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**EXECUTIVE COUNCIL**  
**Thirtieth Ordinary Session**  
**22 – 27 January 2017**  
**Addis Ababa, ETHIOPIA**

**EX.CL/992(XXX)v**  
**Original: English**

**REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON MULTILATERAL  
COOPERATION (SCMC)  
ON THE EVALUATION OF THE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS**

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## Introduction/Background

1. The dawn of a new era within the African polity began at the establishment of the African Union (AU) in 2002. The establishment of the African Union did not spell a total departure from the objectives of its preceding and successful continental body, known as the Organization of the African Unity (OAU), established in 1963.

2. While the main objectives of the OAU included a holistic pursuit to totally liberate the continent from colonization and apartheid; promote unity and solidarity among African States; coordinate and intensify cooperation for development; safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States and stimulate international cooperation within the framework of the United Nations, the objective of the AU in turn reinforces the intent and purposes of the OAU, but with a greater thrust to accelerate the process of continental development and integration, and where necessary, collaborate with the international community, with a view to rightfully play its role in the global economy.

3. As part of the mandate of the African Union, the drive for continental development and integration required that the continental body builds synergy with the other parts of the world with focusing on where maximum mutual benefits would be derivable. It is in this spirit that the AU, soon after its establishment began to engage the international community to seek cooperation aimed at advancing the process of achieving its development and integration agenda. This motivation resulted in the establishment of relationships with various international bodies and groups, countries, and continents.

4. The significant socio-economic and political development that Africa witnessed at the turn of the century ignited a renewed interest among the major global players. The interest shown in Africa by emerging economic powers such as China, India, Brazil, Turkey, may have also triggered a renewed interest from longstanding global powers such as USA, Europe and Japan. Therefore, the strategy to adopt in dealing with Africa's Partners should be premised on a significant degree of inter-dependability that achieves parity between Africa and its partners. Hence, there is a need to ask the following questions:

- How do we ensure that partnerships are strategic and what defines a strategic?
- What do partners want from Africa and what does Africa want from the partners?
- Is there an African resource that more than one of the partners want? If so, how can Africa strategize or engage in negotiations in a manner that optimizes its gains?

- Is there a resource that Africa needs that more than one of the partners can provide? If so, how can Africa negotiate with the others to minimize costs?
- Is there a need that Africa has, which may be too overwhelming for one Partner to undertake? In that case, how can Africa build a Consortium around such a need?
- Are there areas of common interest and experience that Africa can share and replicate?

5. However, due to a lack of proper guidelines and a systematic approach on how to engage in meaningful and strategic relationships with the other parts of the world, meant that an avalanche of requests for partnerships from the International Community, coupled with enthusiasm by the AU/AUC led to the aforementioned proliferation in establishing relationships. Africa's needs were not properly identified on the outset. In addition, the Partners' areas of core competences were not understood before embarking on the Partnerships. As a result, there were convoluted activities that have featured myriad areas of cooperation. This meant that the African Union/Africa engaged its Partners in numerous areas, without clear focus or objectives, thereby achieving little.

6. Based on the enumerated shortcomings and the resultant illogicality, the Executive Council, at its 12<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session held in Addis Ababa in January 2007, adopted decision EX.CL/Dec.397 (XII), which among other things, requested the AU Commission to deploy necessary efforts to develop a new type of partnership in order to maximize mutual benefits and to earmark resources in the budget. This policy thrust was premised on the growing number of partnerships with other parts of the world and the continued requests from prospective Partners to establish new partnerships with the African Union.

7. Therefore, with the large number of Partnerships already in existence, and the growing number of those under consideration, as well those to be initiated, the Executive Council, at its 19<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session held in Malabo in June 2011, adopted decision EX.CL/Dec.646 (XIX) on Structural reforms and requested the creation of the Division of Strategic Partnerships in the Office of the Chairperson of the Commission. Following this Decision the Division was created in 2012.

8. In line with the Executive Council Decision EX.CL/Dec.397 (XII) an evaluation of the Strategic Partnership was carried out by AUC with the technical and financial support of UNDP/Regional Service Centre for Africa. A Report entitled "Evaluation of Africa's Strategic Partnerships" was submitted to the Sub-committee on Multilateral Cooperation in November 2014.

9. The evaluation work targeted nine (9) so called "strategic partnerships" entered into by Africa through the African Union (AU) namely:

• **Continent to Continent/Regional Organization Partnership**

- {Africa/African Union}-Europe (European Union) – established in 2000
- {Africa/African Union} - Arab – established in 1977
- {Africa/African Union}-South America Summit - ASA – established in 2006

• **Continent to Country Partnerships**

- {Africa/African Union}-India – established in 2008
- {Africa /African Union}- Turkey – established in 2008
- Forum for China - Africa Cooperation Forum - FOCAC – established 2000
- {Africa/African Union}-US – established in 2013
- Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) – established 1993
- {Africa/African Union}-Korea Partnership – established in 2006

10. Consequently, paragraph 11.1 of Executive Council June 2015 Decision EX.CL/Dec.877 (XXVII), requested the PRC “to ensure that discussions and negotiations on substantive issues with respect to partnerships be guided by the outcome of the Evaluation of the Strategic Partnerships and to submit recommendations regarding the said Evaluation to the January 2016 Summit”.

11. The objective of the aforementioned 2014 document on Evaluation of Strategic Partnership was to conduct a review of the nine (9) Strategic Partnerships<sup>1</sup> entered into by Africa through the African Union, to determine their continued relevance, as well as their benefits and value addition to the Africa Union and more specifically, to its Member States, as well as to the region as a whole.

12. However, the Sub-Committee recognized a number of key limitations outlined in this document, primarily the following:

- a) The views of RECs, NPCA and Member States were not considered in this document, as the consultant was not able to visit those important stakeholders due to budgetary and time constraints.
- b) The consultant was not able to meet more members of the Sub-committee to consolidate the very informative and directive feedback received from the Chair of the Sub-Committee and the Chair of the African Union before submitting the 2014 document.
- c) Most partnership data and information collected fail to differentiate between continental/regional cooperation and bilateral cooperation.

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<sup>1</sup> Africa-Arab Partnership, Africa-India Partnership, Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), Africa-Korea Forum, Africa-South America Cooperation Forum (ASA), Africa-EU Partnership, Africa-Turkey Partnership and Africa-US Partnership.



13. Hence, taking into account the outcomes of the aforementioned 2014 document on Evaluation of Strategic Partnerships, and its key limitations, the Sub-Committee decided to submit recommendations in an overall evaluation report entitled “Report of the Sub-Committee on Multilateral Cooperation on the Evaluation of the Strategic Partnerships”, This Report is submitted by the Sub-Committee to the PRC for its consideration.

14. In advancing the implementation of the AU policy organ, the Permanent Representative Committee Sub-Committee on Multilateral Cooperation (PRC-SCMC), under the Chairmanship of Egypt, on 29<sup>th</sup> June 2015 embarked on the consideration of the Report entitled: “Evaluation of Africa’s Strategic Partnerships” submitted to it by the African Union Commission in November 2014, which reviewed the evaluation work done by Consultants. The report of the Commission in this regard has been examined by the PRC Sub Committee on Multilateral Cooperation.

15. The meeting agreed on the need to approach all engagements with the African Union Strategic Partnership in a more robust, purpose-driven and result-oriented manner. It recognized the need for the African Union to be self-oriented and proactive rather than being reactive in its engagements with Partners.

16. The resolve to adopt this dynamic approach stemmed from the need to deviate from the status quo that has maintained overtime, where the African Union Partners have been allowed the prerogative to develop concepts that guide relationships between both parties that ordinarily should have been joint efforts, spelling out the areas of needs for both sides.

17. It agreed that the strategy to adopt in engaging with Partners and developing frameworks for cooperation as well as determining areas of cooperation should be premised on the point that Africa needs something from Partners and Partners need something from Africa. In that respect, it was resolved that time has come for Africa to first identify its needs and gaps that may exist, which require the support of Partners, and then further identify the Partners that have such competences to assist.

18. Within that context, the Sub Committee considered the Report of the Commission on the Evaluation of the nine Strategic Partnerships, in order to develop its recommendations for the attention of the PRC and onward submission to the Assembly of the Union. As part of this exercise, the Sub-committee identified the areas of cooperation with Partners and developed documents entitled “African Union (AU) Outline Framework for Strategic Partnerships” and “Existing Structures and Formalized African Strategic Partnerships: African Aspirations and Core Competencies of the Partners”.

19. The report of the PRC-SCMC, as presented below has been classified in three categories, namely:

- ***Part A: Overall Challenges and Recommendations with Partners.***

- **Part B: Case Studies and analysis of specific partnerships with respective recommendations.**
- **Part C: Recommendations on the enhancement of the institutional state of the AU Commission to drive the African Union's engagements with Partners**

## **PART A: Overall Challenges in Engaging Partners**

**20.** In the process of evaluating “Strategic Partnerships”, the Sub-Committee identified several overall challenges that are cross-cutting when engaging Partners, namely the following:

- a) The appropriate nomenclature for the Partnership;
- b) Definition of a Strategic Partnership;
- c) The cycle of Partnership meetings and their venue;
- d) Participation of Member States in meetings organized within the framework of Strategic Partnerships; and
- e) An African Union Strategic Partnership Policy and Strategy Framework.

**21.** Continued heated debates on the aforementioned challenges within the African Union Policy Organs and with the Partners, have significantly hindered the capacity of the African Union to adequately act on behalf of Africa in advancing its collective interests with the Partner. Hence, consideration of these challenges and any recommendations therein, are with a view to facilitating an effective, efficient and result-oriented engagement and management of Africa’s Partnerships, ultimately for the betterment of the relationship as a whole.

### **The Appropriate Nomenclature for the Partnership**

**22.** The Executive Council requested the PRC in collaboration with the Commission to determine the appropriate nomenclature for Strategic Partnerships given the current variances in this regard, as some Partnerships use the term “Africa”, whereas others use the term “African Union” (Paragraph 11(IV) of EX.CL/Dec. 877(XVIII)).

**23.** In this context, the issue of nomenclature has been politicized by some Member States, as it indicates the scope of the partnership and hence the participation in partnership meetings. In other words, which Africa is at stake in a partnership relationship? The geographic Africa involving all African States? Or the political Africa involving all African Union Member States? Or simply all African States with diplomatic relationships with the Partner?

**24.** To date, there is no consensus in this regard, notwithstanding the decision by the Executive Council “reaffirming the right of all Member States without distinction to participate in all meetings, activities and events organized within the context of partnerships of which the AU is part” (Paragraph 10 of EX.CL/Dec.877(XVIII)).

**25.** To facilitate the adoption of a prudent and implementable decision in this regard, it is worth noting the following:

- a)** Not all AU Member States enjoy the same relationship with each of the Partners in a bilateral context. In fact, one Member State has not been able to attend most Partnership meetings. (Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic). Three Member States have had difficulties in attending Partnership meetings or participate with a limited role, (Burkina Faso, Sao Tome and Principe, and Swaziland in the case of FOCAC). Other Member States may also have difficulties attending (Eritrea in the case of the TICAD Senior Officials meeting hosted in Djibouti), whereas others have always been able to attend. In short, actual attendance in Partnership meetings has been de-facto governed by the nature of diplomatic relationships existing between the Member State and both the Partner and the host country as a common denominator.
- b)** On the issue relating to the Kingdom of Morocco, there is a need to realize the following:
- Morocco sent a written notification of its withdrawal from the OAU on 13 November 1984 and has not withdrawn this notification ever since<sup>2</sup>;
  - There is disagreement between Morocco and the OAU Secretariat over the interpretation of Article 32 of the OAU Charter regarding the effective date of withdrawal from the OAU and hence the ensuing financial implications<sup>3</sup>;
  - Morocco has neither ratified nor acceded to the Constitutive Act of the African Union. Consequently, it can only be admitted as a Member of the African Union in accordance with articles 27 and 29 of its Constitutive Act<sup>4</sup>.

### Recommendations:

**26.** The Sub-Committee proposes to the PRC to recommend to the Executive Council that:

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<sup>2</sup> Note Number 456 dated 14 November 1984

<sup>3</sup> The Secretariat maintains that the effective date of withdrawal should be one year after the date of the written notification according to article 32. However, Morocco maintains that all the articles of the OAU Charter should be considered as one indivisible whole, and since the OAU violated article 4 by admitting a non-sovereign and a non-independent entity to its membership (the Saharawi Republic), then article 32 could not be entirely upheld.

<sup>4</sup> A detailed legal opinion on the status of the Kingdom of Morocco vis-à-vis the African Union has been provided by the Office of legal counsel upon the request of the Sub-committee on Multilateral Cooperation (Annex).

- a) The nomenclature of “African Union Strategic Partnerships” should be used when the Partner is an organization whose relation is considered strategic. Otherwise, the nomenclature of “Africa Strategic Partnership” should be used in other cases where the relation is also considered strategic. In both cases, it is the AU structure that would act on behalf of Africa in representing its collective interest with the Partner.
- b) Africa’s Strategic Partnerships be guided by the following basic principles:
- Partnership with respective partners should focus on specific areas, after conducting an assessment on the prospective Partners’ abilities to engage in identified areas of cooperation;
  - Determination of areas of cooperation with Strategic Partners should be aligned with what Africa wants and in line with the Aspirations of the First Ten-Year plan of the AU Agenda 2063;
  - The areas of cooperation should not be ambiguous. It should be understandable, implementable, specific and result-oriented;
  - All documents to be developed in readiness for the Strategic engagements with Partners should provide insight into the African Union’s strategic objectives, and how those objectives relate to the ability of Partners to give support; It should be able to create and sustain outcomes aimed at making better the lives of the African people, and elaborate on what Africa can offer in return both in terms of its resources, technical capacities, and so on;
  - All the identified areas of cooperation for consideration towards advancing the objectives of the Strategic Partnerships shall include the collective interest of all AU Member States, African Union Commission, other organs of the African Union, NEPAD, and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) that readily includes the buy-in of Member States;
  - Africa should strive to originate all documents relating to the identified areas of cooperation and be firm in negotiation of Africa’s interest;
  - The development of Declarations for all Forum/Summit pronouncements should maintain a flow that is in sync with the identified areas of cooperation. It should be reader-friendly and precise. Representatives of both sides should endorse the Declaration so adopted, in order to preserve its authenticity;
  - There would be a need to ensure that the parameters for monitoring and evaluation are put in place so that commitments are honored;

- All activities undertaken within the framework of the partnership should be conducted in the spirit of trust, equality, mutual respect, transparency and confidence building;
- There should be conscientious examination of the identified areas of cooperation with a view to ascertaining the opportunities that exist as well as challenges and uncertainties that may be encountered in the course of attempting to achieve the set objectives.

### Definition of a Strategic Partnership

**27.** AU Agenda 2063 basically captures the very essence of improving the livelihood of the African people. It accommodates the interests of individual Member States as well as the continental values that would galvanize the general thrust of the continental development and integration agenda.

**28.** In that regard, it becomes important to examine the modalities for engaging with Partners with a view to determining whether the Union is heading towards a Partnership that is purely multilateral with a larger impact on the continent as a whole, or a hybrid that generally juxtaposes what is happening at the national, regional and continental levels. To achieve this harmony requires that Africa speaks in one voice. In this context, the issue of when a partnership qualifies as a Strategic Partnership is called into question. Several criteria have been proposed to that effect, namely the following:

- a) The age of the partnership indicates how long the partnership relationship has stood the test and challenges of time.
- b) Whether the partnership involves a country or a continent, given that the larger the number of countries involved, the larger the potential for this partnership. Hence, if a Partner wants to engage with Africa as a continent, there must be a multilateral dimension without diminishing the importance of bilateralism. This may also be examined by determining the amount of resources earmarked by the Partner to the African Union for multilateral engagements, and the amount of resources dedicated for bilateral purposes. This is important in order to forestall any potential competition between individual Member States and the AU for the same pool of resources.
- c) The extent to which a partnership is assisting Africa in implementing Agenda 2063, whether in a bilateral or a multilateral context. It is worth noting that domestication of Agenda 2063 is required to avoid the dichotomy between national and regional plans. This entails the full implementation of a road map to domesticating Agenda 2063, notwithstanding that this matter remains a sovereign decision for each Member State, given that it is up to each Member State to decide on the means of achieving the objectives enshrined in Agenda 2063. Hence, pending the full domestication of Agenda 2063, whereby national projects are fully aligned accordingly, the bilateral element

in the Partnership shall remain independent of the multilateral element in such a relationship.

- d) The degree of coordination between the Partners on one hand, and between the various bodies in the AU and the African Ambassadors accredited to the Partner on the other hand. Taking into consideration the relatively limited scope of African diplomatic representation to Partners, compared to the African Union, it is worth noting that the Executive Council decided “that the PRC will take the lead in representing Africa before the Partners, while soliciting the views of the Africa Group accredited to the Partners concerned” (Paragraph 17(IV) of EX.CL/Dec. 899(XXVII Rev.2)).
- e) The degree of involvement of the African Union in the management of the Partnership relationship. Currently, the role of the AU varies between a mere observer and a full partner. In addition, there appears to be some confusion regarding who represents the AU in the relationship with the Partner, whether the AU leadership or the AUC or both. In this context, the presence of the AU as an observer would not be possible in a Strategic Partnership. It is envisaged that in a Strategic Partnership, the AU leadership (not the AUC or the host country) would be co-chairing Partnership meetings.

