COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
Eleventh Ordinary Session
Algiers - September 1968.

REPORT OF THE OAU CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE
FOR THE LIBERATION OF AFRICA
TO THE 11TH SESSION OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR THE LIBERATION OF AFRICA
(COMMITTEE OF ELEVEN)

REPORT OF THE O.A.U. CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR
THE LIBERATION OF AFRICA TO THE 11TH SESSION OF
THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

This report covers the period between the 12th Session meeting in Conakry in January and July 1968, during which the liberation struggle has been maintained at an encouraging level in the various spheres of active military engagements whilst the forces of liberation continue to consolidate their positions in those areas already under their effective control. The report touches on the following matters:-

(I) General Remarks

(II) Situation in dependent territories-

(a) Angola, Mozambique, the so-called Portuguese Guinea, South Africa, Zimbabwe, South West Africa and the so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti)

(b) Special case of the Canary Islands.

(c) Other territories (Seychelles and Comoro Islands).

(III) Recommendations and Resolutions.

1. The work of the Committee was guided by the opening statements of the President of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, His Excellency President Houari Boumedienne, the outgoing Chairman, the Honourable Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Guinea, Dr. Lansana Beavogui, and the Honourable Algerian Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr. Abdelaziz Bouteflika and His Excellency, Ambassador M. Sahnoun, Assistant Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity. The statements are attached as Appendices A, B, C and D.

2. Reports from the various Liberation Movements give cause for optimism and indicate that the struggle on many fronts continue to gather momentum. The intensification of the armed struggle in the dependent territories has been brought about by the continued determination and rededication on the part of all freedom fighters to the struggle,
coupled with the fresh wave of political consciousness among the masses of the population inside these territories. This development has given rise to a correspondingly increased support from the masses of people in the dependent territories for the forces of liberation.

3. The fascist regimes in Southern Africa have been greatly upset by this current wave of resistance which has been countered by a merciless clamping down on any form of political and military activity. In fact the extension of their oppressive measures is commensurate with the intensification of the military activities of the freedom fighters, whose every onslaught on the oppressors is reciprocated with increased violence against the African people.

4. The Committee is gratified that notwithstanding the fierceness of the enemy's retaliatory measures, the freedom fighters remain undaunted in the relentless pursuit of their struggle. The disension within the ranks of the leadership of the rebel regime of Ian Smith, the movement of South African defence lines to Rhodesia and Mozambique and the increased dependence of Portugal on the support of her NATO allies for the continued preservation of her racist hegemony on the African Continent are demonstrative of the uneasiness and insecurity of these racist and fascist regimes in the face of the new dimensions which the armed struggle has now assumed and the threat which the renewed determination of the people now poses.

5. While the struggle against imperialism in Africa is the primary concern of the Committee, nevertheless it must be viewed in its world perspective. Confronted with the alliance of imperialist and colonialist forces, Africa must realise that the total liberation of the Continent can only be conceived and achieved on the basis of a full and inevitable commitment, side by side with all the forces of liberation and progress throughout the world.

6. African countries should not fail to see the diabolical links between international monopoly and capitalist forces which are the purveyors of bloodshed and wanton crimes perpetrated by the U.S. imperialists in Vietnam, which were the motive force behind the Zionist aggression on the United Arab Republic and people of the Middle East, and which will continue to menace world peace and order unless all peace-loving people rise as one and deal a death blow to them.
7. The African countries must dedicate themselves totally to aid increasingly those brothers who are on the front line of the struggle for independence. Unfortunately, one Member of the Organization of African Unity, the Republic of Malawi, has never supported the Liberation Committee or the Liberation Movements. Malawi no longer hides her lack of concern for the struggle and has become a day-light henchman of the imperialists and colonialists in Southern Africa. The Committee is greatly perturbed by the unco-operative attitude of this Member State of the O.A.U., which by reason both of its proximity and contiguity to the dependent territories in Southern Africa, is well positioned to play a useful and important role in the cause of the liberation struggle.

