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REPORT OF THE OAU STANDING COMMITTEE ON SANCTIONS



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The OAU Standing Committee on Sanctions was set up by Resolution CM/Res.634 (XXXI) adopted by the Thirty-First Session of the Council of Ministers and endorsed by the Fifteenth Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Khartoum, Democratic Republic of the Sudan, in July, 1976.

The Committee replaced the former ad hoc Committee on Oil Embargo.

By the terms of Resolution CM/Res.634 (XXXI), Paragraph 7 already cited above, it was decided to: "TRANSFORM THE OAU COMMITTEE OF SEVEN ON OIL EMBARGO INTO A STANDING COMMITTEE TO FOLLOW UP REGULARLY THE SUBJECT OF SANCTIONS AGAINST WHITE MINORITY RACIST REGIMES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA ....."

Like its predecessor, the Standing Committee on Sanctions is composed of the following Member States:

- 1) Algeria
- 2) Gabon
- 3) Ghana
- 4) Libya
- 5) Nigeria
- 6) Sierra Leone
- 7) Zambia

The Committee held its first Ambassadorial meeting of Member States on 2 November 1976 in Addis Ababa. It held a second meeting on 28.2.79 along side the Thirty-Second Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers in Nairobi, Kenya. A third Ambassadorial meeting of Member States of the Committee was held on 11 April 1979 at the OAU Headquarters in Addis Ababa.

Report on these three meetings are attached as Annex I of this document.

The Standing Committee on Sanctions held its first meeting from 28 to 29 May 1979. Below is the report of this meeting.

REPORT OF THE FIRST MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE NEW STANDING COMMITTEE ON SANCTIONS HELD ON 28 AND 29 MAY 1979 IN LUSAKA, REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIA

The first Ministerial meeting of the Standing Committee on Sanctions was held in Lusaka, Republic of Zambia, from 28 to 29 May 1979.

The Member States present were represented as follows:

<u>Name and Titles of Delegates</u>	<u>Name of Country</u>
H.E. Fajah Joka-Sangura (Mrs.) Sierra Leone Ambassador to Ethiopia	Sierra Leone
H.E. Mr. E.N. Oba High Commissioner of Nigeria to Zambia	Nigeria
Mr. M.D. Brimah, Senior Councillor	Nigeria
Mr. Ahmed Y. Yousef Libyan Charge d'Affaires in Botswana	Libya
Mr. A.K. Asful High Commissioner of Ghana to Zambia	Ghana
Mr. C. Vandyok Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Accra	Ghana
Hon. W.M. Chakulya, M.P. Minister of Foreign Affairs	Zambia
Mr. P.L. Kasanda Permanent Secretary in Ministry of Foreign Affairs	Zambia
H.E. Kangwa Kalenga Ambassador of Zambia to Ethiopia	Zambia
Mr. G.R. Zimba Ambassador for Political Affairs, Min. of Foreign Affairs	Zambia

The General Secretariat was represented by Dr. Peter OMU, Assistant Secretary-General, Head of Political Affairs, Mr. Venant Mzomwita, Chief of Sanctions Section.

The representatives of SWAPO, the Patriotic Front, the ANC of South Africa also attended the meeting.

The meeting, which was officially opened by H.E. W.M. Chakulya, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Zambia, started work at 4:10 p.m. in the Mulorgushi Conference Hall at Lusaka.

Before the official opening, Dr. Peter ONO, Assistant Secretary-General, Head of Political Affairs, thanked the Government and the people of Zambia for the warm and cordial welcome given to the members of the Committee. He then asked the latter to elect their chairman in order to continue the proceedings.

A delegation proposed the representative of Zambia as chairman of the Committee at the Ministerial level. This proposition, seconded by another delegation, was adopted by the other members by acclamation.

The Chairman, H.E. Mr. Chakulya, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Zambia, thus elected, immediately assumed office. He thanked the members of the Committee for the trust reposed in him as well as his country by electing him as Chairman of the Standing Committee on Sanctions. He pointed out that he was aware of the importance of the duties and responsibilities entrusted to him and expressed the hope that, with the understanding and cooperation of each and everyone, the proceedings would evolve in the best atmosphere and yield good results. Finally, he suggested to Committee members to appoint a rapporteur to complete the bureau.

A delegation soon took the floor first to congratulate the new chairman on his election, then to propose the representative of Algeria as Rapporteur. This delegation stressed that the representative of Algeria was already the Rapporteur of the Committee, at the Ambassadorial level.



This proposal, which did not meet with any objection was unanimously adopted.

At this stage of the discussion, the Chairman proposed the adoption of the draft agenda submitted to the Ministerial Committee by the Committee of Ambassadors.

As no amendment was proposed, the following draft agenda was unanimously adopted by the members present:

Agenda of the First Ministerial Meeting of the Standing Committee on Sanctions.

1. Organization of work;
2. Report on the first, second and third meetings of the Committee on Sanctions at the level of Plenipotentiaries;
3. Report on the Secretary General's application of sanctions;

System of supervision at the General Secretariat enabling Member States to communicate to the latter information on the implementation of the resolutions on sanctions and oil embargo against the racist regimes of Southern Africa;

5. Report of the Administrative Secretary General made in collaboration and cooperation with the Committee on sanctions of the United Nations, League of Arab States and the Commonwealth, and the appeal of the OAU to strengthen the UN Special Committee against Apartheid as well as the Centre against Apartheid;

7. Report of the Administrative Secretary General on the reinforcement of the services of sanctions of the General Secretariat and on the establishment of a mechanism and methods with a view to helping the Committee on Sanctions;
8. Report of the Administrative Secretary General on the efforts made by the African Group at the United Nations to convene a meeting of the Security Council, so as to examine the oil embargo issue;
8. Need for fresh consultations with the OPEC Member countries in Latin America, South East Asia, Middle East on ways and means to apply better sanctions, particularly the oil embargo decided by the Revolutionary Government of Iran against the racist regimes of Southern Africa and Zionist regime of Israel.
9. Consideration of other forms of sanctions against the racist regimes of Southern Africa. e.g. air connections, trade, Sports, diplomacy, politics, etc...
- .(a) Consideration of the particular circumstances affecting individually the Southern African States and Cape Verde as regards the application of Sanctions;
- .(b) Plans to visit Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia, Cape Verde and Mozambique on consultations;

11. Consideration of the possibilities of employing the services of consultants to help the Committee on Sanctions;
12. Date and Venue of the next meeting;
13. Any other business.

In his double capacity as Minister of Foreign Affairs of Zambia and Chairman of the OAU Standing Committee on Sanctions, H.E. Mr. W.M. Chakulya, officially opened the meeting of the Committee. On that occasion, he delivered an important speech during which he stressed the need to boycott the racist regimes of Southern Africa, and the assistance that the neighbouring states of these regimes should expect from other countries. The integral text of this masterful speech is annexed to this report. (Annex II)

After this brilliant speech, the Chairman proposed that the Agenda be analysed item by item starting by item 4 relating to the Organization of Work.

On this score, it was suggested that the meeting be adjourned till 9 o'clock the next day and should continue till 1 p.m. and that the afternoon should be reserved for talks with the Zambian authorities. This suggestion was adopted with a slight amendment that the proceedings continue till 6 p.m. and resume on the following day according to the proposed time-table.

Considering item 5 relating to the reports of the various meetings held by the Sanctions Committee at Ambassadorial level, the Chairman asked members to make their comments and observations.

H.E. Mr. Kalenga Kangwa, Ambassador of Zambia to Ethiopia and Chairman of the Sanctions Committee of Ambassadors presented the reports on the meetings of the Committee of Ambassadors. He gave every detail of the aim of each meeting as well as the items which had the unanimous approval of the Committee. He particularly insisted on the following three items on which there was disagreement and which were referred to the ministerial meeting for consideration:

- 1) The use of the South African Airways flights to and from Lesotho.
- 2) The visit to Cape Verde before or after the Monrovia Session.
- 3) The visit to Iran on the invitation of the Authorities of that country.

In view of the delicate nature of these items, they were referred to the Ministers for decision. The Ambassador concluded his report by requesting the meeting to find a solution for each item.

After thanking the Chairman of Sanctions Committee of Ambassadors for his lucid introduction, the Chairman requested the Committee members to make their contributions. He further pointed out the presence of representatives of Liberation movements in the hall who could, if they so wished, enrich the discussion by their interventions.

In relation to the first item, namely, the use of the services of the South African Airways for the intended journey to Lesotho, all the Committee members were unanimous in acknowledging that it was not normal, for obvious reasons, for an OAU Committee to travel by South African Airways. They wondered how they could reach Lesotho to accomplish their mission without using South African Airways. At the request of a delegation, the General Secretariat pointed out that according to information received from Lesotho, there were other two possible alternatives. The first would be that the authorities of Lesotho would put a special plane at the disposal of the Committee from Gaberones, Botswana. The second alternative would be that the Authorities of Lesotho send a delegation to Botswana to have consultations with the OAU Committee. The General Secretariat then promised to get in touch with the Maseru Authorities to consider together with them which of the two alternatives would be more expedient.

Taking the floor on these two alternatives, the Chairman said that in his opinion it was better that the committee went to the country in order to have on the spot information the realities. He believed this visit would have a very important political and psychological impact as much inside South Africa as outside it.

There were further debates on the other possible air links with Maseru. Some delegates mentioned the DETA Airline which would link Maputo to Maseru. Others observed that a link could be established between Manzini and Maseru by Air Swazi.

After that brief exchange of information, it was decided to make an in-depth enquiry with the Maseru Authorities to have more clarification. It was equally decided to ensure that overflying the South African territory would not endanger the security of the Committee members.

In connection with the visit to Iran, the Committee decided to accept the invitation and to postpone this visit until circumstances were favourable.

Regarding Cape Verde, it was clearly stressed that the visit to this country was mandatory for the Committee but that the problem was at the level of the committee's commitment to other meetings. After a brief examination of the calendar of the other meetings, it was decided to send a sub-committee of three Committee members to Cape Verde. The representatives of Zambia, Algeria and Ghana were consequently appointed as members of the sub-committee assigned to visit Cape Verde before 15 June 1979.

At the same time, the Committee decided to divide itself into two sub-committees, one to visit Mozambique and Swaziland and the other, Botswana and finally Lesotho. The two sub-committees were composed as decided.

Group A: Maputo - Mbabane

- 1) Ghana
- 2) Libya
- 3) Zambia <sup>¶</sup>

Group B: Gaberones - Maseru

- 1) Algeria
- 2) Nigeria
- 3) Sierra Leone
- 4) Zambia <sup>¶</sup>

<sup>¶</sup> By virtue of being Chairman of the Committee, Zambia was a member of both sub-committees.

While awaiting this information, the Chairman proposed that the meeting proceed to the plan of visit to Iran and Cape Verde. On these two items, the General Secretariat reminded the Committee that the visit to Iran was planned by the ex Ad Hoc Committee on Air Embargo within the framework of its tour of the OPEC Member States at the end of 1977. The Iranian Authorities at that time had categorically refused to receive the Committee on the pretext that oil could not be used as a political instrument. When the new regime came to power in Iran the authorities, through their Embassy in Addis Ababa, addressed an invitation to the Committee to visit Iran and to have consultations on the best ways and means of applying sanctions. It was left therefore for the Committee to find the appropriate time to undertake the visit. The General Secretariat concluded that bearing in mind the situation prevailing in Iran and on the advice of the Charge d'Affaires of Iran in Addis Ababa, it would be expedient for the Committee to postpone temporarily its visit to Teheran.

As for the visit to Cape Verde, the General Secretariat informed the Committee that this was strongly requested by the Cape Verde Authorities because of the particular situation created by the establishment of the SALE Airport in Cape Verde.

Consequently, it was recommended that the Committee find an appropriate time to effect this visit so that the report of the mission of the Committee <sup>on</sup> the Southern African countries and Cape Verde recommended in Resolution M/Res.623 adopted in Khartoum, could cover all the countries that should be visited.

Regarding item 7 relating to the system of monitoring to help Member States communicate information on the application of sanctions, the Committee decided to recommend to Member States to give the General Secretariat maximum cooperation by providing information requested on the application of sanctions.

Considering item 8 on collaboration with the Sanctions Committees of other international organisations, the committee was informed of the contacts already established between the General Secretariat and the executive bodies of these various organisations such as the UN Sanctions Committees, the Arab League and the Commonwealth. It was then decided to recommend visits to the headquarters of these organisations with a view to having substantial consultations with their leaders and to have first hand information of the experience of others in matters of Sanctions. It was also recommended that the travel and subsistence expenses during these visits be borne by the OAU, with a view to reducing the financial burden of Member States of the Committee.

The meeting adjourned on 28/5/79 at 6:30 pm and resumed on 29 May 1979 at 9:30 am. under the Chairmanship of H.E. Mr. W.M. Chikulya, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Zambia.

Declaring the meeting open, the chairman announced to the members of the Committee that the President of the Republic of Zambia, His Excellency Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, would receive them at 7 p.m. He then called on them to continue their deliberations beginning from item 9 on the agenda dealing with the need to strengthen the Sanctions Services operating within the General Secretariat with a view to making it more effective.



Introducing the item, the General Secretariat announced that the Sanctions Section would be strengthened as from 1 June 1979 within the framework of plans to restructure the General Secretariat. To be more specific, the strengthening of the Sanctions Section will lead to the up-grading of the Chief of Section to Head of Division and the recruitment of a new co-ordinator and a stenographer, thus raising the staff of the Section from three to six.

This information did not raise any serious comment and the committee immediately tackled the next item dealing with efforts being made by the African Group at the U.N. on possible imposing of oil embargo on racist regimes in Southern Africa. The General Secretariat informed the committee that the African Group in New York, in conjunction with the OAU General Secretariat and its New York Office, had made considerable efforts to cause a Security Council meeting to be convened to consider placing an embargo on oil supplies to South Africa. He emphasised that these efforts were not in vain, because the U.N. General Assembly adopted many resolutions on the issue. Finally, the General Secretariat indicated that a more detailed and comprehensive report on the activities of the New York Office would be submitted to the Thirty-Third Session of the Council of Ministers.

These explanations satisfied members of the Committee and the Chairman asked them to consider item II dealing with the needs for fresh consultations with OPEC Member Countries about Iran's decision no longer to supply oil to the racist regimes in Southern Africa.