**29.** The aforementioned criteria would together assist in assessing whether various Partnerships would qualify as Strategic or not. Consequently, should a Partnership qualify as Strategic, this entails that it merits clear visibility for both the Partner and the African Union. Hence:

- a) The application of the Banjul Formula – or any other formula for rationalized participation – should be waived in favor of a wider form of participation agreed to between both Partners.<sup>5</sup>
- b) The Chair of the African Union should be co-chairing the meeting with the Partner, notwithstanding the right of the host country – if African – to deliver a speech during the opening session and to be seated on the panel with the co-chairs, in a similar format to that prevailing during various AU Summits.
- c) Consider granting audience to Strategic Partners during one of the two semi-annual Summits of the African Union to address the partnership relationship according to agreed modalities between both Partners, given that the AU represents a good platform for representing the collective interests of Africa, and hence in driving the course and purposes of the African Continent.

## Recommendations:

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<sup>5</sup> The details of the Banjul Formula are discussed in Paragraph 41.

**30.** The Sub-Committee proposes to the PRC to recommend to the Executive Council the following:

- a) Adopt the aforementioned criteria when assessing whether a Partnership qualifies as Strategic or not.
- b) Request the PRC to re-assess accordingly whether the current partnerships qualify as Strategic or not.
- c) Waive the application of the Banjul Formula – or any other formula for rationalized participation –in favor of a wider form of participation agreed to between both Partners, when a Partnership qualifies as Strategic.
- d) Ensure that the Chair of the African Union co-chairing the meeting with any Strategic Partner, notwithstanding the right of the host country – if African – to deliver a speech during the opening session and to be seated on the panel with the co-chairs, in a similar format to that prevailing during various AU Summits.
- e) Consider granting audience to Strategic Partners during one of the two semi-annual Summits of the African Union to address the partnership relationship according to agreed modalities between both Partners.

### **Cycle of Partnership Meetings and their Venue**

#### *Frequency and cycle of Meetings:*

**31.** It has been noted that several Summits and other Partnership meetings were held while the comprehensive review of the various partnerships relationships has not yet been concluded as requested by the Summit. This situation posed an additional challenge, as preparation for such meetings hindered the completion of the envisaged comprehensive review. In fact, some Member States requested a moratorium on Partnership meetings until the comprehensive review is complete, in order to base the interaction with the Partners on clear guidance from the Summit. Others opposed such a moratorium, based on the need to respect current obligations in this regard.

**32.** In addition, it has been noted that most partnerships are on a three year cycle while some are on a five year cycle. In this regard, the Sub-Committee underscored the need to streamline the process of scheduling Partnership meetings, with a view to ensuring uniformity and allowing the accommodation of adequate preparatory processes for all Partnership meetings, while maintaining an adequate level of attendance by Heads of State and Government.

**33.** In this regard, in its Decision EX.CL/Dec.899(XXVIII), the Executive Council:

- a) Encouraged Partners or designated host countries to ensure that other Partnership Summits' meetings (Senior Officials and Ministerial Meetings)

are held at the same venue and immediately precede respective Partnership Summits.

- b)** Approved a five (5) year cycle, whereby two (2) partnership meetings are organized per year as from 2017 for all Strategic Partnerships, and requested the Commission to adopt its gradual implementation taking into consideration the need to reschedule previously adopted Partnership meetings accordingly, including at the Summit level, and in consultation with the respective Partners and host countries.

**34.** Consultations with Partners indicate the possibility of considering the application of a five year cycle to all partnerships as of 2017, as per the attached schedule, with the exception of TICAD, whereby this cycle could be applied as of 2019 due to a previous commitment by Japan to hold the Summit for the first time in Africa (Kenya) in return for reducing the periodicity of the Summits from its original five (5) year cycle to its current three (3) year cycle. Reverting back to the five (5) year cycle requires agreement regarding the venue of the Summits and their Preparatory Meetings, in a manner that ensures adequate domestic visibility for both Partners. It is worth noting that any amendment in the partnership cycles requires endorsement by the Partners in their first upcoming Partnership Summits respectively.

**35.** In case the ongoing proliferation of Strategic Partnerships exceeds the capacity of the African Union to manage each of them independently within the approved 5 year cycle (two Partnership Summits per year, totaling 10 Strategic Partnerships over five years), then new modalities may be required to enhance the effective and efficient management of such partnerships. Accordingly, there may be a need to amend the prevailing modalities, from single partnership management to collective partnership management, whereby an Annual Partnership Summit involving all Strategic Partners may be a substitute for the current single country/continent to continent Summit meetings.

#### **Recommendations:**

**36.** The Sub-Committee proposes to the PRC to recommend to the Executive Council to request the Commission to:

- a)** continue the gradual implementation of the previously adopted five-year cycle for all Partnerships, taking into consideration the need to reschedule previously adopted Partnership meetings accordingly, including at the Summit level, as per the attached schedule.
- b)** Consider amending the prevailing modalities for managing Partnerships, from single Partnership management to collective Partnership management, in case the ongoing proliferation of Strategic Partnerships exceeds ten Strategic Partnerships.



*Venues:*

**37.** The Executive Council “encourages Partners or designated host countries to ensure that other Partnership Summits’ meetings (Senior Officials and Ministerial Meetings) are held at the same venue and immediately precede respective Partnership Summits” (Paragraph 19 of EX.CL/Dec.899(XXVIII) Rev.2)

**38.** However, given the need to extend the cycle of most Partnership meetings from a three year cycle to a five year cycle, it is worth considering that the modality for allocation of venues of meetings, should be such that when Partnership Summits holds in one Partner region, the preparatory meetings of that Partnership would hold in the hosting region and counterpart’s region, in order to promote ownership and necessary awareness.

**39.** When it comes to Africa, in particular, it would be on a similar modality, where venues are determined based on regional considerations, and where it would not be possible to host meetings in a particular region or country, the headquarters of the African Union would play host to such meetings.

### **Participation all Member States in meetings organized within the framework of Strategic Partnerships**

**40.** The Executive Council “request (e d) the PRC in collaboration with the Commission to comply with and implement Paragraph 10 of Decision EX.CL/Dec. 877(XXVII) adopted by its 25<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the Executive Council held in Johannesburg, South Africa in June 2015, reaffirming the right of all Member States without distinction to participate in all meetings, activities and events organized within the context of partnerships of which the AU is part”. Yet, the scope and nature of participation in Partnership meetings is often called into question.

**41.** To date, one formula – the Banjul Formula – has been devised and adopted to rationalize participation in single-country partnership relationships, irrespective of whether this relationship is strategic or not. This Formula has been criticized and the nature of the criticism revolves around the following:

- a)** Some AU Member States purport that the Banjul Formula doesn’t allow for adequate representation of all Member States given the absence of adequate rotation in representing Africa with the Partner, and that some Member States participating in their capacity as representatives of Regional Economic Communities (RECs) actually represent their national interests more than representing the interests of the RECs.
- b)** Some Partners purport that applying the Banjul Formula to all single-country Partnerships deprive those Partnerships – when considered Strategic – from the merits of the visibility that could be accorded by the non-application of the Banjul Formula.

**Recommendations:**

**42.** The Sub-Committee proposes to the PRC to recommend to the Executive Council to:

- a) Waive the application of the Banjul Formula for Partnerships that are considered Strategic as per the adopted criteria in this regard. In this case, notwithstanding the sovereign right of Partners and Member States in conducting their diplomatic relations, priority should be accorded – whenever possible – to holding meetings in venues that can allow the participation of all Member States without distinction.
- b) Adopt one of two formulae for rationalized participation in non-Strategic Partnership meetings, whereby Member States participate according to their Membership in either the current Banjul Formula or in the Sub-Committee on Multilateral Cooperation.

**Adoption of an African Union Strategic Partnership Policy and Strategy Framework and determining what Africa wants in line with the AU Agenda 2063**

**43.** The AU Agenda 2063 has defined the strategic direction which Africa would adopt to attain its development and integration agenda and more directly align its strategic engagement with its Partners.

**44.** The Sub Committee developed an Outline Framework with the technical content that highlighted the core competencies, comparative and competitive advantages of Partners as well as the needs and gaps of the African Continent. The Outline Framework will guide the African Union in engaging with its Strategic Partners and practically provide guidance on the baselines and approach that underpin the identification of areas of cooperation and development of working documents for the Partnerships, which the African Union is engaged in, taking into consideration what Africa wants to achieve in accordance with the priorities stipulated in the AU Agenda 2063 First Ten Year Plan. The Sub Committee also developed a Matrix that outlines the areas the Union could focus attention upon in relation to the areas the Partners command core competences. The two aforementioned reviewed documents have been attached as annexes 1 and 2. A third document is yet to be reviewed by the Sub Committee prior to recommending it for adoption, namely the 'Partnership Strategy Framework' prepared by the UNDP Consultants and the Commission.

**45.** These documents have therefore been developed to ensure that proposals advanced for discussion and negotiations with African Union's Partners are self-oriented, demand-driven and strategically focused towards Africa's development and integration agenda, as expressed in the AU Agenda 2063 and its First Ten Year Implementation Plan. The new approach will enable understanding of the areas of cooperation with Partners, guarantee ownership of the agreed areas of cooperation and stimulate confidence during the process of negotiations and implementations. While applying the merits of the proposed guidelines, it would be important to ensure that the

agreed areas of cooperation at every given time would be limited in scope to enable delivery.

**46.** In determining the areas of core competencies, comparative and competitive advantages of Partners, the Sub Committee in collaboration with the Commission will continue to engage the existing Partners and agree on those areas that are limited in scope and directed to where optimum benefits could be derivable based on identified abilities. These efforts will also be extended to prospective Partners. The three annexes will provide the necessary guidelines when initiating, formulating and negotiating a Strategic Partnerships and due consideration should be given to the specialization of those partnerships, based on partners' comparative advantage and economic/financial capacity, and the meaningful nature of what the partner can contribute to Africa. This no doubt will help to overcome the practice where attempts are made to cover the same long list of cooperation areas with every Partner.

**Recommendations:**

**47.** The Sub-Committee proposes to the PRC the following recommendations for adoption by the Executive Council:

- a)** Continue engaging the Partners and other relevant stakeholders in the aforementioned Matrix on Areas of Cooperation, with a view to verifying the identified areas of competencies for the partnership relationship.
- b)** Ensure the alignment of the African Union Program Budget jointly funded by Partners, according to the priority areas identified in the First Ten Year Implementation Plan.

## **PART B: CASE STUDIES AND ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC PARTNERSHIPS WITH RESPECTIVE RECOMMENDATIONS**

48. The Sub Committee reviewed the specific Partnership evaluation and aligned its findings to the work done by the Consultants as follows:

### **{Africa/African Union-European Union} (EU) Partnership**

#### Assessment and Findings

#### **Legal / Institutional framework**

49. Africa/African Union-EU partnership was initiated through the 1<sup>st</sup> Africa-EU Summit in Cairo in 2000. However, the strategic partnership becomes structured and fully operational only after the 2<sup>nd</sup> Africa-EU Summit of Lisbon in December 2007 with the articulation of the **Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES)**. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Africa-EU Summit in Tripoli, Libya, in November 2010 and the 4<sup>th</sup> Africa-EU Summit in Brussels, April 2014, are the other two Heads of State/Government-level Summits organized under the Africa-EU partnership.

50. The JAES is the overall cooperation framework that governs the strategic partnership between Africa and the EU. But, from a programmatic point of view, three successive action plans have been agreed-upon for implementation by the two parties under the JAES. The Africa-EU institutional framework is to be improved significantly; in particular, more work is needed in improving the functioning of the Joint Experts Groups (JEGs). Coordination and preparation of meetings and other events need to be enhanced significantly.

#### **Policy and Strategy Framework**

51. From a policy perspective, the EU has strategic partnership-specific policy instruments which guide their partnership with Africa. From a strategic perspective, this partnership is based on the EU-Africa Partnerships. This obviously put the Continent and the African Union in a disadvantaged position, especially during the negotiation phase, the definition of priorities and action plans as well as the effective and efficient management of its strategic partnerships for results. Having adopted the African Union Agenda 2063 and its First Ten Year Implementation Plan, beginning 2013, Africa has defined its strategic direction towards its continental development and integration. Therefore, within the context of the AU Agenda 2063, a collective partner-specific strategy and an overall policy framework for the management of Africa's strategic partnerships would be developed.

#### **Institutional, governance and management set-up**

52. The Africa-EU displays depth and maturity in terms of institutional, governance and management and follow-up mechanisms; the partnership is articulated and grounded on meaningful and "SMART" outcome and impact indicators. Monitoring

and evaluation framework needs to be improved in view of the fact that : 1/there is still a **thin line between strategic partnership and bilateral relationship when it comes to nationally-implemented programs or projects**; 2/there still misunderstanding between the two parties as to the meaning of Strategic Partnership; 3/ reporting and coordination mechanisms between the various couples (AU-Partner, AU-RECs, AU-MS, AU-NPCA) have not yet been articulated, discussed and agreed-upon in clear terms.

### Relevance

**53.** The Africa-EU partnership is certainly meaningful in terms of scope (infrastructure, social development, peace and security) but there is room for improvement in more meaningful transformational benefits in several, the areas including but not limited to areas of industrialization and technology transfer/acquisition, given the potential presented by the EU. In addition, the EU political agenda seems to be different, and at same time, not in alignment to the African one (witness EU-backed interventions in Libya, ICC for sitting Heads of States, etc.). However, the Africa-EU partnership is the one that has delivered more balanced development agenda and impacts, namely, in social, sustainable and inclusive development, at bilateral level, but not at the level of political governance and regional stability, at continental level.

### Outcomes

**54.** It is worth stressing that, despite its comprehensive nature, the Africa-EU partnership is more biased towards political dialogue and peace and security than the deeper economic (trade, investment and industrialization) cooperation that Africa is calling for. Incidentally, there is room for significant improvements in technical assistance programs in the areas of private sector development (PSD) and industrialization/technology transfer/acquisition at regional and continental levels, if both parties agree to review the current situation pertaining to this particular partnership.

### Implementation level of Activities

**55.** With regard to **this partnership**, the implementation of planned activities in the various action plans is rather fair in overall social infrastructure to meet the MDGs; implementation is good in political governance and regional stability; as well as private sector development. More effort is needed in economic infrastructures and industrialization; this is because of the emphasis put by the EU in political partnership, and political Dialogue, as opposed to Africa's will for a rather deep economic partnership.

### Socio-economic transformational impacts

**56.** The Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) is the overall cooperation framework that governs the strategic partnership between Africa and the EU. However, from a programmatic point of view, three successive action plans have been agreed-upon for implementation by the two parties under the JAES. Through the implementation of the JAES action plans, EU supported the implementation of some African Flagship programs, such as CAADP, PIDA, APRM, and provided support to African institutions

such as AUC, NPCA and RECs. Although, Africa and EU Cooperation Agreement has yielded significant results in.. Socio-economic front on some bilateral level, the strategic partnership is yet to develop significant socio-economic transformational impact in Africa.

### **Effectiveness and Efficiency**

57. The Africa-EU strategic partnership has displayed a fairly consistent level of effectiveness,

### **Value addition of the Strategic Partnerships**

58. The **Africa-EU partnership** in particular, has delivered specific value addition in the areas of regional integration (through its dedicated institutional support to the AUC), peace and security (through its various support mechanisms to the AU, through the African Peace Facility Framework), and political governance (via its support to transparent electoral processes across the continent). Value addition in Socio-economic Development is very marginal if not minimal within this framework.

### **Conclusion:**

59. In concluding on this Partnership, it is worth saying that, through the AUSP, the EU has provided support for capacity building of the AU institutions, notably the AUC, and assist in the institutional reform process. The support has enabled the AUC to effectively play its role as driver of the African integration process and to facilitate the deepening of the partnership between Africa and Europe.

60. EU also provided technical and financial support in the implementation of number of high-profile institutional support project including the installation of SAP that contributes significantly to the improvement of the AUC financial, procurement and human resource management System. Furthermore, the AUC presently has not less than 70 experts all paid under the EU programme; in particular, AU's flagship programmes such as PIDA, CAADP, AIDA and AGA are largely supported by experts paid under the EU P 55 facility.

61. The EU also supported Africa for the APRM programme; the Africa Peace facility; the ERASMUS Mundus Programme in Education and Training and the Africa-EU Infrastructure Trust Fund (ITF) as well as the Neighborhood Investment Facility.

### **Contentious Issues and Weaknesses**

62. A number of weaknesses in the implementation arrangements were identified (example: in the JEGs - joint expert groups) and there is need for immediate corrective measures in order to improve implementation performance. Areas of concerns include: common understanding of the nature of the partnership, implementation challenges (institutional architecture and lack of a comprehensive result framework), involvement of stakeholders; financing mechanisms; coordination, M&E and reporting mechanisms.

**63.** There were divergent views on the nature of the strategic partnership, and in the perception regarding the strategic partnership. This has been the first challenge Africa and Europe are faced with. Indeed, the African side's expectation and perspective of the partnership is to move-out of political and technical-bureaucratic approach of the partnership to a more development-driven agenda around industrialization, technology transfer, infrastructure development, export and PSD/SME development and more social development, while the EU regards the partnership more as a political one. The AU is far from sharing such view. That is the reason why the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are not part of the Africa-EU Strategic Partnership.

**64.** The Africa- EU Partnership is not working to its full potential. The Africa-EU Partnership still appears as a donor-recipient relationship. Current funding model of the partnership is not sustainable. Co-funding from the African side is very weak. The Africa-EU Partnership is largely compliant and procedure-driven; the timing of disbursement has been problematic. The Africa-EU Partnership lacks a comprehensive and efficient partnership governance System, and especially an appropriate M&E mechanism.

