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**ASSEMBLY OF THE UNION**  
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**Assembly/AU/12(XXV)**

**SIXTEENTH REPORT BY HIS EXCELLENCY DR. ERNEST BAI  
KOROMA, PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE AND  
COORDINATOR OF THE AFRICAN UNION COMMITTEE OF TEN  
HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT AFRICAN UNION COMMITTEE  
OF TEN (C- 10) ON UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL REFORM  
AND RELATED MATTERS**

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PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE AND COORDINATOR OF THE  
AFRICAN UNION COMMITTEE OF TEN HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT  
AFRICAN UNION COMMITTEE OF TEN (C- 10) ON UNITED NATIONS SECURITY  
COUNCIL REFORM AND RELATED MATTERS**

**I. Introduction**

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the African Union Summit Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.564 (XXIV) Doc. Assembly/AU/14(XXIV) during the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 30<sup>th</sup> – 31<sup>st</sup> January 2015.

2. The report covers the period 1<sup>st</sup> February-10<sup>th</sup> June 2015 and builds on the 15<sup>th</sup> Report of His Excellency Dr. Ernest Bai Koroma, President of the Republic of Sierra Leone and Coordinator of the African Union Committee of Ten Heads of State and Government (C-10) on United Nations Security Council Reform and related matters submitted at the African Union Summit held at Addis Ababa in January 2015.

3. Consistent with its mandate, the Committee of Ten Heads of State and Government intensified efforts in advocating, canvassing and promoting the Common African Position. The C-10 also intensified its efforts to reach out at the highest political levels to galvanize the necessary political will in support of the Common African Position on UN Security Council reform. The C-10 also continued to hold high level meetings outside the margins of the Summit of the African Union, with a view to further build on the gains made so far.

4. Since the last report submitted to the Twenty-Fourth Ordinary Session of the African Union Assembly on 30<sup>th</sup> January 2015, the Committee has continued to engage in the intergovernmental negotiations (IGN) in New York on the “***Question of equitable geographical representation on an increase in the membership of the United Nations Security Council and related matters***” with the view of achieving text-based negotiations which is a top priority of H.E. **Sam Kutesa**, President of the 69<sup>th</sup> session of the UN General Assembly.

5. The C-10 has also reached out to members of the Permanent Five members of the Security Council and to other interest groups including the L-69, comprising Brazil and India and about other forty Member States mostly with dual membership, the G-4 (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan) and CARICOM (fifteen member states). The C-10 has also held consultations with the President of the General Assembly and the Chair of the IGN while regularly liaising with the African Group.

6. The C-10 held a Summit hosted by the Republic of Zambia, co-chaired by the Coordinator, His Excellency **Dr. Ernest Bai Koroma**, President of the Republic of Sierra Leone and His Excellency **Mr. Edgar Chagwa Lungu**, President of the Republic of Zambia. The Summit was attended by all members of the Committee. His Excellency **Dr. Hage G. Geingob**, President of the Republic of Namibia and His Excellency **Mr. Ihmed Hamad Homa**, Deputy President of the State of Libya were among the Heads of State that attended the Summit.

7. These efforts by the C-10 have further advanced and promoted the core demands of the Common African Position encapsulated in the Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration. The Common African Position gained momentum with an appreciable degree of support as well as understanding among member states with no real or immediate challenge to its legitimacy.

8. Some Member States continue to bring to the attention of the C-10 the membership of and support given by some African countries to some other interest groups particularly the L-69. Other issues of note is the insistence by some member states that Africa should indicate its nominees for permanent seats and the resistance by some members to the extension of the veto to new permanent members.

9. Member states continue to hold onto divergent positions in terms of a reform model that could make the Security Council more democratically representative, transparent, effective, efficient and accountable. The major areas of divergence include expansion in both categories permanent and non-permanent, expansion in the non-permanent category only with longer term seats; the size of an expanded Security Council and its working methods; and the question of the veto. Progress on abridging the text will not therefore easily translate into bridging the continual divergence among Member States.

