

**AFRICAN UNION**

**الاتحاد الأفريقي**



**UNION AFRICAINE**

**UNIÃO AFRICANA**

---

**P.O. Box: 3243, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Tel.:(251-11) 551 38 22 Fax: (251-11) 551 93 21**  
Email: [situationroom@africa-union.org](mailto:situationroom@africa-union.org), [oau-ews@ethionet.et](mailto:oau-ews@ethionet.et)

---

**PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL**

**80<sup>th</sup> MEETING**

**18 JULY 2007**

**ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA**

**PSC/PR/2(LXXX)**  
**ORIGINAL: ENGLISH**

**REPORT OF THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE COMMISSION**  
**ON THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA**

**REPORT OF THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE COMMISSION**  
**ON THE SITUATION IN SOMALIA**

**I. INTRODUCTION**

1. At its meeting held on 19 January 2007, Council, inter alia, decided to authorize the deployment of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) for a period of 6 months, and requested me to follow up on the implementation of the decision and to report to it regularly.

2. The present report is submitted pursuant to this decision, and covers developments in Somalia since January 2007. More specifically, it focuses on the peacekeeping efforts in Somalia, the reconciliation process, the security and humanitarian situation, as well as the activities of the African Union to promote lasting peace and reconciliation in the country.

**II. PEACEKEEPING EFFORTS**

**a) Deployment of AMISOM**

3. As indicated above, at its 69<sup>th</sup> meeting, Council decided to authorize the deployment of AMISOM, for a period of 6 months, with the mandate (i) to provide support to the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) in their efforts towards the stabilization of the situation in the country and the furtherance of dialogue and reconciliation, (ii) to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, and (iii) to create conducive conditions for long-term stabilization, reconstruction and development in Somalia. In this respect, AMISOM was to undertake the following tasks:

- to support dialogue and reconciliation in Somalia, working with all stakeholders;
- to provide, as appropriate, protection to the TFIs and their key infrastructure, to enable them carry out their functions;
- to assist in the implementation of the National Security and Stabilization Plan of Somalia, particularly the effective re-establishment and training of all inclusive Somali security forces, bearing in mind the programs already being implemented by some of Somalia's bilateral and multilateral partners;
- to provide, within capabilities and as appropriate, technical and other support to the disarmament and stabilization efforts;
- to monitor, in areas of deployment of its forces, the security situation;

- to facilitate, as may be required and within capabilities, humanitarian operations, including the repatriation and reintegration of refugees and the resettlement of internally displaced persons (IDPs); and
  - to protect its personnel, installations and equipment, including the right of self-defense.
4. Council further decided that:
- AMISOM shall comprise 9 infantry battalions of 850 personnel each supported by maritime and air components, as well as an appropriate civilian component, including a police training team;
  - the initial deployment shall involve at least 3 infantry battalions, with adequate arrangements for additional battalions to follow quickly;
  - AMISOM shall be deployed for a period of six (6) months aimed essentially at contributing to the initial stabilization phase in Somalia, with a clear understanding that the Mission will evolve to a United Nations operation that will support the long term stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction of Somalia;
  - the concept of logistic support for AMISOM shall be based on self-sustenance by the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), based on the model of the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB).
5. During its ordinary session held in Addis Ababa, on 29 and 30 January 2007, the Assembly of Head of States and Government called for the immediate deployment of AMISOM, and urged member States to contribute troops, as well as the international community to provide the necessary financial, logistical and technical support. On its part, the United Nations Security Council, in its resolution 1744 (2007) adopted on 21 February 2007, decided to authorize member States of the African Union to establish for a period of six months a mission in Somalia. The Security Council urged member States of the African Union to contribute to AMISOM in order to create the conditions for the withdrawal of all other foreign forces from Somalia. The Security Council provided an exemption to the arms embargo imposed by resolution 733 (1992) and further elaborated by resolution 1425 (2002). The Security Council also urged member States to provide personnel, equipment and services if required, for the successful deployment of AMISOM, and encouraged member States to provide financial resources for AMISOM.
6. In implementation of Council's decision, the Commission approached AU member States for them to contribute troops and civilian police personnel for AMISOM. In this respect, in addition to Uganda which had a long standing commitment to provide two infantry battalions for a peace support operation in Somalia, the following member States confirmed their readiness to contribute to the Mission: Nigeria, 1 infantry battalion; Ghana, 350 military personnel; and Burundi, 2 infantry battalions. The Commission also signed a Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG).