#### **Recommendations:**

**65.** Because this partnership has shown a certain level of consistency in the areas of: Legal, Policy, Institutional, Governance and Management, and value addition level frameworks, and despite the contentious issues and the shortcomings evidenced, in relevance and implementation levels it is recommended that this partnership should continue but there is a need to:

**66.** Completely renegotiate and restructure the partnership in "SMART" terms, with the view to aligning it with Africa's strategic priorities as expressed in the various AU's strategic plans, Africa's Agenda 2063 and AU/Africa's strategic partnerships Policy and Strategy Framework (to be adopted). This would leverage the partnership to a real Strategic Partnership.

**67.** In that case, there is a need to deepen transformational benefits of the partnership through promoting cooperation in agreed upon five priority areas, namely; Peace and Security; Democracy, Good Governance and Human Rights; Human Development, Sustainable and Inclusive Development and Growth and continental Integration and Global and Emerging Issues.

**68.** In leveraging the Strategic Partnership due attention should be given to the enhancement of an Africa-EU social component that will include a number of social development areas such as: the SDGs, education, health systems, social safety net and areas relating to environment and climate change. Cooperation in those areas should be consolidated and cooperation in the post-2015 Agenda as well. Such component would also address youth unemployment issues together with women unemployment which should be given the highest level of priority given its potential to contribute to the fragility and country risk factors such as strikes, political unrests, armed rebellion and terrorism.

## **{Africa/African Union-South America} Cooperation Forum (ASACOF)**

### Assessment and Findings

#### **Legal / Institutional framework**

**69.** The partnership was initiated through the commitment of former President Obasanjo of Nigeria and former President Mbeki of South Africa, on the Africa side, and Former President Lula of Brazil and Late President Chavez of Venezuela, on the South-America side (In the absence of any formal decision), Nigeria and Brazil are the (current) coordinators of the Forum, while the tasks of the ad hoc Secretariat rest with the host country of the respective ASA Summit. The first ASA Summit was held in Abuja, Nigeria in November, 2006. The challenges facing the Forum include the need to distinguish between the processes of bilateral and multilateral engagements of Africa with its South American partner, a lack of institutional, organizational and follow-up mechanisms, amidst a lack of political and financial commitment.

#### **Policy and Strategy Framework**

**70.** The South American part, like the African side, is yet to adopt a collective partner-specific strategy, for the management of this partnership. This shortcoming also affects negatively the progress and success of the partnership.

#### **Institutional, governance and management set-up**

**71.** The Africa-South America Cooperation Forum (ASACOF) is relatively a new partnership that is not yet grounded on strong institutional and political commitments. Seven years after its inception in November 2006, not much has been achieved; attempts are currently being made to put in place the necessary mechanisms that would ensure the effective implementation of the governance/management mechanisms and the projects agreed-upon.

#### **Relevance**

**72.** The Africa-South America partnership requires further negotiation and structuring work as its action plans are defined loosely with no transformational benefits to the African continent; its implementation level is low and the implementation and follow-up mechanisms are relatively weak.

#### **Outcomes**

**73.** The Africa South America partnership generated only marginal outcomes, if not at all, in terms of scale and depth; the action plans and/or scope cover the same long list of cooperation areas as the partnerships with Korea, Turkey and Arab world. A number of regional Joint projects have been initiated, but have not yet materialized.



### **Implementation level of Activities**

74. The implementation of activities contained in the operational plans of action of this partnership is very low to nil. To implement the Joint Implementation Plan that was approved by ASA Ministers in September 2010 in New York, the following priority projects were selected for implementation: -1/ In Television, the South-South Broadcasting Network; -2/ In Investment, the South-South Development Bank; -3/ In Education, the South-South University. No implementation has taken place so far due to a combination of coordination, financing and leadership issues over the activities of the partnership.

### **Socio-economic transformational impact**

75. The Africa-South America partnership generated only very limited development impacts due to its limited scale and level of implementation, or simply the limited implementation of action plans that occurred. It is worth mentioning that no implementation has taken place so far due to a combination of coordination, financing and leadership issues over the activities of the partnerships. Therefore, this partnership is yet to produce concrete socio-economic transformational impact on Africa's development Agenda.

### **Effectiveness and Efficiency**

76. The Africa South America strategic partnership, due to all reasons stated above, is yet to display any level of effectiveness and efficiency; projects agreed upon are not implemented and follow-up mechanisms put in place are not functioning.

### **Value addition of the Strategic Partnerships**

77. The Africa-South America partnerships have not delivered value addition as implementation level is still low or insignificant. If the three major projects agreed upon under the 2010 – 2015 Action Plan are materialised, the value addition will be very significant for Africa; these are: - the South-South Broadcasting Network; - the South-South Development Bank; and - the South-South University.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

78. The Africa-South America Cooperation Forum (ASACOF) needs more efforts from both sides for it to be grounded on solid institutional and political commitments. For these reasons not much has been achieved since its inception. Efforts are currently being deployed to put in place the necessary frameworks that would ensure the effective implementation of the governance/management mechanisms and the projects agreed-upon. While the AU/AUC is striving to lead the process on the African side, the partnership is suffering serious lack of leadership on the Partners' side due to their indecisiveness regarding who should assume the leadership in the management of the partnership

**79.** Overall, significant works need to be done to enable the partnership to deliver benefits on the socio-economic front. However, the political benefits of the partnership are potentially important given the total number of countries involved in it (13 + 54).

**80.** As a result, **continuation of this partnership, is recommended**, if the AU and the South American partners could put in place the required mechanisms, including a financing mechanism and a robust follow-up mechanism to support the implementation of the agreed-upon projects. This calls for a comprehensive review of the mechanisms required to allow for the continuation of this partnership on a solid basis (rather than transforming it **into a "Political and Cultural Dialogue" vehicle** and/or to be limited, in term of governance, **at "Ministerial Level"**).

**81.** With the above in mind, it is recommended that the following key issues be addressed as a matter of priority to ensure continuation of this partnership:

**82.** The AUC, in collaboration with the PRC, should implement the Executive Council Decision (EX.CL/Dec.786 (XXIV) which calls for them to engage with the South American partners: - 1/. to urgently finalize work towards jointly establishing an ASACOF Financing Mechanism and Fund for the implementation of agreed-upon specific projects, namely, projects that would attract benefits to the two sides; and – 2/. to agree on the modalities for the functioning of the ASACOF Strategic Presidential Committee.

**83.** In implementing the above, and in order to test the Relevance of the Partnership in its current format and for deciding on the Way forward, it is recommended that, the AUC, in coordination with the PRC, should engage a high-level consultation process with the South American partners to agree on the restructuring of the current format of the partnership into a more manageable and less ambitious format that should nevertheless be grounded on a comprehensive and resourceful coordination, follow-up and reporting mechanism.

**84.** In this context, the AUC and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) Secretariat should coordinate as a functional Secretariat rather than the current ad hoc format, this arrangement shall ultimately forestall any competition for leadership within the Forum by defining the role of the Summit hosting country and that of regional coordinators.

**85.** It is also recommended that both parties should agree on a format with more modest deliverables from a socio-economic and political perspective. To that effect, the three major projects agreed upon under the 2010 – 2015 Action Plan should constitute the major pillars at this time for this partnership, namely: - the South-South Broadcasting Network; - the South-South Development Bank; and - the South-South University. This will also include Programmes of Cultural and Sports nature Activities.

## **{Africa/African Union} - Arab Partnership**

### Assessment and Findings

#### **Legal / Institutional Framework**

**86.** The cooperation was institutionalized through a Declaration and Programme of Action adopted by the historical First Africa-Arab Summit held in Cairo, Egypt in March 1977. An Africa-Arab Partnership Strategy was adopted by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Africa-Arab Summit (2010 in Libya). The Legal/Institutional Framework also includes the Kuwait Declaration and Resolutions, adopted by the 3<sup>rd</sup> Africa-Arab Summit (2013 in Kuwait).

**87.** The day to day activity of Africa-Arab Partnership is coordinated jointly by the Commission and the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States, under the guidance of the Coordination Committee of the Africa-Arab Partnership at Ministerial and Senior Officials levels. The Coordination Committee is composed of the Current and outgoing Chairs of the African Union, Chair of the PRC Sub-Committee on Multilateral Cooperation and the Commission on the African side, and the current, outgoing and incoming Chairs of the Arab League and the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States on the Arab side. A Preparatory Committee composed of the Co-chairs of the pervious Summit, the Host Country, the Commission and the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States is established to deal with the logistical aspects of Africa-Arab Summits. The Preparatory Committee reports to the Coordination Committee. The African Union Permanent Delegation to the League of Arab States based in Cairo, Egypt and the Diplomatic Mission of the League of Arab States to Ethiopia and AU/ECA, based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia play supportive role and serve as communication channels between the two sides.

#### **Policy and Strategy Framework**

**88.** Although this partnership started as a cooperation framework between the Arab world and the African side as a solidarity undertaking between the two parts, the Arab world part, like the African side, is yet to adopt a collective partner-specific strategy for the management of this partnership; it should be recalled, as stated above, that the two parties have adopted an Africa-Arab Partnership Strategy to consolidate this cooperation.

#### **Institutional, governance and management set-up**

**89.** The specific joint mechanisms and structures that were created or needed to be created to facilitate the implementation of the Joint Action Plan 2011-2016 and other joint activities were not put in place. The mechanisms that were envisaged by the Plan include the establishment of a Confederation of Africa-Arab Chambers of Commerce and Industry, sectorial Working Groups and Technical Committees. The involvement of PSOs and CSOs in the partnership was also agreed-upon from both sides respectively; but these are yet to be implemented.

**90.** The Assembly of the African Union, through its Decision Assembly/AU/ Dec.343 (XVI), endorsed the Report on the 2nd Africa-Arab Summit contained in the Document Assembly/AU/12(XVI) which among other things proposed for the “*establishment of direct working relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and other similar organizations in the Arab world*”.

### **Relevance**

**91.** The long-standing Africa-Arab Cooperation is now being further developed. This therefore requires further negotiation and structuring work as the action plans will have to be re-defined in “SMART” terms, with transformational benefits to the African Continent. This partnership should be considered as a partnership between two highly intermingled peoples bound by historical, geo-political, economic, religious, cultural, linguistic and other factors. 70% of Arabs are Africans and 9 out of the 22 Members of the League of Arab States are also members of the African Union. Hence, the Africa-Arab Partnership could be regarded as a naturally compelling one and relevant for both sides.

### **Outcomes**

**92.** As one of the oldest cooperation arrangement that Africa entered into with the external world, the cooperation was institutionalized in 1977 in Cairo, Egypt. Such arrangement has now evolved into a formal Strategic Partnership in 2010 at the Africa-Arab Summit in Libya, following the adoption of the Africa-Arab Partnership Strategy, which defines the principles and objectives of the Partnership and elaborates the long term strategy, focusing on four main areas of cooperation namely Political Cooperation, Economic, Trade and Financial Cooperation, Cooperation in Agriculture and Food Security and Socio-cultural Cooperation. The Strategy also contains the Implementation and Follow up Mechanisms. The Strategy calls for the human and financial capacity of Department/Units dealing with Africa-Arab Partnership in both the African Union Commission and the General Secretariat of the Arab League to be substantively enhanced to enable them to play their assigned roles in implementation and follow-up of the Joint Africa-Arab Partnership Strategy and its action plans.

**93.** The Africa- Arab partnership, which is now the successor of the Afro-Arab Cooperation, took advantage of the ongoing activities and built upon them. Therefore, the outcomes generated in terms of scale and depth, although through a new action plan and/or scope is yet to be materialised. Besides, the action plan covers the same long list of cooperation areas like the case of some other new partnerships.

### **Implementation level of Activities**

**94.** The implementation of activities is found good in social and cultural development, political dialogue, agricultural development, trade and financial cooperation for the Africa-Arab partnership. But the implementation level is relatively weak and needs to be improved in areas where joint institutions have been established and joint projects have been identified for implementation; some of these projects are yet to be fully implemented

to the satisfaction of both parties, due to few challenges, among which are: - the lack of financial resources and, - lack of follow-up on implementation.

### **Socio-economic transformational impact**

**95.** This long standing partnership had established Joint Institutions and Joint Projects on the basis of which it has been operating, such as: -1/ the Africa – Arab Cultural Institute, established in 2002 in Bamako, Mali; but not functioning well due to budgetary and administration problems (The Decision of the Joint Policy Organs to transform the Institute into an Africa-Arab Institute for Culture and Strategic Studies has not been implemented, pending the improvement of the financial and administrative situation of the Institute) ; -2/ Africa-Arab Trade fair ( Seven editions already held); -3/ Africa – Arab Joint Action Plan on agricultural Development and Food Security; -4/ Africa-Arab Cooperation for Peace and Security; -5/ Africa-Arab Cooperation on Migration (Joint Technical Coordination Committee established); -6/ Africa-Arab Disaster Response Fund (Study being undertaken on the operational modality of the Fund) 7. Africa-Arab Joint Working Groups in the areas of Trade and Investment and Transport, Communication and Energy, 8. Africa-Arab Development Forum, held prior to the 2nd and 3rd Africa-Arab Summits to facilitate the participation of the Private Sector and Civil Society in the partnership process. Due to the nature and scope of those above, their implementation will take quite a long time before materializing some socio-economic transformational impacts; this is not the case for the moment.

### **Effectiveness and Efficiency**

**96.** The Africa-Arab Partnership has displayed a certain level of effectiveness, though it can and should be improved from a planning and reporting point of view. AU/AUC should establish as a matter of urgency a Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism together with a Reporting framework for effective and efficient follow-up and reporting purpose.

### **Value addition of the Strategic Partnerships**

**97.** To some extent, the Africa-Arab partnership has delivered a fair level value addition through ; the Africa-Arab Cooperation in the areas of Peace and Security (joint meetings of the African and Arab Peace and Security Councils); the continuous increase in the Arab financing of African Development through the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) and other national and regional financial institutions in the Arab World (BADEA's allocations for the Seventh Five-Year Plan (2015 -2019), stood at US\$ 1.600 million, representing an increase of US\$ 600 million compared to the Sixth Five-Year Plan (2010 – 2014)); the Africa-Arab Trade fair and cooperation through the Africa-Arab Cultural Institute in Mali.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations:**

**98.** The Executive Council at its XVI Session decided “*to transform the Afro-Arab Cultural Institute into the Afro-Arab Institute for Cultural and Strategic Studies*” (Dec.

EX.CL/Dec. 535(XVI). The objective was to identify and address issues of strategic importance to Africa-Arab Partnership. The Africa-Arab Partnership Strategy, adopted by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Africa-Arab Summit, also requested the two sides to *“revitalize and further strengthen the newly transformed Africa-Arab Institute for Culture and Strategic Studies which will develop a detailed action plan to enhance socio-cultural cooperation through networking with similar African and Arab institutions”* (Para 55). There is therefore a need to facilitate the implementation of the decision on the transformation of the Institute.

**99.** The Africa-Arab Partnership is a partnership between two highly intermingled peoples bound by historical, geo-political, economic, religious, cultural, linguistic and other factors. 70% of Arabs are Africans and 9 out of the 22 Members of the League of Arab States are also members of the African Union. Hence, the Africa- Arab Partnership could be regarded as a naturally compelling one. Taking into account the above, and because of its uniqueness it is therefore recommended that this partnership should continue.

**100.** In addition to the political solidarity, which is so far satisfactory, the two sides could also pursue a meaningful economic and financial cooperation, combining the huge financial potential in the Arab world with the nearly untapped human and natural resources in Africa. The financial cooperation that exists at bilateral level between Arab national and regional financial institutions and African countries could also be further strengthened and be used to assist the integration efforts of the African continent, through making it focus on financing Africa’s Flagship Programmes; and through the necessary multilateral trade facilitation mechanisms to be put in place.

**101.** Overall, despite its great potential, the partnership, in its present format, has some challenges both in its structure and the implementation of the Joint Action Plan 2011-2016. It is therefore important to take into account the following recommendations:

**102.** The Priority program for 2014-2016 should be streamlined and should contain a limited number of projects which are realistic and achievable, in “SMART” terms. Only activities that have reliable sources of funding, and which are to be handled at the level of the two coordinating Organizations, should be included in the programmes. The activities that could be implemented by the financial institutions, the private sector and civil society and do not fall within the strategic arrangement could be implemented at bilateral level;

**103.** The joint mechanisms which were envisaged in the Africa-Arab Partnership Strategy to strengthen the Africa-Arab Partnership should be established without further delay; and the capacity of the coordination mechanisms in the two Institutions, as envisaged by the Africa-Arab Partnership Strategy should be strengthened, in order to enable them effectively discharge their responsibilities;

**104.** There are a number of Arab National and Regional Financing Institutions /Funds created to assist Africa. Most of those funds are owned by the Gulf Cooperation Council

(GCC) countries. The GCC could be brought under the umbrella of this partnership, and the resources available could be directed to finance its activities, as well as Africa's regional development projects. To this end, it is recommended that the AU/AUC should:

- Engage a direct Cooperation Arrangement with the GCC;
- Implement the MoU signed with the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) who could play a significant role in coordinating the efforts of the Funds;
- Use part of these funds to feed into the overall Partnerships Trust Funds (to be created), while the strategic partnership should limit itself to the ongoing programmes, projects and activities of the current Action Plan, other overlooked opportunities.