10. The present report deals with recent developments since February 2015 and consists of the following:

- a) the present state of play within the intergovernmental negotiations process which focuses mainly on the introduction of a new approach based on the Framework process with the objective of producing a concise negotiation text;
- b) Outreach with interest groups; and
- c) The C-10 Summit in Livingstone, Zambia.

## II. The intergovernmental negotiations process

11. Since the appointment of a new Chair, the intergovernmental negotiations continued to focus mainly on an approach to produce a text fit for negotiations as

proposed by H.E. Mr. Sam Kutesa, President of the 69<sup>th</sup> session of the General Assembly. To that end, three sessions of the intergovernmental negotiations in the informal plenary were held beginning with a preparatory meeting on 11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> February, 2015; an interactive session to introduce the Chair's Framework Document on 26<sup>th</sup> March 2015 and informal interactive dialogue sessions on 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> May 2015 to provide an opportunity for member states to explore the positions contained within the Framework Document.

**12.** At the preparatory meeting held on 11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> February 2015. H.E. Mr. Sam Kutesa reiterated the need for Member States to focus on text-based negotiations as a major objective with the view to producing a workable text for real negotiations.

**13.** A considerable number of member states including the C-10, the G-4, the CARICOM, the L-69, the Uniting for Consensus Group (UfC), three members of the P-5 and several other delegations also emphasized the need for text based negotiations to advance the process to the stage of real negotiations.

**14.** The G-4 (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan), as well as some member states noted the significance of 2015 as a landmark year for the United Nations marking 70 years of its establishment and ten years since the 2005 World Summit. It called for a concise text possibly in the form of a draft resolution to advance the process to real text-based negotiations.

**15.** The UfC expressed its openness to text based negotiations, with the stipulation that all proposals were given equal consideration. The UfC further expressed its preference for the second revision of the previous negotiation text. This support for the second revision of the negotiation text stems from the need to acknowledge the legitimacy of the only text that to date gathered the broad consensus from the membership.

**16.** The C-10 Permanent Representatives expressed support for the President of the General Assembly's objective to produce a text fit for real negotiations. The C-10 reiterated that the second revision of the negotiation text which accurately reflects the Common African Position enjoyed consensus. The C-10 further stated the need to define and agree on the principles and criteria before any merging or streamlining of the positions of members. The C-10 assured the Chair that it would engage in the process with cautious optimism.

**17.** Having listened to a range of constructive views from member states, the Chair closed the meeting with the remarks that he intended to use inputs from Member States to determine a path forward for the IGN. The Chair also noted the cautious approach suggested by some member states which calls for more interaction between and among interest groups in a friendly and informal atmosphere in order to create convergence. The call for text based negotiations by the majority of Member States was also recognized.

**18.** By a letter dated 27<sup>th</sup> February 2015, H.E. Mr. Courtenay Rattray, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Jamaica to the United Nations, and Chair of the IGN, called for an interactive briefing session on 26<sup>th</sup> March 2015 to outline his Framework upon which, he argued, a basis for negotiations could be built.

**19.** The Chair's Framework document was designed to reflect the various positions of the membership within a structured format based upon the five key issues contained in General Assembly Decision 62/557. In that connection, H.E. Mr. Sam Kutesa called upon Member States not to prejudge the approach or second-guess the content of a document that has not yet been presented for consideration.

**20.** The Chair's Framework approach involves several stages in the remaining months of the 69<sup>th</sup> session and is underpinned by two primary principles; firstly, it will be a member-centric process, and secondly, there will be certain points at which the Chair will need to use a form of "executive authority" to guide the process.

**21.** Member States were therefore assured that fidelity to General Assembly decision 62/557, as a consensus agreement will be upheld. The decision not only lays out the basis for the IGN but also represents the commitment of member states to seek a solution through negotiations.

