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ANNEX I

REPORT ON THE MISSION OF THE OAU  
MONITORING TEAM TO SOUTH AFRICA  
10 - 19 MAY, 1992



GENERAL SECRETARIAT'S NOTE

The Ad-hoc Committee of Heads of State and Government on Southern Africa, meeting in its Eighth Ordinary Session in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, on 8 April 1992, decided to send a Monitoring Team to South Africa to assess the situation in the country and report especially on the escalation of violence, which will give a new impetus to the negotiations process.

2. Pursuant to that decision, the Secretary-General appointed members of the Monitoring Team comprising the Ambassadors of Nigeria, Algeria, Congo, Uganda and Zimbabwe accredited to the OAU and Ethiopia, assisted by the Executive Secretary of the Liberation Committee and an official of the OAU Political Department.

3. The Team was in South Africa from 10 to 19 May, 1992 and met the main political actors of the country as well as the institutions and bodies dealing with the question of violence. It also visited a number of townships and other areas where the violence was rampant.

4. The Team had prepared a mission report which the Secretariat has the honour to present to the Council of Ministers for consideration and follow-up. In this regard, the Councils' attention is particularly called to Part III of the Report dealing with the Group's recommendations and, notably, Paragraphs 124, 126 and 127.



**REPORT ON THE MISSION OF**  
**THE OAU MONITORING TEAM TO SOUTH AFRICA**

**Introduction**

1. The 8th Session of the OAU Ad Hoc Committee of Heads of State and Government on Southern Africa met on 28 April, 1992, in Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania and adopted a Communique in which it resolved, inter-alia, to send an OAU Team to South Africa in order to assess and report on the situation in that country, especially the escalating violence and provide impetus to the negotiation process.

2. Following that decision the OAU Secretary General, H.E. Salim Ahmed Salim, appointed a Monitoring Team consisting of Ambassadors based in Addis Ababa of Nigeria, Algeria, Congo, Uganda and Zimbabwe to be assisted by Brigadier H. Mbita, Executive Secretary of the Liberation Committee and Mr. M. Kane from the Political Department.

3. A day before departure for South Africa, the Team was received by the Secretary General who among other things advised it to be open-minded and establish contacts with all shades of political opinion within and outside CODESA. The Team set off on 9 May, 1992, and arrived in Johannesburg on 10 May, 1992, preceding a Ministerial delegation to CODESA II, comprising the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Nigeria and Uganda, who were joined by the Ambassadors of Algeria, Congo and Zimbabwe representing their respective Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

4. On arrival at Jan Smuts Airport, the Team was received by representatives of the South African Government, the ANC, the PAC and the South African Council of Churches (SACC). In their welcoming addresses, the Liberation Movements informed the Group that they had jointly requested the SACC to coordinate the activities of the OAU Team during its mission in South Africa.

5. Ambassador Chief O. Olusola, on behalf of the Team, thanked all the parties for their hospitality and arrangements made, especially the decision taken by the Liberation Movements on the handling of the programme of mission by the SACC. The Team addressed the Press at the Airport before it was taken to the Carlton Hotel where it stayed while in Johannesburg.

9. Rev. Frank Chikane who led the SACC delegation expressed deep appreciation on the OAU initiative of sending an observer Team to South Africa. He then reiterated the long-standing and active opposition of the SACC to the Apartheid System. Dwelling on the negotiation process in the country, he recognised that some progress had been achieved in spite of the fact that the government had the capacity to reverse or block the process of change. This was why they also advocated for an Interim Government and a Constituent Assembly to be put in place as soon as possible.

10. Although he agreed that the SACC understood the positions of the PAC and AZAPO in boycotting CODESA, he did not fail to observe that there was an urgent need for the Liberation Movements and other democratic forces to unite their efforts in order to accelerate the establishment of a new South Africa.

11. He accused the Government of being responsible for allowing and in some instances creating the climate of violence aimed at discrediting Liberation Movements thus providing an alibi for its reluctance to speedily continue with the process of democratization. In this regard the General-Secretary of the SACC informed the Team that an emergency Summit of Black leaders on violence held on 22 April 1992 under the auspices of church leaders to seek means of bringing about an immediate cessation of the current violence, called for an international mechanism to monitor that situation. He therefore believed that in order to avoid jeopardizing the Peace process, the OAU had an important role to play.

12. On its part the OAU Monitoring Team briefed the SACC delegation on the purpose of its two-fold Mission to South Africa: assessment of political developments in general and the violence that poses the greatest impediment to the process of democratization in particular.

