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**EX.CL/ 227 (VIII)**

**REPORT OF THE 6<sup>TH</sup> WTO MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE,  
13 – 18 DECEMBER 2005, HONG KONG, CHINA**

**REPORT OF THE 6<sup>TH</sup> WTO MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE,**  
**13 – 18 DECEMBER 2005, HONG KONG, CHINA**

**Introduction**

1. The Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference took place from 13 to 18 December 2005 in Hong Kong, China in a spirit of great expectations following the deadlock of Cancun in 2003 caused by the refusal of developing countries to yield to the pressure of developed countries on Singapore issues. It should be recalled that countries making up the African Union, the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP) and the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) had regrouped themselves as the Group of 90 (G90) in order to face the developed countries in unity. The objectives of the Conference were to take stock of the progress made in the negotiations since Cancun, to agree on concrete steps to redirect the development round towards achieving its objective and to undertake further negotiations on some of the major outstanding issues with a view to successfully concluding the Doha Round of WTO negotiations by 2006.

**Preparatory Process leading up to Hong Kong**

2. African countries have realized that, in the current era of globalisation, the vision and objective of Africa to achieve rapid and sustainable socio-economic development, eradicate poverty and integrate effectively into the global economy cannot be realized unless the imbalances in the current multilateral trading system are eliminated. Therefore, they have been actively involved in the WTO process since the adoption of the Doha Work Programme (DWP) by the 4<sup>th</sup> WTO Ministerial Conference held in Doha, Qatar in November 2001. Indeed, the adoption of the DWP and the commitment made by the 149 WTO members to put the development dimension at the center of every aspect of the Programme was due in no small measure to the efforts of African countries. Africa's primary goal in the on-going Doha Round is to rid the multilateral trading system of the imbalances against developing countries, especially those in Africa, and to make the system more development friendly.

3. In preparation for Hong Kong, African countries, with the technical support of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), NGOs and civil society organizations undertook a number of activities, some of which were funded by UNDP. These include the preparation of technical studies and the convening of a series of brainstorming sessions, retreats, workshops and meetings on a number of issues on the agenda of the WTO that are of critical importance to the development of Africa in order to articulate African common positions on them. As required by its mandate and as directed by the Decisions of AU Heads of States and Government, the AU Commission played the role of facilitator and coordinator in some of the preparatory activities.

4. The results of the technical studies and the outcomes of the workshops undertaken at national, regional and continental levels facilitated the deliberations of AU Ministers of Trade in their 3rd Ordinary Session held in Cairo, Egypt in June 2005 during which Ministers reaffirmed their commitment to engage constructively in the preparatory process to Hong Kong and reiterated the urgency to meet the

commitment of the Doha mandate of placing the needs and interests of developing countries and, in particular LDCs, at the heart of the WTO work programme. In this regard, they adopted two important documents, namely the Cairo Declaration and Road Map. The basic tenants of these declarations revolve around the importance of the Hong Kong Conference to advance the negotiations, while at the same time, maintaining the same level of ambition embodied in the Doha Declaration. These provided political guidance to African negotiators in Geneva and were extensively used by them in their negotiations.

5. As was decided by the Cairo Conference, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Extraordinary Session of the AU Conference of Ministers of Trade was held in Arusha, Tanzania from 22 to 24 November, 2005 during which Ministers reviewed the state of play in the negotiations following the adoption of the July package. They reclaimed the development agenda and gave guidance on the process, on Development, Agriculture, Services, Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA), on the Aid for trade Initiative, and other issues as reflected in the adopted outcome called "The Arusha Development Benchmarks for the Sixth WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, China." During the Arusha Conference, an interactive session of African Trade Ministers with the Director General of the WTO, the Hong Kong Trade Minister and Chairman of the 6<sup>th</sup> WTO Ministerial Conference, as well as Ministers of major groups and countries including the EU, USA, Brazil and India provided an opportunity for an exchange of views and for the seeking of support for the African common position. African countries were therefore relatively well prepared for Hong Kong.