In its introductory statement on this item, the General Secretariat gave a historical picture of efforts made in 1977 by the Ad Hoc Committee responsible for oil embargo with a view to making the OPEC Member-States aware of the idea of placing oil embargo on

South Africa. He recalled that all the OPEC Member States, except Iran at that time, gave assurances that they would not sell their oil either to South Africa or Rhodesia. The General Secretariat reported that the OPEC countries had indicated that oil exporting countries were bound by regulations in force to make the final destination of their oil known and not to export it to South Africa and Rhodesia. They nevertheless admitted that it was rather difficult to control this clause and therefore sought the co-operation of the OAU and African countries in this exercise. The General Secretariat added that, consequently, fresh consultations with the OPEC countries were necessary to consider the most appropriate over-all methods aimed at ending the illegal oil export to South Africa and Rhodesia by some international oil companies. The General Secretariat concluded its exposition by proposing that these consultations be held by direct contact in order to avoid any issue likely to warrant exchange of correspondence in this especially delicate matter.

The members of the Committee as well as representatives of Liberation Movements present (ANC-South Africa), (SWAPO and the Patriotic Front-ZAPU) spoke one after another calling for stronger action on oil embargo. They highlighted the need for consultations with OPEC Member States in order to strengthen and co-ordinate their common action in this area. They agreed among themselves to recommend that oil companies which violated the sanctions, i.e. the notorious "seven sisters" should be black-listed in all African countries and retaliatory measures taken against them. Consequently, it was suggested and accepted to draw inspiration from the boycott methods adopted by the Arab League countries which, in the opinion of all had yielded useful results. They also discussed, at length, the case of many ships flying Liberian flags and decided to pass a recommendation calling on Liberia to be more vigilant and exert serious control over these ships in order to ensure that they do not transport oil or other goods towards South Africa. Furthermore,

members of the Committee intimated that it would be useful to consult all the other oil exporting countries, especially Britain, to persuade them to abide by the decision on oil embargo against South Africa. The General Secretariat made the following short statement when called upon by the Chairman to introduce item 12 dealing with any other form of sanctions against racist regimes in Southern Africa.

The racist regimes in Southern Africa should be completely isolated and be made to face embargo in all fields of activities. All forms of sanctions should strictly be applied especially in the political, economic, cultural and sports as well as other fields.

The break in air links with the South African regime would be a very important step. Consequently, a conference of Aeronatic Experts was convened in Addis Ababa in March 1979 but could unfortunately not be held for lack of quorum. Something must be done in this field as in others.

After this exposition, all the members of the Committee realized that the item was very important. They emphasised the need for African countries to rely on themselves, to co-operate and to give the best example by strictly implementing the sanctions. In conclusion, they recommended that all African States which had not ended all economic and trade relations with South Africa should do so and to refrain, forthwith, from any facilities they have been providing the South African Airways and any other airways operating from or to South Africa. They contended that this was the only way they could really ask other African partners to impose sanctions on the Apartheid regime.

After this meeting, the committee continued its mission with visits to the following countries:

- Botswana
- Lesotho
- Mozambique
- Zambia
- Swaziland
- Cape Verde.

By Resolution CM/Res.623, paragraph 7, the Sanctions Committee was requested to "look into the special circumstances affecting individual states in Southern Africa and Cape Verde, within the context of the application of sanctions"

In conformity with the provision of Resolution CM/Res. 623, the Committee on Sanctions decided to pay visits to the countries concerned with a view to appraising themselves of the exact situation there and obtaining first-hand information directly from the authorities of these countries.

The Committee's visit to Southern Africa took place between 29/5 and 6 June 1979. The visit to Cape Verde came on from 14 to 16/6/79.



On item 14 dealing with the possibility of employing consultants to help the Sanctions Committee, the General Secretariat explained that the Permanent Committee on Sanctions was of a special importance and to operate effectively, it should be provided with experts whom it could consult any time on any aspect of its work. It referred to the London-based HALSEMERES Group which had already done very useful work on behalf of the U.N., Britain and the Commonwealth on the violation of oil sanctions. Considering the fact that OAU knew no other competent consultants and that this group had offered its services for an insignificant monthly remuneration of between US \$400 and US \$500, the General Secretariat suggested the use of the HALSEMERES even if it was for a one-year probationary period after which a final decision would be taken.

After a short exchange of views on this issue, it was decided to recommend that the Committee accept the one-year offer made by the Halsemeres Group.

On items 13 and 15 dealing with consideration of circumstances affecting Southern African States and Cape Verde, it was decided to discuss them later in the light of the outcome of consultations with the States concerned.

The meeting ended at 1.45 pm after hearing a statement by the Representative of the Patriotic Front and another statement by the Zambian Minister of Foreign Affairs on Zimbabwe and Namibia.

It is necessary to recall immediately that the Ministerial meeting of the Committee on Sanctions decided, for practical reasons and in order to save time to divide the Committee into three sub-committees to visit the different countries (vide Annex 1) relating to the Ministerial Conference of the Standing Committee on Sanctions. All the members of the Committee held discussions with the Zambian authorities. The first sub-committee made up of Libya, Ghana and Zambia as well as the Assistant Secretary-General responsible for Political Affairs, Dr. Peter ONU, visited Mozambique and Swaziland. The second sub-committee composed of Algeria, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Zambia and the Chief of O U Sanctions Section, Mr. Venant NZOMWITA, visited Botswana and Lesotho. The third sub-committee composed of Algeria, Zambia and Ghana and assisted by the Chief of the O U Sanctions Section went later to Cape Verde.

I. Discussions between members of the Standing Committee on Sanctions and Zambian Authorities.

A consultative meeting was held between the Standing Committee on Sanctions and Zambian authorities on 29 May 1979 at the Conference Hall at the office of the Prime Minister.

Participating in this meeting were:

a) Zambia

1. Hon. Jenny Kakoma, Minister of State responsible for Finance, and technical cooperation.
2. Mr. F. L. Kasanda, Principal Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
3. Mr. H. C. Sichilongo, Principal Secretary, Ministry of Finance.

4. Mr. R. Sakwanda, Under Secretary, Ministry of Finance
5. Mr. E.D. Kasunga, Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Finance.
6. Mr. Paul Saunda, Assistant Secretary (Africa and Middle East Division).
7. Mr. F.K. Kabambe, Assistant Secretary (Information) Ministry of Foreign Affairs
8. Mr. W. Mnyantha, Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

b) Standing Committee on Sanctions

All delegates to the meeting of the Standing Committee on Sanctions led by the Zambian Ambassador in Addis Ababa, H.E. Kalen Kangwa were present.

The Meeting was opened by the Zambian Ambassador in Addis Ababa H.E. Kalen Kangwa, Chairman of the Standing Committee on Sanctions. He began by giving a brief background of the Standing Committee since it was established as an ad hoc Committee on Oil Embargo. He spoke about its institutionalization as a Standing Committee with competence over all matters relating to sanctions, up to its first Ministerial meeting in Lusaka from 28 to 29 May 1979. He recalled that the Standing Committee's visit to countries in Southern Africa was aimed at having consultations with the authorities of each country in the region on "the special circumstances affecting certain individual states within the context of the application of sanctions," in conformity with Resolution CM/Res.623 (XXXI), paragraph 7, adopted in Khartoum in July 1978.

The Chairman then requested the Zambian authorities to communicate to the Standing Committee on Sanctions the special circumstances affecting Zambia as regards its efforts to apply the sanctions.

The leader of the Zambian delegation H.E. Honourable Benny Kakoma, Minister of State responsible for Finance and Technical cooperation first reiterated his warm welcome already expressed by the Zambian Minister of Foreign Affairs to the members of the Sanctions Committee.

Tackling the subject proper, the Zambian Minister of State responsible for Finance and Technical cooperation explained the situation which he said, could be sited in the successive territorial periods.

The first period is that of the colonial era. During this period, Zambia maintained very close economic and technical relations with all the countries in the region including Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. The colonial system had created a whole set of structures whereby all the countries in the region depended very strongly on each other. When Zambia started its struggle for independence, the Zambian people and their leaders clearly committed themselves to the principles of Pan Africanism and opted in favour of the struggle for the liberation of Africa and its economic independence. These principles and options are therefore inconsistent with the present situation in the region.

The second period, which began with its attainment of independence in 1964, gave Zambia the opportunity to choose between adhering to these principles of Pan Africanism and the struggle for the liberation of Africa, and remaining within the structures inherited from colonization. On no occasion has Zambia hesitated to opt for Pan Africanism and the struggle for African independence, since this is one of the main priorities of its foreign policy. The Zambian Minister of State responsible for Finance and Technical cooperation said that was therefore the reason why Zambia had always tried to respect United Nations Sanctions and historical situation. The Minister indicated, by way of example, that whilst Zambian imports from South Africa amounted to 72,000,000 Kwacha in 1967, they fell to 28,000,000 Kwacha in 1978,



representing a fall of almost 60% in ten years. (one \$US = 0.76 Kwacha or 76 Ngwe). He emphasised that this related particularly to maintenance of machines used in factories and mines most of which were of South African origin. He said it was a situation inherited from the colonial past and could not change completely overnight. The Minister added that the big South African investments existing before independence had reduced considerably. He further stressed that several companies which were operating in Zambia with headquarters in South Africa or Southern Rhodesia have been asked to close down or transfer their headquarters to Zambia. The number of Zambian workers employed in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia before independence has reduced considerably.

Faithful to its principles, and desirous of respecting its commitments, according to the Minister of State responsible for Finance and Technical cooperation has banned all aircraft to and from South Africa from using its airports. It has however, recognized that it is practically very difficult to deny these aircraft the use of its airspace considering its geographical situation.

2. Regarding Rhodesia, the Minister of State responsible for Finance and Technical cooperation observed that Zambia had always done its best to respect the UN sanctions against Rhodesia. He noted that Zambia had broken its trade with Rhodesia and had done all it could to find other partners. Rhodesian passports were not recognized in Zambia and the border with Rhodesia was definitively closed in January, 1973. The Minister said that owing to special circumstances due to Zambia's needs in fertilizers and also due to the congestion of the port of Dar-es-Salaam and the impossibility of using the access routes to the sea as soon as possible, Zambia was obliged to re-open its Southern border to enable the import of fertilizers which it needed urgently since the arrival of these fertilizers corresponded very precisely to the period of sowing after which they would become absolutely useless. The Minister said that the situation was regrettable but that his country which had hitherto unsuccessfully tried other solutions had not been able to find an alternative. He said a booklet on the reasons leading to the reopening of the Southern road had been published and he had given a copy to the OAU Committee.

Expressing satisfaction with the visit of the Standing Committee to his country to appraise itself of the problems facing Zambia, the Minister intimated that his country needed assistance to meet its problems. He recalled that the idea of giving assistance to Zambia was not new and that certain States even gave assistance when the border with Rhodesia was closed in 1973. On behalf of his country, the Minister appealed to sister African States, through the Standing Committee on Sanctions, to give aid and assistance to Zambia within their means. He said this aid could be many sided, but it should as much as possible relate to the priority needs and those of immediate necessity. In conclusion he renewed his assurances to the Committee and said that even though it was facing a serious crisis, Zambia would never denounce its commitments to Africa and African peoples still struggling for their independence.

The Chairman of the Standing Committee on Sanctions took the floor again on behalf of all members of the Committee and thanked the Zambian Minister of State responsible for Finance and Technical cooperation for his lucid and comprehensive explanations. He added that members of the Committee had taken good note and that they would report to the Council of Ministers at its forthcoming session in Monrovia, Liberia in July 1979. He finally invited members of the Committee to ask questions if they needed more clarification from the Zambian delegation on the burning issues.

The members of the Committee took the floor one after the other, and asked a number of questions which the Zambian delegation answered with clarity and precision.

As to what assistance the OAU Committee of Ten responsible for giving assistance to Front-line States and the United Nations had given to Zambia, the Zambian delegation replied that the United Nations had

given quite substantial assistance to Zambia. It added that the United Nations sent a mission to Zambia two weeks ago to study Zambia's needs and finally grant it fresh aid. African countries they had also done much at bilateral and multilateral level. It said that through the Committee of Ten referred to above, OAU had granted US.\$200,000 to Zambia.

While recognizing the importance of this bilateral aid given by OAU, United Nations, African States and friendly countries, the Zambian delegation stressed that the most important thing was not so much the amount involved, for all that Zambia receives was always welcome; definitely the aid obtained was insignificant considering the great needs created by the very complex situation facing it at the moment. The Zambian delegation specified that its country's needs were estimated at one billion American dollars. It concluded by saying that the aid accorded Zambia, if limited, was aimed at giving it the necessary morale and force to continue the struggle.

All the members of the Committee incessantly paid homage to Zambia for its relentless efforts towards the liberation of Africa, and said they were aware that Zambia was in need of assistance to help it reduce alleviate the burden entailed in those sacrifices. They however observed that in spite of their good will most African States were incapable of giving adequate assistance to their sister countries in difficulty. They also asked what other form of assistance they could give apart from financial assistance. They cited the example of Algeria which proposed, and supplied, oil some time ago to certain Frontline countries.

Replying to this question, the Zambian delegation revealed that it would be evidently preferable for its country to obtain "cash" assistance so as to meet its problems of balance of payment more effectively. The delegation observed however, that giving the assistance in the form of cash or supplying the necessary goods or equipment absolutely boiled down to the same thing, because in both cases, there was evident influence on the balance of payments. In fact, if Zambia obtained oil, trucks etc.. it would save on its foreign reserves. The Zambian delegation concluded

that each country could grant assistance according to its possibilities, facilities and means.

The Members of the Committee asked another question as to whether the Dar-es-Salaam port or the Mozambique ports, by passing through the road leading to Malawi could not expedite the supply of Zambian fertilizers which are considered as of vital necessity.

The Zambian delegation replied that Tanzania and Mozambique had done their best to resolve the problem. The whole difficulty resulted from the congestion of these ports and their limited capacity. And Tanzania and Mozambique on their part, had manifested their sympathy and good will towards Zambia.

The last question asked the Zambian delegation related to whether or not Zambia had a list of defence requirements to help her defend herself against the Rhodesian raids. It was explained that Zambia's defence was of prominent importance in the application of sanctions. At the meeting of Defence Commission late May, 1979 in Addis Ababa the lists of military needs of Botswana and Mozambique were made available but Zambia's list was in respect of the military requirements of the Patriotic Front operating from Zambia.

