, M.A. Fom, in Nairobi, to undertake wide ranging consultations with the TFG, the European Commission, the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS) and the SDPU, in connection with the Mission. It was during those consultations that the AU delegation and the TFG elaborated the Terms of Reference (TORs), the composition of the Mission and its itinerary as reflected below.

#### **(i) Terms of Reference**

9. The Fact-Finding/Reconnaissance Mission was guided by the following TORs:

- assess the needs for protection/security arrangements for the Transitional Federal Institutions (government buildings and offices);
- identify vital/strategic installations (airports, seaports, airstrips, telecommunications and broadcasting facilities) and elaborate appropriate protection arrangements;
- identify key police and army training facilities and determine their fitness for training purposes;
- elaborate operational arrangements for the undertaking of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration;
- indicate possible areas for the deployment of the elements of an AU PSM;
- develop an operational plan for the deployment of an AU PSM in Somalia;
- identify elements and elaborate an indicative budget for the deployment and operationalisation of an AU PSM in Somalia;
- examine any other related aspects vital for the success of an AU PSM in Somalia.

10. To note it here, the Mission's experience on the ground in Somalia revealed the necessity to develop a common and unified deployment plan for both the IGAD PSM, as the one to be deployed first, and for the AU PSM, which would take over the IGAD Mission, in conformity with the decisions of the AU Policy organs. This was as dictated by the nature of the terrain and the prevailing political, security

and socio-economic conditions, as well as the potential deployment sites and sectors and the needs articulated by the TFG with respect to its relocation to Somalia.

**(ii) Itinerary**

11. Although the Fact-Finding/Reconnaissance Mission was originally scheduled to depart Nairobi for Somalia on 11 February 2005, that schedule could not be kept due to the need to further assess the security situation on the ground and the imperative of ascertaining that adequate security arrangements were put in place ahead of the Mission's arrival in Somalia. The itinerary was inaugurated with a regrouping of the Mission's participants on 10 and 11 February 2005, at the Office of the SDPU, for pre-departure orientation and briefing by the AU and representatives from the TFG of Somalia. The itinerary was further revised by the Team on the ground, on the basis of security and other influencing factors. Prior to the Mission's departure, the Defence Minister of the TFG noted that the Government was not yet *"in control of any territory in the country"*. He, therefore, advised the Mission to make its own security arrangements, using *"experiences gained from the earlier AU Missions to Somalia, as the TFG was not in a position to provide for the security requirements of the Mission"*. Thus, the Mission elaborately arranged for its own security ahead of its arrival in Somalia.

**(iii) Composition of the Mission**

12. The Fact-Finding/Reconnaissance Mission was composed of military experts and representatives from the Commission, which provided the leadership of the Mission; the IGAD Secretariat; the LAS; and some IGAD Member States, namely Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, as well as the TFG. The Ethiopian military expert only participated in the pre-departure deliberations, but did not join the Mission en route to Somalia. The IGAD Member States of Djibouti, Eritrea and Sudan were invited by the Commission to send representatives to participate in the Fact-Finding/Reconnaissance Mission, but did not send their representatives early enough to depart with the Mission. In addition, the EU, the UN, Italy and Sweden, who were also invited to enjoin representatives to the Mission, could not do so at the last moment, citing *"security reasons for their own representatives"*, within the context of the situation then prevailing in Somalia. In this regard, Jean-Marie Guéhenno, UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, addressed a letter to the Commissioner for Peace and Security, on 7 February 2005, stressing that, *"under the current security circumstances (in Somalia), the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was not able to send any of its staff into Somalia."* The response from the European Commission was that, *"after the assessment of the security situation in Somalia, the European Council decided to send two persons to Nairobi only,"* where they would participate in the pre-Mission departure briefing and then return to Brussels. In effect, the EU delegation took part in the pre-departure consultations of the Mission in Nairobi, on 10 and 11

February 2005. The UN did not take part in those consultations. However, both participated in the post-Mission briefing to the international community by the Mission, in Nairobi, on 28 February 2005.

#### **IV. CONSULTATIONS AND VISITS OF THE FACT-FINDING/ RECONNAISSANCE MISSION IN SOMALIA**

13. The Mission arrived in Somalia on 14 February 2005, at a time when the issue of the relocation of the TFG to Somalia had assumed paramountcy on the ground. The issue dominated all the meetings and visits of the Mission. In fact, some of the Somalis consulted by the Mission indicated that they thought that the Mission had come to prepare for the relocation of the TFG. Copies of the decision of the meeting of the PSC held on 7 February 2005, which authorized the deployment of an IGAD PSM in Somalia, were already in the hands of the Somalis.

14. During its stay in Somalia, the Mission consulted a mixed spectrum of regional and local authorities, as well as groups from the civil society, religious sphere and the private sector regarding the envisaged deployment of an AU PSM. Within that focus, the military expert/representative of the IGAD Secretariat and the military representatives/experts of the IGAD countries in Mission paid special attention to details required for mounting the IGASOM, as the one to be first deployed. Below are the consultations and visits undertaken by the Mission:

##### **(i) South Mogadishu**

15. In Mogadishu, the consultations and visits of the Mission were facilitated by the Mayor of the city, Ibrahim Omar Sabriye. At the outset, the Mayor briefed the Mission about the security situation in the capital, which he termed as "*preoccupying*". He advised extreme caution to the Mission. During the consultations, the two sides agreed on a program of work for the Mission in the capital, which covered the following meetings and visits:

##### **a) Meeting with the Civil Society Group**

16. The civil society group, led by Retired General Jama Mohamed Ghalib, informed the Mission of the insecurity then prevailing in Mogadishu and pointed out that the continued TFG's operation in exile was not helping to resolve this problem. The group stressed that the TFG should first come home, in order to "*engage in a political process to resolve outstanding issues that were not dealt with by the Somali National Reconciliation Conference, held in Kenya, from October 2002 to October 2004*". These issues include dealing with inter-clan feuds, inter-faction rivalry, hand over of state properties and utilities and compensation to the groups involved, and modalities for a Somalia wide disarmament across all the clans, factions and other armed groups in the country. The group expressed its support

for the deployment of an AU PSM in Somalia. They advised that, for an AU PSM to succeed, troops from the Frontline States (FLS) should be excluded.

**b) Meeting with the Umbrella Organization for Religious Groups**

17. The umbrella organization for religious groups informed the Mission that, while they support the deployment of an AU PSM in Somalia, they would prefer that the Somalis themselves consult to resolve the problems facing the country without involving the deployment of an external force. They insisted that the TFG should first relocate to Somalia to address outstanding issues with stakeholders in the country. They insisted that the former warlords and faction leaders, who are now members of the Government, should disarm themselves voluntarily to give chance to peace and reconciliation in the country.

