



ORGANIZATION OF
AFRICAN UNITY
Secretariat
P. O. Box 3243

منظمة الوحدة الأفريقية
السكرتاريه
ج. ب. ٣٢٤٣

ORGANIZATION DE L'UNITE
AFRICAIN
Secretariat
B. P. 3243

د. Addis Ababa د. Addis Ababa

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

DISTRIBUTION: LIMITED

CM/968(XXXIII)

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
Thirty-Third Ordinary Session
Monrovia, Liberia, July 1979

REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON DECOLONISATION



INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The Administrative Secretary-General has the honour to submit to the Thirty-Third Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers the progress Report on Decolonisation, from July 1978 to July 1979.

2. On Zimbabwe, the Report reviews the various aspects of the so-called All-party Conference and deals exhaustively with the development of the armed struggle as waged by the Patriotic Front. The lack of seriousness in tackling the problem of Zimbabwe from the part of Britain, the administering power and their ally, the United States is amply dealt with. With regard to the so-called referendum and elections, the Report, while exposing the background under which these exercises were held, reasserts the position of the OAU in so far as its future policy is concerned in the decolonisation of Zimbabwe.

3. In that part of the Report dealing with Namibia, the events which have prominently featured in the politics of the Territory namely the efforts made by the United Nations Organization to find a peaceful solution as well as the obstructionist exercises of the racist Pretoria regime are covered in depth. The intensification of the armed struggle by SWAPO, is mentioned in the present report as well as the proposed Namibia elections to be held under United Nations auspices, the major points of the report and recommendations of the United Nations Secretary-General on the role of the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) are also included in this report.

4. Besides, it must be pointed out that an important part of this report is devoted to the situation in South Africa particularly to the unacceptable policy of oppression and apartheid practised by the South African regime. The failure of the arms embargo and South Africa's continued accelerated militarisation and the boosting of its war machinery is discussed in the Report.

African nationalists are still pursuing their opposition, resistance and struggle both internally and externally; these efforts are reviewed in this document.

5. This report does not treat the situation in the Canary Archipelago because the Ad Hoc Committee established to study the case of the Canary Archipelago is still awaiting a positive reply from the Spanish authorities to visit the Archipelago on a fact finding mission.

6. The Sub-Committee on La Reunion met in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, in November 1978 and heard the communist Marxist Leninist Party of La Reunion during the Thirty-second Ordinary Session of the OAU Liberation Committee. Though the Liberation Committee had submitted its report to the Thirty-Second Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers, no definitive decision has as yet been taken to determine the status of La Reunion. It should be mentioned that the problem of the Canary Archipelago and the question of La Reunion are within the domain of the OAU Liberation Committee, it is therefore in the report of this organ that will be included the details on these issues.

ZIMBABWE

THE DEFUNCT "ALL-PARTY CONFERENCE"

7. The so-called "All-Party Conference" of which much noise has been made during the past two years is now a long-forgotten initiative. The Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe and the OAU as a whole have, time and again, reiterated several times their acceptance of the principle of holding an All-Party Conference on the basis of the Anglo-American proposals which were, since their inception, accepted as a basis for further discussion.

8. The two branches of the Patriotic Front stated clearly the views of their respective movements on the issue of an All-Party Conference to the British Government. While doing so they informed the administering Government that they were not prepared to sit in a conference which abandoned issues which, for the Patriotic Front, constituted fundamental principles.

9. President J. Nyerere, Chairman of the Frontline States, elaborating on the fundamental principles contained in the Anglo-American proposals also stated that the Frontline States would not support the holding of an All-Party Conference unless Smith accepted the major provisions of the same proposals. These were: the presence of a UN peacekeeping Force, the dismantling of the present interim administration in Salisbury, the handing-over of power to a new transnational administration and UN supervised elections. In the view of the Frontline States, to attend an All-Party Conference without these preconditions being fulfilled by Ian Smith would be to attend on Smith's conditions.

10. On the other hand Ian Smith and his three black traitors accepted to participate in an All-Party Conference without "pre-conditions". The cardinal piece in their position was, however, the March 3 internal settlement concluded among themselves and which was in turn to serve as a basis for any discussion as well as a principle to serve as a centrepiece for any agreement that would emerge thereof. The black members of the so-called Executive Council, particularly Bishop A. Muzorewa and the Reverend N. Sithole were inextricably adamant on this stance. For them, their political life was completely dependent on the internal settlement and to make even the slightest move away from the ill conceived principles of the internal settlement would be tantamount to political suicide. Their decision to participate in the internal settlement without "pre-conditions" was however conceived by the international community as a useless attempt to gain some diplomatic sympathy from which to lobby for the international recognition of their internal settlement.

11. The reality of the principle of the non-abandonment of the March 3 internal settlement, and the ability of Smith to manipulate at will his black colleagues was further demonstrated when he (Smith) got them all to renegotiate the March 3 Agreement with the result that majority rule scheduled originally for December 31, 1978, was to be supplanted by a government of national unity. As such and following the concept of power sharing, the white minority will have a constitutionally entrenched presence in all sectors of government including the Cabinet until 1984.

12. While still talking of the possibilities to take part in the now defunct All-Party Conference, the protagonists of the internal settlement have been putting in motion their political programme. A new draft constitution was published in December 1978 and ratified in March 1979. Referendum has been organised for the white minority and fake and illegal elections have been conducted in April 1979. The OAU has condemned these exercises and declared them as null and void. Fifty international observers from various organizations were in Rhodesia to witness the so-called elections. The OAU would give proof of vigilance for these observers may present reports favourable to internal settlement likely to receipt some countries to recognize the new Government of Salisbury.

Mr. Cledwyn Hughes' Mission to Southern Africa and Britain's
Stand on the "All-Party Conference"

13. Towards the end of November 1978, the British Prime Minister sent a personal emissary, in the person of the Hon. Cledwyn Hughes, to Southern Africa to investigate the possibilities of holding an All-Party Conference or proximity talks with a view to solving the Rhodesian debacle. His mission was to find answers to the following two questions:

a) Would all the parties to the Rhodesian conflict be prepared to attend a meeting to consider a negotiated settlement?

b) If so, would there be a reasonable chance of such a meeting producing a successful outcome?