8. In view of the fact that the imperialist forces continuously increase their budgets for the perfection of the oppressive machinery, and the African countries realising that the assistance which has hitherto been given to the liberation struggle is no longer sufficient, Member States must increase assistance to counteract the increased means of oppression in the hands of our enemies.

9. The Committee is deeply concerned by the reports of wrangling and division within the ranks of the leadership of certain Liberation Movements. However, the Committee has decided to spare no efforts for restoring the vital unity within the Movements in order to achieve our goal of complete and total eradication of all forms of colonialism and oppression from the face of the Continent of Africa.

II THE SITUATION IN DEPENDENT TERRITORIES:

PORTUGUESE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

MOZAMBIQUE

10. In the period under review, FRELIMO forces succeeded in launching serious of severe assaults on fortified enemy positions in Cabo Delgado, Tete and Niassa Provinces in the course of which Portuguese garrisons were destroyed and large quantities of arms and ammunition captured. FRELIMO forces successfully re-opened operations in the Tete Province and, in addition, the Movement has busied itself mainly with consolidating its position in the areas under its effective control and implementing the social programmes already established.
11. The re-opening of operations in Tete Province is of vital importance in that this is the richest area in mineral resources and the site for the hydro-electric dam project jointly financed by capitalist prospectors. Victory or even serious challenge to Portugal in this area would be proof of the ineffectiveness of Portuguese control of this area and a loss of face among her allies. The Committee is aware of the significance of this situation and has decided to immediately put at the disposal of FRELIMO some funds to cater for its pressing and urgent needs for the struggle in this and other areas. It was also decided that immediate medical assistance be given to the movement to meet its urgent needs in this field.

12. At the time of the sitting of the Committee, FRELIMO was holding its 2nd Congress in the liberated areas of Mozambique under its effective control. It is hoped that this Congress will help in a tremendous way to fulfil the aims and aspirations of all the rank and file of the Movement and bring about renewed vigour and rededication in its pursuit of the liberation struggle.

13. The Committee decided to send a cabled message of support to the FRELIMO to express the profound interest it takes in the work of the Congress, and best wishes for its success.

P.A.I.G.C.

14. The military activities of the P.A.I.G.C. forces have become widespread and have been characterized by persistent attacks and ambushes on Portuguese garrisons in both the Northern and the Southern fronts. These activities are now being moved into the urban areas. Most impressive of these assaults was the attack launched by a group of commandos of the P.A.I.G.C. on 28th February, 1968, against the enemy air base at Bissalanca Airport which is 10 Kilometers from the centre of the capital city of Bissao. The control tower, three hangars and two aircrafts were completely destroyed. The Committee highly appreciates the symbolic token from the fragment of the Portuguese aircraft shot down by the P.A.I.G.C. and offered through the Algerian Government to Africa as a whole.

15. Parallel to its encouraging achievements are the PAIGC's pressing needs for increased financial assistance, and provision of medicines, transport, fuel and telecommunication system.
16. The Committee decided to pass a resolution condemning the use of white phosphorous bombs and napalm by the Portuguese Government on the people of Guinea (Bissau), and expressed its serious concern at the threat by the Portuguese Government to use poison gas on the population. The Committee is greatly impressed by the strides of the progress which the P.A.I.G.C.O. has made and continues to make and congratulates this Movement on its brilliant achievements. It has, therefore, decided to provide immediately financial assistance to this Movement to enable it to meet some of its urgent needs.

ANGOLA

17. The M.P.L.A. has launched fresh offensives in various sectors of Angola and continues to make satisfactory progress. This Movement has already moved its Headquarters from Brazzaville into the liberated areas in Angola under its control.

18. The Committee took note of the difficulties experienced by the M.P.L.A. concerning the transiting of its cadres through the territory of Congo (Kinshasa), with particular regard to the conflict between the M.P.L.A. and the GRAE, the recovery of weapons seized from the M.P.L.A. by the Government of Congo (Kinshasa) and the release of M.P.L.A. militants imprisoned by G.R.A.E.