7. The deployment of the two Ugandan battalions of AMISOM under the leadership of Major General Levy Karuhanga, Force Commander, began on 5 March 2007, with the direct support of the US Government, which provided assistance in terms of airlifting, equipment and procurement of supplies, logistical support and sustenance in the mission area. Uganda also benefited from support from Algeria, which provided airlift for the Ugandan contingent to Somalia.

8. The arrival of the Ugandan contingent was marked by incidents. Indeed, soon after the beginning of the deployment, two of the aircrafts carrying equipment and some troops were attacked. The Ugandan contingent also suffered some casualties, involving attacks by armed elements. Yet, and in spite of the serious constraints facing AMISOM (thin presence on the ground, absence of the envisaged maritime and air components, as well as the lack of sufficient and adequate communication equipment, etc.), the performance of the Ugandan troops has been remarkable. Apart from providing protection for governmental institutions, VIPs and convoys, the troops have also gradually extended their activities, to include the undertaking of patrols within the area of responsibility, demolition of unexploded ordinance (UXOs), securing arms surrendered by the business community in Mogadishu following orders by the TFG to militias to hand over their weapons, and the provision of assistance to the civilian population. In the execution of humanitarian operations, the AMISOM contingent has extended medical treatment and supplied clean drinking water to the civilian population, particularly the needy IDPs.

9. It is against this background that the Commission has intensified its efforts to speed up the deployment of additional troops on the ground. In this regard, from 11 to 15 June 2007, an AU team visited Bujumbura, to assess the level of the readiness of the Burundian troops. A Burundian reconnaissance mission is to travel shortly to Somalia to finalize the preparations for the deployment of the Burundian contingent. I wish to express my gratitude to the United Kingdom, which, in addition to the financial assistance already provided for AMISOM, has also agreed to support the Burundian reconnaissance mission, as well as to France, which conducted training for the Burundian troops and has undertaken to contribute to their airlifting to Somalia. I would also like to express appreciation to the US, Algerian, and Kenyan Governments for the support rendered in facilitating the deployment of AMISOM, as well as to Italy, the European Union, and the League of Arab States for their generous financial assistance. I further express my appreciation to Nigeria, which, in response to my appeal to the member States, through a letter to all African Heads of State and Government on 23 March 2007, to support the deployment of AMISOM, pledged US\$2 million. It is my hope that the logistical and other required preparations will soon be finalized to enable Burundi, Nigeria and Ghana to deploy their contingents. Furthermore, the Commission has approached other member States to contribute troops, as well as provide maritime and air assets.

10. In its efforts to deploy AMISOM and facilitate its operations on the ground, the Commission is working closely with the partners. In this respect, I am pleased to inform Council that, following a request by the Commission, some African Union partners, including the United Nations, have deployed military, police and civilian experts to the African Union headquarters, in Addis Ababa, to support the AMISOM strategic, planning and management unit, established last May. Other African Union

partners have also pledged support in this respect. Furthermore, I would like to inform Council that, on 11 June 2007, NATO, in response to a request by the Commission, agreed, in principle, to provide strategic airlift for African Union member States willing to deploy within the framework of AMISOM.

11. At the time of the finalization of this report, the Commission was taking steps for the relocation of my Special Representative for Somalia, from Nairobi to Mogadishu. The relocation will enable the Special Representative to provide political leadership to AMISOM and to further encourage an all-inclusive political and reconciliation process, by opening up channels of communication with all stakeholders in Somalia, within the framework of the Transitional Federal Charter. Steps are also underway to staff the civilian component of AMISOM. Efforts in this respect are, however, hampered by the lack of adequate facilities in Mogadishu and the precarious security situation on the ground, among other factors.

**b) Contingency planning for a possible United Nations operation**

12. At its meeting of 19 January, Council stressed that the long term stabilization and post-conflict reconstruction of Somalia would require the strong involvement of the United Nations. In this respect, Council urged the Security Council to consider authorizing a United Nations operation in Somalia that would take over from AMISOM at the expiration of its 6 months mandate. In its resolution 1744 (2007) referred to above, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to send a technical assessment mission to the African Union Headquarters and Somalia as soon as possible to report on the political and security situation and the possibility of a United Nations peacekeeping operation following the African Union deployment, and to subsequently report to the Security Council with recommendations on a United Nations engagement in support of peace and security in Somalia as well as further recommendations on stabilization and reconstruction.