14. Mr. Cledwyn Hughes met with Presidents of the Frontline States, the Head of State of Nigeria, the co-leader of the Patriotic Front, the Foreign Minister of racist South Africa and the so-called Executive Council in Salisbury. All along he was accompanied by President Carter's envoy Mr. Stephen Low, the United States Ambassador to Zambia. Conclusions of Mr. Hughes as submitted to the British Prime Minister were (abr):

a) That the parties to the conflict would attend such a meeting;

b) That the parties to the conflict would, however, bring to the meeting rigid and irreconcilable positions because each side believes in the ultimate success of the present policy it pursues. Consequently, their positions are too far apart for agreement;

c) That, therefore, such a conference would undoubtedly be a failure;

d) That such a failure could bring new pressures from Africa upon the British Government as well as encouraging intransigence and re-inforcing the belief of the ultimate success of the policies now being pursued by the parties in conflict;

e) That holding such a conference before or after 20 April (a date set by the so-called Executive Council for national elections) would depend upon many variables, among which are:

- (i) The attitude of South Africa, which at present is unwilling to exert pressure on Ian Smith and his cohorts.
 - (ii) The security situation; if it worsens, it might make the Salisbury regime amenable to flexibility. This could also strengthen the Patriotic Front's demands.
 - (iii) The complexion of the Government of National Unity after 20 April, 1979.
- f) That the British Government should remain alert to the opportunities which might arise to hold such a conference.

15. Following Mr. Hughes' mission, Mr. J. Callaghan, the British Prime Minister informed the British House of Commons on 17 January 1979 that he would abide by the conclusions of his emissary. He stated quote "My Right Hon. Friend gave me a full account of his findings on his return to London. I am most grateful for the way in which he had carried out this task, and I have given the most careful consideration to his conclusions. I have also discussed them with President Carter. My Right Hon. Friend's principal conclusion, which he reached with great regret, was that no good purpose would be served by convening a meeting of the parties to the conflict in the immediate future, since there would be virtually no likelihood of a successful outcome. I have decided that I must accept this advice" unquote.

16. It is astonishing as to how the British Government allotted squarely the faults for not being able to hold the All-party Conference to the Patriotic Front and the so-called Executive Council on the grounds that the parties to the conflict were intending to bring along irreconcilable positions should the conference take place. It remains a matter for the record that the Patriotic Front had accepted the Anglo-American proposals as a basis for discussion and that it had agreed to participate in the All-party Conference on the basis of the principles as contained in the proposals themselves.

17. On the contrary it was Smith and his quislings who had all along refused to accept the Anglo-American proposals and who have been frantically desirous to involve the element of their fictitious March 3 internal settlement to serve as a basis for discussion in an All-party Conference. It will serve no purpose to conceal Britain's impotence to dismantle the Salisbury sham agreement and bring the rebels to the conference table. The OAU has appraised the issue along these lines and it is because of these facts that its co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa has decided to recommend the consideration of the All-party Conference as a thing of the past and the continuation and intensification of the armed struggle as waged by the Patriotic Front.

THE WAR FRONT.

18. The intensification and extension of nationalist guerrillas inside the country gave a new dimension to the armed struggle and the war can no longer be considered as a hit and run strategy. ZANLA and ZIPRA the liberation armies of Zimbabwe are now strongly entrenched in an area no less than 80 percent of the country with tens of thousands of battle ready guerrillas in the Frontline states. Since 1975, the year the Patriotic Forces moved out of the border areas towards the hinterland, and by the

end of 1978 the districts under the effective control of the guerrillas were 39 out of 50. The remaining 11 districts, against which constant attacks have been waged are Salisbury, Bullawayo, Gweru, Umtali, Que Que, Fort Victoria, Gotooma, Hartley, Chamba and a couple ^{of} smaller districts.

19. One of the successful operations of the forces of the Patriotic Front was the attack on the oil depot. The regime lost up to three weeks' supply of much needed fuel in the blaze at its biggest fuel storage depot only three kilometres from the centre of Salisbury. Twenty-six tanks, about half of the entire complex has been burned out. This caused the Smith regime a loss of 20 million gallons worth no less than 20 million dollars without taking into account the damage incurred to the depot and its storage tanks.

20. Following this victorious operation, the rebel regime of Salisbury resorted to new and stricter security operations around all strategic installations. But with so many whites leaving the country, there may not be enough hands to keep the security checks working properly. Nor will the decision to call up young blacks have made impact. From a potential pool of between 40 to 50,000 blacks less than 2,000 or so have bothered to register.

21. Air Rhodesia having been declared an extension of the Rhodesian Air Force in that it was heavily involved in the transport of armaments and military personnel into the war front had to have its share of catastrophic incidents. On September 6, 1978, an Air Rhodesia Viscount was shot down by guerrillas of the Patriotic Front just after taking off from Kariba. The majority of the passengers and crew died when the aircraft crashed. Ten out of the eighteen survivors of the plane crash were later on murdered by Smith's troops, possibly by the 'Cobras' units, with the intention of alleging brutality on the part of the freedom fighters. While admitting the shooting down of the aircraft, the

Patriotic Front rejected promptly and categorically the notion that its guerrillas were responsible for the cold blooded murder of the white survivors.

22. A second Air Rhodesia Viscount was shot down on February 12, 1979. The aircraft has been airborne for a few minutes from the resort area of Kariba when it was struck by SAM missiles of the guerrillas of the Patriotic Front. The real target of the guerrillas may have been the Rhodesian Supreme Military Commander who was travelling on a second Viscount from Kariba and which left fifteen minutes after the first one.

23. For fear of falling a victim to such acts and acknowledging the intensification of the armed struggle as well as the striking capacity of the Patriotic Front, South Africa decided to terminate its flights to Salisbury and pleasure trips to Kariba thereby negating the Smith regime of its direct international access to and from Salisbury.

24. Ian Smith publicly admitted in December of 1978 that his forces were losing ground as well as losing battles against the Patriotic Front. In a last minute attempt to save the situation and following the establishment of Martial Law in almost 80 percent of the country, he secured the authorisation of his government to include in his programme of conscription, mobilization, whites between the ages of 50 and 59. In the same vein, Chief Chirau, Smith's political creation, visited London towards the end of 1978 to consult the British Government on the setting up of a peace conference between the so-called transitional government and the Patriotic Front. Before his departure Chief Chirau stated that the so-called transitional government should negotiate directly with the Patriotic Front and the Frontline states. Chirau's statement clearly indicated a loss of faith in the transitional government.