## **{Africa/African Union} - India Partnership**

### Assessment and Findings

#### **Legal / Institutional Framework**

**105.** The Africa - India strategic partnership officially started in 2008 with the Delhi Declaration. However, some key instruments would need to be leveraged under this partnership, such as: ITEC (Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Program) dated back 1963 as bilateral cooperation instrument. This Strategic Partnership suffers lack of transparency from the part of the Indian side, because, most of the activities mutually agreed upon have been negotiated and implemented directly at the Member States by India without the strategic involvement of the AU/AUC side (Telemedicine Programme for example). The initiation of this engagement at the continental level was in response to Africa's own aspirations for Pan-African institutions and development programmes. The Africa-India Strategic Partnership was jointly established by the two parties through the first India Africa Forum Summit held in New Delhi on 8 - 9 April 2008. The participation from the African side was on the basis of the AU's Banjul Formula

#### **Policy and Strategy Framework**

**106.** From a strategic perspective, India's implicit strategy, as an emerging partner, is more or less based on: 1/ securing access to Africa's OGM and natural resources - forestry and agriculture – for its fast growing economy; 2/ securing EPC contracts; 3/ accessing to the expanding consumer market and industrial market of the African continent

**107.** From a policy perspective, the partnership is based on the use of a combination of India's bilateral policy instruments and strategic partnership-specific ones in the management/implementation of its strategic partnership with Africa.

## **Institutional, governance and management arrangement**

**108.** In terms of institutional, governance and management and follow-up mechanisms, the **Africa-India partnership** requires more work. However the action plan of the partnership appears quite robust, although Monitoring and evaluation framework remains particularly weak. Since then two Action Plans have been adopted and their activities being implemented and the implementation is largely under-target with good potential in technology transfer/acquisition (TVET).

## **Relevance**

**109.** The scope, potential transformational benefits, depth and "SMART" nature of the action plans are meaningful for the Africa-India partnership which, though potentially interesting, is yet to register meaningful level of transformational benefits due to the low level and the short term of its implementation.

## **Outcomes**

**110.** The Africa-India partnership is also interesting from a TVET and other Regional Centers of Excellence point of view. There is still room for improvement in other development areas including but not limited to trade and industrialization.

## **Implementation level of Activities**

**111.** The two Action plans adopted during previous Summit suffered low implementation due to very strong bilateral baize of this partnership. The main projects such as the regional centers of Excellence and TVET centers were not implemented as a result of a lack of clear mechanism of coordination between African and India. With respect to the Regional Centers of Excellence, MOU were signed for some of them, however, the African side found it difficult to abide by some provision therein. With regard to TVET Centers, both sides did not reach an agreement on how to get them implemented.

## **Socio-economic transformational impact**

**112.** Beyond its resource sector and economic cooperation, India is also engaged with Africa in a number of areas including development assistance, human capital development, peace and security, Science and Technology and ITCs (E-Network Project and TVET Project), as well as Pharmaceutical industries. As these are only operated at modest levels for now, the Africa-India partnership generated only very limited development impacts due to the limited implementation of action plans and activities that has been adopted. Beyond business sector activities and economic cooperation, the Africa-India partnership has potentials for expansion to other activity sectors, and for evolving into an effective partnership.

## **Effectiveness and Efficiency**

**113.** The Africa-India strategic partnership has not yet been fully effective as implementation levels remain very low despite the commitments made. In this case,



the problem lies on both sides. While African side delayed in responding to the offers made, the Indian side was not very clear about the implementation mechanism.

### **Value addition of the Strategic Partnerships**

**114.** As mentioned above, the Africa-India partnership has not also delivered value addition as implementation level is still low. A good number of valuable projects have been approved. Out of the cooperation areas agreed upon under this partnership as also mentioned above, a number of four (4) Centres of Excellence, ten (10 ) Vocational Training Centres and ten (10 ) Human Settlement Centres would have to be settled. There has been delays from both sides for implementation

### **Conclusion and Recommendations:**

**115.** The Africa-India partnership has potentials for expansion and for evolving into an effective partnership. The commitments made under the partnership are capable of delivering substance to the people of the two sides and should be fully implemented as they have been backed with concrete projects and earmarked funding.

**116.** Continuation of this partnership is strongly recommended with the following recommendations to enhance its effectiveness and development impacts for both parties:

- a)** Out of the seven (07) areas of cooperation agreed upon in the current Action Plan, the following should be pursued for delivery of tangible results: - 1 / . Incomes, Jobs and decent work 2/ poverty, inequality and hunger 3/ social security and protection including person with disabilities 4/ modern and livable habitat and basic quality services 5/ Education and ST skills driven revolution.
- b)** As recognized by both parties, there is an urgent need to address the issue of low level of implementation of agreed-upon projects; and as a matter of priority, engage in the implementation of the TVET institutions and other Centers of Excellence projects earmarked for implementation by the two parties.
- c)** It is recommended that the Africa-India partnership institutionalize a comprehensive enhanced coordination, follow-up and reporting mechanism that addresses, in a more systematic way, projects implementation and management faced by the partnership;

### **Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD)**

#### Assessment and Findings

#### **Legal / Institutional framework**

**117.** TICAD process started in 1993 as a policy platform on Africa's Development with a bilateral cooperation perspective to promote a high-level political dialogue between Africa and its development partners and to mobilize support for African-owned development initiatives. This drive began after the end of the Cold War when 'aid fatigue' had set in among donor countries. The move was therefore critical in stimulating strong donor interest in Africa. Since its launch in 1993, TICAD has held five summits: TICAD I in 1993, TICAD II in 1998, TICAD III in 2003, TICAD IV 2008 and TICAD V in 2013. The first three summits were held in Tokyo and the last two in Yokohama. In the first place the AUC had an observer status then became a co-organizer of TICAD in 2010 contributing to the articulation of action plans through comments on the initial work prepared by Japan. Since, then the TICAD process has grown into a major global forum to promote development on the continent under the principles of African "ownership" and international "partnership". The Format of participation is African Union Member States + Kingdom of Morocco.

**118.** Unlike other Africa's Strategic Partnerships, TICAD has the specificity of a partnership with five stakeholders called co-organizers, namely the Government of Japan, the African Union Commission (AUC), and United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (UNOSAA), - United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and World Bank.

**119.** The TICAD process also involves other multi stakeholders, Including Japanese related governmental organizations such as Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), some Asian countries, RECs, NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency, donor countries and international organizations and agencies.

### **Policy and Strategy Framework**

**120.** From a strategic perspective, the TICAD process is based on Japan's explicit and implicit strategy towards Africa. In fact, created in 1993 as a bilateral mechanism, TICAD is not a partnership as such but rather a policy forum. From a policy perspective, the partnership is guided by the use of a combination of Japan's bilateral policy instruments and strategic partnership-specific ones; (such as the TICAD framework). Since then the TICAD process has grown into a major global forum to promote development on the continent under the principles of African "ownership" and international "partnership"

### **Institutional, governance and management set-up**

**121.** In the area of partnership governance, the TICAD process has nit displayed depth and maturity in terms of institutional, governance and management and follow-up mechanisms. Monitoring and evaluation framework remains has not been inclusive partnership. The initial cycle of TICAD Summits was five (5) years. However, based on the acceptance of the principle of rotation of the holding of Summits between Africa and Japan at the TICAD V Summit held in June 2013, the First TICAD V Ministerial Meeting held in Yaoundé, Cameroon agreed to reduce the cycle of the TICAD Summits from five (5) to three (3) years.

**122.** From the TICAD IV Summit held in 2008, the TICAD process adopted the following three tiers follow up mechanism:

- Joint Secretariat: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, AUC, UNOSAA, UNDP and World Bank;
- Joint Monitoring Committee: Japanese Government and related governmental Organizations, TICAD Co-organizers, Permanent Representatives Committee of the African Union (PRC), African Diplomatic Corps in Tokyo (ADC), NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency, International Organizations and donor countries;
- Follow-up Meetings: Annual Senior Officials Meeting and Annual Ministerial Meeting and Summit (every three years) with Japanese government and related governmental organizations, African countries, some Asian Countries, TICAD co-organizers, RECs, NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency, donor countries and international organizations.

### **Relevance**

**123.** The scope, potential transformational benefits, depth and "SMART" nature of the action plans are meaningful for this partnership. The TICAD IV, for example, has already delivered transformational benefits for Africa in economic terms according to data provided by the Japanese side.

### **Outcomes**

**124.** The TICAD presents more ODA-backed traditional development cooperation content, namely, in areas such as, health, education and human capital development, and private sector development. However, trade and investment-related outcomes remain below potential.

### **Implementation level of Activities**

**125.** Since its inception, the TICAD process has adopted five action plans. Only the last two namely, TICAD IV and TICAD V action plans fall under the strategic partnership. The implementation of activities contained in those plans is good in overall social infrastructure, agriculture and Peace and Security, and fair in economic infrastructure; this is because TICAD process has first been launched outside the ambit of the AU, and that the two action plans are very recent: 2008 – 2013 for TICAD IV and 2013 – 2017 for TICAD V.

### **Socio-economic transformational impact**

**126.** AUC became a co-organizer of TICAD Summits, Ministerial and Senior Officials' meetings in 2012, and has participated in the drafting of TICAD V Yokohama Plan of Action (2013-2017). Before that, TICAD has been implementing four Action Plans

namely, TICAD I; TICAD II; TICAD III; and TICAD IV Action Plans, all based on initial TICAD philosophy as a bilateral Japan support to African countries development. According to the reports of the implementation of the Action Plans prepared by TICAD, the implementation of the four Action Plans has produced tangible (socio-economic transformational impacts) in the agriculture and food security areas through support to CAADP (irrigation projects).

**127.** Projection of progress in the construction of primary and secondary Schools (1,000 Schools; 5,500 classrooms) accumulated since April 2008, with training of 100,000 primary and secondary schools teachers. Japan's Assistance Package for Africa, under TICAD V, which implementation has just started, is presented in the form of **result-oriented quantified deliverables**, and is quite **robust in terms of outcomes** (financing facilities and technical assistance programmes) in the areas of ODA, commercial finance, investment promotion, infrastructure development, industry and private sector development, social development, environmental sustainability, and peace and stability. Hence, the evaluation of this Action Plan, for the time being, will evolve around the relevance and robustness/depth of its outcomes. To date, it is not possible to assess the outcomes of TICAD V in terms of impacts as the report of implementation is still work in progress until adopted by the TICAD VI Summit.

### **Effectiveness and Efficiency**

**128.** TICAD partnership has displayed a fairly consistent level of effectiveness, due to the initiative and leadership role of the partner. In particular, the TICAD process, which has been operating mostly on bilateral level, is built around a comprehensive follow-up mechanism that conditions and determines the ability of the partnership to meet its stated objectives

### **Value addition of TICAD**

**129.** TICAD has delivered a significant level of value addition to Africa, especially on the bilateral level. Furthermore, the TICAD package encompasses a balanced developmental offer of industrialization and private sector development, social development, environmental sustainability, and peace, security and political governance support backed by strong financial offers in both ODA and commercial finance terms.

**130.** ODA disbursement commitments to Africa by Japan were largely met. Indeed, in the 1990s, Japan spent around US\$ 1 billion a year on ODA to Africa. This amount increased greatly from 2000 onwards in line with TICAD III plans to double ODA disbursements, up from US\$ 1.226 billion in 2000 to US\$ 2.596 billion in 2006. The partnership would have to focus more on Africa's Strategic Vision, and to be based on support to Africa's strategic flagships programmes and projects.

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<sup>6</sup> The source for these information is: JICA 2012. A study on TICAD V Strategic Action Plan for Africa. By MURC. November 2012.

## **Conclusion and Recommendations:**

**131.** TICAD process was designed outside the African Union Framework, on Japan's own initiative, as a bilateral Development Plan for Africa. TICAD Action Plans I, II, III, and IV were implemented as such. It was only when AU/AUC came on board that some components of TICAD, especially TICAD IV Plan of Action incorporated Africa's strategic concerns. Therefore, the Yokohama TICAD V Plan of Action (2013-2017) indicated three (03) pillars and six (06) strategic approaches, which could accommodate some of the AU's Flagship Programmes/Projects Activities such as, PIDA, BIAT, Peace and Security issues and some other few Integration programmes.

**132.** Japan's Assistance Package for Africa, under TICAD V, is quite robust in terms of outcomes (financing facilities and technical assistance programmes) in the areas of ODA, commercial finance, investment promotion, infrastructure development, industry and private sector development, social development, environmental sustainability, and peace and stability. Furthermore, the package is presented in the form of result-oriented quantified deliverables.

**133.** Based on the above facts, it is strongly recommended that without possibly disrupting the TICAD process and establishing a new singular African Union-Japan partnership, the TICAD Process may continue as a global framework for promoting policy dialogue and coordinating activities on African issues, while reinforcing the current format of this partnership to promote the essence of an {African Union/Africa} – Japan Strategic Partnership. In line with the approved Decisions of the African Union Heads of State and Government, the following recommendations are made:

- a)** Promote equal roles between African Union and Japan and then, agree on the involvement of other stakeholders to include additional co-organizers (such as the African Development Bank (ADB) to complement the roles of the other co-organizers currently in place from the Japanese side.
- b)** With the African Union on an equal footing with Japan in the TICAD process, where Africa and Japan are in the driving seat of the process:
  - Issues relating to Co-chairing of the meetings and Summit within TICAD would be the joint responsibility of the African Union and Japan and not host countries co-chairing with Japan;
  - Decisions on matters relating to the TICAD process, and as affecting the African side, would be made by the African Union;
  - With respect to the initiation of Summit documents such as the Summit Declaration, Action Plan, etc., both Africa and Japan would independently initiate such documents and subsequently meet to negotiate them for finalization;

- Selection process for the hosting of meetings of TICAD by African countries would be considered by applying the principle of rotation under the relevant AU procedures.
- c) Urgently formulate a mechanism that would deal with the support of Japan to Africa in a manner that promotes Africa's strength to Japan for mutual relationship and benefits. This means that most of the resources allocated to Africa in a multilateral context, and within the framework of TICAD will be passed through the AU. AU will receive and conveniently manage these resources as agreed upon by the two sides.
- d) Stress the regional integration aspect in the partnership in line with Agenda 2063 and its First Ten Year Implementation Plan.

### **Recommendation on M&E mechanism:**

**134.** Institutionalize a comprehensive enhanced joint coordination, follow-up and reporting mechanism that addresses, in a more systematic way, projects implementation and management faced by the partnership.

### **Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC))**

#### Assessment and Findings

#### **Legal / Institutional framework**

**135.** FOCAC was launched in October 2000 in Beijing as a tri-annual collective dialogue platform for cooperation between China and Africa. It has held five ministerial conferences and two summits at the level of heads of states and governments. The Forum has gradually become an important platform for collective dialogue and an effective mechanism for enhancing practical cooperation between China and African countries and has provided the political umbrella in which bilateral relations have thrived. FOCAC started first as a bilateral partnership framework between China and African Member States with AUC being an observer. It is only in 2012 that the AUC became a full member of FOCAC

**136.** FOCAC is a forum for South-South cooperation set up to address development issues of mutual concern between China and African countries. The Forum has operated as bilateral relationship, where African countries champion their individual interests. It has been a strong bilateral-based partnership, which has operated for over a long period of time and no doubt has great potential to support the advancement of the course and purposes of the African continent and China, especially in areas with political dimension, infrastructure development, utilization of available market and the business opportunities that could be harnessed by both sides. It statutorily holds at the Ministerial level and has been hosted in the past as follows:

- 2000 – FOCAC I, Beijing, China;

- 2003 – FOCAC II, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia;
- **2006 – 1<sup>st</sup> FOCAC Summit (FOCAC-III), Beijing, China;**
- 2009 – FOCAC IV, Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt;
- 2012 – FOCAC V, Beijing, China;
- 2015 – 2<sup>nd</sup> FOCAC, Johannesburg, South Africa.

### **Policy and Strategy Framework**

**137.** From a strategic perspective, FOCAC is based on China's explicit and implicit strategy towards Africa, which include, among others: -1/ securing access to Africa's Oil, Gas and Mining (OGM) and natural resources, forestry and agriculture, for China fast growing economy; - 2/ Securing Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) contracts; - 3/ Accessing to the expanding consumer market and industrial market of the African continent. From a policy perspective, the partnership is guided by the use of a combination of China's bilateral policy instruments and strategic partnership-specific ones; (such as the China's China-Africa Development Fund (CADF) framework).

### **Institutional, governance and management set-up**

**138.** The **Africa-China partnership (FOCAC)** displays depth and maturity in terms of institutional, governance and management process and a strong follow-up mechanism. Monitoring and evaluation framework remains particularly weak; accessing easily M&E data on FOCAC projects has been difficult as there is no formal FOCAC mechanism or System (i.e. a joint AU/China System) that follows-up, monitors, evaluates and reports on its activities. Apparently the Chinese side has its own mechanism of capturing and reporting on project outcomes and outputs; but the AU does not.

### **Relevance**

**139.** The scope, potential transformational benefits, depth and "SMART" nature of the action plans are meaningful for Africa-China partnership. The Africa-China (fourth FOCAC) has already delivered some transformational benefits in economic terms for the African Continent.

### **Outcomes**

**140.** The Africa-China partnership is biased toward more economic cooperation, namely, in the areas of trade, industrial investments in OGM, infrastructure and manufacturing with highly visible transformational benefits over the last decade during which FOCAC was operating on bilateral basis with African countries. FOCAC evolved into a partnership that started providing to regional integration activities, only when AU/AUC became a full member of the FOCAC process.

### **Implementation level of Activities**

**141.** Within the framework of the implementation of the 2010 – 2012 and 2013 - 2015 FOCAC action plans, China started providing support to Africa for Regional Integration

and multilateral Cooperation. Therefore, the implementation level of activities is particularly good in infrastructure and resources sector investment, but merely fair in technology transfer and other sectors activities.

### **Socio-economic transformational impacts**

**142.** Since Africa-China partnership started first as a bilateral cooperation framework between China and African countries, and like in the case of TICAD above, it is not possible to quantify achievement of the FOCAC process in term of socio-economic transformational impacts, as a Strategic Partnership. The results obtained could only be accounted for on the basis of a pure bilateral cooperation point of view.