**22.** If accepted, both the IGN Chair and the UN General Assembly President believed, the Framework could serve as a basis for member states to build a workable negotiation text that will represent the full range of views on the five key issues of the IGN's mandate.

**23.** Member states were given a period of three weeks to populate the Framework Document with their respective positions. The date for submissions to the populated Framework Document was 16<sup>th</sup> April 2015.

**24.** The C-10, expressed support for the Chair of the IGN to ignite and refocus the IGN process. It indicated that it would engage in the new approach with cautious optimism. In that regard, the C-10 submitted to the Chair of the IGN for inclusion into the Framework Document its comprehensive position on all the five key issues that it submitted earlier in December 2009 and which were faithfully reflected in the second revision of the negotiation text.

**25.** Approximately 115 Member States populated the Framework Document with their positions. The inputs received were collated and circulated by the Chair to Member States in their entirety on 5<sup>th</sup> May 2015.

**26.** Following the meeting of 26<sup>th</sup> March 2015 and the circulation of the framework document, the Arab Group, the UfC, China, the Russian Federation, Lao People's Democratic Republic, and the United States of America in separate letters transmitted

to the Chair expressed reservations about the current process, in particular, the Framework Document arguing that if it is not in conformity with the principles and Decision 62/557.

**27.** In response to some of the concerns and reservations, by letter dated 14<sup>th</sup> April 2015, the Chair sought to make clarifications on a range of issues including the process of reflecting submissions into the Framework document; the next steps; the inter-linkages between the five key issues; the governing principles that will underpin future negotiations; the mandate of the Chair; the status of the second and third revisions of the negotiation text; the terminology used by the Chair during his briefing on 26<sup>th</sup> March 2015 and the Chair's interpretation of the concepts of "widest possible political acceptance" and "general agreement".

**28.** By a letter dated 5<sup>th</sup> May 2015, the Chair circulated six letters submitted by Member States that were not in compliance with the format of the Framework document. The Member States included China, the Uniting for Consensus Group (UfC), Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Russian Federation, the United States of America and the Arab Group. This means that, the positions of these Member States were not included in the present Chair's compilation of the Framework document.

**29.** Following the circulation of the populated Framework document, a technical update to Member States positions was circulated on 13<sup>th</sup> May 2015 with the view to addressing any omissions or errors in the way Member States' positions were reflected.

**30.** On 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> May 2015, an informal interactive session was convened to provide an opportunity for Member States to explore the positions contained within the Framework Document.

**31.** This informal interactive dialogue session was intended to allow member states to further explore each other's positions with the aim of providing a greater sense of clarity to the range of positions and to identify any areas of convergence or overlap.

**32.** Many member states expressed support for the allocation of new permanent seats along the existing regional configuration. However, some including Colombia and Russia, pointed out that allocating new permanent seats to Western Europe would negate the principle of equitable geographical representation and equity. More specifically, they noted that allocating an additional permanent seat to Western Europe would mean three permanent members from the European Union and four of NATO states which would create greater imbalance that would be detrimental to the interests of developing countries.

**33.** CARICOM with a membership that overlaps with the L.69 continues to support the Common African Position contained in the Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration. CARICOM also seeks a cross-regional dedicated non-permanent seat for small island developing states.

**34.** The L-69 in response to questions about the transparency of its composition, undertook to provide a list of their members in writing. This list when officially provided by the L-69 will assist to determine the overlaps in membership.

**35.** Responding to questions on the Common African Position, the C-10 clarified that the African Union will nominate its candidates for the permanent seats when allocated. The C-10 noting that the Charter does not rule out regional representation, also clarified that rotating permanent seats are not part of the Common African Position. The C-10 refrained from providing details of how it envisages distributing the twenty-six seats it calls for in an expanded Security Council. It stressed on Africa's demand for two permanent seats and two additional non-permanent seats.