13. The Team gave the assurances that the OAU will spare no efforts, notwithstanding its limited resources to stem out violence. On the possibility of sending an International Force to South Africa and bearing in mind the prevailing international environment, the Team observed with caution the complexity of international involvement.

#### ii) Meeting with the ANC

14. Two meetings took place on 11 and 13 May 1992 with the ANC; the first meeting which was preparatory to the second was attended by Mr. Sydney Mufamadi ANC Peace Desk Head, Mr. Aziz Pahad, Deputy Head of the Department of International Affairs and two other officials from the Peace Desk.

20. After the comprehensive brief by Mr. Mandela, the Group asked whether there was any other role the OAU could play on the unfolding South African Political scene, the National Peace Accord and the scope of international monitoring envisaged by the ANC.

21. In response the officials who were with Mr. Mandela said that their Movement would greatly appreciate if the OAU made it clear to the South African Government that so long as the pre-conditions set out were not met, the possibility of considering the admission of the regime into OAU did not exist. They also requested to be assisted in electioneering education programmes by African countries or the OAU itself in line with and over and above promises given by Nordic Countries, USA as well as some European countries in this regard.

22. On the question of violence, they were of the view that the installation of an Interim Government will make it possible to control the situation in the country. They regretted the fact that the National Peace Accord did not deliver as expected and the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry on violence, although doing a good job, they were doubtful whether it had the means and capacity to investigate thoroughly.

### iii) Meetings with the PAC

23. The first meeting with the PAC was conducted on 11 May 1992 and Mr. Benny Alexander, Secretary-General accompanied by other senior officials were in attendance. After being given a brief on the OAU Mission to South Africa by the leader of the delegation, Mr. Benny Alexander thanked the OAU for this timely initiative. He then immediately dwelt on the process of negotiations stressing the well-known position of the PAC on the neutral venue and chairmanship of those negotiations as pre-requisite for them to attain meaningful results.

24. On violence, he stated that the on-going negotiation process had failed to deal effectively with the issue, this was reason why a summit of Black leaders was convened in April with the participation of the PAC, in order to find ways and means to stop violence. He reminded that his Movement was not involved in violence but was opposed to the regime's manoeuvres aimed at creating an atmosphere of confusion and concern among the people at the prospect of elections in the country.

31. After informing the Police and Defence joint delegation on the important aspects of its mission, namely, the assessment of violence, and the negotiation process for political change, the two organs expressed their views on the prevailing situation.

32. Major-General Burger started by defining the role of the Police which he said had nothing to do with politics but recognized that in the current South African context of violence, tinted with political flavour, it was difficult to escape from certain facts. He enumerated what he considered as the main causes of violence in South Africa which were both political as well as social and outlined conditions to be adhered to, in order to end violence.

33. For Major-General Burger the principal cause of violence since 1990 has been the competition between Political Organizations, especially between the ANC and the IFP for the support of masses and consolidation of power bases. The conflict between the two parties originated in Natal Province (the original base of IFP and where ANC has strong support) and later spread to the Witwatersrand area and Soweto.

34. He said that the second cause related to uncontrolled and rapid urbanization which has been taking place since the abolition of the influx-control measures in 1986. This had led to the influx of Blacks from the rural areas to the cities where they mostly lived in hostels and squatter camps and without jobs. The new population which did not enjoy trust, was generally hated and considered intruders by the township residents.

35. He deplored the fact that the SAP had always been accused of bias and asserted that the Police were impartial in discharging their duties in accordance with the provisions of the law. While Rejecting the involvement of the Police in violence, Major-General Burger, however, stated that when it was proved that some elements of the Police favoured one or another opposing political Groups, the SAP severely dealt with them. Another interesting revelation made by him was that the SAP was capable of stopping violence if it had to make use of "draconian" measures which will be repugnant to them.

36. The leader of the SAP delegation was of the opinion that the phenomenon of violence should be given urgent attention by all political and traditional leaders of the country in order to bring it to a stop. He said that adherence of all to the National Peace Accord, political tolerance and co-operation with the Police were

The Brigadier was vividly emotional in defending Battalion 32 which he described as being well trained and highly disciplined, non partisan and reliable, and that there was no way they could abandon it. Intervening in the discussion, an official of the South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that his government had informed the Angolan Authorities that it was prepared to repatriate the soldiers if they so wished. The Team was of the opinion that soldiers of Battalion 32 should be absorbed in various Units other than those dealing with violence.

42. Prior to the meeting, the Team was flown by a Police helicopter over the city of Johannesburg including the surrounding townships particularly Soweto and Alexandra.