19. After an appeal was made by the Algerian Foreign Minister, the Committee was assured by the Congolese Delegation that the matter would be brought to the attention of its Government and that with the co-operation of the Committee it should be possible to effect reconciliation of the two Movements.

SOUTH AFRICA:

20. The Committee has taken note of the efforts made by the A.N.C. forces, with the collaboration of ZAPU, to advance into South Africa through Zimbabwe, and also of the lack of support of some independent African States which border South Africa. The Committee also takes due note of the attempt by P.A.C. to infiltrate some of its cadres into South Africa through Mozambique, although a group of freedom fighters was intercepted in June by Portuguese security forces at Villa Pery in Mozambique, mid-way between Rhodesian border and Beira.
21. The Committee listened with wrapt attention to the petition made by the Leader of the Unity Movement of South Africa and decided to refer their request for training facilities to the Standing Committee on Defence.

22. The Committee was informed about the wrangling and altercation within the leadership of the P.A.C., which have adversely affected the conduct of the struggle by that Movement. It has, therefore, decided that bilateral consultations should be undertaken by Zambia and Tanzania, with the co-operation of the Executive Secretariat, in order to effect early reconciliation within the leadership of the P.A.C. The Standing Committee on Information, Administration and General Policy could, at the appropriate time, decide on the resumption of assistance to that Movement which has now been suspended.

23. The Committee congratulated the Mission of the OAU to Botswana on its report. The Executive Secretariat was instructed to contact the Government of Botswana with a view to securing the immediate release of Southern African freedom fighters now held by that Government.

SOUTH WEST AFRICA:

24. During the period under review SWAPO freedom fighters carried out series of raids on enemy military bases inside South West Africa. This Movement now concentrates its efforts mainly on re-organizing and planning with a view to establishing more operational zones in every region, district and locality. The Committee appreciates the difficulties of SWAPO with regard to the infiltration of its cadres as well as its material requirements and, therefore, decided to place at the immediate disposal of this Movement some funds to meet its urgent needs.

THE SO-CALLED FRENCH SOMALILAND (DJIBOUTI)

25. The Committee took note of the report of the Political Mission undertaken by the Executive Secretariat (on the so-called French Somaliland) and endorsed the recommendations of the Executive Secretary concerning the grant of assistance to the liberation movements in the territory to enable them to contest in the forthcoming elections.
ZIMBABWE:

26. A report will be submitted separately to the Council of Ministers by the Committee of Five on Rhodesia which is charged with the responsibility with regard to this territory.

(b) CANARY ISLANDS:

27. After listening to the representations submitted to it by the M.P.A.I.C., seeking for recognition and assistance, the Committee:-

(a) decided to solemnly declare that the Canary Islands constitutes an integral part of the Continent of Africa;

(b) affirmed the right of the people of Canary Islands to self-determination and independence;

(c) also decided to create a Commission comprising Algeria, Guinea and Senegal to study ways and means whereby assistance could be granted to this Movement.

OTHER TERRITORIES:

28. The Committee endorsed the recommendations of the Standing Committee on Information, Administration and General Policy, that the Executive Secretary should make a serious study on the situation in the Seychelles Island, because of its strategic position towards the African Continent.

29. There is not much to report about the Comoro Islands except that persecutions of the nationalists by the local authorities are still continuing. It has been reported that following the police intervention in the Students riots which took place in Moroni College on the 14th of March 1968, 150 students were wounded and 7 jailed in a military camp situated 20 kms from the Capital.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS:

After a thorough study of the prevailing situation in the Continent and a thorough examination of the difficulties which at present confronts us in the liberation struggle, the Committee submits the following recommendations to the Council of Ministers:-
1. In view of the necessity for co-operation between the authentic Movements engaged in the armed struggle, which is a necessary prerequisite for successful presentation of a common and united front against the combined forces of the enemy, the Council of Ministers should urge all Member States to do all in their power to ensure that such co-operation is fostered between Liberation Movements in all dependent territories on a national level as prelude to institutionalising the relationship among all Liberation Movements in Southern Africa as a whole.

