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**ASSEMBLY OF THE AFRICAN UNION**  
**Eleventh Ordinary Session**  
**30 June – 1 July 2008**  
**Sharm El-Sheikh, EGYPT**

**Assembly/AU/8(XI)**

**REPORT ON THE MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE OF  
TEN (10) HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT ON  
THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM**

## **REPORT ON THE MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE OF TEN (10) HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT ON THE REFORM OF UNITED NATIONS**

### **I. INTRODUCTION**

1. The Committee of Ten (C10) Heads of State and Government met on 29 June 2008 in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt on the margins of the 11<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union to exchange views on developments on the Reform of the United Nations and to consider their draft progress Report.

### **II. PARTICIPATION**

2. The meeting was chaired by H.E. Dr. Ernest BAI KOROMA, President of the Republic of SIERRA LEONE. Other participants included the Heads of State of Zambia, Namibia and Equatorial Guinea and Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Senegal, Kenya, Uganda, Algeria, Libya.

### **III. OPENING REMARKS**

3. In his opening remarks, the President of the Republic of SIERRA LEONE, Chairperson of the Committee of Ten (C10) highlighted the major issues relating to the Security Council Reform, as contained in the Report of the C10 Permanent Representatives in New York. He, among other things, emphasized the areas of general agreement and divergence, the positions of various groups and the reaction of the African Group to the recent Report of the President of the General Assembly (PGA) as released on 9 June 2008.

4. The Chair of the Committee stressed that the African Permanent Representatives had expressed their opposition to the intermediary approach and to the proposal of taking the reform process from the Open-Ended Working Group to the General Assembly. He further stated that the African Permanent Representatives agreed to elaborate an evolving negotiating strategy and to keep the Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration, as the basis for the intergovernmental negotiations.

### **IV. DELIBERATION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

5. The discussion were focused on the issue of maintaining a unified front, the question of moving to the negotiating stage, the awareness of certain deviation, particularly regarding the size of an expanded Security Council, and the positions of various Groups which remain basically unchanged.

6. The Committee agreed on the following course of action, namely to:
  - endorse the Report of the Permanent Representatives of the C10 in New York and to renew their mandate;
  - accept the offer by the Great Jamahiriya Arab Republic of Libya to host the next meeting of the Committee which will focus on the development of a strategy for the way forward, as well as for support to canvassing the African Common Position;
  - meet periodically in order to effectively prepare for the forthcoming intergovernmental negotiations;
  - engage with all stakeholders at the highest political level;
  - address other Reform issues of the United Nations System, which are equally important to Africa.
  
7. The full Report of the Committee of Ten Permanent Representatives in New York is attached to this Report.

**Assembly/AU/8(XI)**  
**Annex I**

**REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF TEN PERMANENT  
REPRESENTATIVES TO THE UNITED NATIONS**

**REPORT**  
of the  
**COMMITTEE OF TEN PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES TO THE  
UNITED NATIONS**

*submitted for consideration to*

**H.E. DR. ERNEST BAI KOROMA  
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE**

and

**CO-ORDINATOR OF THE AU COMMITTEE OF TEN  
HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT ON  
UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM**

**NEW YORK, JUNE 2008**

## I- INTRODUCTION

This report is being submitted to facilitate the meeting of the Committee of Ten (10) Heads of State and Government which will be held on the margins of the 11<sup>th</sup> Ordinary session of the Assembly of the African Union Heads of State in Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt from 30<sup>th</sup> June to 1<sup>st</sup> July 2008. It is intended as an input into the Report that the Committee will present to the Summit in accordance with item XI.8 of the Agenda.

## II- BACKGROUND

1. At its Fifth Ordinary Session held in Sirte in July 2005, the Assembly of the African Union adopted the Common African Position on the proposed reform of the United Nations, known as “**the Ezulwini Consensus**”, to guide the Continent’s participation in the reform of the United Nations, as enunciated in the Report of the Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. Regarding Security Council reform in particular, the Consensus states:

***Recalling** that, in 1945, when the UN was being formed, most of Africa was not represented and that in 1963, when the first reform took place, Africa was represented but was not in a particularly strong position;*

***Convinced** that Africa is now in a position to influence the proposed UN reform by maintaining her unity of purpose;*

***Conscious** of the fact that the Harare Declaration has made significant impact on the world community and has thus been fairly reflected in the proposed UN Security Council Reform adopted the following position:*