25. Economically, the war is costing the Smith regime about two million dollars a day in arms, transport, fuel and other accessories. By all accounts, Rhodesia is bankrupt and national income has fallen a second year running. That the regime's books are now showing is far from truth. The capital outlay is made up entirely of international capitalist loans and heavily mortgaged plant and machinery. Rhodesia, thanks to the immense financial assistance she is receiving from her step-mother, South Africa, has so far managed to survive. But for how long will this dependency continue?

WHITE EXODUS

26. As the war situation worsened from day to day, white Rhodesians continued to flee the country. The bulk of this run-aways constitute either those who could not condive Smith's policy to bring peace and stability through his so-called internal settlement or the dyehard racists who, viewing the increasing success of the Patriotic Front, fail to entertain the idea of their integration into a non-racial society as Africans and in an independent Zimbabwe.

27. 1978 registered the highest statistical data on white emigration. 18,069 whites left the country as against 4,360 arrivals. The net loss of 13,709 constitute the highest ever in the history of Rhodesia since UDI. However, the actual net loss should be higher than the one provided for in most cases those who leave the country without notifying the government are not registered in as much as those who normally stay behind after having left the country on vacation.

MERCENARIES

28. Mercenarism has become an honourable profession in the services of the rebel regime of Salisbury. To offset its manpower shortages in the armed forces, the Smith regime has been intensively recruiting dogs of war to come to its aid.

29. The "Morning Star" of the United Kingdom, in its issue of 10 August 1978 and quoting the Zimbabwe Review of ZANU (Patriotic Front) stated that there were more than 13,000 mercenaries fighting alongside Rhodesian troops. The paper, always quoting the Zimbabwe Review, stated that South Africa supplied the biggest number of 4,600 mercenaries whereas Portugal made 2,800 and the United States came with 2,300. Others were 1800 from France, 1055 from West Germany, 800 from Israel and 300 from Australia.

30. The Australian contention in that no mercenary of her nationality was in the services of the Smith regime, was defeated by the Rhodesian regime itself when it publicly stated that mercenaries recruited "at the current rate of pay and for the current terms" from Australia, Britain, the United States and several other western countries were fighting alongside the Rhodesian troops.

AGGRESSION AGAINST FRONTLINE STATES

31. During the period 1978/79 the rebel Rhodesian regime's acts of aggression continued and intensified against the Frontline States of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia. The insensitivity of the international opinion to these gastarilly attacks and the inadequate counter stroke and of African aid as regards these states contributed greatly in encouraging the Smith regime to aggress and attempt to intimidate them and destroy the base of the freedom fighters.

32. In October 1978, the Smith regime committed one of its several aggressions and attacked Chilumbi Refugee Camp twenty kilometers outside Lusaka. The Camp which was containing 1900 refugees was never used by the forces of the Patriotic Front for military activities or otherwise. The indiscriminate air bombardment, which lasted for just over thirty minutes claimed, at the end of its operation, 230 dead and well over 600 injured. From Chikumbi the Rhodesian aircrafts proceeded North and attacked Lunsemfwa Girl's Camp. Lunsemfwa was again a refugee centre where vocational training was imparted to young refugee girls from Rhodesia. The savage attack against these innocent girls caused death and loss of trace to more than half of its 1600 refugee population. Schools, health centres and other humanitarian amenities established in these camps were devastated and reduced to ash. Announcing the success of his piratical mission, rebel Smith warned that such raids against guerrilla camps in neighbouring states would continue and if need be increased and intensified. In April 1979, the commandoes of Smith's troops infiltrate into Lusaka and attacked in residence of Mr. J. Mphahlele. In fact, this act of piracy was intended to intimidate the Patriotic Front so as to discourage it in its clearly expressed will to sabotage the so called April elections.

33. Mozambique has been a permanent target for repeated Rhodesian aggression for the last two years. During this period the territory of the Peoples Republic of Mozambique has been constantly violated. All the bordering provinces of Mozambique with Rhodesia have been attacked continuously on the pretext of either pursuing guerrillas or to neutralize their training camps and military depots. All along, Mozambique refused to heed to these acts of intimidation and continued to pursue its firm commitment of rendering maximum

support to the Liberation Movements of Southern Africa. The heroic acts of the Mozambique Peoples Army, which has successfully been repulsing these acts of aggression as well as destroying a number of their aircrafts and helicopters is worthy of mention.

34. The Kuzungula Frontier Post of Botswana has, during this period, been the point of several clashes between the Botswana Forces and the Rhodesian army of aggression. Botswana has been recognised and appreciated greatly by the international community for her high ideals and principles to give protection to refugees from Rhodesia and South Africa. The granting of asylum to refugees from Rhodesia, on purely humanitarian grounds, was construed as a provocative act by the Smith regime and thus served as a pretext to commit these aggressions. Without giving due notice to these violations of her international borders, Botswana, with her limited defence capabilities, has withstood the aggression and confronted heroically Smith and his war machinery.

35. In a frantic attempt to follow the Rhodesian army, Smith attacked the Peoples Republic of Angola, for the first time, in March 1979. Aircrafts of the Mirage Fighter Bomber type having violated the Zambian airspace and following the line of the Benguela Railway flew low over the bombed area - the deepest ever in black Africa. On the completion of their savage mission the bombers caused extensive damage to property as well as killed 192 and injured more than 500 innocent people.

36. The OAU Council of Ministers meeting in its Thirty-second Ordinary Session in Nairobi, Kenya, was seized with the matter and after having heard a detailed exposé made by the Angolan delegation sent messages of solidarity to the Heads of State of the People's Republic of Angola and the other Frontline States. The Council further decided to dispatch its Chairman to both Angola and Zambia and to re-activate the works of the OAU Committee of Ten on Assistance to Frontline States.

37. On the request of the Council of Ministers, the African Group at the United Nations requested the convening of the Security Council to consider the Rhodesian aggression against Angola. At its Twenty-second meeting held on March 8, 1979, the Security Council having discussed the said aggression adopted resolution 445 (1979). The Security Council having expressed its grave concern over the indiscriminate military operations by the illegal regime and the extension of its premeditated and provocative acts of aggression not only against neighbouring independent countries, but also against non-contiguous states and re-affirming that the existence of the illegal regime of Rhodesia and the continuance of its acts of aggression against neighbouring independent states constitute a threat to international peace and security, strongly condemned the armed intervention of the racist regime against Angola, Mozambique and Zambia.