2. In view of the grave financial situation and the fact of the continued increases in the funds budgetted by the enemy to counter the efforts of the liberation forces whereas the budget of the Committee apart from being fixed has not been constantly replenished, the Council of Ministers should increase the contribution of Member States towards the Special Fund of the Committee by 10 per cent and should further urge all Member States of the O.A.U. to meet without any further delay their financial obligations with particular regard to their arrears of contributions.

3. Having regard to the good results produced by the visits made by Military Experts to assess the level of struggle in the yet dependent territories, it is recommended to the Council of Ministers that Commissions of Military Experts should make more periodical visits to the various fields of military operations in the dependent territories.

4. The Committee recommends to the Council of Ministers to declare that May 25th, being Africa Day, should from henceforth be observed as a public holiday by all Members of the O.A.U. and that in celebration of this festival day programmes should be organized at national level in every Member State to include the sale of badges and emblems, film-shows and other events which would assist with the collection of funds for the liberation struggle.

5. The Committee requests the Council of Ministers to recommend to the Heads of State and Government to view the films made as an
example on the magnificent success of some liberation movements particularly the P.A.I.G.C. in Guinea (Bissao) at the 5th Assembly of Heads of State and Government. The Council of Ministers is also requested to make available funds for the reproduction of the same films to be distributed and shown in all capitals of African States so that all the people can be informed of the sacrifices and activities of their struggling brothers in the dependent countries.

6. The Committee recommends to the Council of Ministers to instruct the African Group at the United Nations to further intensify its efforts during the forthcoming Session of the United Nations General Assembly so that the Council for South West Africa can make its presence felt in South West Africa.

NOTION OF THANKS

The OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa at its 13th Regular Session in Algiers, from 16th to 22nd July, 1968, inspired by the revolutionary spirit of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, a country noted for her relentless struggle against all forms of colonialism and imperialism, and her full dedication to the liberation of the entire Continent of Africa and the cause of independence and human dignity:

1. Expresses its most sincere gratitude to the Algerian Government and people for the fraternal and militant reception and generous hospitality accorded to all the delegations as well as to all the Liberation Movements without exception, and to all the observers;

2. Warmly congratulates H.E. President Houari Boumedienne, President of the Revolutionary Council, on the immense and selfless contribution he has brought to the work of the Committee by his edifying speech which he delivered at the Inaugural Meeting.
RESOLUTION

The OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa holding its 13th Ordinary Session in Algiers from 16 to 22 July 1968;

Concerned at reports of the threats of the use of poisonous gases and the use of napalm and white phosphorous bombs by the Portuguese forces against the people of Guinea (Bissau);

Having in mind the U.N. Charter, the universal Declaration of Human Rights and Resolution 1514 of the 15th Session of the U.N. General Assembly concerning the Right of all people to independence and self-determination;

Convinced that Portuguese forces, by the use of napalm, white phosphorous bombs and poison gases threaten to exterminate the population of this territory;

Convinced that Portugal's defiance of world public opinion is supported by her NATO allies;

1. **Condemn** unreservedly the use of poisonous gases, napalm and white phosphorous bombs by Portugal against the African people in territories under its domination.

2. **Denounce** Portugal's NATO allies for their continued support of Portugal's colonialist policies.

3. **Strongly** and unconditionally supports the people of Guinea (Bissau) and other so-called Portuguese territories in their just struggle for independence, self-determination and human dignity.
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
Eleventh Ordinary Session
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ADMINISTRATIVE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S
REPORT ON THE 13TH SESSION OF THE OAU
LIBERATION COMMITTEE AND THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS
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LIBERATION COMMITTEE AND THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

During the past five years, the OAU and particularly the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa have witnessed and been preoccupied with the frequent incidents of internal conflicts within the recognized movements, the fratricidal and hostile acts carried out against each other's cadres by the rival movements within each territory, the hardened attitude of rival movements towards the formation of a united front and the frustration of every effort by the OAU and its committees to effect any reconciliation of rival groups. So much money and time have been spent and often wasted on the transportation of representatives of various rival movements to the numerous meetings of reconciliation Committees and on the servicing of such meetings which often achieve nothing except perhaps to create more bad feelings between the Independent African States which play host to these movements or actively support them in any way.