1. *Africa’s goal is to be fully represented in all the decision-making organs of the UN, particularly in the Security Council, which is the principal decision-making organ of the UN in matters relating to international peace and security.*
2. *Full representation of Africa in the Security Council means:*
  - i. *not less than two permanent seats with all the prerogatives and privileges of permanent membership including the right of veto;*
  - ii. *five non-permanent seats.*
3. *In that regard, even though Africa is opposed in principle to the veto, it is of the view that so long as it exists, and as a matter of common justice, it should be made available to all permanent members of the Security Council.*

4. *The African Union should be responsible for the selection of Africa's representatives in the Security Council.*
5. *The question of the criteria for the selection of African members of the Security Council should be a matter for the AU to determine, taking into consideration the representative nature and capacity of those chosen.*

2. The Heads of State and Government of the African Union endorsed and reaffirmed their commitment to the Ezulwini Consensus, the Harare and Sirte Declarations of June 2007 and July 2005 respectively, and authorized the submission of a draft resolution to the UN General Assembly reflecting the Common African Position which was submitted in July 2005 (UN document A/59/L.67). They also decided to establish a Committee of Ten (10) Heads of State and Government (two per region) to be coordinated by the President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, with the mandate to *“present, advocate and canvas support for the African Draft Resolution to all the regions of the world as well as interested groups with a view to achieving the provisions of the Ezulwini Consensus as well as the Sirte Declaration and Resolution, and submit a report and appropriate recommendations thereon to the Chairperson of the Assembly”*.

3. Since its inception, the C10 has reported on Security Council reform activities in fulfillment of the above mandate at every Session of the Assembly. The last of the reports was presented at the 10th Ordinary Session of the Assembly, held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in January-February 2008 to which the Heads of State reacted with the following decision (Assembly/AU/Dec.184 (X)):

- a) *Takes Note of the Report of the Committee of Ten Heads of State on the Reform of the Security Council;*
- b) *Reaffirms the Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration on the Reform of the United Nations Security Council;*
- c) *Directs the African Permanent Representatives to the United Nations to participate in the forthcoming inter-governmental negotiations on the basis of the Ezulwini consensus and Sirte Declaration and to report to the Assembly accordingly, should they require further guidance;*
- d) *Requests the Committee of Ten to intensify its efforts in promoting the African common position;*
- e) *Decides to renew the mandate of the Committee of Ten until Africa achieves its objectives on the reform of the Security Council;*
- f) *Requests the Committee of Ten to present a progress report to the next ordinary session of the Assembly.*

### III- IMPLEMENTATION OF MANDATE

4. Pursuant to the above mandate, the Committee of Ten Permanent Representatives in New York, (C10 PR), working on behalf of their Heads of State and Governments, engaged with UN member states, the African Group of the Whole and other regional groups, groupings of concerned UN member states, and with the President of the General Assembly (PGA) and the entities he established to facilitate the Security Council reform process. Specifically, the stake holders engaged were:
  - a) The Permanent Members of the Security Council (P5) - China, France, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States;
  - b) The Group of 4 (G4) – Brazil, India, Germany and Japan;
  - c) The Uniting for Consensus Group (UFC) - Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Italy, Mexico, Republic of Korea, Pakistan, Spain, San Marino and Turkey and others;
  - d) The Small Five (S5) - Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Costa Rica, Singapore, Jordan;
  - e) The President of the General Assembly (PGA) ;
  - f) Task Force set up by the PGA, comprising the Permanent Representatives of Bangladesh, Chile, Liechtenstein and Djibouti;
  - g) Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on, and increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Matters Related to the Security Council (OEWG).

#### **The Objectives of the discussions included the following:**

- a) To promote understanding of and support for the African Common Position;
- b) To identify areas of convergence and divergence between the African Common Position and those of other member states and groupings involved in the process;
- c) To gather the views of other stakeholders in the reform process on the way forward;



