



AU HERALD

LES CAHIERS DE L'UA

**Africa: A new dawn?
Afrique: Une nouvelle aube?**

Volume | Numéro 3
January - December 2013 | Janvier - Décembre 2013



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Africa: A Continent Under Threat or Full of Opportunities?

L'Afrique: un continent menacé ou terre d'opportunités?

Tonye P. Cole

Africa: A Continent Under Threat or Full of Opportunities?

Tonye P. Cole

CEO of Sahara Group

Head of the Africa 2.0 Nigeria Chapter

As I reflect on the just concluded year 2012, I am struck once again by the vast shades of emotions that are elicited each time the name Africa is mentioned. Never have I come across a continent so diverse in views, so rich in culture, so blessed with resources, human and natural in abundance, so devoid of natural disasters yet so ravished by man-induced catastrophes of poverty, war and famine. A continent of deep emotions, able to drive you to utter dejection and a feeling of hopelessness one minute, and then swing you the next to a belief in the unwavering ability of the human being to conquer impossible odds and attain great heights.

Never in history has a continent been termed as one of great potential, but never seeming to attain greatness in any way and not in recent times have I witnessed a continent so capture the attention of the whole world as Africa has today. It has been referred to as the land of opportunities, it is said that the rise of Africa is imminent and the rush for Africa has begun.

As I travel all over the world, there is an excitement in the air about this continent, and nations have reworked their strategies around strengthening their commercial, political and diplomatic relations with Africa while companies of all sizes and shape revise their corporate strategies to make Africa key to their development and growth over the coming millennium. We hear stories of long term plans and 'here to stay' scenarios, and of 'strategic partnerships' with African Governments and corporations for the purpose of developing Africa and Africans.

That the interest in Africa exists is without doubt, what is doubtful is how genuine an interest in Africa has. Everyone else on all continents certainly have their plans and ideas for what they want from Africa, while Africa is open for business without setting out the ground rules for engagement. As the rave for Africa builds up and my reflection of what exactly we want Africa to be continues, I cast my mind upon the scenarios of development upon which other continents defined themselves in the modern age and what they might have done that Africa isn't doing today.

Why you may ask, does Africa produce the worlds largest supply of cocoa, yet the selling price is determined by other nations not found in the continent of Africa? Why are the values for African exports of minerals, metals and precious stones ranging from bauxite to oil, copper to iron ore, gold to diamonds and so many other mineral resources too numerous to mention here all determined at exchanges that have zero inputs from the nations that own them? Why does Africa agree to export the basic raw materials at values they have no control over and import the finished products at prices they have no control over? Why is so little value addition coming back to Africa from the vast natural and human resources available on the continent?

It is impossible to articulate in a few words what steps various nations on any one continent would have taken, but if there is a certainty upon which to stand on, it would be that there was a clear vision of what they wanted to achieve and in opening their markets up, they did so to investors on their own set terms and not at the whim and caprices of the investors. This sadly is where Africa is still getting it wrong and it is this openness without vision, gullibility without

understanding that present and future generations should set out to correct so as to reach the Africa 2.0 version, be on the right path to migrate to the 4.0 class and adopt international standards in terms of stability, governance and democracy, entrepreneurship, and health, to name but a few.

A new generation bristling with hope is calling out to say that they are the change they want to see. They cry loud and clear that unless they take destiny in their hands, become actively engaged in the politics and government of the day, they can't expect anything to change and they are sharp and eager to make a difference. In the eyes of this young generation, is a belief that they can achieve anything and they have pitted themselves against the best the world has had to offer and they were not found wanting. This is a generation of intellectuals and social media warriors who have witnessed firsthand the victory that peaceful uprising and the voice of the youth mobilized across social media has wrought in the Arab spring and continues to gain ground in countries like Nigeria's 'Enough is Enough' and more recently in Sudan.

The result should encompass hope and clarity that breaks away from the stigma of decadence and corruption, poverty and famine, war and religious extremism to focus on an Africa built on the pillars of integrity, respect and accountability. Collapsing the barriers created through borders, language and religion, the rising Africa explores the gigantic leapfrogging attainable in regional integration of markets and people by interlinked pillars for capacity building, infrastructure, food security, visionary leadership in government and promoting corporate regional champions as role models.

So Africa finds itself at an interesting crossroads. One where many of its nations will face electoral processes to determine who leads them in the coming years. Others are held tight in the grip of long-term leaders who no longer have age on their side and must soon pass on the baton, however reluctant they may be. In either case the choices for tomorrow are blatantly simple to consider. The next generation of leaders can either be those raised from within the ranks of believers of the Africa dream who are able to move Africa forward, or they can be self centered, visionless and corrupt men and women who usurp the mandate of the people and rule with impunity over all, driving Africa further into the abyss.

The youth who see and understand what is at stake can either take action or keep quiet and do nothing. As Africa moves into the time universally known as Africa's Millennium, would we do so with our eyes wide open or tightly shut?

L'Afrique: un continent menacé ou terre d'opportunités?

Tonye P. Cole

*Directeur général de Sahara Group
Chef, Africa 2.0 Section du Nigeria*

Lorsque je songe rétrospectivement à l'année 2012 qui vient de s'écouler, je ne peux manquer d'être saisi de multiples sentiments, ceux-là même que suscite le nom Afrique, chaque fois et partout où il est évoqué.

Jamais je n'ai vu un continent traversé par autant d'idées, si riche en cultures, si doté en ressources humaines et naturelles, tant épargné par les catastrophes naturelles et pourtant tout aussi ravagé par les périls dus à l'action néfaste de l'homme. Pauvreté, guerre et famine. Ce continent vous met dans le découragement et le désespoir pour vous redonner, l'instant d'après, foi en la capacité inébranlable de l'humain à vaincre, contre toute attente, les adversités et à atteindre des sommets.

Jamais auparavant, continent n'aura regorgé d'autant de potentialités. Jamais continent n'a autant attiré l'attention du reste du monde sur lui. En vérité, l'Afrique est terre d'opportunités dont l'éveil est imminent. La ruée vers l'Afrique a déjà commencé.

Partout où je me rends dans le monde, l'intérêt pour ce continent est manifeste. Le reste du monde a repensé sa stratégie et renforcé ses relations commerciales, politiques et diplomatiques avec l'Afrique. Les entreprises étrangères révisent leurs politiques et reconnaissent que l'Afrique occupe une part importante dans leur développement et leur croissance. Et voilà soudain qu'on se met, s'agissant de l'Afrique, à évoquer, çà et là des plans à long terme, des scénarios « durables », et des « partenariats stratégiques » avec les gouvernements et les entreprises du continent.

Il y a un donc un réel regain d'intérêt pour l'Afrique. Que cet intérêt soit ou non sincère est un autre problème. Le fait est là : Chaque acteur, partout dans le monde élabore ses plans et développe ses idées en direction du continent. Tous veulent tirer profit d'une Afrique ouverte aux affaires mais incapable de définir ses propres règles de partenariat. Alors même que s'amplifie cet engouement pour l'Afrique et que je continue de réfléchir sur ce que nous voulons exactement que l'Afrique soit, que je vois, ailleurs, les scénarios de développement qu'empruntent, pour leur plus grand bonheur, les autres continents, je m'interroge sur la voie positive qu'ils ont empruntée et que l'Afrique ne suit pas.

Il n'est, en effet, pas inutile de se demander pourquoi l'Afrique est le premier producteur mondial de cacao alors que le prix de vente de cette denrée est fixé par des pays non producteurs. Pourquoi les prix des exportations africaines de minerais, de métaux et de pierres précieuses, ceux de la bauxite, du pétrole, du cuivre, du minerai de fer, de l'or, du diamant et tant d'autres ressources minières qu'il serait trop fastidieux d'énumérer ici, sont-ils déterminés par des Bourses d'échanges basées hors d'Afrique? Pourquoi l'Afrique accepte-t-elle d'exporter ses matières premières en deçà de leur valeur? Pourquoi importe-t-elle des produits finis à des cours qu'elle ne contrôle pas? Pourquoi l'Afrique reçoit-elle si peu de valeur ajoutée de ses vastes ressources naturelles et humaines ?

Il n'est pas possible de résumer ici, en quelques mots, les mesures idoines que, à la place de l'Afrique, tout autre acteur de bon sens aurait prises, mais une évidence s'impose : d'autres acteurs, dans la même situation, auraient développé une vision claire, ouvert leurs marchés à

leurs conditions et non pas selon les desiderata et les caprices des investisseurs. C'est la triste réalité : l'erreur de l'Afrique aujourd'hui, c'est cette ouverture non maîtrisée que les générations présentes et futures s'appliquent à corriger. Le salut réside dans une Afrique qui applique les normes internationales de stabilité, de gouvernance et de démocratie.

Une nouvelle génération, pleine d'espoir, interpelle les gouvernants et réclame le changement qu'elle veut voir se réaliser. Elle affirme haut et fort qu'il n'y aura pas de changement tant qu'elle n'aura pas pris en mains le destin de l'Afrique et participé activement à la vie politique et aux affaires. Elle sait et elle veut faire la différence. Elle se dit capable car ayant été formée dans les plus grandes écoles du monde. Elle est composée d'intellectuels et d'utilisateurs férus de médias sociaux, témoins directs et acteurs du Printemps arabe, animateurs de mouvements sociaux qui ont surgit dans nombre de pays comme le Nigeria avec « *Enough is enough* », et, plus récemment, au Soudan.

Le résultat de tout ce processus, c'est l'espoir et la transparence, c'est-à-dire le contraire de la décadence et de la corruption, de la pauvreté et de la famine, de la guerre et de l'extrémisme religieux. C'est une Afrique bâtie sur les piliers de l'intégrité, du respect et de l'obligation de rendre compte. C'est une Afrique qui abat les frontières de la langue et de la religion, une Afrique qui progresse, qui fait d'extraordinaires bonds en avant, sur le chemin de l'intégration régionale des marchés et des peuples grâce au renforcement des capacités, aux infrastructures, à la sécurité alimentaire, à un leadership politique visionnaire et à la promotion d'entreprises régionales.

L'Afrique se trouve à la croisée de chemins. Certains Etats engageront des processus électoraux décisifs pour choisir leurs dirigeants pour les années à venir. Dans d'autres, les dirigeants, très âgés, au pouvoir depuis fort longtemps, seront contraints de passer le témoin, qu'ils le veuillent ou non. Dans l'un et l'autre cas, les choix pour demain sont on ne peut plus clairs. La prochaine génération de dirigeants sera soit celle de ceux qui croient au rêve de l'Afrique, qui peuvent pousser l'Afrique à aller de l'avant, soit celle des dirigeants égoïstes, sans vision et corrompus, qui usurperont le mandat du peuple et érigeront l'impunité en règle, plongeant encore plus le continent dans l'abîme.

La jeunesse africaine qui observe et comprend les dessous de cet enjeu a dès le choix entre deux attitudes : agir maintenant ou garder le silence et ne rien faire. Choisirons-nous de garder les yeux grand ouverts ou bien fermés ?

L'Afrique un continent menacé ou terre d'opportunités?

PEACE IN
AFRICA
LA PAIX
EN AFRIQUE

Progress and Gaps in the African Union's Quest
for Peace

L'Union africaine et la recherche de la paix:
progrès et défis

Jide Martyns Okeke and Lucie Boucher

Role and responsibilities of media in conflicts
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Tidiane Diou

Picture perfect

Reportage de guerre: la photo parfaite

Greg Marinovich



Progress and Gaps in the African Union's Quest for Peace

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Résumé

En Afrique, la dernière décennie s'est caractérisée par une diminution significative des guerres civiles et des conflits intra-étatiques. Dans ce contexte, la base théorique qui définit la paix comme étant l'absence de violence et de guerre a conduit certains à penser que l'Afrique n'a jamais été aussi paisible de toute son histoire postcoloniale. En effet, la création de l'Union africaine (UA) et la mise en place de l'Architecture africaine de paix de sécurité (APSA) en particulier, ont fourni le cadre normatif et institutionnel pour la prévention, la gestion et la résolution des conflits et des crises. Dans le même temps, les transitions démocratiques en Afrique ont également connu une progression considérable. Cependant, la vulnérabilité structurelle et la faible résilience de nombre d'Etats africains constituent un risque vers une nouvelle escalade de la violence et des conflits. En outre, la fragilité persistante des transitions démocratiques est un signe que l'Afrique est toujours menacée par l'insécurité. Cet article met l'accent sur l'Union africaine et sa quête d'une paix durable, en revisitant aussi bien les outils et instruments mis en place par cette institution ainsi que les défis conjoncturels et structurels qui en découlent.



Introduction

This paper attempts to contribute to the growing literature about the progress in the promotion of African-led solutions to peace and security. In the last decade, there has been a significant decrease in the number of civil wars and intrastate conflicts in Africa. Within this context, the conceptual underpinning that, defines peace as the absence of violence and war has led to suggestions that Africa is more peaceful than at any time in its post-colonial history. This is partly attributable to the formulation of an African security regime responsive to imminent or actual security threats emanating from conflicts. The establishment of the African Union (AU) and the concomitant development of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) in particular have provided the normative and institutional framework for the prevention and response to conflicts and crisis situations. There has also been a significant rise of democratic transitions in Africa. This is a clear departure from the immediate post-Cold World era where military coups and other forms of 'war-lord' governance were characteristics of Africa's political geography. However, structural vulnerability and the low resilience of most states in Africa has increased the potential for the re-escalation of conflicts. Also, continued fragility of democratic transitions means that Africa remains threatened by insecurity. Besides, 'new' and emerging forms of security threats such as terrorism, increased prominence of electoral violence, and other cross-cutting security issues like maritime insecurity and climate change have undermined the search for durable peace in Africa.

This paper focuses on the AU's quest for achieving peace in Africa and advances three important arguments. First, we posit that much progress has been made in the reduction of wars in Africa, a development that is partly driven by the renewed interventionist stance of Africa's regional institutions. This intervention posture is a major departure from the traditional sovereignty, which guided the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) that upheld the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states. Second, it seems that Africa's security regime is primarily conflict-centric because it focuses on responses to conflict as opposed to addressing 'new' and emerging forms of security threats. A corollary of this argument is that there has been less appreciation of the need to consolidate the foundations of peace, such as strengthening democratic institutions and the effective drive for sustainable development. This has led to vulnerability and relapses in the gains of peace in Africa. Finally, the multidimensional and unconventional nature of contemporary security threats in Africa requires a system-wide and multidisciplinary peace architecture that can effectively address these issues. This does not mean a radical rethinking of existing normative and institutional arrangements within the AU and other sub-regional and international institutions. Rather innovative interpretations and proper synergy of existing instruments between relevant institutions are essential in overcoming the prevailing pattern of Africa's security concerns.

In order to elaborate on these arguments, subsequent sections of this paper are divided into three sections. Section one provides a conceptual foundation of peace. We provide perspectives on peace within the peace research literature as well as the process of achieving it. The works of

Johan Galtung and liberal peace scholars such as Emmanuel Kant capture the understanding of peace. However, for the purpose of this paper, we confine our appraisal of peace in Africa to the attainment of 'negative' peace based on the absence of wars and other forms of instability that could pose threats to national, regional and global security. In section two, the pursuit of peace by the AU with the support of other regional and international institutions (notably Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the United Nations (UN) is considered. This section importantly identifies emerging trends in progress in regional attempts to promote peace in Africa. Section three lays out some of the inherent structural and institutional gaps in the AU's quest for peace on the continent. Importantly, we raise essential posers on how to overcome some of the existing gaps.

Conceptions of Peace

Africa is currently experiencing remarkably few wars and more democratic transitions. Yet a more critical understanding of the state of peace and security in Africa should commence through understanding the epistemic foundation of peace - that is, how do we define peace. This will allow a more realistic determination to be made about the status of peace in Africa. Like several philosophical concepts, the idea, meaning, characteristics and processes for achieving peace remain disputed. However, there are two relevant perspectives that capture the important notion, characteristics and processes of achieving peace. The first perspective is discernible within the 'peace research' which precedes the Second World War. Although, the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) was the first to use the term 'peace research' as part of its name, there were a few institutes before it researching on peace. Johan Galtung was one of the early scholars that sought to promote the conceptual understanding of peace, but it is not without criticisms. According to Galtung, peace can be defined based on two important and mutually reinforcing dimensions. The first dimension is negative peace, which refers to the absence of violence, or absence of war between collective groups which could be ethnic groups or other forms of cleavages. This dimension has also been described as 'fragile' or 'deadly' peace because even though there is a temporary settlement, "the economy, state and society remain shaped and influenced by the structures of violence."¹

The second typology of peace is 'positive peace' which represents the "integration of human society". It encompasses the values of positive relations such as freedom from fear, freedom from want, economic growth and development, justice, diversity management and other values that putatively seek to promote societal integration. This notion of peace has been quite problematic and contentious because it is regarded as too broad, vague and at best, Utopian. Of course, this is not to discount the desirability of these norms, but to suggest that it is realistic to achieve negative peace while aspiring to the pursuit of positive peace. Besides, both dimensions are helpful in mapping out the meaning and the indicators or characteristics of peace. The second perspective on peace underscores the process through

¹ See Diebel, T.L. (2002) "Instruments of State Power: towards an Analytical Framework", Paper presented at the University of Arizona, http://isanet.ccit.arizona.edu/noarchive/deibel.html#_ftn1 accessed 10/09/2012

which peace can be achieved. Within this discourse, the liberal-democratic framework is significant in understanding the political system, mechanisms and normative instruments that are required for promoting, achieving and sustaining peace. This perspective is rooted in the idea of 'Perpetual Peace' based on the works of the political philosopher, Emmanuel Kant. According to Kant, international peace was possible if 'like-minded' states voluntarily signed up to shared principles including the respect of state sovereignty and adopting liberal democratic governance.² For the sake of our analysis here, we appraise the quest for peace in Africa based on the aspirations towards achieving negative peace and the promotion of the liberal democratic peace project. The limitations of these definitions are primarily found in the structural deficiency of the North-South discourse that may have created the political space for conflicts in Africa is not covered. However, such a narrow definition provides an analytical tool through which we may explain the pattern, and transformations of the security challenges in Africa and how they have been and can be addressed.

Elusive Peace in Africa? 'Old', 'New' and Emerging Security threats

Given the conception of peace, it would seem plausible to suggest that the pursuit of peace has been elusive in most African states. The characterisation of Africa as a 'scar on the conscience of the world' by Tony Blair, the 'hopeless continent' by the Economist and the 'dark Continent' by many Western scholars were frequently used clichés for describing the political and economic geography of Africa. Such descriptions were sometimes exaggerated, but importantly they reflected some realities of the immediate post-Cold War security predicament on the continent. The proliferation of wars (especially intra-state conflicts), extreme political violence (such as the 1994 genocide in Rwanda) and the almost customary practice of military coups were forms and sources of instability in Africa.

The character, pattern and trend of such conflicts were different from Africa's traditional conflicts. The bellicose activities of regular armies were not as prominent as belligerent state misappropriated limited resources and warlords pillaged these resources for perpetuating instability. Civilian populations, including women and children, were often the targets of war through various forms of violence such as rape and the recruitment of child soldiers. In some of these forms of violence, the state was the main culprit, targeting its own citizens to achieve greater political control and power through the deliberate exclusion of certain groups (often ethnic or religious) to prevent them from benefitting from the distribution of resources. There was also a profound expansion of alternatively (informal) governed spaces, often used as safe havens by various groups such as war lords and criminal groups for illicit financial gains (for example, drug trafficking and piracy) and political violence (for example, terrorism, insurgency and guerrilla warfare). Furthermore, there were severe humanitarian crises precipitated by the increased scale of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP's).³

2 See Cramer, C. (2006). *Civil war is not a stupid thing: accounting for violence in developing countries*. London: Hurst & Co Why not refer to Kant himself instead of quoting a secondary source?

3 This changing pattern of humanitarian crises and disasters have been elaborated upon by the authors especially in a paper presented at the 333rd meeting of the Peace and Security Council (14 September 2012).

Since the end of the 1990s, there has been a rapid decline in the number of violent conflicts in Africa. Such reduction is firmly connected with the global decline in armed conflicts where there has been a decrease by 60% in the number of conflicts.⁴ This trend has been due to several factors: first, the establishment of an African-led security architecture following the tragic events of the early 1990s has created the political, normative and institutional space for intervening in Africa's conflicts and broader security challenges. For example, in the 1990s, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which was purportedly established to promote economic integration in West Africa, led peacekeeping missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone.⁵ The transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) was followed by the shift from the traditional principle of sovereignty and non-intervention to a definition of sovereignty as responsibility and the principle of non-indifference. Traditional sovereignty upon which the OAU based its engagement with its member states was founded on the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of individual states.

The territorial integrity of states remains a significant part of international law. However, traditional sovereignty increased the possibility of states deliberately misusing their authority to promote violence against their own populations. There was an important need to redefine sovereignty as responsibility. That is, sovereignty became dependent on the ability, capacity and willingness of the state to prevent gross violations of human rights within its territory. This meant that African states could no longer act as bystanders in situations of mass atrocities and other forms of violence against other Africans. This renewed mindset seems to have reproduced itself in the global sphere through the conceptualisation of, and endorsement of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) by the United Nations as a framework for prevention, in responding to mass atrocities.⁶ Although in recent times, the notion of R2P has become contentious in practice, especially in considering the use of force by the international community to prevent and respond to gross violations of human rights.

Second, the political geography in Africa has changed or is changing. That is, there has been a surge in the democratisation of African states. In 2012 alone, 25 African states were expected to hold democratic elections.⁷ Elections do not necessarily represent the strengthening of democracy. Yet, elections do symbolically reflect positive aspirations in the political transformation of African states. Also, the myth about authoritarian stability, upon which some dictatorial regimes have sought to justify their 'life-time' leadership, has been severely challenged and sometimes dissolved by popular (sometimes armed) uprisings. The 2011 North African uprisings led to the ousting of Presidents Ben Ali of Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt

4 See Marshall, M.G & Cole, B.R. (2011) *Global Report 2011: Conflict, Governance and State Fragility*, New York: Centre for Systemic Peace.

5 Olanisakin, F. 2008. The Dynamics of Conflict and Crises. In: Jaye, T. & Amadi, S. (eds.) *ECOWAS and the Dynamics of Conflict and Peacebuilding*. West Africa: Consortium for Development Partnerships (CDP)

6 See Bellamy, A. (2009) *Responsibility to Protect: the Global Effort to End Mass Atrocities*, Cambridge: Polity Press, pp.12-31

7 For information about elections in Africa, see Electoral Institute for Sustainability of Democracy in Africa (EISA), <http://www.eisa.org.za/WEP/calendar.htm> accessed 20/09/2012.

and Muammar Ghaddafi of Libya. These changing political contexts are sometimes imperfect transitions, contentious and with unexpected negative consequences. Yet, they represent the quest for, or at least the use of, democracy, political participation and equitable distribution of resources as legitimizing tools for political change.

While there have been some gains in the pursuit of peace in Africa, some old security threats persist and other emerging and 'latent' or soft insecurities are becoming more prominent. For example, persistent crises have endured in Somalia, Sudan/South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Also there have been drawbacks in these gains in peace through the recurrence of military coups in Mali and Guinea-Bissau amidst democratic transitions. Related to this, is the growing prominence of terrorism, especially in areas where such activities were latent (for example, Northern Mali). In respect to the latter, the number of Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria involving suicide-bombings is certainly a new dimension in the history of political violence in that country.

At the same time, cross-cutting issues that were previously not within the purview of security are now firmly linked to security discourse within and beyond Africa. For example, there are increased linkages being drawn between climate change adaptation, maritime safety and other environmental issues such as land degradation and deforestation and security. To be sure, a recent study explained the relationship between climate change and conflict in the Sahel region of Africa.⁸ Similarly, the threats of piracy, unregulated/unreported fishing and drug/human trafficking have featured as part of, but not exclusively within, the remit of maritime insecurity. Indeed, there has been some progress in the search for negative peace in Africa. In particular, the significant reduction in the number of intra-state conflicts provides evidence to suggest progress is being made in African-led conflict management and response. Yet as we have explained above, the changing nature of security threats pose severe challenges to the prospects of durable peace on the continent. What follows provides an overview of general trends in the African-led response to peace and security.

Gains in the Pursuit of Peace in Africa

On 4 February 2003, the AU issued a communiqué approving the deployment of the African Mission in Burundi (AMIB) as agreed in the 2002 Ceasefire Agreement between the Transitional Government in Burundi and the *Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie-Forces de défense de la démocratie* (CNDD-FDD) led by Jean Bosco Ndayikengurukiye.⁹ South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique were amongst the major Troops Contributing Countries (TCCs) for the successful deployment of the AMIB. A similar mission was authorized by the AU in Sudan following the escalation of violence in Darfur. This mission was eventually transformed into an AU-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). On 27 September 2012, the Presidents

8 See Mayers, D. (2012). "Africa's bright Future Drying Up" *SmartPlanet*, <http://www.smartplanet.com/blog/global-observer/africas-bright-future-drying-up/6848> accessed on 20/09/2012

9 See AU Communique of the Seventh Ordinary Session of the Central Organ of the Mechanism for Conflict Resolution and Management at Heads of State and Government Level.

of South Sudan and Sudan signed a widely applauded partial agreement on border security and other economic and security issues. This outcome was based on extensive negotiations and political processes initiated by the Thabo Mbeki-led AU High Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) established in 2009. Furthermore, the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has registered recent successes, especially in its military operations against the al-Shaabab terrorist group in Somalia. To be sure, the AU announced on 30 September 2012 that AMISOM had pushed al-Shaabab away from Canjeel, a southern Somali town and were then 5km away from the port city of Kismayo.¹⁰ This military gain remains precarious and it is yet to be seen if sustainable peace will be achieved in Somalia.

Although the above narrative represents differing contexts and varying degrees of success, some of these situations are fluid and therefore constantly evolving. Yet, they provide important pointers about African-led responses to peace and security. There are at least five observations that can be made about the narrative above. First, it seems there is a growing concrete expression and implementation of the envisioned *Pax Africana* in responding to the threats to peace and security in Africa. In 1967, Ali Mazrui was one of the first scholars to articulate the *Pax Africana* idea, underscoring the importance of Africans in the promotion, building and consolidation of peace in Africa.¹¹ Foremost African nationalists, notably Kwame Nkrumah and Julius Nyerere, were also very determined to promote an Africa-led approach to peace, security and development in post-colonial African states. In the examples cited, it is clear that African states themselves are now at the frontline in the restoration of stability and the search for longterm peace in Africa.

Second, the interventionist principle of the AU is now becoming a customary practice. This is a major departure from the emphasis of the sacrosanct principle of traditional sovereignty that was at the epicenter of the OAU. Since the establishment of the AU, it has put in place important legal, normative and institutional frameworks aimed at promoting responsible sovereignty. For instance, Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act underscores the "right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity."¹² In addition to this, the 2004 Protocol Establishing the Peace and Security Council of the African Union established the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) as an institutional framework for the prevention of and response to crisis situations. The APSA is not fully operational but there have been ad hoc peace operations led by the AU. This is most discernible in AU-led peace operations in Burundi (AMIB), Darfur (AMIS), Somalia (AMISOM) and the African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). These interventions are not without numerous challenges, but they illustrate that the AU is increasingly recognized as an important global player in initiating, leading or supporting peace operations in Africa in cooperation with the UN and other international partners.

10 See AU Press Release "Somali, AMISOM forces on the outskirts of Kismayo", AMISOM Nairobi office, Kenya.

11 Mazrui, A. (1967), *Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, and University of Chicago Press.

12 See AU Constitutive Act, http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/aboutau/constitutive_act_en.htm#Article4 accessed on 01.09.2012

Third, alongside an African-led military response to crisis situations, there is a firm appreciation for an African model for long-term political solutions as a panacea for durable peace. The AU-brokered signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) formally ended more than two decades of war between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM) in South Sudan. As part of the implementation of the CPA, South Sudan became an independent state following a referendum in July 2011. In addition, the Mbeki-led AUHIP has continued to work towards achieving durable peace between both Sudan and South Sudan, through painstaking negotiations and incremental agreements aimed at addressing unresolved issues, including border and security concerns between both countries. In similar vein, the AU established a High Level Panel in January 2011 to mediate the post-election crisis in Côte d'Ivoire that produced a report re-legitimising the victory of Alassane Ouattara as the duly elected president of that country. Similarly, the AU launched a Roadmap on 10 March 2011 with the primary emphasis on a diplomatic approach to resolve the armed rebellion in Libya. Unfortunately, this political channel for conflict resolution has sometimes been in sharp contrast with the vision of peace advanced by powerful external actors. In the case of Côte d'Ivoire and Libya, the intervention of NATO (led by France and the United Kingdom) severely undermined Africa's vision for peace in that country. This is not to deny that Africa is still struggling to attain an effective conflict resolution mechanism and, importantly, that there are considerable problems associated with the AU's attempts to implement its lofty aspirations, norms and decisions. However, such African-led solutions are relatively successful especially in the area of political solution rather than a unilateral, non-consent based approach to crisis prevention and management. Alex De Waal has also contentiously argued that credit should also be given to the intentions and aspirations of the AU and African regional institutions in general in conflict management.¹³

Fourth, there is a gradual strengthening of the 'Chapter VIII' approach in the prevention and response to security threats in Africa. Chapter VIII of the UN Charter recognizes the importance of the UN's roles and strategic partnerships with regional organisations in the prevention of, and response to, security threats. Concrete steps have been taken to ensure strategic partnerships between the UN and African regional institutions. Attempts have been made in ensuring political cooperation, for example between the UN Security Council (UNSC) and the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC), through consultation meetings and especially in the planning, deployment and management of peace support operations. The cases of Sudan and South Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, and Guinea-Bissau provide a background of how the AU has worked in tandem with both the UN and RECs in promoting partnerships.¹⁴ For example, it is striking to note that UNSC resolution 2046 (2012) on Sudan and South Sudan was considerably informed by the Roadmap for peace in South Sudan and Sudan adopted by the AUPSC. Yet, the continued lack of clarity and absence of an institutionalized framework

13 De Waal, A. (2012) "Contesting Visions of Peace in Africa: Darfur, Ivory Coast, Libya" *Limerick Papers in Politics and Public Administration*, No. 1, University of Limerick, Ireland, pp1-16.

14 For a detailed explanation of how the AU-UN partnership has evolved, see Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Partnership between the African Union and the United Nations on Peace and Security: towards Greater Strategic and Political Coherence, 307th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council, Addis Ababa (9 January, 2012) <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/report-au-un-jan2012-eng.pdf> accessed 15/09/2012.

for decision-making, division of labour and burden-sharing, continues to undermine the shift from ad hoc and tactical engagement to a more permanent and strategic engagement. It must be underscored that this problem is often reproduced between the AU and RECs, as recently reflected in the AU-ECOWAS relations in the electoral violence in Côte d'Ivoire and the 2012 military coups in Mali and Guinea-Bissau.

Indeed, the above trends suggest that there may not be an agreement about how to define the process of achieving peace. However, it seems that Africans are rapidly institutionalizing a desired framework for the prevention, response to, and re-building of conflict situations. This institutionalization process provides a vision of what could be, rather than what is, in the pursuit of peace in Africa. It now remains to elaborate on some aspects of the 'African peace project' (broadly defined) that would ensure a shift from a primary focus on ambition and ideology to more concrete foundations for peace in Africa.

Closing the Gaps in Africa's pursuit of Peace

The above analysis suggests that important steps have been taken towards the achievement of sustainable peace in Africa. Yet, there seem to be existing cross-cutting structural and institutional issues that continue to undermine the possibilities of durable peace in Africa. This section therefore elaborates on some of these cross-cutting issues with a view to identifying how to address these problems. The first issue is the assumption that even though there has been a rapid decline in the numerical level of conflicts in Africa, there has not been a concomitant policy shift to build structures of peace through long-term engagement in post-conflict reconstruction and development. In the past decade since the establishment of the AU, the APSA has been predominantly focused on responses to conflict. The imperative of promoting structures of peace through development has however been absent. Despite some acknowledgement of its importance, there have been less concrete steps taken toward the promotion of a sustainable development agenda. For example, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) was designed to implement programmes aimed at eradicating poverty, promoting sustainable development and strengthening Africa's economic interests in the global arena. The NEPAD was integrated into the structures of the AU Commission (AUC) to foster greater synergy with the NEPAD Secretariat and therefore to promote the effective implementation of development programmes. Unfortunately, there has been limited mainstreaming of decision-making by the NEPAD Secretariat and the NEPAD Planning and Coordination Unit, which was established under the office of the AUC Chairperson. This problem is compounded by the fact that it was only recently (October 2012) that a Unit Head was appointed to drive the Planning and Coordination unit of NEPAD within the AUC.

A corollary to this problem of the conflict-centric nature of existing responses to peace and security challenges in Africa is the reduced recognition of the multidimensional and changing nature of threats in Africa. The rise of 'new' and emerging security threats such as climate change, terrorism, electoral violence and maritime insecurities means that the orthodox forms of conflict management mechanisms such as traditional peacekeeping and peace support

operations applied within the context of conflicts must be re-considered. Yet, some existing instruments are either suitably adequate or could be innovatively interpreted in flexible ways (referred to in international law literature as legal realism)¹⁵ that could accommodate these threats. For example, the Centre for the Advancement of Sustainable Development Partnerships (CASDP) underscores the "multi-dimensional notion of security" which embraces a wide range of issues such as, but not limited to, natural disasters, ecological and environmental degradation¹⁶. In spite of such relevant instruments that may have introduced non-traditional threats to the agenda of APSA, there is still policy dissonance on how to translate the process of norm-setting in relation to non-traditional threats into concrete steps for subsequent implementation.

The second issue that continues to pose considerable problems is the coordination of regional and international institutions for the attainment of durable peace in Africa. There are two dimensions to coordination: the first refers to coordination within the context of enhancing the internal governance structure of the AUC. As previously mentioned, the expanding nature of security threats means that there is a need for a multidisciplinary approach in addressing these challenges to peace. Unfortunately, the AUC largely operates on a deficient silo-based model established on limited collaboration between relevant departments and divisions in policy formulation and the implementation of peace and security decisions. This reality is widely acknowledged but there has been slow progress in promoting cooperation and coordination across relevant departments. For example, it is regrettable that ongoing attempts to develop a policy framework on security and climate, based on the work-plan of the AU Department of Peace and Security (PSD), are pursued with no consultation with the AU Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture (DREA). However, some progress may have been registered in promoting internal coordination, especially with the recognition of synergy between the APSA and the African Governance Architecture (AGA). The AGA is a political and institutional framework for the purpose of promoting democracy, governance and human rights by enhancing interaction and synergies between the AU organs and institutions that have formal mandates in the area of governance. This governance architecture was endorsed by the AU Assembly during its 16th Ordinary Session to promote greater unity and the advancement of shared values (Assembly/AU/Decl.1(XVI)). Yet, the concrete implementation of this synergy, which is envisaged to promote greater collaboration between the PSD and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) has not been operationalized. It is also useful to move beyond the focus on these two AU departments and embrace system-wide coordination across all relevant departments that will enhance the internal governance structure of the AU.