**v) Meeting with the Azanian People's Organization (AZAPO)**

43. The Team met on 14 May 1992 with a ten member Delegation of AZAPO led by its Deputy-President, Dr. Aubrey Mokoape, its Secretary-General, Mr. D. Nkadimeng, its Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. M. Bakwena as well as AZAPO youth and student representatives.

44. The AZAPO delegation gave a background information on the Organization which they said, emanated from the South African Student Organization (SASO) and was founded in 1976 with the objective of the total liberation of Azania.

45. For the AZAPO delegation Mr. De Klerk's reforms meant nothing but sugar-coating the Apartheid system aimed at maintaining and preserving privileges of the white minority. They were therefore opposed to CODESA. AZAPO felt that the process of peaceful political changes would only be possible through democratic elections under universal suffrage on a common voters roll for the establishment of a Constituent Assembly negotiated under neutral chairmanship and venue.

46. On the violence, they asserted that the carnage was state-sponsored, involving the Police and Defence Force so as to impose solutions desired by the regime. AZAPO made it clear to the OAU Team that under such circumstances they would continue with the struggle.

47. Notwithstanding the hardline stance of AZAPO on CODESA, the Team did not fail to express the view that the on-going negotiations represented a unique opportunity for the South Africans to reach a peaceful settlement of their conflict, and therefore called on them and those outside CODESA to reconsider their positions.

54. He was of the view that the Inkatha Freedom Party, with the collaboration of the Security Forces, was a real source of violence in the country. IFP in its desperate quest for Political recognition resorts to acts of violence to frustrate peaceful resolution of the South African problem. He also expressed strong feelings in favour of International Observer Missions instead of an International Peace-Keeping Force in helping to curb violence.

55. The Commissioner in replying to questions put to him on the negotiation process, thought that CODESA was a product of the struggle, and as such was an appropriate forum to which all South Africans could participate and contribute to the shaping of a future South Africa.

viii) Meeting with the Goldstone Commission of Inquiry on violence:

56. Discussions were held between the Team and the Goldstone Commission, on 17th May, 1992. This Commission of Inquiry regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation was appointed by the state President on 24th October, 1991, following the signing of the National Peace Accord. It is constituted by Justice R.J. Goldstone, chairman, Advocate D.J. ROSSOUW, Vice-Chairman, Advocate M.N.S. Sithole, Ms. L.G. BAQWA, Attorney and Mr. G. STEYN, member.

57. The leader of the OAU Team informed the Commission that the Mission aimed at showing the OAU Solidarity with the South African people and discussing the question of violence with Organizations and institutions dealing with it. Justice Goldstone welcomed this opportunity and briefed the Team on how the Commission was conducting its task.

58. The Chairman of the Commission informed the Team that the Commission was given the widest powers than any other Commission in the history of South Africa. It was mandated to find ways and means of stopping violence in the Country. Since its inception, the Commission has sent 500 written requests for information on public violence and intimidation to all political parties, Universities, newspaper editors, local authorities and civic associations. In response it received relevant and useful information. The Commission has established various specialized committees and held many inquiries in public and some in camera when ever it was considered necessary to do so. At the end of the meeting the Commission informed the Team that it had so far presented reports on the violence at MOOI River and on the violence at the President Steyn Gold Mine in Welkom to the State President copies of both were made available to the Team.

B) In Cape Town

64. The Group travelled to Cape Town, on 12 May, 1992 where it met various political parties represented in Parliament, namely the Conservative Party, the Indian Solidarity Party, the Labour Party and the Democratic Party. It had also meetings with the Deputy Minister for Law and Order and the Director-General in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

i) Meeting with the Conservative Party (CP) :

65. The meeting took place on 12 May, 1992, between the Group and Mr. Thomas LANGLEY, MP and Leader of the Conservative Party, together with three other young members of the Party in Parliament.

66. At the outset Mr. LANGLEY said that his party was opposed in principle to Foreign interference in the internal affairs of South Africa, according to his own interpretation of the UN Charter and criticized the Government for allowing such an interference. He also expressed his opposition to CODESA which was dominated by the socialist ANC although the Conservative Party was not opposed to changes in South Africa that would take into account the specific reality of the country and the right of minorities. Mr. Langley added that his party would not like to be associated with the OAU which was composed of Socialist and Communist Governments. The other members of the CP who took the floor talked rather about their Africity and the desire for peace and stability. They said that they were South Africans and had no intention of living any-where else.