**The consultations centered on the following aspects of Security Council reform:**

- a) The question of the veto;
  - b) The size of enlargement of the Council;
  - c) The categories of membership;
  - d) Regional representation and individual state membership;
  - e) The respective mandates of the Task Force set up by the President of the General Assembly and that of the Open-ended Working Group;
  - f) The proposed intermediary approach and its review mechanism;
  - g) Modalities for the envisaged intergovernmental negotiations.
5. Meanwhile, during the reporting period, continued dynamism around the question of Security Council Reform was sustained. The President of the General Assembly encouraged the members to intensify efforts towards identifying a framework and negotiables for the intergovernmental negotiations, in order to promote the process. Further to this the following emerged:
- a) A group of countries, namely, Cyprus, Malaysia, Netherlands, Romania, and the UK, and led by Germany, in a letter dated 20<sup>th</sup> March 2008, proposed an overarching process, the stated objective of which was to reflect elements that required negotiations, on the basis of pragmatism and feasibility, building on the report of the two facilitators and other progress achieved during the 61<sup>st</sup> session of the General Assembly and to give a sense of direction for the future.
  - b) The Resolution No. 11/11-P(IS) adopted by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference at its 11<sup>th</sup> Summit held in March 2008 in Dakar, Senegal, in which it stated that SCR must give adequate representation to Islamic countries, and that anything else would be unacceptable.
  - c) The letter of the African Group to the PGA dated 20<sup>th</sup> March 2008 urging him to convene a meeting of the Open-ended Working Group as indicated in his previous communication, to enable the membership of the United Nations to address both the framework and modalities that could lead to intergovernmental negotiation taking into account the positions and aspiration of various stakeholders, and which could lead to the widest possible agreement.
  - d) The letter dated 3<sup>rd</sup> April 2008 from the “Uniting for Consensus” group of states to the PGA, in which they, among other things, argued that agreement

should be first reached on the framework for further consultations and intergovernmental negotiations, and that unilateral proposals should be discouraged.

## **IV- OVERVIEW OF THE ENGAGEMENT AND OTHER INITIATIVES**

### **Areas of General Agreement**

6. The consultation exercise has widened the perspective of the Committee on areas of agreement and disagreement on the Security Council reform, particularly relating to the African position. It has reconfirmed that there is general consensus on the need to reform the Security Council to make it more representative, democratic and reflective of the reality of the current world. Related to this, and of immediate significance to Africa, is that there is general agreement on the legitimacy of Africa's demand for permanent representation in the Security Council. The critical challenge, however, is how to achieve this objective. In this connection, the report of the PGA's Task Force and the OEWG, expected in June 2008, may shed more light on the possible way forward, especially in terms of defining negotiating procedures and framework or instrument for the proposed intergovernmental negotiations.
7. Another area of general agreement is the need to improve on the working methods as an integral part of the reform of the Council to make it more transparent and accessible to non-members, in particular, small member states. The driving force behind this aspect of the reform is the Group of S-5 (see table below). However, the Committee observed that some members of P5 hold the view that this is an internal matter of the Council, in accordance with Article 30 of the UN Charter, pertaining to the adoption of its rules of procedures.
8. The Open-Ended Working Group enjoys considerable support from delegations because it provides them with neutral debating and consultation platform for member states, in their individual or group capacities, to express their respective positions on the reform.
9. Lastly, progress on the reform process has been of procedural nature, and not substance. Thus, there is general agreement to move to inter-governmental negotiations, guided by among other factors, the following seven principles advanced by the President of the General Assembly in his statement to the first meeting of the Open-Ended Working Group during the 62<sup>nd</sup> Session of the General Assembly, held on 14 December 2007 , which are as follows:

*“First, we must bear in mind that Security Council Reform is an integral part of strengthening the UN. It must therefore go hand in hand with the transformation of the wider United Nations system;*

*Second, prudent and principle oriented guidance by the President of the General Assembly is required, though it must be based on a joint venture with Member States in good faith and mutual respect.*

*Third, the way forward ought to be accomplished through an objective and transparent process to first identify the negotiables in order to then move to intergovernmental negotiations.*

*Fourth, the Open-ended Working Group should carry out consultations on the framework and the modalities for intergovernmental negotiations;*

*Fifth, further steps must contain components and notions that will allow the Membership to reach a general agreement on all aspects of Security Council reform, in particular on both the composition of the Council, and its working methods;*

*Sixth, the reform of the Security Council must accommodate the interests and concerns of all sides, especially those who are currently underrepresented; and,*

*Seventh, Member States should refrain from steps which could serve to undermine the current momentum and consensus to continue a process with the intention of achieving result oriented solutions.”*

## **Areas of Contention**

### **Size of Expansion**

10. While there is general understanding that the Security Council should be enlarged, there is no agreement on the size of the enlargement. The African proposal calls for an expansion to 26 members, while the G4 and UFC favour 25. The P5 are open to modest enlargement to accommodate Africa, apart from the UK which supports 25-26, but with the caveat that the expansion is done on gradual or incremental basis. Some P5 members also have their preferences among countries aspiring for permanent membership of the Council. The S5 have no common position on this aspect of the reform, and some have even expressed pessimism about any meaningful reform taking place in the immediate future.