15 We adapt the definition of Legal Realism to this context to refer to the determination that the legal status, adequacy and inclusion of non-traditional security threats in relation to relevant AU Instruments is guided in large measure by the attitude of decision-makers towards these threats. This departs from the classicist view that is based primarily on the textual analysis of relevant instruments which must be respected. See Holzgrefe, J.L. (2003) "The Humanitarian Intervention Debate" in Holzgrefe, J.L. & Keohane, R.O (eds) *Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.15-52

16 See African Union (2004) *Solemn Declaration of the Common African Defense and Security Policy*, pp.3-5

The second dimension of coordination is related to the relationship between the AU and the RECs and the UN. The legal foundations for partnership between these regional and international institutions have been firmly established. For example, Chapter VIII of the UN Charter recognizes (sub) regional organisations as important actors for the maintenance of international peace and security. In addition to the AU Constitutive Act, there are also specific Memoranda of Understanding that have been adopted by both the AU and the RECs in ensuring cooperation between regional and sub-regional organisations. For example, the *2008 Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the areas of peace and security between the AU, RECs, RMs of the Regional Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa* provides for the “principles, rights and obligations to be applied in the relationship between the Union, RECs and Coordinating Mechanisms in matters relating to the promotion and maintenance of peace, security and stability in Africa, subject to respective competencies”¹⁷ These forms of partnerships are still works in progress, especially in the institutionalization of strategic and political cooperation and coherence. The AU-ECOWAS relations in the crises in Côte d’Ivoire, Mali and Guinea-Bissau are illustrative of the evolving, but identifiable, policy dissonance between both institutions.

The final issue is discernible in the area of resource mobilization for the purpose of preventing and responding to security threats. The Peace Fund, which was established by the Protocol establishing the PSC, is designed to ensure predictable, reliable and sustainable sources of funding. However, the Peace Fund has been largely dependent on donor support, especially the African Peace Facility (APF) established by the European Union (EU) for providing assistance to the AU. The APF has largely been used for peace support operations, rather than broader aspects of security and development. In addition, these fundings and other forms of donor dependence (especially in the area of capacity building), are sometimes not reliable because they are largely dependent on the political priorities of donor states. This was reflected prominently in the case of the Libyan crisis when the AU Roadmap, intended to find a political solution to that crisis, did not receive support from dominant Western (NATO) powers that favored a controversial military intervention.¹⁸ African states themselves bear the sole responsibility for this problem of limited funding and donor dependence because they have failed to muster the political will needed to source sustainable funding from within the continent. Instead, they have continued to encourage the diversification of dependence by reaching out to emerging non-Western economies (notably China, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Brazil and India) for the financing of its regional institutions and programmes. A Panel on alternative sources of funding set up by the AU and led by former Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo has reinforced the absence of political will from AU member states. During the July 2012 AU Ordinary Summit, the Obasanjo-led panel submitted its report to the Permanent Representative Committee (PRC) with three main recommendations on how to promote alternative sources of funding from within. These recommendations are: a levy of five USD on

17 AU 2008. 2008 Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the areas of peace and security between the AU, RECs, RMs of the Regional Brigades of Eastern Africa and Northern Africa www.au.int accessed 10/04/2012.

18 Souare, Issaka (2011) “A Dark Cloud over Libya’s Future” *ISS Africa.org* Issue 12, pp. 11-12

all air travel to and within Africa; a levy of two USD on hotel reservations in Africa; and 0.05% tax on all text messages. Regrettably, these proposals were deferred by the PRC during the July 2012 Ordinary Summit. The foregoing analysis provides a snapshot of some of the priority areas requiring institutional and structural reforms, especially within, but not limited to, the AU, in order to sustain Africa's progress in the pursuit of durable peace.

Conclusion

This paper has explored the aspirations toward attaining peace in Africa. It has underscored the progress made in the reduction of wars and other forms of violence between groups in Africa. This achievement is both a cause and result of the establishment of normative and institutional frameworks that are specifically tailored to the prevention of, and responses to, crisis situations. Specifically, the APSA represents the maturing of African-led solutions to conflicts. Through this renewed approach for dealing with conflicts and crises, Africa has been making important progress in the areas of peace support operations, laborious political solutions to crises and increased collaboration with RECs and the UN in the concrete expression and implementation of the Chapter VIII mandate of the UN Charter. This paper has argued that these dimensions for pursuing peace have led to the operational reality of the *Pax Africana* ostensibly through what has recently been referred to as African solutions to African problems. This operational reality remains challenged in several respects. It seems that there has often been a contest between the African-led political interventions and the vision of peace as envisaged and practiced by dominant external actors. This is most evident in the international response to the crises in Côte d'Ivoire and Libya. As a result, there have been severe constraints upon the efficacy of the AU-led model in the quest for peace in Africa. This is further complicated by structural and institutional inadequacies inherent within the AU, which sometimes undermine a robust and strategic approach to the promotion of peace. Such inadequacies are discernible in the conflict-centric bias in terms of the priorities affecting responses to security threats in Africa, limited internal coordination within the AU and with relevant RECs and the UN as well as the persistent problem of limited resource mobilization within Africa. These problems highlight the precarious gains and the need for a re-assessment of policy in the pursuit of peace in Africa.

Rôles et responsabilités des médias dans les conflits

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Summary

It is quite possible, when talking about the fate of Africa to reduce the continent to a wide land of 30,415,873 km² racked by complex multifaceted, unprecedented, and increasingly violent conflicts, leaving sometimes, politicians, military, experts on defense and security issues, geopolitics and geographers speechless! It is also possible to describe Africa as a community of more than one billion people who live together, meet, clash, wage war, and sometimes reconcile. The reality is of course more nuanced. But most importantly, such assertions are very ordinary if these conflicts are analyzed and described within their true historical and social context. It is worth noting at the outset that this article is not a dissertation on political science, or geographical report on Africa. It tries to account in the light of Information and Communication Sciences and the experience accumulated by the author in the field of journalism, the very complex relationship between media and conflict in Africa.



Introduction

Il est tout à fait possible, lorsque l'on évoque le sort de l'Afrique, de réduire ce continent à un vaste ensemble de 30 415 873 km² secoué par des conflits complexes, multifformes, inédits, de plus en plus violents, qui laissent parfois, hommes politiques, militaires, spécialistes des questions de défense et de sécurité, polémologues, géopoliticiens et géographes sans voix ! Il est tout aussi possible de décrire l'Afrique comme une communauté humaine de plus d'un milliard d'habitants qui cohabitent, vivent, se croisent, s'affrontent, se font la guerre et, parfois, se réconcilient. La réalité est, bien entendu plus nuancée. Mais surtout, énoncer de telles assertions n'est que très banal si l'on ne prend pas le soin d'analyser, de décrire et de rendre ces conflits à leur véritable contexte historique et social. Il est utile de préciser d'emblée que cet article n'est ni un traité de science politique, ni une somme géographique sur l'Afrique. Il tente modestement de rendre compte, sous l'éclairage des sciences de l'Information et de la Communication et d'expériences accumulées par l'auteur sur le terrain journalistique, de la relation très complexe entre médias et conflits en Afrique.

Aussi la division du continent en plusieurs zones géographiques auquel nous procédons dans la première partie du texte, qui peut, comme tout découpage, paraître arbitraire, n'est opérée ici que pour les besoins de l'exercice. Ce découpage éclaire l'analyse et revêt donc un caractère purement didactique. Il évite surtout d'assommer le lecteur de faits, de dates, de statistiques ou de chiffres généraux sur le continent.

Le monde est de plus en plus interconnecté grâce aux technologies de la communication. L'Afrique n'est certes pas le monde, mais elle est une partie du monde en mouvement. Il n'est pas possible d'analyser la situation du continent sans la relier au reste du globe. Les conséquences de la relation entre médias et conflits ici, sont les mêmes que partout ailleurs. Dans les lignes qui suivent, nous tenterons de montrer que la relation parfois heurtée, parfois pacifiée, que forment médias et conflits existe depuis la nuit des temps, y compris en Afrique où les journalistes sont au cœur des évolutions sociétales. Ils sont les témoins privilégiés de l'évolution des sociétés humaines et, de plus en plus, les interlocuteurs de premier plan des acteurs politiques et des forces de sécurité et de défense. D'où la nécessité d'explorer, de toute urgence, des pistes possibles de collaboration entre médias, sociétés et forces armées en Afrique qui longtemps se sont affrontés.

Le mythe de Sisyphe?

En Afrique de l'Ouest, alors même que la Côte d'Ivoire, longtemps coupée en deux se stabilise, une crise aigüe sévit en Guinée Bissau où, depuis l'assassinat du Président João Bernardo Vieira le 2 mars 2009, l'Etat semble devoir disparaître. Plus au Nord de la Guinée Bissau, une rébellion armée sévit dans la partie méridionale du Sénégal, cette Casamance rebelle, dont il est impensable que le pays de Léopold Sédar Senghor, modèle de démocratie, puisse en être amputé. Mais il y a pire au Mali, où les conséquences du coup d'Etat perpétré le 22 mars 2012 par le capitaine Amadou Sanogo est venu se conjuguer à la partition de fait du pays et au

problème touareg, qui hier, avait déjà failli emporter la nation nigérienne. Il n'est pas inutile de rappeler, pour mieux mesurer l'étendue de l'espace géographique où se joue le sort de toute la sous-région, que le Mali et le Niger couvrent respectivement 24,3% et 24,8%, soit près de la moitié du territoire de la Communauté économique des États d'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEDEAO)¹. Pour corser le tout, un terrorisme islamiste importé se répand, sous différentes formes, tel un venin, dans les interstices de nombre de sociétés ouest-africaines, depuis les dunes sablonneuses de la Mauritanie jusqu'à l'hinterland nigérian. Un nouvel acteur, la piraterie maritime, est là, qui sévit de plus en plus sur le Golfe de Guinée.

En Afrique de l'Ouest, il y a à peine deux décennies, le Sénégal bien sûr, mais aussi le Cap Vert, le Mali, le Bénin, le Niger et plus tard le Ghana -pour ne citer que ces exemples- expérimentaient des trajectoires démocratiques plus ou moins prometteuses tandis que la Sierra Léone plongeait dans un conflit meurtrier qui fit, entre mars 1991 et janvier 2002 près de 200.000 victimes et pas moins de deux millions de personnes déplacées, soit le tiers de la population du pays à l'époque. Au Libéria, la guerre civile, débutée en 1989, aura coûté la vie à près de 150.000 personnes -des civils pour la plupart- et provoqué un effondrement total de l'État alors que quelques 850.000 personnes se réfugiaient dans les pays voisins. Le Liberia et la Sierra Léone connaissent aujourd'hui une relative stabilité alors que le sort du Mali, par exemple, ne cesse d'inquiéter.

En Afrique du Nord longtemps épargnée par les soubresauts politiques, cette onde de choc nommée «printemps arabe», est partie de la Tunisie, a atteint l'Égypte, fait implorer la Libye, menacé le Maroc et l'Algérie et irradié tout le Maghreb. Nul ne sait, aujourd'hui, avec certitude, quand et où elle s'arrêtera. Pour l'heure, dans cette région du globe, les révolutions se succèdent avec leur lot de déceptions et de surprises...

En Afrique centrale, la très ancienne et très multiforme crise en République démocratique du Congo qui mêle politique, accaparement des ressources minières, problèmes frontaliers, rebellions armées et géostratégie, se poursuit, avec ses répercussions sous-régionales. L'Angola est certes pacifié mais le Soudan, la Centrafrique et le Tchad montrent des signes d'inquiétude.

En Afrique australe les pays dits jadis de «la ligne de front» hier secoués et dominés par la puissante Afrique du Sud raciste, poursuivent une aventure démocratique depuis la fin du régime d'apartheid.

A l'Est du continent, le front Ethiopie-Erythrée semble s'être apaisé mais la sécurité sur le Golfe d'Aden inquiète encore, quoique faiblement.

Au total, l'Afrique alterne, depuis au moins une vingtaine d'années, crises aiguës et périodes stables, dictatures et alternances politiques, guerre et paix. Vu de loin, sa trajectoire rappelle la vie de Sisyphe, personnage de la mythologie grecque, au bas de sa montagne, condamné à recommencer chaque jour son labeur. L'Afrique focalise les crises et occupe la part la plus

1 Source: site de le CEDEAO: <http://www.bidc-ebid.org/fr/cedeo.php>

élevée des personnels et du budget des opérations de maintien de la paix des Nations unies pour l'exercice 2011-2012².

L'Afrique n'est pas une entité insulaire mais une partie d'un monde en mouvement qui se rétrécit et au sein duquel les crises nationales, du fait de leur complexité et de la multiplicité des acteurs en action, se transforment très rapidement en crises internationales. C'était le cas, hier du conflit libyen. C'est le cas, aujourd'hui de la crise malienne.

Le conflit ou la paix

A y regarder de près, depuis les indépendances octroyées ou arrachées, deux cultures s'affrontent et se relayent en Afrique: une culture du conflit contre une culture de la paix³. Dès lors, l'enjeu, le vrai, reste celui de la paix, sa permanence, son importance, son omniprésence dans toutes les sociétés africaines et les mots pour dire cette paix, la décrire, la nommer. C'est cette tension permanente entre conflit et paix, constitutive, des sociétés humaines, qui est au cœur de toute réflexion sur les médias et les conflits en Afrique.

Comment analyser cette tension? Qui, pour l'analyser? Avec quels moyens? Quel rôle pour les médias? Comment agir aujourd'hui, pour demain? Le 11 septembre 2001 a considérablement changé la carte du monde. Ce qui frappe, dans ce monde nouveau, c'est la coïncidence entre, d'une part le caractère instantané de la transmission des informations relayées sur les conflits, et, d'autre part, la rapidité et la nature de plus en plus complexe de ces conflits. Or, derrière tout conflit, se joue d'abord une guerre de l'information. C'est cette guerre de l'information qui contraint chaque acteur de l'échiquier international y compris les mouvements rebelles et autres milices privées, à développer leurs propres canaux de communication et à contrôler l'information. Et ce n'est pas une nouveauté.

La guerre, mère des médias

Médias et conflits sont inséparables depuis la nuit des temps. Depuis toujours, les techniques de communication et d'information sont intimement liées à la guerre. Parfois, le conflit a même accéléré la naissance de médias. Le télégraphe n'a-t-il pas été inventé par l'ingénieur français Claude Chappe durant la Révolution française-à une époque où «l'information chemine encore au rythme des chevaux»- puis vulgarisé durant la Convention? Internet, né aux Etats-Unis d'Amérique, en 1962, en pleine guerre froide, était à l'origine un réseau de communication militaire interne capable de résister à une attaque nucléaire soviétique.

2 Avec 16 opérations, près de 100.000 personnels en uniforme et un budget de 7,8 milliards de dollars, les plus importantes missions sont la MINUAD (mission hybride Nations Unies - Union africaine au Darfour) avec plus de 23 400 personnels en uniforme, la MONUSCO (République démocratique du Congo) avec environ 19 000, la FINUL (Liban) avec environ 12 000, l'ONUCI (Côte d'Ivoire) et la MINUSTAH (Haïti) avec chacune près de 11 000, la MINUL (Liberia) avec 9 200 et la MINUSS (Soudan du Sud) avec 5 500 (<http://www.franceonu.org/la-france-a-l-onu/dossiers-thematiques/Paix-et-Securite/operations-de-maintien-de-la-paix/article/operations-de-maintien-de-la-paix>).

3 On pourrait même forcer le trait en opposant une culture de la vie contre une culture de la vie.

4 La Convention est le nom donné à l'Assemblée constituante qui gouverna la France du 21 septembre 1792 au 26 octobre 1795 lors de la Révolution française.

En Afrique, un autre médium, la radio, a joué un rôle crucial dans les guerres coloniales comme le rappelle si bien le journaliste Jean Karim Fall, dans un article publié dans le numéro 1 de la revue des *Cahiers de l'Union africaine*. «La BBC radio est conçue, dès les origines, comme un instrument administratif au service de l'Etat colonial. C'est par ce canal que dans les années 30, la Grande Bretagne s'adresse à son vaste empire qui s'étend du sous-continent indien à l'Afrique. Les premières émissions du «service impérial» de la BBC à destination de l'Afrique du Sud et de l'Afrique de l'Ouest sont destinées aux européens, fonctionnaires coloniaux et militaires». (...) «Au début de la guerre, le gouvernement de Vichy, contrôlant la plupart des émetteurs dans les colonies françaises, les gaullistes eurent recours aux émetteurs des Britanniques pour s'adresser, en Français, aux colonies Françaises». On comprend mieux, dès lors, le contexte de l'appel, resté célèbre, du Général de Gaulle, diffusé à travers les ondes de la BBC. Le 17 juin 1940, le Général n'était plus qu'un officier français en rupture de ban et pourtant le 18 juin, il incarnait la France éternelle.

Médias et sociétés: un mariage heurté?

La radio jouera bien plus tard, un rôle crucial durant les élections qui, comme chacun le sait, sont souvent à l'origine des conflits en Afrique. Et le rôle des médias durant les périodes électorales n'y est pas pour rien. En effet, après avoir expérimenté une tradition de veille, de sécurisation et de contrôle du processus électoral, certains médias africains, les radios principalement, outrepassant allégrement leurs prérogatives, se sont mués tantôt en Commission nationale électorale en publiant avant l'heure les tendances, tantôt en juridiction d'appels en disqualifiant d'office certains candidats. Parfois telles des missions d'observation électorale, elles distribuent les bons et les mauvais points.

Plus grave, chez nombre de journalistes, aucune nuance n'est opérée entre résultats provisoires et définitifs, entre délais de recours et période contentieuse, entre élection, investiture, prestation de serment et passation de services.

Toute cette confusion entretenue par les médias fait que les élections restent des moments de tension extrême, y compris dans les pays de longue tradition démocratique. Les Sénégalais ont beau avoir voté depuis 1848, ils ont vécu, avec une angoisse certaine, la présidentielle de février-mars 2012. Il faut, de toute urgence, revenir à la question de la spécialisation, de l'hyper spécialisation du métier et remettre la déontologie au cœur de la profession.

Le problème est, en effet, beaucoup plus complexe qu'il n'y paraît, car il arrive, bien plus souvent qu'on ne le pense, que les dérapages soient l'œuvre de professionnels affirmés qui violent volontairement les règles déontologiques, lorsqu'éclate le conflit, lorsque les digues de la raison ont cédé, lorsque les journalistes ont épousé les lignes de fracture des partis politiques.

Il est fréquent de rencontrer des journalistes, au demeurant au-dessus de tout soupçon, littéralement dépassés par la réalité dont ils sont censés rendre compte. Les évènements évoluent plus vite que la profession et les professionnels des médias ne sont pas toujours outillés pour décrire, décrypter, comprendre et nommer les faits qui se déroulent sous leurs

yeux, les nouvelles formes de menaces, les concepts aussi complexes que la cyber-criminalité ou la question nucléaire, pour ne citer que ces deux cas.

L'on assiste, aussi, à toutes sortes de dérives, notamment l'irruption dans l'espace public d'une nouvelle catégorie d'acteurs appelés journalistes-citoyens. Férés de nouvelles technologies, ceux-ci, grâce aux infinies possibilités offertes par les réseaux sociaux, téléphone portable en main, décrivent la réalité, «leur réalité» des conflits, sans aucun rédacteur en chef ou secrétaire de rédaction pour recouper, corriger et valider son récit.

Le rôle tant sublimé de ce journaliste-citoyen, tour à tour et en même temps émetteur et récepteur, dont on a peut-être trop hâtivement loué les vertus, a certes été méritoire durant le «printemps arabe». Sans lui, sans Facebook, sans Twitter, nous n'aurions jamais été si bien informés des événements qui se sont produits dans ce monde arabe traversé par des «guerres fermées» si difficiles à décrypter.

Médias et armées: l'impossible entente?

L'incompréhension ne naît pas seulement de la relation entre journaliste et citoyen. Elle existe aussi entre professionnels des médias et forces de sécurité et de défense. Entre ces deux acteurs, deux mondes, deux modes de fonctionnement, deux logiques s'affrontent: la logique du secret contre la logique de la publication à grande échelle. Aussi, deux temps s'affrontent: le temps de l'action sur le terrain du conflit -qui peut être relativement long- contre le temps de la rédaction, qui est de plus en plus instantané. C'est de l'écart entre ces deux temps, que naissent toutes les incompréhensions. Les armées estiment qu'en donnant le nombre exact de militaires tués au combat, le journaliste démobilise les troupes engagées sur le front. Le journaliste quant à lui estime, au contraire, qu'il doit la vérité au «peuple». Le gouvernement estime qu'en dévoilant l'identité des otages, le journaliste offre une tribune aux ravisseurs, fait monter les enchères, compromet les négociations et, en définitive, met en danger la vie des personnes enlevées. Ce sont ces incompréhensions qui ont été à l'origine des relations tendues entre la chaîne de télévision Al Jazeera et le commandement militaire américain en Afghanistan, puis en Irak.

Les forces de sécurité et les journalistes doivent se parler. Il faut jeter des ponts entre médias et forces armées, qui se contentent de cohabiter en s'ignorant. Sans doute l'absence de reporters de guerre parmi les journalistes africains, conjuguée à la faiblesse de la réflexion de type universitaire sur les conflits, a contribué à éloigner les uns des autres.

Les uns comme les autres ont besoin de se hisser à la hauteur des enjeux géopolitiques en développant des moyens modernes d'information et de communication face aux nouvelles formes de menaces à la paix et la sécurité. Toute prise de parole nécessite de connaître les codes, les limites, les acteurs et le contexte dans lequel se déroule le conflit. Fort heureusement, depuis peu, la «grande muette» parle et n'attend plus que des événements se produisent pour s'exprimer. Les armées africaines, de plus en plus, créent en leur sein des Directions de la communication. Toutefois, celles-ci ne doivent pas servir d'outils d'instrumentalisation, de censure ou de propagande.

Les journalistes sont indispensables dans les conflits. Souvent, lorsqu'éclate un conflit, lorsque les armées se mobilisent avant de s'affronter, on ne voit qu'eux. Et, l'on doit, ici, les encourager sans réserve. Mais ce journaliste-là qui se dévoue pour la couverture du conflit, qui garde son sang-froid sous la mitraille, doit connaître les limites déontologiques qu'impose la collaboration avec les acteurs en conflit. Car autant il n'est pas possible d'imaginer un champ sans contre-champ, autant la liberté d'écrire sans aucune limite déontologique ne paraît pas raisonnable, surtout en temps de guerre.

Le journaliste, qui n'est pas un citoyen ordinaire, ne peut, au nom de la liberté d'informer, déchirer la conscience nationale. Il doit pouvoir établir sa propre boussole interne, agir avec neutralité, établir ses propres normes de déontologie dans le traitement des questions de paix et de sécurité, s'assurer la maîtrise des définitions, cerner les contours du conflit, se garder de moraliser, éviter la formule mortelle, posséder l'art de conter et de fixer la scène de guerre.

La question, qui traverse la profession depuis la nuit des temps et, jamais n'a trouvé de réponse consensuelle, est celle du «journalisme embarqué» que les Américains ont remis au goût du jour en Irak. Elle mérite d'être creusée. Faut-il collaborer avec l'armée? Jusqu'où collaborer? Albert Londres, père du journalisme d'investigation en France qui couvrit tant de conflits, s'élevait constamment contre cette pratique qu'il nommait le «bourrage de crâne» -expression inventée par le soldat lors de la guerre de 1914- qu'il rendit populaire et auquel il consacra un ouvrage⁵. Dès le début de la guerre de 14-18, Albert Londres s'était élevé contre la censure et la propagande officielle pratiquée par l'armée française. Il ne tarda pas, aux yeux de l'armée, à devenir «indésirable» et son nom figura en tête d'une liste noire, établie par l'Etat-major, assorti de la mention: «Mauvaise tête».

Hubert Beuve-Méry, fondateur du journal *Le Monde*, préconisait dans un style moins polémiste et pas seulement à propos de la guerre, une pratique du journalisme basée sur «le contact et la distance». C'est cette voie-là qu'il faut suivre.

Conclusion

L'analyse du présent de l'Afrique, de son avenir, de sa place dans le monde, de son rapport aux guerres et aux conflits, peut parfois conduire au pessimisme. Mais est-ce bien une raison pour ne pas raconter l'Afrique en toute objectivité? Les conflits font partie intégrante de l'histoire contemporaine africaine actuelle. Cela ne dédouane pas d'une réflexion sérieuse sur les ressorts de ces conflits.

Il faut déconstruire les vieux clichés d'une Afrique binaire opposant musulmans-chrétiens, Nord-Sud, riches-pauvres, islamistes-laïques, réformateurs-conservateurs et extrémistes-modérés. La complexité de la crise actuelle qui secoue le Mali suffit à interdire tout discours simpliste sur les conflits en Afrique.

⁵ Albert Londres, *Contre le bourrage de crâne*, recueil de reportages de 1917-1918, édition Arléa, 1998.

L'information n'est rien d'autre que l'histoire contemporaine racontée par les journalistes. Or l'information produite sur les conflits qui secouent le continent africain n'est souvent qu'une succession d'histoires racontées et commentées par les acteurs médiatiques du dehors de l'Afrique. La «voix» du continent se perd dans le paysage médiatique international devenu lui-même plus dynamique et plus instantané. Il faut renverser la tendance. Deux choix s'offrent au continent: accepter que sa vie soit racontée dans le langage d'autrui ou se réapproprier le roman de sa propre existence.

Picture Perfect

Greg Marinovich

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Résumé

Le photojournalisme de guerre en Afrique a une histoire mouvementée, peuplée de personnages hauts en couleur venant souvent d'endroits insolites. Tandis que des rebelles ou des aventuriers armés de kalachnikovs et d'appareils photo sillonnent les zones de guerre du continent de manières diverses, certains conflits ont été traités en profondeur par des médias indépendants et d'autres ont été moins documentés. Cela a laissé un riche héritage photographique, qui nous l'espérons fera partie des archives d'une histoire remarquable. A travers cet article, Greg Marinovich témoigne de son expérience de photojournaliste africain ayant couvert l'Apartheid et bien d'autres conflits. L'image peut-elle changer le cours de l'histoire?



African War photographers

War photographers are either sleazy and glamorous; or noble and glamorous. At least this is how it is depicted in various literary or big screen adaptations of photojournalists over the years.

The first famous camp-followers tale was Evelyn Waugh's *Scoop*, set in the fictitious Ishmaelia in the 1930's and the latest film adaptation of a book on photojournalists is *The Bang Bang Club*, very loosely based on Joao Silva and Greg Marinovich's book of the same name about South Africa's bloody transition to democracy.

One would think that there would be a flowering of photojournalism in the continent that inspired those two books, albeit without the quarter tons of luggage as required by correspondents of old. There is, after all, no shortage of conflict, famine and war on the continent to provide numerous scoops.

Yet when conflict photographers gather in hotspots to rekindle camaraderies in dimly lit hotels to the accompaniment of throbbing generators, few Africans are among them. The glaring exception is the South Africans. With all the conflicts in Africa, one would expect there to be more than the few war photographers who have emerged.

Why? If the causes are not compelling enough to warrant the risk and commitment, then surely the lure of hard currency, excitement, booze on expense accounts and sex-and-drugs-and-rock-&-roll are reason enough; if one is to believe the rather crass filmic fantasies of the lives of photojournalists.

A less than vigorous mainstream press across much our continent has previously discouraged independent journalists from covering conflicts. The relatively higher rates of poverty ensure that photojournalists or war photographers working in Africa are conspicuous - the person with the camera is so easily to identify, either to target or to prevent them working.

Despite this, there are some scenarios across the continent where war photography has played a role in determining how society and history view a conflict, perhaps even how that conflict has played out. More recently, there is a case to be made for the definition of conflict photography to be extended to include documenting the war of ideas.

It is perhaps in South Africa that photojournalism is best known for having influenced the course of events, especially in bringing to light the social effects of the previous white regime's Apartheid policies.

Documenting Apartheid

Four iconic photographers began work at about the same time in and around Johannesburg. Alf Kumalo, David Goldblatt, Peter Magubane and Ernest Cole. They all used their cameras as weapons in the struggle against racial oppression, yet fate gave them very different paths.

Kumalo passed away in October of 2012, having left a lifetime of negatives that document South Africa's violent path to democracy. He was particularly close to Nelson Mandela. He became the de facto Mandela photographer when he was in jail, chronicling the lives of his wife Winnie and the children Mandela could not watch grow up. "There were very few people with cameras but thank God we captured many events that have recorded the history of both the struggle and the peace and democracy." And while those images helped tell the story of the struggle for democracy, but were not without a lighter side, "I had requests from people saying they want pictures of Mandela as a baby, even forgetting that I'm a child compared to him, I mean he is so many years older than me!"

Magubane and Goldblatt also documented South African life, and continue to do so, well beyond their allocated three score and ten years. Yet the toll on the last of those four was the most profound. Cole was the one drank most deeply from the fountain of knowledge, and dug too deeply into documenting the injustices of Apartheid. He fled into exile in 1966, and spent 23 unhappy years traversing the globe until he committed suicide.

It was a later generation of South Africans inspired by the images of the previous decades who immersed themselves in the violence of the system, as well as the bloody transition to power in the Nineties. Four of these came to be known as the Bang Bang Club, and the skills they acquired covering the "Hostel Wars" led them to cover wars, conflicts and famines across the continent.

One of them, Ken Oosterbroek did not survive one of the last battles, and was shot dead in Thokoza township, just ten days before all South Africans finally cast their vote without regard for colour or race. Marinovich was severely wounded in the same incident.

Kevin Carter's image of the starving Sudanese child being apparently stalked by a vulture became an icon of African famine; yet contributed to him eventually committing suicide in 1994. Marinovich and Silva's images of Somalia's war and famine in 1992 were the first to enter the mainstream media, and led to extensive media coverage. This provoked the well-meaning but ill-fated international intervention of 1993 through 1994.

A new generation of African photojournalists itched to enter the international news arena. Themba Hadebe chose to be a photographer when he was a child soldier in the same Thokoza, watching the "Bang Bang Club" photographers at work. He now is a veteran with the Associated Press, and has covered stories around the world.

Soldiers versus Reporters

In the Horn of Africa, rather near to where Scoop was set, yet a lifetime later, another war took place. Eritrean guerrillas fought a protracted war of independence, from Ethiopian rule; first from the divine reign of Emperor Haile Selassie, and then from the Mengistu Haile Mariam's Derg regime. On paper, it seems unlikely that the Eritreans could ever defeat the militarily- and numerically-superior Ethiopian forces, who were initially supported by the USA and then the Soviet Union.

Uniquely, the Eritreans decided to document their liberation – they wanted to be in a position to write their own history, and not have their epic struggle distorted by the outside world's capricious attention span. More prosaically, they needed to ensure a steady stream of appropriate imagery to keep alive funding from the Eritrean diaspora.

Some of the fighters, both male and female combatants, were assigned as photographers. Their brief was to be both soldier and reporter, and to use their discretion when to shoot with the camera, or the gun.

Russom Fesahaye recounts how it began, "At first we were all guerrillas in the field. All I wanted to do was to fight. But later it was realised that we had to document the battles. I had worked in a photo lab in Asmara before I joined up. The Eritrean People's Liberation Force gave me a Zenith (camera). Gun in one hand, camera in the other. With a gun you can hide, not with a camera. You have to be right on the front line with the small ammunition."

It was also clear that one of the main reasons, perhaps the main reason, for documenting the liberation struggle was to fulfil the needs of propaganda & agitation – "Agitprop". The war of ideas, the need to unite disparate Eritreans behind the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). The Eritrean warrior-photographers were portraying their own conflict – does one really expect them to have adhered to the "objective" standards of journalism taught at Western schools?

While this does not exactly fit the image of the neutral war photographer, nor adhere to the accepted practice of journalism, the fact is that the efforts of these warrior photographers has left an archive that is unparalleled in African history. Three decades of war reportage from 1963 to 1991 has left a legacy of half a million black & white negatives.

Trawling the thousands of contact sheets, there are a large number of ordinary images interspersed with some of the most startling examples of war reportage. One image especially stood out - on a desert plain is a boy dressed in rags and staring into infinity, his face marked by the trauma of war. He is sitting on an unexploded 1,000 kilogram bomb dropped from the skies during the month long aerial and seaborne bombing assault on the city of Massawa by the Soviet-backed Ethiopian air force after the rebels had taken the vital Red Sea port.

The photographer, Solomon Abraha, a humble man who is now a television cameraman with the state broadcaster, captured the most telling image of industrialised warfare in a non-industrial society, he sees his role as one within a collective. In fact, the pictures were never published with a byline, they were anonymous. His overwhelming sentiment was that he worked within a collective, and his efforts were attuned to the success of that collective endeavour – The Struggle.

One of the best among the photo-warriors was Seyoum Tsehaye. He developed into a mentor to many of the photographers, including Solomon Abraha.

Seyoum understood his duty as a soldier was to follow orders: to record and show the struggle. Many photographers have been faced with the dilemma of wanting to put the camera down

to assist or escape the horror of an extreme situation. But Seyoum's discipline did not allow him any choices, so he continued to film. Inside, he says, he died a little every time he had to capture his civilian compatriots bleeding.

He recalls the month-long bombardment of Massawa in 1990, "I saw so many people killed. The child may be here and the mother there, sometimes both dead and sometimes the child is wounded and his mother is killed. It was cluster bombs that killed so many people at a time; burnt so many houses at a time, so it was like an inferno."

When telling his story, the veteran's eyes filled with unshed tears, "I cannot see these pictures again, because they just take me to that situation. As people were rushing to pull bodies out of the rubble, fearing the next attack, I ran towards these two kids standing there, the blood was flowing from their faces and their hands. And this girl, maybe she was five years old, she asked her elder brother, "Are these people going to bury us?" "No," he said, "they are going to take us to the hospital."

"So in one bombardment you could take pictures of people collecting all these wounded and dead bodies. And in the next bombardment, you see the person from your previous pictures - he is killed. So taking this picture and hearing what they are saying, it really killed me. I was just crying and I was out of control."

The Eritreans, and Seyoum, somehow withstood it all, gathering weaponry from their enemy in battle. The disintegration of the Soviet Union also heralded the end of the Superpowers using Eritrea and Ethiopia as their proxies, and the Eritreans finally won their freedom, after thirty years of struggle.

All Eritreans were proud of their sacrifices, and in the decade after 1990, they continued to do *pro bono* work on everything from resurrecting the Italian colonial railway and locomotives, to planting Neem trees along arid country roads.

But once the euphoria had waned, some veterans felt that they had the right to more than just national sovereignty - they wanted personal freedom too. After a decade of freedom, followed by a two-and-a-half-year border war against Ethiopia in 2000, collective thought and obedience are no longer ubiquitous.

Even among the elite of the ruling party, the fabric of revolutionary unity was fraying in the face of increasingly dictatorial rule. Many, like then Minister for Trade and Industry and co-founder of the ruling party, Haile Waldensae, questioned the failure of the government to make the transition to a true democracy, "We have to suffer from what we have done before. In following one line of thought, one school of thought, there are costs that one has to pay. That ideology was a very motivating thing and the people were very committed. That is why, in the liberation struggle period, the photographers - the propagandists - had an important role in the society."