**36.** Different interpretations of regional representation seem to persist. The United States, the United Kingdom, France and some other member states do not subscribe to the idea of regional seats, arguing that the UN membership representation is based individual Member State and not region.

**37.** The UfC stressed that only the second revision of the existing negotiation text attracted consensus. The UfC was also of the view that the current approach of the IGN Chair is not sufficiently transparent. It also raised concerns about the "cascade effect" of new permanent seats with all the privileges that the P-5 currently enjoy. The UfC received questions about its composition and undertook to provide responses at a later date.

**38.** The G-4 position that new permanent members "shall not exercise the right of veto until a decision on the matter has been taken during a review" appears to assume that new permanent members will have the right but should voluntarily refrain from using it prior to a future review. The G-4 clarified that the veto would not be extended to new permanent members. This clarification by the G-4 provides a clear difference between the G-4 position and the Common African Position.

**39.** Permanent members (P-5) continued to insist that the Security Council should remain the master of its own rules of procedure without interference from the General Assembly. The issue of reform of working methods is considered by the P-5 to be the sole prerogative of the Security Council.

**40.** Some member states reiterated the preference for consensus as the means to achieving the desired objective of the reform process. The Charter provisions relating to the election of non-permanent members were considered by some Member States as applicable to the election of new permanent members. It is however, believed that Charter provisions of two thirds majority for reform that requires the concurrent vote of the P-5 and ratification by all Member States would require a consensus.

41. In closing, the Chair noted that significant overlap exists among the submissions in the compiled Framework Document. The Chair indicated that he would engage in consultations with Member States with the view to removing redundancies and merging of duplications which could shorten and improve the document.

42. This will be followed by a third phase of condensing the document to translate it into a true negotiation text. This text will still contain the totality of member states' positions, but it will be concise, workable and represent a solid foundation for negotiations.

43. The Chair informed the meeting that he will use a "form of executive action on behalf of all Members" in order to shape a concise and workable text. This will be done via extensive consultations with member states. The Chair, however, made it clear that his role in condensing the text does not negate his commitment to a Member-centric approach.

44. Some member states including some P-5 members, the Arab Group and the UfC continue to express reservations and concerns about the Chair's approach. The UfC, and some other member states had earlier questioned the source of the Chair's reference to an "executive authority" and emphasized their preference for the second revision of the negotiation text.

### **III. Outreach with interest groups on the Common African Position**

45. In line with the mandate of the African Union Summit, several outreach meetings and consultations were held by the C-10 at the Ministerial level with four of the five permanent members (China, France, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom). In New York, the C-10 had outreach meetings with some interest groups with the view to advancing the Common African position. In particular, following an expert level meeting, an Ambassadorial level meeting was held with the L-69, an Expert level meeting with the CARICOM, and a briefing of the African Group respectively on the Facilitator's framework document.

46. At the Ambassadorial Meeting between the C-10 and the L-69, the discussion was focused on how to reflect the emerging convergence between the Common African Position and the L-69 position in the Chair's framework document. This convergence is based on the L-69's clear and unequivocal support for the Common African Position as enunciated in the Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration. The main area of concern to the L-69 and the CARICOM is the demand for a dedicated non-permanent seat for the Small Island Developing States (SIDs). This reflects a difference in terms of the C-10's position of no less than 26 seats and the L-69's position of 27 seats.

47. The C-10 also continued to liaise with the African Group in New York through regular briefings and updates on the latest developments.



**IV. The Summit of the African Union Committee of Ten – Livingstone, Zambia  
9<sup>th</sup> – 10<sup>th</sup> May 2015**

**A. Objectives of the Summit**

**48.** The objectives of the Livingstone Consultative Summit were to enable the African Union Committee of Ten Heads of State and Government to:

- a) Consider reports of the C-10 Foreign Ministers on their consultations with the P-5 Member States relative to the African Common Position on the reform of the UN Security Council;
- b) Evaluate the status of the outreach of the Committee with the other interest groups with a view to achieving the best possible outcome of the Committee's mandate;
- c) Examine developments in the on-going Inter-Governmental Negotiations on the Security Council Reform process in the context of the convergences and nuances in the various positions;
- d) Map out strategies to further expand and intensify advancement of the African Common Position as we approach the 70<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the founding of the United Nations.