**143.** FOCAC, like TICAD, is now implementing its 6th Action Plan, FOCAC V (2015-2017). The question for Africa is therefore: is Africa benefiting in a meaningful way from this partnership, namely; from a socio-economic transformation point of view. Do Chinese investments in Africa maximize local content and technology transfer for Africa? Do Chinese operations in Africa promote and benefit local SMEs and the ordinary citizen? In the short timeframe allocated to this study, it could not look into such issues; but a thorough study needs to be undertaken in that direction for all the strategic partnerships. In the FOCAC Action Plan V both parties agreed to work together in areas of: - 1/. Agriculture and Food Security; - 2/. Science and Technology; - 3/. Human Resource Development, including support to TVET programme; - 4/. Health; - 5/. Support to Continental and Regional Integration; as well as – 6/. Support to Peace and Stability. If activities in support to those areas are built around AU flagships programmes, then impact could be access in few years' time.

### **Effectiveness and Efficiency**

**144.** The Africa-China (FOCAC) partnership has also displayed a certain level of effectiveness though it can and should be improved from a planning and reporting point of view. FOCAC, like the Japan's TICAD has also been operating since its inception on a bilateral basis. The shift to a strategic partnership framework will make it more effective and more efficient through a dedicated M&E and Reporting mechanism.

### **Value addition of the Strategic Partnerships**

**145.** The Africa-China (FOCAC) partnership has delivered a significant level of value addition to Africa. In other words, the benefits recorded would not have occurred without the partnership, particularly on bilateral point of view. The agreement, yet to be concluded between the two parties to lift the FOCAC partnership process with the view to aligning it to the AU Vision and strategic priorities as contained in AU's strategic flagship programmes, will add more value to the FOCAC process than it is now.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations:**

**146.** FOCAC is a strong partnership, which has gestated over a long period of time. It has resulted in a win-win situation to both sides. The bold and result-oriented nature of the



partnership as well as the scale of the cooperation has resulted in increasingly meaningful transformational benefits to Africa in industrialization, infrastructure and more general socio-economic terms. The partnership has the potential of bringing even more transformational benefits to the African side if its limitations are addressed as articulated in the recommendations thereafter.

**147.** It is therefore recommended continuing with this partnership, and take all necessary measures, from both sides and jointly, to promote equal roles between the African Union and China and upgrade the partnership to the level of a Strategic Partnership, with the view to serving better the strategic goals and objectives of Africa enshrined in the Agenda 2063 and the Agenda 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

**148.** To that effect, and to make the FOCAC process more relevant to addressing Africa's strategic objectives, it is recommended that the African and the Chinese side agree on a mechanism whereby the (AU/AUC/Africa) contribute to the articulation of implementable action plans around challenges and objectives identified by the AU, and to ensure the inclusiveness of all Member States in the preparatory process. This would correct the current situation whereby the FOCAC action plans are inspired and defined by the Chinese side alone with no to little African contribution.

**149.** It is recommended that Chinese partners pay due attention to local content development in China's financed and executed projects. In particular, the AU and China should institutionalize, as part of the FOCAC process, a "Business Linkage and Local Content Development Compact" with the view to making sure that a minimum level of local content and a systematic technology transfer process is effected at senior management, middle management and worker's level at a ratio of 65% to 80% minimum; this is to ensure effective technology transfer in the implementation of all FOCAC related Programmes/Projects activities.

**150.** The AU to invite China to systematically consider local processing of oil, beneficiation of mining products and the transformation/processing of other raw materials in Africa, instead of exporting them as raw materials to China; this will contribute to the much needed industrialization of Africa, to the maximization of value addition and to the creation of jobs;

**151.** The AU and China should discuss and agree on a comprehensive industrialization partnership around: - 1/ AU continental industrialization programs such as AIDA, RADS, AMV and APCI on one hand; - 2/ capacity building in modern manufacturing tools and techniques, industrial technology, mineral beneficiation technology; and - 3/ FDI, JV and investment support, including for the SME/SMI sector; namely, in special economic zone-like format in the forms of industrial, manufacturing, agro-processing and mining beneficiation platforms; and 4/ cooperation in agriculture and related areas.

**152.** The AU should seize the offer made by China for an "Infrastructure Partnership", in the aftermath of the BRIC Summit of 2013, and discuss its implementation around four mechanisms at least: -1/.Policy, regulatory, legal and institutional frameworks for

PPP/infrastructures; - 2/ Infrastructure project development and financial funding; - 3/. EPC capacity building through JV namely, in technology transfer; and - 4/ Renewable energy project cooperation.

**153.** Accessing easily M&E data on FOCAC projects has been difficult as there is no formal FOCAC mechanism or System (i.e. a joint AU/China System) that follows-up, monitors, evaluates and reports on its multilateral activities. Apparently the Chinese side has its own mechanism of capturing and reporting on multilateral project outcomes and outputs; but the AU does not. Therefore, there is a need to institutionalize a joint coordination, follow-up, monitoring and reporting mechanism that involves not only China and the AU, but also RECs, Member States, PSO and CSO.

**154.** While business and social perception of China cooperation with Africa is largely positive, there are a number of areas where China's business practices on Africa need improvement. For an effective and efficient China-Africa Strategic Partnership to gain momentum and operate at it maximum, it is recommended that the following Africa's concerns and issues be addressed in a systematic manner, and in accordance with previous commitments undertaken by both partners:

- a) Negative Impact on Small African Traders and Wholesale Africa Traders; - Negative Impact on Small African Businesses; - De-industrialization of Africa and negative impact of Africa's export capacity; - Limited employment benefits; - Limited technology transfer, local content and employment creation for Africa in China Turnkey projects; - Natural resource governance and negative impact on good governance.
- b) Barriers that prevent effective coordination and impede decision making that results in delayed decision-making or lack of decision.
- c) Proper planning of the various FOCAC Summits and ministerial meetings; - Proactivity on FOCAC Action Plans implementation matters, to avoid delays.

## **Africa/African Union-Korea Partnership**

### Assessment and Findings

#### **Legal / Institutional framework**

**155.** The Africa – Korea Forum was launched in Seoul, Korea, in November 2006 as a follow-up mechanism of the Korean Initiative of African Development (KIAD) announced by the Korean President Roh Moo-hyun during his visit to three African countries, Egypt, Algeria and Nigeria in March 2006. Envisaged as a Ministerial Conference, the first Africa-Korea Forum was, however, attended by five African Heads of States, President Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of Congo, Chairperson of the AU, President John Agyekum Kufuor of the Republic of Ghana, President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete of the United Republic of Tanzania, President Boni Yayi of the Republic of Benin, the

Minister Ban Ki-Moon, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Korea and by Prime Minister Hang Myeong Sook of Korea.

**156.** The outcome documents adopted during the first Africa – Korea Forum, namely the “Seoul Declaration 2006” and the “Action plan 2006 – 2009”, acknowledged that the first Forum: “laid the foundation for a framework of friendship, partnership and Cooperation between Korea and the African Countries” and also agreed that the Africa – Korea Forum should be held regularly, on a three year cycle, to serve as a mechanism for substantive cooperation. After the first Forum held in 2006, two others were organized in Seoul, Korea, respectively in 2009 and in 2012. The next Africa – Korea Forum is to be held in Africa for the first time in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, as approved by the Executive Council Decision No. EX.CL/Dec. 877(XXVII), adopted at its Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session 7 – 12 June 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa. Though, the first 2006 Forum was entirely driven by Korea in terms of modalities of participation, invitations and the development of the plan of action adopted, the 2009 and 2012 Fora were organized according to the Banjul Formula and the African Union took the lead of the African side.

### **Policy and Strategy Framework**

**157.** From a strategic perspective, this partnership is based on Korea’s explicit and implicit strategy towards Africa, which include, among others: 1/ securing access to Africa's OGM and natural resources - forestry and agriculture – for Korea fast growing economy; 2/ securing EPC contracts; 3/ accessing to the expanding consumer market and industrial market of the African continent, at a lesser stage. From a policy perspective, the partnership is guided by the use of a combination of Korea’s bilateral policy instruments and strategic partnership-specific ones.

### **Institutional, governance and management set-up**

**158.** The Africa-Korea partnership requires more work in this area; the partnership's institutional arrangement, governance and follow-up mechanisms are not yet comprehensively articulated and grounded on meaningful and "SMART" outcome and impact indicators. Monitoring and evaluation framework remains particularly weak, as there is still a blurred line between strategic partnership and bilateral relationship. This relates to the fact that the partnership has first been established outside the AU.

### **Relevance**

**159.** The various action plans of the Africa-Korea partnership are not much useful in relation with their significance in terms of scale and transformational benefits, nor are they articulated in "SMART" terms for a strategic point of view.

### **Outcomes**

**160.** The Africa-Korea which put emphasis on bilateral arrangements generated only marginal outcomes in terms of scale and depth, and its action plans and/or scope cover

the same long list of cooperation; this is understandable since this relationship was first, based on bilateral cooperation between Korea and African countries.

### **Implementation level of Activities**

**161.** Taking into account the above, one could easily understand that the implementation level of activities for this partnership is quite marginal in terms of significance to Africa. After its inception in 2006 by Korea's own initiative, this partnership recognized the full involvement of the AU/AUC only in 2009. It is worth stressing that the basic plan for development cooperation with Africa for 2009-2012 was in fact the Korea bilateral cooperation program for Africa.

**162.** The respective Africa – Korea Fora plans of action adopted in 2006, 2009 and 2012 have not delivered significant level of implementation of projects and activities identified, from a regional or continental perspective. The progress report of the implementation of the 2013-2015 plan of action, for example, sent to the Commission was developed only by the Korean side in 2014 and represents a compilation of programs and projects financially supported by Korea and implemented in specific African countries.

**163.** On a continental or regional basis, no implementation of the Korea-Africa Forum has taken place. The partnership remains more focused on bilateral projects. Both sides are now making efforts to strengthen multilateral cooperation and to expand partnership at a continental level in accordance with various Seoul Declarations and the Frameworks for Korea-Africa Development Cooperation 2009-2012. However some efforts and decisions made by both sides may now strengthen the multilateral component and expand the partnership at a continental level. These efforts consist mainly, in one hand, in the agreement reached in 2009 on the representation of Africa by organs of the African Union and the application of the Banjul Formula when it comes to participation to the Forum. In the other hand, the acceptance of the principle of rotation between Africa and Korea concerning the venue of the Forum is an important step for the African side to advance the continental agenda within this framework as the next Africa-Korea Forum will be held in Africa.

### **Socio-economic transformational impact**

**164.** The Africa-Korea generated only very limited development impacts due to its limited scale and level of implementation, or simply the limited implementation of action plans that occurred, associated with the lack of appropriate M&E mechanism.

### **Effectiveness and Efficiency**

**165.** The Africa – Korea partnership in its current bilateral formulation has not yet been fully effective as implementation level of activities contained in the approved Action Plans remains very low despite the commitments made. For this partnership to display some level efficiency and effectiveness, the commitments made would have to be fully honoured and translated into actions.

## Value addition of the Partnership

**166.** The Africa-Korea partnership's value addition has not met the expectations on the continental level, as the projects approved for implementation are those that would have been implemented under the bilateral cooperation channel.

## Conclusion and Recommendations:

**167.** It is worth stressing that the basic plan for development cooperation with Africa for 2009-2012 was in fact the Korea bilateral cooperation program for Africa. The implementation of various Africa – Korea Action Plans since 2006 is yet to report on a significant achievement at a continental or regional perspective. The partnership remains more focused on bilateral projects. Both sides are now making efforts to strengthen multilateral cooperation and to expand partnership at a continental level. in accordance with various Seoul Declarations and the Frameworks for Korea-Africa Development Cooperation 2009-2012.

**168.** Hence, the partnership has been made consistent by the African side with current ongoing partnerships in terms of format of participation and the role of the AU Commission and the Sub-Committee on Multilateral Cooperation of the PRC. The second Forum has taken place from 23-25 November 2009 under the new format and with the full involvement of the PRC, the Sub-Committee on Multilateral Cooperation and the Commission. This Forum holds the prospect of mutual benefits for both sides and should continue and be vigorously pursued. It is therefore recommended that:

- a) AU Member States take a final decision as to how to respond to Korea's strategy of advancing only its bilateral cooperation through the Africa – Korea Forum and whether the partnership should be treated as a strategic partnership. If considered as a strategic partnership, it is important to determine what areas it should cover and how Africa will be represented. A partnership with Korea at the continental level will, of course, be beneficial to Africa particularly if it is focused and conforms to AU's Strategic Vision as expressed in Agenda 2063 and the Banjul format or as it may be re-configured.
- b) the Plan of Action of the New Reconfigured Partnership to be restructured towards fewer priority areas, and be made more comprehensive in terms of action plan definition in "SMART" terms around meaningful transformational benefits with regard to: - Industrialization, SME development and Technology transfer through TVET and industry-specific technical skills development and in accordance with areas of competence of Korea as mutually recognized by both sides; - As well as the definition of a comprehensive coordination, follow-up and reporting mechanisms on the activities of the partnership.

## **{Africa/African Union}-Turkey Partnership**

### Assessment and Findings

#### **Legal / Institutional framework**

**169.** The first Africa -Turkey Cooperation Summit was held, and Summit Declaration was adopted in August 2008. The partnership framework agreement was also signed in 2008.

#### **Policy and Strategy Framework**

**170.** From a strategic and policy perspectives, this partnership is based on Turkey's explicit and implicit strategy towards Africa, which include, among others: 1/ securing access to Africa's OGM and natural resources - forestry and agriculture – for Turkey fast growing economy; 2/ securing EPC contracts; 3/ accessing to the expanding consumer market and industrial market of the African continent, at a lesser stage. The partnership is also guided by the use of an ambiguous combination of Turkey's bilateral policy instruments and strategic partnership-specific ones that does not respect the unity of Africa.

#### **Institutional, governance and management set-up**

**171.** The Africa-Turkey partnership requires more work in this area; the partnership's institutional arrangement, governance and follow-up mechanisms are not yet comprehensively articulated and grounded on meaningful and "SMART" outcome and impact indicators. Monitoring and evaluation framework remains particularly weak, as there is still a blurred line between strategic partnership and bilateral relationship. This is the result of long-standing bilateral cooperation between Turkey and many African countries.

#### **Relevance**

**172.** For the Africa-Turkey partnership, its action plans are not as useful or significant in terms of scale and transformational benefits for Africa, and are not articulated in "SMART" terms.

#### **Outcomes**

**173.** The Africa-Turkey partnership generated only marginal outcomes in terms of scale and depth, with action plan and/or scope covering the same long list of cooperation areas as Korea. In order to generate meaningful outcomes the plan has to be arranged in a "SMART" manner, and go away from the usual bilateral cooperation areas.

#### **Implementation level of Activities**

**174.** The partnership framework agreement was signed since 2008, despite the adoption of a joint action plan (2010 – 2014). The low level of implementation of this

initial action plan, not to say, the lack of its implementation, has triggered the postponement of the 2<sup>nd</sup> Heads of State/Government Summit, scheduled to take place in 2013 to November 2014 in Malabo-Equatorial Guinea, whereby an Action Plan and a Matrix for Key Priority Projects have been adopted. Following the Malabo Summit a Senior Officials meeting was held from 17<sup>th</sup> to 22<sup>nd</sup> of March 2015 in Ankara, Turkey in order to negotiate the required Funds for the agreed upon activities on the Matrix of the key Priority projects which was adopted during the 2014 Malabo Summit, to that end Turkey has provided One Million USD which was earmark for six Priority Areas. Although the issue of the delayed Implementation is due to the fact that Turkey is providing the Funds when the AU Budget is already adopted this situation make those funds impossible of use, therefore in addressing this issue the Commission had requested from the Turkish side to confirm the formalization of the donation of the Funds in a yearly basis which will enable the AUC to anticipate the Budget Planning. Despite this, or based on this, another "Joint Implementation Plan (2014-2018 Again Turkey is now ready to leverage its bilateral successes in favor of its partnership with Africa, more specifically in the area of Trade and Investment.

### **Socio-economic transformational impact**

**175.** For the same reasons as of TICAD and FOCAC and Korea as stated above, the Africa-Turkey generated only very limited development impacts due to, its initial bilateral nature, its limited scale and level of implementation, or simply the limited implementation of action plans that occurred, and nonexistence of adequate M&E framework.

### **Effectiveness and Efficiency**

**176.** The Africa – Turkey strategic partnership has not yet been fully effective as implementation level of activities contained in the approved Action Plans remains very low despite the commitments made. For this partnership to display some level of efficiency and effectiveness, the commitments made would have to be fully honoured and translated into actions, and the activities to be implemented would have to move from those of bilateral cooperation.

### **Value addition of the Strategic Partnership**

**177.** The Africa-Turkey partnership has not delivered value addition to Africa's socio-economic development as implementation level is still low. African countries long-standing bilateral cooperation with Turkey has certainly yielded value addition to Africa's development agenda, but nothing substantive at strategic partnership level. However the Turkish side agreed in the 2014 Summit to fund six projects over the 16 submitted by the Africa side, and which the AUC Technical Departments are to meet requirements for the projects to start.

## Conclusion and Recommendations

**178.** Like the case of the Africa-Korea partnership, the Africa-Turkey partnership has some potential; but its slow rate and limited scope of implementation will need to take off as not much progress has been made in terms of the implementation of the 2014 Malabo Joint Action Plan as of now, despite the fact that this is a partnership operating on a bilateral basis.