38. The Security Council re-affirming the inalienable right of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination and independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514(XV) of 14-December, 1960 and the legitimacy of their struggle to secure the enjoyment of such rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, commended the People's Republic of Angola, the People's Republic of Mozambique and the Republic of Zambia and other Frontline States for their support of the people of Zimbabwe in their just and legitimate struggle for the attainment of freedom and independence and for their scrupulous restraint in the face of serious provocations by the Rhodesian rebels.

SMITH AND HIS STOOGES VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES

39. In violation of Security Council resolution of 1968, the United States granted entry visas to rebel Ian Smith and his black stooges. The Security Council resolution having condemned the regime established in Salisbury had urged member states of the United Nations to refuse entry to Rhodesians supporting or making part of the illegal Rhodesian government. The apparent invitation extended to the rebels of Salisbury by a group of American Senators was a mere cover up and once they set their foot in the American soil they were pampered by state hospitality and granted facilities to promote their evil schemes for the purposes of attaining an international recognition for their internal settlement.

40. Smith and Sithole addressed a meeting of the National Press Club which was simultaneously broadcast on more than 200 stations across the United States and extensively covered by all national television networks. This, indeed was part of the nationwide campaign promoted by sympathisers of the racist regime to secure enough support for the moves, which at the time were being prepared at the United States Congress, to lift sanctions from Rhodesia.

41. The fact that Smith was received by Mr. C. Vance, the Secretary of State of the United States was significant. Immediately after, and rightfully, Mr. Robert Mugabe, Co-leader of the Patriotic Front stated that the United States should be ruled out of the Anglo-American exercises. For by so doing, the United States, not only violated the Security Council resolution but also took a clear cut side in favour of Smith and his stooges in the Rhodesian debacle.

CONCLUSION

42. Early in September 1978 rebel Smith admitted that Rhodesia, under the so-called transitional administration created through the instruments of the March 3, 1978 internal settlement, was living through its gravest hour. In submission of alternatives, Smith presented three options to his Rhodesia Front Party. They were:-

- a) To continue as before;
- b) To continue as before but try to encourage black nationalist leaders outside the country to return; or
- c) To collapse and surrender to the Patriotic Front.

It was obvious that Smith and his so-called transitional administration had opted option (b) provided the outside leaders undertook not to promote violence.

43. Ever since the March 3, 1978 internal settlement, Smith's secret plan was to secure ceasefire at any cost. The genuine intention of transferring power to the black majority was never conceived through the March 3 agreement or otherwise. This has been clearly affirmed by Smith himself when he stated, as far back as July 1978, that it was now up to the black members of the transitional government to "deliver the goods" i.e. a ceasefire. Smith confirmed then that it was not possible for the internal settlement to function without securing ceasefire and blamed the African members of the so-called Executive Council for failing to secure the much needed ceasefire.

44. This in itself was a clear indication that the black traitors in the so-called transitional administration were made partly the March 3, 1978 agreement to serve as mere stooges and as instruments to oppress the people of Zimbabwe.

N A M I B I ASWAPO PROPOSALS IN THE NAMIBIAN DISPUTE AND SOUTHREACTIONS

45. In July 1978, SWAPO of Namibia submitted a comprehensive document outlining its reactions to the inconclusive talks so far undertaken between the Contact Group (Britain, France, Canada, West Germany and the United States) and racist South Africa and stating its proposals to solve the Namibian dispute. SWAPO having expressed its concern over the then reached agreement emphasized on the following conditions to serve as a basis for the attainment of a genuine independence.

- a) South Africa to announce publicly that she will fully respect and observe the territorial integrity of Namibia,
- b) South Africa to make a public undertaking to withdraw all her armed forces before elections could be held,
- c) South Africa to accept, without any reservation, the principle of free elections in Namibia based on universal adult suffrage,
- d) South Africa to state her acceptance of complete and unconditional independence for Namibia and to undertake not to do anything that will impede the progress or complicate the road to genuine independence.
- e) South Africa to commit herself to safeguard all public property of Namibia including Namibia's treasury and reserves so that the same will be handed over to an independent Namibia; and

- f) South Africa to commit herself publicly to respect the sovereignty of independent Namibia and to undertake not to do anything that will undermine or degrade from such sovereignty.

46. It is worthwhile to note that the set of conditions submitted by SWAPO were addressed to South Africa solely. This was not accidental. The stubbornness of South Africa constitute the principal obstacle to the attainment of a genuine independence by the people of Namibia. Since then SWAPO has gone a long way to modify its conditions and accommodate those put forward by the contact group. SWAPO has even gone to the extent of accepting the presence of a limited number of South African troops during the transitional period.

47. So far racist South Africa has refused to consider and accept Namibia as a unitary and indivisible state. Her far fetched thesis whereby Walvis Bay is to be considered as a separate entity and making part of racist South Africa still persists. Although the United Nations Security Council has now come up with a resolution affirming SWAPO's position with regard to Walvis Bay, South Africa has not yet ceased her sinister activities in promoting her policy of balkanization in Namibia.

48. The question of the withdrawal of the troops to facilitate the holding of fair and democratic elections preceding a genuine independence has been the cardinal point around which the racist regime of South Africa has been revolving to frustrate the efforts of the United Nations in the implementation of its decisions and programmes. During the course of the past two years, South Africa has been increasing her combat troops and para-military forces thereby bringing her military presence in the territory to an all time highest level. Toward the end of 1978, South African troops, already at the level of more than 50,000 were bolstered by the stationing of additional regimental units in the Ovambo area. This was done in the pretext of safeguarding and protection of the fake elections which were held in December 1978.

FAKE ELECTIONS HELD FROM DECEMBER 4 - 8, 1978

49. On September 20, 1978 racist South Africa formally announced that it would ultimately not co-operate with the United Nations plan for elections in Namibia and that it would go ahead with its own elections on December 4 - 8, 1978. This decision was to lead to the imposition of a "constituent assembly" to the under the services of Pretoria in promoting South Africa's policies for Namibia in the form of the Turnhalle Constitution. The racist South African Prime Minister had made this clear in Pretoria in an interview of October 19, 1978, when he stated that South African Government had the final say in the affairs of Namibia.