6. The Arusha outcome was extensively used by the ACP Group and the G90 in their meeting in Brussels prior to Hong Kong. It was observed that both the ACP and LDC groups agreed with the position of the AU. A merged document of the G90 evolved that was used in Hong Kong for the negotiations as a Group. Also, in accordance with the directive of Heads of States and Government to the African Union to join like-minded groups, the G90 which is constituted largely by AU Member States joined the Group of 20 which comprises some developing non-African countries such as India and Brazil to form the alliance of the G110. For the first time in the history of WTO Ministerial Conferences, a Ministerial meeting of the G110 was held to exchange views on ways for better coordination of efforts in order to develop a common approach to issues of common interest. The establishment of the G110 alliance contributed to the enhancement of the negotiating power of developing countries and to some of the development-oriented outcomes of the Conference.

### **Organisation of Work in Hong Kong**

7. The 6<sup>th</sup> WTO Ministerial Conference was characterized by improved participation of African countries in the management of the "green room" process of the Conference. The Ministers of Trade of Nigeria and Kenya served as Vice Chairman of the Conference and Facilitator of the negotiations on Agriculture respectively. The Ministers of Trade of Ghana and South Africa were also designated as Friends of the Chair of the Conference. Those African Ministers as well as the Ministers of Trade of Egypt, Mauritius and Zambia who were the Chief spokespersons for the AU, ACP and LDCs respectively also participated in the "green room" meetings which finalized the text of the Ministerial Declaration. Each Minister was accompanied by his Ambassador in Geneva. Thus Africa had as many

as seven Ministers involved in the green room process which involved around thirty-five members. This is a positive development in the quest of Africa for transparency and inclusiveness in the WTO process.

8. The Hong Kong Conference was indeed a negotiating Conference. The African Group, the ACP, the LDCs were meeting, initially as separate groups and later on as the G90, twice a day in order to be briefed on discussions in the “green rooms” by their respective spokespersons and to readjust the mandate given to them in light of the negotiations of the “green room”. At the same time, daily redrafting of the text on the major issues was being done by the experts for submission to the facilitators for negotiation purposes. Daily press conferences were also being given in order to sensitize the press and the international community on the state of negotiations from the G90 perspective.

### **Main Issues at Stake on Arrival In Hong Kong**

9. AU Member States proceeded to Hong Kong with a view to obtain positive results on the concerns expressed in the Arusha Development Benchmarks, among others:

- Immediate elimination of trade distorting cotton subsidies;
- End date of 2010 for export subsidies;
- Amendment of Annex C on Services as well as the corresponding paragraph 21 in the text of the Draft Declaration;
- The improvement of market access for agricultural and industrial products of export interest to African countries, including the elimination of tariff escalation and the provision by developed countries of bound duty and quota free market access to all products originating from the LDCs;
- The mainstreaming of policy space and flexibilities in all aspects of the negotiations in order for African countries to achieve their legitimate development goals;
- Ensuring that the obligations to be undertaken by African countries are proportional and commensurate with their level of development;
- Increased financial and technical assistance to meet the adjustment costs and to build trade and supply-side capacity and enhance Africa’s competitiveness;
- Transparency and inclusiveness in the negotiation process; and
- Addressing the need for Special and Differential Treatment in all the three pillars of the Agriculture negotiations and the role of Special Products and a Special Safeguard Mechanism as a means of ensuring food security and rural development and addressing livelihood concerns of developing countries.

### **Outcome of Hong Kong**

10. In the period leading up to the Hong Kong Ministerial conference, WTO Members took the strategic decision to scale down the level of ambition for Hong Kong. This was a tacit recognition of the wide divergences on key issues of the negotiations and was meant to forestall failure in the 6<sup>th</sup> Session of the WTO

Ministerial Conference. Failure in Hong Kong was considered as catastrophic for the multilateral trading system and had to be avoided at all costs. The modest outcome in Hong Kong was however a logical consequence of the lack of political will by some WTO Members to deliver on the development promises made at Doha.