**c) Meeting with a Parliamentary Group from the TFP**

18. The parliamentary group, led by the Deputy Speaker Ousman Bekel Bokor of the Transitional Federal Parliament (TFP), informed the Mission that they welcome the deployment of troops from the AU and the LAS, given the fact that Somalia belongs to both organizations. They indicated that the TFP was still to sit to discuss the issues of the deployment of foreign troops in the country. The group stated that *"the political process was not yet complete to pave the way for the deployment of an AU PSM"*. The group explained why the Government was still in Kenya, citing *"insecurity in the country, the unfinished business of reconciliation, financial constraints and the issue of the place to where the Government should relocate"*.

**d) Meeting with the Governor of Marka**

19. The Mission met with Indhacade (war pseudonym), Governor of the Lower Shebelle region, on 16 February 2005, in Mogadishu. During the meeting, the Governor indicated that pressure should be exerted on the former warlords whilst they are still in Nairobi to accept to disarm and to surrender their heavy weapons to the TFG. He expressed opposition to the deployment of an AU PSM in Somalia which could include troops from the FLS. He also stated that *"Ethiopia and Djibouti had taken sides with the different factions in the country, thereby becoming part of the problem"*. The Governor paid tribute to Kenya for hosting the Reconciliation Conference, but hastened to say that Kenya also was *"not neutral in the Somali conflict"*.

**e) Meeting with the Business Community**

20. The representatives of the business community expressed the desire to see that, first, the Somalis fully reconcile among themselves before any involvement/deployment of external forces. They expressed their readiness to play

an active role to facilitate the reconciliation process inside the country, and also to assist the Government in revenue collection. Acknowledging the problem of insecurity in Mogadishu, the businessmen suggested that the relocation of the TFG from Kenya to Somalia could be done gradually, starting with *“those members/components that are comfortable with coming to Mogadishu”*. The business representatives expressed the view that they did not see the need for the deployment of an external force, if the issue of reconciliation among the Somalis was genuinely pursued.

21. The Mission visited three sites/areas during its stay in Mogadishu, the rest having been prohibited through warnings:

**a) Lafole Police Training Centre**

22. The Mission arrived at Lafole Police Centre, which is situated about 20 kms in the outskirts of Mogadishu, along the road from the capital to Kismayo. The accompanying Head of the Police, flanked by the Mayor of Mogadishu, informed the Mission that the Centre can accommodate up to 600 police trainees. In the Mission's view, the Centre could accommodate about three hundred trainees at any single time. In addition, the Mission was told that Mogadishu has fourteen police stations, most of which are not functional.

**b) Villa Somalia/Presidential Palace**

23. The Mission visited Villa Somalia/Presidential Palace, where it met with the Acting Chairman of the Somali National Alliance (SNA), Abukar Ganey, accompanied by members of his organization. Villa Somalia is controlled by the SNA. The Acting Chairman was clear in the view that his organisation was totally opposed to the deployment of foreign troops in Somalia, which ever, be they *“African, European or Arab”*. The organization preferred that the Somalis themselves solve their own problems, including on the issue of disarmament. In the view of the organization, the deployment of foreign troops in the country would bring more problems than there are currently in the country. The Mission observed that most of the buildings in Villa Somalia are in dilapidated state as a result of war and vandalization, hence would require extensive rehabilitation.

**c) National Police Academy**

24. The Mission was welcomed at the National Police Academy by the Deputy Chairman of the police force in the presence of about 400 police officers in parade. Speaking on behalf of the police force, the Deputy Chairman expressed the readiness of the police to welcome and provide security to the TFG and to work with an AU PSM. The Police Academy buildings are intact and operational, and have been used before as a Parliament by the TNG.



25. Overall, the Mission intended to visit 21 sites in Mogadishu, those sites being crucial for the deployment of an AU PSM, but practically visited only three of them, due both to prohibition and lack of facilitation for the Mission's access by some factions. However, the efforts of the Mayor of Mogadishu and the management of the Sahafi Hotel International, where the Mission was accommodated, are to be commended for having facilitated the effected visits and provided the security cover and logistics for the Mission. Though the Mission invited the leaders of the Islamic Courts to meet with it, the later subsequently declined the meeting, stating that they *"did not see the need for the deployment of foreign forces in Somalia."*

26. Lastly, the Mission consulted with the representatives of the Somali Demining and UXO Action, who pledged that their technical teams would be ready to work with IGAD and AU PSMs to be deployed in Somalia. The Mission also consulted with former military officers of the defunct Somali National Army, who, like other previous groups, expressed general opposition to the deployment of foreign troops in Somalia, especially those from the FLS.

**(ii) Visit to Jowhar (Administrative Centre of Middle Shebele Region)**

27. Originally, the Fact-Finding/Reconnaissance Mission was scheduled to travel by road to Jowhar in the company of the Prime Minister, Mohamed Ali Gedi. As the Prime Minister was unable to come to Somalia to join the Mission, it finally reached Jowhar by air on 17 February 2005. The Mission was received by the Governor of the Middle Shebele Region, Mohamed Dhere, and the Minister of Education, Ali Abdullahi Ossoble, Head of the TFG Fact-Finding Mission, then on visit to the region to prepare for the relocation of the Government. After his welcome statement, the Governor informed the Mission that his region supported the deployment of an AU PSM in Somalia comprising of troops from those countries willing to assist Somalia. He advised that an AU PSM should *"comprise of troops from the AU, including those from the FLS, and from the LAS"*. The Governor also informed the Mission that Jowhar would have liked to be the transitional seat of the TFG, but did not have the necessary facilities to provide space for the entirety of the TFG. The Mission was led on a tour of some facilities and infrastructures, which all require rehabilitation.

**(iii) Visit to Baidoa (Administrative Centre of Bay and Bakol Region)**

28. The Mission arrived in Baidoa, in the afternoon of 17 February 2005, to a rousing welcome by the Administration and the population of the town. Like at Jowhar, the Mission arrived in the town whilst a delegation of the Council of Ministers (TFG), led by the Minister of Women Affairs and Gender Development, was on a Fact-Finding Mission in the region to prepare for the relocation of the TFG. The Mission held a number of meetings in Baidoa, during which invitations were repeatedly made to the TFG to relocate to Baidoa on temporary basis, pending its arrival in Mogadishu.

**a) Meeting with the Baidoa Administration**

29. The Administration of Baidoa, led by the Governor, Ahmed Muqtar, informed the Mission that Baidoa town and the region are ready to receive the TFG and to provide security to it. The Administration representatives said that the region has a “well-trained police force, which could assist the Government. They also expressed the readiness of the region to receive an AU PSM, adding that such a PSM should include troops from the FLS. They gave the following reasons for the inclusion of troops from the FLS in an AU PSM: the FLS played a leading role in the Reconciliation Conference that culminated in the formation of the TFG; the neighbouring States of Somalia understand each other better with the Somali people, and this could contribute to the resolution of the conflict; during the fighting in the past, the population of Bay and Bakol Region was assisted by the FLS, especially Ethiopia.