The Zambian delegation indicated that the list referred to was initially submitted to the Committee of Ten on assistance to the frontline states and concerned the military needs of the Patriotic Front only. If Zambia had submitted her own defence requirements the list could have been much longer and would have included such weapons as jet fighters, tanks, etc. because the war of aggression was still ranging on fiercely and the damage caused is considerable and calls for substantial military needs. The Zambian delegation estimated that Zambia's losses in the application of sanctions were approximately one Billion US dollars. The Zambian delegation concluded that its country would continue to assume its responsibility and welcome open-handedly any aid or assistance to be given to it.

In the evening of 29/5/79, the President of the Republic, H.E. Dr. Kenneth KAUNDA received all the members of the Sanctions Committee at the Presidential Palace. On this occasion, the President of the Republic of Zambia made a speech, the full text of which is attached as Annex III.

## II. Discussions with Mozambique Authorities

The Meeting with the Mozambican Authorities took place earlier on 30th May 1979 in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Team arrived when the Mozambican Cabinet was in Session and in the absence of the Foreign Minister, the Secretary General presided on behalf of the Foreign Minister.

Their Representative were :

- |                                |  |
|--------------------------------|--|
| 1. Mr. Valeriano Ferrat        | - Secretary-General, Foreign Affairs   |
| 2. H.E. Jose Carlos Lobo       | - Permanent Representative to the U.N. |
| (113) 3. Mr. Abdul Magid Asman | - National Director of Finance         |
| 4. Mr. Nelson Barreto          | - Ministry of Transport                |
| 5. Mrs Ana Ferreira            | - Ministry of Transport                |
| 6. Mr. Murade Isaac Murarley   | - Ministry of Foreign Affairs          |

Explaining the position of Mozambique with regard to sanctions against Rhodesia and South Africa the Secretary General said Mozambique has since 1976 applied sanctions against the racist regimes. The application of sanctions has cost Mozambique big losses because of the closure of the country's two Ports namely Beira, being closed completely and Maputo being closed partially to the racist regimes. The closure of these Ports has led to the unemployment of thousands of Mozambicans who depended on the work in the Ports. This, of course, has affected the families of these workers. The Secretary General said up to now Mozambique has lost through the closure of the Ports over Five hundred million US Dollars in Foreign Exchange. Materials and equipment at the Railways and Ports which have for long been left at the mercy of the weather and Ian Smith has deteriorated almost beyond repair. Up to 1978 Mozambique has suffered no less than Four hundred armed aggressions from rebel Smith, despite her difficulties Mozambique has received into the country thousands of refugees. Rebel Smith and his Government have now resorted to bombing only economic targets in Mozambique and also to the destructions of oil storage in Beira in an attempt to weaken the economy of Mozambique and thus prevent Mozambique from helping the guerrillas of the Freedom Movements. Asked about possible total closure of

the Port of Maputo to South Africa the Secretary General explained that should this happen Mozambique would suffer economically greatly since the total closure would certainly lead to unemployment of over Forty thousand workers in the Port and closing of the Maputo Port completely would cause a total collapse of Mozambique. If the Port was closed totally Mozambique would incur a loss of over one hundred million US Dollars in Foreign Exchange in one year alone. It was obvious he said that Mozambique cannot apply total sanctions against the racist regimes and be able to develop at the same time in industry.

#### TOURISM

And coming to the question of tourists of South Africans in Mozambique Secretary General said no tourists were now coming from South Africa at the moment and this has apparently led to a loss of revenue from tourism from South Africa. Mozambique is also making attempts to reduce her Foreign Trade with South Africa. He admitted, however, that there are lots of Mozambican migrant workers in South Africa and said the figure could be about over Sixteen thousand. In all the corrected that were Mozambique to apply full sanctions against South Africa the loss which Mozambique will incur will be over Three hundred Fifteen Million US Dollars.

#### AIR TRAFFIC

The Secretary General explained that until the over-throw of Portuguese colonial regime in Mozambique the country had extensive earnings with South Africa. Attempts have now been made to cut off these air links, whatever air links there are at the moment between South Africa and Mozambique are maintained essentially to bring qualified South African Technicians to maintain equipment in the essential areas of the Mozambican economy. At the moment Mozambique receives two flights per week emanating from South Africa compared to five flights per week previously.

Asked about aid received so far to safeguard the effect of the application of sanctions against South Africa and Rhodesia, the Secretary General revealed that as at present Mozambique has received a sum of One hundred Million US Dollars in aid from UN Organisations, since Mozambique imposed sanctions on the two racist regimes. This aid has mostly been on bilateral basis. On the other hand total aid so far received from the Organisation of African Unity is Twenty Million US Dollars.



### III. DISCUSSIONS WITH SWAZILAND AUTHORITIES

Below is a list of Swaziland Officials :

1. H.E. Deputy Prime Minister Sen B.M. Nsibande
2. Hon Minister of Education Canon S. Diamini
3. Hon Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, L. Mucina
4. Under Secretary Ministry of Foreign Affairs, S. Magagula
5. Senior Economic Planning Officer, Dhembe
6. Under Secretary for Commerce Industry, Mines and Tourism,  
C.H. Mikhonza.

The Sub-Committee of the OAU Sanctions Committee held discussions with the Government Team of Swaziland led by the Deputy Prime Minister of Swaziland and the OAU Officials on the 1st of June 1979. Explaining the purpose of the visit His Excellency Ambassador Simbale of Zambia in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs explained as follows:

1. In accordance with the OAU resolution CM/RES-623 adopted in Khartoum by the Council of Ministers and endorsed by the Summit, this Committee's mission to OAU member states of the Southern Region is to hold consultations with a view of looking into special circumstances affecting individual member states in the southern region within the context of application of sanctions.
2. Our mission to this part of the region affords this Committee with an opportunity of utter importance to gather data and be briefed of the problems and efforts of implementing sanctions against South Africa and Rhodesia.
3. The Committee appreciates the efforts member countries of this region are making the sacrifices, sufferings and costs they are going through to disentangle themselves from South Africa.
4. Since this Committee is the first of its kind by the OAU with a special mission, its report will be of utmost importance in future as reference document; the report will be submitted to the OAU Council of Ministers in Liberia at its next sitting.

5. The Committee would be interested, among other facts and statistical information on :
- a. Economic ties with South Africa;
  - b. A list of main items that Swaziland imports and exports to South Africa;
  - c. Problems being encountered in importing or exporting similar commodities elsewhere;
  - d. Transport and communication links with South Africa, Rhodesia and outside world;
  - e. Existence of Diplomatic and Political contacts with South Africa and Rhodesia.

Explaining the position of Swaziland the Deputy Prime Minister of Swaziland said his country has a channel of communications with Mozambique to the east of Swaziland. On the question of migrant labour from Swaziland to South Africa the Deputy Prime Minister said his country is trying to develop its local industry so that all the labour in Swaziland could be absorbed in the country in order to avoid the need for Swazis to migrate to South Africa to work. His Government was also trying to phase out the migration of labour to South Africa and said the number of Swazis going to South Africa has reduced from eighteen thousand to nine thousand at the present time but he said these figures varied according to events such as drought.

#### Customs Union

He said Swaziland is a member of the Customs Union which includes South Africa. The purpose of the union briefly is to allow movement of goods and services among countries within the region. These countries have imposed on themselves the taxes (Lesotho, Botswana, Swaziland, South Africa).

Tourism

He said that South African tourists are mostly attracted to Swaziland by the beautiful scenery of the country but attempts are being made to attract tourists from other regions of the world apart from South Africans. This will help to reduce the number of persons from South Africa in Swaziland.

Air Traffic

Asked about attempts Swaziland was making to reduce her dependency on South Africa for air traffic services, the Deputy Prime Minister explained that Swaziland is trying to be independent of South Africa in as far as air services are concerned. Towards this end Swaziland has recently established her own airline, the Royal Swazi, though it has teething problems at the moment. Swaziland would also like to develop her air links with other airlines and progress has been made in this direction; e.g. Frequent flights to Zambia.

At the end of the discussions the Deputy Prime Minister at the request of the OAU Team promised to send a full report to the OAU Secretariat at the latest by the 15th June 1979, explaining attempts his country is making towards cutting links with South Africa.

#### IV. DISCUSSION WITH BOTSWANA AUTHORITIES

The Sub-Committee comprising Algeria, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Zambia, originally planned to go to Botswana on 31/5/79 and a message to this effect was sent to the Botswana government. On 30 May 1979, just on the eve of the date scheduled for the Sub-Committee's departure, the latter was informed by the Botswana authorities that it was unfortunately impossible to hold the discussions because of visit of a foreign Head of State.

As the Sub-Committee insisted on meeting the Botswana authorities in compliance with its mandate, an appointment was finally fixed for Tuesday 5 June 1979 in Gaborone where the members of the Sub-Committee arrived on 3 June 1979 from Lusaka.

A meeting was held as planned on 5 June 1979 at the conference hall of the Ministry of Finance and Planning in Gaborone.

The Botswana Government was represented by the following:-

1. T.D. Mogami (Chairman), Deputy Secretary for External Affairs.
2. N.T.K. Mmono, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Works and Communications.

3. S.A. Mpuchare, Administrative Secretary, Office of the President.
4. O.K. Matambo, Director of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance and Development Planning.
5. E.T. Matenge, Under Secretary, Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
6. K.K. Diako, Acting Senior Commercial Officer, Ministry of Commerce and Industry.
7. A.T. Lemo, Collector of Customs and Excise, Ministry of Finance and Development Planning.
8. B.T. Motlhalame, External Affairs, Department of External Affairs.

The discussions between members of the Committee and representatives of the Botswana Government opened at 9.a.m.

After the usual formalities and exchange of words of courtesy, the Chairman of the Sub-Committee, His Excellency Mr. Kalenga Kangwa, informed the Botswana authorities about the background of the Standing Committee on Sanctions. He recalled the Committee's mandate, its various and earlier activities as well as the aim of its mission to Botswana and other countries in Southern Africa and Cape Verde. Mr. Kangwa later explained that if the Committee insisted on visiting Botswana, it was because it wanted to examine the situation on the spot and exchange views with Botswana authorities with a view to submitting as detailed a report as possible to the forthcoming OAU Summit in Monrovia, Liberia. He finally called on the representatives of the Botswana Government to

inform the Sub-Committee about the particular circumstances affecting Botswana in its application of sanctions against the minority racist regimes in Southern Africa. The Chairman reiterated that this information would enable the Standing Committee on Sanctions to appreciate the difficulties being experienced by Botswana in view of its proximity to Rhodesia and South Africa and to make appropriate recommendations on the special needs of Botswana. The Chairman of the Sub-Committee concluded by thanking the representatives of the Botswana Government for distributing to all members of the Committee a document prepared on 15 May 1979, summing up the situation of Botswana and its relations with South Africa.

As the Ministerial authorities of Botswana were very busy during the Sub-Committee's visit, the Botswana delegation to these discussions was led by the Deputy Secretary for External Affairs, Mr. T.D. MOGAMI.

Replying to the address by the Chairman of the Sub-Committee, Mr. Mogani announced to the members of the Committee that the document distributed to them had been prepared by the Botswana Government, adding that it contained information supplied by the various ministries, each on its field of activities. He said the document contained several chapters dealing with: economic relations with South Africa, the effects that sanctions against South Africa have on Botswana,

possibilities and repercussions of the application of sanctions by Botswana and the problem of oil embargo and its effects. The Botswana delegates quickly, explained the details of these chapters, adding that information given to the members of the Committee were included in the said document which reflects the views and stands of the Botswana Government on the application of sanctions (Annex IV refers).

At this juncture the Chairman of the Sub-Committee, His Excellency Ambassador Kalenga KANGWA, invited questions from members of the Sub-Committee.

Many issues were, in fact, raised. To a question as to the assistance the OAU could offer Botswana should South Africa impose an embargo (especially an oil embargo) on it the representatives of Botswana replied this question was very difficult to answer. Botswana is a land-locked country and assistance to such a country is not easy. Eighty-five percent of Botswana's imports come from South Africa and all its exports are channelled through that country.

In case of embargo on South Africa or if South Africa imposes an embargo on Botswana, the latter will have to receive its supplies by air or road through Zambia and the other countries.

This means of supply would be extremely costly and the representatives of Botswana confessed that they could not provide

assessed figures of the requirements. They however confirmed that Botswana had an urgent need of oil. Hitherto Botswana imports its oil from South Africa. As a result of the new situation created by the stoppage of oil supply to South Africa by Iran, Botswana is likely to face serious difficulties. A new source of supply should be found; even then there would still be the problem of routing. The representatives of Botswana said that without the application of sanctions Botswana suffered a lot. Imagine for one moment what would happen to this country if South Africa applied sanctions!

A member of the Sub-Committee, referring to the last paragraph of the document submitted by the Botswana government wanted to know if other alternatives for routing the consignment of Botswana's goods, outside South Africa, had been found and what was the approximate cost.

In reply to this question, the representatives of Botswana intimated that the economic situation of their country was growing worse each day, especially with regard to oil. They explained that although no study on finding a solution to this complex problem was underway, nothing concrete had been done so far. Botswana, nevertheless, was planning to approach Angola, Mozambique and Zambia for its oil supply. Even then, the routing of oil would remain a problem for it had practically no border with these countries.



The Committee members then asked two specific questions:

1) Can Botswana apply the sanctions against South Africa?

What would be the consequences ?

2) In case of South Africa applying sanctions against Botswana, what effect would this have on the latter?

The delegation of Botswana referred the Committee members to the official document distributed to them and called on them to draw their own conclusions. They pointed out that in any case the situation of Botswana would not permit it to apply sanctions against South Africa because for by breaking away from South Africa, Botswana would be cut off from the rest of the world. Botswana needed South Africa more than the latter needed it. Moreover sanctions would have more negative effect on Botswana than on South Africa. If other could do it, it was well and good but Botswana was not in a position to apply sanctions which would be more detrimental to it than to the racist South Africans. Botswana received more from South Africa than it gave it. If it applied sanctions that meant it has refused to receive. On what would Botswana live? But contrarily South Africa would not suffer much because Botswana's contribution to South Africa's economy was insignificant.