11. After six days of intensive consultations/ negotiations, the Ministerial Conference adopted the Hong Kong Declaration on 18 December 2005, many elements of which do not meet the demands and expectations of African countries and do not adequately address their interests and concerns as articulated in the Cairo Declaration, Cairo Roadmap and the Arusha Development Benchmarks. The main elements of the Hong Kong outcome that can be considered as positive achievements for Africa are:

- The elimination of all forms of export subsidies by 2013,
- The elimination of all forms of export subsidies for cotton by developed countries in 2006,
- Duty-free and quota free market access for all products originating from LDCs by 2008;
- In Agriculture and NAMA (non-agricultural market access), a framework for full modalities has been fleshed out; the commitment in the NAMA negotiations to reduce or as appropriate, eliminate tariffs, including the reduction or elimination of tariff peaks, high tariffs and tariff escalation, in particular on products of export interest to developing countries, and to take into account the special needs and interests of developing countries, including through less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments has also been made;
- The initiation of work on the Aid for trade Initiative as an instrument to help developing countries, particularly LDCs, to take advantage of new export opportunities and build up their capacity to trade. This is a clear recognition of the supply side constraints hampering the ability of developing countries to respond to market access opportunities;
- Some progress on preventing the abuse of food aid as a disguised form of dumping.

12. However, even those elements that have been enumerated above as positive outcomes, are mitigated by the following:

- The confirmation of the end date of 2013 is conditional upon the completion of the modalities;
- There is little victory for cotton farmers in developing countries. While export subsidies will be eliminated in 2006, this constitutes only a small portion of the trade distortion. There is no action agreed for trade distorting domestic subsidies which amount to about 80-90% of total US support for cotton. Domestic subsidies also make up almost all of the European cotton subsidies. Instead some token commitments on the export competition and market access pillars in relation to the cotton question have been undertaken,
- On the Aid for Trade Initiative, the only commitment is the creation of a task force by the Director-General of the WTO that is to report to the General Council by July 2006. No concrete commitment on new resources

for this initiative are contained in the Hong Kong Declaration in spite of some offers made by some countries;

- Instead of bound duty and quota free market access to rich countries' markets for all LDC products, an escape clause that countries having difficulties providing such market access shall provide access for 97% of products allows developed countries to continue to protect "sensitive products" that are of export advantage to LDCs, such as textiles and clothing, rice, sugar, leather products and fishery products. The LDCs are only given rights in areas where they cannot realise these rights.

13. Besides, the textual changes proposed by developing countries to Annex C on Services were rejected. New methods of negotiations (plurilateral, sectoral, modal) are agreed to, that will erode the flexibilities available to developing countries to liberalise only in sectors they choose to and the extent they want to. This will put enormous pressures on African countries to open up sensitive service sectors to powerful corporations from the North and is a diminution of the development friendly flexibilities inherent in the GATS Agreement. As for NAMA negotiations, the adoption of the Swiss Formula, albeit with different coefficients, could impact negatively on Africa's industrialization prospects. Moreover, the end date of 2013 for the elimination of export subsidies in Agriculture loses in significance when compared to the damages to African farmers caused by domestic support measures in the rich countries. The domestic support in the EU amounts to 55 billion euros, while export subsidies amount to 3 billion euros.

### **Follow-up Action**

14. Most of the difficult decisions have been put off to a further meeting in April 2006. In Agriculture, the bulk of the work remains to be done, especially in the field of domestic subsidies. WTO members need to complete full modalities on Agriculture and NAMA by the new deadline set by themselves.