13. In accordance with this resolution, the Secretary-General dispatched a multi-disciplinary technical assessment mission to the region from 15 to 26 March 2007. The Commission held consultations with that mission. In its key findings, as contained in the report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia, dated 20 April 2007, the mission formulated two possible scenarios regarding the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation. The first scenario envisages a situation in south-central Somalia in which hostilities have ceased and all or most armed groups and communities have signed an agreement that would allow for external monitoring. Under this scenario, United Nations involvement would primarily focus on technical assistance to the reconciliation efforts and reconstruction and development, supported by an appropriate United Nations peacekeeping presence. Under the second scenario, the political process would have made insufficient progress or would have failed altogether. In parallel, the security situation would remain highly volatile or would have further deteriorated. The deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation would not be possible or appropriate under this scenario, and alternative options, including peace enforcement, should be considered. The mission concluded that an operation mandated by the United Nations, mounted by and composed of a coalition of the willing with appropriate capabilities, would be better suited to the circumstances of this second scenario.

14. On his part, the Secretary-General recommended that the Security Council review the situation in Somalia again by mid-June 2007, with a view to determining whether the conditions are in place for the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation. On 30 April, the Security Council adopted a presidential statement welcoming the technical assessment mission sent by the Secretary-General to Somalia and the region. It requested the Secretary-General to immediately begin appropriate contingency planning for a possible United Nations mission. In another presidential statement dated 14 June 2007, the Security Council emphasized the urgent need for appropriate contingency planning for a possible United Nations mission, to be deployed in Somalia if it decided to authorize such a mission.

15. Subsequently, and as requested by the Security Council in April, the Secretary-General submitted, on 25 June 2007, a report in which he provided information on the contingency planning for a possible United Nations peacekeeping operation in Somalia. The Secretary-General indicated that, in view of the enormous needs of Somalia, a United Nations peacekeeping operation would have to be multidimensional. Such an operation, whose operational focus would be south-central Somalia, would not only contribute to the security and stability of the country, but also support the transitional process, including though massive reconstruction and development assistance, urgent recovery efforts, and the rehabilitation and strengthening of national institutions.

16. The Secretary-General indicated that, based on the initial assessment, a large, very robust and mobile military force would be required. With headquarters in Mogadishu, the force would consist of a number of brigade-sized sectors in south-central Somalia, supported by significant military aviation, including attack helicopters and considerable military engineering, logistics and transport units. A strong maritime component would also be required, given the continuing scourge of pirates off the coast of Somalia and extensive flow of weapons into the country. The total force would consist of up to 15 infantry battalions, excluding the over horizon capacity, which would be activated in extremis should the peace process unravel during the generation and deployment of forces. Together with support elements, the force could comprise over 20,000 military personnel.

17. The mission would also comprise a police component that would assist in reviving the Somali police force. Furthermore, there will also be need of a sizable and comprehensive civilian component that would focus on supporting the transitional process, including human rights, the protection of civilians and justice, and reconstruction and development efforts.

18. The plans put forward by the Secretary-General are based on the assumption that certain conditions would be in place on the ground. In more precise terms, the scenario would be one in which hostilities would have largely ceased and all major armed groups would have signed an agreement that would allow for external monitoring. The Secretary-General indicated that, while the presence of spoiler elements and opposition to peacekeeping troops could not be ruled out, a United Nations operation would have to be broadly accepted by all clans and sub-clans, with such acceptance being preferably expressed in a cessation of hostilities or ceasefire agreement or declaration.

19. In his recommendations to the Security Council, the Secretary-General noted that the conditions for a United Nations peacekeeping operation as outlined above exist only in part or not at all, and further noted that a United Nations operation would only succeed if it is deployed in support of a political process, not as a substitution for one. Therefore, he concluded that the immediate focus of the international community should be on promoting a ceasefire arrangement and a viable and inclusive political process, which in turn would bring about a sufficiently stable environment in which peacekeepers would play a useful role. At the time of finalizing this report, the Security Council was yet to pronounce itself on the recommendations of the Secretary-General.

20. In the meantime, the International Contact Group on Somalia, at its meeting held in London on 6 June 2007, having congratulated AMISOM for the work it is doing in Mogadishu, encouraged further immediate support, including from non-traditional donors. The Contact Group encouraged urgent consideration of funding mechanisms for AMISOM. On its part, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union, during its 11<sup>th</sup> ordinary session held in Accra from 1 to 3 July 2007, while welcoming the steps taken by the Commission for the deployment of AMISOM, stressed the need for the Security Council to take all necessary steps for the deployment of a United Nations operation that would take over AMISOM.