**b) Meeting with the delegation of the Council of Ministers**

30. The delegation of the Council of Ministers informed the Mission that, in its view, Baidoa should “*serve as the transit point for the relocation of the TFG of Somalia, pending its final arrival in the capital, Mogadishu.*” The delegation explained that Baidoa and the region as a whole were supportive of the TFG and had various facilities to offer to the Government.

**c) Meeting with the Civil Society**

31. The Mission also met with representatives of civil society groups based in Baidoa and the region. All the representatives expressed solidarity with the Mission and expressed their readiness to welcome an AU PSM, including with the participation of troops from the FLS. They called on the Government to come to Somalia as soon as possible to work with the people in the reconstruction of the country.

32. During its stay in Baidoa, the Mission toured the following places/areas: the main police stations, the regional police headquarters, the town storage depot, the presidential palace, the town hospital, the city fuel depot and the prison building. The facilities are in need of rehabilitation. The hospital requires medical staff. The airport buildings, too, are in a dilapidated state, due to war and vandalization, and need refurbishment. The runway at Baidoa airport is in a fairly good condition and can accommodate big aircrafts.

**(iv) Visit to Belet-Weyne (Administrative Centre of the Hiraaan Region)**

33. The Mission arrived in Belet-Weyne town in the afternoon of 19 February 2005, to a thunderous welcome starting from the airport and throughout the town. The Mission was welcomed by Ugaas (Chief) Abdirahman Khalif, accompanied by

the officials of the Hiraan Regional Administration. In his welcome statement, the Ugaas apologized for the failure of Belet Weyne to receive the AU Reconnaissance Missions in 2003 and 2004. He attributed that failure to the political divisions that were affecting the town at the time of those visits. In his main remarks, the Ugaas welcomed the deployment of an AU PSM, which, he said, should include troops from the FLS. He said that the FLS contributed significantly in terms of bringing relief to Hiraan Region and again during the Reconciliation Conference. Regarding disarmament, the Ugaas suggested that a *"Commission be established at the federal, regional and district levels, to plan and manage the disarmament process"*. He added that the process should include the participation of traditional and clan leaders to make it effective.

34. Subsequently, the Mission consulted with Eng. Abdullahi Abdi Ali, Governor, and the Hiraan Regional Administration. Eng. Abdullahi Abdi Ali, speaking on behalf of the Region, expressed the readiness of Belet-Weyne to serve as the *"transitional seat of the TFG"*. He stated that the town has sufficient facilities and infrastructures to service the Government. He added that the town has a well-trained and disciplined police force capable of providing protection and security for the Government. He stated that an AU PSM should include troops from the FLS. Furthermore, he pointed out that the criteria for troops participating in the Mission should be the willingness of a country to assist the Government and people of Somalia.

35. In addition, the Mission consulted with the Midland Political Organization (a faction that used to control part of the town) the Kulaland Political Organization (another faction that used to control the other part of the town) the traditional leaders of the Hiraan Region the religious groups and the civil society group. In common, these groups expressed support for the deployment of an AU PSM and emphasized the need for it to include troops from the FLS. They also indicated that progress had been made in reconciling the different groups in the town and the region at large.

36. During its stay in Belet-Weyne, the Mission visited the following places/facilities: a paramilitary training camp (rehabilitated with the help of international financial support and currently functioning as a secondary school with 300 students); the Idi Amin military training camp (currently occupied by civilians and most of the buildings are dilapidated, some beyond repair); the main hospital; the Belet-Weyne storage warehouses, which can be used for storage, accommodation and training; the Youth Training Centre (the youth of Belet-Weyne offered the facility to the TFG). Rehabilitation is necessary for these facilities to become effectively functional. The Mission also visited the HQ of Global Hiraan Services (GHS), holding an exporter abattoir and a water purification and bottling plant. The management of GHS said that they could provide some of their products to an AU PSM based on appropriate arrangements.

**(v) Visit to Galkacyo**

37. The Mission was received in Galkacyo north by a governmental delegation of the Puntland State, led by Abdirahman Mohamed Farole, Minister for Planning and International Cooperation, on 21 February 2005. During the consultations, the Minister informed the Mission that, in the Puntland State, the voice of the people concerning external deployment is channelled through the Government; Puntland State welcomes the deployment of an AU PSM; that such a PSM must include troops from the FLS; and that the forces should be stationed at Galkacyo for Puntland. The Minister also noted that the Puntland State has a well-trained police and para-military forces, the facilities for the training of the police and the army and a functioning transport and communication network. The Mission was later led on a tour of various facilities. Subsequently, the Mission toured the southern part of Galkacyo town, where the acting leaders of the USC/SNA received it. The leaders expressed "*serious reservations*" on the envisaged deployment of an AU PSM in Somalia. They said that they would prefer that there be dialogue among the Somalis and with the Government to address outstanding issues and contentions in the country prior to the involvement of foreign troops.

**(vi) Visit to Garowe**

38. The Mission arrived in Garowe on 22 February 2005, to be received by the President of the Puntland State, Mohamed Muse Hirsi, who stated that Puntland welcomes the deployment of an AU PSM, in which troops from countries in Africa or outside and willing to help Somalia should participate. He also indicated that the FLS should be a component of an AU PSM to be deployed in Somalia. Regarding the place/town for the relocation of the TFG, the President emphasized that "*it should be a place close to the capital.*" As regards the approach to disarmament, Hirsi suggested that the Somalis themselves undertake the task. He proposed "*the buying of heavy weapons and the collection of small ones by the TFG.*" Subsequently, the Mission was led on a tour to visit a number of facilities that would be vital for the training of the police and army.

**(vii) Visit to Bossaso**

39. The Fact-Finding/Reconnaissance Mission arrived in Bossaso (seaport town), on 24 February 2005, accompanied by the Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, Abdirahman Mohamed Farole, and the Minister of Labour, Sports and Youth, Said Jama Qorshel (Puntland State). The Governor of the Bari Region, in which Bossaso is situated, welcomed the Mission and guided it on a tour of the various facilities and government installations/buildings. The Mission noted that the infrastructures in Bossaso, including facilities for the training of the police and the army, would contribute significantly to the effectiveness of the envisaged deployment and sustenance of PSMs.

(viii) **Meeting with President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, TFG**

40. Following a request from President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, the Fact-Finding/Reconnaissance Mission met with the latter, accompanied by the Prime Minister, Ali Mohamed Gedi, and other members of the Council of Ministers, as well as those of the Administration of the Puntland State, in Garowe, on 26 February 2005. The meeting started from a general overview of the progress of the Mission and the key issues on which the Mission required the guidance of the TFG: the mandate of an AU PSM; the place to which the TFG would relocate, with the assistance of IGAD as decided by the AU policy organs, as it has an impact on the planning for the deployment of the PSMs (IGAD PSM and the subsequent AU PSM), and the size of the force to be deployed and in which areas.