"But it is not without a cost and it is particularly after independence that you start realising the cost. To not be very open, to not be very critical. There had not been a development of tolerance

to different opinions”, Weldensae spoke of his own failing as a leader. “The Eritrean people need much more room for democracy. It is not something that has to be granted. Almost every family has paid its dear sons and daughters to the struggle for 30 years. And in the last two and half years war with Ethiopia, families who had lost all their sons and daughters except one, have now contributed this only remaining child. Who has the right to air opinion more than this family? It’s not a privilege, it’s not something that a government or a political organisation or any individual should grant to them.”

Waldensae’s desire for freedom of expression saw him arrested and jailed without trial. It is believed he has been killed - executed - about a year after he was detained.

The veteran photographer Seyoum Tsehaye was barred from the frontline when he wanted to document this new war against the old enemy. He began to question its rationale, why did more sons and daughters blood have to nourish the already-sated soil? His attitude saw him being shadowed by the secret police in 2001. Within weeks, he was also jailed with trial, tortured repeatedly and kept in remote desert prisons. Occasionally, exiled Eritrean journalists get word of him from sympathetic prison guards, they say he has grown his beard as a protest and is still defiant, despite being in solitary for over a decade.

Whatever the politics behind the decision to send photographers into the field during their initial struggle, the fighter-photographers have left a crucial historic document behind.

It is quite rare that an African conflict is comprehensively covered by professionals with no stake in the outcome. Most modern civil wars are, in fact, widely documented by partisans who have a desire to show what is happening to their compatriots, or their comrades. Or they are sporadically documented by outsiders, and left to oral historians and politicians to spin tales of valour and cruelty over the scarred battlegrounds.

Confronting violence

One local photographer who decided to confront the violence around him and document images of scalding brutality is Kenyan photojournalist Boniface Mwangi. He did not have to travel to exotic locales to cover wars, rather, conflict came to him.

A couple of years before the orgy of post-electoral violence in 2007, Mwangi had an initiation into the violence underlying Kenyan society especially in the sprawling slums of Kenya’s capital.

“I knew some few people in Mathare so when Mungiki gang members shot two police officers in the slums, a friend of mine called me and told the slum had been cordoned off. The residents of Mathare will forever remember June 2007 as the month that armed police backed by the dreaded General Service Unit turned the slum into a killing field to avenge the murder of their two colleagues. When the guns fell silent, 14 people were dead, most of them shot at close range or from the back either having surrendered or been cornered. I had many images of Mungiki members who were arrested by police only their bodies to be later found at the

morgue with gunshot wounds. The coverage was risky because I wasn't allowed to take images of police executing the suspects and at one point they pointed a gun at me for trying to do that. The police brutality was sanctioned by the government and so even after publication of the images no one was reprimanded."

The Mungiki are a strictly Kikuyu ethnic gang who are said to induct members through gruesome secret rites. Many of these rites and the Mungiki culture are said to stem from the Mau Mau. The Mau Mau were the Kikuyu guerrillas fighting British colonial rule in the Fifties. The Kikuyu, also Kenya's most numerous group, went on to dominate post-independence politics. Many believe that the Mungiki were used by the old guard Kikuyu politicians to stay in power as they fleeced the countries coffers.

A couple of years later, Mwangi went on to be the most searing eye for Kenyans during the 2007 post-election violence. "My collection of mostly unpublished images present the unvarnished truth about that moment of madness when neighbour turned against neighbour. 1,100 people were murdered and a further 600,000 rendered homeless."

"Covering the post-election violence in my own country was extremely difficult, I had to falsify my identity in areas where certain ethnicities were not welcome. The perpetrators and victims spoke a language I could understand."

Mwangi is a Kikuyu, though absolutely unaffiliated to Mungiki, and thus he was simultaneously in a privileged and a disadvantaged position to document the spasm of violence as the old guard began to lose their iron grip on power.

Covering conflict in your own country is a risky affair. Mwangi has been detained in military camps and police stations, and repeatedly beaten in the course of doing his work. The organised criminals of Mungiki have threatened worse yet.

That, of course, is the indicator that Mwangi is following the correct path; that what he is doing has value. These experiences have pushed him to take his photojournalism into outright activism, sometimes with a camera and sometimes without.

While the outrage of patronage politics, widespread corruption and the use of ethnic gangsters to further political ambition is still rife in Kenya, some high profile figures have had to face charges at The Hague. Without the photographic evidence from photojournalists like Mwangi, the Kenyan communal conflict might have disappeared into the moral relativism of "anticipated" African electoral violence.

While brave and principled documenters like Tsehaye suffer in a desert jail, and others gave taken their own lives in despair, many others continue to work across the continent. The rapid advance in technologies such digital photography, mobile phones and the internet, means that anyone with the desire can document society around them.

There are more and more home-grown African photographers who are starting to establish a reputation as chroniclers of the conflicts and uprisings around them.

While there are still few world-renowned African war photographers, many less famous ones continue to document conflicts, injustice and abuse at great personal risk.

We need these men and women to document and show the cost of war and conflict on ordinary people. They are our equivalent of the coal miner's canary – an early warning system against greater horror.

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GOVERNANCE &
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GOUVERNANCE ET
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confronting Africa's democratic paradox
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Unconstitutional Changes of Government:
Confronting Africa's
Democratic Paradox

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Résumé

Cet article étudie le phénomène des changements anticonstitutionnels de gouvernement en Afrique et fournit des mesures fortes pour prévenir toute résurgence aux niveaux national, sous-régional et régional. Les auteurs avancent que la récente série de changements anticonstitutionnels de gouvernement en Afrique est une manifestation de la faiblesse générale des systèmes démocratiques et des institutions politiques. En conséquence, afin de dissuader les auteurs de ces actes anti-démocratiques, les pays devraient être encouragés à bâtir des institutions démocratiques crédibles, fortes et indépendantes et des mécanismes de gouvernance qui pourraient empêcher la corruption, promouvoir la bonne gouvernance, assurer la transparence et l'obligation redditionnelle, appuyer la société civile et la participation populaire dans la gouvernance et assurer un fort contrôle civil sur l'armée. En outre, il serait impératif que les élites politiques africaines se conforment aux règles, normes et principes qu'ils ont eux-mêmes adoptés volontiers.



Introduction

Africa's post-independence history has been fraught with the challenge of Unconstitutional Changes of Government (UCG), principally through military coup d'états. The enervating effect of this phenomenon has helped perpetuate dictatorships, subverted democratic governance, precluded the exercise of the rights of people to constitute or change their government and led to the gross violation of fundamental human rights.¹ Despite progress in consolidating democracy over the past two decades, the series of recent UCG has raised questions about the state of the democratic structures that are currently in place. In this paper, we argue that the re-emergence of UCGs, especially coup d'états, is a manifestation of the general weaknesses of the democratic systems and political institutions that have been established. Therefore, in order to remove much of the incentives for perpetrators of such undemocratic acts, we advance the argument that there is a need to move beyond targeted sanctions and condemnations to tackle the root causes of the problem, which are corruption, bad governance, weak political institutions and the unwillingness by political elites to abide by the set of rules, norms and principles that they have willingly or voluntarily signed on to.

The paper begins with a definition of UCG and explores the institutional frameworks adopted at the regional and sub-regional levels to prevent its occurrence. Next, we discuss the various forms and manifestations of UCGs in Africa, highlighting their causes and motivations. For analytical purposes, we limit our focus to the most recent events within the last decade. The subsequent section interrogates the efficacy of regional and sub-regional responses to UCG on the continent. Lastly, we conclude with some practical policy recommendations on how the African Union (AU) and the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) can improve their responses against UCGs in Africa.

Definition and Frameworks for Preventing Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa

The two main policy documents that currently define UCGs in Africa and underpin what we term as a democracy regime are the July 2000 Lomé Declaration and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) of January 2007. In the Lomé Declaration, Unconstitutional Changes of Government are categorized as:

- a. Military coup d'états against a democratically elected government;
- b. Intervention by mercenaries to replace a democratically elected government;
- c. Replacement of democratically elected government by armed dissident groups and rebel movement; and

¹ Omotola, J. S. (2011), "Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa: What Implications for Democratic Consolidation?" *Discussion paper 70*, Uppsala, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet

- d. The refusal by an incumbent government to relinquish power to the winning party after free, fair and regular elections.²

Article 23 (5) of the ACDEG) expanded this definition to include: “Any amendment or revision of the constitution or legal instrument, which is an infringement on the principles of democratic change of government.” The addition of this provision was to enable the AU respond adequately to incumbent presidents who temper with their country’s constitution to prolong their stay in power. However, important as this clause may be, it is an ambiguous clause which needs a very precise definition of what actually constitutes “any amendments or revision of the constitution or legal instrument”. Is it for instance amendments to extend presidential term of office or what? Francis Ikome has also argued that the Lomé Declaration over-emphasizes “legality” over “legitimacy” – thus, it prescribes only how power must be acquired and not how it should be exercised.⁴ Furthermore, situations such as the overthrow of governments through popular democratic uprising like the 2011 Arab Spring are also exempted from these two instruments. Since the only legal means through which governments can leave power is through democratic elections, it is important for the AU to clarify its position on such situations as to whether it amounts to UCG or not.

In dealing with UCG, some regional and sub-regional frameworks have been formulated. At the regional level, the position of the AU on UCG is guided by the Constitutive Act, the Lomé Declaration and the ACDEG. These instruments acknowledge the strict adherence to the principles of good governance, democracy, rule of law, transparency and human rights as an antidote to lessen the risk of UCG. Article 4(p) of the Constitutive Act provides for the “condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments” by all member states. Article 30 also states that “Government which shall come to power through unconstitutional means shall not be allowed to participate in the activities of the Union.” Moreover, the Article 4(h) of the Constitutive Act also recognizes the right of the AU to intervene in member state in circumstances of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. This provision is actually a major departure from the age-old principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states to the principle of non-indifference and sets the AU apart from its predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The Constitutive Act, the Lomé Declaration and the ACDEG also enjoins the AU to publicly condemn such undemocratic changes, suspend and sanction the government concerned and urge for the speedy return to constitutional order within a period of six months.⁵ The Article 7(g) of the July 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) gives the AU PSC that enforcement authority. Sanctions may include economic sanctions, trial of perpetrators by a competent court of the AU, which would presumably be the African Court of Justice which, to

2 See the Lomé Declaration of July 2000 on the framework for an OAU response to UCGs (AHG/Dec.5 (XXXVI))

3 For more information see Saungweme, S. (2007). “A Critical Look at the Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance” Open Society Initiative – Afrimap.

4 Ikome, F. N. (2007). “Good Coups and Bad Coups: The Limits of the AU’s Injunction on Unconstitutional Changes of Government”, *Institute for Global Dialogue Occasional Paper* 55.

5 See Article 30 of the Constitutive Act; Articles 25 of the ACDEG; Article 7(g) of the PSC Protocol

date, has not heard any case and a ban of perpetrators in participating in elections to restore constitutional order or taking any position of responsibility in government.⁶ Lastly, Article 25 of the ACDEG proscribes member states from harboring or giving sanctuary to perpetrators of UCGs as well as signing of bilateral agreements with such governments. At the sub-regional level, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has enacted a Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance in 2001 to compliment that of the AU.⁷ This protocol for instance emphasized the need for separation of powers and states that access to power must be through free, fair and transparent elections, with zero tolerance for power obtained through unconstitutional means and strict adherence to democratic principles.⁸ Others such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD) are in the process of negotiating similar instruments. But this notwithstanding, the Constitutive Act of the AU provides both a normative framework and a strong legal basis for actions to be taken against perpetrators of UCG by RECs who do not currently have any specific frameworks.

Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa: A Survey of the Various Forms

This section discusses some of the forms and manifestations of UCG focusing on recent developments across the continent. Specifically, we focus on military coup d'états, refusal of incumbents to relinquish power after electoral defeat and review of constitutional limits for tenure prolongation.

The Coups d'états Syndrome

Since the first coup in 1958 by Sudanese Lieut. Gen. Ibrahim Abboud and the subsequent assassination of Togolese President Sylvanus Olympio in 1963, there has not been any single decade without a coup activity on the continent. During the period that spanned the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and the early 1990s, military interventions became the norm that characterized Africa's political developments.⁹ But, with the demise of the Cold War and the new wave of democratization that swept through the continent from the 1990's, the incidence of coups dwindled considerably and became less common.¹⁰ In its place, multi-party politics with regular elections became the norm, robbing military rule of its legitimacy in most states. However, the

6 See Article 25 of African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance

7 See the Article 1 (b-e) of the ECOWAS Protocol A/SPI/12/01 on Democracy and Good Governance Supplementary to the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security (December 2001)

8 *ibid*

9 See McGowan, P. J. (2003), "African Military Coups d'états, 1956-2001: Frequency, Trends and Distribution" *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 3, 2003, p. 353.; Mwakikagile, G. *Military Coups in West Africa Since the Sixties* (New York: Nova Science Pub Inc, 2001).

10 See Souare, I. (2009), "The AU and the Challenge of Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa" ISS Paper 197; Ikome, (2007), *op. cit.*

phenomenon has re-emerged in recent times, undermining the tremendous progress made in consolidating democracy. Since 2000, countries such as Mauritania, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Niger and Mali have all fallen victims to military takeovers. But it would appear that most of the governments that were overthrown first of all lacked legitimacy, either as a result of their mode of ascension to power, the creation of a power vacuum, unpopular policies or abysmal performance in power.¹¹ In the case of Mauritania, although the immediate cause of the coup was the president's removal of four top military officials, there were other remote factors that included pressing issues such as corruption, rising poverty levels, soaring food prices, inability of the government to respond to threats from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the upsurge of drug trafficking throughout the country.¹² In Guinea, Captain Moussa Dadis Camara suspended the constitution and took charge of the country after the power vacuum that was created by the death of long-standing president Lansana Conté in December 2008.¹³ This was a situation where with an absence of a clear successor, the military seized power under the pretext of averting any instability that may sprang up. Similar to Mauritania, the coup was justified on grounds of excruciating poverty, corruption, marginalisation of youths and women in decision-making processes and the government's obvious failure to provide basic social services such as water and electricity.¹⁴ However, on the island nation of Madagascar, the situation seemed to be quite different. In contrast with the coups above, Andry Rajoelina, a former disc jockey and Mayor of Antananarivo, ousted President Marc Ravalomanana with the backing of the military in March 2009. The 2012 Malian coup also demonstrates a situation where the inability of the government to deal with threats emanating from Tuareg rebellion in the north of the country led to its overthrow by the military.¹⁵ The Malian coup actually portrayed a case of lack of governance and leadership. In conclusion, it can be gleaned from the foregoing discussions that, in all case of coups, irrespective of their causes or motivations, certain issues stand out clearly, namely endemic corruption, weak governance institutions and the inability of governments to respond to the socio-economic needs of the people.

Refusal of Incumbents to Relinquish Power after Electoral Defeat

The recent political stalemate in Kenya, Zimbabwe and subsequently in Côte d'Ivoire, where the incumbent presidents declined to relinquish power to the winning political party after their electoral defeat depicts yet another form of UCG on the continent. In Kenya, a Grand

11 Omotola, 2011, op. cit.

12 See "Mauritanian military stages coup" <http://www.aljazeera.com>, accessed 13 June, 2012; See also "Mauritania Rights and Liberties Report" <http://www.africa.com>, accessed 12 June 2012

13 See Aning, K. & Bah, S.A. (2008), "ECOWAS and Conflict Prevention in West Africa" Centre on International Cooperation, New York University.

14 For more information see Yabi, G. O. (2010), *The Role of ECOWAS in Managing Political Crisis and Conflict: The Cases of Guinea and Guinea-Bissau* (Abuja: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung)

15 See Laurence Deschamps-Laporte, "Jihadism and Tuareg nationalism are not the same" <http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/features/81475/print>, accessed 10 May 2012.

coalition government had to be created between the Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), with the former controlling the presidency and the latter filling the newly created prime ministerial position. The cabinet and other ministerial positions were also shared according to the number of seats each party controlled in parliament. Likewise, in Zimbabwe, the impasse over the March 2008 elections was finally halted after the two parties, Mugabe's Zimbabwe African National People's Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) of Morgan Tsvangirai signed a Global Political Agreement (GPA) together with a breakaway faction of the MDC led by Author Mutambara. In the GPA, President Mugabe was to maintain his position as the president while Morgan Tsvangirai became the prime minister.¹⁶ Even though the power-sharing arrangements finally discontinued the post-electoral violence in Kenya and Zimbabwe, it nevertheless set precedence for incumbents who lose competitive elections not to concede victory to the winners. Moreover, the observance of these arrangements has also been very exigent- the parties have made serious reservations about the level of compliance and non-compliance of the arrangements. But more significantly, the underlying issues that led to the conflict in both countries have still not been addressed and this can surface in the next elections and cause serious security problems. Côte d'Ivoire's situation seemed to be quite different from Kenya and Zimbabwe. The protracted violence that followed the 2010 presidential run-off elections between former President Gbagbo and Alasane Quattara led to the emergence of two parallel governments until the eventual forceful removal of Gbagbo by French/UN and pro-Quattara forces.

Review of Constitutional Limits for Tenure Prolongation

The practice of prolonging presidential term limits in Africa began in 1998, when the Namibian Constitution was amended to allow President Sam Nujoma to have a third term in office.¹⁷ Since then, Africa has witnessed a number of sitting heads of state attempting to or succeeded in extending their tenure of office beyond the constitutionally permitted term limits. Indeed, the manner in which some leaders carry out dubious constitutional reviews to remain in office makes it appear that without them their countries cannot survive or develop. To be precise, most of them see themselves as the embodiment of their states or indispensable to their countries future. As such, the arguments for continued stay in power has often ranged from allowing them time to complete reforms begun, ensuring political stability to the failure of any obvious successors to emerge.¹⁸ Others contended that it helps to retain the experience of the incumbent presidents for national development. But whatever constructive reasons that might be given; this practice derails the democratic process and daunts the development of new leadership that may permit new ideas and policies to move countries forward. It also

16 Cawthra, G. (2010), *The Role of SADC in managing Political Crises and Conflict* (Maputo: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung)

17 Nkongho, F.A. "Extension of Presidential Mandates in Africa" <http://law.nd.edu/center-for-civil-and-human-rights>, accessed 15 June 2012; Sturman, K. (2011), "Unconstitutional Changes of Government: The Democrat's Dilemma in Africa" *SAIIA Policy Brief*; Posner, N. D. & Young, D. (2007), "The Institutionalization of Political Power in Africa", *Journal of Democracy* 18(3):126-40

18 Nkongho, op cit.

breeds corruption as national resources are usually diverted to mobilize legislators to support such agendas.

Interrogating the Efficacy of Regional and Sub-Regional Responses

By far, the reaction of the AU against UCG has principally been contingent upon the political context of the country involved at any given period. Since 2004, the norms and values of the AU's framework for preventing UCG have been unevenly applied to states that have fallen foul of them. Ikome for example, notes that the responses of the AU have depended on the "states that have an interest in a particular coup country, as well as power coalition patterns on the continent and in the AU. It has also depended on the domestic reaction to the coup and the stakes a coup country have for the powerful global powers."¹⁹ On UCGs through constitutional amendment for tenure prolongation, the AU has mostly been apathetic, with its position sometimes even conflicting with that of the RECs. The case of President Mamadou Tandja of Niger in 2009 is illustrative of this assertion. The AU was mute when he unilaterally dissolved the democratically constituted parliament in his bid to extend his term in office. The AU only intervened when the government was overthrown by the military to steer the country towards the restoration of constitutional order.²⁰ On the contrary, ECOWAS suspended and sanctioned Niger for violating the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance. In actual fact, the AU's response to Tandja's bid to extend his term of office reflected how it dealt with similar situations elsewhere on the continent. Examples include past cases involving Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria, Iddris Deby of Chad, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and Paul Biya of Cameroon.²¹

The AU also faces serious dilemmas in dealing with incumbents who fail to relinquish power after their electoral defeat. The AU has not been firm, coherent and consistent in the application and implementation of its policy stance on such matters. In Kenya and Zimbabwe for example, where both incumbent presidents failed to relinquish power after their electoral defeat, the AU and SADC facilitated a power-sharing arrangement between the incumbent and the opposition parties. However, in the case of Côte d'Ivoire, the response was fairly different: the AU and ECOWAS supported Alassane Ouattara as the President elect until Gbagbo's forceful removal from office. These inconsistencies in response however raised some critical questions: thus, why did the AU adopt a firmer stance on Gbagbo than Mugabe and Kibaki when all of them refused to admit electoral defeats? Another issue that is worth mentioning is the lack of consensus and unity of purpose that characterized the AU and ECOWAS intervention in Côte d'Ivoire.²² This was manifested in the internal divisions between member states over the course of action to be taken in resolving the crises. For example within ECOWAS, while some

19 Ikome. (2007), op. cit.

20 Ormotola, (2011).

21 See Ormotola, (2011), op. cit; Ikome. (2007), op. cit.

22 See Aning, K. & Atuobi, S. (2011), "The Challenge of the Côte d'Ivoire crisis for West Africa: exploring options for a negotiated settlement" *KAIPTC Policy Brief 5*

member states like Nigeria supported military intervention to oust Gbagbo, others like Ghana rejected such actions for reasons of national security and foreign policy interests.²³

With respect to coups which are the most popular form of UGCs confronting the AU, it has since 2002 condemned, suspended and imposed sanctions on a number of countries including Madagascar, Togo, Mauritania, Central African Republic, Niger, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau and Mali. But in praxis, these policy responses have produced different policy outcomes with some notable successes and shortcomings. In Mauritania, the AU in addition to suspending the country from its activities, imposed sanctions including, the denial of visas, travel restrictions and the freezing of some assets belonging to those involved in the coup.²⁴ This was lifted in June 2009 to allow elections to be conducted the following month. But in contravention of the Article 25 of the ACDEG, General Aziz, the coup leader was allowed to participate in the elections which he won. Similarly, in February 2005, Faure Gnassingbe, the son of the late president Gnassingbe Eyedema of Togo defied the Togolese Constitution by assuming the presidency after the death of his father. In response, the AU followed the lead of ECOWAS by suspending and announcing sanctions against the country. Under the weight of ECOWAS and AU pressures and other international criticism, Faure Gnassingbe stepped down for elections to be held which he contested and won. ECOWAS and AU's responses in Togo proved effective, in that it restored constitutional order through a presidential election. However, the participation of the perpetrators in the elections in both Mauritania and Togo to some extent led to the validation of the coup. In the case of Guinea, members of the military junta were banned from taking part in the elections that followed the resolution of the impasse.²⁵ The AU and SADC produced a similar outcome in Madagascar in 2010. Madagascar was sanctioned and suspended from the AU and SADC following Andry Rajoelina's refusal to restore constitutional order after a military coup that conferred power on him. However, after some mediation talks and intense pressure from the AU and SADC, he stepped down to allow for a return to constitutional rule.²⁶ Without a doubt, it can be argued that it was the actions of the AU, SADC and other international actors that forced Rajoelina to step down to allow the restoration of constitutional order in the country.

The recent ECOWAS and AU intervention in Mali also demonstrated the willingness and ability of the two organisations to invoke their policies on UCG. The AU and ECOWAS strongly denounced the coup, sanctioned the military junta, and demanded an immediate return to civilian rule. Under intense pressure, the coup leaders handed over power to a civilian interim president to return the country to constitutional order. Although this is a major achievement, the intervention raises serious implications for the West African sub-region. In that, it suggests that any group of disgruntled soldiers can just take over power illegally and get away

23 Ibid; Aning, K. & Atuobi, S. (2011), "The Challenge of the Côte d'Ivoire crisis for West Africa: exploring options for a negotiated settlement" *KAIPTC Policy Brief 4*

24 See "African Union lifts sanctions on Mauritania" <http://www.reuters.com>, accessed 10 June 2012.

25 Omorogbe, E. Y. (2011), "A Club of Incumbents? The African Union and Coups d'État" *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law*, Vol. 44:123

26 Africa Policy Institute, (2009), "Madagascar: Regional Path to Peace", *API Policy Brief No.1*.

with it. Overall, while the AU has largely followed some consistent path in the application and implementation of its policy stance against UCG by way of coups d'états, this has not been the case for the other forms.

In Search of a more Sustainable Prevention: Some Policy Considerations

It must be noted that the adoption of multiparty constitutions and holding of regular elections are no guarantee against UCGs as the conditions that inspire it may still exist. Critical issues such as endemic corruption, weak political institutions, poor governance and economic mismanagement, political marginalization and weak civilian control over the military have come out clearly as the probable factors underlying most coups and other forms of UCG in Africa. Though some of these issues have existed since the early post-independence era, they have assumed new forms and intensity since the past decade. In particular, most government institutions and agencies such as the security services and judiciary continue to be ineffective and inefficient, non-functional, corrupt and subjected to political manipulation and intimidation in most countries like Guinea-Bissau. In reality, governance on the continent has not generated the much needed impact on the longstanding problems of human security, transparency and accountability, corruption, adherence to the rule of law, electoral credibility and economic mismanagement. More ominously, the emergence of new security threats such as issue of narcotics and other organized crimes, terrorism and religious extremism have further aggravated the already precarious situation, putting at risk the very foundations of states on the continent.

In order to remove much of the incentives for perpetrators of this undemocratic act, we advance the argument that there is a need to move beyond targeted sanctions and condemnations to tackle the root causes of the problem. At the national level, countries should be encouraged to build credible, strong, and independent democratic institutions and mechanisms of governance that would eradicate endemic corruption, promote good governance, ensure transparency and accountability, increase civil society and civic participation in governance and ensures strong civilian control over the military. More importantly, policies and programmes that respond to the socioeconomic challenges of the people, strengthens the efficiency of institutions such as parliaments and judiciary as well as reform of the security sectors inherited from post-colonial period should be identified, prioritized and effectively implemented. Governments must also note that the best insurance against illegal seizures of power depends largely on the effectiveness, sustainability and reliability of democratic institutions and the system of governance that are put in place.

A propos responses to UCG at the regional and sub-regional levels, the AU and the RECs should be more firm and consistent in the application of the Lomé Declaration, ACDEG and other relevant instruments against perpetrators irrespective of the personalities and countries involved. The AU needs to take a firm stand against power-sharing arrangements as it is an

affront to democracy and can serve to embolden some incumbent presidents to cling on to power when they lose elections. Perpetrators of UCG should also not be allowed to contest for elections that are meant to restore constitutional order because they will always manipulate the process in their favor. Besides, it is a violation of the ACDEG. Moreover, the Article 25(5) of the ACDEG states that *"Perpetrators of unconstitutional change of government may also be tried before the competent court of the Union."* However, till date, no perpetrator has been tried before any Court of the AU. Probably, it is time the AU put in place institutions and mechanisms that can effectively execute this provision to serve as a deterrent to would-be violators. In conclusion, the AU and the RECs need also to move to a more principled approach in its responses, facilitating preventive measures through, for example, early warning. In that regard, the early warning mechanisms of the RECs should be effectively interfaced with the AU Situation Room to ensure that the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) of the AU receives relevant, accurate and timely data for preventive actions to be taken.

Choice Matters:

Elections and Democracy in Africa

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Résumé

Cet article constitue un panorama des élections en Afrique au cours de la dernière décennie et met en lumière leur double rôle dans l'accession à la démocratisation ou le maintien des dictatures. Les auteurs soutiennent que le résultat d'un processus électoral dépend de la façon dont il respecte le principe de la «certitude procédurale et d'incertitude sur le fond », c'est-à-dire la certitude dans le processus menant au scrutin et l'incertitude quant au futur vainqueur. Dans une certaine mesure, les États africains ont réalisé des progrès en matière de démocratisation. Cependant, beaucoup reste à faire afin de consolider les acquis réalisés et pour se prémunir contre un recul. L'article met en évidence des exemples d'élections qui ont atteint ou dépassé les attentes de «certitude procédurale et d'incertitude sur le fond» et explique pourquoi l'utilisation abusive de ce principe dans d'autres cas a conduit à l'illégitimité, au conflit et à la violence.



Introduction

Elections occupy an important place in a democracy. They are the kernel of political accountability and a means of ensuring reciprocity between leaders and citizens (Adejumobi, 2000). Although elections are not synonymous to democracy, they embody democracy's main principle. Yet, their centrality in democratisation is not clear cut. Elections can either advance democracy or shield autocracy. This depends almost entirely on the context and the management of the electoral process. Free and fair elections are a useful milestone towards democratic consolidation (Lindberg, 2006), as they confer credibility and legitimacy to the process and outcome. In other words, legitimacy is conferred by the people and actual exercise of choice at the ballot is critical.

Elections are a means to governance. They allow people to determine the government in power and how power is exercised to manage public affairs. In many other places in the world, including Africa and the US, the exercise of real choice during an election is never always guaranteed (Palast, 2003). There is a central principle of fairness guiding elections that calls for 'procedural certainty and substantive uncertainty' that has been repeatedly abused. As Thandika Mkandawire, (1999:119) argues, Africa's Big Men believe in choosing their own voters. They have devised ways to short-circuit the possibility of real competition and exercise of choice such that there appears to be a specific African logic to multi-party elections that aims to eviscerate the electorate (Adebanwi and Obadare, 2011).

This chapter provides an overview of elections in Africa over the last decade or so and sheds light on their twin role in facilitating democratisation or maintaining elected dictatorships. We argue that the outcome of an electoral process depends on how the process abides by the principle of 'procedural certainty and substantive uncertainty'; that is, certainty in the process leading to balloting and uncertainty on the eventual winner (Mozaffar and Schedler, 2002: 11). In other words, we argue that elections are credible if the rules of the game do not predetermine the winner. The chapter acknowledges extenuating factors within the political environments in which electoral processes are conducted but argues that the success of an electoral process depends on how electoral management bodies pass the test of political neutrality.

To some extent African states have achieved progress in democratisation. However, considerable ground is yet to be covered in consolidating the gains so far made and in guarding against relapse. We highlight notable examples of recent elections that have met or surpassed expectations of 'procedural certainty and substantive uncertainty' and explain why the abuse of the principle in other cases has led to illegitimacy, disputes and violence. In large measure, these outcomes undermine civil liberties, postpone popular participation and stall the democratisation process.

Overview of Elections in Africa

In a liberal democracy, elections function to select the political representatives of the people. Elections commit leaders and the led to a periodic mandate that is renewable at the end of an electoral cycle. For the contract to be valid, the leaders need legitimacy conferred at a fair and transparent electoral process. The mandate depends entirely on the legitimacy of the electioneering process, a process whose governance should guarantee and safeguard voting rights and actual exercise of choice at the ballot.

Liberal democracy however differs from classical idea of democracy as popular power (Ake, 1992). Although people occupied political office in traditional African societies, elections were not prerequisite for people to enjoy popular participation in governance. Voting in its current form is therefore recent in African political vocabulary, dating mainly to the colonial period (Jinadu, 1995). In colonial times, Europeans introduced a racialised notion of the franchise in the political process and the extension of voting to the majority of Africans was a late colonial affair. Otherwise, Africans were denied voting rights.

We identify four main phases in the practice of elections in Africa in recent times. These are i) the transition from colonialism to independence, ii) the one-party era, iii) the transition to a multi-party dispensation and iv) the current era of attempted democratic consolidation. In the first phase, elections were conducted mainly to confer legitimacy to nationalist leaders who assumed political power at independence. These were transition to African rule elections and they favoured the radical arm of the nationalist movements who preferred 'independence now' and total detachment from the colonial powers (Laakso and Cowen, 2002). The nationalist forces embraced political liberalization and competition because it conferred respectability to their cause and guaranteed freedom from the colonial masters.

The zeal for democratic governance evaporated soon after independence. The elite who took over began to champion one-party rule. This soon morphed into authoritarianism in some cases, military rule in others and open and vile dictatorships in extreme cases. It took a while for the masses to discern the unfolding authoritarian streak in their leaders as one after another embraced the one party rule. Some leaders consequently became objects of official adulation while others in Malawi and then Zaire simply took the cue to declare themselves presidents for life.

By the late 1960s, elections were a rarity as military dictatorship and authoritarianism dominated. This situation was exacerbated by the condition of power under the Cold War where protagonists propped up dictators and military regimes as part of their Cold War strategy. The regimes that were propped, like that of Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, remain egregious examples of tyranny. Change in political leadership for most of these countries came either after the death of the sitting president or through military coups or carefully managed elections whose results were devoid of the principle of substantive uncertainty.

Indeed, very few African countries like Senegal, Botswana, Kenya, and Tanzania held periodic elections during the Cold War period. But they rarely allowed elections to be competitive to the point of facilitating regime change. Change occurred to a new president in a few countries

but under vastly varying circumstances. In Senegal, the transition from Léopold Sedar Senghor to Abdou Diouf in 1981 was more of an internal Socialist Party of Senegal (SPS) succession while in Botswana, Seretse Khama of Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) died in office in 1980 and was succeeded by Katumile Masire who was re-elected in 1984, 1989 and 1994 before he retired in 1998. The dominance of SPS ended in 2000 while BDP still reigns under Khama's son, Ian Khama.

The end of the Cold War came with euphoria for democracy. This 'contributed significantly to the new power, visibility, and effectiveness of the new political parties, leaderships, and pro-democracy movements' across the continent (Ihonvbere, 1996: 346). Dubbed the second coming of *uhuru*, new requirements for the political process emerged. Among these was a demand for democratic governance hinged as it was on an emphasis on periodic competitive multi-party elections accompanied with presidential term limits. Major transformations subsequently took place in countries like Benin where a National Conference in 1991 stripped Mathieu Kerekou of powers he had steadily accumulated since October 1972 when he seized power in a military coup. The Conference secured the transition process. It was the power of multi-party politics that ultimately silenced self-proclaimed life presidents like Kamuzu Banda and Mobutu Sese Seko. They both made rare concessions to civil society before they were eventually ousted from power. In Lesotho, the ruling Basotho National Party (BNP) was defeated by the Basotholand Congress Party (BCP) in 1993 after twenty-three years in power (Neocosmos, 2002).

Less glamorous yet important changes took place in other countries. In Kenya, Moi conceded to multi-partyism in 1990. However, he abused the principle of procedural certainty to secure a favourable electoral outcome in the 1992 and 1997 multi-party elections. This was just one example of how, in many places in Africa, old and new leaders alike circumvented fair and competitive democratic elections by manipulating the rules of the electoral process, harassed the political opposition and compromised any possible gains for democratic progress.

The momentum of the euphoric phase began to ebb by the turn of the century. Not only were there old and emerging new challenges to democratic consolidation but the cumulative effect of this was increasing frustration among the people about the failed promise and deferred hopes of the second *uhuru*. Some opted not to participate in elections as the incidences of opposition boycott in Senegal, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, and Uganda illustrate. The opposition did not help solve matters in these countries as they lacked internal democracy, did not articulate any distinguishing ideology or programme and treated elections as an avenue to raw power. This not only intensified fears about the prospects for real change but also crystallised the feelings of frustration among citizens. A number of reasons explain the sense of frustration.