67. The Leader of the OAU Team outlined the fact that the OAU presence in south Africa was possible because the Government and the people of South Africa so agreed. He added that the aim of the Mission was to contribute positively to the process of change being pursued in CODESA and assess the situation of violence. He further informed the conservative Party delegation that even in some African Governments there were strong conservative elements , but that did not negate the democratization process which the OAU is currently encouraging.

68. In spite of the difference of positions between the two parties, the Team got the impression that the CP delegation listened carefully to the views it expressed.

- (b) Both ANC and IFP should prevail over their followers to desist from violence.
- (c) Leadership of Political Parties should insist on establishing a code of conduct.
- (d) Demand for dissolving or disbandment of ANC's armed wing, Umkhonto we sizwe (MK) alone was politically unworkable.
- (e) Private armies including Homeland Police be dissolved and incorporated in a single structure and thought that the Government should put more efforts in that direction.

75. Commenting on CODESA he was very optimistic that its outcome would lead to a Democratic South Africa. He asked the Team to persuade both the PAC and AZAPO to join the negotiations but although in responding to a question put by the Team, he observed that the absence of PAC could not derail CODESA.

76. On the National Peace Accord, Mr. Gastrow was of the opinion that the National Peace Committee was toothless and bearing in mind his earlier observations on violence he ended by saying "violence can't be eliminated before the first elections." He also thought that supportive role of OAU for on going changes would be helpful.

iv) MEETING WITH THE LABOUR PARTY

77. The Team was received by Representatives of the Labour Party led by Mr. T. Abrahams in the Labour Party Caucus Room, Old Senate Building and had very useful exchange of views on violence and evolving political changes. From the outset the Labour Party informed the Team that violence can't end before the holding of Free and Fair elections, since by nature, the Apartheid system exists on the culture of violence and more so since the students uprising of 1976. Young people of sixteen year and below know only one solution to problems - violence. The Labour Party thought that violence had for sometime benefitted some parties but the situation seemed to be changing. Although some elements of the security forces might be involved, they thought not all Policemen were bad.

78. On the political changes now in progress and the re-alignment of Political Forces they encouraged the OAU to take active leadership role in developments in South Africa.

83. Referring to CODESA, he urged those who were not part of the negotiation process to join without delay otherwise the train would leave the station without them. He informed the Team in this regard that this position was made clear to the PAC during their meeting with the Government in Abuja last April.

84. On the question of the Third Force, Mr. Neil Van Heerden said that such allegations were unfounded and that Mr. De Klerk was very sincere in the conduct of the Peace process. This was the reason why a lot of progress had been unbelievably achieved since December, 1991.

85. In reaction to some of the observations put by the Director General, the Team indicated that as soon as conditions for admitting South Africa within the ranks of the OAU were met, the Organization would be more than pleased to welcome his Country, a development which would greatly contribute to the strengthening of the Continental Organization.

vii) Visits in Cape Town

86. The Team seized the opportunity while in Cape Town to visit Robben Island and a Taxi Station in Guguletu, a Scene of violent incidents between two rival Taxi Association named WEBTA and LAGUNYA. It was revealed to the Group that a Convention for a Democratic Taxi Association (CODETA) following the example of CODESA had been created and that negotiations conducted under the forum had resulted in an agreement to end violence between the warring Associations. The two Union leaders were of the opinion that their rivalry, the entire violence within their particular context should be viewed within a scenario of social and economic deprivations which bred a culture of violence. Hence, the situation is still fluid.

C) In the Natal Province

87. From Cape Town on 13 May, 1992, the Team flew to Natal Province which experiences a lot violence. At Louis Botha Airport in Durban, the Team met with regional ANC leaders who briefed it extensively on the situation of violence in that region. They accused the IFP of being the main source of violence in Natal and informed the Team that the ANC had a strong support among the Zulus in the Region. Later the delegation flew in an helicopter to ULUNDI to meet the President of the Inkatha Freedom Party and Chief Minister of Kwazulu, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi.

94. After the exchanges of introduction of the two delegations, Chief Buthelezi opened the meeting by reading a lengthy prepared Memorandum outlining the viewpoint of IFP on a wide spectrum of issues ranging from CODESA, DRIVE FOR FEDERALISM, AN ACTIVE CONSTITUTION, NATIONAL ETHICS, INTEGRAL ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY, DEFINITION OF THE IDEALS OF THE PEOPLE to Placing the Constitution in the SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT.