50. Against this background the Security Council met on November 13, 1978, to discuss the decision of South Africa to unilaterally elections in Namibia and to find ways and means of stopping them. The Council reaffirming the legal responsibilities of the United Nations over Namibia and its continued commitment to the implementation of its resolution 335(1976), in particular, the holding of free elections in Namibia under United Nations supervision and control and expressing its grave concern at the decision of South Africa to proceed with unilateral elections in Namibia in clear contravention of its resolutions 335(1976) and 435(1978), condemned the decision of South Africa.

51. South Africa, in an arrogant manner of flouting with the United Nations decision, decided to put aside the Security Council resolution and proceeded with the organization of her fake elections. As it was well known the useless exercises of elections were designed to give an overwhelming victory to the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) - a product of the Pretoria regime. But, with the approach of December 1978 tension in Namibia mounted. With SWAPO and the Namibia National Front boycotting the 'elections', only the DTA and other racist parties to the right of it participated. The spectacle of the lavish DTA electioneering rallies were clear indication of the amount of funds Pretoria was prepared to spend to ensure the continuation of its racist policies in Namibia.

52. However it was not only money that the South African regime used to ensure its continued influence in Namibia. The harassment and victimisation of peaceful people and raids of workers' living quarters by military and police forces grew. Intimidation of workers by their employers into registering for the 'elections' caused thousands to flee the country. Arrests of SWAPO members or sympathisers of whoever questioned the procedure of the 'elections' became widespread. In reaction to these arrests SWAPO supporters held a rally in Katutura in the middle of the 'election' period and while denouncing it decided to campaign for its boycott.

53. The procedure for polling, laid out in the so called Proclamation of September 20, 1978, underscored the total lack of credibility that the 'elections' were to have. During the five days of voting some four hundred mobile polling booths were used no doubt accompanied by the threatening presence of the South African police and military units. Likewise there was plenty of leeways for manipulation in the provisions made for voting by the sixty per cent illiterates of Namibia. In this case South African polling officers under the supervision of DTA party members were voting on their behalf. Besides, names of a number of dead people appeared on the voters role and the DTA leaders and organisers who served as Registration Officers moreover boosted up their "membership" by obtaining names from graveyards.

54. The Organisation of African Unity denounced vehemently the 'elections' and called on the United Nations Security Council to exercise its authority and impose forthwith mandatory sanctions against racist South Africa under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. The OAU rejecting a priori any results of the so-called elections reiterated its previous stand on the issue, in that the only acceptable solution to the Namibian independence problem was elections under the UN supervision so that all the people of Namibia could exercise their right to choose their leaders freely without hinderance, intimidation and without any rigging.

THE WAR FRONT

55. SWAPO, the sole and legitimate representative of the Namibian people developed its guerrilla activities. During the year 1978/79 the racist troops of occupation have been

under constant fire and harassment by the freedom fighters of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN), the military wing of SWAPO. In all the major operations carried out by SWAPO, the racist forces suffered heavily in both men and equipment. By and large, the intensification of the armed struggle under the leadership of SWAPO constituted the determining factor to pressurize both South Africa and the Western powers to accept the reality and seek a peaceful transition to independence. SWAPO's war, being a people's war is bound to win and the essence of this war has now become a reality as against the mythical conception that it has been entertaining a couple of years ago.

56. Large areas of Namibia, particularly in the Northern part of the country, are now either under the effective control of SWAPO or a haven for constant infiltration and attack by the guerrillas of PLAN. The mobility and potentiality to effect deadly incursions have greatly increased in as much as its manpower requirements both in the administrative, humanitarian and military aspects of the guerrilla fighting. In response to the determination of SWAPO to bring about a genuine independence to the territory, the oppressed masses of Namibia have been swelling the rank and file of its organization as well as participate actively in collaborating with SWAPO's operations inside the territory.

57. During the period under review SWAPO conducted hundreds of successful operations. During these operations innumerable racist forces have been wiped out along with the destruction of military bases, combat vehicles and helicopters and the seizing of large quantities of arms and equipments. During the period the fake elections were

conducted, SWAPO guerrillas, in pursuit of their usual operations, intercepted racist troops activities of intimidation and forceful registration of voters. Though the majority of these clashes were reported to have taken place in the Northern part of Namibia a similar activity had taken place across the breadth and width of the entire territory.

58. Towards the late of August 1978, SWAPO guerrillas, attacked the military camps in Katima Mulilo in Eastern Caprivi. Following this exemplary attack, the military camps were totally demolished along with over a hundred dead and several more injured. During this attack a sizeable amount of war machinery was either destroyed or captured. Four helicopters and a number of military combat vehicles were destroyed. Towards mid February of 1979, SWAPO conducted another successful attack against the military base of Nkongo in the Northern part of Namibia. The attack, which was later confirmed by the racist regime of Pretoria, was as devastating as the numerous combat operations of SWAPO during 1978/79 and left behind a number of South African dead and war machineries destroyed.

SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERNAL REPRESSION AND EXTERNAL AGGRESSION

59. As a retaliation to their losses in the battlefield and to entrench firmly their grip over Namibia, the racists of Pretoria intensified their acts of suppression in the entire territory. This was characterized by mass deportations, arrests, murders and aggression against the Frontline States, especially Angola and Zambia. Ever since the efforts of the Five Western Powers initiated, these acts have continued to increase to the contempt and disregard of the international community.

60. South Africa's suppression reached its peak before and during the so-called elections of December 1978. As it is stated in earlier paragraphs, South Africa let loose its means of oppression against SWAPO members inside Namibia and all other opponents of the racist regime. Wide spread arrests, intimidation and murders were executed unabated. Though the intention was to protect the proceedings of the so-called elections, the real objective was to annihilate and break once and for all SWAPO and through it the genuine aspiration of the Namibian people for independence. For racist South Africa it was construed as a unique opportunity to pave the way for the installation of a puppet and client government in Namibia. South Africa is perfectly aware of the fact that no government will be installed in Namibia as long as SWAPO remains alive and in the services of the masses of Namibia.

61. Early in May, 1978 South Africa launched a military attack across the Namibia - Angola border, striking what it claimed to be a major base of the People's Liberation Army of Namibia in Kassinga 150 miles inside Angola. Kassinga was a refugee settlement holding, at the time of the attack, about 5,000 refugees consisting mostly of women, children and old people. The centre contained clinics, a sewing factory and some maintenance workshop.