Sense of Frustration

In many countries the basis of political transition had been tenuous at best. The declaration of multi-party politics occurred without any serious structural and constitutional changes. As such, the basis for any sustainable project of transformation was weak or lacking, thereby reproducing in multi-party context tendencies that characterised the one-party or military

rule. For instance, the nature and make-up of political parties has stalled democratisation. Not only were parties weak for the task of political competition and entrenching democracy, few of them were anchored in any social base. The lack of internal democracy in existing political parties dented any prospects of their being vehicles for democracy. Further, they lacked firm ideological grounding, were populated by individuals whose record or commitment to democracy was at best lukewarm and inconsistent. Matters were not helped by politicians who bastardised political parties through their desire to use them as objects for ascending to power with an eye to primitive accumulation of wealth. They perfected the art of party hopping to an illogical extent. As one Kenyan politician quipped, political parties are like a *matatu* (privately-owned public transport vehicle), if you miss one, you take the next (see Kiraitu Murungi as cited in Kagwanja and Ringera, 2012: 214).

The combination of opposition party weakness and dominance of incumbent president has driven a damaging nail in the prospects of elections democratising Africa. Opposition weakness is not simply the product of fecklessness on the part of the party but rather the weakness is partly politically engineered by the dominant executive incumbent (Opalo, 2012, 86). In Cameroon, the influence of the Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM) on power has been facilitated by a process that limits the influence of the opposition in the legislature through gerrymandering and preventing the emergence of an independent electoral oversight board. In an instance where the ruling party is dominant, effecting changes to the rules governing elections to ensure a level playing field has been next to impossible. This is because of the control the incumbent enjoys over Election Management Bodies (EMB). Worse, opposition parties have not distinguished themselves once in power. The actions of Frederick Chiluba in Zambia and Abdoulaye Wade in Senegal illustrate the sameness of parties in African politics. Their record at muzzling the opposition, the calculated use of office for corrupt ends and their attempt to or success in changing the constitution to remove the term limits all point to a general problem of weak institutionalisation of political competition for which the character of the political elite across the aisle is partly to blame.

The political elite in Africa are not committed to transforming the state through issue-based politics. They treat politics as "a high-stake contest for raw power and resources," view elections "as 'war by other means', and electoral victory [as] a do-or-die affair" (Obi, 2011: 372). This is not simply with reference to militarised politics in Nigeria that Obi writes about but also many other places where violence has become a 'normalised' medium of transaction in politics. This militarisation of the elite political practices has gone the extent of creating and maintaining criminal gangs mainly as party and campaign youth. These practices feed into the factionalised nature of politics and the attendant ethnic mobilisation for votes that dominates during electioneering. Together with the desire to bias the electoral field that is a regular practice used in Africa to undermine the principle of procedural certainty, these have resulted in a lack of confidence and general citizen frustration with elections.

This is how elections attract violence of different scales of ferociousness. Consequently, gangs and related merchants of violence have become key players in elections. Some of these merchants use state apparatuses to block political reforms and harass opponents with the

aim of making the electoral environment uncertain. The more uncertain the process leading to elections, the more uncivil and unpredictable the terrain and the better for these merchants of violence. The extent to which state institutions are informalised fuels the uncivil behaviour of the elite around elections and illustrates how most politicians treat politics as a do-or-die affair. The character of the political elite therefore accounts for the bad fortunes of Africa's democratisation process through elections and explains the frustration among youthful Africans.

The mobilisation around elections has often assumed an ethnic, religious, clan or class dimension depending on the country in question. In much of Africa, ethno-regional considerations loom large in party politics and electioneering. Politicians repeatedly defect from one to the other party depending on the ethnic pendulum thereby distorting the line between parties and party manifestoes or programmes. Due to this criss-crossing of members, party manifestoes have tended to be alike, making it impossible to rally support on clearly distinguishable party agenda and programmes. It is precisely because of this likeness that the notion of 'choiceless democracies' makes sense (Mkandawire, 2008). How can there be exercise of choice in a political contest where political parties are hardly different? This lack of difference explains the stalling of democratic gains with the incumbents devising ways of rigging elections and quite often deploying police and military force to abuse the electoral process. By the turn of the new millennium, the electoral field remained very uneven, reaching to a new demand for real change mounted.

Elections and Civil Liberties in Africa since 2000

Have elections contributed towards consolidation of democracy, guarantee for civil liberties and greater popular participation? The picture by the turn of the millennium was complex and mixed. Mixed in the sense that there are several African countries where gains in civil liberties, governance and democracy have been attained and safeguarded and others where this has stalled. Ken Opalo (2012: 84) cited a four-fold categorisation of African countries: electoral democracies, emerging democracies, consolidating/consolidated autocracies and those that remain ambiguous. Readers can make further reference to the article.

However, such categorisation does not capture the fluid nature of electoral politics. For instance, South Africa and Mali have taken trajectories that dent their claims to guaranteeing civil liberties and democracy. The outright murder of protesting miners in South Africa in August 2012 and the retreat into civil war in Mali sparked by a coup d'état in March 2012 point to the fragility of gains accruing from the electoral democracies. On the other hand, the ease with which Ghana and Malawi handled the transition from the departed John Evans Atta Mills and Bingu wa Mutharika to John Dramani Mahama and Joyce Banda is reason for cautious optimism. What distinguishes these countries is the existence of and respect for institutions of governance. While in Malawi parliament and the military restrained competing politicians from altering the constitution to deter Banda from ascending to power, the quick transition in Ghana and the recent election of President Mahama have been remarkable for their smoothness.

Institutions that safeguard laid down constitutional principles are therefore important for elections and stability and for entrenching civil liberties and ensuring participation. In some of the electoral democracies Opalo cited, the independence of and respect for the EMBs has been crucial, tolerance in campaigning is exercised and concession to the winner is freely made. Independent institutions are the reason why in a number of countries, the principle of term limits is respected whether grudgingly or not and attempts to challenge it has been defeated. In Senegal, the push for a third term for Wade ended in a humiliating defeat at the polls thanks to the associational liberties enjoyed in the country. Where the principle has been respected grudgingly, the desire to impose a preferred successor failed. In others countries, however, political participation and competition has been effectively thwarted and the electioneering process held hostage.

We must reiterate that consolidation of democracy is a tenuous process. The 2002 elections in Kenya that ushered in Mwai Kibaki as president gave the impression of healthy electoral competition and a degree of political maturity as the opposition party, National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) ousted the long-serving Kenya African National Union (KANU) regime after 24 years of authoritarian rule. But shortly afterwards, the new president began to backtrack on many electoral promises including the promise for constitution review (Murunga and Nasong'o, 2006: 2). This backtracking split the party and generated a wave of cutthroat competition that led to the Post Election Violence (PEV) in the 2007. Contending parties treated the vote as a zero-sum game in which winners won everything and losers lost everything. The fear of losing power pushed the incumbent to manipulate the vote tallies, declare victory and get sworn in at night thereby thrusting the country into a violence orgy that saw over 1,133 dead and more than 350,000 displaced (Republic of Kenya, 2008: 346, 352).

Electoral Contexts, Disputes and Violence

Electioneering process takes place within specific contexts that are laced with their own exigencies. The context impacts on the electoral process and outcome in many ways. Where elections result in or exacerbate disputes, violence and conflict, the reasons for these should be sought in the socio-political context that produced the electoral governance system. By this, we refer to the overall constitutional framework that stipulates the "broad institutional framework in which voting and electoral competition takes place" (Mozaffar and Schedler, 2002: 7). Of course, and as Mozaffar and Schedler further elaborate, there are also the other levels of rules making where the institutions and rules of electoral competition are made, of rule implementation where tasks to different personnel are spelled out and execution of the different mandates undertaken and of rule adjudication where mediation and settlement of disputes takes place.

The task of managing the exigencies of the context of electoral competition goes to the applicable levels of rule making, rule implementation and rule adjudication. Of course, technical failures do occur that are not necessarily the product of fraud. But on balance, election related disputes, violence and conflicts arise from a breakdown in electoral governance that surpasses

the acceptable limits of a genuine margin of error. And many of the errors are manufactured and deployed by a political elite who equate politics to warfare and political competition as a means to an end, 'the end being the hijack and consolidation of power, and the resources it guarantees. [to] the dominant ruling class, rather than as a means of inducting representatives with a genuine agenda for social transformation' (Adebanwi and Obadare, 2011: 327).

The violent logic embraced by the elite reflects the character of local politics that focuses on raw power. The drive for raw power has repeatedly undermined electoral governance systems in Africa since the onset of multi-party politics with catastrophic post-election consequences. The drive for raw power thrives in weak, unstable and divisive political environments and incumbents are determined to abrogate the electorate by whatever means possible (Adebanwi and Obadare, 2011).

Often, lack of participation stems from mobilisation of existing diversities for political gain. The notion of "Ivoirité", created by Henri Konan Bédié and widely used by Laurent Gbagbo to delegitimize the claim to citizenship of communities in the North of Côte d'Ivoire illustrates the mindless use of ethnicity to sideline political competitors and their supporters. In this case, the aim was to sideline Alassane Ouattara ahead of the 1995 presidential elections. In Kenya, the repeated instances of pre-election ethnic clashes in 1992 and 1997 were designed to disenfranchise communities in the Rift Valley and the Coast Province. Such a strategy of circumventing the electorate has in other cases been facilitated through gerrymandering or simply removing unwanted voters from voter registers leading to disenfranchisement of whole communities. The release of distorted information on where voting takes place, who takes charge of the voting station, who secures the ballot papers, how the counting proceeds and who tallies and announces the results have all combined to tilt the electoral field.

In Côte d'Ivoire, the conflict between the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) and the Constitutional Council over the outcome of the 2010 elections aggravated an already tense post-conflict situation leading to escalation of tensions, violence and partial return to civil war. It did not matter in Côte d'Ivoire that an elaborate process to secure the credibility of elections had been negotiated through the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement and elections were postponed five times between 2005 and 2010 partly to safeguard their credibility and get the UN as an impartial arbiter to certify the election results. In annulling the IEC declaration of Ouattara as winner, the Constitutional Council in fact abrogated the provision dealing with irregularities in the Election Act thus further undermining their own credibility (Matlosa and Zounmenou, 2011). The Côte d'Ivoire example finely illustrates the arrogance of raw power.

Conclusion: Avoiding Post-Election Violence

The example of Côte d'Ivoire cited above illustrates what is wrong with elections in a conflict situation but also the role of the African Union (AU) on resolving election-related disputes and violence. We wish therefore to conclude with a word on the importance of the AU in institutionalising the mechanisms to resolve disputes.

The need for institutions that can withstand the pressures generated by elite greed for power and the do-or-die competition this engenders is long overdue. This is important because PEV is fast becoming the Achilles' heels of development and democracy in Africa. Already, the AU and other Regional Organisations have established important normative frameworks to address this issue. These include, among many others, the African Charter on Human and People's Rights (1981), Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000), Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation (2000), OAU/AU Declaration Governing Democratic Elections in Africa (2002), The Guidelines for African Union Electoral Observation and Monitoring Missions (2002), Protocol to the ACHPR relating to women (2003), Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (2004), African Youth Charter (2006) and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (2007). In 2010, the AU in collaboration with International Peace Institute issued a *Report of the Panel of the Wise on Election-Related Disputes and Political Violence* which stressed Strengthening the Role of the AU in Preventing, Managing, and Resolving Conflict. The report identified the problems of democratisation in Africa, reiterated the value of existing normative frameworks and made recommendations for future action.

However, two major issues stick out from this good record of norm setting. First, the willingness of African governments to implement the norms is weak or absent. Indeed, few are unwilling to ratify some of the charters precisely because they are not committed to them. Second, this unwillingness perpetuates an external non-African urge to adopt and support minimalist approaches to democracy and opens the door to forces outside the continent who front their own interests whenever PEV strikes. It is true as Adebawo and Obadare (2011: 315-316) argue that for many western governments, "the capacity of 'victorious' [African] elites to maintain legitimacy and stability in their respective African countries ultimately counts for more than ensuring actually transparent elections and the electoral sovereignty of citizens.' In other words, they easily trade off the radical change that free and fair elections promise for stability. This in itself makes the case for continental initiatives to take precedence over other external initiatives. The experience of the AU mediation in Kenya and in Côte d'Ivoire highlighted the significance of a strong and collective resolve of the AU on such matters.

However, it might be necessary to revisit and evaluate the feasibility of mediation agreements around elections that prefer power sharing as a solution. Where it worked in Kenya and has provided the basis for reforms that should strengthen the country as it heads to the next elections in March 2013, power sharing has yielded different results in Zimbabwe where Morgan Tsvangirai's MDC sits uncomfortably with Mugabe's ZANU-PF and was stillborn in Côte d'Ivoire where Gbagbo hoped to generate a stalemate so as to engineer power sharing. Further, power sharing seems to dilute the very idea of opposition in Africa since the ease with which the opposition is incorporated into government suggests that the ultimate desire for opposing is to access raw power under any circumstance.

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Religion and ethnicity in Africa: an obstacle to development?

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Résumé

Alors que le centre de gravité des défis au développement de l'Afrique (politique, sociale, économique et territoriale) ne peut pas être situé dans un seul cadre, cet article tente de le circonscrire dans le contexte de la marginalisation ethnique et le fanatisme religieux. L'article soutient que la marginalisation et l'exclusion des groupes ethniques de l'évolution politique, sociale ou économique, conduit à l'émergence de groupes de militants ou d'insurgés dont les actions vindicatives retardent et affectent le développement d'un pays ou d'une région. L'article s'appuie sur l'exemple du groupe rebelle et semi-religieux de Joseph Kony, l'Armée de résistance du Seigneur (LRA), qui provient du groupe ethnique Acholi du nord de l'Ouganda. Afin d'atteindre son objectif qui est de mettre fin à la marginalisation du Nord de l'Ouganda, la LRA associe les tactiques militaires aux pratiques religieuses extrémistes créant ainsi une atmosphère empreinte de mysticisme et de peur au sein du groupe lui-même et des populations locales.



Introduction

Majority of the major religions such as Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Animism believe in the concept of a supreme being. The practice and approach of religion however takes on diverse forms. Whilst some adherents are tolerant of other beliefs and express their faith peaceably, others are bigoted and fanatical. In pursuing their agenda, fanatics have in the name of their religion and in some cases, carried out public acts of violence and terror against persons or establishments that supposedly fall outside of, or in some instances within the purview of their faith or religious convictions. Religious fanaticism is defined as an excessive and single-minded zeal of a person or group for a religious cause. Religious fanaticism takes on different forms and functions, a subset of which is insurgency, expressed in either a violent or non-violent manner. Examples of such religious groups that exhibit(ed) such extremist idiosyncrasies include: Al-Qaeda (Afghanistan); Hamas (Palestine); Aum Shinrikyo (Japan); Ku Klux Klan (USA); Army of God (USA); Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb - AQIM (Mali, Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger and Tunisia); Boko Haram (Nigeria); Lord's Resistant Army (Uganda, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and the Central African Republic [CAR]); Al-Shabaab (Somalia) and the Islamic Salvation Front (Algeria). Such radical religious sects have become a major source of terror, threat and worry at the local, regional and international levels; accordingly, a number of them have been flagged as terrorist groups.

In probing the dynamics of religion, ethnicity and the likely challenges they pose to sustainable development, this article focuses on ethnic marginalization and how unaddressed grievances and frustrations stemming from exclusion provides an impetus for insurgency. Identity factors such as religion and ethnicity in or of themselves, do not beget insurgency or violence. However in a society polarized into two imbalanced divides with one faction feeling marginalized, these factors may provide the foundation or become vehicles for the rise of insurgents or militant groups, some of which are underpinned by extreme religious beliefs and practices. Over time, the perpetuation of imbalanced conditions and inequalities lead to a myriad of social, cultural and political grievances that provide a predisposition for factions from within marginalized groups to rebel or find 'unorthodox' channels of expressing their grievances or redress. While the exact locus of Africa's development challenges (political, social, economic and regional) cannot be situated within a particular cause or event, we situate it within the context of the marginalization of some ethnic and religious groups from political, social, or economic developments and its fallout of insurgencies along identity lines. As a case study for discussion, we draw on Joseph Kony's quasi-religious rebel group, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which originated from the Acholi marginalized ethnic group in northern Uganda. The paper is structured as follows: an introduction; a discussion on ethnic marginalization and the rise of insurgent groups; case study of the LRA and its implications thereof on political, social, economic, regional development; recommendations and conclusion.

Ethnic Marginalization and the Rise of Militant Religious Groups in Africa

Africa is a melting pot of diverse ethnicities, cultures, clans, regions, languages, religions, and many more. Identities, hinged particularly on ethnicity and religion matters in most if not all, African societies. In the words of Haynes (2007), these multiple identities “oftentimes affect social interactions, political progression, and national development.” The twin factors of ethnicity and religion particularly, often merge to create problems or conflicts at the local, national or regional levels in a number of heterogeneous African countries in which some groups are often excluded from national development. In such instances, grievances stemming from identity crisis (ethnic marginalization and religious divisions) often coalesce with a peculiar set of circumstances - political, social, and ideological to assume violent dimensions or birth insurgency (Juergensmeyer 2004). Examples of pervasive conflicts and development challenges underscoring ethnic marginalization and/or religious factors can be drawn from countries such as Nigeria, Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Mali, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, Libya, Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad and Burkina Faso among others.

The issue of identity crisis within Africa has often been linked to the legacies of colonialism that arbitrarily grouped varied groups into administrative colonies. According to Aning & Salihu (forthcoming), “the formation of artificial borders and boundaries by the colonizers created fragmented societies marked by different identities within and among nation-states.” As a result, many historians share the belief that ethnic community ideologies became entrenched in contact with the European invasion (Lentz, 2000). The artificiality of these boundaries and the lumping of different ethno-cultural groups together, to an extent contributed to rivalry and antagonism among groups. With some groups being favored by the colonizers and thereby having a measure of dominance, control and access to resources and power began to be manipulated by individuals and groups of particular ethnic affiliations to the detriment of others.

Marginalization along identity lines however led to antagonism, polarizations and rivalries with devastating impacts on political stability, sustainable development, economic livelihoods, nation building, education, and healthcare (with women and children being the most affected). For instance, in the political domain of most African countries, political leadership and allocation of state resources are often determined on the basis of ethnicity and/or religion thereby creating a setting where employment, development resources and other benefits leads to competition among ethnic communities and sometimes religious groups (Posner, 2007; Kobia, 2010). In Kenya, studies have shown that the acquisition of political power by an ethnic group increases its prospects to development resources, employment and education creating a feeling of marginalization among other competing ethnic groups (Oloo, 2010). Also of prominence is the example of the bipolarized society of Rwanda where the “*Tutsization*” of the economy (control of power and resources) by the minority Tutsi elitist ethnic group

resulted in a violent revolt from the majority yet marginalized Hutus; leading to the massacre of over 800,000 people mainly Tutsis in the 1994 genocide (Reyntjens, 2006).

Linked to the issue of identity marginalization is the proliferation of insurgent or militant groups as channels for “disfranchised groups ... to gain a shred of power or influence” (Juergensmeyer 2003). In tracing the advent of insurgents or militant groups in Africa, Kubia (2010) categorizes it into four historical phases:

(1) Pre-colonial period when reformers mobilized resistance against oppressive traditional rulers in societies with centralized sources of authority; (2) The period of the scramble for Africa when colonial powers moved into Africa to annex their spheres of influence; (3) The liberation struggle, which pitted Africans against their colonial masters who they were determined to drive out of their newly created states so that they could reclaim the land and, more importantly, the dignity and freedom that the colonized people believed would be the products of self-rule and political independence; and (4) The realization that the much-sought-after independence did not fulfill the expectations of the masses.

Invariably characterized by well or loosely structured hierarchal systems, militant groups thrive on religious and ethnic marginalization, identity polarization and fractionalization in most African societies (Collier, Hoeffler & Söderbom, 2004; Ikelegbe & Okumu, 2010). According to Ikelegbe & Okumu (2010), the objectives of such groups usually “relate to projecting or protecting, fighting for and defending certain private groups, communal, ethnic, religious, sectional, regional, national, regime or related interests that may concern power and resource struggles, security and safety.” Indeed, most militant groups in Africa such as the Boko Haram, LRA, AQIM, and Al-Shabaab are noted to have risen on the basis of social injustices, unequal distribution of national resources, bad governance, poverty, and ethnic or religious marginalization (Marr, 1994; Lentz, 2000; Herbst, 2000). Consequently, in most African countries militant groups have become key actors of ethnic, religious and resource conflicts, contributing to underdevelopment and human insecurity (Ikelegbe & Okumu, 2010). For example, the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, which emerged in 2002 was supposedly inflamed by the continued high corruption and poor governance that impoverished and marginalized the predominantly Muslim population of northern Nigeria (Brock, 2012). Since its inception till date, attacks by Boko Haram has claimed several lives, displaced thousands and destroyed many development structures in Nigeria (Walker, 2012). In the first two weeks of 2012 for instance, more than 250 deaths were accounted to the group (Brock, 2012).

For permanency and long-term operations, militant groups tend to recruit more youth and children to swell their ranks, as they are subservient and easily indoctrinated (Ikelegbe & Garuba, 2007; George & Ylönen, 2010). The one group that has perhaps taken this practice of child recruitment to great lengths is Kony’s LRA. Adding to this is the gender dimension of these militant groups. While often associated with men, women, according to Ikelegbe & Okumu (2010) are not only passive victims of militant groups but play active roles within militant groups. Some women have even been known to be the leaders of such groups; of note is Alice Lakwena who remains the most popular female militant leader in Africa. Although the

activities of these militant groups have been domestic and locally based, they have also taken regional dimensions in recent times. Furthermore, militant groups in Africa are also reported to share and exchange funding, trainings and weaponry with some having established linkages with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the Middle East (Lerman, 2012). While several factors such as the involvement of governments and non-state actors and the financial and material support given by multiple funders could be attributed to contributing to the formation and perpetuation of militant groups, the condition of exclusion, division and marginalization also sets the tone for it (Lomo & Hovil, 2004; Alli & Ogunwale, 2011).

Uganda's North-South Divide: The Holy Spirit Movement and the Lord's Resistance Army illustrated by its sharp distinction between North and South, the East African country of Uganda is polarized along the lines of region, ethnicity, religion and language. A rich developed predominantly Christian south comprised of the Bantu speaking ethnic groups (Buganda, Batoro and Banyankole) and a 'geographically, culturally and politically marginalized' Nilotic north (Acholi, Lugbara, Langi, Karamojong) composed predominantly of Muslims and Animists (Royo, 2008). While these polarizations existed before the advent of colonialism, there is consensus that it became more pronounced during the period of British colonization with its divide and rule approach to governance. During this period, Southerners received better access to education, economic investment in agriculture, and civilian posts in government. Northerners, by contrast, were deemed suited for military service and their region was seen more as a source of inexpensive labor than as a location for enduring investment. (Le Sage 2011)

Furthermore, the northerners were regarded as "having certain inherent traits and flaws that made them brutal and martial "tribes" unsuited to rational political administration and economic governance, in contrast with the peaceful communities in the south" (Lomo & Hovil, 2004). One would have thought that after independence in 1962, the country's north-south divide would be addressed and the gulf between the two regions bridged. However, this was not the case as the north-south divide characterized by disenfranchisement, biases, neglect and exploitation was continued and further entrenched by post-independence regimes of Milton Obote (I & II), Idi Amin Dada and Yoweri Museveni. Some of these regimes were also characterized by the victimization and revenge attacks of persons or groups that supported the other. A case in point was Amin's summary execution of Acholi army officers who had served in Obote's government and the series of revenge attacks on unarmed civilians in the Acholi and Lango districts after he had ousted Obote in 1971 (Lomo & Hovil, 2004).

Grievances and frustrations stemming from these developments within the north set the stage for the rise of insurrections and mobilizations, particularly from the Acholi,' against the Kampala government in the south. The Acholis also accused the Museveni regime for overthrowing Tito Okello' and debarring Acholi political leaders from government; Museveni in turn, accused them for murdering his army and thus posing a threat to his government

1 Acholi is a northern Uganda ethnic group comprising of the Agago, Kitgum, Nwoya, Amuru, Pader, Gulu, and Lamwo districts.

2 Okello was an Acholi native whose Acholi-dominated army took over power from Milton Obote's second regime in 1985.

(Lomo & Hovil, 2004). The objective of several of the insurgent groups was thus mainly to “fight either to restore their control of political power and related socio-economic advantages or to push for popular support to overthrow the government” (Lomo & Hovil, 2004). Two major groups included in the pool of insurgent groups seen as embodiments of Uganda’s embedded ethnic and religious divisions were the Holy Spirit Movement/Holy Spirit Mobile Forces’ (HSM/HSMF) and the Lord’s Resistance Army (Haynes 2007). These two fused their political agenda with a blend of Acholi mysticism and Catholicism.

The HSM was “an anti-government, syncretic politico-religious movement” that “represented a social response to serious upheaval and external attack in a situation where the state was unable to either establish an effective administrative structure or to offer significant economic development for the impoverished Acholi” (Haynes 2007). Alice Auma Lakwena,⁴ a self-proclaimed Acholi spirit medium led this group (Haynes, 2007; Le Sage 2011). From the onset, the HSM gained massive support and popularity from several marginalized groups in the north. Former Acholi soldiers from Obote’s Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) and other insurgent groups were all absorbed into the group (Haynes 2007). The HSM’s ideology was premised on “the purification of society through the eradication of sin, particularly expressed through acts of witchcraft. ... [This presupposed that soldiers] defeat was seen as a consequence of their own moral weakness and not the enemy’s military superiority” (Royo (2008). Until its defeat by Museveni’s National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M) in October 1987, the HSM was able to “launch several successful attacks against the NRM government” (Le Sage 2011).⁵

Its successor, the LRA, initially the United Holy Salvation Army, emerged late 1987 soon after the HSM’s defeat.⁶ Fusing politics with religion, the quasi-religious cult guerilla, draws on a combination of Christian, Islam and animist beliefs to validate its actions (Chatlani, 2007). Its messianic religious leader and founder Joseph Kony,⁷ is also a self-proclaimed spirit medium who receives messages from the Holy Spirit (God) “which most Acholi believe can represent itself in manifestations” (Landis & Albert, 2012). The objective of Kony and his band of rebels is to: overthrow the Museveni government; establish a regime in Uganda based on the biblical Ten Commandments; and finally himself being an Acholi, to liberate the Acholi of marginalization (Royo 2008; Chatlani 2007). Although some of these fell in line with the aspirations of many Acholis, and was akin to those of the HSM, the LRA did not gain as much support or approval from within this community as its predecessor (HSM) had. For what he perceived as an act of rejection and betrayal against the LRA, the Acholis paid the price as the LRA began a brutal attack on northern Ugandan civilians killing, raping and abducting children and women as child soldiers, sex slaves and wives (Chatlani, 2007).

3 The HSMF was the military wing of the HSM

4 Means messenger in Acholi language. According to her, “a spirit named Lakwena came to her as a messenger of the Holy Spirit and instructed her to organize a war against evil forces that had come to plague the Acholi” (Le Sage 2011).

5 Lakwena, fled to Kenya where she remained until her demise in 2007.

6 The LRA name was adopted in 1992

7 He is believed to be a relative of Alice Lakwena - nephew according to some, cousin by others.

The LRA has come under severe criticism from both local and international circles for its human rights violations and war crimes. High on its list of atrocious cruelties and human right abuses is the abduction and recruitment of children into its army. Since its inception in 1987, the group is alleged to have kidnapped over 60,000 children aged between 13 and 15 years (Ikelegbe & Okumu, 2010). Robbed of their childhood, the child abductees are forced and trained to serve as child soldiers, sex slaves, and caretakers among others (Haynes 2007). The girls amongst them are distributed “among the fighters as concubines, partners, servants, cooks, porters and even fighters and security services” (Royo 2008). To instill fear among the young children and ensure they do not consider escaping, they are forced “to kill and torture soon after capture, making them massacre their own communities [fellow children, mothers, fathers, neighbors, and friends] to create a ‘clean break’ with their past” (Lomo & Hovil, 2004).

In addition to the child abductions, the LRA’s reign of terror have included sporadic violent attacks, murders, massacres, torture, sexual exploitation and abuse, mutilations, displacements and the burning and pillaging of houses and displacement camps (Lancaster et al 2011). According to Chatlani (2007), the LRA routinely cuts off lips, ears, and breasts; gouges eyes; and amputates the limbs of its hostages. It is important to note however that the LRA was not the only perpetrator of these human rights violations and crimes, but so also was the government military tasked to protect the civilians and fight the LRA. According to the Human Rights Watch (HRW), in the early part of 2005, the Uganda People’s Defense Force (UPDF) based in the Gulu district, committed copious premeditated killings and continual beatings of local population (HRW Report, 2005).

The ideology or political agenda of Kony and his band of rebels is uncertain and equivocal (Chatlani 2007). For instance, as earlier mentioned, he claims to be an Acholi liberator yet turns around and terrorizes the very same people. Also his plan to unseat the Museveni government and rule Uganda based on the set of commandments given to the prophet Moses is difficult to fathom. While it emerged from northern Uganda, the LRA’s areas of operation and terrorizing acts have gradually extended from within the confines of this terrain deep into other areas including outside of Uganda. Today, even though it “is now comprised of only several hundred members using small arms and light weapons”, the LRA has extended deep into other neighboring DRC, CAR, South Sudan, and Sudan (Le Sage 2011).

The LRA has its own set of spiritual rituals and practices (some of which were co-opted from the HSM) that forms part of initiations into the group as well as exercises to be performed prior to attacks or raids to ensure the spiritual protection of members from enemy bullets or explosions (Royo 2008). Some of these initiations and rituals include: beating child soldiers with sticks and machetes; soldiers wearing rosary beads and reciting Bible passages before battles; abstaining from food for three days and brushing one’s teeth to be ‘clean’ before going to battle; smearing shea butter or sometimes the blood of murdered victims in the sign of the cross on your body (Lomo & Hovil, 2004). These are done to create an aura of mysticism that puts fear in LRA fighters and increases members’ faith in Kony’s ‘spiritual powers’. They are brainwashed into believing they are fighting under the direction or orders of a spirit being

who gives his orders or message through Kony (Lancaster et al, 2011). Conversely, the LRA's occult practices coupled with some ethnic groups strong belief in the supernatural (spirits), has served to create a paralyzing fear of the group among the local population; to the point that some army officers and senior Ugandan officials are trepidatious of LRA combatants and therefore hesitant to pursue the rebels, it does not matter if they are children (Lomo & Hovil, 2004; Lancaster et al, 2011).

Impact and Implications of the LRA movement on Development

Political

Uganda's political history has been characterized by coup d'états, ethnic and religious conflicts, and aggressive resistance by marginalized groups in the country's north particularly. Post-independent regimes of Obote, Amin and Museveni all experienced aggressive resistance, ethnic tensions and coup d'états with each regime being proponents of undemocratic change of government at one point (Moncrieffe, 2004). Taking over power through a coup d'état in 1986, Museveni inherited a legacy of religious and ethnic factionalism and a corrupt governance system that his regime was expected to extirpate. Although some recorded improvement has been seen under his leadership, Uganda remains a fragile political system as the incumbent has been facing resistance largely from Acholi militant groups since assuming power in 1986 (Moncrieffe, 2004; Branch, 2011). This is partly due to Acholi marginalization and estrangement from state resources, national politics and socio-economic development, consequently making the place fertile for militant groups (Jackson, 2010)

The north-south divide with its fallout of insurgency has also contributed to political disruptions, mistrust, and fragility in the country. The LRA's inscrutable leader, Kony, has not hidden his distrust towards the current government and his desire to see the Museveni regime removed from Uganda's political sphere. Lomo & Hovil's (2004) research point to the fact that Kony's rebels are willing to fight until the current government is overthrown. The group believes that the Museveni regime does not have the welfare of the group and the northerners at heart. This in part, accounted for Kony's rejection of the 2006 amnesty offered by the government and his subsequent refusal to sign the 2008 final peace agreement.⁸ Prior to this, the LRA tried to influence previous elections by backing the opposition as evinced during the 1996 presidential elections, when it supposedly halted its attacks and enjoined the population to vote for the opposition, the Democratic Party (DP) (Lomo & Hovil, 2004).

The north-south political acrimony that exists between the LRA specifically and the Museveni regime is also much apparent within the wider northern population towards the incumbent for similar reasons as the LRA. Additionally, the northerners also blame the incumbent for its lack of political will towards the resolution of the conflict and the eradication of the LRA dilemma, and accuses the government of turning a blind eye to their plight while using the conflict to

⁸ See <http://www.ploughshares.ca/content/uganda-1987-2010>.

its political advantage (International Crisis Group [ICG], 2004). Museveni is reported to have said: "the Acholi are like grasshoppers in a bottle biting each other...so there is no war because his area (the south) has no war" (Lomo & Hovil, 2004). As a result, most of the northerners would want to see him removed from office. They exhibited this by backing Paul Semwogerere, of the DP and Kiiza Besigye in the 1996 and 2001 presidential elections respectively; even though both were not natives of the region (ICG, 2004). Moreover, the government's reluctant approach towards ending the war has created a lack of cooperation from the northerners in supporting the government to fight the LRA (Lomo & Hovil, 2004). This could engender the continuation of the conflict since it is highly impossible to stop the operations of the LRA without the full support of those in the region. The culmination of these political disputes and tensions, while they have not destabilized Uganda's political tranquility has however created fragility in the country's body politics.

Economic

At independence, Uganda was one of Sub-Saharan Africa's most vibrant and promising economies; the country was sufficient in food, and accrued adequate foreign revenue from the exportation of coffee, cotton and cocoa, despite the use of indigenous production techniques (World Bank, 1993; Sejjaaka, 2004). However, with its post-independent conundrum of coups, mismanagement by successive regimes, and longstanding ethnic conflicts mainly in the north, the country began to experience some economic challenges. Most critical of which was the problem of food crisis that rocked most part of the country, particularly the north, as a result of the LRA insurgency. With most of them being farmers, the displacement of millions of northerners from the homes during the conflict has declined agricultural activities, resulting in low production of food in the region (Nampindo et al, 2005). In 2002, for example, the World Food Programme sounded alarm of impending food crisis in northern Uganda with reported food shortage and 800,000 people in need of food aid in the region (Ross, 2002). The LRA's pillaging of the communities food and livestock also contributed to the worsening food scarcity in the region (Lomo & Hovil, 2004).

Following the protracted conflict in the North, there has also been considerable reduction in the production of some of Uganda's cash crops particularly cotton (Uganda's white gold), which used to be the second most important export commodity after coffee. This in turn has affected the country's much needed foreign exchange income. Reports indicate that Uganda's foreign exchange income from cotton depreciated significantly from 25% in the 1950s through to the 1970s to less than 5% in 2009 (Habati, 2009). This was partly due to the involvement of Acholiland in the conflict as it used to be one of Uganda's highest cotton producing communities; but the prolonged conflict hampered production in the region thereby transferring the cotton-producing power to the western part of the country, which is a less cotton-producing region (Habati, 2009). Additionally, international donor contributions and investments have also suffered with donors and investors losing trust and confidence in the government and the economy. For example, the high defence expenditure by the

government in fighting the LRA coupled with some governance issues has made some donors mainly Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom skeptical towards their contributions to the Ugandan economy (Dagne, 2011). This has implications for the national budget, stalling much needed development projects, since international donors contribute 41% of the country's national budget.