### **Conclusion**

15. Through its few minor gains, the Hong Kong Conference constitutes an important step in the negotiations. However, when measured against development goals, it cannot be said that Hong Kong was a success. Therefore, the AU Group must remain alert and united in order to work its way towards the completion of modalities of the July 2004 package. African countries need to strengthen their coordination and harmonise their position in the last lap of negotiations of the Doha Work Programme because there is no credible alternative to the WTO rules-based system. It is more than trade. It is also about peace and security because the Doha Trade Round is an integral part of the global agenda and is essential for the achievement of the MDGs.

**EX.CL/227 (VIII)  
ANNEX**



**The Hong Kong ministerial compromise in the perspective of the Arusha and Cairo declarations**

**January 11, 2006**

<b>Agriculture</b>			
<b>Issue compared</b>	<b>Cairo Declaration on Agriculture</b>	<b>Arusha Declaration on agriculture</b>	<b>Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration on agriculture</b>
Market Access: preference erosion	Specific and concrete mechanisms to address the problems of preference erosion	Specific and concrete mechanisms to address the problems of preference erosion, including through designation of sensitive products by developed countries	The importance of preferences is emphasized. There is a convergence on the need to reinforce capacity building on this matter, but divergence on the mechanisms to put into place to limit preferences erosion.
Market access: formula and cuts for African countries	Take into account the particular pattern of trade of African countries and their different tariff structures	a) Full operationalization of the principle of proportionality in the reduction of tariffs, and the need to take into account the different tariff structures of Members;	Agreement on the principle of four bands for structuring tariffs cuts, but no convergence on the threshold and cuts inside the bands. Lesser commitment of the developing countries, but general divergence on the threshold and cuts applied by these countries.
Market access: tariff escalation	The issue of tariff escalation must be addressed fully in accordance with paragraph 36 of the Framework Agreement without prejudice to the products benefiting from preferential arrangements,	Substantial improvement in market access for products of export interest to African countries. In this regard, special attention should be given to tariff escalation, tariff peaks and non-tariff barriers;	Clear divergence among WTO members on the tariffs caps. Some members reject this concept, other propose a differentiated cap for developed countries (75%-100%), and developing ones (150%).
Market access: full market access for LDCs	Developed countries, and other developing countries in a position to do so, must provide bound duty and quota free market access to agricultural products originating in LDCs	-	Unrestricted market access for LDCs is still discussed by WTO members.



<p>Market access: Sensitive and Special Products, and Special Safeguard mechanism</p>	<p>[...] the development of meaningful modalities on Special Products (SPs) and the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM). [...]Modalities with respect to the designation of special products and treatment must be devised in a way that provides maximum flexibility to countries in Africa to reflect their particular domestic circumstances and development needs</p>	<p>Designation and treatment of the special products must be devised in a way that provides maximum flexibility to the African countries to reflect particular domestic circumstances and development needs .The SSM to be established for the developing countries should be operationally effective to address the specific circumstances of the African Countries;</p>	<p>Divergence among WTO members on the number for sensitive products. The proposals range from 1% to as much of 15% of the tariff lines for the developed countries. The treatment of the sensitive products is also debated. The WTO members agree on the principle of a greater flexibility for developing countries regarding sensitive products. They are also discussing on the criteria to designate the special products, as well as their type of treatment. It has been proposed that developing countries could designate at least 20% of their agricultural tariff lines as special products.</p>
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<p>Domestic support: formula for cuts</p>	<p>the formula to be agreed must result in meaningful and effective reductions in the subsidies granted by the major trading partners to their farming communities. [...] disciplines on domestic support (DS) should not lead to “box-shifting” the subsidies,</p> <p>African countries must be allowed to maintain policy space [...],</p>	<p>Modalities should include disciplines to prevent box shifting;</p> <p>African countries must be exempted from de minimis and AMS reduction commitments;</p> <p>African countries must be allowed to maintain policy space for the development [...]</p> <p>African countries underline the importance of meeting the Doha objective of real reductions in trade distorting domestic support.</p>	<p>On the overall cut, the following formula is proposed:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="1131 354 1934 518"> <thead> <tr> <th>Bands</th> <th>Thresholds (US\$ billion)</th> <th>Developed countries cuts</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>0-10</td> <td>31% - 70%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2</td> <td>10-60</td> <td>53% - 75%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3</td> <td>&gt;60</td> <td>70% - 80%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>With respect to reductions in the amber box measures, the following formula should apply:</p> <table border="1" data-bbox="1159 643 1906 807"> <thead> <tr> <th>Bands</th> <th>Thresholds (US\$ billion)</th> <th>Developed countries cuts</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>1</td> <td>0-12/15</td> <td>37% - 60%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>2</td> <td>12/15-25</td> <td>60% - 70%</td> </tr> <tr> <td>3</td> <td>&gt;25</td> <td>70% - 83%</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>50%-80% cuts for de minimis tariffs applied y developed countries, reduced cuts / no cut at all for developing countries.</p>	Bands	Thresholds (US\$ billion)	Developed countries cuts	1	0-10	31% - 70%	2	10-60	53% - 75%	3	>60	70% - 80%	Bands	Thresholds (US\$ billion)	Developed countries cuts	1	0-12/15	37% - 60%	2	12/15-25	60% - 70%	3	>25	70% - 83%
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<p>Domestic support: blue box and box shifting</p>	<p>disciplines on domestic support (DS) should not lead to “box-shifting” the subsidies,</p>	<p>The tightening of the criteria for the Blue Box measures is critical;</p> <p>Modalities should include disciplines to prevent box shifting;</p>	<p>Agreement on further constraining the use of the blue box. Discussion on the technique for achieving it, with two proposals: either reducing the current 5% ceiling to 2.5%, or increasing the discipline related to this type of domestic support.</p>																								