**179.** The current form of this Partnership does not qualify as a Strategic Partnership. Yet, the Partnership may have the potential to become Strategic. In order to transform this Partnership into a Strategic Partnership, if necessary, it is recommended that the Partnership qualifies as “Strategic” according to the threshold previously identified in this report. This calls for a comprehensive review of this Partnership to allow for its continuation on a solid basis.

**180.** In the interim, it is therefore recommended that the joint implementation plan should be restructured towards fewer priority areas, and made more comprehensive in terms of:

- a) Re-scoping of the joint action plan into a limited number of agreed implementable projects.
- b) Redefinition of the Action Plan in "SMART" terms around meaningful transformational benefits in terms of:-1/ 1/ Incomes, Jobs and decent work  
2/ Poverty, Inequality and Hunger  
3/ Social security and protection including Persons with Disabilities  
4/ Modern and livable Habitats and Basic Quality Services  
5/ Education and STI skills driven revolution  
6/ Sustainable and Inclusive Economic Growth  
7/ STI driven Manufacturing / Industrialization and Value Addition  
8/ Economic diversification and resilience setting up a Partnership Coordination, Financing, Follow-up and Reporting Mechanisms on the activities of the partnership.

**181.** In addressing the issue of low level of implementation of the joint action plans, it is recommended that, as recognized and agreed upon by both parties, these issues should be addressed as a matter of urgency and priority, and the two parties should engage in the implementation of the projects identified by them.

### {Africa/African-US} Partnership

**182.** This is a partnership between the United States of America (US) and African Countries that have diplomatic relations with the US. It is not within the framework of Africa’s Strategic Partnerships.

**183.** It is, therefore, recommended that this partnership be brought under the framework of Africa’s Strategic Partnership.



## **PART C: RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE ENHANCEMENT OF THE INSTITUTIONAL STATE OF THE AU COMMISSION TO DRIVE THE AFRICAN UNION'S ENGAGEMENTS WITH PARTNERS**

### **I. AU- Level Challenges in the Management of Strategic Partnerships**

**184.** The management process of Africa's strategic partnerships has been fraught with a number of challenges and constraints that need to be addressed in a comprehensive manner, with a view to delivering results effectively and efficiently. These include the following: (make consistent)

- Absence of a Partnership Policy and Strategy framework;
- Lack of AU-level technical capacity, procedural and knowledge gaps;
- African side coordination and communication issues;
- AU-level financial resources constraints;
- Perceived institutional weaknesses of the AUC;
- Stretched capacity of the AUC in the management of strategic partnerships;
- Challenges of AU Partnership, Management and Coordination Division (PMCD):
  - Deficit in the institutionalization, sustainability, follow-up mechanisms and continuity in the management of strategic partnership at AU level;
  - Weaknesses in the monitoring/follow-up, review, reporting and evaluation mechanisms.

### **The Need for Partnership Policy and Strategy Framework**

Adoption of a Comprehensive AU Policy and Strategy Framework for the establishment and management of strategic partnerships:

**185.** While most Africa's strategic partners have their strategy towards the Continent, Africa, on her side, has not yet adopted an overall Partnership Policy and Strategy Framework for the management of its Strategic Partnerships. Obviously, a one-size fit all approach to the structuring of the partnerships and their action plans does not reflect the relative complexities of the different partnerships and the specific opportunities they bring to the African continent. In addition, many partners don't have a clear understanding of AU continental priority programmes and the way they are supposed to contribute to their implementation.

**186.** The value of a result-oriented and strategic approach to the management of strategic partnerships needs to be considered at the African Union Commission for better delivery in the management and coordination of the partnerships. Since the inception of these partnerships, their management activities have been scattered among the various operational departments with less or no coordination among

them. Each one has also been operating without a clear partnership policy and strategy framework. There has been some improvement since 2012 when a Partnership Management and Coordination Division (PMCD) was established under the Bureau of the Chairperson of the AUC.

Initiation and structuring of partnership:

**187.** On Africa's side, in the absence of a clear Partnership Policy and Strategy Framework, the initiation of partnerships is yet to be based on a set of clear criteria and pre-determined objectives and goals both in developmental and political terms. Furthermore, the quasi totality of partnerships attempt to cover the same long list of cooperation areas without a differentiation based on partners' specific advantage(s) and the meaningful nature of what the partner can contribute to Africa. Lastly, what Africa brings to the table is not clearly articulated and valued neither. Not all partnerships should look alike in terms of cooperation areas. Obviously, a specialization of partnerships, based on partners' comparative advantage and economic/financial capacity, should be considered.

Reactive approach to the management of strategic partnerships:

**188.** A Partnership Policy and Strategy Framework will help the AU/AUC shift from reactive to proactive approach with the partners. It will also improve the level of preparedness, the technical and financial capacity gap of the AUC and/or the deficient internal coordination of the AU with other African stakeholders such as Member States, RECs, Private Sector organizations, etc. Trade and investment programs require the involvement of African private sector which is not yet fully associated in the planning, implementation and management of Africa's strategic partnerships in a systematic way.

**AUC-level Technical Capacity, Procedural and Knowledge Gaps**

**189.** The management of strategic partnerships from initiation/negotiation to full implementation and reporting involves a combination of diplomatic skills, functional program/project management skills, thematic development assistance/cooperation related skills and commercial project development, structuring and implementation skills. These need to be developed at AU/AUC levels within the framework of the PMCD, whose current limited structure undermines the capacity of the African Union to manage the various partnerships relationship in an efficient and effective manner

**African-side Coordination and Communication Issues**

**190.** The lack of institutionalized working relationships between the AUC (PMCD) and stakeholders such as RECs, NPCA, Private Sector, CSOs and other organs of the AU and/or their non-involvement in the partnership management process of the AU- inter alia - affect negatively the ability of the AU to negotiate relevant partnerships and influence their structuring and implement their action plans timely.

**i) AUC-RECs:**

**191.** AUC and RECs communication and information flows suffer on three fronts. First, AUC engages in strategic partnerships which implementation requires active involvement of RECs; but the partnerships are designed without inputs from RECs. Secondly, RECs themselves negotiate partnerships on their own with the same strategic partners as the AU, giving room for possible redundancies. Thirdly, although the RECs which are supposed to implement part of Africa's strategic partnership are somehow involved in the process of establishing the strategic partnerships, they do not necessarily have the budget to engage in planning and implementation activities.

**ii) AUC - Member States:**

**192.** AUC and Member States communication and information flow suffer on three accounts:

- a)** The overall AU's vision of strategic partnership should be one that results, among others, in the implementation of programs and projects of regional dimension; but number of Member States put their national interest first.
- b)** Significant gaps/differences have been noted between AU continental programmes and the action plans defined within the framework of strategic partnerships that tended to be articulated in a bilateral project format with no link to the regional/continental agenda. Hence, this data gap is widened by the lack of an adequate delineation between the data provided by Partners in their support of Member States in the bilateral and multilateral contexts.
- c)** Position coordination issues have arisen in many meetings where consultations between the AUC and Member States have been deficient. Additionally, the Banjul Formula on participation in Continent to Country Summits has proven to be controversial<sup>7</sup>.

**iii) AUC-PRC/Sub-Committee on Multilateral Cooperation (PRC/SCMC):**

**193.** At times, it is not clear to the PRC/SCMC who, between the PMCD and technical departments, leads the way in the preparation and organization of consultations with partners. Where technical departments are involved, the multiple commitments of the AUC staff involved in the management of partnership relationship, has often translated into repeated communication gaps between the AUC and the PRC or the SCMC.

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<sup>7</sup> This matter has been addressed extensively in part A of the Report (paragraphs 40-42)

**i) AUC-NPCA:**

**194.** The AUC/PMCD and NPCA for now failed to work together in order to send a strong signal to partners that the two structures are complementary. Besides, the synergy between them will contribute to higher levels of implementation.

**ii) AUC-Partners:**

**195.** The inability of the PMCD to coordinate the implementation of decisions within the AUC and with partners as well as the delays experienced by the PMCD and its staff to respond to queries from partners push the latter to often by-pass the PMCD and engage directly with technical departments and/or AUC Chairperson or Deputy Chairperson Offices to secure feedback timely. Not only does this undermine the credibility of the PMCD and its staff; but it also results sometimes in contradictory and/or uncoordinated positions among AUC's staff themselves and between the AUC and the partners.

**196.** Partners have reported situations where feedback received from the Chairperson office were not known to the technical department in charge of the specific issue; causing delays and misunderstanding in the implementation of the anticipated project.

**197.** It is worth noting that there is a need to revise the cost implication of a partnership, and the amount of resources dedicated to its execution, in order to ensure that they all correlate to envisage value and anticipated outcome of the partnership.

**PMCD-Technical Departments:**

**198.** PMCD, SCMC and even some partners have deplored the many delays or even absence experienced in the technical departments' inputs/contributions to the partnership management process due to a combination of low priority given to partnership issues, bureaucracy, workload, amidst a lack of adequate decision making processes in the absence of Departments' Heads . It is worth noting that the de facto independence of the Department of Peace and Security resulted in a lack of coordination in this regard. Moreover, it is to be recalled that the current limited structure of PMCD continues to undermine the capacity of the African Union to manage the various partnerships relationship in an efficient and effective manner.

**199.** With Technical Departments, it is also known that there are established procedures for signing legal instruments, such as MOUs, which obliges all Departments to get clearance from the Chairperson of the Commission before any agreement is signed. But this seems not always observed; and PMCD was not always involved when some agreements with partners are signed. This has created dysfunctions, and made follow up difficult.

**200.** Furthermore, it was observed that some AUC Departments have unilaterally submitted requests for funding the same programmes within their mandate for cooperation, to different partners, without adequate coordination with other AUC Departments to avoid redundancy in such requests. This situation puts partners in difficult and uneasy positions and makes them hesitant in accepting the proposals.

### **AU Financial Contribution Issues**

**201.** Africa and the AUC will not be able to influence successfully their partnerships nor contribute significantly to the implementation of action plans if AU internal financial resource mobilization agenda is not addressed decisively and funding contribution to implement agreed-upon project put in place. One should not forget that these are Strategic Partnerships based on win-win undertaking; and their implementation needs financial input/contribution from the African side.

### **Perceived Institutional Weaknesses of the AUC**

**202.** There are current deficiencies in the internal governance, management and control system of the AUC, particularly in the areas of strategic planning and programing, as well as financial and human resources management. The continuation of such deficiencies shall create a confidence deficit that would negatively impact the ability of the AU to mobilize financial and technical assistance from both strategic and traditional development partners as financial limits and non-flexible disbursement might be imposed on the AUC to hedge against such deficiencies.

### **Stretched Capacity of the AUC and Cost to the AUC**

**203.** Each partnership comes with its string of consultation and coordination mechanisms including: heads of states summits, ministerial meetings, coordination and/or follow-up mechanisms, technical committees, preparatory meetings action plans and frameworks for cooperation. The preparation and participation of/into these multiple instances, committees and meetings, the various requests for technical inputs as well as the coordination meetings with the PRC, cause significant drain in financial and staff time in terms on the personnel of the AUC without tangible results for most partnerships.

**204.** Furthermore, there are currently too many objectives in certain partnerships which not only stretches the capacity of the AU Commission in the implementation phase, but also results in partnerships not delivering to their full potential as resources are spread over a wide area of intervention; and implementation is not focused.

### **Challenges of the AU Partnership Management and Coordination Division**

**205.** The African Union (AU) pursues three types of partnerships, namely (i) Continent to Continent Partnership, (ii) Continent to Country Partnership and (iii) Organization to Organization Partnerships (Institutional Partnerships). Before the establishment of the PMCD, the management of all these partnerships was scattered, and handled by

various Departments of the Commission and by the Chief of Staff, Bureau of the Chairperson. This situation had made it difficult for the AUC to have a comprehensive overview of the management process and challenges of all partnerships with the view to devising a common policy and strategy for the partnerships. This shortcoming has prompted the establishment, in the Office of the Chairperson, of the Partnership Management and Coordination Division (PMCD).

**206.** The mandate of the PMCD, as decided by the Executive Council Decision (Dec.CL/Dec.646 (XIX) at its 19<sup>th</sup> Session held in June 2011, in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, was to coordinate the various Partnerships entered into between Africa and other parts of the World and to:

- Manage the activities relating to those Partnerships;
- Propose and implement actions for the operationalization of the Frameworks and/or Plans of Action supporting the various Partnerships;
- Follow-up on the implementation of activities resulting from those instruments;
- Service the meetings of the PRC and the Sub Committee on Multilateral Cooperation under the various Partnerships;
- Assess the various outcomes of activities and documents resulting from various meetings of the Partnerships and make proposals for actions and follow-up;
- Liaise with various Departments/ Units of the Commission for coordination purposes as they relate to each Partnership;
- Ensure synergy between and among the various Partnerships.

**207.** Within this mandate, the Role, Functions and Activities of the PMCD were defined and approved. The Commission was requested to implement this Decision gradually by recruiting staff for the Structure over a period of three years starting January 2012.

**208.** The position of Head of Division of the PMCD which is P5 is too low when compared to Directors heading Departments on the one hand, and with high level Diplomats and senior officials from partners on the other hand. These asymmetric relations have had negative bearing during various exchanges and negotiation process with partners that now have the tendency of by-passing the PMCD and speak directly to the Chief of Staff, Bureau of the Chairperson and/or the Technical Departments; situation that generates significant communication and information flow problems for the Division and partners alike. It is important and of utmost urgency to operationalize a fully staffed and equipped PMCD with a view to making it responsive and up to the task.

## **AU-level Causes of Low Level of Implementation**

**209.** Since its establishment in 2012, the PMCD has coordinated number of high level and technical meetings and consultations with various partners. The PMCD has also worked closely with the PRC/Sub-Committee on Multilateral Cooperation and line Departments to draft implementation matrixes for Action Plans. However, its capacity to transform most of the action plans into implementable projects has been relatively weak as a result of many factors summarized as follows:

- AUC-level coordination problem: The low level of coordination between the PMCD AUC leadership and the line/technical departments has been raised in relevant sections above. The full operationalization of the PMCD at all levels and with the full backing of the leadership will put an end to such situation;
- Host country default: Failure of African host-countries to meet their part of the obligations in the implementation of identified projects, such as, Regional Centers of Excellence, has been a major cause of low level of implementation namely, in the case of the Africa-India partnership that proposed the setting-up of no less than a dozen of such projects;
- The issue of financial resources contribution from Member States to the AUC, to allow it implement fully, efficiently and effectively the various frameworks that have been established for the management and coordination of the Strategic Partnerships, has also been raised in above sections; when resources are made available, the established mechanisms are established, the AUC will be in a better position to implement those partnerships in all their components. Lack of project formulation/development capacity. Weak technical back-up System for partnership portfolio managers and AUC/PMCD level.

## **Weaknesses in the Monitoring, Follow-up, Review, Monitoring and Evaluation and Reporting Mechanisms**

**210.** Partnerships have been very rarely evaluated from the African side. Reports of Monitoring and Evaluation of the activities of all the Partnerships have been prepared by the Partners without the involvement of the AU Structures. In such many situations where the relationships have been on bilateral basis, the Commission has had no access or mechanism to get involved, so as to contribute in necessary monitoring and evaluation.