62. Following this savage attack it was established that the racists had murdered over 300 persons and injured much more including innocent refugees. The barbarous act was initially committed by air bombardments followed by troops invasion of the refugee camp and cold blood murder of

unarmed and innocent refugees. This savage act was confirmed by independent sources and was ascertained that it was making part of South Africa's global strategy in Namibia. The Security Council meeting at an emergency session unanimously condemned South Africa for the raid and calling for an immediate withdrawal of troops from Angola, decided to meet again to adopt more effective measures as provided under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The resolution was to no avail to those innocent refugees who lay dead and injured, for by then racist South Africa had withdrawn her forces defining her aggression as "successful" and the matter was closed as far as the UN was concerned.

63. " Zambia was another victim of continuous acts of aggression from the part of racist South Africa. Her frontiers along the Caprivi Strip have been the subject of continued aggression. In the month of August 1978 alone, South Africa waged an all out invasion through the Caprivi Strip making use of fighter bombers and armoured personnel carriers. During that particular invasion the racist troops occupied, though temporarily, a part of Zambian territory and then withdrew after having killed more than a dozen innocent civilians and damaged property.

64. " The purposes of attacking both Angola and Zambia is not only directed against the bases of SWAPO with the view to neutralizing its activities and its very being but also to cow down both of these Frontline States from their firm commitment to support Liberation Movements in Southern Africa. It is now an established fact that this attempt has failed for both Angola and Zambia have demonstrated that their commitment remains unshakable even if it is at the great cost of sacrifices in human lives and in property.

UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL ASSISTANCE GROUP (UNTAG)

65. The Security Council at its meeting of 27 July 1978 adopted resolution 431 (1978) on the question of Namibia. By that resolution, the Council, recalling its resolution 385 (1976) of 30 January 1976, requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to appoint a Special Representative for Namibia in order to ensure the early independence of Namibia through free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations. The Council further requested him to submit at the earliest possible date a report containing his recommendations for the implementation of the proposal in accordance with Security Council resolution 385 (1976).

66. In implementation of this resolution, the Secretary-General appointed Mr. Martti Ahtisaari, the United Nations Commissioner for Namibia to serve as his Special Representative. Following his appointment, the Special Representative visited Namibia from 6 to 22 August to consult extensively with representatives of political parties, local authorities, military and police commanders, churches, business community and individuals for the purpose of carrying out a survey of all matters relative to the implementation of resolution 431 (1978). On the basis of the survey mission, the Secretary-General submitted his report to the Security Council on 29 August 1978.

67. In his report, the Secretary-General emphasized the need for the establishment of a United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in the territory consisting of a civilian component and a military component to serve under

the overall direction and command of the Special Representative. The deployment of these components of UNTAG was to take into account the specific geographic, demographic, economic and social conditions prevailing in Namibia. These included, in particular, the vast distances and varied nature of topography and vegetation, the broad range of climatic conditions, the scarcity of water, the population distribution and existing communication network and the distribution and concentration of ethnic groups. Given the above mentioned factors, the UN Secretary-General pointed out to the need for sizeable resources, both military and civilian which would be required for the United Nations to accomplish its task effectively.

68. In his report the Secretary-General stated that in order for the military component of UNTAG to fulfil its responsibilities effectively, there should be the need of seven infantry battalions, totalling approximately 5,000 with 200 additional monitors and an element for the purposes of communications, logistic and air support totalling approximately 2,300. The Functions of the military component of UNTAG will be:-

- a) Monitoring the cessation of hostile acts by all parties, the restriction of South African and SWAPO forces to base, the phased withdrawal of all except the specified number of South African forces and the restriction of the remainder to specified locations;

- b) Prevention of infiltration as well as surveillance of the borders of the Territory; and
- c) Monitoring the demobilization of citizen forces, commando and ethnic forces and the dismantling of their command structure.

69. Taking into account the geographical conditions of the territory, the Secretary-General proposed the stationing of about 300 civilian officers as well as the necessary supporting staff for the initial period and until the cessation of hostile acts. This number of the civilian component would be augmented to include another 1,000 civilian officers and 200 field and general service staff to assist during the period of electoral campaign and polling of votes. According to the Secretary-General's report the first part of the civilian component of UNTAG will have the following tasks:-

- a) Supervising and controlling all aspects of the electoral process, considering the fairness and appropriateness of the electoral procedures, monitoring the balloting and the counting of votes, in order to ensure that all procedures are strictly complied with, and receiving and investigating complaints of fraud or challenges relating to the electoral process;
- b) Advising the Special Representative as to the repeal of discriminating or restrictive laws, regulations or administrative measures which may inhibit the objective of free and fair elections;

- c) Ensuring or investigating complaints of, intimidation, coercion or restrictions on freedom of speech, movement or peaceful political assembly which may impede the objective of free and fair elections;
- d) Assisting in the arrangements for the release of all Namibian political prisoners or detainees and for the peaceful, voluntary return of Namibian refugees or Namibians detained or otherwise outside the Territory; and
- e) Assisting in any arrangements which may be proposed by the Special Representative to the Administrator-General and implemented by the Administrator-General to the Special Representative's satisfaction intended to inform or instruct the electorate as to the significance of the election and the procedures for voting.

70. According to the Secretary-General's report, the second part of the civilian component will be the civil police. This unit which will be composed of approximately 360 experienced police officers will have the duties of taking measures against any intimidation or interference with the electoral process from whatever quarter, accompanying the existing police forces, when appropriate, in the discharge of their duties and assisting in the realization of the function to be discharged by the administrator-General to the satisfaction of the Special Representative of ensuring the good conduct of the existing police forces.

71. The Security Council met on 29 September 1978 to discuss the report of the Secretary-General which was submitted pursuant

to the Security Council Resolution 431 (1978). The meeting, which was attended by Benin, Botswana, Sudan, Zambia, the United Nations Council for Namibia, the United Nations Committee of 24, the Administrative Secretary-General of the ONU and the President of SWAPO discussed the report of the UN Secretary-General dealing with the various aspects and proposals for the effective functioning of UNTAG in its task of assisting Namibia accede in to independence in peace and harmony. During its debate a draft resolution in support of the Secretary-General's recommendation was adopted as Resolution 435 (1978).