<p>Domestic support: green box</p>	<p>The developed countries must engage in the review and clarification of the green box criteria in a manner that will ensure that the green-box measures have no or at most minimal trade-distorting effects or effects on production.</p>	<p>Need to review the Green Box Criteria to provide policy space for developing countries;  Review and tighten the Green Box Criteria for developed countries to ensure that it is non or minimally trade distorting;</p>	<p>Convergence on the need to make the Green Box more “development friendly”, but divergence among WTO members on the rest of the discussion.</p>
<p>Export competition: end date</p>	<p>Place emphasis on the need for a credible end date for the elimination of all forms of export subsidies on agricultural products. This elimination shall be without prejudice to S&amp;D treatment of NFIDCs and LDCs,</p>	<p>Stress the need for the elimination of all forms of export subsidies on agricultural products by 2010. This elimination shall be without prejudice to S&amp;D treatment of NFIDCs and LDCs;</p>	<p>The WTO members agreed to ensure the parallel elimination of export subsidies and disciplines in all export measures with equivalent effects to be completed by the end of 2013. Convergence on disciplines with respect to export credits, export credit guarantee or insurance programmes with repayment periods of 180 days and below.</p>

<p>Cotton</p>	<p>Recommends to:          - Eliminate all export subsidies and domestic support measures on cotton,          - Set up an emergency support fund for African countries and          - Grant bound quota- and duty-free market access for cotton and its by – products from African LDCs, that are cotton producers and exporters.</p> <p>Besides, bilateral and multilateral donors are urged to meet their commitment on the development-related aspects of the cotton initiative.</p>	<p>Stresses the need for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Total elimination by the 31st December 2005 of export subsidies;</li> <li>- Substantial reductions of domestic support measures that distort trade on cotton in three steps.</li> <li>- Elaboration of disciplines that prevent shifting of domestic support between different boxes</li> <li>- Setting up of Emergency Fund to address cotton revenue deficits resulting from cotton price depressions in the international markets;</li> <li>- Mobilization of the technical and financial assistance.</li> </ul>	<p>The WTO members agreed that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- All forms of export subsidies for cotton will be eliminated by developed countries in 2006</li> <li>- On market access, developed countries will give duty and quota free access for cotton exports from least-developed countries (LDCs) from the commencement of the implementation period.</li> <li>- Trade distorting domestic subsidies for cotton production should be reduced more ambitiously than under whatever general formula is agreed and that it should be implemented over a shorter period of time than generally applicable.</li> </ul>
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<p>Export Competition: STEs</p>	<p>African countries' State Trading Enterprises (STEs) shall be excluded from the application of any new disciplines on STEs; in recognition of the critical role played by STEs in sustaining livelihoods, food security and poverty reduction in such countries.</p>	<p>State Trading Enterprises (STEs) in Africa play an important developmental and poverty alleviation role and in this regard, African countries' STEs should be exempted from the application of any disciplines.</p>	<p><b>Progress on the new disciplines regarding STE, but no consensus on the exemption of the developing countries from these disciplines.</b></p>