Another critical economic factor increasingly taking centre stage in national debates is the growing trend of land grabbing in the country's north. Land is an essential economic commodity in Uganda since the country thrives mainly on agriculture.⁹ After the conflict subsided in 2006, many displaced civilians returned to their communities to find the demarcated boundaries of their lands removed, resulting in land ownership disputes among the people as most of them are unable to identify the borderlines of their lands (Mabikke, 2011). In the Gulu district for instance, several returnees were involved in disputes over border demarcations that were removed during the war period (Mabikke, 2011). An emerging corollary from the land ownership bedlam is land grabbing, which is reportedly perpetrated largely by politicians, military officers and the elite section of Acholis (Mabikke, 2011). These officials and individuals use their authority and power to forcefully acquire the lands of the local people and sell them to investors (Matsiko, 2012). This worrisome emerging trend has heightened ethnic tensions resulting in possible land wars in the region - the consequence of which may possibly leave Uganda in an economic limbo.

Social

The conflict between Kony's LRA and the Museveni government marked by loss of lives predominantly women and children, child abductions and the displacement of many more¹⁰; has resulted in the collapse of families, stalled many aspirations of people, created more divisions between individuals and communities, hampering the social development of the country. All these have largely affected the social configuration of Uganda with resultant effect and challenges in the areas of education; health; and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR).

With many families escaping the brunt of the conflict and children being abducted by the LRA as combatants, many schools were closed and education came to a standstill in the north. As a consequence, many youth and children in the north lack reading and writing skills as well as the requisite career skills that will create opportunities for employment (Okino, 2008). Although life returned to some appreciable level of normalcy after the conflict abated in 2006, an improvement in the region's educational system is yet to be seen. Many children are still out of school and teachers are unwilling to teach in the region due to lack of accommodation, teaching logistics and sufficient salary (Okino, 2008). This has entrenched the poverty level in the north with the proclivity of increasing criminality and other social vices in the region.

⁹ Agriculture contributes 43% of Uganda's GDP

¹⁰ As at 2005, 12,000 lives had been lost, 20,000 children abducted, and about 1.5 million people displaced (Nampindo et al. 2005).

Following the passing of the Amnesty Acts in 2000, which sought to encourage a peaceful resolution of the conflict, many combatants returned to surrender their arms (Mallinder, 2009). However, the DDR process for the ex-combatants has been fraught with many challenges. Firstly, regarding disarmament, reports indicate that due to lack of comprehensive firearms collection system, a sizable number of arms are hidden by returnees and those surrendered are often not recorded (Justice and Reconciliation Project, 2008). This is corroborated in the Small Arms Survey's 2006 report that northern Uganda and southern Sudan are awash with arms caches stockpiled for current and future use by the LRA (Justice and Reconciliation Project, 2008). This has the propensity to engender small arms and light weapons (SALW) proliferation in the country and across the region, with accompanied civilian insecurity. Also, the reintegration process has particularly not been a smooth one as both the communities and ex-combatants have met it with mixed feelings. While the communities feel compelled to re-live their torturous experiences of the conflict by accepting the ex-combatants into the community, the ex-combatants on the other hand are in constant fear of being re-abducted, killed by Kony's rebels or prosecuted by the government (Justice and Reconciliation Project, 2008). Moreover, as they reintegrate, the ex-combatants continue to experience stigmatization from the society, coupled with food scarcity, poverty and post conflict trauma (Osire, 2011). Accordingly, ex-combatants unable to resettle are likely to re-mobilize or become easy targets of intransigent and radical movements, further destabilizing the social order (Osire, 2011).

Health crisis has been one of the alarming impacts of the conflict. The brutalities suffered by the civilian populations at the hands of both the LRA and the Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces (UPDF) have resulted in severe cases of psychological trauma, sexually transmitted diseases (especially HIV/AIDS), malnutrition, hunger and high infant and maternal mortality rate among others (Chatlani 2007). The deplorable and squalid conditions of the over 35 Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps in the north, referred to as 'protected villages', characterized by overcrowding, food and water shortages, exiguous facilities and oversight mechanisms has occasioned a health crisis in the region (Osire, 2011). Additionally, not only are campers forced to share the camps' limited resources with other displaced persons but to their chagrin, with reintegrated ex-combatants as well.

Regional

Once a northern Ugandan problem, the LRA has evolved into a complex regional security dilemma with multiple actors and interests, following the group's spillover into neighboring Sudan, DRC, CAR, and Southern Sudan. This has the proclivity of destabilizing the already fragile peace in the Eastern, Central, and Great Lakes regions (Schomerus, 2007; Atkinson, 2009; Omach, 2010; Dagne, 2011). The regionalization of the LRA conflict has been hinged on several factors including weak national and regional military apparatus to subdue the LRA; financial and material supports of governments, foreign intervention; lack of regional commitment towards the resolution of the conflict; and counter-support of militant groups among countries in the region among others (HRW Report, 1997; Kasaija, 2010; Le Sage, 2011).

Coupled with its limited resources in terms of personnel, transportation, local intelligence sources, and funding, the regional military from CAR, Uganda, Sudan and DRC have for instance been accused of unprofessionalism (Cakaj, 2010; Le Sage, 2011). The LRA rebellion and its presence in the other countries have also fueled tense regional relations and exacerbated human insecurity (Le Sage, 2011). In addition to incidences of cross-border attacks, there have also been cases of cross-border recruitments and mobilization. For instance, in reaction to the Ugandan government's military offensive (supported by United States of America) in 2008, the LRA spread its activities deep into northeastern DRC and southern Sudan murdering over 1000 civilians and abducting almost 250 children (Le Sage, 2011). The LRA's regional presence has also contributed to suspicions and mistrust among countries within the region; resulting in the counter-support of militant groups from each other's territories (Child Soldiers Global report, 2008; Kasaija, 2010). In the 1990s, the Al-Bashir regime of Sudan was identified as one of the core funders of the LRA in Uganda (HRW Report, 1997; Child Soldiers Global Report, 2008).

Conclusion and Recommendations

The marginalization of groups along identity lines in Africa often coalesce with a peculiar set of grievance factors to result in the creation of insurgents or militant groups whose existence have become a bane to national and regional development. The case of the LRA in northern Uganda as has been hitherto discussed, illustrates a scenario where the twin factors of ethnicity (marginalization) and religion (fanaticism) have been mismanaged and manipulated by several actors, resulting in a complex security situation. In dealing with the insurgency and its associated insecurity that has had devastating impact on sustainable development and socio-economic livelihoods, the following recommendations are proffered:

- Since the LRA insurgency and its related security challenge were primarily spawned by the north's history of neglect and marginalization (economic, social, political) culminating in unaddressed grievances, it is critical that its north-south gulf be addressed. One way of realizing this is through the implementation of programs, infrastructure projects, and policies aimed at developing northern communities by the Ugandan government and relevant stakeholders (NGOs, Civil Society groups, bilateral or multilateral organizations).
- In addressing the tension and mistrust that have existed between the south-based government and the northern communities, there needs to be a systematic effort by government to not only ensure political inclusion of, and access to resources by the latter, but also the establishment of strong and transparent institutional structures. Coupled with government's active participation in the development of the North, these measures will engender trust from the northerners and the international community.
- To address the challenges of reintegrating ex-combatants, a comprehensive and a multidimensional reintegration and rehabilitation mechanisms that addresses the needs of both local populations and the ex-combatants must be developed. This should seek to ensure social cohesion and peaceful co-habitation between ex-combatants and civilians, as there is often intense feeling of animosity, pain, stigmatization and grievance.

- In tackling the health and security challenges within the IDP camps and affected communities, there is the need to provide adequate humanitarian assistance in the form of medical supplies, food, shelter, clothing, water and also ensure the protection of civilians against incursions and hostilities. These will help to improve living conditions and offer a safe or secure environment.
- To curb the counter-supporting of militant groups in each other's territories and strengthen approach towards the resolution of the LRA insurgency as well as the proliferation of other militant groups, there is the need for countries of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and the DRC to build stronger regional relations

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THE ACHILLES'
HEELS OF
DEVELOPMENT
LES TALONS
D'ACHILLE DU
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Afrique: 50 ans de stratégies de développement. Pour quels résultats?

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Summary

Before the euphoria of the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of independence across Africa and the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of both the African Development Bank and the Organization of African Unity, now the African Union to ensure economic takeoff of the continent in the context of globalization, it is necessary to examine the effectiveness and efficiency of development efforts in Africa. The continent has certainly made progress, some countries recording impressive growth rates and a small number rightly claiming the status of emerging countries. However, the persistence of underdevelopment with its attendant evils such as insecurity and vulnerability leads to the following question: did policies and development strategies implemented in Africa for decades succeed? Why Africa cannot achieve sustainable and inclusive growth economic growth, in spite of its immense potential? Why the same policies and strategies, implemented in other places, have given satisfactory results?



Introduction

Devant l'euphorie de la célébration du cinquantième anniversaire des indépendances à travers l'Afrique et à la veille du cinquantième anniversaire de la création tant de la Banque africaine de Développement que de l'Organisation de l'Unité africaine, devenue Union africaine pour garantir l'envol économique du continent dans le contexte de la mondialisation, il y a lieu de s'interroger sur l'effectivité et l'efficacité des efforts de développement de l'Afrique.

En effet, après plus d'un demi-siècle de mise en œuvre de politiques et stratégies de développement, l'Afrique semble encore bien à la traîne dans la compétition, de plus en plus âpre, entre nations et continents pour un développement socioéconomique durable, comme en témoigne le fait que le continent demeure, à ce jour, celui où l'autosuffisance alimentaire n'est pas maîtrisée; l'industrialisation semble bloquée; l'éducation et la formation ont du mal à s'épanouir véritablement; les conflits et les rebellions armées trouvent des terrains de prédilection; les pratiques de bonne gouvernance économique et politique s'apparentent à des chimères; les conflits interconfessionnels sont en résurgence; le tribalisme et l'ethnocentrisme divisent les peuples et les nations, etc..

Pourtant, depuis les années 60 jusqu'à nos jours, le continent a expérimenté diverses politiques et stratégies de développement économique pour tenter de sortir du cercle vicieux de la pauvreté et de la misère, et de se positionner irréversiblement sur la voie vers une croissance inclusive et un développement durable. L'Afrique a certes accompli des progrès, certains pays africains enregistrant des taux de croissance impressionnants et un petit nombre réclamant à juste titre le statut de pays émergent, mais la persistance du sous-développement sur le continent, avec son cortège de maux tels que la précarité et la vulnérabilité, à des niveaux parfois insoutenables, amène nécessairement à se poser la question suivante: À quels résultats les politiques et stratégies de développement mises en œuvre en Afrique depuis des décennies ont-elles abouti? La réponse à cette question générale passe par des réponses à des interrogations plus précises. Pourquoi l'Afrique n'arrive-t-elle pas à réaliser une croissance économique forte, durable et inclusive, en dépit de l'immensité de son potentiel? Pourquoi les mêmes politiques et stratégies, sous d'autres cieux, donnent-elles des résultats plus satisfaisants qu'en Afrique? En d'autres termes, pourquoi les mêmes recettes, très productives ailleurs, sont-elles peu productives en Afrique?

Le poids de l'extérieur est toujours perceptible

Un regard rétrospectif sur le cheminement de l'Afrique vers le développement pourrait permettre de réunir quelques éléments de réponses aux nombreuses interrogations déjà évoquées. Plusieurs pistes de réflexion pourraient être explorées pour identifier les facteurs à l'origine du manque d'efficacité des politiques de développement mises en œuvre en Afrique. Mais pour les besoins de notre analyse, nous insisterons particulièrement sur la non-maîtrise des politiques adoptées, la prédominance des flux extérieurs dans le financement des projets de développement, et la faible cadence de l'intégration économique et politique du continent.

L'on se rappellera que les décennies 60 et 70 ont été marquées par une floraison «d'ismes». Les dirigeants africains, au lendemain des indépendances politiques, ont adopté le capitalisme, pour certains, et le socialisme, pour d'autres, comme doctrines économiques pour conduire leurs peuples vers la prospérité, le bonheur et le bien-être. À l'époque, l'on pouvait même parler de plusieurs capitalismes ou socialismes, d'autant plus que partout où ces doctrines étaient expérimentées, elles étaient enrichies de touches locales qui les différençaient des doctrines originelles. Les pays africains ont donc adopté des «capitalismes» ou des «socialismes» sans réunir, au préalable, les conditions de succès de chacune de ces doctrines. En conséquence, les pays africains, dans leur quasi-totalité, ont été contraints, à leur corps défendant, de se mettre au régime des institutions de Bretton Woods, par le biais des programmes d'ajustement structurel (PAS). Ils ont tous dû avaler l'amère pilule des «PAS», prescrite par ces institutions basées à Washington. Pendant des décennies, les PAS, sous leurs diverses formes, ont constitué les fondements des politiques économiques mises en œuvre dans les pays africains. Le consensus de Washington a donc guidé pendant longtemps les économies africaines. La crise financière puis économique de 2007, qui a atteint son paroxysme en 2008, n'a pas infléchi ni atténué l'emprise du consensus de Washington sur les économies africaines. Cette emprise s'est même accentuée, avec le poids grandissant des marchés financiers désormais aux commandes de la gouvernance de l'économie mondiale.

Comment l'Afrique peut-elle s'attendre à des résultats positifs dans la mise en œuvre de politiques et stratégies de développement dont les leviers de commande lui échappent totalement? L'agenda de développement qu'elle tente de mettre en œuvre depuis des lustres est conçu et imposé de l'extérieur. Les programmes d'ajustement structurel, qui en sont une illustration assez édifiante, ne représentent en fait que la partie visible de l'iceberg. Les différents agendas de développement conçus par les Africains et pour les Africains n'ont jamais pu être effectivement mis en œuvre pour que l'on puisse évaluer leurs impacts sur le niveau de vie des populations africaines.

L'Afrique, encore et toujours tributaire du financement extérieur

La pénurie de ressources financières a amené les dirigeants africains à mettre en veilleuse ces agendas et, partant, à adopter des politiques de développement adaptés aux financements extérieurs mis à leur disposition. Dans cette perspective, les principaux programmes continentaux tels que le Plan d'Action de Lagos (1980), le Traité d'Abuja (1991), le NEPAD (2001) ont été relégués aux calendes grecques, au profit de politiques économiques conçues et dictées dans le cadre de la vulgarisation du consensus de Washington.

Pour le financement de son développement, l'Afrique demeure ainsi tributaire de l'extérieur. Mais là où le bât blesse, c'est que le financement extérieur est assorti de conditionnalités extrêmement sévères, rendant ainsi difficile l'accès à ce financement qui se raréfie dès lors au fil du temps ou dont les sources tarissent au gré de la santé économique des principaux donateurs. Les principaux projets intégrateurs, particulièrement dans les domaines des infrastructures et de l'énergie, sont alors mis en veilleuse ou font l'objet de laborieuses

discussions dans les instances internationales où l'on recycle en permanence les engagements financiers destinés à donner corps à ces projets. L'histoire des faits économiques enseigne que le développement est d'abord un acte endogène. Or, en Afrique, l'endogénéisation du processus de développement est l'exception; et son extraversion la règle. La primauté du financement extérieur sur l'apport intérieur ou domestique est une des raisons expliquant les faibles résultats obtenus dans la mise en œuvre des politiques et stratégies économiques.

Une question cruciale mérite également notre attention à ce niveau. Comment un continent peut-il se fier essentiellement à des sources extérieures pour le financement de son développement économique et de son progrès social? En fait, les sources extérieures de financement doivent être un appoint, et non un substitut. Malheureusement, l'insuffisance des ressources internes est une caractéristique commune de tous les pays du continent africain et même des organisations régionales et continentales africaines. En général, ces organisations sont aussi largement tributaires des bailleurs de fonds qui, par le biais de conditionnalités drastiques, plombent ainsi l'exécution de projets intégrateurs sur le continent. Ces faits, têtus en raison même de leur nature, invitent les dirigeants africains à tout mettre en œuvre pour mobiliser auprès de sources internes l'essentiel des financements nécessaires pour le développement économique de leurs pays. C'est l'une des principales options permettant de s'assurer que les politiques et stratégies de développement réalisent les résultats attendus. Le tableau ci-dessous est illustratif de cet état de fait.

Sources du budget programme de l'UA et de ses différents organes (en millions de \$EU)

Années Source Budget	2008 (%)	2009 (%)	2010 (%)	2011 (%)	2012 (%)
États membres	14.7 (31%)	11.3 (16%)	11.2 (8%)	10.2 (7.1%)	7.6 (5%)
Partenaires au développement	32.4 (69%)	57.4 (84%)	133.7 (92%)	134.2 (92.9%)	151.7 (95%)
Total	47.1 (100%)	68.7 (100%)	144.9 (100%)	144.4 (100%)	159.3 (100%)

Source: Budget de l'UA, années successives

Les chiffres que montre ce tableau constituent un indicateur du désengagement progressif des pays africains de la mise en œuvre des projets intégrateurs régionaux et continentaux. Ces chiffres, en fait, charrient le message d'une Afrique qui crie, *Ubi et Orbi*, l'urgence de son intégration économique et politique et qui, de façon paradoxale, confie le financement de cette entreprise souveraine aux «soi-disant» partenaires au développement. Et pour cause, le budget programme de l'UA qui est censé prendre en charge le financement de tous les projets intégrateurs est, depuis 2010, couvert à plus de 90% par l'apport extérieur. Les partenaires

au développement ont, en 2010, 2011 et 2012, respectivement financé le budget-programme de l'UA à hauteur de 92%, 92,9% et 95%. Ces ratios qui croissent *crescendo* sont, de nos jours, difficilement acceptables dans une Afrique qui brandit fièrement son autonomie et sa souveraineté à la moindre occasion qui s'offre à elle. La participation grandissante des partenaires au développement dans le financement du budget-programme de l'UA et ses principaux organes accroît, la dépendance extérieure de l'Afrique tout entière et annihile, *ipso facto*, son autonomie et sa souveraineté. Il est donc extrêmement urgent que des dispositions soient prises pour inverser cette dangereuse tendance par l'entremise de l'adoption des mécanismes générateurs de Fonds propres (comme c'est le cas à la CEDEAO et à la CEEAC) et des mécanismes s'inspirant de la philosophie des financements innovants.

Le processus d'intégration a du plomb dans l'aile

Enlever le retrait en début de phrase politiques et stratégies de développement restent infructueuses en Afrique, faut-il le rappeler, du fait de la désintégration du continent. Les tentatives d'intégration de l'Afrique, marquées par plusieurs initiatives, ont produit des résultats mitigés. L'Afrique souffre encore du syndrome de désintégration, caractérisé par la pauvreté en infrastructures physiques et institutionnelles; les dissonances dans l'expression de la voix du continent à l'extérieur; l'intime attachement des pays à leur souveraineté nationale; la protection des intérêts nationaux; l'expression d'une unité ou d'un consensus de façade; et l'avènement d'espaces régionaux peu viables, avec des branches ou secteurs d'activité désarticulés. En Afrique, l'intégration peine encore à produire les effets escomptés et à faire du continent le nouveau pôle tant rêvé de croissance de l'économie mondiale.

Mais comment donner un contenu aux économies africaines? Que faire pour que les politiques et stratégies de développement mises en œuvre en Afrique produisent les résultats attendus? Nous sommes d'avis que l'une des solutions résiderait dans le succès de l'intégration économique et politique du continent. Pour réussir son intégration économique et politique, gage de l'acquisition du titre de membre à part entière de la Communauté internationale, l'Afrique doit accepter de prendre son destin en main, en s'entourant de tous les atouts endogènes pour garantir l'exécution efficace de tous ses projets intégrateurs régionaux et continentaux.

Il est vrai que l'Afrique a déjà adopté son modèle d'intégration, modèle qu'illustre parfaitement la Déclaration d'Accra de juillet 2007. Il s'agit de bâtir, par le truchement des principaux leviers du Traité d'Abuja, les États-Unis d'Afrique. Un tel choix, clairement et fortement opéré, requiert que l'Afrique se donne les moyens d'instituer un marché unique continental; une monnaie unique; un parlement panafricain digne de ce nom, dont les membres sont élus au suffrage universel; une cour de justice crédible; et des mécanismes régionaux et continentaux générateurs de fonds propres, qui soient à la mesure des ambitions intégrationnistes continentales.

Une Afrique et non des Afriques pour rendre irréversibles les acquis de l'intégration

Suis-je Panafricain? Es-tu Panafricain? Est-il Panafricain? Sommes-nous Panafricains? Pourquoi ce genre de questions, après plus d'un demi-siècle d'émancipation économique et politique de l'Afrique? À première vue, ces questions semblent redondantes. Toutefois, au regard du dernier renouvellement du mandat des élus politiques de la Commission de l'Union africaine, il y a lieu de se les poser. En effet, cet événement politique de l'organe exécutif de l'Union africaine a donné lieu au réveil des démons que l'on croyait pourtant ensevelis. On a ainsi assisté à une résurrection, voire à une revitalisation des Afriques, ou plus singulièrement à un affrontement entre «Afrique francophone» et «Afrique anglophone», reléguant au second plan les «autres Afriques». Tout s'est passé comme si l'Afrique était réduite à ces deux ensembles linguistiques. Tout s'est passé comme si le continent africain était redevenu le terreau d'un affrontement déguisé, sinon téléguidé entre capitales et cultures de l'extérieur du continent.

L'Afrique du XX^{ème} siècle mérite-t-elle un tel spectacle? L'Afrique de l'Union africaine, fièrement lancée à Durban en 2002 dans un enthousiasme débordant, mérite-t-elle ce sort? Ce n'est certainement pas l'avis de la majorité de la population africaine aujourd'hui, et c'est cette population que nous devons écouter. L'Afrique d'aujourd'hui a fait beaucoup de progrès sur le chemin de l'intégration économique et politique. Les Africains, dans leur immense majorité, sont conscients que les pays, pris individuellement, n'ont pas d'avenir dans un environnement mondialisé. L'avenir de l'Afrique n'a de sens que dans un processus réussi d'intégration économique et politique. Cette prise de conscience, profondément ancrée dans une vision de prospérité partagée, n'autorise pas les clivages linguistiques hérités de l'époque coloniale à remettre en cause le fonctionnement de nos institutions panafricaines en charge de cette intégration.

Le Panafricanisme qui hier a conduit à la création de l'Organisation de l'Unité africaine et a permis de sortir toute l'Afrique du joug colonial et de venir à bout de l'apartheid, doit aujourd'hui aider à consolider les fondements de l'Union africaine et à accompagner le continent dans sa marche vers l'intégration économique et politique. À cette fin, les dirigeants et les acteurs africains, tant publics que privés, doivent s'approprier les valeurs et la philosophie du Panafricanisme, et en faire le fondement de leurs décisions. Concrètement, cela signifie que chacun d'entre nous doit d'abord penser à l'Afrique, avant de penser à son propre pays. Nous devons penser à l'Afrique comme étant notre «pays-continent», et non comme un continent constitué d'États souverains et indépendants aux intérêts divergents, dont les voix restent d'ailleurs à peine audibles dans le concert des nations. C'est donc cette vision d'une Afrique intégrée, une et forte qui doit guider nos choix économiques et politiques, avec pour objectif commun de sortir ensemble la population africaine de la pauvreté. C'est aussi cet esprit panafricaniste qui doit prévaloir dans la conduite des politiques menées par les Communautés économiques régionales, indispensables piliers de la construction d'une Afrique qui soit une et intégrée politiquement et économiquement.

Par ailleurs, un tel changement d'échelle, qui doit désormais faire de l'Afrique un bloc soudé à part entière, appelle à la citoyenneté africaine. Il invite de ce fait à enterrer définitivement les antagonismes et autres clivages passés, et notamment les antagonismes et clivages linguistiques, qui sont autant de séquelles de la colonisation dont le dessein de diviser pour régner n'a pas été la moindre des caractéristiques.

C'est devant cette situation qu'il paraît crucial de réformer profondément le mode du scrutin pour le renouvellement de la Commission. Il s'agit de préserver les acquis de l'intégration du continent et d'avancer ensemble vers une Afrique intégrée et une. Nous ne devons pas nous-mêmes jouer le jeu de ceux que la balkanisation du continent arrange, quoi qu'ils disent. Nous devons plutôt œuvrer, à tous les niveaux et à tout instant, pour que l'Afrique, riche de ses régions, de ses populations, de ses tribus, de ses valeurs culturelles, de ses langues, de ses religions, en somme de sa diversité plurielle, reste une, afin de faire disparaître à jamais le spectre potentiellement dévastateur de la «guerre des Afriques».

Conclusion

L'Afrique ne peut compter et être consultée, écoutée et respectée si elle continue d'être constituée d'États indépendants et souverains. Une telle situation recèle en soi des ingrédients de nature à disperser et fragiliser la voix du continent, en plus de rendre celui-ci vulnérable aux chocs exogènes et de l'éloigner davantage du cercle des membres de la Communauté internationale. Si l'Afrique tient à sa carte de membre de ladite communauté, elle doit accepter de: (i) fondre les souverainetés nationales dans le moule de la souveraineté continentale, dans l'esprit d'un partage de souveraineté; (ii) se constituer en «pays-continent», dans la logique des États-Unis d'Afrique; (iii) se doter d'une politique extérieure conduite par un seul ministre des Affaires étrangères; (iv) avoir une défense commune; v) convenir d'une politique économique commune, garante de la crédibilité et de la pérennité de la monnaie unique africaine en voie de création.

Si l'Afrique se dotait de tous ces moyens, elle deviendrait d'office membre de la Communauté internationale au sein de laquelle elle pourrait alors affirmer son identité, son indépendance et sa vision dans le traitement des affaires du monde. La Commission de l'Union africaine, organe exécutif de l'Union, doit à cette fin se doter de capacités réelles d'impulsion, d'innovation, d'intégration et de persuasion de ses États membres.

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Opportunities and Threats - Population Growth, Climate Change and Agriculture in Africa

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is the Executive Director of the Institute for Security Studies which he co-founded in 1990. He played an important role in the transformation of the South African armed forces and the institution of civilian control over the military in the period 1990 to 1996. At present most of Dr Cilliers' interests relate to the emerging security architecture in Africa as reflected in the developments under the banner of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union as well as issues around African futures. Dr Cilliers has presented numerous papers at conferences and seminars and published a number of books on various matters relating to peace and security in Africa. This article is co-authored with ISS Researchers Thembani Mbadlanyana and Trusha Reddy.

Résumé

D'aucuns reconnaissent que l'Afrique évolue rapidement. La population augmente et est davantage urbanisée. De plus, la croissance économique s'est accélérée au cours de la dernière décennie. Les progrès vers l'atteinte des Objectifs du Millénaire pour le développement (ODM) sont évidents. En toute objectivité l'Afrique a accomplis des progrès remarquables dans la promotion du développement humain au cours de la dernière décennie. En dépit de ces transitions positives, le continent est encore aux prises avec des défis de taille tels la pauvreté, des taux de fécondité très élevés, le recours à l'agriculture de subsistance et la malnutrition. Le changement climatique vient s'ajouter à cette liste de défis déjà longue. Dans ce contexte, l'Afrique peut-elle diversifier ses économies et utiliser le potentiel que représente sa population en croissance dans l'industrie et les services, gérer la richesse générée par l'exploitation de ses matières premières? Le changement climatique augmentera-t-elle la pression sur l'agriculture ou l'Afrique fera-t-elle sa révolution verte? Comment l'Afrique fera-t-elle face aux opportunités et aux menaces émanant de la croissance démographique, le changement climatique et les bouleversements dans le secteur agricole?



Introduction

There is an increasing recognition that things are rapidly changing across Africa. Many critical and interacting transitions are underway that are rapidly reshaping the continent. Populations are growing substantially and urbanising. By 2025, the majority of Africans will be living in towns and cities and the continent will cease to be predominantly rural. Urbanisation is bringing large numbers of people into cities, not just into tenuous and tumultuous life conditions associated with social discontent, but into increasingly productive economic environments. The youthful momentum of Africa's growing population means that, by 2050, almost one in four of the world's people will live in Africa and that its population will continue to grow until the end of this century.¹

More so, economic growth has accelerated over the last decade. New technologies, including mobile phones, are sweeping across the continent. Longstanding conflicts are being addressed as much as new challenges emerge. Having started from a very low base and handed inappropriate targets and unrealistic starting dates, Africa will fail to reach many of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) on schedule, including of extreme poverty rates and achieving universal primary education. Yet the progress towards most of them is clear, and often striking and accelerating. In fact, by any objective standard Africa had made remarkable progress in advancing human development in the last decade.

Despite of these positive transitions and progress across a number of issues, the continent, has to grapple with daunting challenges such as poverty traps, very high fertility rates, reliance on subsistence agriculture and lack of nutrition. Agriculture is an important sector in Africa. The paradox, however, is that agriculture in most African countries remains a highly under-developed sector, characterised by (1) an almost total dependency on rainfall; (2) low use of external inputs such as improved seeds and fertilisers; (3) absence of mechanisation; and (4) poor linkage to markets.

Despite large tracts of rich, uncultivated land, Africa suffers from high levels of malnutrition and low agricultural productivity. Food security is vital to human and social development. At the individual level, having access to sufficient, affordable, and nutritious food is essential to health and livelihood, enabling one to take full advantage of educational and economic opportunities. Unfortunately, millions of people in Africa still lack adequate food security, resulting in widespread malnutrition. Excessive dependence on primary agricultural and mineral commodities, and low levels of industrial manufacturing activities confine hundreds of millions of young Africans to a large cadre of unemployed and often poorly educated class.

Rapid urbanisation and changing economic structures bring their own problems, such as social discontent and socio-political disruption. In addition, there are new and emerging problems.

¹ Unless indicated otherwise all figures and statistics are from the International Futures software version 6.58 Frederick S. Pardee Center for International Futures, University of Denver. See www.issafrica.org/futures. The text draws upon Jakkie Cilliers, Barry Hughes & Jonathan Moyer, African Futures 2050 – the next forty years, ISS monograph no 175, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2011

Not least of these is climate change. For instance, 2010 was recorded as the warmest year in the world since 1880, the earliest date for which global data are available. During the next two decades, the global average temperature may rise by around 0,2 degrees Celsius a decade; and a global temperature increase of 4 degrees Celsius from the beginning to the end of the century (the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC] high warming scenario) now appears increasingly likely. Water stress will increase, especially across the already driest parts of Africa, and the impact of climate change may stall or reverse much of the progress made towards achieving some MDGs.


Can Africa diversify its economies and employ its growing populations in manufacturing and services, as well as successfully managing the wealth generated by its raw materials? Will climate change increase pressures on agriculture or will Africa have its own green revolution? How will Africa deal with opportunities and threats emanating from population growth, climate change and changes in the agricultural sector?

There are many choices to be made that will determine the future of the African population growth, agricultural productivity and responses to climate change.

1. Population


The demographic size of Africa in the world has grown from 9 per cent of the total in 1960 to 15 per cent in 2010. By 2050, its share of global population will reach 23 per cent and it will be considerably larger than either China or India (see Figure 2.1).

Population, History and Forecast



Moreover, its population will be still growing by more than 1 per cent annually, well above the rate of other global regions. This dramatic growth will considerably increase Africa's global relevance, regardless of what happens to other aspects of its development.

The population increases of Africa will, however, not be uniform. In fact, the demographic balance within Africa will shift quite sharply towards Eastern and Western Africa because of their higher total fertility rate (TFR). By 2050 these two sub-regions (almost indistinguishable from one another in the accompanying graph) will each have more than 700 million people and be more than 2,5 times as large as Central, Southern or Northern Africa.



In addition, fertility is high and is likely to remain high in Central Africa. Whereas that region is currently less populated than the other regions of the continent, it will be comparable in size to Northern and Southern Africa by 2050.

Unless current patterns change significantly (and there is considerable socio-political leverage in this area in the longer run), fertility rates in 2050 will have declined to replacement levels only in Northern Africa. This means that population growth across almost the entire continent, and especially in Central Africa, is likely to still have considerable momentum even in 2050, shortly before the size of the global population will peak. In fact, the African population may not approach stability until near or even shortly after the end of the century, by which time it could be about 3 billion people, or 32 per cent of the global total.

This continued growth in the African population poses many problems. At the same time, however, at least two demographic opportunities will appear. The first is the demographic dividend, the phenomenon of the rising share of those of working age in the total population (it occurs when fertility rates decline and reduce the relative size of the population below 15 years of age, before the population significantly ages and therefore rapidly increases the share of the elderly). Currently, the share of the African population of working age (those between 15 and 65 years of age) is much lower than that of the US, the EU, India, or China due to the extreme youthfulness of its people.

The share of population in the working-age category is currently highest in Southern Africa (about 65 per cent) and considerably lower elsewhere in the continent. Even in Southern Africa, the demographic dividend will grow somewhat until 2040, as the other regions of the continent gradually converge with its higher levels by 2050.

While potentially a blessing, growing demographic dividends can also be very problematic with respect to unemployment rates when inadequate numbers of jobs are available. Thus a 'youth bulge' often accompanies the early stage of the demographic dividend and can be socially destabilising, especially when unemployed (unemployed young men are notoriously disruptive and globally the major source of crime and violence).

Second and similarly, urbanisation poses both opportunity and challenge. Urbanisation rates in Africa have advanced rapidly over the last 50 years. More than 50 per cent of the continent's population is likely to be in cities before 2025.² This growth will occur across African regions.

The urbanisation process is very important to the continent. An analysis by the McKinsey Global Institute found that the shift from rural to urban employment accounts for 20 to 50 per cent of productivity growth.³ In 1980, McKinsey noted, a mere 28 per cent of Africans lived in cities. The proportion in 2010 was closer to 40 per cent and rising rapidly. By 2030, the continent's top 18 cities could have a combined spending power of \$1,3 trillion.⁴ Industries related to consumers (such as retail, telecommunications and banking), infrastructure development, agriculture and resources would be worth \$2,6 trillion in annual revenues by 2020.⁵

The challenges such growth rates pose for policymakers are obvious. Each year they must provide more classrooms, more teachers, more health facilities and more services of all types to simply maintain current standards. Urban areas will mushroom and become the key drivers of African futures.

2. Agriculture

Much has been made of Africa's agricultural potential to help absorb the demands of this massive population growth. The massive expanse of underused arable land, though less nutrient-rich than in countries such as Brazil, holds the potential to unleash an African green revolution. Water resources will remain abundant in certain regions (especially in central Africa), but will become increasingly strained in the north and south due, in part, to climate change. Energy and other resources have been underexplored and recent large oil and gas discoveries will help greatly to alter the future development of the continent.