### **The veto**

11. The veto is the most sensitive and contentious issue of the reform. Africa's position is that it should be abolished, otherwise, so long as it exists, and as a matter of principle and common justice, every permanent member should be entitled to it. While the P5 are generally understood to be opposed to the extension of the veto to new members, some appear to be flexible, as far as Africa is concerned. The S5 and the UFC believe that extending it to new members will amount to reinforcing the undemocratic nature of the Security Council. The G4 are opposed to its extension to new permanent members, until the question has been decided upon in the framework of the review of the mandate. They argue that the most immediate task, that of entering the Council as permanent members, should be accomplished first.

### **Regional Representation**

12. The G4, S5, and UFC support the Africa's prerogative to select its representatives, and would like to explore the possibility of extending this African model to other regions. The P5 have not expressed any common position on this issue.

### **Categories of membership**

13. Further to the current Permanent and Non-Permanent categories, an approach proposing an intermediary category is contained in the Report of the Two Facilitators of 26 June 2007 and enjoys the support of the PGA. It states:

*“The intermediary approach entails the creation of a category of membership not currently provided for under the Charter. Within the intermediary or transitional approach, Member States may wish to consider, inter alia, creating extended seats that could be allocated for the full duration of the intermediary arrangement, up to the review; extended seats for a longer period than the existing non permanent seats with the possibility of re-election; or extended seats for a longer term than the existing non permanent seats but without the possibility of re-election.*

- *Any of these options can be combined with enlargement in the regular non-permanent category, in accordance with article 23.2 of the Charter.*
  - *The options in size range from a limited to a large expansion, a decision which could be adopted either in one step or in stages – i.e., a given number at first and a further expansion in the review.*
  - *The length of the extended seats would have to be considered together with their re-election modalities, as appropriate, and the geographic distribution of the new seats. This constitutes an essential negotiable and is also tied to the review”.*
14. The African Group observes that the intermediary category is at variance with the provisions of the Ezulwini Consensus. Some members of the S5 are concerned about the details, while the G4, P5 have not expressed a common position. The UFC favours the intermediary approach but is opposed to creating extended seat that could be allocated for the full duration of the intermediary arrangements. The intermediary approach is also perceived as an indirect attempt by the big powers to perpetuate the status quo.

## **V- OBSERVATIONS**

15. The Committee has observed the following:
- a) The African Common Position has remained strong, legitimate and viable, and should be maintained for the envisaged intergovernmental negotiations;

- b) Considering the varied positions on the question of the veto, particularly those of the P5 on its extension to new members, progress in this regard in the near future is a major challenge;
- c) There are narrow differences in the majority of proposals regarding the size of an enlarged Council and a possible compromise may be feasible in the near future. However, the P5 remain reluctant to accept a significant enlargement of the Council;
- d) The President of the General Assembly has continued to urge for leadership by member states themselves on the issue of both the framework and the negotiables of the envisaged intergovernmental negotiations;
- e) Following their eagerness to move to intergovernmental negotiations some Members State led by India and Brazil, are introducing a draft resolution with a view to speeding up the process;
- f) It would be important to encourage the incoming President of the 63ed session of the General Assembly to build on the current progress of the process to ensure necessary continuity;
- g) The Report of the Taskforce established by the President of the General Assembly on the framework and negotiables for the intergovernmental negotiations is expected in mid-June 2008. This C10 report may be subsequently updated if necessary.

## **VI- CONCLUSION**

16. As it can be noted from the above the process of consultations is still continuing and has not yet reached the negotiating stage. As such, the group positions have remained basically unchanged. We, therefore, recommend that the Committee merely take note of the developments and brief the Assembly accordingly.