41. The President of the TFG expressed appreciation for the work done by the Mission inside Somalia. He expressed regret that the Mission was not able to visit the whole of Mogadishu, including north Mogadishu, which he said to have been more secure than the southern part of the city. Furthermore, he condemned the bomb explosion, which occurred in the morning of 17 February 2005, in Mogadishu, and which he said was targeted at the Mission (the bomb was supposed to have been delivered by a motorcyclist against the Mission, in Mogadishu). Regarding the issue of deployment of an AU PSM, the President said that the TFG supports the full participation of IGAD Member States without discrimination, since they had been part and parcel of the entire peace process from the beginning. In particular, he pointed out at the leading role that the FLS had played during the Reconciliation Conference. He attributed the success of the Conference to the efforts and commitment of the FLS, with the support of the international community. The President stated that, for the TFG, *"it is unacceptable for any deployment, whether AU or IGAD, to exclude the FLS; the TFG itself has considered the matter and has a common view that the Frontline States have to be involved in any deployment in Somalia"*. As regards the relocation of the TFG, the President informed the Mission that the Council of Ministers would decide where the Government was to be relocated, *"before the Kampala IGAD military meetings"*, then scheduled for 8 to 14 March 2005.

42. The Prime Minister corroborated the views of the President. He emphasized that Somalia *"cannot be kept hostage by narrow-minded and opportunist individuals who are in the minority, adding that the majority shall always over ride them"*. He then advised the Mission to return to Nairobi via Mandera, in the North-East of Kenya, without passing through Mogadishu, for security reasons.

43. Although the Fact-Finding/Reconnaissance Mission successfully toured Somalia and undertook its tasks, it faced a number of adverse factors on the ground, which had an impact on its delivery capacity vis-à-vis its mandate, particularly in Mogadishu. Among the main ones were non-cooperation from some factions controlling portions of Mogadishu, Marka and Kismayo (the Mission could

not visit Marka and Kismayo due to insecurity and lack of communication with the controlling factions); threats of harming the Mission; complaints about lack of advance notice of the arrival of the Mission and its purposes by some groups; and lack of adequate facilitation to visit some of the intended sites/areas. The Mission was saved by advance warnings by two Somali individuals, separately, during the night of 14 February 2005 (arrival day) and the following day. Some other warnings were provided by the Mayor of Mogadishu, while the Head of the TFG delegation received warnings to the Mission by telephone.

## **V. FINDINGS OF THE FACT-FINDING/RECONNAISSANCE MISSION**

44. The Fact-Finding/Reconnaissance Mission observed and found as follows, with regard to the public opinion in the different towns and regions, particular opinions of some groups, and general perceptions and reactions:

### **(i) Opinions, perceptions and reactions**

45. The opinions, perceptions and reactions received varied across those groups that opposed the deployment of foreign troops and those that were in favour. There was a shared perception among some of the groups consulted in south Mogadishu and in Galkacyo south that the deployment of an external force in Somalia was tantamount to the *"imposition of a system/political agenda on the country by outsiders; that in such a situation, where the Somalis would not have resolved their own problems, the outsiders would be caught up in difficult circumstances"*. Whereas in other towns and regions, the general reaction was that foreign troops would contribute positively to Somalia's peace efforts.

46. In south Mogadishu, the Mission noted three streams of opinion regarding the deployment of an AU PSM or any external force:

- one stream of opinion came from groups totally opposed to any foreign troops deployment in Somalia;
- another stream of opinion came from groups that were vehemently opposed to the deployment of an AU PSM in which troops from the FLS (Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya) would participate;
- still, the other stream of opinion came from groups that openly advocated an AU PSM composed of troops from neutral African countries, LAS and countries with an Islamic culture.

47. Outside Mogadishu, there was a common pattern of opinions, except for one reservation in Galkacyo south, regarding the deployment of an AU PSM or any external force in Somalia, with a characteristic emphasis on the need to enlist troops from the FLS in such a deployment. The opinions are as follows:

- an AU PSM or any external force to be deployed in Somalia should be composed of troops from African countries;
- the IGAD countries, and *“without discrimination,”* should deploy in Somalia in support of the efforts of the TFG;
- an AU PSM should, as a matter of priority, enlist troops from the FLS;
- still, there was some criticism of the LAS by one member of the Baidoa Administration.

**(ii) Regarding reconciliation in Mogadishu and other parts of Somalia**

48. Some groups consulted by the Fact-Finding/Reconnaissance Mission felt that the gains of the Somali National Reconciliation Conference, from Eldoret to Mbagathi, are still to filter to the grassroot level inside Somalia, in terms of the pacification across clans and sub-clans and within the sub-sub clans. Still, certain groups felt that there has not been enough reconciliation among the former faction leaders, most of which now form part of the TFG. It was explained that this lack of leader-to-leader reconciliation was one of the factors why the capital city and other parts of the country remained under the influence and control of the different factional militias. Other groups also had the feeling that different actors in the international community were allying themselves with different elements in the TFG and the TFP, thereby driving wedges between the arms of the Government. Cases were cited whereby some elements in the international community were exerting pressure upon the Speaker of the Parliament for the TFG to go to Mogadishu.

49. Yet also, across all the groups consulted, there was a common feeling that the disarmament process is a complicated issue requiring more consultation among the Somalis to determine how best to go about it; many groups preferred a simultaneous disarmament cutting across all the armed factions, groups, clans and sub-clans. In some areas, strong views were expressed that disarmament should be led or, at least, involve the clan and traditional leaders, with the Government and foreign forces playing the role of an overseer and recipient of the weapons to be collected.

50. From the views gathered at some of the meetings, the impression was given that there was a degree of re-militarization among certain groups; the reasons being that such groups had no clarity on the direction in which the country was moving and that the TFG continued to stay outside the country, thus creating a crisis of expectations. It was pointed out that the sale of weapons on local arms market dramatically increased, together with the price of weapons.

51. Regarding the facilities useful for security arrangements and training of the police force and the army, once the envisaged Peace Support Missions (IGASOM for the IGAD and AMISOM – AU Mission in Somalia - for the AU) are deployed:

- there are facilities and centres in different parts of Somalia that, if rehabilitated for the most, would enhance the effectiveness of the training of the police and the army;
- there is a significant capacity in terms of Somali trainers of trainees that, if enlisted and given refresher courses, would be able to contribute to the training of the police and the army;
- there is some capacity in some towns and regions in terms of having fairly well-trained police and para-military forces that could be tapped to provide security for the TFG, in collaboration with the PSMs to be deployed in Somalia;
- Somalia has the a fairly functioning telecommunication system based on mobile and satellite-linked telephones;
- most of the public infrastructures and installations in Mogadishu are in a run-down state. Elsewhere, some of the facilities are in a fairly good condition in some areas, while in other areas, the facilities would require considerable rehabilitation. Notably, different authorities, factions and groups took charge of most of those facilities and still do control them;
- supplies in Jet A1 fuel, diesel, petrol and lubricants seemed to be regular. The operations are in the hands of private entrepreneurs and also the agents of some armed factions in some areas. The Mission contacted some businessmen, who made the offer to provide fuel supplies to the PSMs when they come to Somalia;
- internal air transport is based on small aircraft in many areas, with short and medium length (1 and a half kilometers) gravel airstrips. Mogadishu (clan and faction controlled), Kismayo (open and faction controlled), Garowe (controlled by Puntland authorities) and Baidoa (faction controlled) have long hauled tarred runways, while Belet-Weyne has a long haul gravel run way. Cross-border air transport links exist between Somalia and Kenya (about 70 % of the traffic) and between Somalia and Ethiopia. There are air links, also, between Somalia and some Persian Gulf countries.