With regard to the second question relating to sanctions by South Africa against Botswana and the assistance the latter

...would need, it was clearly underlined that it would be almost impossible to satisfy Botswana's needs because the closure of border with South Africa would necessitate a complicated infrastructure concerning the construction of roads and airports to enable it to face these new difficulties. As for its exports namely, cattle, copper, nickel, etc... Botswana felt it would be utterly impossible to convey such goods by air. Asked if Botswana would be able to apply sanctions against South Africa in case if other alternatives were found the representatives of Botswana wondered if that would really be realistic. They, however, stated that if alternatives were found, Botswana might apply sanctions against South Africa. Nevertheless, they feared that no possible alternative could be found, at least for the moment, to disenclave Botswana other than the use of the South African border and that OAU would not be in a position to offer the massive assistance which the use of the air service would entail.

The delegation of Botswana added that even in case of massive assistance, the problem would remain unresolved. According to Botswana, the problem was too political. It was inexcusably linked with the very existence of the racist regimes and the security of their neighbouring countries. After reckoning the glaring facts of Botswana's dependence on South Africa, the Committee members asked if Botswana had already attempted to persuade the South African authorities to change their apartheid policy.

The reply of Botswana to this question could not be clear. It could be summed up as follows: The fact of cooperating economically with the South African regime as a must for Botswana. But politically there was a vast difference between the two countries. Botswana was entirely opposed to apartheid. It made this known clearly in its statements and its official stands. South Africans knew this very well. When they came to Botswana, they appreciated the freedom and the equality prevailing there. This, however, gave rise to reflection when they return to their country. For instance, during the official discussions in the field of customs union, it was absolutely forbidden to use the word bantu which had a racial conotation. That was an achievement, little though, it was an achievement all the same. Botswana was therefore making great effort to fight the apartheid system, but it had not been possible to have official discussions on this problem, simply because the South African racists did not accept it.

The last question related to the problem of refugees and the security of Botswana.

With regard to refugees, the Botswana delegation indicated that most of the refugees came from Southern Rhodesia. They were very many and their up-keep involved considerable expenses in the fields of administration, education, food, housing, etc.

Concerning defence, the Botswana delegation stated that this was delicate and serious field if one thought of the repeated acts of aggression of the Southern Rhodesians. Finally, it expressed the hope that the OAU Defence Force could assist Botswana.

V. DISCUSSION WITH LESOTHO AUTHORITIES

In a bid to avoid using the South African Airlines and landing in Johannesburg, the Sanctions Committee requested the Lesotho government to send a delegation to Botswana to meet members of the Committee or charter a special aircraft to transport them to Maseru.

The Lesotho authorities in fact chartered an aircraft. Members of the Sub-Committee were therefore able to go to Lesotho on 6/6/79. They arrived at Maseru at 11 o'clock local time and were led directly to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where they had a working session with the Honourable Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lesotho, H.E. C.D. MOLAPO.

Present at this meeting with H.E. MOLAPO, Minister of Foreign Affairs, were the following:

- Mr. P.K. Sephomolo, Principal Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Mr. T. Makhaola, Assistant Principal Secretary, Ministry of Trade and Industry.
- Mrs. M. Mashologu, Assistant Secretary, Ministry of Finance.
- Mr. T. Sekautsi, Director of Africa Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- Mr. A.M. Monyaka, Principal Secretary, Ministry of Planning and Economic Development.

After the two parties had finished exchanging welcome addresses and the usual formalities, the Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Sanctions, as he had done in the other countries already visited stated the objective of the Committee's mission. On behalf of the Committee he thanked the authorities of Lesotho for chartering a special aircraft to transport members of the Committee. This move, he said, was a proof of the determination of the authorities of Lesotho to cooperate with the Sanctions Committee. Finally he invited the Honourable Minister of Foreign Affairs, H.E. Mr. C.D. MOLAPO and his assistants to throw light on Lesotho's problems in connection with the application of sanctions against South Africa.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs first explained to members of the Committee that the special aircraft placed at their disposal was a contribution by Lesotho to supplement the efforts of the OAU and the individual African States in helping the neighbouring states of the racist and minority regimes in Southern Africa. Lesotho's position as explained by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and his assistants and included in a document distributed to members of the Committee is as follows:

POSITION OF LESOTHO ON THE QUESTION OF SANCTIONS  
AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA.

The International Community is opposed to the South African regime in view of the apartheid policy South Africa has practised for 300 years. Lesotho is also against the apartheid system which is best known to it by virtue of its geographical location. Lesotho experiences this system in its daily contacts with its racist neighbours, it hears about it on the air and reads about it in the press. Lesotho has tried on several occasions to enter into contact with the racist South Africans with a view to dissuading them to change this abominable policy of racial discrimination. The South Africans always simply retort that it is all an internal matter and that it is their way of life. Nevertheless, they have accepted to eliminate little by little a minor aspect of apartheid, but as far as Lesotho is concerned, apartheid is an indivisible entity which must absolutely be destroyed through a war, sanctions and if need be through military intervention. Lesotho has learned to understand that the racist South Africans can only be persuaded by these three measures. The International Community should be able to impose mandatory sanctions on the South African regime in compliance with chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Although Lesotho is totally enclaved by South Africa, it has undertaken to support the International Community's efforts to impose total embargo on the racist regime of South Africa. It will continue to do so as long as the South African regime remains intransigent especially on the question of Namibia and Zimbabwe. South Africa has been increasing its acts of aggression against Zambia, Angola, Botswana and Mozambique, Lesotho citizens are killed each month either by the South African police or farmers. This is a very grave situation which calls for special attention.

Finally the refusal of the South African regime to change its policy of apartheid is of permanent concern to Lesotho.

In the case of the application of mandatory sanctions against the South African regime in pursuance of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, Lesotho has enormous difficulties. Despite these difficulties, Lesotho will never oppose the votes for mandatory sanctions. On the contrary, it supports such votes because it hates apartheid against which it has been fighting since the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, the position of Lesotho must be clearly understood. Despite its clear and unequivocal position on the question, Lesotho will neither vote for sanctions. It will abstain from voting for obvious reasons. Lesotho would like the OAU to understand its position and neutrality as far as voting is concerned.



This position should therefore not be regarded as cowerdice because Lesotho has certain obligations and has to "play its cards" in order to avoid any problems the South African regime may create for this country.

If the mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter are decided, the International Community should not lose sight of the relevant provisions of Article 50 of the UN Charter.

Having for a long time fought against apartheid, Lesotho has since independence taken a number of precautions regarding the application of sanctions. Since 1966, Lesotho has endeavoured to reduce its dependence on South Africa. Prior to independence, one had to transit South Africa in order to go from one point to another in the country. Today the situation has improved considerably. Roads and other infrastructures have been constructed. Some efforts have been made in the field of industry. Despite these efforts, 45,000 Lesotho workers still work in South Africa. Eighty percent of Lesotho's imports come from South Africa. Lesotho depends entirely on South Africa in areas of transport, communications and energy (electric and oil). Seventy-five per cent of Lesotho's income is derived from the Customs Union which comprises South Africa, Botswana and Swaziland. To reduce this quasi-total dependence, the government of Mozambique has established a weekly air link with Maseru. This operation by Air Mozambique has perhaps

so far been carried out at a loss. It is however an example of the sort of assistance a friendly country can give another friendly country like Lesotho.

If Lesotho were not so dependent on South Africa it would be more vocal and arrogant towards it. However in its present situation it is obliged to be realistic. On the other hand the fact still remains that Lesotho and its partners of the Customs Union have categorically rejected South Africa's attempts to help Bophutathswana and Transkei become members of the Customs Union. The same is the case with Rhodesia with which South Africa maintains customs relations only on a bilateral basis.

In the face of these difficulties, Lesotho needs the assistance of the OAU and the whole International Community. This assistance is indispensable especially in the field of energy and more significantly with regard to oil supply. To this end, Lesotho's Minister of Foreign Affairs reported that the four members of South African Customs Union (South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland) had met lately to consider the problem of oil prices, following the decision of Iran to stop its oil supply to South Africa. South Africa informed the three other members of the Union that it would reduce its supplies to them by 30 percent and increase prices by 15 percent. This situation, the Honourable Foreign Minister of Lesotho said, would have adverse effects on its economy as a whole and especially on its agriculture, and would hamper the numerous

on-going economic projects. The Minister finally appealed to the OAU to assist his country to set up its own refinery and find other sources of supply of refined oil. He however acknowledged the fact that the problem of transport still remained serious because any consignment would have in one way or another to pass through South Africa. This in short is Lesotho's position which has more lucidly been explained and developed in the document submitted to the Sub-Committee as Annex V.

After hearing explanations on the official position of the Government of Lesotho and the difficulties facing the latter, the Chairman of the Sub-Committee thanked the Honourable Minister of Foreign Affairs for his explanations. He assured him that his explanations were noted with much interest and would be faithfully reflected in the report to be submitted to the OAU sessions in Monrovia. The Chairman then invited his colleagues to ask questions.

The first question was on the problem created for Lesotho by refugees, and the defence and security of this country vis-a-vis aggressive South Africa.

This, the honourable Foreign Minister said, was a very important question. Lesotho, he went on, has been a host country of refugees since the nineteenth century. This has

been a tradition and a way of life for the Basothos. Many refugees come from South Africa. They flee from the persecution due to the apartheid system. They also flee from educational system in the Bantustans. On their arrival in Lesotho, they are well received. The children go to school and the adults are employed in both the private and public sectors without any discrimination whatsoever. They share all facilities with our nationals. In short, they are fully integrated in the society, and there are no refugee camps in Lesotho. They also co-operate because they understand the situation of Lesotho and often ask to leave for other countries. This is done with the help of the UN High Commission for Refugees and Air Mozambique flights to Maseru have facilitated the operations.

The Honourable Minister of Foreign Affairs pointed out that that these refugees however constitute a heavy burden for his country, especially in the area of education. Their presence also pose a security problem to Lesotho because as South Africa cannot bomb them in camps which are non-existent, resorts to kidnapping operations within Lesotho. This, the Minister concluded, is a very serious problem affecting the security and defence of Lesotho.

Another question was asked on the extent of South African investments in Lesotho.

The Honourable Foreign Minister and his assistants, in reply, said it was not very easy to make a clear distinction between South African and other investments, because the investors are most often multinational corporations which invest there through their branches. On the other hand, there are many investments which apparently belong to businessmen of Lesotho but which in reality come from South Africa. They added that Lesotho has recently established a national financial and monetary system which will help control better the economic activities of the country.

One of the members of the Sub-Committee asked whether Lesotho has an oil refinery and whether it had other sources of energy such as already refined oil.

The answer to this question is as follows:

Lesotho has no oil refinery. It therefore needs refined oil. If it is supplied with crude oil it will be obliged to have it refined by South Africa.

Concerning other sources of energy, Lesotho has considerable potentialities because most rivers in the region take their sources from Lesotho. This country can therefore construct dams for hydroelectricity, but this is a long-term project which has already been estimated at 400 million dollars. The problem is to find the necessary capital.

To the question as to whether South Africans need visas to enter Lesotho and vice versa, the Honourable Minister replied that there was free movement of people and goods between the four member states of the South African Customs Union.

The meeting ended at 1:30 p.m. and informal discussions continued during a lunch offered by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

This was followed by a visit to the Prime Minister's Office by members of the Sub-Committee led by the Honourable Minister of Foreign Affairs, H.E. Mr. C.D. MOLAPO. For almost one hour, the Prime Minister of Lesotho

defined the position of his country on the question of sanctions. He said he was happy to receive the Sub-Committee of Sanctions and strongly supported its assignment. He assured the Sub-Committee that although Lesotho is completely enclaved by South Africa, it had no sympathy whatsoever for apartheid, and unreservedly supported all measures OAU might take with a view to eliminating apartheid and its related problems. The Prime Minister then highlighted in particular the assistance needed by Lesotho to surmount its difficulties resulting from the oil crisis. Lesotho he emphasized, would never fail in its commitments to the liberation of Africa. On many occasions, he pointed out, my country and myself have been approached

and millions of dollars proposed to us to support apartheid, but we have rejected this shameful offer.

The Chairman of the Sub-Committee of Sanctions, H.E. Ambassador Kalenga Kangwa, on behalf of all members of the Committee, warmly thanked the Prime Minister of Lesotho,

for the warm hospitality extended to the Committee and especially for the firm commitment of Lesotho to the liberation of Africa and against apartheid. He reiterated the assurances already given to his Minister of Foreign Affairs that a very faithful report would be submitted to the Council of Ministers and the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at their next Sessions in Monrovia.

## VI. VISIT TO CAPE VERDE AND TALKS WITH THE AUTHORITIES

Pursuant to the decision taken at the ministerial meeting of the Sanctions Committee held in Lusaka, Zambia, from 28 to 29 May 1979, a sanctions sub-committee was to visit Cape Verde before 15 June 1979. Algeria, Ghana and Zambia were appointed members of the sub-committee.

The sub-Committee, in fact, arrived in SAILE, one of the Cape Verde islands, on 14 June 1979. It was composed of :

- H.E. Mr. Kalenga KANGWA, Ambassador of Zambia to Addis Ababa, Chairman.
- H.E. Mr. Abderrahmane BENSID, Ambassador of Algeria to Tanzania, Rapporteur.
- Mr. Vénant NZOMITTA, Chief of Sanctions Section, representative of the Secretariat.

The Sub-committee members spent the morning of 15 June 1979 visiting the island and the SAILE International Airport before going to PRATA, capital of Cape Verde, at noon. At 3 p.m. the Sub-Committee members were received by H.E. the Minister of Transport and his assistants. After welcoming members of the sub-committee and wishing them a happy and fruitful stay, the Minister of Transport made a brief statement on the economic situation of the archipelago and also on the efforts made by the Government for the development of the country and the welfare of the people. He informed the Committee members that his statement was but an introduction to the discussions they were going to have with a team of Experts from the various ministries.

The Chairman of the Sub-Committee, H.E. Ambassador Kangwa, thanked the Minister of Transport and through him the Government of Cape Verde for the warm reception extended to the sub-Committee members since their arrival in the archipelago. After explaining to him the aim of the sub-Committee's mission, he expressed the desire to start discussions immediately with the team of experts so as to gain time especially as they had to visit SANTIAGO ISLAND.