72. Racist South Africa tabled a battery of objections on the Secretary-General's report and its adoption by the Security Council particularly with regard to the composition of UNTAG. Once her objections were not entertained by the Five Western Powers, South Africa decided to co-operate and ensure the speedy implementation of resolution 435 (1978) with a set of provisos as preconditions. These were:-

- a) No reduction of South African troops until cessation of hostilities;
- b) Date for elections to be established and should not be later than September 30, 1979;
- c) Consultations leading to satisfactory results should be held on the size and composition of the military component of UNTAG;
- d) Existing Police Force to remain responsible.

for the maintenance of law and order; and

- e) The Administrator-General to exercise legislative and administrative authority in South-West Africa during transitional period until independence.

73. Given the fact that these preconditions were not entertained by the international community and in a last minute attempt to frustrate the United Nations plan for Namibia, the South African regime has now started introducing new elements with regard to the monitoring system during the pre-election period. In so far as the Secretary-General's recommendations are concerned, the UN forces of UNTAG are to monitor South African and SWAPO bases in the territory. The question of monitoring of SWAPO bases in the neighbouring states was left to the sovereign states themselves and to which maximum assurances have been given to the Secretary-General by the states themselves. However, the Five Powers have now resorted to the idea of introducing an electronic system for monitoring overall troop movements. Nevertheless, South Africa is, once again, contemplating to refuse the introduction of this system too.

CONCLUSION

74. During the period under review, SWAPO and the OAU scored a monumental political victory as far as the indivisibility and territorial integrity of Namibia was concerned. The long standing contention of the Pretoria regime in that Walvis Bay has never been part and parcel of Namibia was rebuked by the international community. To this effect, the Security Council in July 24, 1978 recalling its past resolutions on the territory

and reaffirming, in particular, the provisions of Security Council resolution 385(1976) relating to the territorial integrity of Namibia, declared that the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia must be assured through the reintegration of Walvis Bay within its territory. The Security Council also decided to lend its full support to the initiation of steps necessary to ensure early reintegration of Walvis Bay into Namibia.

75. However, and in the face of racist South Africa's intransigence and taking into account the racist regime's vital economic, political and strategic interests, much remains to be done. The OAU should not be under any illusion that South Africa wants to withdraw her illegal administration from the international territory of Namibia. If at all, she will do so after having been made sure that a puppet and unrepresentative regime is established in Windhoek to guarantee her the territory's administration by proxy.

76. During the last session of the Council of Ministers and following the debate on Namibia and the appeal extended to it by the President of SWAPO a number of African countries have expressed their wishes to participate in UNTAG. The act should be construed as a positive step and more Member States should be encouraged to heed to the appeal, for by so doing the OAU will demonstrate its faith and confidence in the United Nations plan for Namibia.

SOUTH AFRICASOUTH AFRICA'S POLICY OF REPRESSION

77. During the period under review, the racist regime of South Africa continued with its policy of repression, persecution, intimidation and murder. To a large extent, it intensified this policy of repression, by which it tends to guarantee its existence through the strict exercise of the inhuman policy of apartheid to which thousands of innocent people from South Africa are subjected. These innocent people are serving long prison terms under the Terrorism and Suppression of Communism Act. They are people with no recourse to the courts, no right of access to their legal advisors and with no rights to receive visits from either family or friends. The public or families concerned have, in most cases, no right to be informed about who has been detained. The powers with which the Security Police are invested by the Terrorism and Suppression of Communism Act and the secrecy of their exercise, which is sanctioned by the same Act make it impossible to give an accurate account of the existing situation.

78. The detentions without trial, the suffering of detainees and their families, the cold blood murders of detainees and the police harassment of supporters of the Liberation Movements of the Territory and the Black Consciousness Organization, demand all forms of protest from all concerned as does the inhuman characters of the Terrorism and Suppression of Communism Act itself. The severe measures of this Act are designed to maintain a small group of white people in power whose continued affluence is dependent upon the continued subjugation and oppression of the

people in South Africa. For an increasing number of black people, continued detentions are considered as essential parts of the total system of white domination. Thus rather than spending a great deal of time in protests, which most often are futile, many black South Africans have decided to engage in active work to maintain and develop the black consciousness programme and to consider the introduction of armed struggle under the leadership of their Liberation Movements, the ANC and PAC.

79. Mr. Nelson Mandela, the distinguished leader of the ANC(SA) celebrated his 60th birthday while languishing in the notorious prison of Robben Island. The international appeal for the release of Mr. Nelson Mandela and all political prisoners now serving sentences in South African jails which was launched on the occasion of his 60th birthday was not heeded at all by the racist regime of South Africa. Mr. Nelson Mandela, who is now allowed to receive only three letters a month, was refused the thousands of letters which came from freedom fighters, friends, relatives and prominent world leaders on the occasion of his birthday.

80. Mr. Solomon Mahlangu, a young militant of the ANC(SA) was murdered in a Pretoria jail at 0600 on April 6, 1979. The racist regime alleged that Mr. Solomon Mahlangu was guilty of a shoot-out incident where two white South Africans were killed in 1977. It was, however, ascertained that though Solomon Mahlangu was physically present during the incident, he did not take part in the shooting. The racist regime refused to heed to appeals made by the United Nations Security Council and other world leaders. The OAU General Secretariat requested the UN Secretary-General to intervene in saving the life of this militant of the ANC. On the other hand and through a press release, the Secretariat

warned racist South Africa in the strongest possible terms not to carry out the sentence. It would be a matter of deep regret if such action in defiance of the international community is not revenged in the manner it obviously deserves.

SOUTH AFRICA'S ARMS BUILD-UP

81. South Africa's military power is immense and expanding at a fast rate. The West has been responsible, principally, for the supply of these arms and a substantial amount of these have been supplied by the United States, France, Britain, West Germany and Israel. South Africa's military build-up has been taking place in spite of the arms embargo which has been decided by the Security Council in November 1977. We would be deceiving ourselves in thinking that the arms embargo decided in 1977 was more effective than the one decided by the same world body as far back as 1963.

82. When the question of arms embargo against South Africa was resolved at the United Nations in 1963, the South African regime had a relatively small military establishment with less than 13,000 men in the permanent force and total annual military expenditure of not more than 150 million dollars. Lacking even a meaningful attack force, the South African regime had an essentially defensive capability. Today, however, South Africa with her extensive military hardware which includes 600 combat aircrafts, 200 helicopters, 500 tanks, 200 armoured cars and more than 1000 armoured personnel carriers constitutes a state with the most formidable aggressive machinery.