***N.B.:* The table attached is a summary of the positions of different groups in the Security Council Reform process.**

**VARIOUS POSITIONS ON THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM  
MAY 2008.**

<b>GROUPINGS</b>	<b>EXPANSION OF THE SIZE</b>	<b>VETO</b>	<b>REGIONAL REPRESENTATION</b>	<b>CATEGORIES OF MEMBERSHIP</b>	<b>WORKING METHODS</b>
<p><b>GROUP OF 4 (G4)</b> Brazil, India, Germany, Japan</p>	<p>In favour of adding 10 new members for a total of 25, being 6 new permanent and 4 new non permanent members</p>	<p>Opposed to its extension to new permanent members, until the question has been decided upon in the framework of the review of the mandate.</p>	<p>In favour with following allocation  <b>Permanent cat.</b>            Africa: 2            Asia: 2            GRULAC: 1            WEOG: 1  <b>Non permanent cat.</b>            Africa: 1            Asia: 1            GRULAC: 1            WEOG: 1</p>	<p>No common position on the proposed intermediary category</p>	<p>In favour to be implemented in accordance with articles 31 and 32 of the UN Charter pertaining to the participation of non members of the Council in its work, in consultation with member states on a regular basis</p>
<p><b>UNITED FOR CONSENSUS (UFC)</b> (Pakistan, Italy, Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Malta, Mexico, Republic of Korea, San Marino, Spain, Turkey</p>	<p>In favour of expansion to 25 composed as follows:            5 current permanent             10 new non permanent in addition to the present number of 10.</p>	<p>Oppose to extension to new members</p>	<p>In favour, and would like to explore the possibility of extending the African model to other regions;</p>	<p>The UFC favours the intermediary approach but is opposed to creating extended seat that could be allocated for the full duration of the intermediary arrangements</p>	<p>In favour of improvement, For the Council to be more transparent, inclusive and accountable</p>
<p><b>AFRICAN GROUP</b> All 53 African countries</p>	<p>In favour of enlargement to 26 with the 11 additional seats as follows:            Permanent seats:            Africa: 2            Asia: 2            Eastern European States: 1            GRULAC:1            Western European and other States: 1             Non permanent seats:            Africa: 2            Asia: 1            GRULAC:1</p>	<p>Opposed to the veto in principle, but as long as it exists, it should be extend to all permanent members.</p>	<p>In favour of equitable regional representation, and for Africa to chose its representatives</p>	<p>Opposed to intermediary category, since African position not covered and could lead to the perpetuation of an historical injustice</p>	<p>Need to engage fully all regions in the work of the Council and to enlist their support.</p>
<p><b>The SMALL 5 (S5)</b> (Costa-Rica, Liechtenstein, Jordan, Singapore and Switzerland)</p>	<p>No common position</p>	<p>Believes veto is not democratic so should not be extended to any other new members</p>	<p>In favour and propose that it should be applied both to the AU and the EU, and the modalities should be clarified</p>	<p>No common position on the intermediary category. Some members expressed concern about the implications of the details</p>	<p>Strongly believe that of improving the working methods of the Council is feasible in areas, such as Relationship with the GA and other principle organs; implementation of Decisions, involvement of non-members in the work of Subsidiary bodies of the Council, the use of veto etc..</p>

<p><b>THE PERMANENT FIVE (P5)</b></p> <p>China France United Kingdom United States Russia</p>	<p>Open to a modest enlargement (21), in particular to Africa ; Some members preference among countries aspiring for permanent membership;</p>	<p>Generally understood to be opposed to but some appear to be flexible as far as Africa is concerned</p>	<p>No common position</p> <p>France, UK, US are in favour of permanent representation for Africa</p>	<p>No common position</p>	<p>Think it is an internal matter of Council</p>
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**Assembly/AU/8(XI)**  
**Annex II**

**SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT BY C-10 PERMANENT  
REPRESENTATIVES TO THE UN ON  
SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM**



## **SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT BY C-10 PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES TO THE UN ON SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM**

### **INTRODUCTION**

1. This supplementary report is submitted pursuant to Paragraph 6 of the report of the C-10 Permanent Representatives to the UN on Security Council Reform, already submitted to H.E. President Ernest Bai Koroma of Sierra Leone, the Coordinator of the African Union Committee of Ten on UN Reform. It seeks to reflect the situation following the release of the report of the President of the General Assembly's Task Force on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council on 9 June 2008. The PGA's report gives an analysis of the current situation of the reform process, especially the positions of the various stakeholders, many of which are already in our original report. This report therefore concentrates on areas that are either not covered in our original report, or elaborates further areas that are already covered by it. The report is concluded with some observations that the Committee may wish to consider in their deliberations.