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<b>NAMA</b>			
<b>Issue compared</b>	<b>Cairo Declaration on NAMA</b>	<b>Arusha Declaration on NAMA</b>	<b>Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration on NAMA</b>
Formula	Identify an appropriate formula or tariff approach that would allow African countries to undertake industrial policy and diversification objectives and take as priority the principles of non-reciprocity, Special and Differential Treatment and less than full reciprocity,	An appropriate formula or any other tariff reduction approach that incorporates development factors and concerns and would allow African countries to pursue industrial policy, employment creation and diversification objectives and take as priority the Special and Differential Treatment and less than full reciprocity;	The WTO members agreed that the Swiss type of formula should be used, with coefficients that take into account the special needs of the developing countries, including through less than full reciprocity in reduction commitments. However, divergences remain on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- The type of coefficient (fixed or variable). Some WTO members propose to refer to coefficients based on the initial tariffs average (Girard Type formula).</li> <li>- The level of the coefficients, as the proposals range from 5 to 10 for developed countries, and from 10 to 30 for developing ones.</li> <li>- The reference tariffs (bound or applied tariffs)</li> </ul>
Flexibility	Provide policy space and flexibility that fully takes account of African countries' developmental, financial and industrial needs which removes the risk of de-industrialization with its attendant negative consequences on poverty reduction,	Preserve policy space and flexibility that fully takes into account African countries developmental, financial and industrial needs, which averts the risk of de-industrialization and fiscal revenue constraints and its attendant negative consequences on poverty reduction;	There are still divergences on the interpretation of the paragraph 8 of the July package. Some WTO members propose that the flexibilities introduced in this paragraph are integrated into the tariff cuts formula, estimating they are equivalent to 4-5 additional points to the coefficient in the formula, others refuse to re-open the NAMA framework.

Binding	Provide flexibilities for African countries to determine their binding coverage commensurate with their development objectives,	These flexibilities should allow African countries the means to determine their commitment levels, including binding coverage, commensurate with their development objectives;	The WTO members agreed that full bindings would be a desirable objective for the NAMA negotiations. Two methodologies are still under discussion, the constant and flexible mark-up mechanism.
LDC	Fully respect, LDCs exemption from tariff reduction commitments	Full respect for LDCs exemption from tariff reduction commitments and full flexibility with regard to binding coverage;	Duty-free and quota-free market access for LDCs exporters is still discussed.

**Services**

<b>Issue compared</b>	<b>Cairo Declaration</b>	<b>Arusha Declaration</b>	<b>Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration on agriculture</b>
Approach		Our concerns on the issue of complementary approaches, and oppose the inclusion of approaches that are incompatible with the spirit and structure of the GATS;	The request-offer negotiations shall remain the main method of negotiations.
Targets		We are (...) opposed to qualitative and quantitative targets, modal targets as well as sectoral negotiations, or any language on the plurilateral request/offer approach that goes beyond the negotiating guidelines;	