### **III. RECONCILIATION PROCESS**

21. Both the Council and the Assembly, at their January meetings, stressed the need on the part of the TFIs to embark on an all-inclusive and genuine process of dialogue and reconciliation within the framework of the Transitional Federal Charter. The United Nations Security Council, in its resolution 1744 (2007), also stressed the need for broad-based and representative institutions reached through an all-inclusive process, and welcomed the initiatives of the TFIs to pursue an inclusive intra-Somali political process.

22. In this respect, I am pleased to note that, since its return to Mogadishu, the TFG has initiated efforts to bridge the differences that exist between some of the clans. The focus has been on continuing dialogue with the Hawiye clan that is dominant in Mogadishu. This included meetings between President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed and individuals who supported the insurgency, but whose role would be crucial to any successful attempt to stabilize the situation in the capital and create conditions for a lasting reconciliation throughout the country.

23. I am also pleased to report that the TFG has taken the initiative for the convening of a national reconciliation congress. The stated objective of the congress is to bring together, on a large scale and based on the 4.5 clan-based power sharing formula, representatives of all the clans, including the diaspora, to discuss issues of concern and chart out a roadmap for the remainder of the transitional political process, in line with the Transitional Federal Charter. This congress is to be managed independently and guided by a national governance and reconciliation committee headed by former President Ali Mahdi Mohamed. I am pleased to note that the TFG authorities have since reaffirmed, on a number of occasions, the independence of the National Governance and Reconciliation Committee as the only organ mandated to

organize the congress. I welcome the assurances thus given by the Somali authorities.

24. At its London meeting, the International Contact Group expressed the belief that the national reconciliation congress was the primary vehicle to demonstrate an inclusive approach to governance, help deliver security and advance political reconciliation. The Contact Group, therefore, welcomed the assurances given by the TFG that the reconciliation congress will be fully inclusive and that no clan or sub clan, or individual members of them who renounce violence and are selected by their clans, will be excluded from the reconciliation process; that participation will be determined by the relevant groups without interference; and that a process leading to a permanent peace and stability in Somalia will be agreed upon and that the TFIs will respect the Transitional Federal Charter. The Contact Group also noted the TFG's request for assistance in isolating those elements seeking to undermine the political process through acts of violence.

25. During the period under review, the Commission has continued to encourage the Somali stakeholders to forge ahead with the reconciliation process. The Commissioner for Peace and Security raised the issue during the visit that he undertook to Mogadishu on 20 March 2007 and in his subsequent meetings with the Somali stakeholders and African Union partners. My Special Representative for Somalia met, in Nairobi and Mogadishu, with former President Ali Mahdi, who stressed that dialogue and reconciliation were the only option and that the effort must be a comprehensive and inclusive exercise. I also discussed the issue with President Abdullahi Yusuf when I met him in Addis Ababa, at the end of April 2007, stressing, on that occasion, the importance of an all-inclusive reconciliation process to the attainment of lasting peace in Somalia.

26. The congress was initially scheduled to start on 16 April 2007. Since then, its opening has been postponed twice, to allow more time to the various Somali clans to choose delegates and to prepare venue for the congress. The congress has now been opened, and I look forward to it being focused on the imperative of reconciliation.

#### **IV. SECURITY AND HUMANITARIAN SITUATION**

27. The security situation in Somalia continues to be precarious. This has been particularly the case in Mogadishu. Indeed, while the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) as an organization has been routed out, certain groups remain active, and some of them are in fact re-organizing as insurgents. This insurgency, driven by extremism and acts of terrorism, is now the major cause of instability, particularly in Mogadishu and some areas of south-central Somalia. In March this year, the insurgent elements mounted coordinated attacks within Mogadishu. The activities of such elements and the efforts by the TFG and Ethiopian forces to dislodge them resulted in fighting in densely populated areas of Mogadishu, with substantial collateral damage on both the civilian population and property.



28. Since then, the TFG authorities have taken a number of steps to normalize the situation in the city. It is in this context that a mayor and a new police commissioner were appointed, and that arms have been banned in Mogadishu. However, over the past weeks, and against the background of the intensification of preparations for the holding of the national reconciliation congress, Mogadishu has been the scene of several attacks against the TFG troops and the Ethiopian forces, including the use of improvised explosive devices, wired or remotely controlled. In addition, a number of individuals seen as supporters of the TFG and other prominent personalities have been victim of targeted assassination.