### **THE CURRENT SITUATION AS PRESENTED IN THE REPORT OF THE TASKFORCE**

2. The following are the major elements of the current situation as presented by the Report of the Task Force:

1. There is sustained general understanding that the Security Council needs to be reformed in its composition as well as working methods to reflect "international reality", democratic representation and to enhance the participation of small and developing countries;
2. The positions of major groupings described in the report remain unchanged. It would be noted that positions of other groupings are consistent with the African demand for two permanent seats, but remain silent on the question of the veto;
3. There is an observable attempt to push for the proposed transitional approach which aims at achieving reviewable compromise after a stipulated period of operation, while members still retain their original positions. The provisions of this proposal are:
  - *Extended seats that could be allocated for the full duration of the intermediary arrangement, including the possibility of recall;*
  - *Extended seats, which would be for a longer period than the regular two years term, but with the possibility of re-election. The length of the*

*terms as well as the re-election modalities should be decided in negotiations;*

- *Extended seats, which would be for a longer period than the regular two years term, but without the possibility of re-election. The length of the term should be decided in negotiations;*

3. Some new elements, mainly embellishments, have been added to the original positions. Significantly, the Uniting for Consensus favours a general agreement on the proposed intermediate solutions to the question of Security Council reform. It should also be noted that the UFC position does not include permanent seats. The Taskforce report highlights the proposal by the UK and France to work on an intermediate approach, and states that they “reaffirm their support for the candidacies of Germany, Brazil, India and Japan for Permanent Membership, as well as permanent representation for Africa on the Council”, without specifying the size of representation for Africa. The positions of the other P5 members are already contained in the original C-10 report.

## **REACTIONS TO REPORT**

3. The Task Force report has generated the following reactions so far:

1. The G4 would like to take the process to the General Assembly and thus terminate the work of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG). The African Group, the UFC and others prefer retaining the OEWG as the framework for intergovernmental negotiations;
2. Divergent views have been expressed by the membership of the UN with respect to the intermediary approach, and the PGA has announced that he would release the report of the OEWG in July;
3. The Arab Group has written a letter to the PGA that its position should be reflected in the Report;
4. On June 19, 2008, the African Group of the Whole deliberated on the report, and while strongly reaffirming the African Common Position, they reserved their position on the Report, and would come back to it later. They however concluded that:
  - *The report of the Task Force proposes three options that negate the African Common position as outlined in the Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration, namely, intermediate approach, increase in the non-permanent seats or no reform. Therefore it is not acceptable to the African Group and could not be taken as the basis to start intergovernmental negotiations.*

- *The African permanent representatives agreed to start elaborating an evolving negotiating strategy through an open, transparent and all inclusive process, with a view to push forward the African demands in the forthcoming consultations and when intergovernmental negotiations start.*
- *The African Permanent Representatives to the United Nations will continue to take Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration as the basis of their positions in the consultations and the intergovernmental negotiations.*

## **OBSERVATIONS**

4. Members of the C-10 may wish to consider the following in their deliberations:

1. Since general sympathy for the African Common Position has been sustained, it should remain the basis for the envisaged intergovernmental negotiations, amongst others.
2. The persisting gaps in the positions of the concerned groupings mentioned in the Report of the C10PRs underscore the need for the process to move to intergovernmental negotiations, beginning with consultations on both the negotiables and framework for negotiations.
3. The African Group and the C10PRs in New York have stressed the importance of unity, including in the consolidation of reports. The Group has initiated its internal preparation in anticipation of the envisaged intergovernmental negotiations.
4. The Committee should note a curious calculation at the end of the report, suggesting that the size of an *expanded Security Council* “*would add up to less than 22 members*”.

5. Given the wider picture of the reform process, the C-10PR believe that the following view of the Task Force on page 10 of the report deserves to be noted:

*“it should be recalled that deliberations aiming to reform the Security Council began in January 1994, and although the Working group has made progress, particularly during its sixty-first session, positions as summarized above still remain far apart. Moreover, a sense of frustration surrounds the present stage.*

*We could eventually conclude, therefore, that there is simply not sufficient common ground to move the process forward toward fruitful intergovernmental negotiations. A possible outcome that member States should keep in mind is that the present deadlock would culminate, in practical terms, in an indefinite*

*postponement of the Security Council reform effort (even though the OEWG might continue to meet).*

*Moving the process forward would require political willingness to compromise by engaging in intergovernmental negotiations based on sufficient elements to seek agreed solution as the outcome”*

***draft c-10 supp report  
June 24, 2008  
3.15p.m.***

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