After greeting the Minister of Transport, who received them on behalf of the Government, the sub-committee members proceeded to a meeting hall of the Ministry of Transport where they held official talks with the following Cape Verdian Government Representatives :

Name	Title
1) Mr. Renato Cardoso	Director General of Political, Economic and Cultural Affairs
2) Mr. Calisto ESTROLE	Director General of Civil Aviation
3) Mr. Virgilio Fernandes	Director General of Planning
4) Mr. Filinto A. Silva Porreea	Director of Air Transport
5) Mr. Caldeira Marques	Legal Expert

Serious discussions started at 3.45 p.m.

The Representative of Cape Verde, Mr. Renato Cardoso, Director General of Political, Economic and Cultural Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, right-started by stating his country's position on apartheid. He said that his country's position in connection with apartheid was well known. This he said had been stated and reiterated several times by the Government and the Party (PAIGC) and there was no need to tarry on it.

He noted, for his part, that it was more important and urgent to help Cape Verde in its development efforts and at doing away with its excessive dependence on foreign countries. He suggested to the members of the sub-committee to listen, first of all, to two statements one of which dealt with the general economic situation of the country and the other, specifically the SALE International Airport. Members should then visit the hinterland to study, on the spot, the agricultural situation and the problem created by the ten-year drought and finally ask questions on issues needing clarifications.

The Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Sanctions, His Excellency Ambassador Kalonga KANGWA in turn took the floor. He explained the aim of the Sub-Committee's mission and expressed satisfaction at the Sub-Committee's programme which he said he had fully approved on behalf of his colleagues, members of the Sub-Committee.

He then called on the representatives of the Cape Verde Government to begin their statements by paying special attention to the specific circumstances affecting Cape Verde with the context of the application of sanctions.

First Statement : General Economic Situation of Cape Verde

Some information and figures which were provided by way of simple illustrations showed the economic situation and prospects of Cape Verde.

Cape Verde is an island country measuring 4000 km<sup>2</sup> with 300,000 inhabitants. The Santiago Island where PRAL, the capital is situated is the largest of the group of islands. It has an area of 1000 km<sup>2</sup> with half the population of the Archipelago.

It is well known that Cape Verde is among the least developed countries. It has a very low Gross National Product and depends heavily on foreign sources. In fact, the Gross National Product covers only 60% of the country's expenditure while the remaining 40% is derived from outside especially from foreign assistance, imports and remittances from nationals working abroad. Two-thirds of the national's consumption come from imports.

Cape Verde has a service economy i.e. 55% of GDP. This economy is characterized, inter alia, by the lack of national saving. The little investments made come from outside and the national budget is mostly fed by duties and taxes raised on imported foreign goods. The balance of payment is in serious deficit. Out of an active population of 93,000 only 33,000 are in permanent employment. The majority of the population is rural and therefore lives on agriculture; but unfortunately it has not rained for nearly 12 years.

Nevertheless, great efforts have been made since the 4 years of independence especially in agricultural mechanisation and productive infrastructure.

Second Statement : SAIS INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

Background Information on the airport : The "Amilcar Cabral" Airport, built on the Salo Island which is one of the 10 islands constituting the Cape Verde Archipelago, is the only International Airport in the country.

It was built as a military airport in 1948. Later on it was developed. In 1963 however, with funds from South Africa. It was transformed into an international airport by the Portuguese Government to accommodate large planes. According to information collected on March 1979, SAILE Airport brings in 29.8 million Escudos in revenue. (US \$ = 236 Cape Verde Escudos). This revenue is derived from handling and handling charges. The "South African Airways" carries out 24 flights a week including non scheduled flights. The use of this airport by planes of the "South African Airways" which are mostly Boeing 747 yielded revenues estimated at 19.3 million Escudos in 1979, representing 65% of the total revenue from the airport. To this should be added other revenue paid by the South African Airways for other related services. Aside from revenues from the handling of planes and other services, SAILE airport employs 300 persons and constitutes, for the Cape Verde, the only opening to the outside world. On the whole, the inhabitants of the SAILE Island, between 6000 and 7000, depend directly on the "Amilcar Cabral" Airport for their livelihood.

A document stating more clearly the situation in Cape Verde and of the "Amilcar Cabral" airport is attached as Annex VI.

After these two exposes on the general economic situation and the "Amilcar Cabral" airport, questions were invited from members of the sub-committee. The first question was whether it would be possible to make an exact estimate of the resources of the country on the basis of its relations with the South African regime. They clearly specified that they wanted to know what losses Cape Verde would incur and the repercussions these would have on the population in case Cape Verde broke relations with South Africa, relations established due to understandable historical circumstances.

Cape Verde's reply to this question is as follows :

It is easy to throw light on the financial, customs and economic losses as well as other specific data, for instance in the tourist sector etc. One thing must be pointed out, however, and that is besides the material resources provided by the "Amilcar Cabral" airport it is also the only pole of attraction and constitutes an essential factor in the dynamic development of the country. It is therefore very difficult to make an accurate evaluation.

Members of the Sub-Committee explained to the Cape Verde representatives that their terms of reference were essentially on this aspect and that the evaluation of losses to be incurred by Cape Verde in case of a break in its relations with South Africa should enable OAU consider the possibility of offering it adequate assistance.

The representatives of Cape Verde reaffirmed that it was impossible to replace the services rendered by the airport with a mere financial compensation. The ban on South African Airways from using the Salé airport, they said, would amount to closing the airport. In fact, it seemed that very few airlines were interested in the airport, due to lack of water and other appropriate infrastructures. The Cape Verde representatives recalled that most of the permanent jobs of Salé Island were created by virtue of the existence of the airport and that in case of its closure, maintenance of these services would not be guaranteed.

The members of the Sub-Committee objected and said they did not expect the airport to be closed, rather it should continue to operate with services replacing those normally rendered by South African Airways. The representatives of Cape Verde categorically asserted that objectively speaking, the closure of the airport to South African Airways would soon amount to the closure of the airport with all the repercussions entailed thereby. They proposed that, rather, efforts should be concentrated on the development of the country and creation of jobs; only then could South African flights be stopped without much difficulty.

Members of the Sub-Committee then asked the following question : In case OAU granted Cape Verde assistance to develop its fishing industry for instance, or other industries, and Cape Verde equally accepted to make some sacrifices, would this not solve the unemployment problem that would be caused by the cancellation of South African planes' landing rights ?

Replying, the representatives of Cape Verde indicated that their country had already done much to reduce its foreign dependence. Cape Verde had geared its efforts towards the hydraulic, fishing and salt industries etc.. They added that as soon as these industries got underway, it would be possible to make a transfer of personnel. They said however, that the existence of the "Amílcar Cabral" international airport was vital because not only is it the sole door open to the outside world but also it constitutes a strategic point and a threshold for development.

Members of the Committee revealed they had never related this problem to the closure of the Sale Airport. They said the question of break in relations with South Africa should not be tied with the closure of the Airport because it was the feeling that the Airport could continue to exist and operate normally without South Africa, provided Cape Verde was given the necessary assistance. They added that the building of a hotel of international standing could for instance attract tourists and consequently other international airlines.

In reply, representatives of Cape Verde said that theoretically the airport would continue to operate without South African aircraft, but that in practice, this was not correct because other airlines were not interested in the market. This, they added, might be realised later when the development projects now under study became operational.

The last question was whether Cape Verde had other links with South Africa apart from Sale International Airport. The reply to this question was negative. After this meeting which had lasted almost two hours, members of the Committee, accompanied by the representatives of the Cape Verde Government, toured Santiago Island and saw for themselves the important agricultural achievements in the area. These achievements were unfortunately hampered by natural disasters which practically neutralised their effects. It seemed there had not been any rain in the Archipelago for 12 years, and this resulted in drought which considerably hindered agricultural development.

The Sub-Committee left the Archipelago convinced that this country was in need of urgent and substantial assistance to enable it steer out of its difficulties.

### CONCLUSION

The visit of the Sanctions Committee to the independent countries in Southern Africa and Cape Verde was carried out in very good conditions and the discussions with the authorities of these countries were pregnant with a spirit of cordiality, frankness and mutual understanding.

From these discussions, facts and realities, it emerged that the countries in Southern Africa and Cape Verde are by their very nature and historical circumstances linked with South Africa.

In the case of some of these countries, a complete break with South Africa is very difficult if not impossible as they are totally enclaved or have inherited certain economic and technical structures from colonisation.

Others on the other hand; could sever all relations with South Africa without this being fatal to them, provided they can find alternate solutions to both the problems of this change and the means to make these solutions workable.

Some of these solutions have been proposed and the needs resulting from the application of sanctions were outlined by the States concerned themselves.

It is now incumbent on Member States to endeavour to find the appropriate means to meet these needs.

One thing certain is that the countries in Southern Africa, and Cap Verde are resolved to apply as much as they possibly can, sanctions against the apartheid regime. Their determination to do so could surely not be doubted.

The Committee on Sanctions for its part, deems it necessary to formulate a number of recommendations which if approved, would help the countries in Southern Africa, and Cape Verde apply the sanctions without serious repercussions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Standing Committee on Sanctions has the honour to make the following recommendations:

- 1) Member-countries should fully cooperate with the OAU General Secretariat by communicating to it the necessary information on the application of sanctions.
- 2) Travelling and living expenses of all the missions of the Sanctions Committee should be borne by O.A.U. so as to alleviate the financial burden on Member States of the Committee.
- 3) The Sanctions Committee should further be mandated to have other consultations with OPEC member countries so as to consider together the role of international oil companies in the breaking of sanctions. These consultations have become necessary by dint of developments in the situation caused by Iran's historic decision which has affected oil supply to South Africa.
- 4) All International oil companies which supply oil to South Africa should be blacklisted in all African States.
- 5) Liberia and Somalia should be called upon to withdraw their flags of convenience from all ships found guilty of collaborating with the racist South African regimes.
- 6) a) All African Countries which continue to maintain air links with South Africa are being called upon to break these links and refuse all planes from and to South Africa permission to fly over their territories and the use of their airports.  
b) Meanwhile special allowances be made for Cape Verde and countries bordering South Africa in the implementation of the above recommendation, because of their present geopolitical and economic circumstances.

- 7) The use of the services of the HALSEHERE consultancy group should be authorized for a period of one year.
- 8) Supply of oil to Southern African States affected by the effects of the oil embargo imposed on South Africa, should be envisaged.
- 9) a) The possibility of granting massive financial assistance to African countries bordering South Africa and Cape Verde so as to enable them obviate the difficulties caused by the application of sanctions.  
b) The Committee on Sanctions should establish further consultations with the States mentioned above so as to identify their specific needs and other forms of cooperation with them.



CM/971(XXIII)

ANNEX I

FIRST MINISTERIAL MEETING OF

THE STANDING COMMITTEE

ON SANCTIONS

Lusaka, Zambia

April 26, 1979

REPORTS OF THE SECOND AND THIRD MEETINGS  
OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON SANCTIONS  
AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL

REPORT OF THE SECOND MEETING OF THE  
STANDING COMMITTEE ON SANCTIONS HELD  
IN NAIROBI on FEBRUARY 28, 1979  
BY AMBASSADORS ACCREDITED TO ETHIOPIA

The second meeting of the Standing Committee on Sanctions was held in Nairobi, Kenya, on February 28, 1978 at the Kenyatta Conference Centre.

All Member States of the Committee were represented.

The meeting chaired by the Zambian Ambassador in Addis Ababa, H.E. Mr. Kalenga Kangwa, began at 10:30 a.m. The purpose of the meeting was the consideration of a draft agenda hailing the decision of Iran's new leaders to apply sanctions against the racist regime of South Africa.

In fact, the members of the Committee on Sanctions discussed a draft resolution on Iran. The amended draft was transmitted to the Drafting Committee of the Plenary which, in turn, amended it before having it adopted by the Council of Ministers.

The resolution was unanimously adopted under symbol no. CN/Res.685(XXXIII) entitled "Resolution" expressing appreciation for Iran's Decision to apply the Sanctions Adopted Against the Racist and Minority Regimes of Southern Africa."

The meeting which lasted two hours ended at 12:30 p.m.

Done in Nairobi on February 28, 1979

REPORT OF THE THIRD MEETING OF THE STANDING  
COMMITTEE ON SANCTIONS HELD IN ADDIS ABABA  
ON MARCH 26, 1979 AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL

The OAU Standing Committee on Sanctions held its third meeting at Ambassadorial level in Addis Ababa on March 26, 1979 at the General Secretariat.

All Member States of the Committee were represented, namely:

Algeria  
Gabon  
Ghana  
Libya  
Nigeria  
Sierra Leone  
Zambia

Opening the meeting, the Chairman observed that the said meeting had been scheduled to take place on February 8, 1979 in Addis Ababa but could not be held owing to unforeseen circumstances.

The Chairman then proposed that committee members consider resolution CM/Res. 685 (XXXII) on Iran, adopted by the 32nd Session of the Council of Ministers and make proposals for its application. He recalled, in particular, paragraph 6 of the resolution which was specifically addressed to the Committee. The Chairman said that the Ad Hoc Committee on Oil Embargo had not been able to visit Iran because the former leaders of that country had refused to receive the Committee.

He then opened the discussion on the Subject.

The General Secretariat, in the person of Dr. Onu, took the floor and pointed out to the Committee that what the resolution called for was very simple, namely that a copy be forwarded to the Iranian authorities. He said that the new Government of Iran had done what was needed by severing all relations with South Africa and that the transmission of the resolution would be a token of OAU's gratitude.

The representative of Nigeria, H.E. Ambassador Clark, spoke in favour of the General Secretariat's proposal to communicate the text of the Resolution to Iran. He suggested that the Committee take note of the resolution and refer it to the Ministerial meeting of the Committee which alone could decide on the action to be taken regarding paragraphs 5 and 6.

Following an exchange of views on the matter, the Committee decided to take note of the resolution, transmit it to the Iranian authorities through their Embassy in Addis Ababa and leave the decision on paragraphs 5 and 6 to the Ministerial Committee.

The Chairman invited the members of the Committee to pass to the item concerning the date and venue of the next ministerial meeting of the Committee on Sanctions. He then proposed that it be held in Lusaka, Zambia. Taking into account the time-table of meetings and the availability of the Ministers, the Chairman asked the Committee to meet from April 27 - 30, 1979.

The members of the Committee took the floor in turns in support of the Chairman's proposal for the meeting to be held in Lusaka, Zambia from April 27 - 30, 1979. The Chairman thanked the members of the Committee for their support of his proposal. He promised them he would contact his Government immediately so that the necessary arrangements could be made to host the meeting. He asked them to get in touch with their Ministers as well.