**49.** The Livingstone Consultative Summit, which was preceded by the meeting of Foreign Ministers and Permanent Representatives at the United Nations and the African Union, was the second of frank, critical and far-reaching consultations held by the Committee at the level of Heads of State, exclusively outside the margins of the Ordinary sessions of the Heads of State and Government of the African Union.

**B. State of affairs and key issues**

**50.** The Heads of State took note of the reports of the C-10 Foreign Ministers on their consultations with the Five Permanent Members (P-5) as was decided at the 24<sup>th</sup> Ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State as well as the Permanent Representative of the C-10, on the ongoing intergovernmental negotiations. The Heads of State and Government commended the C-10 Foreign Ministers and the Permanent Representative on their work and directed that the Ministers of Foreign Affairs present a comprehensive report of their consultations with the P-5 before the next summit of the Assembly.

**51.** The Heads of State noted the report of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and reiterated the inevitability of the reform to reflect the realities of our current geopolitical and economic environment. On this note they reaffirmed as follows:

- i) That Africa remains the only region in the world that is not represented in the Permanent category of the United Nations Security Council and this fact continues to be a travesty of the organization's avowed adherence to the fundamental principles of democratic, equity and fair play;
- ii) That Africa's under-representation and non-representation in the non-permanent and permanent categories of the Security Council respectively are inconsistent with the demand for the democratization of the international system, in particular, its inclusiveness, transparency, accountability and legitimacy;
- iii) That despite the fact that Africa makes substantial contributions to the work of the Security Council through its participation in funds, programmes and activities of the United Nations including in the agenda of the Security Council, the continent continues to be under-represented in the non-permanent category and not represented in the permanent category in this highest decision making Organ of the Organization on questions of international peace and security;
- iv) That based on consultations held thus far, the merit of regional representation and equity in the attribution of the membership and the corresponding rights and privileges of the permanent category are being unduly dismissed as integral components of the negotiating clusters of the reform process;
- v) That the Heads of State commended the efforts of H. E. Mr. Sam Kutesa, President of the 69<sup>th</sup> Session of the UN General Assembly and the appointment of H.E. Mr. Courtenay Rattray, Permanent Representative of Jamaica to the United Nations as the Chair of the on-going *Intergovernmental Negotiations on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Related Matters* with a view to injecting a renewed momentum and his commitment to move the process to text based negotiations;
- vi) That the African Common Position, as contained in the *Ezulwini Consensus* and *Sirte Declaration*, shall continue to serve as the only viable option that reflects Africa's legitimate right and aspiration to rectify, inter alia, the historical injustice endured by the Continent;
- vii) That it is time for the repeated proclamations and statements in support of Africa to be translated into concrete actions for the achievement of the African Common Position within the framework of the wider United Nations reform process and other interest groups;

- viii) That the negotiations of the Security Council reform have reached a critical stage requiring all members of the African Union to belong to a single negotiation group. All African Union Member States should fully and unequivocally support, defend and canvas the Common African Position at every forum and wherever the opportunity arises.