52. The Mission also found that the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) was engaged in police training programmes in several localities in Somalia. For example, there were 350 police recruits undergoing a UNDP-supported training course at Jowhar when the Mission visited on 17 February 2005. At Garowe and Bossaso in Puntland, too, there were ongoing police training courses when the Mission visited. The support of the UNDP to police training also covers the rehabilitation of police camps and the construction of new police training and refresher course facilities. In this perspective, the rehabilitation of the Lafole Police Training Centre, referred to far above, and the police training programmes undertaken by the centre in the past benefited from the support of the UNDP. It should also be noted that the UNDP, based on arrangements made with the TFG of Somalia, has a training target of 5,000 police officers for the whole country.

## **VI. POLITICAL SITUATION**

53. The political situation in Somalia has evolved positively in recent months, but with many challenges emerging. The relocation of the TFG from Kenya to Somalia is the biggest challenge. It is worth mentioning that the IGAD-led peace process resulted in a balanced power sharing arrangement based on the 4.5 clan formula, which guided the conduct of, and political representation during, the Somali National Reconciliation Conference. The power sharing arrangement, as institutionalised in the Transitional Federal Institutions, is based on the following components:

- the Transitional Federal Charter adopted by the Reconciliation Conference;
- the TFP, constituted on the basis of the 4.5 clan formula;
- the President of the TFG elected by the TFP;
- the Council of Ministers, headed by a Prime Minister.

54. At the time of concluding this report, consultations were ongoing within the TFG to appoint officers for various departments and divisions of the Government, including for regional and local governance structures and processes. Furthermore, whilst the TFG remains determined to speed up the arrangements for its relocation to Somalia, it continues to face various obstacles, the main ones being the unfinished political debate as to whether relocation is to be straight to Mogadishu or to some transit town (s), pending final arrival in Mogadishu; the lack of funding to meet the costs of relocation; the persistence of the problem of insecurity in Mogadishu and its neighbourhood; the unfinished planning for the deployment of an external force that will provide protection and security on the ground to the TFG and differences over the composition of the force; as well as differences of

approach to disarmament. Also, reconciliation within the TFG is still at a fragile stage, thereby posing the problem of cohesion to reach action-oriented decisions on the various issues. However, recently, some clarity emerged, with the TFG indicating that the Government shall relocate simultaneously to Baidoa, 150 km north-west of Mogadishu, and to Jowhar, 60 km north-east of Mogadishu.

55. At the same time, there are unrelenting calls from the Somali people for the Government to come home without any further delay; rising opposition from some groups to the linkage of the home-coming Government with, and to its accompaniment by, external forces, especially among those in Mogadishu; the tentatives among the factions controlling the different parts of Mogadishu to lay down some parameters for the demilitarisation of Mogadishu; the contradictory statements/positions taken by some members of the Council of Ministers; the threats to the AU delegation in Nairobi from some former faction leaders, now members of the Council of Ministers.

56. In addition, owing mainly to the divisions within the TFG about which town to relocate to, and how to go about the deployment of foreign forces, the session of the TFP convened at the Grand Regency Hotel in Nairobi, to discuss the deployment of the foreign troops, plunged into violence on 18 March 2005. The violence resulted in some members of Parliament suffering injuries and considerable damages to the property of the Hotel. The incident was followed by several arrests and interrogations of some TFG officials by the Kenyan police, which deployed efforts to establish the cause of the violence and its instigators. Also, the IGAD Council of Ministers, then in session in Nairobi, condemned the acts of violence.

57. It should also be noted that, since its establishment in December 2004, based on the conclusions of the Stockholm Donor's Conference for Somalia held on 29 October 2004, the Coordination and Monitoring Committee (CMC) has been making efforts to strengthen its support to the transition in Somalia. The Prime Minister, as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and the UN jointly chair the CMC, whose principal function is to coordinate the efforts and support of the donors towards the Transitional Federal Institutions. On its part, the 17<sup>th</sup> Summit of the LAS held in Algiers, Algeria, on 22 and 23 March 2005, decided to provide a financial support of US\$ 26 million to assist the TFG meet the costs of its programmes, including relocation to Somalia.

## **VII. SECURITY SITUATION**

58. Generally, the security situation in Somalia over the past five months has been characterized by relative calm and stability, notwithstanding skirmishes in some parts of the country. This is attributable to the Eldoret Declaration holding on the ground, as signed by the Somali leaders on 27 October 2002, providing, inter-alia, for the cessation of hostilities among the Somali factions, the inclusive nature

of the TFG and the atmosphere of awaiting the peace dividends prevailing in the country. The persistent problem of security in Mogadishu and the surrounding Benadir region has to do more with the political and economic perceptions of certain elements within the clans, particularly some of the former faction leaders, still-active self-appointed governors and administrators in some areas and self-constituted local entities in other areas. Politically, those elements view the texture of the TFG as representing a major victory by one clan, namely the Darod. Thus, there is some discomfort arising from that perception. Economically, there are groups, which feel that the TFG would simply be coming home to dispossess them of the economic benefits arising from the control they had, over the preceding years, of resources and taxable installations and utilities.

59. Equally, the once volatile provinces of Sanaag and Sool overlying the boundary zone between the Puntland State and the self-declared independent region of Somaliland and the scene of a longstanding territorial dispute, have seen signs of the de-escalation of tension and quasi-stability in recent months. The military deployments by either side, which dominated the area in November and December 2004, have since been scaled down as a confidence building measure. This was confirmed to the Fact-finding/Reconnaissance Mission by the President of the TFG during the meeting between the two sides in Garowe, on 26 February 2005.