The Chairman concluded by saying that the General Secretariat would be informed of the final decision following consultation with the Ministers.

At this point, one delegation asked whether the members of the Committee were sure to be in Lusaka in view of difficulties of flight connections. It wanted to know if the itinerary for the countries to be visited would be prepared in Addis Ababa or Lusaka.

This question retained the attention of many of the other delegations which called on the General Secretariat to throw light on it.

After an exchange of views regarding flying over South African Territory, air and ground facilities to be used, South African Visa, itinerary and so on, it was decided to convene the Ministerial meeting in Lusaka on 28 April 1979 and undertake the mission on 29 April 1979 according to the itinerary to be drawn up in Lusaka. It was further agreed that as regards the question of flying over South African territory, both the governments of Lesotho and Botswana, dwelling on their experiences, could find a solution to that problem.

The Chairman called for the consideration of the draft agenda of the Ministerial meeting of the Committee on Sanctions:

After a brief discussion, the following agenda was adopted

MINISTERIAL MEETING OF STANDING COMMITTEE OF SEVEN ON  
SANCTIONS AGAINST THE RACIST REGIMES, LUSAKA, ZAMBIA

28 MARCH 1979

- 1) Opening Ceremony
- 2) Election of officers by the Ministers
- 3) Adoption of the agenda
- 4) Organization of work
- 5) Reports of the First, Second and Third meetings of the Committee on Sanctions at Ambassadorial level
- 6) Report of the Secretary-General on the application of Sanctions
- 7) Sanctions Control System within the General Secretariat to enable member states communicate the necessary information on the application of the various resolutions on Sanctions and oil embargo against the racist regimes of Southern Africa.

In reply, the General Secretariat said that the Ambassadorial meeting of the Committee would prepare the meeting of Ministers. According to the General Secretariat, the programme could be drawn up by the Ambassadors subject to approval and amendment by the Ministers. The General Secretariat concluded by saying that any programme drawn up by the Ambassador would be communicated immediately to the Ministers for their consideration.

The Chairman therefore suggested that the members of the Committee should attend the Ministerial meeting of the Committee in Lusaka. From Lusaka, the Chairman said, the Committee could visit the various countries of Southern Africa before returning to Lusaka or going to another Capital city of their choice to adopt the report. According to the Chairman, the tour could be completed between 28 April and 7 May 1979.

One Delegation felt that it would probably be impossible to visit all the countries in seven days. It therefore suggested that the Committee break up into sub-committees in order to expedite matters and also because of difficult flight connections.

With regard to the latter question, the Chairman said that although it had previously been decided that the Committee would break up into Sub-Committees, it would be preferable if the final decision were left at the discretion of the Ministers. He gave assurance that there would be no serious problems regarding air connections since flights were relatively frequent between Lusaka, Maputo and Gaseromas.

- 8) Report of the Administration Secretary-General in collaboration and co-operation with the United Nations Committee on Sanctions, the League of Arab States and the Commonwealth, and the OAU's appeal for the strengthening of the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on Apartheid, and the centre against Apartheid.
- 9) Report of the Administrative Secretary-General on the strengthening of the Sanctions section of the General-Secretariat and the establishment of machinery and modalities to assist the Sanctions Committee.
- 10) Report of the Administrative Secretary-General on the efforts being made by the African Group at the United Nations on the question of convening the Security Council to consider the Oil Supply Embargo.
- 11) The need for further consultations with OPEC member countries in Latin America, South-East Asia, Middle-East on ways and means of ensuring the effective application of Sanctions especially the Oil Embargo in the light of Resolution CE/Res.685(XXXII) on Oil Embargo adopted by the Revolutionary Government of Iran against the racist regimes in Southern Africa and the Zionist regime of Israel.
- 12) Consideration of any other form of Sanctions against the South African regimes, regarding such matters as air links, trade, sports, diplomatic political relations and so forth.
- 13) (a) Consideration of specific circumstances affecting individual Southern African States and Cape Verde Islands within the context of the application of Sanctions.



(13) Proposed visits of consultation to Botswana,  
Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia, Cape Verde and L. ...

14) Consideration of the possibility of using the services  
of consultants to assist the Sanctions Committee.

15) Date and venue of the next meeting.

16) Other Business.

SPEECH BY THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON. H.M. CHAKULYA MP  
ON THE OCCASION OF THE MEETING OF THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN  
UNITY STANDING COMMITTEE ON SANCTIONS AGAINST RACIST REGIMES OF  
SOUTHERN AFRICA - LUSAKA - 28TH MAY 1979

His Excellency, The Assistant Secretary-General of the OAU  
Excellencies, Distinguished Members of the Standing Committee,  
Distinguished Representatives of Liberation Movements,  
Excellencies and  
Dear Comrades,

I have great pleasure in extending to you all, on behalf of His Excellency the President, the party and its Government, fraternal greetings and warm welcome to our country. We in Zambia, consider the choice of Lusaka as the venue for the fourth session of the OAU Standing Committee on Sanctions Against Racist Minority Regimes of Southern Africa, as a source of gratification and inestimable privilege. It is indeed a great honour shown to the people of Zambia.

May I at the same time convey our sincere apologies for not being able to hold the meeting last month as was scheduled due to some unforeseen circumstances. We are however most encouraged that despite the unavoidable postponement, you are able to be here today. This demonstrates once more your serious commitment to the cause, principles and goals of the organisation of African Unity.

We in Zambia attach special significance to the present session of your Standing Committee in view of the new developments which are unfolding in a most crucial and decisive manner in Southern Africa. The liberation struggle in Rhodesia and Namibia has assumed a new dimension which will inevitably usher in a new era, either for the best or for the worst. There is in this region, increased tension and an ever escalating confrontation between the forces of freedom and oppression.

I feel that we cannot treat the question of sanctions against minority regimes in Southern Africa separately from the whole concept of the struggle for the liberation in that area, whose ultimate objective is to end and remove oppression and racism. Sanctions are therefore but, another weapon in the arsenal of the liberation struggle.

Before I speak on the question of sanctions, I would like, with your permission to briefly talk to you about the current situation presently obtaining in two main areas of Southern Africa, namely Rhodesia and Namibia. I am doing so with a view to underlining the importance we attach to the present session of the Committee.

Excellencies,

Distinguished Delegates and

Dear Comrades,

Zimbabwe and Namibia are areas where we in the Organisation of African Unity need to harness more efforts and apply extra pressure in order to eradicate the shameful schemings of domination, racism and oppression.

Only recently in Zimbabwe, the white rebels and their black puppets in collusion with the racists in South Africa, and with the collaboration of their Western allies have once again tried to abuse the confidence and the patience of the progressive forces of the world. Under a constitution which was no more legal or valid than the UDI constitution, they conducted sham elections and sought to instal a regime which is no less illegal than the one which existed since the rebellion. There can be no question of such elections being fair, representative and democratic, as some western circles seem to suggest.



For we all know that the Patriotic Front, the major political movement, and undoubtedly a determining force in the shaping of future Zimbabwe was systematically kept out of the scheme.

We have heard plans to extend recognition to the new Rhodesian puppet government. History will judge those responsible and their countries will go on record as traitors of democracy. They will eventually have to account for their mis-deeds to the people of Zimbabwe soon or later.

In Namibia, racist South Africa is planning another internal settlement in total defiance of the relevant general assembly and Security Council Resolutions of the United Nations. It is important for all progressive forces of the world to watch this development very carefully and ensure that no bogus settlement is allowed in this territory. There can be no genuine independence in Namibia without the full participation of the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO).

In both Zimbabwe and Namibia, racist South Africa is the key force behind all the manoeuvres calculated to entrench domination and oppression. It is therefore necessary for the progressive world to fight and remove the iniquitous of apartheid policy in South Africa and restore human dignity and freedom for the rightful sons of that territory.

Excellencies,

Distinguished Delegates,

We can now, against this brief account of events, realise the need for us in the OAU and particularly in this committee, to sharpen up all the weapons in our hands in order to defeat the enemy. The holding of the meeting of the Sanctions Committee is therefore so timely and indeed opportune. We need to act with expedition.

The question of applying sanctions against racist regimes in Southern Africa has been with us for several years. It has been discussed at length at several meetings of the United Nations and the OAU. Several resolutions and decisions have since been taken calling for the immediate implementation of sanctions, and yet, it must be accepted, very little has been done in this respect.

There are countries which, though being so out-spoken in favour of sanctions, have in the backyard supported and financed minority regimes in Southern Africa.

It is therefore our duty to identify those responsible for the bursting of sanctions. This committee, I believe is well indicated to collect and analyse all the information relating to sanctions, bursting by the enemies of freedom in Africa.

It is, however important that your committee should look at the economic difficulties which some of our countries, particularly in Southern Africa have to face arising from their geographical position. I note with gratitude that the distinguished members of this committee will undertake visits to some of those countries with a view to discussing this particular problem with their governments.

Speaking from my country's own experience, Zambia had learnt the bitter way, but with bravery, the effects of economic sanctions. I have no doubt that other sister countries may have experienced the same ordeal.

It is with this in mind, that we expect your committee to seriously look at this problem and recommend the measures needed to overcome these economic difficulties, so that we can address the existing loopholes, and ensure an effective application of the law. We stand to be guided by your committee in this respect.

I wish to assure you that the Zambian Government is prepared to hold discussions with your committee on this matter, and is well disposed to supply whatever information you need for the successful completion of your mission.

Once again, I would like to wish you a good stay in Zambia and success for your deliberations.

I thank you.

ADDRESS BY HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT KENNETH DAVID KAJUNDA  
TO THE OAU STANDING COMMITTEE ON SANCTIONS AGAINST RACIST  
REGIMES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, LUSAKA, 29TH MAY, 1979

Comrade Chairman,  
Distinguished Delegates,  
And Comrades,

I must add my personal welcome to those you have already received from my colleagues on behalf of the Party, the Government and the people of Zambia. I consider your presence and the choice of Lusaka as the venue for the 4th session of the OAU Standing Committee on Sanctions Against Racist Minority Regimes of Southern Africa as a great honour and privilege for Zambia. I extend to you all fraternal greetings and warmest welcome.

May I at the same time convey our sincere apologies for not being able to hold the meeting last month as was scheduled due to some unforeseen circumstances. We are however most encouraged that despite the unavoidable postponement, you have been able to be here to-day. This demonstrates once more your serious commitment to the cause, principles and goals of the Organisation of African Unity.

We in Zambia attach special significance to the present session of your Standing Committee. The Liberation struggle in Namibia and Rhodesia is going past a most decisive watershed. After what is currently going on there things will never be the same again.

I felt therefore that it was important for me to speak to you briefly on this present occasion of your meeting in Lusaka. I want to speak in reference to two matters, namely, the importance of sanctions in the struggle by the peoples of the African continent to free themselves from exploitation and domination; secondly, the experience of Zambia with sanctions.



About ten years ago, the Manifesto on Southern Africa laid down two alternatives with which the peoples of Africa and the progressive world can meet the challenges of oppression and racism in Southern Africa. These were (a) negotiation supported by maximum social pressure and (b) armed struggle once negotiation fails. The alternative of war follows logically upon the failure of the appeals to the humanity of the oppressors through reasoned negotiation supported by maximum social pressure.

It is hoped that those who, for any reason, cannot support war as a weapon for liberation can exert their effort through the first alternative of negotiation and maximum social pressure to speed up the removal of racist oppression. Sanctions are therefore a key weapon in the arsenal of the people's liberation in the world of to-day. The Standing Sanctions Committee of the Organisation of African Unity is therefore one of the key fighting instruments of the people of Africa.

It is the responsibility of your committee not just to watch the application and observance of sanctions but to shape up this weapon on behalf of the OAU. You must lose no time. You must work extremely hard to provide the OAU and the people of Africa and the progressive forces of the world a "sanctions bomb". You have to research hard to build your weapon because a devastating "sanctions bomb" cannot come out of one or a few formal sessions per year. You are called upon by the leaders of this continent to spearhead a very serious programme action.

While the objective of Sanctions is to exert pressure on racists in Southern Africa to drop oppression. Africa will have to develop a "sanctions bomb" to apply on any supporter of our oppressors operating outside the Continent. Africa must as quickly as possible be able to "bomb" organisations, "bomb" systems, "bomb" countries that give the objected support to racism and oppression in Southern Africa.

A way must be found whereby Sanctions against racism in Southern Africa are applied on operators outside Southern Africa. Africa will have to pressure others to apply sanctions on supporters of racism. Africa has to develop the capacity to drop the "sanctions bomb" on those insisting on fuelling, financing and arming racism on the continent. The Continent now has resources which can be mobilised to make possible the attack on trading and other operations in any country of the world which are committed to supporting racism in Africa.

Comrade Chairman and Comrades, I am speaking this from a personal experience. There is no country which has faced up to economic sanctions as Zambia has done. We have learnt the bitter truth that many persons, organisations and governments outside the African continent who have been shouting salvation through sanctions have in practice in their countries meant and done exactly the opposite.

In the case of Rhodesia where the sanctions alternative has been preferred to war by some in the last fourteen years, some of those who have been most vocal in favour of sanctions have been the greatest supporters of the racist minority regime of Rhodesia. They have fuelled the regime, armed and financed it all the time.

I will give you only one example. The scandal of the oil sanctions against Rhodesia. For a long time, despite sanctions, the world accepted the situation where everybody knew the oil and other essential products were passing freely into Rhodesia to maintain the illegal regime. Although there was too much talking, the world avoided the issue. Many countries winked at the breach of their own laws on the grounds of political expediency.

It is known that the successive British Governments were the loudest promoters of sanctions but nonetheless most of the oil for rebel Rhodesia was being provided by British oil companies. These companies, Shell and B.P. and the British Government knew full well all the time what was going on. They knew sanctions were not working. What they were most concerned was to hide from world opinion what was actually happening.

They did not only know but they worked out the cover-up arrangements whereby British companies would supply oil to a French company in South Africa so that the French Company in question would supply a corresponding amount of oil to Rhodesia. The British Government could then state publicly that no British Company was supplying oil to Rhodesia and that the British Government supported fully the oil sanctions.

These were deliberate and carefully calculated moves. The reason for all these and other public lies, was the flat refusal by the British Government and other Western powers to consider a confrontation with South Africa. Such a confrontation was to be avoided at any cost and by any subterfuge while maintaining the political camouflage of sanctions.