## II. Enhancement of the institutional state of the AU Commission to drive the African Union's engagements with Partners

**211.** There is a need to empower the Partnership Management and Coordination arm of the Commission for enable it discharge its functions and duties. To that effect, the following recommendations are hereby made:

- a) Restructure the PMCD, in conformity with its newly envisaged role, functions and duties, within the context of the overall restructuring exercise of the African Union Commission, by - inter-alia - considering upgrading it to a Directorate.
- b) The role of PMCD will be maintained as clearly indicated in its Terms of Reference, which include; to coordinate and manage the partnerships entered into by the African Union through the Commission and ensure that the terms and conditions of the financing of the projects are fully met.
- c) The Directorate should work in close collaboration with line Technical Departments that are responsible for initiating and implementing the programs and projects to be financed by the partners and ensure a close coordination and synergy between it and the Departments;
- d) Formalize the establishment of a Strategic Partnerships Focal Points Group (SPFPG) made up of Focal Points designated by the relevant Departments/Directorates/Units of the AUC, so as to provide necessary support to AU-SPD in promoting understanding and better working relationship with Departments/Directorates;
- e) Provide technical skills requirements for staff of the PMCD/SPFPG, together with clearly defined operational and administrative systems, as well as supporting guide/procedure manuals and other knowledge tools that could assist the staff of the PMCD/SPFPG to properly administer and manage the Strategic Partnerships;
- f) Consider establishing presence at the capitals/cities of countries/regions/locations, where the African Union maintains Strategic Partnership. At the minimum, consider stationing a staff in such respective locations that are found critical or have need to advance the partnership process, to follow up on all Partnership activities;
- g) The Sub Committee on Multilateral Cooperation (SCMC) should be capacitated in administrative, logistical and technical terms, to enable it engage effectively in providing guidance to the partnership management process. This could be achieved by engaging in orientation through Executive Seminars both for the PRC, SCMC and the AUC at the highest leadership level for a common understanding of the role of each one with respect to the Strategic Partnerships;



- h) Put in place a Partnership Reporting System (PRS) that enables partners to communicate systematically all activities and projects funded under a strategic partnership framework and commits all AU Member States, RECs, NPCA and AfDB to communicate systematically all activities and projects undertaken under African strategic partnership framework.
- i) Establish and operationalize a Partnership Management Information System (PMIS) that will contribute immensely to the Follow-up on implementation, Review, Monitoring and Evaluation, and Reporting on all on-going Strategic Partnerships activities involving all stakeholders;
- j) Harmonize the follow up mechanisms for all Strategic Partnerships in line with the 5-year cycle alongside a uniformed model for ease of implementation and follow up through a single and same format, as follows:
- Summit level meetings;
  - Ministerial level meetings (preceded by a Ministerial Meeting – *follow up and preparatory for Summits*)
  - Senior Officials level meetings (preceded by biennial Senior Officials Meetings)
  - Technical level meetings; Action plans; Frameworks for Cooperation and Monitoring and Evaluations meetings should be held as necessary and agreed upon by all sides
- k) Promote joint planning, implementation, follow-up, and reporting and M&E framework for each partnership;
- l) Promote synergy between the AUC/AU and the African stakeholders, such as:
- Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs)
  - NEPAD Coordinating Agency (NPCA)
  - United Nation's Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)
  - Africa's Financial Institution- AfDB
  - African Capacity Building Foundation (ACFB)
  - Non State Actors (NSAs), as in Private Sector Organizations and the umbrella Chamber of Commerce and Industry, *The Pan African Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PCCI)*
- m) The African Union should mobilize sufficient resources, which will enable it to play its role as a true partner, not as recipient-only partner, in the implementation of projects earmarked. In that regard and given the potential of AU's strategic partnerships to mobilize financial resources and deliver on meaningful development impacts for the Continent, operational budgetary allocations should be made available to the African Union

Strategic Partnerships Directorate (PMCD) with clearly stated deliverables. In the process, the African Union should provide all budgetary requirements of the PMCD and ensure that all expenses to be incurred by Member States and RECs in the management of strategic partnership should also be factored;

- n) Secure adequate, sustainable financial resources for AU PMCD to allow it to perform its newly envisaged role, functions and duties in managing partnership relationship in an efficient and effective manner. This could be provided through the mobilization of internal resources, or built into the various partnerships agreements as administrative/program support or overhead.
- o) Establish and operationalize an appropriate delivery Mechanism/Framework, between the AUC and other African stakeholders such as RECs, Member States, (Government: PSO, and CSOs), NPCA, and Other AU Organs in the management process of Africa's strategic partnerships. Within such framework, the PMCD, as the overall AU partnership management and coordination body, will coordinate policy guide lines as approved by various AU policy making organs on partnership issues and technical support in the negotiation of partnerships involving the RECs and Organs; the PSOs and CSOs. The PMCD, in consultation with the RECs and the other AU, Organs will participate in their monitoring and evaluation activities and reviews in particular, and support them in the capacity building activities of their partnership coordination and management structures;
- p) For the PMCD to better coordinate and manage the various partnerships, consider elaborating the following tools and frameworks, in addition to the AU Outline Framework, Matrix indicating Partners areas of core competences and AU Strategic Partnership Policy and Strategy Framework::
- An AU Partnerships Orientation Paper;
  - Partnership Results and Accountability Framework;
  - A Partnerships Management Information System (PMIS);
  - A Partnership Monitoring and Evaluation and Reporting Framework;
  - An appropriate Delivery Mechanism Framework among African Stakeholders}.

## CONCLUSION

**212.** In general, partnership is a voluntary collaborative agreement between two or more parties in which all participants agree to work together to achieve a common purpose or undertake a specific task and to share risks, responsibilities, resources, competencies and benefits. Synergy is the power behind strategic partnerships, as it leverages assets, in terms of resources, core competences, capabilities, amongst others, for all the parties involved for their mutual benefits. It is by sharing and purpose-driven cooperation that we can direct our collective resources and capabilities to those projects we consider most important.

**213.** A review of the report entitled Africa's Strategic Partnerships has been conducted and concluded with clear recommendations expected to be adopted by the African Union Policy Organs and effectively and efficiently implemented at all levels.

**214.** Having noted that adopting a focused thrust and strategic direction in relationships engaged by the Union with the other parts of the world has become urgent and necessary, three reference documents, namely: African Union Outline Framework for Partnerships; Matrix on areas of cooperation and core competences, which are expected to give guidelines on how the Union engages in partnerships, maintains successful partnerships, manages transition as and when necessary, have been proposed for adoption by the Policy Organs. A third document is yet to be reviewed by the Sub-committee prior to recommending it for adoption, namely the Partnership Framework prepared by the UNDP consultants and the Commission.

**215.** Great emphasis has been made on developing an inclusive Monitoring and Evaluation/Follow up framework, to complement existing M&E documents. In that regard, the Commission in collaboration with the PRC Sub Committee on Multilateral Cooperation, together with relevant stakeholders and Partners would have to mobilize such existing efforts in M&E to come up a strong and binding Monitoring and Evaluation Framework that would ensure sustainability in following up on the implementation of agreed areas of cooperation.

**216.** It is believed that the empowerment of the AU Commission body in charge of management and coordination of African Union partnerships, in general terms will be the platform required to fulfil its mandate. Such empowerment will give a new meaning and impetus to Africa's relationship with the other parts of the world and support the African Union/Commission's efforts towards addressing the challenges faced by Africa and its people in their strive to attain economic development and integration; focusing on the long-term strategic and sustainable relationships with evident short-term successes, in line with the AU Agenda 2063.

**217.** As the world transforms with passion, towards greater sustainable growth, and rapidly striving to improve the living standard of its vast population, the 21<sup>st</sup> century offers unique opportunities for Africa. Africa has since embraced this reality and has unarguably made clear its resolve to embark on result-oriented endeavours towards this

end, hence the adoption of its Agenda 2063. The African Union Agenda 2063 and its first ten year plan feature a grand design to inter alia transform Africa's economy through the development of technological capabilities and value addition to its natural endowments, as well as promote transformation at the political, social and cultural arena, while allowing for greater solidarity and cohesion, in the face of the challenges of globalization.

**218.** It is in this spirit that Africa engages with the other parts of the world in building sustainable partnerships, with a view to forging better relationship in the form of strategic partnerships, not only with its traditional partners, but also with the emerging powers. The African Union and its Commission will remain the pivot and serve as levers and guarantors in the initiation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of these partnerships, in accordance with the guidelines and criteria laid down by the Policy Organs and as contained in the three reference documents. These partnerships must be based on solid and effective structures, built on the principle of equality and mutual respect and capable of promoting a win-win relation for all sides.

**Annex 1**



**DRAFT Rev 3**

**AFRICAN UNION (AU) OUTLINE FRAMEWORK FOR  
STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS**

## Draft African Union Outline Framework for Partnerships

### Background

1. At its meeting of 29<sup>th</sup> June 2015, in the Caucus Meeting Room 21 of the African Union Commission New Conference Complex, the Working Group of the Permanent Representative Committee Sub-Committee on Multilateral Cooperation (PRC-SCMC), under the Chairmanship of Egypt, requested the Commission to develop a template in the form of an outline framework for Partnership. The meeting agreed on the need to approach all engagements with the African Union Strategic Partnership in a more robust, purpose-driven and result-oriented manner. It recognized the need for the African Union to be self-oriented and proactive rather than being reactive in its engagements with Partners.

2. The resolve to adopt this dynamic approach stemmed from the need to deviate from the status quo that has maintained overtime, where the African Union Partners have been allowed the prerogative to develop concepts that guide relationships between both parties, that ordinarily should have been joint efforts, spelling out the areas of needs for both sides.

3. The strategy to adopt in engaging with Partners and developing frameworks for cooperation as well as determining areas of cooperation should be premised on the fact that Africa needs something from Partners and Partners need something from Africa. In that respect, time has come for Africa to first identify its needs and gaps that may exist which require the support of Partners, and then further identify the Partners that have such competences to assist.

### Rationale for the Development of the Outline Framework Document

4. The purpose of this Outline Framework document is to develop a template which will guide the African Union in engaging with its Strategic Partners and practically provide guidance on the baselines and approach that underpin the identification of areas of cooperation and development of working documents for the Partnerships, which the African Union is engaged in, taking into consideration what Africa wants to achieve in the next three to four years in accordance with the priorities stipulated in the AU Agenda 2063 First Ten Year Plan.

5. In undertaking this exercise, the following African Union reference documents were used, namely:

- (i) Constitutive Act of the African Union
- (ii) Decisions and Declarations of AU Policy Organs
- (iii) Agenda 2063 First Ten Years Plan: 2013-2023;
- (iv) African Union Commission Strategic Plan 2014-2017
- (v) Approved Budget Program for 2016.

In addition to these documents, a Report on the Evaluation of Africa's Strategic Partnerships has been provided to the Sub-Committee for its consideration.

6. The Partnerships Management and Coordination Division (PMCD) was also required to liaise with the various African Union Commission (AUC) technical Departments in order to collect their views as their involvement in the partnership process is critical.

7. A more detailed Outline Framework or prototype with the technical content that will highlight the core competencies, comparative and competitive advantages of Partners as well as the needs and gaps of the African Continent would be developed after receiving inputs from AUC technical Departments and after the process of evaluating the Strategic Partnerships has been completed and recommendations adopted. It is believed that this generic Outline Framework document will guide future development of all Strategic Partnerships documents, namely Declaration, Action Plan, etc.

### **Africa's Priority areas during First Ten-Year Plan of the AU Agenda 2063**

**Aspiration 1:** A Prosperous Africa Based on Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development.

8. *There are six goals under this aspiration: 1-7:*

- (1) A High Standard of Living, Quality of Life and Well Being for All;
- (2) Well Educated Citizens and Skills revolution underpinned by Science, Technology and Innovation;
- (3) Healthy and well-nourished citizens;
- (4) Transformed Economies and Jobs;
- (5) Modern Agriculture for increased productivity and production;
- (6) Blue/Ocean Economy for accelerated economic growth ;
- (7) Environmentally sustainable climate and resilient economies and communities;

**Aspiration 2:** An Integrated Continent, Politically united and based on the Ideals of Pan Africanism and Vision of African Renaissance

9. *There are three goals under this aspiration: 8 -10:*

- (8) United Africa (Federal or Confederate);
- (9) World Class Infrastructure criss-crosses Africa;
- (10) Decolonization;

**Aspiration 3:** An Africa of Good Governance, Democracy, Respect for Human Rights, Justice and the Rule of Law

10. *There are two goals under this aspiration: 11-12:*

- (11) Democratic values, practices, universal principles of human rights, justice and the rule of law entrenched;
- (12) Capable institutions and transformed leadership in place at all levels;

**Aspiration 4: A Peaceful and Secure Africa**

**11.** *There are three goals under this aspiration: 13 – 15:*

- (13) Peace Security and Stability is preserved;
- (14) A Stable and Peaceful Africa;
- (15) A Fully functional and operational APSA;

**Aspiration 5: Africa with a Strong Cultural Identity, Common Heritage, Values and Ethics.**

**12.** *There is only one goal under this aspiration: 16:*

- (16) African Cultural Renaissance is pre-eminent;

**Aspiration 6: An Africa Whose Development is people driven, especially relying on the potential offered by its Youth and Women**

**13.** *There are two goals under this aspiration: 17 -18:*

- (17) Full Gender Equality in All Spheres of Life;
- (18) Engaged and Empowered Youth and Children;

**Aspiration 7: Africa as a strong and influential global partner**

**14.** *There are two goals under this aspiration: 19 – 20:*

- (19) Africa as a major partner in global affairs and peaceful co-existence
- (20) Africa takes full responsibility for financing her development.

**Africa's Priority areas under Strategic Plan 2014-2017**

**15.** *The African Union Strategic Plan 2014-2017, centers around five pillars, namely:*

- (i) Peace and Security;
- (ii) Social, Economic & Human Development;
- (iii) Integration, Cooperation & partnerships;
- (iv) Shared Values; and
- (v) Institutions, Capacity Building and Communication.

**16.** These pillars have been designed to enable the African Union achieve the overall goal, namely: "Accelerate progress towards an integrated, prosperous and inclusive Africa, at peace with itself, playing a dynamic role in the continental and global arena, effectively driven by an accountable, efficient and responsive Commission".

**17.** These five pillars are already reflected in the Agenda 2063.



## **Africa's Priority areas as aligned with the Budget Programme**

**18.** Africa's priority areas as indicated in the approved yearly Budget of the African Union have been subsumed under the AU Strategic Plan, 2014-2017, and the First Ten-Year Plan of the AU Agenda 2063.

### **Involvement of stakeholders**

**19.** In order to ensure coherence and effectiveness, the need to involve all African Union Member States, AUC, Other AU Organs, NEPAD and Regional Economic Communities have been underscored.

### **Guiding Principles on Partnerships**

**20.** It is observed that some of the African Union Partners seek visibility and would readily accept to engage cooperation in various areas that may fall outside their core competencies. In that regard, Africa should focus its partnership with respective partners on specific areas, after conducting an assessment on the prospective Partners' abilities to engage in identified areas of cooperation. This will ensure that partners actively and effectively deliver on the agreed areas of cooperation.

**21.** Africa's needs have been identified and enumerated in the AU Agenda 2063, and further clustered into five implementation phases of which the First Ten-Year Plan has been adopted for implementation. Determination of areas of cooperation with Strategic Partners should therefore be aligned with what Africa wants and in line with the Aspirations of the First Ten-Year plan of the AU Agenda 2063.

**22.** Africa's priorities areas for implementing the 20 goals outlined under the aforementioned seven aspirations are as follows:

1. Incomes, Jobs and decent work
2. Poverty, Inequality and Hunger
3. Social security and protection Including Persons with Disabilities
4. Modern and Livable Habitats and Basic Quality Services
5. Education and STI skills driven revolution
6. Health and Nutrition
7. Sustainable and inclusive economic growth
8. STI driven Manufacturing / Industrialization and Value Addition
9. Economic diversification and resilience
10. Agricultural Productivity and Production
11. Marine resources and Energy
12. Ports Operations and Marine Transport
13. Sustainable natural resource management
14. Bio-diversity, conservation, genetic resources and eco-system,

15. Water Security Climate Resilience and Natural Disasters preparedness and prevention
16. Framework and Institutions for a United Africa
17. Financial Institutions
18. Financial and Monetary Institutions
19. Communications and Infrastructure Connectivity
20. Democracy and Good Governance
21. Human Rights, Justice and The Rule of Law
22. Institutions and Leadership
23. Participatory Development and Local Governance
24. Maintenance and Preservation of Peace and Security
25. Institutional structure for AU Instruments on Peace and Security
26. Fully operational and functional APSA Pillars
27. Values and Ideals of Pan Africanism
28. Cultural Values and African Renaissance
29. Cultural Heritage, Creative Arts and Businesses
30. Women and Girls Empowerment
31. Violence & Discrimination against Women and Girls
32. Youth Empowerment and Children
33. Africa's place in global affairs.
34. Partnership
35. African Capital market
36. Fiscal system and Public Sector Revenues
37. Development Assistance

**23.** In addition to the principles enshrined in the African Union Constitutive Act, there is a need to further identify guiding Principles that are expected to establish the platforms necessary to provide guidelines on the baselines and approach that underpin the identification of areas of cooperation, development of framework for cooperation and necessary working documents for the Partnerships that the African Union is engaged in. This outline framework document would act as a template for each Strategic Partnership, and will attempt to bring ownership, assertiveness and uniformity in the way Declarations, Framework for Cooperation and Action Plans are prepared.

**24.** Accordingly, the guiding principles on partnership will include:

*i) Strategic focus*

All documents to be developed in readiness for the Strategic engagements with Partners should provide insight into the African Union's strategic objectives, and how those objectives relate to the ability of Partners to give support; It should be able to create and sustain outcomes aimed at making better the lives of the African people, and elaborate on what Africa can offer in return both in terms of its resources, technical capacities, and so on.

*ii) Stakeholder inclusiveness*

All the identified areas of cooperation for consideration towards advancing the objectives of the Strategic Partnerships shall include the collective interest of all AU Member States, African Union Commission, other organs of the African Union NEPAD, and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) that readily includes the buy-in of Member States.

*iii) Conciseness and reliability*

Determination of areas of cooperation should not be ambiguous. It should be understandable and implementable. It should be specific and result-oriented.

*iv) Self-Reliance on Initiation of Concept and Funding*

Africa should strive to originate all documents relating to the identified areas of cooperation and be firm in negotiation of Africa's interest.

*v) Development of Strategic Partnerships Forum/Summit Declarations*

The development of Declarations for all Forum/Summit pronouncements should maintain a flow that is in sync with the identified areas of cooperation. It should be reader-friendly and precise. Representatives of both sides should endorse the Declaration so adopted, in order to preserve its authenticity.

*vi) Monitoring and Evaluation*

There would be a need to ensure that the parameters for monitoring and evaluation are put in place so that commitments are honoured.

All activities undertaken within the framework of the partnership should be conducted in the spirit of trust, equality, mutual respect, transparency and confidence building.

*vii) Future outlook*

There should be conscientious examination of the identified areas of cooperation with a view to ascertaining the opportunities that exist as well as challenges and uncertainties that may be encountered in the course of attempting to achieve the set objectives.

**A Matrix indicating the existing structured/formalized AU Strategic Partnerships; Current areas of Cooperation; Priority areas to focus and Justifications.**

(See attached table)

It is envisaged that this Matrix will guide the formulation of the African Union Program Budget.

### **Concluding Thoughts**

**25.** The draft Outline Framework document has been developed to ensure that proposals advanced for discussion and negotiations with African Union's Partners are self-oriented, demand-driven and strategically focused towards Africa's development and integration agenda, as expressed in the AU Agenda 2063. The new approach will enable understanding of the areas of cooperation with Partners, guarantee ownership of the agreed areas of cooperation and stimulate confidence during the process of negotiations and implementations.

**26.** While applying the merits of the proposed guidelines, it would be important to ensure that the agreed areas of cooperation at every given time would be limited in scope to enable delivery.