95. In response Major-General Nwachukwu started by explaining the nature and scope of the Mission covering two majors aspects i.e. to assist the process of change in South Africa and look into the question of violence. He commended the People of South Africa for bringing about on-going changes and pledged OAU's readiness to assist the attainment of the required goal. Major-General Nwachukwu then touched on various points raised in the memorandum and said that a perfect Constitution for South Africa may not be attainable immediately. He therefore addressed the President of IFP in the context of greater South Africa far beyond the confines of Kwazulu and appealed for the impediments of the past to be left behind.

96. Major-General Nwachukwu concluded his remarks by addressing violence engulfing many parts of the country and called for every effort to be exerted to stop it and allow the democratic path to make progress.

97. Hon. P.Ssemogerere - Second Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Uganda made a short intervention and reminded the President of Inkatha of his responsibilities in confidence building efforts between his Party and the ANC, between Zulus and others in South Africa as well as between whites and other races. He then asked what exactly IFP wanted in its Federal concept for the State, the Regions and Democratization.

98. Chief Buthelezi started by expressing his appreciation and that he was heartened for having their (IFP) views heard in OAU. He then went at length to explain to the Mission his political background and his ancestors association with political struggles in South Africa before and after the founding of the ANC. He spoke of his membership to the Movement and of his personal cordial relations with the ANC President, Mr. Nelson Mandela.



105. A question was raised whether the OAU could mediate between IFP and ANC to which Chief Buthelezi replied "I have no objection".

106. Having listened attentively, the Leader of the OAU Team made a passionate appeal to IFP President to go an extra mile for the sake of the whole of South Africa. He asked him to make that extra effort and be flexible. General Nwachukwu went on to say that if through flexibility the position of the KING would not be compromised that should not prevent him from leading IFP at CODESA.

107. Chief Buthelezi reacted vehemently and said "I know my people better than the OAU does. The King is above politics. But apart from the King, the Zulu Nation needs to be represented like the Xosas and Vendas".

108. Then four of the Ministers who were with Chief Buthelezi spoke and all exposed hardline positions and one of them directed his remarks personally to the Executive Secretary of the Liberation Committee. He said that the training and arms given to the Liberation Movements were not used against the enemy but their people.

## PART TWO

### ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION

109. The sending of the OAU Monitoring Team to South Africa was timely as it made it possible for the Organization for the first time to inter-act with the main actors in the South African Political scene in order to assess on the situation in that country at this crucial phase of struggle against Apartheid. The findings of the Group in conformity with its mandate focussed on the on-going democratization process and the scourge of violence which constitutes an impediment to the Peace process.

#### 1. Negotiation Process in South Africa

110. Today the quasi-totality of the forces in South Africa are conscious of the need for change although there exists differences of perceptions on how the country should be transformed into a non-racial and democratic society. CODESA was established late in 1991 as a forum for negotiations leading to democratic political changes. Participating Parties with the exception of Bophuthatswana have signed a Declaration of Intent binding them on agreements reached through this forum. Within the framework of CODESA however two different opinions can be identified while other views and positions are expressed outside this forum.

still persist throughout the country. And above all the Government has failed to effectively maintain peace and security in the country generally and in townships around Johannesburg and Natal Province in particular.

## 2. The Question of Violence

117. There is a general agreement in South Africa that the violence is a major hindrance to the Peace process now underway. There is also agreement that the causes of the scourge are both structural and political. The question that arises, however, is who is fomenting the political violence and for which objectives. From the findings of the OAU Monitoring Group a first assessment of the situation would attribute the causes of violence to the political aspect of violence and the economic crisis both being the heritage of the Apartheid System.

118. Political violence started in 1985 with the first state of Emergency and the creation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) which launched broad mass actions against oppression. It has become a by-product of political transition for control of power and enlargement of constituencies since the commencement of Reforms in 1990. The main actors in the political fight that generates the prevailing state of violence in South Africa apparently seem to be the Liberation Forces on the one hand and those opposed to the emergence of a new democratic South Africa or struggling for their survival on the other.

119. Notwithstanding repeated denials by IFP it became obvious to the OAU Monitoring Team that many followers of that Organization had a hand in the incidents of violence and that elements in Government or its Security agencies could not be exonerated for its sustenance.

120. In any situation of political changes the phenomenon of Party rivalry and political alignments are inevitable and the South African chapter cannot be an exception. This may express itself in many forms including violence. Many a time the OAU Team was informed of the existing rivalry between the ANC and IFP. Recent opinion polls in South Africa give the Inkatha, a Zulu-based regional Party only a Black support base of 3 percent in the Reef zone as against 70 percent of black political support for the ANC including Zulus. Nonetheless IFP believes itself to be a force to be reckoned with and that may explain its desperate desire for recognition by all means.

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