This is only one example and there are many I could sight. For example the open and blatant organised sanction-busting activities of Shell Mozambique, another British Company. So were some other Western Oil Companies whose stories you know very well.

Comrade Chairman and Comrades, I am not inventing all these facts. They are set out in the Bingham Report on the supply of petroleum products to Rhodesia commissioned by the British Government itself.

I must point out with emphasis to this Committee that the only thing which made the oil companies and the governments behind them to make any real effort to comply to a degree with sanctions was outside public pressure. This public pressure took many forms, among them public disclosure of documents and facts by various charitable and fighting organisations as well as the frontal court action by the Government and people of Zambia.

I repeat and stress what I have said already, it is most important for this committee to devise ways to hit back hard on those who deliberately break and ignore sanctions. Wherever sanctions are to be applied there must be a "sanction bomb" to be tossed into the works of those who break or disregard them.

In this fight against racism and oppression, Africa has to accept that it has enemies outside the continent that are not repentent and others that appear incapable of reason. For example, after the publication and revelations of the Bingham Report any sane person who has had a peep into those sordid deeds of that Report, would have thought that the oil companies would have recognised the irreparable damage they had done to Zambia by deliberately breaking the internationally-imposed oil sanctions.

Certainly I, as President of Zambia, had thought and hoped that it became very unnecessary to press further the legal action which Zambia had started before the publication of the Bingham Report. The official book by the British Government spoke for itself. Alas! I was apparently mistaken.

Some of these public offenders are unrepentent. It is clear, for example, from the latest Reports of B.P. that the Company intends to do nothing to compensate Zambia. The Company intends to treat our court action against it with derision and contempt.

The Government of this country is taking up the challenge of that company. I will pull everything everywhere, if need be, until that company comes round to its senses and compensates the people of Zambia. No criminals in our way will get away that easily. This case is clear, simple and straight forward. If it is the company's wish to escalate the case, it is its business to do so. The Zambian Government must now press forward its action with all speed in the courts of Zambia. There should be no other considerations. No delays.

Comrade Chairman and Comrades, these are some of the sad experiences we have had and we are still having in Zambia. As you consider further applications of sanctions to the problem of racism and oppression in Southern Africa these experiences are relevant. You must perfect further the sanctions weapon as sharp-cutting working tool.

It is important that the weapon must be able to hit both those to whom it is directed and those who blunt it by breaking and undermining its application wherever they may be and whoever they may be. Like the case of Rhodesia, the weapon should be able to hit the persons and companies that offend as well as Governments that shield them and permit them to break sanctions.

It is for you in this Committee to develop such a weapon for the progressive forces to apply with effectiveness anywhere in the world where there are supporters of racism in Africa.

Presently, you are here to consider what sanctions can and should be brought to bear on South Africa over Namibia. The object of these sanctions is to speed up the establishment in Namibia of a free and lawful regime acceptable to all people. You should provide for the OAU a scheme which will approach this problem realistically and one that can be effective in practice.

It must be a scheme that can cover adequately the key areas. Oil is one key area. But you must work out other areas. You must identify the sections of the international community to be mobilised to achieve an effective application. Determine what practical punishments and how they should be meted out to those who undermine your programme of sanctions anywhere in the world.

In this regard let us in Africa decide what we can do. Then let us go forward and do it in unity, honestly and without deflection from our course on grounds of political expediency or indeed any other ground.

May God bless and guide your programmes of action.

Thank you.

CM/971(XXXIII)

Annex IV

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

Thirty-third Ordinary Session

Monrovia, Liberia

July 1970

EFFECTS ON BOTSWANA IN THE CASE OF AN  
INTERNATIONAL BLOCKADE AGAINST R.S.A.

EFFECTS ON BOTSWANA IN THE CASE OF AN  
INTERNATIONAL BLOCKADE AGAINST R S A

To comprehend Botswana's situation in the context of an international blockade against R.A.A., it is very important to understand the nature and scope of Botswana's economic and political relations with R S A. These relations are a result of the following basic structural and present political facts:

1. Botswana is, population-wise, a small country. This, together with the present low stage of economic development, makes the economy a very small one. As most small economies it is highly specialized and therefore wholly dependent on international trade.
2. The proximity and size of the RSA economy makes it beyond all comparison the natural centre to which Botswana relates in an economic sense.
3. Botswana's land-locked position makes it necessary for virtually all trade to go through other territories.
4. These surrounding territories are for the time being ruled by minority racist regimes, which Botswana has taken a strong political stand against. Cooperation with these regimes is therefore undesirable, but Botswana is in several sectors compelled to depend on them. Such relations are riddled with uncertainties.
5. Presently, in addition to the above, both Namibia, Rhodesia and RSA itself are either in war or in situations where war-like conditions could easily develop.

In concrete economic terms some major areas of dependency on RSA are the following:

- (1) Botswana presently gets 85% of her imports from RSA. An even supply of such imports is crucial for the smooth running of the economy. Disruption



of the supply of industrial inputs, especially oil, will mean loss of exports and foreign exchange to an extent that will make Botswana a heavy burden for the international community. Disruption in the supply of consumer goods will particularly hit the urban consumer, but also have quite severe effects all through the country. It is estimated that  $\frac{1}{4}$  to  $\frac{1}{3}$  of grain consumption is imported. Imports of capital goods is critical to industrial development. The import of motor vehicles is essential for Botswana's great transportation needs.

Inflation in Botswana is largely "imported". At any time 60-70% of the inflation in Botswana is a direct effect of the RSA inflation. As imports of goods in relation to GDP is around 70% any general price increase of imports involves great costs for Botswana. A sudden spurt in import prices of about 10% (e.g. in connection with switching sources of supply away from RSA) could easily wipe out completely a national income growth of over 5%.

Even in physical terms, the possibilities for switching to other suppliers than RSA are limited. Particularly important is the easy access to supplies, the short distances for transportation and supplies of spares, repair facilities etc. In the event of a prolonged blockade the ability to maintain equipment would be severely impaired. Import of specialised services both in the social sectors (e.g. health) and in the private business (e.g. mining) also pose great problems in the absence of access to RSA.

(ii) The heavy dependence on supply of goods from RSA implies a similar dependence on that country's transport system. The export of beef, copper and Nickel, is also wholly dependent on the RSA transport network.

For international communications and postal systems  
Botswana is heavily but not inextricably linked with RSA.

(iii) As many as 50-60,000 workers, or about 14% of the total work force in Botswana are employed in RSA. Their earnings and transfers are important contributions to foreign exchange revenues and rural incomes. A gradual reduction in migrant workers is considered an important aim. An uncontrolled and rapid withdrawal would however create severe problems.

(iv) About 90% of the registered companies in Botswana are owned by non-citizens, mostly South Africans. Often such companies in Botswana are branches of South African companies with all that this means for trade and finance links.

(v) Over the next plan period (NDP V) it is expected that around 4% of the annual government recurrent revenue (on an average of roughly P100 million per year) will come from the AGU arrangement. Botswana would hardly be able to draw a similar net amount of finance from a separate customs arrangement without a substantial increase in local taxation which would increase prices of consumer goods as well as other goods. In addition, the customs revenues are paid in Rand which provides a valuable source of foreign exchange even though the Rand is not fully convertible.

In summary, Botswana's economic links with RSA are such that it would be justified to call Botswana an appendix to RSA's economy. Therefore any economic fluctuation, be it boom or crisis, will spill through to Botswana within a short time.

#### Some Scenarios for an oil embargo against RSA

The effect on Botswana of an oil embargo on RSA will depend on the political and security situation in the area (Namibia, Zambia and particularly Zimbabwe) and perhaps most of all South Africa's attitude towards Botswana following the imposition of a blockade. Also, the amount of oil stored in RSA will be of importance.

Below we shall assume that the security situation at the time of oil embargo is much like the present, rendering supply lines through Zimbabwe, Zambia or Namibia untenable or in the best case very unreliable. As the main problem for Botswana is a safe transport route, an opening of e.g. lines through Zimbabwe would eliminate the major problems and make our situation manageable.

We shall also assume that RSA oil stores and SASOL II capacity will only be enough to prevent major problems in South African economy for a shorter period.

For Botswana an oil embargo against RSA would lead to problems in two different ways:

- a) The direct effects as a result of disruptions in the supply of oil.

- b) The indirect effects due to a depression in the South African economy with repercussions in Botswana.

One cannot help note, that in most analyses of this problem the indirect effects are receiving minimal attention. If a blockade were to work well enough to bring down the present racist regime as one understands is the purpose, the "ripple effect" of this on Botswana would be enormous even if the supply of oil (direct effects) did not cause any trouble. It should be enough to mention closure of RSA mines and difficulties with our export outlets. In addition there would most likely be political problems caused by massive numbers of refugees as urban unrest and widespread unemployment in RSA developed. The great emphasis on the oil supply question alone indicates that much of the analysis of Botswana's trouble caused by an oil embargo on RSA implicitly assumes that the embargo only to a small extent becomes effective.

For illustrative purposes, three different alternatives of South Africa's attitudes to Botswana are considered below:

- A. Following an embargo, RSA adopts a "punishing" attitude towards Botswana.

This could well be the case if the situation in RSA become desperate, resulting in a "fortress-mentality" and militant anti-black government. A very likely response to alleged military incursion from the frontline states could e.g. be to cut food supplies and oil supplies by not allowing transport through RSA. Other reactions could be to deny transportation through South Africa of beef, copper and nickel, and force migrant workers to return to Botswana. The likelihood of the above types of action is also enhanced by the fact that they would be concurrent with South African self interest in e.g. keeping up black domestic employment and saving energy.

This is clearly a "disaster" scenario even if not all the possible actions mentioned above were taken. Trying to estimate the "costs" to Botswana would be a rather pointless exercise. The emphasis would have to be on emergency supplies of food and basic essentials. Depending on the situation one might have to run huge airlift operations at an exceedingly high cost. It would be a question of not tens but perhaps hundreds of million Pula a year.

B. Under blockade RSA will care about "Her own Problems", and not be hostile against Botswana

This is possibly nearest to the present RSA attitude as conceived by Botswana and probably the most likely situation. In some of its effects it would be as serious as alternative A, but tempered by a policy by RSA not to openly display her hostile attitude. The supply of petrol and transport to and from Botswana would be curtailed "to save petrol". Mine workers would have to return because RSA "wanted jobs for her own blacks". The decline in imports could cause a decline in government revenues although soaring prices in RSA would make every unit of import more expensive.

Such a situation could prevail over a long time and at great cost depending on the scale of disruption in supplies and transport, return of miners etc., and would certainly result in a drastic fall in living-standards and public and private activity. Purely illustratively, if exports were halved and prices of imports went up by 10% an annual income flow of P100m would be needed to compensate (based on 1977 figures).

C. The RSA might, in the face of a blockade, wish to appear "helpful" to Botswana

This could be part of a policy to "beat the blockade" by a new "entente" drive towards African countries.

In that case RSA would undertake to guarantee Botswana's transport arrangements, perhaps on the condition of Botswana securing oil for Botswana related traffic.

It would hardly be likely that RSA would give Botswana mine workers and other migrant workers preference to black South Africans.

Also, Botswana would face the same price hikes and decline in general activity as South Africa.

Overall effects would not be very severe except for a vastly increased, and presumably urban, unemployment (returned mine workers) with all its potential for social unrest.

The acceleration of import prices and a higher price of oil if supplied from RSA would be two easily quantifiable economic effects. As an illustration; a 10% increase on import prices would amount to P23 million. Somewhat less than a doubling in the price of crude oil would on basis of 1978's consumption levels mean an addition to the import bill of some P15 million. The total of these two figures are in excess of the annual amounts now received by Botswana as development grants.

#### Present oil-situation.

##### i) Consumption

Botswana's present consumption of petroleum products is around 150 million litres per annum (69% diesel, 24% petrol, 4% paraffin and 3% aviation fuel). Apart from being of obvious importance for the road transport needs of a large country as Botswana, petroleum products are essential for running rail-services which are entirely propelled by diesel engines. Borehole-engines supplying water of vital importance for Botswana's economic mainstay-cattle-are also mostly run by diesel engines. Electricity generation of which 1/2 is oil based provides power to the mines without which Botswana's government revenue and foreign exchange position would be untenable. In many isolated rural areas a multitude of activities including social services are dependent on oil generated electricity.

Household heating and lighting is very dependent on a stable supply of paraffin over the whole country. Geographically consumption of petroleum products is concentrated in the Gaborone and Francistown/Selebi-Phikwe areas. Some opportunities do exist

for exploiting the abundant coal deposits in the country for power generation, but this must at best be seen in a 10 year perspective.

## ii) Supply

All supplies presently come from RSA. There is no refinery capacity in Botswana. Up to 1975 about 50% of the total supply came from Maputo through Rhodesia particularly supplying the eastern part of the country.

Since 1975 virtually all supplies have come through RSA from a refinery in Durban. Some parts of Western Botswana are supplied from Cape Town and certain products to Southern Botswana come from the NATREF refinery at Sasolburg.

Products are distributed through the networks of BP, Caltex, Shell, Mobil and Total which operate local branches in Botswana. The international oil companies have grouped RSA, BLS, Mozambique and Rhodesia into one marketing region and naturally see Botswana as a small market in the outskirts of the region.

## iii) Storage Capacity

The present storage capacity, including private stores, petrol stations, some government departments and the oil companies stores is equivalent to some 2-3 weeks of 1978 consumption. Two government tank farms, one in Gaborone and one in Francistown presently under construction will increase storage capacity to the level of 3-4 months of 1978 consumption. The build-up of stocks will take place over a 9 months period from May (in Gaborone). The operation of the scheme is the responsibility of the local oil companies which also pay for part of the project. The increased storage capacity is only

one month in excess of negotiation and adjustment time needed if technical breakdowns in the refinery and transport system for oil products occur.

iv) Prices

Prices are only slightly higher than in RSA. Prices vary considerably between regions in Botswana. Super presently costs 38t in Gaborone, 39t in Francistown and 44t in Manu.

As RSA's crude oil supplies from Iran (roughly at world market prices) dwindled, alternative oil supplies proved hard to find and expensive. The reason for this is the political reaction in several oil producing countries against the policies of the white racist regime. Because Botswana is part of the Southern Africa market it has had to accept the recent price increase of petrol of about 6 cents a litre. This is going to an oil Equalization Fund which will be used to compensate oil companies which have to pay more than the average price charged to RSA for crude oil. Reports are that South African Oil companies now pay up to 10 US \$ more per barrel than the 13-14 US \$ they paid previously.