ANNEX 2

**Existing structured and formalized African Union Strategic Partnerships;  
Current Areas of Cooperation, Aspirations, Goals and Priority Areas to focus; and Justifications<sup>8</sup>**

Existing Strategic Partnerships			Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations, Goals and Priority Areas during the 1 <sup>st</sup> 10-year Plan of AU Agenda 2063				Justifications- Partners Capacity to support/Core Competencies	
Strategic Partners	Inception/ Important Date	Follow-Up Mechanisms	Current Areas of Cooperation	Areas currently active	Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas	Pillars		
Africa-EU  <i>AU M/S + Morocco</i>	2000, Cairo 2007, Lisbon 2010, Tripoli 2014, Brussels	Africa-European Union Summit (3 years) Ministerial College to College (C2C) Joint Annual Forum (JAF) Joint Experts Group (JEG)	Peace & Security Democracy, Good Governance & Human Rights Human Development Sustainable and Inclusive development & growth and continental integration Global and Emerging issues	Democracy, Good Governance & Human Rights  Sustainable and Inclusive development & growth and continental integration	(1) A prosperous Africa, based on inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development	(1) A High Standard of Living, Quality of Life and Well Being for All Citizens	1. Incomes, Jobs and decent work  2. Poverty, Inequality and Hunger  3. Social security and protection Including Persons with Disabilities  4. Modern and Liveable Habitats and Basic Quality Services	2. Social, Economic and Human Development	Also top EU MS: Germany, UK, France and Italy Could be useful in <i>Sustainable and Inclusive development &amp; growth and continental integration</i>	
					(2) Well educated citizens and skills revolution underpinned by Science, Technology and innovation					5. Education and STI skills driven revolution
					(4) Transformed Economies					7. Sustainable and inclusive economic growth

Existing Strategic Partnerships			Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations, Goals and Priority Areas during the 1 <sup>st</sup> 10-year Plan of AU Agenda 2063				Justifications- Partners Capacity to support/Core Competencies
Strategic Partners	Inception/ Important Date	Follow-Up Mechanisms	Current Areas of Cooperation	Areas currently active	Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas	Pillars	
							8.STI driven Manufacturing / Industrialization and Value Addition  9.Economic diversification and resilience		
					(3) An Africa of Good Governance, Democracy, Respect for Human Rights, Justice and the Rule of Law	( 11) Democratic values, practices Universal principles of Human Rights, Justice and the rule of law entrenched	(20) Democracy and Good Governance Human Rights,  (21) Justice and the Rule of Law	4. Shared values	EU generally could assist on Political matters.
Africa- South America  <i>AU M/S + Morocco</i>	2006, Abuja	Summit (3 years) Ministerial Snr. Off. Meeting	Cooperation in Multilateral Issues Cooperation to fight crime and other related matters Peace and Security Democracy, Governance, Human Rights and Political Issues Agriculture, Agri-business, Rural Development and Water Resources Economy, Trade, Investment and Tourism	None <i>for now</i>	1) A Prosperous Africa, based on Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development	(1) A High Standard of Living, Quality of Life and Well Being for All Citizens	1.Incomes, Jobs and decent work  2.Poverty, Inequality and Hunger  3.Social security and protection Including Persons with Disabilities  4.Modern and Liveable Habitats and Basic Quality Services	2. Social, Economic and Human Development	

Existing Strategic Partnerships			Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations, Goals and Priority Areas during the 1 <sup>st</sup> 10-year Plan of AU Agenda 2063				Justifications- Partners Capacity to support/Core Competencies
Strategic Partners	Inception/ Important Date	Follow-Up Mechanisms	Current Areas of Cooperation	Areas currently active	Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas	Pillars	
			Combating Poverty and Hunger Infrastructure development Energy and solid minerals Social issues and Sports Science, Technology and Informational and Communication Technologies Education and Cultural issues Environment Institutional development, Exchange of information and Shared Views on Appropriate Practices			(2) Well Educated Citizens and Skills revolution underpinned by Science, Technology and Innovation	5.Education and STI skills driven revolution		Brazil, Chile, have competences in Agriculture; Renewable Energy;
					5) Africa with a Strong Cultural Identity Common Heritage, Values and Ethics	16) African Cultural Renaissance is pre-eminent	27. Values and Ideals of Pan Africanism  28. Cultural Values and African Renaissance  29. Cultural Heritage, Creative Arts and Businesses	4. Shared values	The two continents share similar culture and could explore other great practices
Africa-Arab  AU M/S	1977, Cairo 2010, Tripoli 2013, Kuwait	Summit  Coordination Committee at Ministerial  Senior Officials level	Political Cooperation  Economic, Trade and Financial Cooperation  Cooperation in Agriculture and Food Security  Socio-cultural Cooperation	Cooperation in Agriculture and Food Security  Trade and Financial Cooperation	1) A Prosperous Africa, based on Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development	(1) A High Standard of Living, Quality of Life and Well Being for All Citizens	1.Incomes, Jobs and decent work  2.Poverty, Inequality and Hunger  3.Social security and protection Including Persons with Disabilities  4.Modern and Liveable Habitats	2. Social, Economic and Human Development	

Existing Strategic Partnerships			Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations, Goals and Priority Areas during the 1 <sup>st</sup> 10-year Plan of AU Agenda 2063				Justifications- Partners Capacity to support/Core Competencies
Strategic Partners	Inception/ Important Date	Follow-Up Mechanisms	Current Areas of Cooperation	Areas currently active	Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas	Pillars	
							and Basic Quality Services		
						(4) Transformed Economies	7. Sustainable and inclusive economic growth  8.STI driven Manufacturing / Industrialization and Value Addition  9. Economic diversification and resilience		Notwithstanding the widespread unrest in the region, countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt have continued to invest huge amounts in infrastructure in the face of the Suez Canal being expanded and encouraging more trade across borders.  Knowledge in Oil industry management could be shared
						5) Modern Agriculture for increased productivity and production	10. Agricultural Productivity and Production		Africa's Agricultural Developments could be bolstered through corporate and investment banking of the Arab World
					5) Africa with a Strong Cultural Identity Common Heritage, Values and Ethics	16) African Cultural Renaissance is pre-eminent	27.Values and Ideals of Pan Africanism  28.Cultural Values and African Renaissance  29.Cultural Heritage, Creative Arts and	4. Shared values	Informal close cooperation since time immemorial and nearly three decades of formal cooperation speak in favour of exchange in values and ideals;  Inter-relations where about 60% of Arab population and 10 out of 22 members of the LAS





Existing Strategic Partnerships			Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations, Goals and Priority Areas during the 1 <sup>st</sup> 10-year Plan of AU Agenda 2063				Justifications- Partners Capacity to support/Core Competencies
Strategic Partners	Inception/ Important Date	Follow-Up Mechanisms	Current Areas of Cooperation	Areas currently active	Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas	Pillars	
						(3) Healthy and well-nourished citizens	6. Health and Nutrition		India has attained a prominent global position in the Health and pharmaceutical sectors. And with a huge pool of scientists and engineers who have the potential to take revolutionize the industry. Indi could be of great assistance to Africa.
						(4) Transformed Economies	7. Sustainable and inclusive economic growth  8.STI driven Manufacturing / Industrialization and Value Addition  9 .Economic diversification and resilience		Science and technology/R&D is regarded as a strong instrument of Indian's growth and development. African could explore this opportunity
						(6) Goal 6: Blue/ ocean economy for accelerated economic growth	11. Marine resources and Energy  12. Ports Operations and Marine Transport		

Existing Strategic Partnerships			Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations, Goals and Priority Areas during the 1 <sup>st</sup> 10-year Plan of AU Agenda 2063				Justifications- Partners Capacity to support/Core Competencies	
Strategic Partners	Inception/ Important Date	Follow-Up Mechanisms	Current Areas of Cooperation	Areas currently active	Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas	Pillars		
Tokyo Int'l Conf. on Africa Dev. (TICAD) <sup>9</sup>  AU M/S + Morocco	1993, 1998, 2003, Tokyo  2008, 2013, Yokohama	<u>Follow up meetings</u>  Summit (3 yrs)  Annual Ministerial Meeting  Annual Snr. Off. Meeting  Joint Monitoring Committee Meeting  Joint Secretariat Meeting	The 3 Pillars  1. Robust and sustainable economy 2. Inclusive and resilient society, and 3. Peace and stability	Robust and sustainable economy  Inclusive and resilient society, and  Peace and stability	1) A Prosperous Africa, based on Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development	(1) A High Standard of Living, Quality of Life and Well Being for All Citizens	1. Incomes, Jobs and decent work  2. Poverty, Inequality and Hunger  3. Social security and protection Including Persons with Disabilities  4. Modern and Liveable Habitats and Basic Quality Services	2. Social, Economic and Human Development	<i>Get Japan to use its economic muscle to influence global policies in Africa's favour</i>   <i>On the other hand, the Union may construct a smart and coherent strategy to inform and guide Member States on their engagements with Japan- an economic giant, on at least how to add value to Africa's raw materials;</i>	
						(2) Well educated citizens and skills revolution underpinned by Science, Technology and innovation				5. Education and STI skills driven revolution
						(4) Transformed Economies				7. Sustainable and inclusive economic growth  8. STI driven Manufacturing / Industrialization and Value

<sup>9</sup> TICAD is different from other partnership. It is a framework agreement and there are other actors (co-organizers) in the process whose interest also needs to be reflected.

Existing Strategic Partnerships			Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations, Goals and Priority Areas during the 1 <sup>st</sup> 10-year Plan of AU Agenda 2063				Justifications- Partners Capacity to support/Core Competencies
Strategic Partners	Inception/ Important Date	Follow-Up Mechanisms	Current Areas of Cooperation	Areas currently active	Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas	Pillars	
							Addition 9.Economic diversification and resilience		
						(6) Blue/ ocean economy for accelerated economic growth	11. Marine resources and Energy 12. Ports Operations and Marine Transport		
						7) Environmentally sustainable climate and resilient economies and communities	13. Sustainable natural resource management 14. Bio-diversity, conservation, genetic resources and eco-system, 15. Water Security Climate Resilience and Natural Disasters preparedness and prevention	2. Social, Economic and Human Development	
						4) A Peaceful and Secure Africa	(13) Peace Security and Stability is preserved 24. Maintenance and Preservation of Peace and Security	1. Peace and Security	

Existing Strategic Partnerships			Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations, Goals and Priority Areas during the 1 <sup>st</sup> 10-year Plan of AU Agenda 2063				Justifications- Partners Capacity to support/Core Competencies
Strategic Partners	Inception/ Important Date	Follow-Up Mechanisms	Current Areas of Cooperation	Areas currently active	Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas	Pillars	
Forum for China-Africa Coop. (FOCAC)  <i>AU M/S + Morocco</i>	2000, Beijing 2003, Addis Ababa 2006, Beijing 2009, Sharm el-Sheikh 2012, Beijing	Ministerial Conference (3yrs)  Snr. Official Meeting	Development Cooperation  Trade and Investment  Peace and Security  Agriculture and Rural Development  International Cooperation  Public Health  Education and Vocational Training  Poverty Eradication and Sustainable Development	Development Cooperation Trade and Investment	1) A Prosperous Africa, based on Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development	(1) A High Standard of Living, Quality of Life and Well Being for All Citizens	1. Incomes, Jobs and decent work  2. Poverty, Inequality and Hunger  3. Social security and protection Including Persons with Disabilities  4. Modern and Liveable Habitats and Basic Quality Services	2. Social, Economic and Human Development	<p><i>China can also use its economic muscle to influence global policies in Africa's favour.</i></p> <p><i>On the other hand, the Union may construct a smart and coherent strategy to inform and guide Member States on their engagements with China- an economic giant, on at least how to add value to Africa's raw materials;</i></p>
						(2 ) Well educated citizens and skills revolution underpinned by Science, Technology and innovation	5. Education and STI skills driven revolution		
						(4) Transformed Economies	7. Sustainable and inclusive economic growth  8.STI driven Manufacturing / Industrialization and Value Addition  9. Economic diversification and resilience		



Existing Strategic Partnerships			Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations, Goals and Priority Areas during the 1 <sup>st</sup> 10-year Plan of AU Agenda 2063				Justifications- Partners Capacity to support/Core Competencies
Strategic Partners	Inception/ Important Date	Follow-Up Mechanisms	Current Areas of Cooperation	Areas currently active	Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas	Pillars	
						(4) Transformed Economies	7. Sustainable and inclusive economic growth  8. STI driven Manufacturing / Industrialization and Value Addition  9. Economic diversification and resilience		
Africa-Korea  Banjul Formula	2006, 2009, 2012, Seoul, Korea	The Africa-Korea Forum (every 3 years)  The Africa-Korea Partnership Senior Official Meeting (Every year)	Sustainable Development  Human Resource Development  Agricultural Development  Public Health Service  Green Growth and Climate Change  Trade, Investment and Economic Development  Peace and Security  Cross-Cutting	No outstanding areas of greater focus	1) A Prosperous Africa, based on Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development	(1) A High Standard of Living, Quality of Life and Well Being for All Citizens	1. Incomes, Jobs and decent work  2. Poverty, Inequality and Hunger  3. Social security and protection Including Persons with Disabilities  4. Modern and Liveable Habitats and Basic Quality Services  5. Education and STI skills driven revolution	2. Social, Economic and Human Development	South Korea ranks high amongst the most advanced automobile-producing countries in the world.

Existing Strategic Partnerships			Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations, Goals and Priority Areas during the 1 <sup>st</sup> 10-year Plan of AU Agenda 2063				Justifications- Partners Capacity to support/Core Competencies
Strategic Partners	Inception/ Important Date	Follow-Up Mechanisms	Current Areas of Cooperation	Areas currently active	Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas	Pillars	
			Cooperation			5) Modern Agriculture for increased productivity and production	10. Agricultural Productivity and Production		South Korea could share its experience in agricultural development on the “Korean Green Revolution”
						(6) Blue/ ocean economy for accelerated economic growth	11. Marine resources and Energy 12. Ports Operations and Marine Transport		
						(7) Environmentally sustainable climate and resilient economies and communities	13. Sustainable natural resource management 14. Bio-diversity, conservation, genetic resources and eco-system, 15. Water Security Climate Resilience and Natural Disasters preparedness and prevention		
Africa-US	2013, DC.2014 (African Leaders Summit) 2015, DC	1. Technical working groups chaired at Commissioner level (or designees). They meet at least once a year. 2. High Level	Peace and Security  Opportunity and Development (including youth, education, health and gender)	All areas are of critical importance.	1) A Prosperous Africa, based on Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development	(1) A High Standard of Living, Quality of Life and Well Being for All Citizens	1. Incomes, Jobs and decent work 2. Poverty, Inequality and Hunger 3. Social security and protection Including	2. Social, Economic and Human Development	US commands greater muscles to assist Africa in the identified areas



Existing Strategic Partnerships			Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations, Goals and Priority Areas during the 1 <sup>st</sup> 10-year Plan of AU Agenda 2063				Justifications- Partners Capacity to support/Core Competencies
Strategic Partners	Inception/ Important Date	Follow-Up Mechanisms	Current Areas of Cooperation	Areas currently active	Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas	Pillars	
		Dialogue chaired at the highest level (Chairperson and U.S. Secretary of State) meets once a year in April or June.	Economic Growth, Trade and Investment (including trade, investment, energy, and agriculture)				Persons with Disabilities 4. Modern and Liveable Habitats and Basic Quality Services		
			Democracy and Governance			(4) Transformed Economies	7. Sustainable and inclusive economic growth 8. STI driven Manufacturing / Industrialization and Value Addition 9. Economic diversification and resilience		
						(7) Environmentally sustainable climate and resilient economies and communities	13. Sustainable natural resource management 14. Bio-diversity, conservation, genetic resources and eco-system, 15. Water Security Climate Resilience and Natural Disasters preparedness and prevention	2. Social, Economic and Human Development	

Existing Strategic Partnerships			Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations, Goals and Priority Areas during the 1 <sup>st</sup> 10-year Plan of AU Agenda 2063				Justifications- Partners Capacity to support/Core Competencies
Strategic Partners	Inception/ Important Date	Follow-Up Mechanisms	Current Areas of Cooperation	Areas currently active	Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas	Pillars	
					3) An Africa of Good Governance, Democracy, Respect for Human Rights, Justice and the Rule of Law	(11) Democratic values, practices, universal principles of human rights, justice and the rule of law entrenched	20. Democracy and Good Governance 21 .Human Rights, Justice and The Rule of Law	4. Shared values	
					4) A Peaceful and Secure Africa	(13) Peace Security and Stability is preserved	24. Maintenance and Preservation of Peace and Security	1. Peace and Security	

Note:

This is a Reform Exercise aimed at ensuring that:

- 1) At all times, we should be able to account for the attainment reached on the goals and priorities areas outlined on the AU Agenda 2063 (1<sup>st</sup> Ten-Year Plan).
- 2) We determine which goals we spend more energy, time and money upon, and more importantly expose areas that are over-funded/under-funded.
- 3) Ultimately, we are informed and guided on where to direct our Partners attention for support
  - The content of this matrix will be an evolving one where further refinement and update would continue to ensue as studies on the potentials and comparative advantages/core competencies of each Partner would be embarked upon.
  - It is also proposed that the yearly programme budget be correlated and aligned in terms of allocations to the 37 priorities areas (this will assist for the No. 2) above). PMCD may have to coordinate an in-house taskforce to do this.
  - Cross cutting issues under Goal number, 17 and 18 will be applicable to all partners.
  - Aspiration 7, generally provides for Africa's resolve to take responsibility of its own destiny.

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2017

# REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON MULTILATERAL COOPERATION (SCMC) ON THE EVALUATION OF THE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS

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