² The UN-Habitat's *State of African Cities 2010* report forecasts that 60 per cent of Africans will live in cities by 2050, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11823146>, accessed 30 November 2010; the IFs forecast for 2050 is 55 per cent.

³ McKinsey Global Institute, *Lions on the Move: the Progress and Potential of African Economies*, June 2010, 19.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 3-4.

⁵ *Ibid.*

Perhaps most impressively, Africa has 60 per cent of the world's total amount of uncultivated, arable land (around 600 million hectares).⁶ This at a time when the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Switzerland projects that new global demand for land could amount to more than 500 million hectares by 2030 – about the size of the Indian subcontinent. While this 'excess' land is likely to suffer negative impacts from climate change,⁷ its use could influence the balance of payments related to food because, despite its millions of hectares of unused land, Africa spends \$20 billion each year buying food. Currently most countries are net food importers.⁸

Despite these large tracts of rich, uncultivated land, Africa suffers from high levels of malnutrition and low agricultural productivity. Some have argued that a Green Revolution—increasing yields and land under cultivation—could bring a brighter future for all Africans, similar to what occurred in Vietnam in the 1970s and more recently in Brazil. Unfortunately, millions of people in Africa still lack adequate food security, resulting in widespread malnutrition. Currently, an estimated 239 million people, or 25 per cent of the continent's total population, are malnourished.⁹

Africa's agricultural sector is severely underdeveloped, so much so that production over the last few decades has been unable to keep up with demand. A growing population and rapid but unequal economic growth have led the continent to become ever more reliant on imported food and have ensured that malnutrition levels remain stubbornly high. A number of limiting factors continue to plague the sector: poor infrastructure, low fertilizer use, inadequate research and extension programs, fragile soils, and variable rainfall. Together, these factors have retarded growth in the sector and must be addressed in order to successfully transform agriculture in Africa. An upcoming policy paper by the African Futures project forecasts that if agricultural production in Africa remains stagnant, the number of malnourished people actually increases over the next twenty years.

To this end, in 2003 the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and the African Union (AU) conceived the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) – in recognition of the fact that agriculture is central to the alleviation of poverty and hunger in Africa. Both official development assistance (ODA) and private investment had fallen dramatically in preceding years and there was a need for Africa itself to commit to funding agriculture as well as for external partners to increase support. The total investment needed to 2015 was estimated at \$251,3 billion. Of this, around \$141 billion would be capital investment, almost \$69 billion for operation and maintenance, and \$42 billion for safety nets, food and emergency relief. It was anticipated that Africa would finance no less than 55 per cent

6 McKinsey, *Lions on the Move*, 22.

7 Ruben de Koning, *Climate Change, Land and Security*, SIPRI, December 2009, <http://www.sipri.org/media/newsletter/essay/dec09> (accessed 13 January 2010).

8 ACCES, *Climate Change and Security in Africa* dialogue forum and process document, 18. Also see ICTSD and FAO policy dialogue on, "Securing food in uncertain markets" 23 March 2012, Geneva

9 World Food Program website: <http://www.wfp.org/hunger/who-are>

of the total (\$104 billion) and that the private sector would provide \$44 billion from domestic sources (\$27 billion) and foreign direct investment (FDI) (\$17 billion).¹⁰

Subsequent years saw a number of initiatives such as the special summit in Abuja in June 2006 that launched an African green revolution. Fertiliser was declared a strategic commodity and steps were to be taken to increase its use, reduce costs and enhance farmers' access to it. Accelerated investment in infrastructure, targeted subsidies, national financing facilities, and regional procurement and distribution facilities were to be put in place, and an African fertiliser development financing mechanism established.¹¹ A 2010 progress review found, however, that rollout was disappointing. By CAADP's own admission, planning and implementation was slow and ineffective and its contribution to the sector minimal.¹² The AU and the NEPAD agency have now sought to re-energise CAADP and the success of a country such as Malawi, which has moved from net food importer to exporter in a few years, has reenergized agricultural renewal as has developments in Rwanda, where agricultural production has grown by 13 and 17 per cent per year in 2009 and 2010.¹³

Brazil has shown how dramatically¹⁴ an integrated systems approach and help from active government-sponsored, research organisations can transform tropical agriculture.¹⁵

Importantly in Africa, the agricultural sector employs 70 per cent of the labour force, and provides 50 per cent of exports and 30 per cent of GDP.¹⁶ Inevitably transformation in the sector will have massive consequences for the continent.

Although much potential agricultural land in Africa receives less rain than that in Brazil, there are many similarities with the nutrient-poor and, until recently, not extensively cultivated regions of that country. With technology transfer, interest from China and the Middle East, among others, in African production potential, high current food prices and growing domestic capabilities (and currently low yields and land use), the time may be ripe for considerable expansion of crop production. The potential is evident from basic statistics – Africa uses 8 kg of fertiliser per hectare compared to 150 kg elsewhere; moreover, only 3,5 per cent of its arable land is irrigated.¹⁶

10 NEPAD Planning and Coordination Agency, *CAADP Review: Renewing the commitment to African agriculture*, March 2010, 1–2, <http://www.nepad-caadp.net/pdf/CAADP%20Report%20for%20the%20AU%20July%202010%20Summit.pdf> (accessed 3 December 2010)

11 *Ibid.*, 3

12 *Ibid.*, 9 and 12–19

13 IRIN, *Subsidising agriculture is not enough*, 5 February 2008, <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=76591> (accessed 3 December 2010). *Implementing CAADP for Africa's food security needs: A progress report on selected activities, July 2010*, available at <http://www.nepad-caadp.net/library-reports.php> (accessed 3 December 2010)


14 (The miracle of the cerrado, *The Economist*, 26 August 2010, <http://www.economist.com/node/16886442> (accessed 29 November 2010))

15 *Climate Change and Agriculture in Africa*, http://www.ceepa.co.za/Climate_Change/index.html (accessed 3 December 2010).

16 See for example, the results of the Africa Fertilizer Summit held in Abuja, Nigeria from 9 to 13 June 2006. The summit was organized by the African Union (AU), the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD), and the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, and implemented by the International Center for Soil Fertility and Agricultural Development (IFDC). Its purpose was to boost fertilizer use across the continent and trigger a green revolution in Africa. <http://www.ifad.org/events/fertilizer/index.htm> (accessed 23 October 2)

In contrast to experience in the rest of the world, the very moderate improvements in agricultural production on the continent in recent years appear to be based on area expansion, not greater productivity. As a result, African farm yields are among the lowest in the world. According to the World Bank, the average African farmer in sub-Saharan Africa produces only one ton of cereal per hectare, less than half of what an Indian farmer produces, less than a fourth of a Chinese farmer's production and less than a fifth of an American farmer's production.¹⁷ Relative to most other regions, cereals are less important, and millet, sorghum, maize and cassava much more widely cultivated.


Land Use, Crop, History Plus Forecast



Some of Africa's growing potential in crop production is presented in graphic form separately. Because of the intensity of its farming, China now produces considerably more than other countries and regions. But the greatest agricultural growth in the world through mid-century is very likely to be in Africa, where total output should outstrip that of the EU and the US in the coming decades.


¹⁷ World Bank, *World Development Indicators*, 2010. <http://www.data.worldbank.org> (accessed 5 October 2010).

Agricultural Production, History Plus Forecast



In Africa, the greatest potential for growth of food production is in the eastern, western and central regions since north and south are generally much more arid. Building on the considerably underdeveloped potential of countries like Nigeria, the first two regions are most likely to manifest that potential, but given the huge potential of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Central Africa could surprise and grow very rapidly.

Agricultural Production, History Plus Forecast




Two counterintuitive findings in the literatures on African agriculture are important in understanding its vast untapped potential. First, contrary to most expectations, agricultural production in Africa is generally not limited primarily by absence of water/drought, but by poor soil fertility, hence the importance of fertilisers and genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Second, inadequate access to labour, markets, credit and technology also means that in many cases, smallholder farms are more productive than larger units that should have great potential.¹⁸ Both factors are amenable to relatively cheap corrective interventions.

3. Climate change and critical uncertainties around food security

Agriculture (and its ability to provide employment) will be affected particularly by changing and increasingly variable climate (including increasing temperatures and more irregular rainfall). Of these factors, rising temperatures are likely to have the most significant negative effect on agricultural production. Many crops are already at their tolerance limits for high temperatures, a problem that will be exacerbated by the increasing (already observed) variability of rainfall. Uncertainties regarding the future status of agriculture include the utilisation of the water endowment for irrigation (likely, but which will evolve slowly) and the effect of carbon fertilisation on crop growth, as well as the possibility of new cultivars and genetically modified organisms (GMOs) that are temperature tolerant (likely, but with long development lead times).

Temperature Change From CO₂ (Relative to 1990)




At one level, Africa does not have a shortage of water since the amount of water available to the continent is comparable to that in other regions of the world. But since its population is set

18 Eric Firnhaber, Agricultural productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa, *Development Forecasting*, Autumn 2010, 6–7, Pardee IFs Center paper available on the IFs website.

to increase dramatically in the years ahead, and together with the impact of climate change and current lack of infrastructure, the continent will face severe water shortages in future decades. Furthermore, Africa's water endowment conceals the fact that rainfall across much of the continent is highly variable and unpredictable, both between and within years. This is most pronounced in Eastern and Southern Africa. These regions experience year-to-year variations exceeding 30 per cent around the mean, a rate much greater than the temperate climates in Europe and North America. High seasonal variability compounds these effects, causing droughts and floods.¹⁹ High inter and intra-annual rainfall variability explains the unpredictable, and relatively low, seasonal and annual flows in many African rivers.

Climate change will affect Africa more significantly than most other regions due to its already warm climate, inconsistent rains, generally poor soil, extensive floodplains, predominantly rain-fed agriculture and poor governance with limited coping capacity. Warming will occur across the continent (and the extent of warming in Africa is expected to exceed global averages substantially),²⁰ with the sub-tropical zones becoming more arid, and desertification continuing in the Sahel. Precipitation decline will thus be especially great in Northern and Southern Africa. Northern Africa already faces severe water stress, typically defined as using more than 40 per cent of annual renewable supplies; in fact, it uses more than 80 per cent, drawing heavily on fossil water supplies (under-ground aquifers with little recharge).

Perspiration Change From CO₂ (Relative To 1990)



19 Vivien Foster and Cecilia Briceño-Garmendia (eds) *Africa's Infrastructure: a Time for Transformation*, Africa Development Forum Series, Agence Française de Développement and the World Bank, Washington DC, 2010, 1-14 and 272, <http://www.infrastructureafrica.org/aicd/library/doc/552/africa%E2%80%99s-infrastructure-time-transformation> (accessed 3 December 2010).

20 According to Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 2°C global warming will translate into 3.5 °C warming for Africa.

Around 200 million people in Africa currently suffer from water stress and 13 per cent of the continent's population experiences drought-related stress once every generation. More recently, 17 African countries were considered to be in a protracted food crisis due to recurrent natural disasters and/or conflict, several years of food crises, breakdown of livelihoods and insufficient institutional capacity to react to the crisis. Of these, almost two thirds of the total undernourished population can be found in Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, DRC and Zimbabwe²¹. Droughts have increased from once a decade to one every two or three years.

The comprehensive assessment of Africa on climate change and security by the Africa, Climate Change, Environment and Security Dialogue Forum (ACCES) found, in summary, that Burundi, Chad, the DRC, Republic of Congo, Kenya, Ethiopia, Niger, Nigeria and Sudan are the most vulnerable countries in Africa in the context of climate change and security, and that the Sahel region (stretching from Dakar in the west to Mogadishu in the east) is the most threatened region in the continent. These findings are the result of individual country analyses that relate to climate-induced water, food and energy shortages. Most environmental migration and displacement threats related to climate change are expected to occur in Eastern Africa, and the region in Africa most at risk of natural disasters from floods and drought is the Sahelian countries. Chad and Niger could potentially lose their entire rain-fed agriculture by 2100 due to changing rainfall patterns and degraded land, with severe reductions in cereal crops in Mali.²²

Clearly vulnerability to the impact of climate change varies from country to country and from village to village and it is important to bear in mind that Africa is a relatively water-rich continent by comparison with others. In fact, in one scenario, the continent could triple the irrigated area by 2050, greatly increasing food production and decreasing imports.²³ Today, only 3,5 per cent of Africa's agricultural land is equipped for irrigation, some 7 million hectares concentrated in a handful of countries.²⁴ Africa lacks the means to manage and distribute its resources, more resilient and productive agricultural practices, information production and dissemination, and the ability to link production with markets – challenges that developmental initiatives can alleviate.

Changes in the availability of water will not affect just African agricultural systems, but also its migration patterns and socio-political stability. By 2100, shifting sands could be blowing across huge tracts of land in Botswana, Angola, Zimbabwe and western Zambia. For pastoralist communities, forced migrations in search of water and pasture have already exacerbated resource-based conflicts. According to DFID, in 2012, East Africa experienced a

21 Into mid-2011, the world's worst food crisis is being felt in East Africa, in Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya (see <http://www.globalissues.org/article/796/east-africa-food-crisis>).

22 ACCES, *Climate Change and Security in Africa*, 5–8 and 30. See also IPCC, *Climate Change 2007: impacts, adaptation and vulnerability*, Working Group II contribution to the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (summary for policymakers), <http://www.ipcc.cn/SPM13apr07.pdf> (accessed 30 July 2007).

23 Jasper Grosskurth, *Futures of Technology in Africa*, STT 75, Netherlands Study Centre for Technology Trends, The Hague, 93, <http://www.stt.nl>, 2010 (accessed 25 October 2010).

24 Foster and Briceño-Garmendia, *Africa's Infrastructure*, 1-14 and 287.

major humanitarian crisis due to drought. More than 13 million people were affected, more than the combined population of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The recent (2012) report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations University for Environment and Human Security (UNU-EHS), reveals (based on scores of personal testimonies from refugees in Eastern Africa) how climate change can make people more vulnerable and can also play a part in driving them into areas of conflict and ultimately across borders and into exile and how it is now one of the leading causes of the global rise in refugees.*According to the International Red Cross, climate change disasters are now a bigger cause of population displacement than war.*

4. Conclusion

The three critical and interacting transitions discussed here, those of population, agriculture and climate change will collectively shape Africa's socio-economic and political landscapes. Understanding their interaction and the impact they have on each other becomes a necessity. It is easy to delineate a link between agriculture and population growth in Africa. Dependency on primary agriculture can confine hundreds of millions of young Africans to a large cadre of unemployed and often poorly educated class. Growth in the agricultural sector can help to absorb a large pool of unemployed youth that has the potential of becoming a destabilising factor in the continent.

However, this interaction becomes more complex when one puts climate change into the equation. It becomes difficult to confidently determine the impact that climate change will have on agriculture and population growth in the continent.

Agriculture is highly dependent on specific climate conditions. Nonetheless, trying to understand the overall effect of climate change on the continent's food supply can be difficult since climate change can bring both opportunities and threats. Increases in temperature and carbon dioxide (CO₂) can be beneficial for some crops in some places. But to realize these benefits, nutrient levels, soil moisture, water availability, and other conditions must also be met. Changes in the frequency and severity of droughts and floods could pose challenges for farmers.

As highlighted by the IFs forecasts and a number of studies by the Food and Agriculture Organization and International Food Policy Research Institute, the likely impact of climate change on agriculture and population human well-being include: i) the biological effects on crop yields; ii) the resulting impacts on outcomes including prices, production, and consumption; and iii) the impacts on per capita calorie consumption and child malnutrition. The biophysical

25 UNHCR and UNU-EHS. Climate Change, Vulnerability and Human Mobility: Perspectives of Refugees from the East and Horn of Africa. No.1 June 2012

26 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). *Climate change and its possible security implications: report of the Secretary-General*, 11 September 2009. A/64/350, 117, <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4ad5e6380.html>, accessed 17 October 2010. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (2009) *Hunger, disaster, hope: rethinking humanitarian action. Advocacy Report*, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Geneva, Switzerland, <http://www.ifrc.org> (accessed 23 November 2009).

effects of climate change on agriculture induce changes in production and prices, which play out through the economic system as farmers and other market participants adjust autonomously, altering crop mix, input use, production, food demand, food consumption, and trade.

Overall, climate change could make it more difficult to grow crops and raise livestock. In fact, climate change could result in declining crop yields as well as additional price increases for the most important agricultural crops—rice, wheat and maize. Rising temperatures and changes in rainfall patterns will have direct impact on crop yields, as well as indirect effects through changes in irrigation water availability. In addition, more extreme temperature and precipitation can prevent crops from growing. Extreme events, especially floods and droughts, can harm crops and reduce yields.

Agriculture is already under pressure in the continent mainly due to an increasing demand of food for the growing population. Growing incomes in Africa, combined with continued rapid population growth, are fuelling food demand, which is expected to lead to a gradual upward trend in real agricultural prices. The prospects of climate change make this problem a priority for Africa. Potential increase in temperature due to climate change and its impacts on crop production, above all food security, will remain a major concern in the coming years.

Thus Africa needs to strengthen its local capacities to be able to deal with stresses in line with general agricultural development priorities. In terms of adaptation in Africa, what is required is strengthening of capacities of African agriculture and food systems to adapt to climate change, via improved technology generation and adoption systems, more and better irrigation and drainage, better markets, and greater ability to import foods in bad years or on a year round basis, greater preparedness for extreme weather events, and better safety nets. To harness the enormous land reserves of the continent will require more labour and migration of populations from higher population density areas and areas with little or declining agricultural potential to the lower population density areas, where better quality agricultural land is available.

Population growth adds to the challenge of increasing per capita income and feeding. Thus, aggressive agricultural productivity investments are needed. There is a need to also reinvigorate national research and extension programs and increase funding for adaptation programs. Supporting community-based initiatives should also be an integral part of adaptation strategies. Crop and livestock productivity, market access, and the effects of climate all are extremely location specific. International development agencies and national governments should work to ensure that technical, financial, and capacity-building support reaches local communities.

As pointed out by FAO, neither population growth nor climate change will present insurmountable challenges to agricultural development in Africa, if Africa seizes the opportunities it now has. While climate change is likely to affect most regions in Africa negatively, it will also open new opportunities in some regions where rainfall and other climate

parameters will improve. Other opportunities arise from the possibility of carbon trade once the instruments for trading via land use commitments and changes are better developed. In the aggregate, the impact on African agriculture will undoubtedly be negative, but climate models are not yet sufficiently well developed for Africa to predict what will happen with sufficient certainty to engage in detailed planning. As a consequence, climate change should be mainstreamed into the general agricultural and risk mitigation agendas.

As Africans pursue their policy goals in the contexts of both rapid change and great uncertainty, they need insight into the path that they are on and where that path is taking them, as well as into the leverage that their choices provide them. As this paper has argued, action must be taken around issues of human development (associated with population growth), agricultural productivity and climate change. It is already clear that the future of African agriculture and human development would be better off if investments are directed toward the domestic market – supporting projects such as networked agricultural infrastructure, and farm services designed to improve the production and purchasing power of smallholder farmers. Rewards can be reaped at the end if concerted efforts are made; resources and time are channelled towards realizing a Green Revolution—increasing yields and land under cultivation.

La «malédiction» des ressources naturelles: derrière l'économie, la politique

Thierry Vircoulon

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Summary

Ten years ago natural resources have made their entry into the international debate as a development issue. Ten years later, they appear as a major political issue in the process of determining the future of the African continent. Africa is both a poor continent and a major provider of mineral resources (57% of cobalt mined in the world, 46% diamond, 39% manganese, etc..) and hydrocarbons (8%). In 2011, many countries rich in commodities could be found at the bottom of the human development scale established by the United Nations Development Programme (Democratic Republic of the Congo on the 187th on 187, Guinea-Conakry - 178th, Nigeria - 156th, Angola - 148th, Niger - 186th). Therefore, economists have been struck by the gap between the abundant natural resources of some countries and the poverty of their population. This poverty in the midst of abundance initially questioned the economics and resulted in economic analysis on the link between underdevelopment and natural resources. But economists have had to quickly resolve the obvious and turn their gaze toward politics to understand the «curse of natural resources.»



Il y a dix ans, les ressources naturelles ont fait leur entrée dans le débat international comme un problème de développement. Dix ans plus tard, elles apparaissent comme un problème politique majeur en passe de déterminer l'avenir du continent africain. L'Afrique est à la fois un continent pauvre et un grand producteur de ressources minérales (57% du cobalt extrait dans le monde, 46% du diamant, 39% du manganèse, etc.) et d'hydrocarbures (8%). En 2011, de nombreux pays riches en matières premières se retrouvent en bas de l'échelle du développement humain établie par le Programme des Nations Unies pour le Développement (République démocratique du Congo 187^{ème} sur 187, Guinée-Conakry 178^{ème}, Nigeria 156^{ème}, Angola 148^{ème}, Niger 186^{ème}). De ce fait, les économistes ont été frappés par l'écart entre la richesse en ressources naturelles de certains pays et la pauvreté de leur population. Cette pauvreté dans l'abondance a d'abord questionné la science économique et donné lieu à des analyses économiques sur le lien entre mal-développement et ressources naturelles. Mais les économistes ont vite dû se résoudre à l'évidence et tourner leur regard vers la politique pour comprendre la «malédiction des ressources naturelles».

Cet article revisite l'histoire de la malédiction des ressources naturelles pour montrer qu'il s'agit davantage d'un problème politique qu'économique. Les tentatives de régulation internationale qui sont apparues depuis une décennie représentent un retour de la politique dans un débat qui a commencé entre économistes mais ces tentatives de régulation sont encore à la recherche d'un succès pour convaincre. Qu'entendez-vous faire dans cet article? Quelle est sa structure et sa principale thèse?

Politique et ressources naturelles: une relation néfaste à la démocratie

L'économie d'enclave et le mal hollandais (*«dutch disease»*) ont permis d'éclairer la «malédiction des ressources naturelles». Généralement, le développement du secteur des ressources naturelles s'accompagne d'une poussée inflationniste - phénomène qui a été, pour la première fois, remarqué par les économistes en Hollande quand ce pays est devenu producteur de gaz naturel. Les secteurs minier et pétrolier ont aussi tendance à susciter un développement limité: globalement, ils produisent peu d'emplois (haut degré de mécanisation), sont consommateurs d'emplois qualifiés (que le marché local ne peut pas fournir) et les énormes profits qu'ils génèrent ne sont pas réinvestis sur place. Leur effet de développement est donc réduit à une enclave géographique. Le développement de ces secteurs induit aussi un effet de spécialisation qui entrave la diversification nécessaire de l'économie du pays concerné. Ces derniers se retrouvent donc pris au piège d'une économie dont la croissance dépend de l'évolution du cours des matières premières. Au moindre retournement de conjoncture, ces économies subissent un choc exogène quasi-immédiat comme l'a démontré la crise de 2008.

Mais ces phénomènes économiques négatifs ont conduit à examiner, en plus du rôle des compagnies, celui des gouvernements. Comment les gouvernements négocient-ils avec les compagnies? Comment régulent-ils ou non le secteur? Que font-ils de la rente? Toutes ces

questions ont mis en évidence le fait que l'abondance des ressources naturelles génère un type particulier de système étatique: l'Etat rentier, un Etat dont l'essentiel des revenus dépend du secteur des ressources naturelles. Cette rente en fait un Etat théoriquement riche ou plutôt riche tant qu'elle est bien gérée. Or l'expérience démontre que cette rente est généralement captée par des intérêts particuliers, sert à faire gonfler les chiffres de la fonction publique à des fins électoralistes quand elle ne sert pas tout simplement à se doter d'un arsenal répressif et à acheter l'opposition. Facilement détournée et manipulée par les dirigeants, la rente qui se chiffre annuellement en millions de dollars pour les minerais et en milliards pour les hydrocarbures est à l'origine d'un système politique très déséquilibré: les détenteurs du pouvoir ont accès à des ressources financières sans commune mesure avec les moyens de l'opposition. En d'autres termes, le pouvoir a les capacités de convaincre et de contraindre. Grâce à la rente, il consolide son emprise par un mélange de mesures démagogiques, de programmes de construction, de contrôle de l'espace public et, si besoin est, de corruption politique. La malédiction des ressources naturelles n'est donc pas seulement économique, elle est aussi politique. En générant un système politique profondément déséquilibré, la rente est un frein à la démocratisation. L'Etat rentier se caractérise par une très faible opposition, une forte centralisation du pouvoir politique et économique autour d'un clan ou d'une famille et des indicateurs de gouvernance très faibles.¹ Une des raisons du retard démocratique de l'Afrique centrale tient à la concentration d'Etats rentiers dans cette partie du continent. Le Gabon, la Guinée équatoriale, le Congo-Brazzaville, le Tchad, l'Angola, etc., ont tous deux caractéristiques communes: des pouvoirs en place depuis plus de quinze ans et une économie pétrolière. Dans cette région, l'Etat postcolonial s'est facilement inscrit dans la continuité de l'Etat colonial extracteur de ressources. Cette rente renforce la tendance à la patrimonialisation qui s'observe dans les Etats de cette région et la résistance victorieuse de certains régimes archaïques à la démocratisation ne s'explique pas autrement. Ces régimes sont parvenus à transformer leur rente minière ou pétrolière en rente politique et à prolonger leur espérance de vie au-delà du raisonnable.

La ruée vers les matières premières qui caractérise notre monde global joue en faveur d'un allongement de la durée de vie de ces régimes qui n'est pas sans lien avec le cycle de prix élevés des matières premières.² Plus d'une décennie de prix élevés ont abouti à une ruée vers des territoires autrefois délaissées parce que leurs gisements n'étaient pas rentables en période de prix bas. Malgré le manque d'infrastructures du continent, le club des producteurs africains de matières premières s'élargit. De nouveaux producteurs d'hydrocarbures (aujourd'hui dans l'offshore en Afrique de l'Ouest,³ demain en Afrique de l'Est⁴ et sans doute après-demain en

1 La dynamique de l'Etat rentier a été analysée dans Thierry Vircoulon, «Matières premières, régulation internationale et Etats rentiers», *Etudes*, 2009/5, volume 410.

2 Voir les graphiques d'évolution des prix sur la longue durée en annexe.

3 Des découvertes off shore ont récemment concerné la Côte d'Ivoire, la Sierra Leone, le Ghana, la Mauritanie, et le Liberia.

4 Depuis le début de l'année 2012, les découvertes d'hydrocarbures se multiplient au Kenya et en Tanzanie.

Afrique centrale⁵) et de minerais (Mali, Burkina Faso, Sénégal, etc.) apparaissent sur le continent africain tandis que certains producteurs pétroliers vieillissants rêvent d'un renouveau économique grâce aux ressources minières comme le Gabon et le Cameroun. Des pays qui étaient hier des «no-go areas» absolus comme la Somalie et la République démocratique du Congo (RDC) sont maintenant sur la carte des compagnies pétrolières et cela induit deux conséquences: une tentative de transformer la relation entre les Etats et les compagnies et l'apparition de nouveaux dilemmes géopolitiques.

La résurrection d'une vieille idée: rééquilibrer les termes de l'échange

Les cartes minières et pétrolières sont en train d'être redistribuées en Afrique aussi bien entre les pays qu'entre les pays et les opérateurs privés. S'apercevant comme en Amérique du Sud que les cours montaient mais que les termes de l'échange étaient les mêmes, les gouvernants africains ont lancé des renégociations de contrats dans le sillage de leurs homologues sud-américains. Initiée par le Liberia en 2005 à propos d'un contrat avec la société indienne Mittal puis suivi par la Guinée-Conakry et la RDC en 2007, la vague des renégociations s'est amplifiée sur le continent mais semble avoir été contrariée par la crise de 2008 (Afrique du Sud, Ghana, Guinée-Conakry, Liberia, Madagascar, Niger, Nigeria, RDC, Sierra Leone, Tanzanie, Zambie). Il est sans doute trop tôt pour conclure sur le résultat réel de ces renégociations. Si le Liberia et la Zambie semblent avoir redressé une relation contractuelle très désavantageuse, en RDC, la révision des contrats miniers entre 2007 et 2009 n'a permis qu'une modeste augmentation de l'actionnariat de l'Etat et s'est déroulée dans la plus grande opacité. Certaines de ces renégociations se sont accompagnées de menaces de nationalisation, voire ont pris la voie de «l'indigénisation» comme au Zimbabwe où le *Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act* voté en 2007 implique que les Zimbabwéens possèdent 51% des sociétés minières opérant dans le pays. Si certaines compagnies ont obtempéré tout en freinant leurs investissements,⁶ d'autres dont Impala Platinum, l'une des plus grandes sociétés du pays, ont engagé un bras de fer avec le gouvernement.⁷ Le nationalisme des ressources se répand sur le continent depuis le regain d'intérêt pour ses ressources naturelles, au point d'affecter même le plus capitaliste de ces pays: l'Afrique du Sud. Depuis que Julius Malema, l'ancien président de la Ligue de la Jeunesse de l'ANC, a lancé l'idée de la nationalisation, l'augmentation de la taxation du secteur minier et la création d'une compagnie minière nationale ont fait partie des idées mentionnées dans les débats publics en Afrique du Sud⁸ le gouvernement sud-africain envisage non seulement d'augmenter la taxation du secteur minier mais aussi de créer une compagnie minière nationale. L'existence d'une compagnie nationale et d'une société de trading est certes déjà la norme dans le secteur pétrolier mais elle reste

5 Les compagnies pétrolières s'intéressent également à cette partie du continent très difficile d'accès faute d'infrastructures et prospectent depuis peu en RDC, Rwanda, Burundi et Centrafrique.

6 "Pyrrhic victory for Mugabe as Rio Tinto gives up control of tiny diamond mine, but likely drops \$200 million expansion", www.mining.com, 9 octobre 2011.

7 "Zimbabwe to announce Implats fate after ownership talks deadlocked", Reuters, 6 mars 2012.

8 «KwaZulu-Natal ANC wants talks on transformation», BusinessDay, 19 juin 2012.

l'exception dans le secteur minier où peut-être une nouvelle évolution se profile. Souvent la renégociation traduit un souci d'indépendance énergétique et de politique économique: les gouvernements africains réclament une raffinerie pour ne pas avoir à importer le pétrole qu'ils exportent brut⁹ ou des usines pour transformer les minerais et augmenter la valeur de leurs exportations. Malheureusement, cette légitime exigence bute souvent sur le déficit d'énergie et d'infrastructures de communications nécessaires au développement industriel. Tandis que les compagnies parlent du retour du risque politique, les gouvernements africains parlent d'un partage plus équitable des ressources et de souveraineté nationale – la question essentielle étant éludée par les deux parties: où vont et comment sont réinvestis les profits?

Le temps des conflits de ressources

Autre conséquence de la ruée vers les ressources naturelles: une reconfiguration de la géopolitique africaine. Certains pays sont des producteurs en déclin; d'autres sont de nouveaux producteurs et d'autres enfin sont d'anciens producteurs qui vont bénéficier ou bénéficier déjà d'une «renaissance minière ou pétrolière» grâce à la montée des prix¹⁰. La carte minière et pétrolière du continent est en train d'être redessinée et cela ne manquera pas d'avoir de fortes répercussions sur la géopolitique du continent. Nul ne sait si les nécessités de stabilité pour une exploitation industrielle de longue durée vont l'emporter sur les rivalités que la découverte de nouvelles ressources va susciter entre Etats et à l'intérieur des Etats mais force est de reconnaître qu'après les guerres du diamant au Liberia et en Sierra Leone dans les années 90, on compte maintenant déjà deux guerres du pétrole en Afrique et une guerre des mines.

Dans le delta du Niger, le Mouvement pour l'émancipation du delta du Niger MEND avait déclaré en 2007 une guerre pour le pétrole et l'émergence de la menace islamiste au nord du Nigeria s'effectue sur fond de lutte permanente pour une meilleure redistribution de la rente entre les Etats du nord et du sud. La lutte entre le nord et le sud Soudan a pris la tournure d'une guerre pétrolière au début de l'année 2012 quand Juba a décidé de stopper la production en rétorsion aux attaques de l'armée soudanaise et que des travailleurs chinois ont été pris en otage dans le Sud Kordofan. L'enjeu pétrolier s'est invité dans le conflit soudanais au point de reléguer la question religieuse au second plan. Le pétrole est d'ailleurs la raison pour laquelle la diplomatie chinoise sort de son dogme traditionnel (la non-ingérence) et endosse le rôle de médiateur dans ce conflit.¹¹

L'est de la RDC est le théâtre d'une véritable guérilla minière depuis la fin des années 90. Depuis 2002, les Nations Unies documentent l'exploitation illégale des ressources naturelles dans cette région riche en minerais et ont créé spécifiquement un groupe d'experts sur cette

9 Le Tchad a ainsi obtenu la construction de la raffinerie de Djarmaya par une société chinoise et à la fois le Kenya et l'Ouganda souhaitent accueillir une raffinerie sur leur territoire afin de ne pas dépendre l'un de l'autre.

10 Grâce à des technologies permettant d'extraire du pétrole d'anciens gisements en fin de vie, certaines sociétés ont redonné vie à d'anciens champs pétroliers et se spécialisent dans ce créneau.

11 5% des importations chinoises proviennent du Soudan. "South Sudan puts Beijing policies to the test", Reuters, 20 février 2012.

question dont le dernier rapport remonte à décembre 2011¹¹. L'or et les minerais composites du groupe de l'étain (cassitérite, coltan, niobium, wolfram) sont exploités depuis le début du XX^e siècle. Le boom du coltan (2000) a été l'événement par lequel le scandale est arrivé: la recrudescence de l'activité minière a alors mis en lumière les liaisons dangereuses du commerce et des groupes armés. Le «commercialisme militaire» définit le système d'exploitation mis en œuvre pendant les deux guerres (1996-97 et 1998-2002) par l'Ouganda et le Rwanda qui reposait sur une implication de leurs armées dans la commercialisation des minerais. Décrit à grands renforts de détails par les Nations Unies et les ONG, ce commercialisme militaire permettait de générer des profits de guerre pour les pays impliqués.¹² Depuis cette date, le financement par le commerce des minerais des diverses forces combattantes opérant dans les provinces orientales s'est routinisé et même banalisé. Après les turbulences des années 1996 à 2003, la trajectoire d'informalisation du secteur minier s'est achevée dans une milicianisation et une militarisation qui permettent aux milices et à l'armée de survivre et de s'autofinancer. Les milices et l'armée exercent une emprise territoriale serrée sur les principaux sites miniers dont ils tirent des bénéfices qui se comptabilisent en millions de dollars américains. Les sites miniers ont suscité et suscitent encore leur convoitise, même si un partage tacite du marché a parfois lieu entre les différentes forces armées. La zone aurifère de Mongbwalu en Ituri a été hautement contestée par les milices locales avant de passer sous le contrôle de l'armée congolaise en 2005. Des affrontements entre les Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) et les Forces Armées de la RDC (FARDC) ont eu lieu en 2005 pour le contrôle de Mwenga au Sud Kivu; entre 2006 et 2009, la 85^{ème} brigade a «tenu» la mine de Bisie qui produit 75% de la cassitérite du Nord Kivu. Et la stratégie militaire mise en œuvre contre les FDLR consiste en grande partie à les chasser de leurs emprises minières traditionnelles (Shabunda, Mwenga, etc.). La facilité d'exploitation des ressources minières du Kivu se traduit par un coût d'opportunité très bas pour la création de groupes armés et aboutit donc à un cercle vicieux de la conflictualité qui s'est enracinée dans cette région depuis plus de dix ans. En Afrique, les conflits de ressources ont une acuité qu'ils n'ont pas ailleurs comme en témoigne une étude de l'agence des Nations Unies pour l'environnement qui consacre 6 de ses 13 cas d'études à des conflits africains.¹³

Réformes et régulations: à la recherche d'un succès

Compte tenu de l'importance des secteurs minier et pétrolier dans l'économie africaine et de leurs implications précédemment développées, deux types d'initiatives ont été lancées: l'une vise à améliorer la gouvernance de ces secteurs et l'autre vise à leur éviter de devenir une source financière pour les belligérants.