In view of the vulnerability of the Botswana economy to the imposition of restrictions in our current supply of petroleum products, the Government of Botswana is actively investigating the potential and relative costs of alternative supply routes.



IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS  
AGAINST RSA

1. BACKGROUND:

LESOTHO DEPENDS ON RSA FOR

- (i) 45% EMPLOYMENT OF HER LABOUR FORCE, WHICH TAKES THE FORM OF MIGRANT LABOUR, PRIMARILY TO THE RSA MINES.
- (ii) 80 PER CENT OF HER IMPORT TRADE.
- (iii) 100% OF HER COMMUNICATIONS AND EXTERNAL TRADE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS.
- (iv) 100% OF HER ENERGY REQUIREMENTS i.e. ELECTRICITY AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS.
- (v) 75% DEPENDENT ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN CUSTOMS UNION FOR HER REVENUES.
- (vi) MIGRANT LABOUR REMITTANCES ACCOUNT FOR 70% OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT. THUS THESE REMITTANCES ACCOUNT FOR A CONSIDERABLE PROPORTION OF THE PURCHASING POWER FOR IMPORTS (PRINCIPALLY MANUFACTURES AND AGRICULTURAL IMPORTS).

2. EFFECT OF SANCTIONS.

- (i) RECESSION IN RSA WILL LEAD TO CUT BACKS IN EMPLOYMENT AND GENERAL PRODUCTION OF GOODS, WHICH IN TURN WILL LEAD TO DRASTIC CUTS IN EMPLOYMENT OF MIGRANT BASOTHO LABOUR, WHICH WILL LEAD TO UNEMPLOYMENT, REDUCTION IN PURCHASING POWER, ETC.
- (ii) EMPARGO ON OIL WILL LEAD TO "BLACK MARKET" PRICES, SCARCITY AND RATIONING, PRESERVATION OF THE RSA "SELF INTEREST", WHICH MEANS SUPPLIES TO LESOTHO WILL SUFFER VERY DRASTIC REDUCTION PREFERENTIALLY TO RSA CONSUMERS. THIS WILL HAVE EXTREMELY SERIOUS EFFECTS ON THE ECONOMY AS A WHOLE.

e.g. GREATLY INCREASED PRICES FOR GOODS AND SERVICES, A NEAR -- TOTAL SHUT DOWN IN THE BUDGETING INDUSTRIAL SECTOR.

- (iii) TRANSPORT & COMMUNICATIONS: THE ONLY ALTERNATIVES LESOTHO PRESENTLY HAS TO A TOTAL BOYCOTT OF RSA IN THE TWO SECTORS WOULD BE THROUGH THE YOUNG AIRLINK WITH MAPUTO AND THE UMT LINK WITH NAIROBI. SANCTIONS AGAINST RSA IN THESE TWO SECTORS WOULD LEAD TO A VIRTUAL CUT OFF AND ISOLATION OF LESOTHO IN THE ECONOMIC TRADE SECTOR AS WELL AS OTHER COMMUNICATION CONTACT WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD. THE CUT OFF IN THE TRADING SECTOR WOULD DRASTICALLY IMPACT UPON THE ENTIRE ECONOMY AND FRUSTRATE ALL IMPORT -- ORIENTED SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AS FAR AS DEVELOPMENTAL GOODS AND SERVICES HAVE TO ORIGINATE FROM BEYOND THE RSA BORDERS.
- (iv) ASSUMING NO TOTAL EMBARGO ON TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS, BUT BOYCOTT OF RSA EXPORT PRODUCT, LESOTHO WOULD HAVE TO PAY AN ADDED COST OF 30-40 PER CENT TO HER IMPORT BILL SUBSTITUTED OF THE 80% IMPORTS CURRENTLY OBTAINED FROM RSA IF ALTERNATIVE PRODUCE SOURCES ARE TO BE RESORTED TO. IN NUMERICAL TERMS, THIS COULD BE IN EXCESS OF R70 MILLION p.a. IN ADDED IMPORT COSTS.
- (v) REDUCTION OF IMPORTS AND GENERALIZED RECESSION IN RSA WOULD DRASTICALLY AFFECT LESOTHO'S REVENUE FROM THE COMMON CUSTOMS POOL, LEADING TO A DOMESTIC BUDGET CRISIS.

### 3. MEASURES BEING TAKEN BY LESOTHO TOWARDS DISINTEGRATING FOR C.N. AND GREATER SELF-RELIANCE & SELF SUFFICIENCY

#### 3.1. ENERGY:

- (i) PLANS FOR A 4-MONTHS STRATEGIC PETROLEUM RESERVE SUPPLIES ARE AT IN THE EARLY STAGES OF IMPLEMENTATION.
- (ii) PLANS FOR EXPLOITING AND HARNESSING LESOTHO'S OWN WATER RESOURCES FOR DOMESTIC GENERATION OF ELECTRICITY ARE IN THE PREPARATORY STAGES.

#### 3.2. SELF SUFFICIENCY IN FOOD PRODUCTS:

- (i) THE CCPP AND BISP WILL HOPEFULLY MEET THE OBJECTIVE OF SELF SUFFICIENCY IN FOOD PRODUCTION.

- (ii) A MOUNTAIN LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM WILL CONTRIBUTE SIGNIFICANTLY TOWARDS THE NATIONAL SECURITY IN RED MEATS AS WELL AS POTENTIAL EXPORTS. THE PROGRAMME WILL BEGIN TO RUNS THE END OF 1979.
- (iii) DEVELOPMENT OF LARRET SCALE P. MEATRY AND FISH PRODUCTION ARE PROGRAMMED TO BEGIN IN 1980.
- (iv) DOMESTIC PROCESSING OF AGRO PRODUCTS IS AT AN ADVANCED STAGE; A NATIONAL FLOUR MILL STARTED OPERATIONS IN APRIL THIS YEAR, AND A NATIONAL ABATTOIR WILL BE COMMISSIONED TOWARDS THE END OF 1980. OUTPUT FROM THESE AGRO INDUSTRIES WILL SATISFY THE NATIONAL DEMAND.
- (v) REQUESTS TO DONORS FOR FOOD AND FOR THE VITUM VITUM HAVE ALREADY BEEN MADE.
- (vi) STORAGE CAPACITY FOR GRAINE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLY INCREASED BY SOME 30,000 TONS CAPACITY IN THE FORM OF CONCRETE SILOS (12 BINS) AND MORE HOUSING FACILITIES ARE TO BE CONSTRUCTED AT SEVERAL LOCALITIES IN THE RURAL AREAS.

### 3.3 EMPLOYMENT:

- (i) THE MOST INTERESTING PROBLEM NOW FACING THE LESOTHO GOVERNMENT IS THE RAPID GROWTH OF DOMESTIC EMPLOYMENT TO ABSORB THE LARGE NUMBERS OF MIGRANT LABOUR.
- (ii) LABOUR INTENSIVE TECHNIQUES IN THE CONSTRUCTION AND CONSERVATION SECTORS HAVE SUCCESSFULLY INITIATED IN 1976. THEY HAVE TO BE VERY RAPIDLY EXPANDED TOWARDS FULL NATIONAL COVERAGE WITHIN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS.
- (iii) MUCH GREATER AND MORE INTENSIVE EFFORTS ARE NOW TO BE MADE TO DEVELOPMENT OF THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR AND THE EMPLOYMENT OF LABOUR WILL INADEQUATE OF REGULATIONS AND STRICT ENFORCEMENT IN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR ARE.
- (iv) ANOTHER AREA AT AN ADVANCED STAGE OF DEVELOPMENT IS THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NATION-WIDE STONE INDUSTRY.

4. DOMESTIC SAVINGS AND INVESTMENT:

FOUR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS HAVE RECENTLY BEEN SET UP TO ARREST THE EXPORT OF CAPITAL AND SAVING TO RSA:

- (i) THE NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY
- (ii) THE BUILDING FINANCE CORPORATION
- (iii) THE LESOTHO AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT BANK
- (iv) THE MONETARY AUTHORITY.

IN ADDITION TO THESE FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, THERE ARE TWO PUBLIC CORPORATIONS TAILORED TO MEET THE OBJECTIVES OF ARRESTING OUTFLOWS OF SAVINGS TO RSA, VIZ, ESTABLISHMENT OF WHOLESALES AND SHOPPING CENTRES IN STRATEGIC PLACES, AND THE LESOTHO HOUSING CORPORATION.

5. AS LESOTHO HAS HISTORICALLY BEEN VIOLENTLY OPPOSED TO DISCRIMINATION AMONG HUMAN BEINGS, SHE HAS CONSISTENTLY OPPOSED THE POLICY OF APARTHEID AND CONTRIBUTED HER MORE THAN JUST SILVER NOT ONLY IN PAYING THE PRICE FOR SUCH OPPOSITION, BUT ALSO IN CONFORMING TO INTERNATIONAL CONDEMNATION OF IT.

THE ENORMOUS PROBLEMS THAT NOW FACE LESOTHO AS A RESULT OF INTERNATIONAL ACTION AGAINST RSA APARTHEID POLICIES SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD, AS NOT JUST OF LESOTHO'S OWN MAKING, BUT RATHER AS A RESULT OF ACTIONS AND DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. IT IS THEREFORE LESOTHO'S HOPE THAT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY WILL ASSUME A MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY IN THE RESOLUTION OF HER PLIGHTFUL SITUATION.

MEMORANDUM

The Republic of Cape Verde, independent since the 5th July 1975, constitutes an archipelago of 10 islands. The only international airport is "Amilcar Cabral" in the island of Sal.

Information related to March 1979, pointed out, in resume that:

1. The 1979 Sal Airport operational expenditures are computed in about 36.4 million escudos.

The estimated 1979 airport total revenues are estimated in about 29.8 million escudos, that is to say, only 82% of the operational expenditures. The remaining 18% are covered by funds presented as a balance of the existing reserves.

2. However, the above referred expenditures concern only the personnel and the most urgent operational expenses, do not including at all the airport preservation and maintenance charges, which are evaluated in, at least, 30 million escudos per year, as envisaged along the next five years period.

This corresponds effectively to dramatic deficient situation of less than .5% of the airport incoming revenues coverage.

3. The airport revenues result from charges and fees, the most important of them coming from aircraft landing charges, which are evaluated as a function of the aircrafts maximum take-off weights.

S.A.A. "South African Airways", with an average of 24 flights per week, most of them using the big "Boeing 747" aircrafts, is estimated to pay in 1979 about 19.3 million escudos, corresponding to near 65% of the total Sal Airport incoming revenue.

4. In fact, S.A.A. pays the country much more than that in the form of traffic handling charges (collected by TCV, the national airline), fuel consumption (to the Capoverdean Shell Agency), catering and accommodations (to the Sal hotels), and several other local business and occupations.

5. Information referred that the "Amílcar Cabral" International Airport represents as much as about 2% of the total country budget.

But, in fact, it represents indirectly much more than that.

Effectively, as constantly accentuated by the Government, air transport is an essential and vital activity for the country's life and development considering its peculiar configuration as an archipelago of 10 islands dispersed in the Atlantic far away from the African coast, and taking in consideration the so recent independence and the country limited resources.

The international airport in the island of Sal is an important gateway linking Cape Verde to the World.

6. Considering in special the island of Sal, about 300 people are airport employees.

However, it must be advanced that a similar amount of local population is dependent of the airport activities linked to airlines, fuel supply, hotels, transportation, Government services (Customs, PTT, Safety, Banks, etc.), food, and other supplies and many other related occupations, representing the life support of some 3000 inhabitants directly linked with the Airport infrastructure.

We may say that the greatest part of the near 6000 Sal Island inhabitants are dependent of the "Amílcar Cabral" International Airport operation.

7. Taking in consideration the above statements, the special Cape Verde environment, its recent independence, the limited country resources and the development difficulties, the country position is a politic of "open skies" in the field of civil aviation.

Limited arable land

54% of the farming population with less than 1 ha  
73% of the farming population with less than 2 ha

Fisheries : Potential catch 56 000 tons  
Actual catch 9 000 " 16%  
(including industrial fisheries)

Limited means of Fishing

Lack of conservation infrastructure

Mining industry : SALT

Processing : Only a few industrial enterprises exist.

Fish canning

Milling and bakery

Fish cold storage

Refrigerators

Tobacco

Spirits

TRANSPORT: Problems due to country being an island, inter-island transport  
Problems.

Ports

ships

## C. DEVELOPMENT DIRECTION

### 1. Agriculture

Desertification control : dams....

Prospection and exploration of underground water

Hydro-agricultural work

1000 ha irrigable by 1999

2. .... Industries

A great effort is needed to create 26000 jobs by 1999  
limited possibilities due to small local market  
light industries, using imported goods;  
some light export industries

3. Industries and services related to geo-strategic situation.

- Development of stopover and transit services
- " of merchant marine fleets, domestic trade
- Industrial fisheries : fishing zone
- Cold storage,
- Industries and allied services
- services at S. Vicente (port) and at Sal (airport).



C: /571 (XXXIII)  
Annex VI

General Outline of Cape Verde's Economy

## 8. Structure of the active population

Agriculture/livestock production	74 500	80%
Small-scale fisheries	3 000	3%
Industry and construction work	4 500	5%
Trade, Transports,.....	5 000	6%
Administration	6 000	6%
	<hr/>	
	93 000	100%

## 9. Percentage of Illiteracy

- 40%

## B - CAUSES

1. Colonial inheritance resulting in lack of economic infrastructures and industrial production as well as erosion and desertification.
2. Drought : Despite the 80% of the active population in agriculture, this sector contributes barely over 20% of the GDP.

3. BREAK-DOWN BY SECTORS

## Agriculture/livestock production :

Land shortage

Water shortage

Irrigable land

2 000 hectares

Drying area

58 000 "

Forest

2 000 "

Pastures

23 000 "

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90 000 hectares 23%

Total irrigable area

400 000 hectares 0,5%

Sugar-cane and banana cultivation on irrigable land.

(Maximum area : 100 000 hectares of which 10 000 hectares are irrigable and 60 000 hectares for drying purposes).

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# Report of the OAU Standing Committee On Sanctions

Organization of African Unity

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