60. Although the Mission found the security situation in some parts of Somalia preoccupying, there are opportunities for transforming and improving the security environment in the country. The challenges to do so mainly lie in Mogadishu, the middle coastal areas around Hobyo, some spots in central Somalia (Galgadud Region) and areas around Kismayo, all being areas touched by recurrent skirmishes. In some of these cases, like in Hobyo and the surrounding areas, the intermittent confrontation between armed groups or sub-clans tends to be fuelled more by the competition for control and ownership of scarce resources (pasture, water, fertile land, plantations, etc), rather than the competition for political power, which characterized the high period of the civil war in Somalia. Furthermore, there are those groups on the ground that espouse the idea that the TFG should come into the country to consult with them and arrange for the smooth handover of public facilities and properties, with the provision for compensation where necessary.

## **VIII. SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION**

61. Despite the many adverse factors, including the lack of funds and expertise, the socio-economic situation in Somalia seems to have improved from the viewpoint of the previous AU Missions to the country, in 2003 and 2004. The improvement is more visible in the education and health sectors, though the magnitude of the improvement varies from one town to another and from one region to another. Puntland has registered a higher level of improvement in

education and health. In some places in Bay and Bakol region, also, progress has been made in the social sector. Elsewhere, the Mission noted that schools, clinics and hospitals were facing serious limitations, especially in medical staff and the supply of drugs. Not least, the facilities available need rehabilitation and new ones have to be established to cater for the existing demands.

62. As observed by the Fact-Finding/Reconnaissance Mission during its tour of Somalia, the economic arena has recorded some improvement in certain areas, notwithstanding the existing imperative of post-war reconstruction throughout the country and the need to deal with the problem of unemployment of the youth. In addition to the usual productive and commercial activities witnessed by the earlier AU Missions to Somalia, in 2003 and 2004, there has been a marked increase in the construction of factories in some towns. Most of those factories are based on the processing of livestock products for export and also for domestic consumption. Notably, the continued improvement in the livestock sector in some parts of Somalia is taking place, thanks to the technical advisory efforts of the Nairobi-based AU Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources (IBAR). Other factories are based on the tapping of underground water, purification and bottling of that water. New factories now stand in towns like Belet-Weyne, Bossaso and Jowhar, just to mention a few. Even in Mogadishu itself, a consortium of Somali businessmen established a beverage processing plant, based on the Coca-Cola line of products, among other enterprises, towards the end of 2004.

63. In some areas, there was evidence of rapid urban expansion as manifested by sprouting commercial buildings, small business units and well planned residential zones. The visible investments and developments could be attributed to both remittances from the Somali diaspora, taking advantage of an improved system of money transfer within Somalia and from outside and local revenues. In Puntland, the most spectacular changes, if viewed against the sights of the previous AU Missions, could be witnessed in towns like Galkacyo and Garowe.

64. In areas where there were already irrigation systems, but ruined by civil war and vandalization, those systems have been rehabilitated and are again productive, i.e., around Jowhar. Thus, in the prime agricultural region in downstream Shebele River and Juba River, agricultural green belts are slowly re-appearing on the landscape. If given external financial and technical support and sound management, the level of production would increase. As a result of the agricultural revival, the local markets showed improved food stock. Furthermore, the flow of traffic across localities and regions, once constrained by numerous roadblocks, has improved to some extent, thereby giving possibility for goods and services to spread out in the country. Supplies in all types of fuel and lubricants appeared to be regular in the places visited.

## **IX. UN ARMS EMBARGO AGAINST SOMALIA**

65. As Council will recall, the UN Security Council adopted, on 23 January 1992, resolution 733 (1992) imposing a comprehensive arms embargo against Somalia. Subsequently, the Security Council adopted resolution 751 (1992) establishing a Committee of the Council to monitor the implementation of the arms embargo. In view of the continued flow of weapons and ammunition supplies to and through Somalia, in contravention of the arms embargo, the Security Council, on 16 December 2003, adopted resolution 1519 (2003), in which it requested the UN Secretary-General to establish a Monitoring Group to, among other tasks, investigate the violations of the arms embargo, assess progress made by the States in the region to implement fully the arms embargo, and to make recommendations based on its investigations and the previous reports of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to resolutions 1425 (2002) of 22 July 2002 and 1474 (2003) of 8 April 2003.

66. The Monitoring Group established pursuant to resolution 1519 (2003), and whose mandate was extended for a period of six months by resolution 1558 (2004) of 17 August 2004, submitted a report in February 2005. In that report, the Monitoring Group noted that arms embargo violations continued at an alarming rate, and that it had uncovered thirty-four individual arms shipments from February 2004 to the time of finalizing its work. The arms ranged in size from individual weapons, such as large and expensive anti-aircraft guns, to ocean freight containers full of explosives, ammunition, small arms and anti-tank weapons. Noting the soaring demand for financial sources by major parties to the conflict in Somalia to fund the arms purchases, the Monitoring Group signalled the existence of a sophisticated financial network operating inside and outside the country that may be directly involved in arms purchases.

67. The Monitoring Group stated that recent purchases have strengthened the military capacity of well-armed and funded opposition elements, which have publicly expressed their intention to violently oppose the TFG and its supporters, e.g., foreign troops, if they enter Somalia. In addition, it indicated that the Bakaaraha arms market inside Somalia, particularly in Mogadishu, and the arms market in the neighbouring Gulf States continue to play a central role as sources of arms that fuel violent clashes and remain an obstacle to peace and stability in Somalia. These markets are also a main cause of the many arms related problems in the FLS. It further noted that ocean transport and road transport have been the predominant means of delivery. However, the role of air transport should not be ignored.

68. The Monitoring Group recommended continued monitoring of the arms embargo to ensure its effectiveness, as well as development of the draft list of violators, for eventual submission to the Security Council Committee for future punitive actions. It was further recommended that the Monitoring Group should

establish a more formal and structured relationship with the AU, the IGAD and possibly the Frontline and neighbouring States in order to facilitate cooperation and the exchange of information. In addition, international and regional financial organisations should enhance their support for financial local authorities in the Frontline and neighbouring States, in terms of promoting cooperating, training, information-sharing and financial networking.

69. In its resolution 1587 (2005), adopted on 15 March 2005, the Security Council stressed the obligation of all States to comply fully with the measures imposed by resolution 733 (1992), and expressed its intention to give the report of the Monitoring Group due consideration in order to improve implementation of, and compliance with, measures imposed by resolution 733 (1992). The Security Council requested the Secretary-General to re-establish, for a period of six months, the Monitoring Group with, inter-alia, the following mandate:

- a) to continue investigating the implementation of the arms embargo by Member States and violations;
- b) to assess actions taken by Somali authorities, as well as Member States, in particular those in the region, fully to implement the arms embargo;
- c) to make specific recommendations to give effect to and strengthen the implementation of the arms embargo in its various aspects;
- d) to continue refining and updating information on the draft list of those individuals and entities who violate the measures implemented by Member States in accordance with resolution 733 (1992) and their active supporters, for possible future measures by the Council.