12 Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies, Lettre datée du 29 novembre 2011, adressée au Président du Conseil de sécurité par la Présidente du Comité du Conseil créé par la résolution 1533 (2004) concernant la République démocratique du Congo, S/2011/738, 2 décembre 2011. http://www.un.org/french/documents/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2011/738 (16 septembre 2012)

13 Rapport de la mission du Conseil de sécurité dans les Grands Lacs, 15-26 mai 2001 et «Etude sur le rôle de l'exploitation des ressources naturelles dans l'alimentation et la perpétuation des crises de l'Est de la RDC», International Alert, octobre 2009.

14 From Conflict to Peacebuilding, United Nations Environment Programme, 2009.

Afin d'améliorer la gouvernance de ces secteurs, un train de réformes a été conçu et s'est imposé au fil des années comme une sorte de norme internationale non-dite. Largement inspiré de la gestion des hydrocarbures par la Norvège, ce train de réformes consiste à établir la transparence financière, à épargner une partie de la rente, à en consacrer une autre fraction au développement local et à mettre en place un dispositif de gestion concertée. Ce sont en général ces principes qui ont inspiré *l'Africa Mining Vision* de l'Union africaine et inspirent les réformes minière et pétrolière suggérées par les institutions financières internationales – Banque mondiale et Fonds Monétaire International. Ces réformes fonctionnent toujours selon le même schéma: refonte du cadre réglementaire, renforcement de capacité de l'administration gestionnaire et adhésion à l'Initiative pour la Transparence dans les Industries extractives (ITIE). Cette organisation est un club de pays et de sociétés qui s'engagent à publier les flux financiers qu'ils échangent (les sociétés doivent publier les taxes et impôts qu'elles paient et les gouvernements doivent publier leurs recettes fiscales). Selon cette doctrine informelle, la bonne gouvernance du secteur des ressources naturelles suppose également un système de gestion concertée entre l'Etat, le secteur privé et la société civile. Cette relation triangulaire est le point faible de cette réforme: d'une part, le gouvernement et le secteur privé n'apprécient guère l'intrusion d'un troisième partenaire dans une relation qui est déjà suffisamment délicate et parfois instable et, d'autre part, quand la société civile parvient à s'immiscer dans le système de gestion des ressources naturelles, le rapport de forces au sein de ce trio est loin d'être égalitaire.

De fait, les promoteurs de la bonne gouvernance dans ces secteurs sont encore à la recherche d'une «*success story*». Jusqu'à présent, le succès n'a pas vraiment été au rendez-vous: la réforme minière lancée par la Banque mondiale en RDC au début du siècle s'est enlisée et cette vénérable institution a connu un revers retentissant au Tchad en 2006. En RDC, la Banque mondiale avait sponsorisé la confection d'un nouveau code minier, la création d'un cadastre minier et la restructuration de la principale compagnie minière publique du pays. Cette approche top down visait à la fois à rendre le secteur plus transparent et plus attractif pour les investisseurs étrangers en instaurant de nouvelles règles du jeu et à remettre en marche la principale source de financement de l'Etat. Toutes ces initiatives ont rencontré l'assentiment du gouvernement de transition et la voie semblait tracée pour une adhésion réussie à l'ITIE. Or, depuis la fin de la transition, la réforme est au point mort, voire pire: elle a déraillé! La gestion des titres miniers est redevenue douteuse, le nouveau code minier est violé et contesté en permanence, le rendez-vous avec l'ITIE fixé en 2009 a été manqué et surtout la restructuration de la Gécamines est encore en chantier. Au Tchad, la Banque mondiale et la Banque européenne d'investissement ont tenté de transplanter le modèle norvégien en formant un partenariat avec les sociétés pétrolières et le gouvernement. Ce transfert de politique s'est heurté à l'entrée en guerre du Tchad et donc à la nécessité de mobiliser des ressources financières rapidement. Le gouvernement tchadien a fait volte-face et est revenu sur ses engagements en entraînant dans son sillage les compagnies pétrolières.¹⁵

15 Pour plus de détails, lire <http://www.crisisgroupblogs.org/africanpeacebuilding/2010/09/02/tchad-la-victoire-facile-dun-etat-fragile-contre-les-institutions-internationales/>

Afin d'éviter que les ressources naturelles ne financent les conflits, deux initiatives internationales ont été mises en place: le Processus de Kimberley et la diligence raisonnable. Ces deux initiatives reposent sur le même principe: la vérification de l'origine des produits. En juillet 2010, le gouvernement américain a voté une loi de réforme financière, le *Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act*. La section 1502 de cette loi appelle la Commission Américaine de Sécurité et d'Echange (SEC) à rendre ce secteur plus transparent en élaborant des règles contraignant les compagnies à divulguer l'origine de leurs minerais, en mettant en pratique la diligence raisonnable sur leur chaîne d'approvisionnement. Les architectes du Dodd-Frank Act espèrent que ce dernier permettra de rompre le lien entre le commerce des minerais et les groupes armés dans les Grands Lacs. L'OCDE a repris à son compte le principe de diligence raisonnable et incite les industries à l'appliquer tout comme la Conférence Internationale sur la Région des Grands Lacs (CIRGL) qui a inclus la certification dans son Initiative Régionale sur les Ressources Naturelles¹⁶. Le Processus de Kimberley est un système de certification et de traçabilité concernant les diamants et mis au point en réaction aux guerres civiles du Liberia et de la Sierra Leone. Les pays exportateurs certifient l'origine des diamants, c'est-à-dire qu'ils n'ont pas été achetés à des groupes armés.

Dix ans après sa création, le Processus de Kimberley est décrédibilisé au point que certains de ces fondateurs l'ont quitté et que sa gouvernance interne ait été mise à l'épreuve par les divergences de vues sur les diamants de Marange.¹⁷ Les rapports du panel d'experts se sont routinisés, les réformes pétrolière et minière sont en attente d'une «*success story*» et l'ITIE recherche un second souffle. La logique de clubs informels qui fait la force de l'ITIE et du Processus de Kimberley fait aussi leur faiblesse: en l'absence de sanctions formelles et efficaces, le club ne peut atteindre qu'un consensus a minima et imposer des obligations elles aussi minimales. De leur côté, quand elles ne sont pas directement contredites par les événements politiques comme au Tchad, les réformes font face à de puissantes coalitions d'intérêts et s'enlisent entre manque de coordination, manque de capacité et manque de volonté. Ces réformes sont complexes et requièrent, en effet, un engagement politique sincère et de long terme, ce que n'autorise ni l'évolution du marché ni le cycle de la politique ni le cycle de projet des donateurs.

Conclusion

Après avoir été abordées comme un problème économique, les ressources naturelles sont maintenant abordées comme un problème politique. Cela a abouti à l'émergence de tentatives de régulation internationale qui ne sont ni des interventions étatiques ni des interventions du marché mais se situent entre les deux. Il s'agit de promouvoir des normes au niveau international qui ne s'imposent ni aux marchés ni aux Etats mais sont prises en compte par le marché et les Etats. Ces normes ne peuvent ni être imposées ni être ignorées et leur expansion dépend des avantages qu'elles peuvent procurer à l'industrie et aux pays producteurs.

16 <https://cirgl.org/spip.php?article136>

17 Sur les problèmes du Processus de Kimberley, lire <http://www.crisisgroupblogs.org/africanpeacebuilding/2010/11/04/time-to-rethink-the-kimberley-process-the-zimbabwe-case/>

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
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
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



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AFRICA'S
ECONOMIC
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LE DÉCOLLAGE
ÉCONOMIQUE
DE L'AFRIQUE



African Private Sector and Entrepreneurship
Development

Développement du secteur privé et de
l'entrepreneuriat en Afrique

Tidjani Jeff Tall

Beyond the Rhetoric: The role of Partnership in
Africa's Development

Au-delà de la rhétorique, le véritable rôle des
partenaires dans le développement de l'Afrique

Dr Sekai Shand

How to sustain the new African economic rise?

Comment pérenniser la nouvelle embellie
économique africaine?

Sanou Mbaye

African Private Sector and Entrepreneurship Development

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Résumé

L'Afrique est souvent présentée sous un jour négatif dans les médias. Toutefois, le continent présente beaucoup d'avantages notamment dans le secteur privé et l'entrepreneuriat.

En effet, l'Afrique dispose d'économies en pleine croissance le secteur privé y contribue grandement, notamment le secteur informel. L'entrepreneuriat est vivace à travers les nations africaines et les femmes y jouent un rôle important grâce à leur participation au secteur privé.

Toutefois, certains changements doivent être faits: décider de la gestion l'économie informelle, mettre davantage l'accent sur l'entrepreneuriat en tant que choix de carrière viable, faciliter l'accès au financement, à la formation et à l'éducation et enfin, revisiter la réglementation qui étouffe toute créativité et toute initiative. Les femmes devraient bénéficier de ces avantages tout comme l'élimination des discriminations basées sur le genre doit être une priorité. En outre, il est essentiel de réduire la corruption et de relever les normes de gouvernance afin d'obtenir un niveau et environnement équitables.

Avec la croissance économique que l'Afrique a connue, couplée aux ressources naturelles et humaines disponibles, le continent n'a jamais connu de moment plus propice pour se prendre en main et accomplir les changements nécessaires pour une pleine intégration au marché mondial et pour le bénéfice de tous les Africains.



Where Does Africa Currently Stand?

Despite the fact that Africa is generally painted in a negative light, depicting the poverty and violence that stem from some regions, the continent has many positive attributes in its favor, starting with its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) trends. The GDP of Africa as a whole has been growing steadily at more than 5% a year for the past decade and that growth is expected to continue and increase¹. This creates a strong foundation on which Africa can build in order to have a more productive economy. The high proportion of young people (age 25 or less) in the population is also a reason for optimism.

However, there are a number of factors affecting the future growth of the African economy and these stem primarily from the private sector. While Africa weathered the economic storm and came out relatively unscathed, this was due primarily to the fact that the African financial markets are not significantly integrated into the global economy. While this offers some form of protection, it also shelters the African economy and will cause stagnation in growth if the situation is not rectified. Even more an issue is the global perception of Africa as a poor and non-advanced society, which, as mentioned in the first paragraph, is built up or maintained by what the global media portrays.

Discussed in this document are the African private sector & entrepreneurship and the role they play in the developing economy. It is important to consider various aspects of the private sector, including entrepreneurship, but also including the presence of the informal economy and the untapped talent that lies in the shadows. These issues are addressed individually, with emphasis placed on the current atmosphere in Africa and what needs to be changed to encourage economic growth within African countries and Africa as a continent. This document also mentions corruption in the private sector and the role it plays in stifling the economic growth of many African nations.

Size of the Private Sector

In post-colonial Africa, many countries were run under a socialist system that ensured that services and commodities were supplied by the state. The result of this system was an economic collapse in the 1980s, but in the 1990s structural reforms, although not always well implemented, brought about a change in the role the private sector played in the economy. Since then, the private sector has grown, but the extent of this growth had not been measured until Stampini et al. conducted a study of the current size of the African private sector. They point out in their paper that the size and characteristics of the private sector in each African country will have a marked effect on how growth is stimulated by policy-makers and development programs. In countries in which there is a larger private sector, the focus will be more on supporting entrepreneurs, while in countries in which there is a small private sector, building skills in entrepreneurs is key.

1 World Economic Forum, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank; The Africa Competitiveness Report: 2011

2 Stampini, M.; Leung, R.; Diarra, S.M.; Pla, L.; How Large Is the Private Sector in Africa? Evidence from National Accounts and Labor Markets; December 2011

The Stampini et al. study is based on national account data from the African Economic Outlook 2009/10, which is representative of 50 African countries, with the exclusion of Zimbabwe, Somalia, and Eritrea. Credit data was retrieved from World Development Indicators and labor market data was retrieved from household and labor force survey data from 16 different African countries. The results of their study showed that the private sector in Africa is quite large, perhaps more so than is generally realized. The data shows that the private sector accounts for 4/5 of total consumption, 2/3 of the total investments, and 3/4 of the total credit. In addition, Stampini et al. found that 90% of employment comes from the private sector. The problem with this is that much of this employment and much of the private sector itself is informal, with an average of only 10% of jobs constituting permanent-wage employment.

The Informal Economy

Characteristics of the informal sector include little or no formal education, labor-intensive jobs, small start-up costs and few employees, lower wages, long working hours, intense poverty, and poorer working conditions. The extent of the informal economy in Africa has, until recently, been largely unknown. However, in recent years it has been measured through the use of household and labor force surveys. One problem concerning the informal economy is the likelihood that its size has been underestimated³. There are a number of ways in which the size of the informal economy might be misinterpreted. Consider those who work very few hours a week, work illegally, are child laborers, or work in low-paying jobs, such as those concerned with survivalist activities. These people are likely to falsify information on the survey. There is also the concern of what is to be considered informal employment as opposed to formal employment. For example, should part-time temporary employment without the usual benefits, such as sick leave, be considered formal or informal?

Among the developing nations, those in Africa face a unique challenge due to the prevalence of the informal sector, which may have actually grown in recent years. Dr. Sher Verick argues that African countries face the challenge of creating employment opportunities and promoting economic growth, but at the same time they must improve the situation of the workers⁴. Dr. Verick poses the question of whether the governments of Africa are better off integrating the informal sector into the formal sector as it currently exists, potentially risking a decrease in job creation and economic growth, or whether they should lift the regulations that are keeping those in the informal sector from becoming a part of the formal sector.

Whatever way the governments choose to approach the situation, there are certainly benefits to becoming part of the formal sector, whether by being integrated into the formal sector in its current state or being able to join it through the deregulation of the formal sector. These benefits include the availability of credit, increased transparency, and better governance. However, these benefits have to be weighed against the barriers between the informal and

³ Muller, Colette; *Measuring South Africa's Informal Sector: An Analysis of National Household Surveys*; September, 2002.

⁴ Verick, Sher; *The Impact of Globalization on the Informal Sector in Africa*; Date not Provided

formal sectors, as these can be significant. A good example can be seen in many of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, where a new business in the formal economy can have as many as 11 different procedures to go through in order to establish themselves. This takes well over two months to complete and the costs are high. In addition, businesses have to become licensed entities, another costly procedure. There is also extensive documentation required for the export of goods and costs associated with registering property to be used by the business.

Entrepreneurship and the Informal Economy

In following from the discussion on the informal economy in Africa, it is vital that entrepreneurship be closely examined. Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) form the foundation and backbone of any economy and since the majority of the entrepreneurial ventures in African countries are part of the informal sector, they fly largely below the radar and are not capable of boosting the economies of the African nations. The EU-Africa Business Forum discusses the requirements to promote and develop entrepreneurship in Africa⁵. They propose four key areas that must be addressed in order to accomplish this goal:

- Help with the creation and development of enterprises
- Improving access to financing
- Improving access to education and training
- Focusing on regulatory framework and governance

These steps bring to light the need for proper management of businesses to help business owners get started and help them grow. This means that there must be more opportunities for business people to acquire education in order to ensure that there are individuals with the necessary management skills to take these SMEs to the next level. However, the opportunities for education must also include developing a familiarity with entrepreneurship from primary level education, ensuring that future generations grow up with the entrepreneurial spirit firmly entrenched in their reality. Access to financing must be brought about by reforming the banking system and the laws pertaining to bankruptcy and collateral. Finally, regulations must be changed in order to ensure that the rewards of starting a business in Africa will outweigh any efforts and risks involved.

It needs to be recognized that the current state of entrepreneurship in African countries has a couple of very positive points, as outlined by Bright Simmons⁶. Simmons points out that both hyper-entrepreneurship and the diversity of African entrepreneurship at first glance appeared to be negatives, responsible for holding back the African economy from achieving the growth of which they were capable. However, on closer inspection, it turns out that these two characteristics of African entrepreneurship actually help give the economy strength.

Hyper-entrepreneurship is the high turnover rate of employees in the entrepreneurial sector.

⁵ The Eu-Africa Business Forum; Working Group Entrepreneurship in Africa; African Union Commission; Addis Ababa, 2007

⁶ Simmons, Bright B.; What Africa's Entrepreneurs Can Teach the World; Harvard Business Review; March 5, 2012.

Compared to their Western counterparts, those of us employed by entrepreneurs in African countries had a much greater tendency to leave their jobs so that we could then start our own businesses. The positive side of this, according to Simmons, is that being employed actually stimulates latent entrepreneurial abilities in many people and it also results in a major re-investment of social capital into the business to realize gains in financial capital.

Simmons also discusses the concept of diversity in the entrepreneurial businesses in Africa. On average, an entrepreneur in West Africa runs six separate businesses. While Simmons initially saw this as excessive diversification, he explains that these multiple-business owners serve a number of functions that in the West are accomplished by different means, but that in Africa work best in this manner. They serve as tax shelters, collateral shells, and they serve as the ideal training ground for management.

Simmons refers to the businesses that Africans run as profit ecosystems. This is important in light of the resiliency shown by the economies of developing nations after the financial crisis, as noted by the World Bank's 2008-2010 survey of entrepreneurial activity. The economies of the developing nations fared much better than those of the developed nations. Indeed, they must be doing something right.

Women's Role in Entrepreneurship

Women, who make up a significant portion of the informal sector of the African labor market, make up 50% of the self-employed people in Africa, but only 25% of employers'. In Tanzania, it is estimated that up to one third of SMEs are women-run businesses'. Women are under-represented in the formal labor force due to lower education and social expectations, but they are a key component to improving the entrepreneurial development of Africa. A higher proportion of women are found in those jobs and fields that are comprised of smaller companies that exist within the informal sector and that are in lower-value-added industries.

The key to strengthening the economies of Africa by empowering women in the entrepreneurial market is to help them move from simply being self-employed to becoming employers. Helping them move into different industries and broadening their skill set is crucial. Richardson, et al. recognize the unique challenges women face in the development of their own businesses. Women face the challenge of managing a family and performing household duties, as well as gender bias, cultural and social barriers, and a lack of formal education and technological training required to operate at the same level as men. They also fear putting their money into an uncertain venture when they have children to feed and educate. In addition, they face barriers in financing their enterprises, have difficulty accessing market information, and have to deal with policies and regulations that do not favor them.

7 2nd Ugandan UK Convention 2012: Strengthening Women's Entrepreneurship in Africa; May 15, 2012; <http://www.ugandanconventionuk.org/strengthening-women%E2%80%99s-entrepreneurship-in-africa/>

8 Richardson, P., Howarth, R, and Finnegan, G.: *The Challenges of Growing Small Businesses: Insights from Women Entrepreneurs in Africa*; 2004.

Some women have managed to flourish, thrive, and grow their businesses, but Richardson, et al. point out that the extent of this success has not been studied in detail. However, there are examples to be found, such as Bethlehem Tilahun Alemu from Ethiopia, who grew up to realize how impoverished her community was and how much untapped artisan potential there was among her people⁹. She was fortunate enough to be able to gather capital from her husband and other family members and she used this to bring the artisans together to create a line of footwear called SoleRebels that has become one of the most recognizable in Africa. Another example of a woman-turned-entrepreneur is that of Dina Bina of Tanzania, who owns Dina Flowers¹⁰. She also obtained help from her family and took the five bunches of flowers her sister-in-law had given her and created a thriving flower and interior design company that was awarded the contract for revitalizing the Julius Nyerere International Airport. These are just two examples, but they show that when given the opportunity and resources, woman can be achievers.

Fortunately, there is a lot of help out there for African women who are entrepreneurs. Since it is recognized that they play a crucial role in the informal economy and have much to contribute to the growth of the African economy, there are organizations that help provide financing for women's ventures. These include organizations such as the African Women's Entrepreneurship Program (AWEP), a U.S. State Department program, and African Women in Business Initiative (AWIB), a program of the African Development Bank. The latter of the two is a program that is designed to improve women's access to business support, financing, and training and to raise awareness of women in business among the stakeholders. Many of these programs also support business development agencies so that they can, in turn, support the female clients that require their help. However, as indicated by de Groot¹¹, the key to helping women lies first in reducing the existing gender gaps and, by so doing, making it easier for women to access what they need from financial, legal, and business systems.

The Role of Corruption in the Private Sector

Corruption is often considered a shortcoming of the public sector, yet it is all too prevalent in the private sector as well. In fact, former judge Willem Heath says that corruption in the private sector is more widespread than that of the public sector and that as much as 1,5 billion Rand has been taken from South Africa in schemes of tax avoidance¹². This report goes on to disclose that there have been surveys conducted that indicate that a large percentage of people in the business sector feel that corruption is becoming a major problem. A staggering 62% of businesses surveyed feel that bribery is becoming a standard and accepted practice.

9 Nsehe, M.; Africa's Most Successful Women: Bethlehem Tilahun Alemu; Forbes; January 5, 2012; <http://www.forbes.com/sites/mfonobongnsehe/2012/01/05/africas-most-successful-women-bethlehem-tilahun-alemu/>

10 Weber, A; From Humble Beginnings, Tanzanian Businesswoman Inspires While Giving Back to the Community; Community of Women Entrepreneurs; December 21, 2010; <http://www.reformsnetwork.org/women/?p=1339>

11 de Groot, T.U.; Women Entrepreneurship Development In Selected African Countries; UNIDO; 2001.

12 The Impact of Corruption on Governance and Socio-Economic Rights; www.casac.org.za

The question remains, how pervasive is corruption in the private sector? The Impact of Corruption on Governance and Socio-Economic Rights also revealed that the Department for Public Service and Administration conducted a survey that found 15% of businesses in the private sector said they had been told they must offer a bribe, and that the Business South Africa report disclosed that 13% of companies felt they had lost a contract as the direct effect of bribery. Part of corruption is fixed-pricing. Both fixed-pricing and corruption have a vastly negative impact on the economic development of a country as they do not make room for fair competition, which, in turn, impedes the growth of small businesses. This type of thing is most devastating to poorer communities.

Price-fixing and corruption take place in a certain type of environment, an environment in which there is poverty, high levels of unemployment and low wages, rising prices of fuel and energy, lower purchasing power, high interest rates, and where food security is a problem for poor households¹³. This price-fixing is believed by many to extend to basic food stuffs. In fact, the Competition Commission has uncovered a number of cartels that have used price-fixing in both the bread and pharmaceutical industries¹⁴. Using the bread cartel as an example, it was discovered just prior to Christmas 2006 that some of the biggest companies in bread had made an agreement with each other to keep bread prices high for consumers and to fix their prices for distributors. Of course, high prices can be affected by many different criteria, such as the cost of supplies and logistics, but in this instance the corruption was uncovered.

The solution to eliminating or at least diminishing the impact of price fixing and corruption is to ensure that there is a democratic system in place that has complete transparency. In addition to this, the existence of freedom of the press and rule of law are extremely helpful in keeping corruption at bay. Individual companies can do a lot to help curb corruption and its effects, starting with the implementation of a code of ethics that will help guide the company in the right direction¹⁵. The implementation of the code and subsequent follow-up will include the need for training and the need to ensure that there is ongoing awareness of the code. Companies can also empower employees and stakeholders by ensuring that there is a way to anonymously report suspicious dealings or behavior.

The Competitive Advantage

While it might not be widely apparent, Africa has several advantages when it comes to economic growth and prosperity. The lack of infrastructure can be a positive, if viewed in the right way, and this is often referred to as the leapfrog approach. Africa is a continent with insufficient electricity or internet connectivity. Much of it is off the grid. This lack of infrastructure gives us an entrepreneurial advantage because it is easier to come in with the currently required

¹³ Nyembezi, N.; Report on proceedings of the THIRD ANTI-CORRUPTION SUMMIT; Chapter 7.4; August 2007

¹⁴ Mokoena, N.; Report on proceedings of the THIRD ANTI-CORRUPTION SUMMIT; Chapter 7.3; August 2007

¹⁵ Minnaar, Dr. J.; Report on proceedings of the THIRD ANTI-CORRUPTION SUMMIT; Chapter 7.2; August 2007

natural resources, such as solar, wind, and geothermal solutions, and make a clean start than it is to contend with the upheaval of changing from an already well-established infrastructure. Indeed, the technological lag Africa has experienced might just be our best kept secret as it is a terrain that is ready for new technologies to be brought in and to thrive¹⁶. This is already visible in the field of mobile telecommunications.

In addition, Africa has a young work force that is ready and waiting, and there is incredible diversity and opportunity in the entrepreneurial sector. Many countries also have the advantage of having an abundance of natural resources. In fact, much of the continent's economic success over the past decade is due to exports of oil and minerals in some countries. Leke, et al. cite research by the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI), which indicates that these natural resources have accounted for one third of the economic growth seen in Africa¹⁷. The other two thirds were the result of internal structural changes.

Conclusion

As detailed in the preceding pages, while Africa is a continent full of developing countries and while it is often portrayed in a negative light in the media, the nations of Africa have a lot going for them when it comes to the private sector and entrepreneurship. The challenge becomes how to make the most of the advantages that already exist in Africa to bring our nations fully into the global economy and give us a competitive edge in the global marketplace without disrupting what is already working for us. Africa has solid, growing economies to which the private sector contributes greatly, primarily in the form of the informal sector. Entrepreneurship is alive and well throughout the African nations and women play an important role with regards to contributing to the private sector. Africa is also more than ready for technological development because, at the present time, there is very little in the way of solid infrastructure in terms of energy and connectivity, and coming in with eco-friendly alternatives to build from the ground up is very feasible.

In order to make it easier for Africa to keep moving ahead and establish itself in the global market, there are some changes that need to be made. Primarily, the governments must decide how to handle the informal economy, whether the informal sector should be integrated into the formal sector as the formal sector exists in its current state, or whether the government should adjust the formal sector regulations to allow the informal sector to shift into the formal sector with relative ease. In addition, there must be an emphasis on entrepreneurship. There must be easier access to financing, training and education, and the revamping of regulations to make it easier for entrepreneurs to form a new venture and develop it. Women must be given this type of help and more, as the removal of gender bias must be a priority. Women must have greater access to training, technology, financing, market information, and legal

16 Knowledge@Wharton; Yes, There Is Hope For Entrepreneurs In Africa: 2007; http://www.forbes.com/2007/12/17/africa-foreign-investment-ent-tech-cx_kw_1217whartonafrika.html

17 Leke, A., Lund, S., Roxburgh, C., van Wamelen, A.; What's driving Africa's growth; McKinsey Global Institute; June, 2010; http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/Whats_driving_Africas_growth_2601

help. Ensuring the eradication or minimization of corruption in the private sector is also necessary in order to give small businesses room to grow and thrive. This can be accomplished by ensuring companies operate according to a code of ethics and by ensuring transparency in a democratic government, as well as establishing freedom of the press and genuine rule of law.

Africa is a group of nations that has come a long way over the past few decades. The continent and the countries it contains are at a crucial point in their history. The economic growth we have been experiencing, coupled with the available resources, both natural and human, are advantages that are in the continent's favor, and there has never been a better time for Africa to take charge and make the changes necessary to move fully into the global marketplace. With the proper steps, the economic growth Africa has seen during the past decade can carry us into a very bright economic future. This is just the tip of what could be a very large economic iceberg.

Beyond the Rhetoric: The role of Partnership in Africa's Development

Dr Sekai Nzenza Shand

Dr Sekai Nzenza is a writer and an international development consultant from Zimbabwe. She graduated with a PhD in International Relations from the University of Melbourne. Her essays, fiction and short stories have been published in a number of journals including "The Age" Newspaper and the UK "Guardian Weekly". After several years working in humanitarian aid in Australia, Africa and the United States, Dr Nzenza returned to Zimbabwe a year ago. Confronted with the consequences of HIV/AIDS, the dependency on donor food hand-outs and increasing deaths and poverty in her village, she and the Village Women's Burial Society formed Simukai Development project. With a membership of over five hundred people, mostly widowed women, the project's aim is to introduce practical sustainable solutions to empower the community and solve village based poverty. Dr Sekai Nzenza has a weekly column in the Zimbabwe Herald where she writes about globalisation and its impact on culture and social change.

Résumé

Le présent article examine le rôle des partenaires dans le développement de l'Afrique. Il commence par mettre en évidence quelques-uns des principaux écueils et les échecs dans les partenariats au développement. Il s'interroge sur les facteurs qui entravent la mise à niveau de l'Afrique à l'aune des normes internationales ainsi que sur les modi operandi des schémas de développement. Il s'attaque aussi au déséquilibre historique de pouvoir et aux problèmes qui subsistent entre l'Afrique et les institutions et gouvernements occidentaux. L'article examine ensuite le rôle des puissances émergentes et les opportunités qui se présentent à l'Afrique dans son interaction avec la Chine, l'Inde, le Brésil, la Russie et l'Afrique du Sud (BRICS) en se concentrant moins sur les institutions et les bailleurs de fonds traditionnels. Enfin, le Dr Nzenza soutient que l'Afrique doit consciemment s'éloigner de la rhétorique du partenariat et de collaborer activement avec les nouveaux et les anciens partenaires dans les processus de prise de décision commune, les questions politiques et la planification.



Introduction

The role of partners in Africa's development has often been criticized. In some cases, this is justly so, given the imbalances of power inherent in Africa's colonial and post-colonial engagement with Europe and other Western institutions. There is a problem in speaking or applying the term partnership to a relationship among unequals in power and wealth. The idea of partnership becomes nothing but a rhetorical word to hide historical inequalities between Africa and Western nations.

This paper seeks to explore the politics of Africa's partnerships and expand the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) number eight which calls for a "global partnership for development." It examines the new geopolitical order and its impact on Africa's partnerships with emerging nations. At the same time, the paper interrogates the influential and powerful relationships that are being forged through channels of trade and finance, health, governance, peace and security, education and non-governmental organisations.

As the global relations shift and new emerging powers increasingly exercise more influence, there is a growing movement for a more effective partnership between Africa and external donors, governments and institutions. The role of partnership in Africa's development becomes a key feature of recent global development strategies.

The Rhetoric of Partnership

To partner means there is an existence of mutual cooperation and equality in the relationship from the time policies are made right through to strategy development, planning, budgeting, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. The question arises as to what extent poorer countries in Africa are able to participate equally in the decision making process and spell out their views and concerns.

Within the framework of unequal relations, we find the language of partnership in recent development policies such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), Poverty Reduction Strategies Papers (PRSPs) and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) taking ground. The desire to partner is well meant. However, the issue of continuing power inequalities in international development has had little attention. How can a true partnership exist when there is so much power disparity between African states and the European Union (EU), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and the United Nations (UN)? These institutions have traditionally imposed westernized values of good governance, free trade and integration as conditions for aid to African states.

In his research on the unequal role of American universities in developing countries, Professor Samoff criticizes the word "partnership" and writes:

"Partnership has become the *mot du jour* of foreign aid... In the contemporary world of aid, everything is a "partnership"... What earlier was called aid is now called a partnership. What

earlier was described as external guidance, oversight and validation is now recharacterized as partnership...."¹

The rhetoric of partnerships hides the reality of power imbalance by promising relationships based on equality, decision making and accountability. This is further exacerbated by history. In the past, African states did not enjoy the privilege of equal sovereignty alongside Europe. Indeed, the history of injustice between Europe and Africa goes back for centuries.

Pitfalls of Past Development Partnership

In the late 1960s and 1970s, Western government ignored the role of participation and focused more on democratization and good governance. Quite often former colonial powers gave budget aid support to the newly independent nations. There was an assumption that with financial support, new nations would build a strong state, provide the basic health and social services while managing the development of business and the economic sectors. Donors gave development aid to countries pursuing policies that were favorable to them. It was left to the African government to be accountable for the money.

Because of the condition-laden, asymmetrical relations imposed on Africa by the western trading partners and financial institutions, there was a little flexibility and no alternatives or room to move. At the same time, accountability and ownership of development was not taken into account. Without clear agreement on responsibility, partnership was bound to fail as corruption and lack of capacity to deliver started to surface.

Rather than allow governments to implement, donors changed the strategy of giving directly to government and channelled money into projects. Project cycles were introduced. From the outset, there was a strong donor involvement with donors opening technical assistance offices and placing their nationals in recipient countries. The donor identified the project, planned, implemented and measured progress and effectiveness. Clearly, there was no confidence in the ability of national governments to implement the project. In the end, African governments did not have control of project developments. Donors controlled the project implementation from beginning to end. Communities had no say in the decision-making process and they did not own development. It was a top down approach. Within this context, there was no room for partnership.

In 2002, a report by The Reality of Aid (an NGO alliance) argued that contemporary aid partnerships were shallow and only led to more rhetoric. They pointed to the fact that donors themselves created the intellectual and institutional framework for the developing countries within which the countries were asked to decide their policies. In this regard, 'the countries are in the driving seat but the donors retain the road map'².

1 Joel Samoff is a professor at Stanford University in its African Studies Center. Excerpts from a 130-page article by him and Bidemi Carrol in the *African Studies Review* in 2004.

2 This is an independent review of poverty reduction and international development assistance. See <http://www.realityofaid.org/roa-reports/index/secid/362/>

Without policies deemed as acceptable, African countries did not meet the criteria for receiving aid. This was the case with the PRSPs whereby the poorest countries were only given aid if they presented an acceptable strategy. Quite often, the strategy did not include participation from the communities expected to benefit from development. In addition, there was a lack of transparency from the very beginning because the village communities did not fully understand where the money was coming from. The donor controlled the availability and use of resources, made decisions from initial project identification, through to design and implementation.

The World Bank and Partnerships

In the 1980's, the World Bank placed strict and rigid conditionality on African governments and imposed free market economic reforms through the structural adjustment programmes. This was an infringement of the countries' sovereignty and ability to control economic reform. The Bank's policies were often based on the one-size-fits-all policy and did not take into consideration the political and economic specific contexts of individual African countries.

Bowing to increasing criticisms over its dominant policies, the World Bank accepted that the strategy of coercing countries to adopt certain policies had failed. As a result of the lessons learnt from the past, the Bank introduced its new partnership arrangements. The World Bank then sought to implement and develop its policies in a participative fashion, with governments and broader society involved, leading to a sense of ownership of the development strategy. Today, the World Bank focuses on a four-year Country Assistance Strategies and encourages community participation at local, regional and international levels.