29. On 16 May 2007, an AMISOM patrol fell victim of a roadside bomb that killed 4 Ugandan soldiers and wounded 6 others. In a communiqué issued that same day, I condemned this act in the strongest terms. I took the opportunity to pay tribute to AMISOM personnel and to remind all Somali parties of the objectives of the Mission.

30. On 17 May 2007, Prime Minister Mohamed Ali Gedi survived a bomb attack. On 3 June 2007, he escaped another assassination attempt. In a communiqué issued on 4 June, I unreservedly condemned this act. I appealed to all the people of Somalia to continue to stand firm for peace and reconciliation and to shun any recourse to violence, and reiterated the African Union commitment to continue supporting the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia.

31. Elsewhere in Somalia, the situation has also been of concern. In April, Kisimayo was the theatre of inter-clan fighting between rival militias from the Marehan and Mijerteen sub-clans of the Darod. On 30 May 2007, Al Shabab elements belonging to the ICU and traveling in boats from Kismayo attacked the Bargal area in the Bari region of Puntland. In early June 2007, in Kismayo, ICU elements killed the district intelligence officer. There were also clashes between Somaliland and Puntland in April in the disputed areas of Sool and Sanaag regions.

32. At its London meeting, the International Contact Group, referring to the security situation, expressed its serious concern at a continued sporadic violence in Mogadishu. The Contact Group condemned the attack on the Prime Minister and called on all the parties to agree immediately on a formal and sustainable cessation of hostilities and the protection of civilians. The Contact Group strongly condemned the actions of extremists and terrorists and those seeking to undermine the political and reconciliation process, and called on the international community to do everything it can to prevent further attacks.

33. In its presidential statement of 14 June 2007, the Security Council expressed its grave concern regarding the recent pattern of attacks by extremist elements in Somalia, including the increased use of explosive devices, and condemned all attempts to use violence to undermine the political process. The Security Council called on all member States to cease immediately any further support for extremist elements or those who seek to block progress by violent means, and to support the ongoing efforts towards inclusive political dialogue. The Security Council also condemned the attack on the Prime Minister of the TFG, on 3 June 2007, as well as attacks on AMISOM.

34. The fighting which broke out in Mogadishu led to the displacement of about 400 000 people from the city, towards the south central region of Somalia and as far as Galgaduud and Mudug. Efforts to assist the affected population were hampered by the prevailing insecurity, the presence of illegal checkpoints, as well as harassment of humanitarian workers by roaming militias.

#### **IV. ACTIVITIES OF THE COMMISSION IN SUPPORT OF THE PEACE AND RECONCILIATION PROCESS**

35. During the period under review, and in addition to the ongoing deployment of AMISOM, the Commission has taken a number of steps in furtherance of the peace and reconciliation process in Somalia. As noted above, on 20 March 2007, the Commissioner for Peace and Security visited Mogadishu, where he met with the leadership of AMISOM, to whom he expressed AU's appreciation for the work done by the Mission. He also met with the TFG representatives, including President Abdullahi Yusuf, encouraging them to pursue their efforts aimed at promoting lasting peace and reconciliation in Somalia and assuring them of AU's continued support.

36. On 15 and 26 March 2007, I met with the United Nations technical assessment mission dispatched by the Secretary-General to Somalia and the region in pursuance of resolution 1744(2007). On both occasions, I reiterated the need for the international community to act swiftly to consolidate the reconciliation process, in particular through the deployment of a United Nations operation that would take over AMISOM.

37. In late April, I met with the President Abdullahi Yusuf in Addis Ababa. We seized the opportunity to review the situation and the efforts to consolidate the ongoing process in Somalia. Once again, I impressed upon the President the need to promote an all-inclusive and genuine reconciliation, involving all those who will renounce violence. I stressed that such a process would usefully complement the efforts being deployed by AMISOM on the ground and would constitute an encouragement to member States to contribute the troops and other personnel required to reach AMISOM's authorized strength, as well as to the African Union member States and partners to provide the much needed financial and logistical resources for the sustenance of the Mission. President Abdullahi Yusuf reiterated the TFG's commitment to an all-inclusive and genuine reconciliation process.