70. Similarly, the AU has remained concerned about the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms and the need for scrupulous compliance by Member States with the embargo. It will be recalled that the Commission undertook consultations with successive UN Panels of Experts and Monitoring Groups, in 2003 and 2004, to exchange views on how best to enhance collaborative efforts in the implementation of the embargo. In the same vain, the 6<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> meetings of the PSC, held on 25 May 2004 and 29 August 2004, respectively, expressed concern over the continued flow of arms in Somalia, in violation of the arms embargo. The PSC appealed to all AU Member States, in particular the countries of the region and other neighbouring countries, to scrupulously adhere to the relevant Security Council resolutions and to extend full cooperation to the Monitoring Group. In this respect, the PSC requested the Commission, in consultation with IGAD and its Member States, to take all actions deemed appropriate to enhance the implementation of the arms embargo. Subsequently, the Commission, in May 2004, addressed Note Verbales to the IGAD Secretariat and Member States, requesting

them to submit proposals on the modalities for enhancing the implementation of the arms embargo; the contribution that could be made by the Commission to assist the IGAD countries in the implementation of the relevant UN Security Council resolutions; as well as the modalities for an exchange of information on possible violations of the arms embargo and the coordinating mechanism that could be put in place. The Commission received a response from the Government of the Sudan, and is awaiting responses from the other IGAD Member States and the Secretariat, to make concrete proposals on how best to enhance compliance with the arms embargo.

71. While it remains necessary to see to it that the illegal movement of arms to Somalia is stopped, in order to enhance the chances of peace, the emerging political dispensation in the country makes it imperative for the international community to think of means and ways of enabling the TFG to rebuild the Somali security forces and the IGAD to deploy troops. In this regard, the UN Security Council should be requested to provide exemptions in the arms embargo.

#### **X. THE IGAD MILITARY PLANNING MEETINGS (ENTEBBE TO NAIROBI) ON IGASOM**

72. As indicated above, the planned deployment of IGASOM in Somalia arose from the communiqué of the meeting of the IGAD Heads and Government, held in Abuja, on 31<sup>st</sup> January 2005, which decided to deploy an IGAD PSM in Somalia and directed the Ministers of Defence of IGAD to meet and plan the envisaged deployment in Somalia to help the TFG relocate and establish peace and stability in Somalia. The Assembly of the AU, meeting at the same time and venue, adopted decision Assembly/AU/Dec.65 (IV), endorsing the communiqué.

73. The meeting of the Ministers of Defence took place in Entebbe, Uganda, on 12 and 13 March 2005, in the aftermath of the meetings of the IGAD military experts and Chiefs of Defence Staff, held also in Entebbe, from 7 to 11 March 2005, to lay the groundwork for the Deployment Plan of IGASOM. My Special Envoy, accompanied by a Team from the Commission, participated in those meetings, and later on in the IGAD Council of Ministers' meeting. During the meeting of the Ministers of Defence, President Yoweri Museveni made a contribution providing clarification on some political aspects of the deployment. Following its adoption by the Ministers, the Deployment Plan was subsequently adopted by the meeting of the IGAD Council of Ministers, held in Nairobi, from 17 to 18 March 2005. Essentially, the concept of deployment under IGASOM covers the mandate of the Mission, management at the IGAD Secretariat and in the field, assumptions, sectors of the theatre of operation, phases of deployment, troop contribution, size of the mission, tasks and the budget and the end-state:

- (i) **Mandate:** The mandate of IGAGOM will be to provide security support to the TFG in order to ensure its relocation to Somalia, guarantee the sustenance of the peace process and assist with the establishment of peace and security, including the training of the police and army.
- (ii) **Charter Establishing IGAD:** This was amended to provide for IGAD to undertake a peace support mission in the region, specifically undertake IGASOM.
- (iii) **Mission Management:** IGASOM will be a project of IGAD Secretariat, as decided by the 24<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of IGAD Council of Ministers, held in Nairobi, Kenya, from 17 – 18 March 2005. The Mission Management will be provided for in two levels. At the first level, the Peace and Security Division of the IGAD Secretariat will coordinate the Mission, to which Member States will second political and military officers for the duration of the Mission; the second level will be a Field Mission Headquarters to manage the operations of IGASOM in the field, comprising of a Head of Mission, a Force Commander and other relevant personnel.
- (iv) **Assumptions:** The TFG will relocate to a transit city before going to the capital city, Mogadishu. Troop contributing countries will meet some costs of their troops during the first 90 days, pending reimbursement at a later date. The rates for reimbursement will be based on the ad hoc rates of the budget in the IGAD Deployment Plan.
- (v) **Sectors in the theatre of operation:** For the purpose of IGASOM, Somalia, minus Somaliland, has been divided into five sectors, namely Sector 1: Bay and Bakol, Sector 2: Central Region; Sector 3: Puntland; Sector 4: Juba Valley; and Sector 5: Benadir.
- (vi) **Duration of Deployment:** IGASOM will operate for nine months, starting from the first day of deployment.
- (vii) **Phases of Deployment:** There will be three phases: phase one will be undertaken by Uganda and Sudan, each contributing a battalion of 850 troops. The two battalions will deploy two weeks before the Government relocates to a city of its choice. If the need arises that the TFG relocates to two transit cities, then one battalion will be deployed to each of the places of relocation. Phase 2 deployment will depend on the advise from the Head of Mission; similarly, phase 3 deployment will be undertaken on the advise of the Head of Mission.
- (viii) **Force Size:** IGASOM, when fully deployed, should have eight battalions in the theatre of operations.



- (ix) **Troop contribution:** All five IGAD countries who offered troops during the Abuja IGAD Summit, namely Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Sudan, will participate in IGASOM, with Uganda and Sudan providing combat troops in phase 1, while the rest of the IGAD countries provide logistic and other forms of assistance to IGASOM.
- (x) **Tasks of IGASOM:** The typical tasks assigned to IGASOM include protection of the TFG, securing supply routes, protection of VIPs, carrying out further reconnaissance missions, and identification of tactical areas for IGASOM. However, in each phase, there may be a change of tasks and the Head of Mission has the leeway to consider additional tasks in consultation with the Force Commander.
- (xi) **Budget:** The IGASOM budget (ad hoc option) for the nine months for one battalion will be as follows:

i.	Major Equipment refurbished	34,659,391
ii.	Minor equipment and stores	768,262
iii.	Transport, including airlift	1,217,500
iv.	Sustenance (rations etc.)	13,421,530
v.	Mission HQs	6,035,800
vi.	Exit Phase	1,167,500
	<b><u>Total</u></b>	<b><u>51,234,183</u></b>

**Cost of two battalions** **102,468,366 US\$**

- (xii) **End State:** The TFG relocates from Kenya to inside Somalia and peace and stability is re-established in Somalia.