	<p>We (...) request for substantial improvement in market access in modes and sectors of export interest to African countries. Under Mode 4, Members should make commitments aimed at ensuring a commercially meaningful outcome for African countries.</p>	<p>Special attention should be accorded to the needs and interests of small service suppliers of African countries. (...). The Ministerial text must ensure that members make commercially meaningful commitments in sectors and modes of supply of export interest to developing countries, particularly in Mode IV.</p>	<p>Members shall pursue full and effective implementation of the Modalities for the Special Treatment for Least-Developed Country Members in the Negotiations on Trade in Services (LDC Modalities) adopted by the Special Session of the Council for Trade in Services on 3 September 2003, with a view to the beneficial and meaningful integration of LDCs into the multilateral trading system.</p>
	<p>We (...) seek to intensify work in the rule-making area so as to restore the balance between the market-access and rule-making tracks. (...) We call upon Members to expeditiously establish an emergency safeguard mechanism.</p>	<p>We stress (...) the need to intensify the rule-making negotiations in order to develop pro-development disciplines, particularly in domestic regulation and emergency safeguard measures.</p>	<p>Members must intensify their efforts to conclude the negotiations on rule-making under GATS Articles X, XIII, and XV in accordance with their respective mandates and timelines.</p>

**Least developed countries**

Issue compared	Cairo Declaration	Arusha Declaration	Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration on LDCs
Exemption	Exemption from undertaking any reduction commitments,	We call (...) LDCS to be exempted from undertaking any reduction commitments	LDCS are exempted from any tariff.
Unrestricted market access		Developed countries and developing countries in a position to do so to provide LDCs with bound duty free and quota free market access for all LDCs for all products.	WTO members agree that developed-country Members shall, and developing-country Members declaring themselves in a position to do so should provide duty-free and quota-free market access on a lasting basis, for all products originating from all LDCs by 2008 or no later than the start of the implementation period in a manner that ensures stability, security and predictability. Members facing difficulties at this time to provide market access as set out above shall provide duty-free and quota-free market access for at least 97 per cent of products originating from LDCs, defined at the tariff line level, by 2008 or no later than the start of the implementation period.



Trade-related investment measures		LDCs to be provided with policy space and flexibilities in order to pursue their development goals, including the use of Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) for development purposes;	Extra policy space are granted for LDCs on investment, with the use of Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) for development purpose.
Reinforcement of the integrated framework		In this regard, we the African Ministers continue to attach high priority to the Integrated Framework for LDCs. We welcome the decision of the IMF and the World Bank for an enhanced IF.	The Integrated Framework (IF) should continue delivering technical assistance and capacity building in order to reinforce African export capacities. In this perspective, countries are urged to increase their contribution to the IF.

<b>Trade facilitation</b>			
<b>Issue compared</b>	<b>Cairo Declaration</b>	<b>Arusha Declaration</b>	<b>Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration on trade facilitation</b>
Special and differentiate treatment	We welcome the Annex "D" which stresses the need for synergy between the level of commitments, the cost of and the availability of resources to implement any possible outcome and the provision of financial and technical resources for the capacity building of developing and least-developed countries. We emphasize the need for (...) technical assistance and capacity building support to African countries.	We call for the deepening and intensifying of negotiations on special and differential treatment, with the view to arriving at S&D provisions that are precise, effective, operational and allow for necessary flexibilities in implementing any possible outcome of the negotiations.	The special and differentiate treatment (S&D) is to be fully integrated in any compromise on trade facilitation, with special attention on the technical assistance.

<b>Rules</b>			
<b>Issue compared</b>	<b>Cairo Declaration</b>	<b>Arusha Declaration</b>	<b>Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration on rules</b>
Regional integration	Clarification and improvement of disciplines and procedures relating to regional trade agreements as mandated under Paragraph 29 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration should not reopen the Enabling Clause under transparency or systemic issues in RTA negotiations as this would not meet Africa's developmental needs.	The development aspects are taken fully into account in the negotiations aimed at clarifying and improving disciplines and procedures relating to regional trade agreements;	WTO members continue their discussion on the Regional Trade Agreements, especially on the interpretation of "substantially all trade" and the length of the transitional period.

2006

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