### **C. Conclusions and Key recommendations**

**52.** Following frank and open deliberations, the Heads of State and Government agreed that:

- i) The African Common Position as outlined in the Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration remains the only viable option for Africa and should continue to be the rallying point for Africa and the basis for garnering strong support from the various interest groups;
- ii) The Heads of State took note of the emerging consensus to move towards a meaningful text-based negotiations and urged the membership to move into text-based consultations, consistent with Decision 62/557 based on agreed principles and criteria;
- iii) Africa must reaffirm its strong commitment to the Common Position and emphasize the need for African Union Member States to continue to be fully united in purpose and to speak cohesively with one voice on all issues and aspects of the reform process, while rejecting any attempt at undermining the unity of the group in order to obtain the best outcome for the continent;
- iv) Africa should continue to engage in the Intergovernmental Negotiations process as the appropriate forum to discuss Security Council reform and ensure that the inclusiveness and integrity of the reform process as contained in General Assembly Decision 62/557 be preserved;
- v) The IGN be given enough space to further its work as a Member State-driven process and adhering to principles established by the UN General Assembly and seeking a package solution that accommodates the interests and concerns of all member states;
- vi) The Heads of State emphasized the need for a clear, more structured and streamlined African strategy for consultations and lobbying of other countries and groups. Such strategy should spell out deliverables and how to achieve collaboration through holding meetings between the C-10 Capitals and the Missions in Addis Ababa and New York to further deepen cooperation in the C-10's engagement and interaction with other interest groups;

- vii) Africa should continue to canvass the support of Member States with a view to correcting bias, injustice and inequity within the UN system, especially as it affects the continent and reject any piece-meal approach to the reform that contradicts the Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration;
- viii) The Committee continues to engage and consult outside the margins of the Summit following consultations by the Coordinator until Africa achieves its objective;
- ix) The need for Africa to continue to engage with all interest groups as well as countries that are not aligned with any interest group to further advance, advocate, canvass and promote the Common African Position. One of such outreach measures could be held at a Ministerial level with all interest groups to further build on and strengthen the basis of the Common African Position;
- x) That the African Union include an item on Security Council Reform in the Agenda of the closed-door Session during the next African Union Summit
- xi) The C-10 deepens its outreach and collaboration efforts with all like-minded groups that have fully endorsed the Common African position, notably the L-69 Group and CARICOM, with the objective of creating a strategic alliance to achieve true reform that guarantees Africa's rightful place in the UN Security Council; and
- xii) The Assembly decisions of the 23<sup>rd</sup> and 24<sup>th</sup> Ordinary sessions of the African Union<sup>1</sup> requesting the AU Commission to fund from the General Budget, the activities of the C-10 had not been implemented, the Heads of State agreed that the decisions be carried out as directed.

**53.** The Committee concluded by commending the Coordinator, His Excellency **Dr. Ernest Bai Koroma** for his strong leadership and commitment in spearheading the mandate of advancing the objectives of the Common African Position on the reform of the United Nations Security Council.

**54.** The C-10 further registered its sincere appreciation and gratitude to His Excellency Mr. Edgar Chagwa Lungu, President of the Republic of Zambia, the Government and People of the Republic of Zambia for hosting the second exclusive Summit of the Committee of Ten outside the margins of the Ordinary Summits of Heads of State and Government and for the warm hospitality accorded to the Committee during the Summit. The Summit also expressed appreciation to the Republic of Namibia for their offer to host the next meeting of the Committee of Ten.

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<sup>1</sup> Doc.Assembly/AU/Dec.537 (XXIII) and Doc. Assembly/AU14 (XXIV)

## V. Observations

**55.** The intergovernmental negotiations (IGN) continue to be the only acceptable forum for Member States to continue engaging on the question of “equitable geographical representation on and increase in the membership of the UN Security Council.

**56.** The outcome of interactive sessions within the framework of the intergovernmental negotiations as well as the state of the outreach with Member States by the C-10 indicates that the Common African Position continues to gain momentum.

**57.** Member States remain strongly attached to their respective positions. Some delegations, in particular those who are anxious to table a draft resolution as well as those against extending the veto to new permanent members, continue to insist that Africa is the key to progress and must be flexible while recognizing its legitimate demands. It is worth noting that these delegations have not demonstrated the flexibility that they call for.

**58.** The President of the General Assembly and the Chair of the IGN, have succeeded introducing a new approach in the form of a Framework document. This is however considered by some as a reversal within the context that positions submitted were the same to those reflected in both the second revision and updated third revision of the negotiation text.