74. In the aftermath of the meeting of the IGAD Council of Ministers, the Executive Secretary of the IGAD, then directed by the said Council to implement the decisions on IGASOM, addressed a letter to me, on 30 March 2005, highlighting the urgent issues for which the Secretariat sought the intervention and assistance of the Commission. In the letter, the Executive Secretary stated that "the IGAD Council of Ministers directed that the first IGAD Member States to deploy a battalion each (one to Baidoa and one to Jowhar – relocation towns for the TFG), in Somalia, under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter will be Uganda and Sudan", and the "two countries have been advised to begin the process of preparing their troops awaiting further instructions".

75. The Executive Secretary presented a budget totaling US \$ 10,146, 800 for some of the aspects of the initial deployment of two battalions. The budget encompasses the costs of the airlift of personnel from the IGAD TCCs [Uganda (850) and the Sudan 850]; the airlift of equipment for two battalions (one Ugandan and the other Sudanese); the salaries for Mission HQ Staff for nine months; the

airlift of men and equipment in exit from Mission and for incidentals and other unforeseen expenses.

76. The Executive Secretary requested the Commission to convene a PSC meeting for the current Chairman of the IGAD Council of Ministers to present the Deployment Plan of IGASOM. In addition, he requested the Commission to assist the Secretariat with respect to obtaining a UN mandate for IGASOM deployment and the lifting of the UN arms embargo against Somalia for IGASOM forces.

77. Some members of the international community have expressed concern about the involvement of troops from the FLS in the deployment of IGASOM. Further, the need for immediate dialogue among the concerned parties on crucial issues, especially those relating to the demilitarization of Mogadishu, in order to establish a secure environment in the capital, the relocation of the TFG and the identification of temporary operational sites for the Government in Somalia, has been stressed. In a Declaration issued by its Presidency, on 6 April 2005, the EU insisted that inclusiveness and reconciliation remain the two pillars for the peace process in Somalia. The EU stated that insufficient consensus on important issues, such as security and relocation, will only result in the creation of divisions derailing the successful outcome of the IGAD-led Reconciliation Conference and shaking the confidence of the international community on the nascent Transitional Institutions. The EU advocated for immediate dialogue among all concerned parties within the Transitional Institutions, with a view of reaching an agreement on relocation and security.

78. On his part, the President of the TFG issued a statement on 9 April 2005 in which he, inter-alia, committed himself to undertake all the necessary initiatives with a view of the Council of Ministers and the Parliament approving a new and comprehensive bill on security and the relocation of the TFP inside Somalia.

## **XI. OBSERVATIONS**

79. More than six months have elapsed since the election of President of the TFG and the formation of the Government and yet the Transitional Federal Institutions still remain in Nairobi. A number of factors, relating, among others, to the prevailing insecurity in Mogadishu, explain this delayed relocation. In addition, some differences have emerged among the Transitional Institutions, relating mainly to the issues of the transit towns for the relocation and the composition of the foreign forces to be deployed in Somalia. Furthermore, the unorganized self-relocation by some members of the same institutions has added a new dimension to the problems at hand. Indeed, over the past weeks, some members of the TFG and the TFP returned to Mogadishu, with the stated aim to address security problems in the capital and make possible a broad-based agreement within the TFG. This initiative, which is known as the Mogadishu Security and Stabilization Plan (MSSP) and which was proposed by 48 members of the TFP and 6 other

regions, has as immediate objectives the removal of 49 security checkpoints, the recruitment of a 3,000 strong police force and the cantonment of 4,000 militias. The first phase of the implementation of the MSSP is supposed to be completed by 10 May 2005. Regardless of what the authors of the Plan would achieve, their prolonged absence from Nairobi has made it somewhat difficult for the Transitional Institutions to function more effectively.

80. Clearly, there is need for all concerned members of the international community to take a more proactive approach to guarantee the sustenance of the outcomes of the IGAD-led reconciliation process. Over the past two years, vigorous efforts have been deployed by IGAD and its Member States, with the support of the AU and the larger international community, to promote lasting peace and reconciliation in Somalia. The establishment of the TFG was a crowning success of these efforts and a major step in the attempt to bring the Somali conflict to a definite end. Should the international community fail to act decisively to sustain the gains of the reconciliation process, there is a risk that the efforts thus far deployed would be put to waste.

81. Against this background, the AU and the larger international community should provide the necessary political, financial and logistical support to facilitate the deployment of phase I of IGASOM. Regarding more particularly the AU, steps are underway to accelerate the establishment of the Advance Mission approved by the 22<sup>nd</sup> meeting of the PSC, held on 5 January 2005, in order to provide the necessary back up to IGASOM and the overall reconciliation process in Somalia, as well as make it possible to undertake adequate preparations for the takeover of IGASOM by the AU at the appropriate time.

82. I wish to emphasize the need for IGAD, in the process of deploying IGASOM, to maintain close consultations with all the Somali parties and stakeholders. In this regard, the sentiments and concerns expressed to the Fact-Finding Mission by some factions and sections of the Somali population should be duly taken into account. Equally crucial is the need, in a spirit of partnership, for continued engagement of the larger international community, with a view of securing its full support for the ongoing efforts to stabilize the situation in Somalia.

83. Given the need for IGASOM troops to carry weapons into Somalia and the need for the TFG to re-establish the Somali security forces, the Security Council should authorize exemptions on the arms embargo against Somalia. In this respect, the AU, jointly with the IGAD, should liaise with the Security Council Committee on Somalia, to seek the adoption of a resolution that would make it possible to support the ongoing process, in Somalia without violating the existing arms embargo. At the same time, the IGAD Member States that have not yet done so, as well the IGAD Secretariat, should be urged to expeditiously provide the Commission with their views on how best to enhance the implementation of, and

compliance with, the arms embargo, to make it possible to submit to the PSC concrete proposals on the best way forward in this respect.

84. Whilst the international community has such a critical role to play, it is equally important to stress on the primary responsibility of the Somalis for ensuring lasting peace and reconciliation in their country. The outcome of the Reconciliation Conference offers a unique opportunity to be seized by the Somalis for lasting peace and reconciliation, as well as state functioning institutions, to be re-established in Somali, and for their country to regain its rightful place in the community of nations. In this respect, it is imperative for the Transitional Federal Institutions to strengthen their cohesion on the critical issues now facing the reconciliation process and for the TFG to intensify dialogue with all the Somali stakeholders, with a view to deepening reconciliation inside the country.

85. I encourage the TFG to speed up its relocation arrangements. Clearly, this will facilitate both the operationalization of IGASOM and the engagement of measures to promote normalcy, including the rule of law, good governance, the protection of human rights and post-conflict reconstruction in Somalia.

86. Finally, I wish to pay tribute to the participants of the Fact-Finding/Reconnaissance Mission, who courageously undertook their assignments and fulfilled the mandate of the Mission under difficult security conditions in Somalia. I wish, also, to thank all the Somalis, who, at various levels, rendered assistance to the Mission.

2005

# Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Outcomes of the Fact-Finding/Reconnaissance Mission to Somalia and the IGAD Military Planning Meetings

African Union Commission

Peace and Security

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