Cultural Differences and the Problem of Silence

Despite all the talk about partnership and equality, very little has changed at grassroots level. In development literature, we speak about the 'voices of the poor' and yet, such voices are hardly heard at the global, regional and national levels when strategies to engage Africa are made. A problem often arises when trying to balance the donor's strategic objectives with that of the local people. Already, there are historical, cultural, social and political tensions in existence but not discussed. As a result of this power imbalance and mistrust, it is difficult for communities to receive and share information as well as participate in political discussions on an equal level.

During this development intervention, the African community made little contribution (if any) to how the project was to be implemented, monitored and evaluated. Although words like 'culturally sensitive' were used in writing the proposal and in searching for skills to work on the project, there was little understanding of the cultural dynamics. Due to lack of language and decision making powers, the community was left disempowered and the project was not sustainable.

Today, local and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) continue to grow and so are their influence at grassroots level and there is an increasing emphasis on empowerment and partnership-led developments. But who is making the decisions for strategy development, goals, objectives and outcomes of the work to be done? Who is directing the development process and who is accountable? The issues of power, language and cultural differences are not often taken into consideration.

I shall draw upon experiences of rural women in Zimbabwe to highlight the critical issues that make partnership impossible at village level. A study to explore the problems of partnership and power dynamics between donor and a village community was done by this writer while working on The Simukai Project in Zimbabwe in 2012.

The Simukai Project is a village based community development project formed by rural women to promote HIV and AIDS awareness and treatment, nutrition gardens, food security, water and hygiene. Representatives of an American-based NGO visited the Simukai Project to make a poverty feasibility study in February 2012. They wanted to meet the women, hold focus group meetings, carry out interviews, take pictures and then ask the women to apply for a small business skills grant. The donors asked for the proposal to be written in English. The rural women could hardly write, let alone speak English. It was therefore important to bridge the gap between the American donors and the rural women by introducing a translator who was well versed in the English language.

The translator sought words in the English language that suited the understanding of the donors. Such a language included words of pity and the rhetoric of empowerment, partnership and sustainable development. Meanwhile, the rural women remained mostly quiet as they felt disabled by their lack of the English language. They trusted the translator to speak for them even when they did not understand what was being said.

In their past experiences, the only time the rural women had contact with white people was during the colonial period and at food relief handout gatherings. Basically, there was never any direct communication between the village women and donors except through a translator. To the rural women, the English language represented donor money and power. The translator exercised power to speak English rendering the village women mute to the donors. The inability to speak English silenced the rural women making them appear vulnerable and disempowered. Yet, silence did not mean the rural women were not speaking. They were - the problem is that their real voices were not heard. Basically, there was no direct communication between donor and beneficiary. What they knew about each other was what they were told by the translator. It was entirely up to the translator to speak about what was being said and what was not being said between the two parties. In this situation, we have an unequal partnership laden with historical cultural misunderstandings, assumptions and misperceptions of what the other is saying.

In essence, the village women were objects of a focus group study rather than producers of indigenous knowledge or real partners in the decision making process. Because they assumed

that money could only come if they looked miserable, the rural women looked needy and poor when pictures were being taken of them. When asked to smile for more photographs, they did as they were told believing this would lead to donor money being made available.

In this donor meets community scenario, partnership is unlikely to happen unless the donor and the translator relinquish positions of power and allow trust to develop between the two parties. The problem also lies in the manner in which Africans beg and use contradictory language of pity alongside that of partnership, empowerment and sustainability to get money from donors. In the end, what emerged from the American donors' visit were quite clearly an imbalanced partnership and the existence of an unsustainable development intervention. An open dialogue was needed to promote the practice of speaking with the village people rather than speaking to them or for them.

Emerging Powers and New Partnerships

The rise of emerging power grouping of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) is increasingly influencing aid delivery and poverty reduction in Africa. Africa's traditional relationship with western powers has shifted and changed, creating room for new partnerships with the emerging powers. As a result, African economies are looking to new partnerships in a changing globalised world. The new geopolitical global contexts focus more on the concept of partnership in aid relationships. This is good news for Africa and partnership engagements

Indeed, African states are no longer *just* focusing on their traditional partners but are looking for access at new financial models from emerging countries like Brazil, China, India and Russia and South Africa. Unlike aid from the DAC countries, which is multilateral, policy driven and centralised through the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, OECD and EU, aid from emerging nations is not centralised. It is received through bilateral relationships with African countries.

In the global world of international development, we are therefore witnessing new paradigms, opportunities and risks for Africa's engagement with partners. These emerging powers have entered the development arena with more vigour and desire to challenge the Western government's domination of international development. For example, Brazil's trade with Africa grew five-fold between 2002 and 2009. At the same time Africa provided Brazil with oil and coal.³

More recently there has been an increased rapid economic transformation, investments and bilateral trade between Africa and China. The Sino Forum on China-Africa Co-operation (FOCAC) held the fifth Ministerial Conference of the FOCAC on July 19, 2012 in Beijing, under the theme "Building on past achievements and opening up new prospects for the new type of China-Africa strategic partnership." The forum provided an opportunity for Africa and China

3 The broad range of emerging partnerships - African Economic Outlook www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/.../emerging.../Africa...
You + I'd this publicly, 28 May 2012

to review their partnership and develop strategies that are mutually beneficial to China and to the African continent. Chinese President Hu Jintao argued the case for China and Africa “to strengthen political mutual trust and expand practical cooperation in order to open up new prospects for China-Africa partnership.”⁴ He also noted the need to build upon “traditional friendship, maintaining the momentum of high-level exchanges, enhancing strategic dialogue, increasing experience, sharing on governance, doing away with external interference and deepening mutual understanding and trust”⁵

Among the emerging nations, there is a competition between India and China to increase partnership in Africa. Over the past ten years, India and China have continued to increase volumes and values of African exports, bringing in more revenue to African countries with resources. They are looking for minerals, markets, raw materials, agricultural imports and influence. Apart from providing Africa with alternatives for exports, India and China are providing Africa with cheaper imports, increased investments and development aid different to the imposed restrictions of Western powers.

China and India claim that the “south-south co-operation”, linked to aid with trade, presents a new kind of anti-colonialism perspective promoting a different kind of partnership. At the same time, they also argue that they have greater familiarity with the political and economic conditions of African countries. From another perspective, this is an advantage for them commercially and it creates new partnerships based on mutual benefit, solidarity and self-determination. Such a mutual benefit must be based on open dialogue, transparency and levels of trust between the parties.

China is clearly encouraging new thinking on modes of partnership in international relations and aid. And yet there are reasons to be skeptical of China’s intentions. Ian Scoones argued in a recent blog that “aid is about power, regardless of where it is coming from, we must still ask the extent to which the new emerging powers are also a top-down, expert-led stances of past development interventions—from colonialism to the western aid era.”⁶

Are we therefore witnessing another scramble for Africa’s wealth and resources while Africa sits back hoping for an equitable partnership to simply happen on its own? For example, recent trade figures between China and Africa show a stark imbalance focused on African countries with oil and minerals. About 70 percent of China’s imports from Africa come from Angola, South Africa, Sudan and the Congo while about 50 percent of exports from China go to South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt and Liberia.⁷ Is this really a win-win partnership between China and Africa?

Although there are mutual benefits beyond China’s role in building stadiums, parliaments

4 Forging Sino-African relations, Beijing Review, July 19, 2012.

5 Ibid.

6 Pastoralism: Good News from a Troubled Region of Africa http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ian-scoones/pastoralism-africa-livestock-trade_b_1668153.html 07/13/2012

7 See Zimbabwe Financial Gazette, 14 September 2012. www.financialgazette.co.zw Companies and Markets page 12.

and military bases, we cannot rule out China's vested motives to establish friendship while actively promoting economic and strategic self interests. China also uses aid money to achieve political interests and economic advantage. There is also a concern that China's exports to Africa include massive quantities of poor quality merchandise while China takes raw materials to process in China.

Overall, it would be naive for African states to accept China's partnership with Africa without analyzing the motives and building the necessary steps required for trust to prevail. Africa must continue to review the terms of partnership and bridge the gaps caused by lack of open dialogues. Despite the inequality in geographic distribution of trade and investment both parties must continue to move towards a relationship that allows a win-win situation.

Although it is still early to get a clear picture of the new South-South relations, we should still ask questions regarding the nature of power and partnerships. At the aid conference in Busan, South Korea, the US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, warned poor countries to "be wary of donors who are more interested in extracting your resources than in building your capacity."⁸

As the shift in global politics increases, emerging economies and private sector must unite to reduce aid dependency and create effective partnerships based on mutual trust and accountability. This change in international relations brings to the fore a fundamental reappraisal of development policy management. Increasingly, South-South partnership presents opportunities for a different kind of aid partnership. The outcome of the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness, the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, illustrates this. Indeed, the Busan Partnership presented a more inclusive partnership for development promoting effective international cooperation. The Busan Declaration therefore presented new ways to look at different models of partnership, bringing African governments, private-sector, civil society and other stakeholders towards a more effective partnership engagement.

Clearly, Western traditional methods of aid alone are now being replaced by a more comprehensive view of international cooperation through partnership. The EU, IMF, World Bank and other UN agencies must recognise the historical legacy of unequal relations between Africa and Europe and put in place new ways to include partnership and participatory approaches. The question is: will Western traditional powers willingly and consciously give up power in favor of equal partnerships with African states? It may no longer be possible to go back to past policies of aid dependency and patronage. In order for true partnership to work, the Western institutions must now focus more on a new people-centred and people-driven approach based on respect, mutual accountability, and democracy, the rule of law, equality, citizenship and ownership. Likewise, African states have a responsibility to honour agreed principles of conduct between partners.

8 www.guardian.co.uk/.../Hillary-Clinton-aid-initiative-busan, 11 November 2011.

Recommendations for Effective partnership Strategies

- During community consultation, there is a need for open dialogue on history and perceptions before a mutual accountability and trust could be built. True partnership can only exist if it is rooted in openness, dialogue, and respect and honesty.
- New strategic partnership must promote the views of a wide range of stakeholders and marginalized groups in the decision making processes at the local, national and regional level. The donor must let go of power and create a level playing field that recognizes the role of the recipient in the decision-making and planning process.
- There is need for Africa to place more emphasis on technological development to enable effective negotiation with diverse partners.
- Institutional Capacity Building is needed to ensure sustainability and compliment effective development partnership dialogues focusing on political stability, a legal framework, capital investments, policy development and the skills needed to implement development interventions.
- To ensure accountability and transparency, all stakeholders including the community should be involved in the initial agreement and the final measurement of results and lessons learnt. A more transparent and flexible programming processes will help move a few steps towards real partnership.
- For real equality to exist there must be respect between members of the partnership regardless of size, power and wealth. The participants must agree on mandates, responsibilities and acknowledge constraints and commitments.
- During initial consultations there should be sharing of information, open dialogue and the ability to speak must be initiated from the beginning to enable a platform for partnership. Systems and structures to overcome cultural and language barriers must be built right from the beginning of a partnership process.
- A decision to implement an activity must be accompanied by accountability from all parties. Such decisions can only be made if the parties have skill, competencies, resources and capacity to deliver on their commitments.

Conclusion

No doubt, Africa is at the threshold of a rapidly changing development landscape in which South-South collaboration has become increasingly important. The momentum in developing real partnership in regional integration, intra-African trade, infrastructure and investment is increasing. At the same time, Africa must return to lessons learnt from the successes and failures of traditional forms of aid when developing new relationships with BRICS and other Western nations. Nation states must enter into partnership agreements that allow establishment of clearly defined outcomes and achievements.

In order to go beyond the rhetoric of partnership as just another fashionable word in development, there should be a new framework to enable the development of mutual learning between Africa and her partners. African states must still monitor the power imbalances that exist when there is not enough stakeholder consultation and agreement required for a real partnership to work. At the same time, it is important to note that an effective partnership can only exist if there is an ongoing assessment, review, accountability and respect for the balance of power between parties. True partnership must go beyond rhetoric and focus on more realistic and pragmatic vision of the African nations supported by the African Union going forward. In conclusion, Africa is in a much stronger position now to assert more sovereignty and autonomy, recast the partnership relationship with foreign donors and collaborate in development as equals.

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Comment pérenniser la nouvelle embellie économique africaine?

Sanou Mbaye

Sanou Mbaye, économiste et ancien haut fonctionnaire de la Banque Africaine de développement, est aujourd'hui un chroniqueur politique et économique. Ses écrits sur le développement des pays africains proposent des politiques alternatives à celles mises en place, en Afrique, par le Fond monétaire internationale (FMI) et la Banque mondiale. Il est l'auteur de «L'Afrique au secours de l'Afrique», édition de l'Atelier/coédition solidaire panafricaine, 2010.

Summary

For the first time in half a century, Africa is poised to celebrate a reversal of roles. Africa enjoys good times while the Eurozone crisis and threats of economic recession pose to the world full swing. African Countries experience the most prosperous economic period in their history.

The continent is the second engine for global economic growth after Asia. Since 2000, sub-Saharan Africa experienced an average growth of 5% to 7%. During the 2009 global recession, Africa and Asia were the only two regions where Gross National Product (GNP) grew.

In this article, Sanou Mbaye identifies and analyzes the dynamics that are at the origin of this rebirth so as to determine actions to be taken in order to strengthen and sustain it.



Des taux de croissance jamais atteints

Pour la première fois, depuis un demi-siècle, l'Afrique est en passe de célébrer un renversement des rôles. Alors que la crise de l'euro et les menaces de récession économique qu'elle fait peser sur le monde battent leur plein, la conjoncture est favorable en Afrique. Les pays de la région traversent la période économique la plus prospère de leur histoire.

Le continent est le deuxième moteur de la croissance économique mondiale après l'Asie. Depuis 2000, les pays d'Afrique subsaharienne ont connu une croissance moyenne située entre 5% et 7%. Durant la récession mondiale de 2009, l'Afrique et l'Asie ont été les deux seules régions du globe où le produit national brut (PNB) s'est accru.

Il convient d'identifier et d'analyser les dynamiques qui sont à l'origine de ce renouveau pour déterminer les mesures qu'il serait opportun de prendre pour le renforcer et le pérenniser. Parmi les principaux facteurs derrière le renouveau du paysage africain on peut compter: les Investissements Directs Etrangers (IDE), les transferts des émigrés, l'aide publique au développement (APD), l'entrée en scène des pays émergents et l'urbanisation alimentée et énergisée par l'émergence d'une classe moyenne et l'éclosion de la jeunesse. Le potentiel agricole et environnemental africain et le cadre politique progressivement démocratique sont également des réserves de croissance.

La première source de la croissance africaine vient des IDE. Ils sont en forte hausse. Selon la Conférence des Nations unies pour le Commerce et le Développement (CNUCED), les IDE sont passés de 9 milliards de dollars en 2000, à 88 milliards en 2008. Et déduction faite des investissements dans l'exploitation pétrolière et gazière, un acteur continental s'impose car c'est l'Afrique du Sud qui est le plus gros investisseur sur le continent, et non pas la Chine, l'Europe ou les Etats-Unis.

Pour mobiliser les fonds nécessaires aux investissements massifs requis particulièrement dans l'agriculture, l'énergie et les infrastructures, les gouvernements africains, les sociétés publiques et privées auront recours de plus en plus aux emprunts sur les marchés des capitaux nationaux, régionaux et internationaux. La vingtaine de bourses africaines existantes ne pèsent au total que 2% dans la capitalisation boursière mondiale. Mais, fusionnées en une seule, elles se placeraient au quinzième rang mondial.

Plusieurs pays ont désormais reçu le sésame qui leur donne accès aux marchés financiers: le «rating» ou la notation financière qui leur a été attribuée par les agences de notation. Cette note s'est révélée, dans la plupart des cas, supérieure ou égale à celle de nations aussi industrialisées que la Turquie, le Brésil ou l'Argentine. Des Etats et des entreprises publiques et privées ont de plus en plus recours aux bourses pour lever des fonds d'investissement. Depuis 2007, des pays comme le Sénégal, le Gabon et le Ghana ont levé des centaines de millions de dollars sur le marché des capitaux. La tendance devrait se poursuivre et s'amplifier. En septembre 2012, le Kenya annonçait le lancement d'un emprunt obligataire de 25 milliards de dollars pour la construction d'un second port, d'un gazoduc de 2000 km et d'une route pour le transport du pétrole du Soudan du sud.

Agir sur la monnaie

Il est admis qu'en mettant exclusivement l'accent sur la rentabilité et le profit, les investissements financés par des fonds privés encouragent les transferts de technologie et de compétence et favorisent la productivité et la compétitivité. La meilleure façon pour l'Afrique d'en tirer parti pour financer son vaste programme d'investissement sera de continuer à renforcer ses systèmes bancaires, de développer ses marchés de capitaux et de mettre en place un cadre réglementaire approprié et un code d'investissement attractif. L'adoption de politiques du travail plus compétitives, la formation d'une main-d'œuvre qualifiée, la réforme du système judiciaire et une lutte effective contre la corruption participent également des mesures d'incitation à l'investissement qu'il convient d'implémenter. L'objectif doit être de faire que les flux de capitaux privés qui représentent actuellement 5% de ressources extérieures nécessaires aux pays africains passent au moins à 70% dans l'avenir.

Mais tout désirable que puisse être l'accroissement des flux financiers en direction du continent, il serait bon d'en orienter le débit pour financer en priorité des investissements productifs à moyen et long terme et non des placements spéculatifs à court terme. En effet, il ne sert à rien de mobiliser des ressources si c'est pour les voir s'exiler après s'être fructifiées. La CNUCED estime à 400 milliards de dollars le montant de la fuite des capitaux d'Afrique depuis les années 1970. La fuite des capitaux africains trouve ses origines dans le paiement des intérêts et de l'amortissement des dettes de l'APD; dans l'adjudication à des firmes étrangères de la quasi-totalité des contrats financés par ces dettes; dans l'exemption de droits de douane, de taxes et d'impôts dont jouissent les biens et services financés par les Institutions financières internationales; dans la détérioration des termes de l'échange (le différentiel entre les prix des biens manufacturés importés par les pays de la région et ceux des matières premières exportées par ces mêmes pays); dans les opérations spéculatives; le libre transfert des profits réalisés sur place; les réserves de change bloquées sur des comptes à l'étranger; dans la propension des élites à exiler leurs capitaux et dans le détournement des recettes d'exportation, particulièrement celles du pétrole et les prébendes. Selon les estimations de la Banque mondiale, entre 20 et 40 milliards de dollars placés sur des comptes en France, en Suisse, au Royaume-Uni ou dans différents paradis fiscaux proviennent des pots-de-vin payés à des dirigeants corrompus de pays pauvres, notamment ceux d'Afrique.

La priorité doit donc être donnée à la mise en place de politiques de contrôle de change pour favoriser l'investissement productif, juguler les opérations spéculatives et freiner la fuite des capitaux. Pour ce faire, il s'agira de renverser les mesures initiales de dérégulation et de libéralisation auxquelles les économies africaines ont été assujetties depuis des décennies à travers les Programmes d'ajustement structurel des institutions de Bretton Woods - FMI et la Banque mondiale. Les Etats doivent recouvrer la pleine jouissance de leur rôle de planificateur et de régulateur du processus de transformation et de modernisation de leurs économies⁵. Il s'agira notamment d'adopter des taux de change réalistes de manière à se constituer une ligne de défense dans la «guerre des monnaies» que se livrent les grands pays industrialisés à l'instar des Etats-Unis et des pays européens, et ceux en processus d'industrialisation accélérée comme le Brésil, la Chine ou la Corée du sud par exemple. Ils s'évertuent tous à intervenir

sur le marché des changes pour maintenir au plus bas le niveau de leurs taux de change afin d'accroître leurs échanges extérieurs et de revigorer la croissance de leurs économies.

A cet égard, il faudrait éviter des parités irréalistes de taux de change. Ce problème est particulièrement d'actualité dans les pays de la Zone Franc qui ont le franc CFA comme monnaie commune. La politique de change de cette monnaie est du ressort du Trésor français. Contre le dépôt d'une partie de leurs réserves, leur monnaie commune, le Franc CFA est librement convertible, à l'inverse de toutes les monnaies des pays émergents ou en voie de développement à l'exception du rouble russe qui n'est convertible que depuis 2006. A l'aube des indépendances le dépôt exigé était de 100 %. Il a été réduit à 65% en 1973, puis plafonné à 50% depuis septembre 2005. Le franc CFA est arrimé à l'euro à un taux de change fixe surévalué contrairement aux autres monnaies dont les cours sont non seulement flottants mais également maintenus au niveau le plus bas possible. La convertibilité permet aux firmes françaises et aux élites de transférer librement les fortunes qu'elles engrangent et un franc CFA fort les prémunit contre les dépréciations monétaires courantes.

Il importe de rappeler que cette convertibilité si chèrement payée est restreinte à l'euro et que le libre transfert du franc CFA est circonscrit à la France consécutivement au régime de contrôle de change qu'elle a fait mettre en place en 1993. Les francs CFA émis par les pays d'Afrique de l'Ouest et ceux d'Afrique centrale ne sont même pas interchangeables. Les pays de la zone franc, bien que partageant cette monnaie, ne commercent pas ensemble du fait des barrières douanières qu'ils ont érigées entre eux. Les conséquences désastreuses de la politique de change adoptée par les pays de la Zone Franc se mesurent à leur environnement économique peu propice au développement. Leurs économies sont à la traîne comparées à celles des autres régions du continent. Une mesure immédiate consisterait à mettre fin aux distorsions liées à la surévaluation du taux de change en abrogeant dès à présent la convertibilité, la libre transférabilité et le taux de change fixe du franc CFA.

Le meilleur cadre pour la mise en place des mesures devant viser à favoriser l'investissement et le commerce est celui de l'union. Dans toute stratégie d'intégration politique, économique et monétaire, la priorité doit être donnée à la création d'unions régionales douanières et de zones de libre-échange pour faire du commerce et des investissements intra régionaux le premier levier de croissance économique pour le développement de la région. Il ne s'agit pas seulement de signer des accords et d'adopter sur le papier un tarif extérieur commun. Il importe de s'armer de la volonté politique de les rendre effectifs. L'intégration régionale ouvre la voie à un cadre d'échanges et d'investissement plus large et favorise les investissements et les échanges intra-régionaux. L'ouverture régionale est la première étape sur la longue route du développement et du progrès.

Transferts des immigrés

La seconde source de croissance des économies africaines provient des transferts des émigrés. Ils représentent une source importante d'apport de devises. Les informations recueillies auprès des consulats, des ministères concernés, des banques centrales ainsi que toutes les études conduites sur les transferts des migrants démontrent leur importance. Plus de 30

millions d'Africains vivant en dehors de leurs pays d'origine envoient tous les ans entre 30 et 40 milliards de dollars à leurs familles et aux membres de leurs communautés demeurées chez eux. L'achat de terrains, la construction de maisons, la mise sur pied d'une entreprise comptent parmi les premières activités financées par ces fonds. Ils représentent 36% des investissements au Burkina Faso, 53% au Kenya, 57% au Nigeria, 15% au Sénégal et 20% en Ouganda.

Malheureusement il n'existe aucune structure bancaire adéquate qui permette de convertir ces fonds en investissements productifs à moyen et long terme pour la création de valeur ajoutée, de richesse, d'emplois, de croissance économique et de développement communautaire. De nombreuses initiatives sont en cours pour mieux structurer ces transferts et en assurer une meilleure gestion. Parmi celles-ci figure le projet de création d'une banque d'investissement de la diaspora.

Aide publique au développement

L'APD est la troisième source de financement de la croissance en Afrique. L'importante place qu'elle occupe dans le financement du développement économique et social des pays africains ne devrait pas soustraire ces derniers de l'obligation de s'en affranchir progressivement. Car de toutes les sources de financement, l'"aide ", est la moins appropriée pour financer le développement d'un pays. Elle répond aux exigences définies par les bailleurs de fonds à travers les programmes d'ajustement structurel et ne résulte donc pas d'une compréhension objective et critique des économies africaines. Les projets financés servent plus à remplir les carnets de commandes des firmes occidentales et à enrichir les élites des pays bénéficiaires qu'à promouvoir le développement. Les crédits octroyés peuvent aussi payer des arriérés d'intérêts qui donnent accès à de nouveaux crédits. Pour gagner en efficacité, l'aide publique devra de plus en plus faire place au commerce et à l'investissement pour ne plus jouer qu'un rôle de soudure aux investissements publics et privés sous forme de prêts concessionnels et de fonds de soutien aux prix agricoles, aux programmes sociaux et aux forces de maintien de la paix.

Coopération avec les pays émergents

Une autre dynamique importante de croissance de l'Afrique vient aussi de l'entrée en scène dans le continent des pays émergents dans la région. Depuis le début des années 1990, la croissance économique accélérée de ces pays, leurs importations des matières premières et des produits africains et l'exportation de leurs produits à meilleurs prix constituent un réel bénéfice pour l'Afrique qui détient potentiellement plus de 10% des réserves mondiales de pétrole, 40% de celles de l'or, un tiers de celles du cobalt et des métaux de base. Il est fort improbable que la demande à long terme de ces produits puisse diminuer d'autant qu'en ces temps de crises de l'euro, de programmes d'austérité et de risques de récession en Europe et avec leurs conséquences sur le reste du monde, l'Afrique présente un double avantage: elle offre aux investisseurs le plus haut taux de rentabilité comparé à toute autre région et des valeurs refuges comme le pétrole, l'or, l'argent et le platine.

La présence de plus en plus affirmée sur la scène africaine d'acteurs comme la Chine, l'Inde, la Corée, la Malaisie, la Turquie et le Brésil a donné aux pays Africains une plateforme d'exportation accrue ainsi que la mise en place d'un nouveau modèle de coopération basé sur le commerce, l'investissement et le transfert de technologie, ce qui a élargi leurs options de croissance économique et leur a donné une opportunité significative de progrès. A titre d'exemple, les seuls échanges entre la Chine et l'Afrique sont passés de 10 milliards de dollars en 2000 à 107 milliards en 2008. Dans le même temps, l'Empire du milieu a investi plusieurs milliards de dollars dans les secteurs du pétrole, des mines, des transports, de l'électricité et des télécommunications, ainsi que dans différentes autres infrastructures.

Il est toutefois regrettable de constater que, contrairement à ces pays à développement industriel rapide qui disposent tous d'une stratégie de pénétration du marché africain, les Africains, en revanche, n'en ont aucune et rencontrent en ordre dispersé leurs interlocuteurs. Pour maximiser les retombées positives de leur coopération avec les pays émergents, les Africains seraient bien avisés de former un front et un programme communs pour rencontrer leurs partenaires.

L'urbanisation rapide de l'Afrique est un autre facteur de croissance nourri de l'émergence d'une classe moyenne et de l'explosion de la population des jeunes. Durant la décennie passée, le nombre des consommateurs de la classe moyenne – ceux qui dépensent 2 à 20 dollars par jour - a augmenté de plus de 60% et représente 313 millions, suivant un rapport de la Banque africaine de développement (BAD). La propension à consommer et la capacité à investir de cette classe moyenne constituent de puissants moteurs de croissance*.

La jeunesse africaine représente aussi une grande réserve de croissance. Dans la décennie à venir, l'Afrique sera le seul continent où la population en âge de travailler continuera de croître. En 2045, sa population jeune se chiffrera aux alentours de 1,1 milliard, plus que la Chine et l'Inde. Face aux multiples problèmes qui se posent à l'Afrique, la formation de cette jeunesse, particulièrement dans les domaines scientifiques, sera la gageure des décennies à venir. L'Afrique a besoin de former dans les décennies à venir au moins 10 000 scientifiques, ingénieurs et informaticiens par an. Présentement, elle n'en forme qu'environ 800 annuellement. La création en 2011 à Dakar, au Sénégal, d'un Institut Africain des Sciences Mathématiques (African Institute for Mathematical Sciences: AIMS), comme il en existe en Afrique du Sud et comme il va en naître, en réseaux sur tout le continent, est une des réponses apportées à cet impératif. L'AIMS invitera des professeurs du monde entier, pour des formations dispensées à des étudiants de tout le continent⁶. Dans le domaine tout aussi précieux des Technologies de l'Information et de la Communication (TIC), Google et Microsoft soutiennent activement des entrepreneurs locaux pour promouvoir la création et le développement de nouvelles entreprises africaines de technologie.

L'enracinement d'un meilleur environnement politique a aussi grandement aidé à cette nouvelle embellie de l'Afrique. Les violences post-électorales qui font la une des journaux obscurcissent le fait que des élections libres et des transitions politiques paisibles ont eu lieu dans une majorité de pays comme au Sénégal, au Mali, en Zambie, en Afrique du Sud, en Ile Maurice, au Botswana, au Cap Vert, aux Seychelles et en Namibie et dans bien d'autres.

L'Afrique dispose de 60% des terres cultivables non exploitées du globe. Dans un monde menacé de famine grandissante par l'explosion des prix des denrées alimentaires, un tel actif est d'une valeur inestimable. La ruée vers les terres africaines fait les gros titres des manchettes des journaux. Il est vrai que l'opacité qui entoure ces transactions et les conditions léonines dont la plupart des terres sont l'objet peuvent faire scandale. La crise alimentaire et la crise financière se sont combinées pour déclencher une hausse des prix des denrées alimentaires et une vague d'«accaparement des terres» au niveau mondial. D'un côté, il y a des gouvernements qui, préoccupés par l'insécurité alimentaire, recourent à des importations pour nourrir leurs populations. Ils s'emparent de vastes territoires agricoles à l'étranger pour assurer leur propre production alimentaire de manière délocalisée. La Chine, l'Inde, le Japon, la Malaisie et la Corée du Sud en Asie; l'Égypte et la Libye en Afrique; et le Bahreïn, la Jordanie, le Koweït, le Qatar, l'Arabie Saoudite et les Emirats Arabes Unis au Moyen-Orient sont à placer dans cette catégorie¹¹. De l'autre, des sociétés agro-alimentaires, des sociétés d'investissement, des investisseurs privés et des fonds spéculatifs voient dans les investissements dans des terres agricoles à l'étranger une source de revenus importante et nouvelle. Des négociants de céréales se tournent vers le foncier, à la fois pour la production alimentaire, pour la culture des agro-carburants et pour s'assurer de nouvelles sources de profit. L'Afrique a besoin d'émettre des directives claires pour réguler et superviser ces acquisitions. Le secteur agricole a besoin d'investissements productifs pour se développer et servir de moteur de croissance au reste de l'économie. Toute acquisition qui génère création d'emplois et de revenus, transfert de technologie et formation peut être classée comme investissement productif à encourager. Les acquisitions qui ne répondent pas à ces critères relèvent d'opérations spéculatives et doivent être interdites.

Dans cet ordre d'idée, il convient de renforcer les droits fonciers des agriculteurs africains qui représentent la grande majorité des populations. Ils ne sont pas propriétaires des terres qu'ils exploitent. Pour accroître leur productivité et leurs revenus, il y a besoin de faciliter leur accès au capital pour l'acquisition d'intrants, d'équipements et de formation afin de moderniser l'agriculture de subsistance pour en faire un vecteur d'autosuffisance alimentaire. Disposer d'un titre de propriété sur les terres qu'ils cultivent peut servir de garantie à la mobilisation des ressources et à la sécurité dont les exploitants ont besoin pour faire de l'agriculture familiale une composante importante dans les politiques agricoles visant l'autosuffisance alimentaire¹².

La biodiversité est un patrimoine écologique de l'humanité dont la propre survie est menacée par les exactions d'un capitalisme mondial très peu respectueux de l'environnement. D'où l'urgence d'inventer des modalités de croissance plus durable. L'Afrique peut être une pionnière en matière de politiques de développement qui préservent l'environnement. Le continent est riche en énergie hydraulique avec des réserves estimées à des milliers de milliards de kilowatts/heure, représentant environ la moitié des réserves mondiales¹³. Mieux encore, quelle que soit l'ampleur des ressources hydroélectriques que recèle l'Afrique, elles sont négligeables comparées à celles qu'offre l'énergie solaire. Grâce à la technologie d'«énergie solaire concentrée», il suffirait de concentrer l'énergie solaire sur une superficie équivalente à 0,5% des déserts chauds, en l'occurrence celui du Sahara, pour couvrir les besoins d'une partie du monde en énergie comme l'ambitionne le projet Desertec¹⁴. L'Afrique abrite aussi

le deuxième poumon écologique de la planète derrière l'Amazonie avec les 200 millions d'hectares de forêts que représente le Bassin du Congo. Les réserves d'énergie propre et les forêts africaines constituent un actif économique dans la lutte contre le réchauffement de la terre et dans la promotion des projets de développement propre.

Des efforts considérables seront encore à déployer sur le plan africain au cours des décennies à venir pour pérenniser la nouvelle embellie économique qui se fait jour sur le continent et la transcrire en amélioration réelle des conditions de vie de la majorité des populations. Ces efforts ne seront payants que si le climat africain et international s'y prête car les causes structurelles de la faim et de la malnutrition, et en général, du sous-développement sont de dimension mondiale.

En Afrique, il s'agit de mettre fin à la corruption, la gabegie, la mal gouvernance et les divisions qui ont été la marque de fabrique du continent durant ces décennies. Et il est grand temps que l'Afrique réalise que c'est en parlant d'une seule voix à travers l'Union africaine et les organisations régionales qu'elle pourra le mieux faire entendre sa voix et maximiser les dividendes que lui confère sa position de levier économique dans la nouvelle géopolitique mondiale.

Au plan international, ce dont il est question est de mettre fin à la division internationale du travail qui cantonne les pays africains dans la production et l'exportation de produits de base, ce qui ne leur permet pas de créer de la valeur ajoutée et de la richesse. Il convient aussi de conclure positivement les négociations au sein de l'Organisation Mondiale du Commerce (OMC) en vue de mettre fin au système commercial présent qui perpétue des relations inégalitaires entre les pays du Nord et ceux du Sud. L'Occident doit se rendre compte que la construction de l'Afrique servirait ses propres intérêts, comme la reconstruction de l'Europe d'après-guerre avait servi les intérêts des Etats-Unis grâce au plan Marshall. Cela nécessitera un changement radical des mentalités des africains et de leurs alliés occidentaux tout comme des relations complexes de dépendance et de paternalisme nées des pesanteurs du lourd héritage historique qu'ils partagent. L'environnement économique qui prévaut en Afrique et en Occident est favorable à de telles mutations ainsi qu'à une révision radicale des stratégies de développement ayant cours. Il offre également aux Occidentaux et aux Africains une opportunité de définir un nouveau cadre de coopération. Pourtant, ni les Africains, ni les Occidentaux, ne semblent être en mesure d'en définir les contours. Les Occidentaux restent cantonnés dans leurs sermons moralisateurs aux Africains sur la nécessité de lutter contre la pauvreté, la corruption et la mal gouvernance. Le discours est certes louable mais il sonne faux au regard des causes des défaillances qui ont conduit à leur faillite actuelle. Les Africains peuvent, à juste titre, légitimement assimiler ces causes à un échec de gouvernance qui a provoqué la crise financière mondiale en 2008 et leurs déboires actuels. Quant aux gouvernements africains, ils semblent pour le moment être dans l'incapacité de se forger un rôle plus indépendant et de peser de leur nouveau poids dans la conduite des affaires du monde.





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

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



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