38. Furthermore, the Commission took part in the three meetings of the International Contact Group on Somalia, which were held in Dar-es-Salaam, on 9 February, in Cairo, on 4 April, and in London, on 6 June 2007. In the course of these meetings, the Commission's representatives stressed the need for increased support for AMISOM and the reconciliation process in Somalia.

39. On 11 June 2007, the Commissioner for Peace and Security met with the United Nations Under Secretary-General for Political Affairs, in Addis Ababa. The meeting provided an opportunity to exchange views on the situation in Somalia and AMISOM deployment. It also provided an opportunity to discuss the practical steps to be taken to better coordinate the efforts of the African Union and the United Nations.

40. During the period under review, my Special Representative has kept continuous contacts with all concerned. These contacts have involved three meetings with the President of the TFG, as well as meetings with the Prime Minister and other personalities who could contribute to the efforts for reconciliation and settlement of the political differences. The objective has been to encourage all Somalis to be actively and constructively involved in the process of reconciliation and consolidation of the gains made, within the framework of the Transitional Federal Charter.

41. In addition to the deployment of AMISOM and the efforts being exerted in furtherance of the reconciliation process, the African Union is also contributing to the alleviation of the socio-economic impact of the conflict on the local population. The more than decade long conflict that Somalia has witnessed has had an adverse impact on the livestock, which provides livelihood to over 75% of the Somali population. It is in this context that several animal resources related activities are being carried out by the Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources (IBAR).

## **V. OBSERVATIONS**

42. More than five months after its deployment, AMISOM continues to be faced with tremendous difficulties. In spite the many efforts it has deployed, the Commission has not yet been able to fully deploy the Mission and reach its authorized strength. Even though some countries have pledged troops, financial and logistical constraints have made it difficult for them to deploy in the mission theatre.

43. The Ugandan troops that are on the ground are confronted by several challenges. The contingent is overstretched and lacks some vital assets. In addition, the absence of the envisaged air and maritime components has further compounded the difficulties facing the Mission. Yet, as indicated above, the Ugandan troops have done a remarkable work. I wish to pay tribute to the troops for the efforts and the sacrifice made. I also would like to pay tribute to the Ugandan Government for its commitment to the restoration of lasting peace and reconciliation in Somalia.

44. I would like, once again to appeal to the African Union member states and partners to provide the requisite financial and logistical resources for the smooth and effective running of AMISOM. As has been stressed by the African Union and other members of the international community, the developments that took place in Somalia at the end of last year have created a unique opportunity to restore lasting peace in the country and promote genuine reconciliation. This opportunity should be fully exploited. Assisting AMISOM and providing it with the requisite resources and logistics will go a long way in ensuring that the opportunity that exists today is not lost.

45. Both the African Union and the international community have repeatedly emphasized the importance of an all inclusive and genuine political process for the achievement of lasting peace and reconciliations in Somalia. I note with satisfaction the steps already taken by the TFG in this regard and the opening of the national reconciliation congress. I am encouraged by the assurances given by the highest Somali authorities on the independence of the national governance and reconciliation committee. I am confident that the committee will spare no efforts to ensure that the congress is as inclusive and transparent as possible.

46. While the TFG has a key role to play for the successful convening of the congress, the international community should stand firm on the side of Somalia's legitimate institutions in their efforts to fight violence and other acts aimed at undermining the political process. I appeal to all African Union member States and partners to fully support the ongoing process and the steps taken to promote an all-inclusive and genuine reconciliation.

47. I would like to seize this opportunity to reiterate my condemnation of all the acts of violence perpetrated by those forces determined to undermine the political process. I, particularly, condemn the attacks against AMISOM. I would like, once again, to encourage the United Nations Security Council to authorize the deployment of a United Nations operation that would take over AMISOM. The international community has the duty to ensure that the hard-won gains made over the past months are not lost.

48. In the meantime, I recommend to Council to extend the mandate of AMISOM for an additional period of six months. During this period, the Commission will work towards the early deployment of the military and civilian police personnel that have already been pledged, as well as the mobilization of additional troops and resources to reach AMISOM authorized strength. The Commission will also continue to encourage the reconciliation process and support all efforts made in this respect.

AFRICAN UNION UNION AFRICAINE

African Union Common Repository

<http://archives.au.int>

---

Organs

Peace and Security Collection

---

2007

# Report of the chairperson of the Commission on the Situation in Somalia

African Union Commission

Peace and Security

---

<http://archives.au.int/handle/123456789/2177>

*Downloaded from African Union Common Repository*