**59.** The populated framework document provides a compilation of positions submitted by some Member States; it is clear evidence that positions have not significantly changed. The existing divergence on expansion models indicates that achieving a broadly acceptable framework resolution is still a major challenge. Narrowing down the areas of divergence between positions can only be achieved through continued dialogue and sustained political will.

**60.** The last two clusters namely, the working methods of the Security Council and the relationship between the General Assembly and Security Council are not as controversial as the categories of membership, question of the veto, regional representation and size of an enlarged Security Council. These three clusters continue to be points of contention and divergence between Member States. The submissions of many variations on the right of veto as well as on the working methods of the council indicate that these two issues are critical to the overall reform of the Security Council.

**61.** Some member states including the Arab Group, Uniting for Consensus (UfC), China, the Russian Federation and the United States of America have expressed considerable reservations to the Framework process, both in their recent written and oral statements. These groups and member states participate in the IGN meetings but declined the request of the IGN Chair to populate the Framework Document.

## VI. Conclusions and recommendations

**62.** The Common African Position remains the only viable option and continues to attract increasing support from various reform groups. Africa should continue to be unified in support of its common position and continue to speak cohesively with one voice on all issues and aspects of the reform process.

**63.** The need for the unity and cohesion on all aspects and phases of the reform process remains paramount to the objective of achieving the core demands of the Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration. Any perception of division within the African Group will undermine its core demands, delay the process, and provide the perfect opportunity for other interest groups to exploit the reform process to their own advantage.

**64.** The C-10 should continue to deepen its outreach and collaboration efforts with all Member States to further advance, advocate, canvass and promote the Common African Position which incorporates the core principles of the UN Charter of equity, inclusivity and a fairer world based on universalism. One of such outreach measures could be a stand-alone meeting at the Ministerial level with all interest groups.

**65.** The primary objective of these outreach measures should be to build greater demonstrable support for the Common African Position as well as to intensify the momentum to generate and sustain the necessary political will to achieve true and genuine reform that guarantees Africa's rightful place in the UN Security Council.

**65.** A potential division within the African Group created by a few but significant African countries who on the one hand are bound by the Common African Position; but on the other hand are members of the L-69 Group of Member States, two of whom subscribe to the G-4 proposal (Brazil and India), and canvassing support for it, regardless of the fact that it is visibly not compliant with the veto requirement of the Common African Position, is a threat to the cohesiveness and unity of the Group.

**66.** It is necessary that the IGN Chair incorporates in the preamble of any future compilation negotiation text, emanating from the submissions made to the framework document, the principles and criteria that will underpin the negotiation process. The IGN Chair listed his view of the principles, criteria and the membership driven nature of the process in his letter of 14<sup>th</sup> April 2015 to the Members States.

**67.** A concerted effort by all Member States is required to generate the necessary political will to reach a comprehensive solution on Security Council reform. Any piecemeal approach will be detrimental to the demands of the Common African Position, divide its membership and in the process, weaken the integrity of its core demands and potentially undermine the gains made so far.

**68.** The C-10 should continue to engage in the intergovernmental negotiations with the view to further promoting and advancing the Common African Position and building on the gains made so far. It should continue to support the Chair of the IGN's initiative of the Framework document with cautious optimism and make every effort to safeguard the substantive gains in the second revision of the pre-existing negotiation text.

**69.** The C-10 should continue to convene high-level meetings including outreach meetings outside the margins of the African Union summit to further garner and galvanize the necessary political will in support of the core demands of the Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration.

**70.** The African Union Commission should implement without further delay paragraph 9 of the Assembly's decision Assembly/AU/Dec.564 (XXIV) Doc. Assembly/AU/14(XXIV) to facilitate the work of the Committee of Ten Heads of State and Government on United Nations Security Council reform.

2015

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African Union

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