83. • During the fiscal year 1978-79, racist South Africa allocated over 2,000 million dollars for defence spending with over 500 million dollars of it for arms purchases from overseas.

The purchase of such arms is made possible simply because certain Western countries, despite their positive utterances at the level of the United Nations, have all along been inclined to preserve their economic gains arising from such trade than to remain faithful to their collective decisions to impose arms embargo against the racist regime. The West's arms markets have not yet shut their door to the military need of South Africa.

OPPOSITION TO THE APARTHEID REGIME

84. Opposition to the apartheid regime, at least from the international scene, was highlighted by the recent decision by the Islamic Republic of Iran to stop its supply of petroleum to South Africa, Iran, hitherto has been responsible for the supply of ninty per cent of its requirments of this important commodity to South Africa and had snubbed OAU efforts to prohibit the supply of oil to the racist regime of South Africa. The decision of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which also included the severing of diplomatic ties, will go a long way in the history of the struggle to combat racism, racial discrimination and apartheid.

85. The General Assembly of the United Nations meeting in New York on January 24, 1979, adopted fifteen resolutions on the question of apartheid. Through one of its resolutions, the General Assembly, requested the Security Council to envisage urgently the application of mandatory sanctions against the racist regime on the supply of oil and petroleum products. The General Assembly further requested all Member States to promulgate national legislation to prohibit all activities of their nationals in relation to South Africa as well as the use of their harbours

and airport facilities for the transportation of oil and the extension of investments and for technical assistance towards the oil industries of South Africa. This resolution was adopted by 105 votes for, 5 against and 4 abstentions.

86. Adopting another resolution by 98 votes for, 10 against and 20 abstentions, the General Assembly, requested the Security Council to consider urgently the application of mandatory economic sanctions against the South African regime. The resolution also envisaged of particular action against investments in, preferential tariffs to and commercial transaction with the racist regime of South Africa. As in the past, the Western Powers voted against the adoption of these two resolutions.

87. Internally opposition to the apartheid system continued through the actions of the oppressed people of South Africa and freedom fighters of the Liberation Movements, the ANC and PAC. During the period under review, both Liberation Movements managed, successfully, to infiltrate a number of their cadres to conduct guerrilla warfare in the urban centres notably Johannesburg and Pretoria. This, to a large extent, was facilitated due to total co-operation extended to the Liberation Movements by the various popular organizations and consciousness movements now operating inside the territory. Students in Soweto and other townships intensified their defiance activities against the racist regime before, during and after the anniversary of the Soweto martyrs and that of Steve Biko. Destruction of government buildings, burning of public buses and private vehicles as well as street fighting against the racist troops and police were daily occurrences during this period.



CHANGES IN APARTHEID HANDS

88. John Balthazar Vorster, the man who became the incarnation of apartheid and all that racist South Africa stood for during the past decade relinquished his Premiership on September 20, 1978. His retirement after 22 years in active politics marked the end of a long career characterised by an unflinching commitment to white, particularly Afrikaaner supremacy in South Africa. He entered the racist Parliament in 1953 and was appointed Deputy Minister in 1958 by Hendrik Verwoerd, the leading ideologue of Apartheid. Since then, Vorster remained a faithful apostle in the ranks of the National Party, later becoming Minister of Justice in 1961 and finally Prime Minister following the assassination of Verwoerd in September 1966.

89. Thus Vorster presided over a police force whose recorded acts of brutality have few parallels, and over a judiciary whose application of justice was basically and fundamentally racist. His greatest contribution as Minister of Justice was in 1963 at the Rivonia Trial when Nelson Mandela and other black leaders were handed over for life to Robben Island. For articulating opposition to apartheid. To the majority of South Africans and to Africa at large he will be remembered not only as a morbid racist the world has ever known, but also as a monstrous being whose only contribution to the South African society was his introduction of the most comprehensive range of repressive and draconian legislation. During his political career, Vorster, besides sending to goals hundreds of black heroes, signed the death warrants of school children in Soweto, Langa, Port Elizabeth and all those others like Steve Biko who were murdered in South African prisons.

90. Pieter Willem Botha, formerly Defence Minister and champion of the racist regime's aggression against the People's Republic of Angola in 1975-76 and Zambia took over the instruments of suppression from Vorster. A dyehard racist and hawkish, Botha became the eighth person to hold the post of Prime Minister since the Act of Union of 1910 and the fifth Nationalist to hold the premiership since the racist party came to power thirty years ago. On his assumption of the post of Prime Minister, Botha stated in no ambiguous terms that he will not deviate from the party policy on the question of majority rule and that black South Africans were to belong to their "tribal homelands" and that they were not going to make part of the white political system. It is a foregone conclusion that the situation in South Africa has gone from worse to worst.

THE QUESTION OF UNITY BETWEEN ANC AND PAC

91. The OAU Committee charged with the question of unity among the Liberation Movements of South Africa met in Dar-Es-Salaam, Tanzania, on May 16-17, 1978, under the auspices of the OAU co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa. It is, however, regrettable to note that the deliberations of the Committee did not produce the expected results at the Dar-Es-Salaam meeting.

92. The report of the Co-ordinating Committee for African Liberation covers the point on the unification of the Liberation Movements in Southern Africa.



CONCLUSION

93. Racist South Africa is a police and a militarised state where the colour of one's skin remains the basis for the decision as to whether he is to be treated as a human being or to the contrary. It remains, though, despite her military power that South Africa's invincibility has now become a myth due to gradually successful, armed infiltration which have been carried out by Liberation Movements and the resistance on all possible fronts by the black population. The fact that political trials have been on the increase clearly demonstrates the growth of resistance activities by the majority of the South African population. Accordingly and if a meaningful change is to be expected in South Africa the tempo of raising political consciousness among the people of South Africa and their level of participation in the struggle to destroy this machinery of repression should be raised and maintained.

AFRICAN UNION UNION AFRICAINE

African Union Common Repository

<http://archives.au.int>

Organs

Council of Ministers & Executive Council Collection

1979-07

Report of the Administrative Secretary-General on Decolonization

Organization of African Unity

African Union

<https://archives.au.int/handle/123456789/10009>

Downloaded from African Union Common Repository