The examples of the situation existing between the ZAPU and ZANU in Rhodesia, the MPLA and GAB in Angola and even of FRELIMO and COREMO in Mozambique are cases in point. In the first case of Rhodesia, efforts have been made even up to the level of the Council of Ministers to try to bring the two movements together but these efforts have failed, since the movements not only still retain their identity and their individual fighting in their selected areas but have also gone further to join movements from other territories in waging a common battle. Nevertheless it should be observed that where necessity demands, even the fighting units of the rival parties are compelled to fight together in order to defend themselves on the dictates of self-preservation.

In the second case of Angola, it is beyond doubt that any further efforts to reconcile the two movements would achieve little.
Already several committees have tried without success to achieve the desired reconciliation. The two governments of Congo Brazzaville and Congo Kinshasa have taken various steps to deal with the problem but the situation remains the same if not worse.

In the case of Mozambique, FRELIMO is the only recognized movement but even COREMO which is not recognized by the Liberation Committee has continued to take some action and to assist some recognized movements like the PAC when possible even though they also refuse to join the FRELIMO.

After considering all these incidents and the dissipation of the energy and resources of the OAU on the futile attempts at reconciliation, it is considered inevitable that a reassessment of the whole situation and of the attitude of the OAU should now be made by the Liberation Committee and particularly by the Council of Ministers.

In order to do this, it is necessary to consider the following points:

Firstly, a distinction has to be made between the armed or militant wing of each Liberation Movement and its political wing when acting as a party. This distinction is important when one considers the problems of, to mention a few, FRELIMO, PAC and GRAE. In the case of the two first movements which are no doubt militant and effective in their respective spheres as reports of the activities of their fighters confirm, the internal conflicts and struggle for power for the control of the political machinery of the party, though undesirable in their repercussions on the armed struggle itself and irritating because of their frequency and confusion, should not, nevertheless, influence the Liberation Committee to ignore the ultimate objectives of the liberation struggle and the sacrifice of those cadres who daily carry out their struggle relentlessly despite the rivalry and horse play among their political leaders often far removed from the territories and the battle fields. In fact as the leader of the Algerian Delegation and Chairman of the 13th Session of the Liberation Committee rightly put it by citing the case of Algeria before independence, the temptation should be resisted by the Liberation Committee or the OAU generally to concern itself too much with the internal affairs of these movements.
The conflict for leadership is definitely an internal affair common to any liberation movement.

Secondly, the situation outside Africa could be an object lesson. The nearest example is that of Aden where two movements, NLC and FLOSSY, existed side by side, fought very hard severally against the colonial power until independence was almost achieved and then on the eve of independence turned on each other to settle the problem of which party would rule the independent state and which leaders would handle the reins of power within each party.

In citing this example, no attempt is being made to justify, condone or condemn any methods used by these movements in Aden but merely to point out that a liberation struggle and therefore the activities of the militant wings of recognized movements which are supported should be treated solely with regard to the objective of liberation and decolonization but separately from and unprejudiced by the politics of the parties which are bound to continue even after the liberation struggle and the grant of independence. In the case of GRAB, by recommending the withdrawal of the status of Government in exile but not of recognition as a liberation movement, the Liberation Committee has in fact, consciously or categorically made this distinction as advocated above.

Thirdly, the making of this distinction in every case and in all dependent territories will save the Liberation Committee the embarrassment of discovering on the eve of independence that on account of too much support for and identification with a particular movement which was formerly considered active and popular but later loses support or even elections where these precede independence, the ruling party which emerges at independence becomes hostile to the Liberation Committee in particular and the OAU in general.

In view of the above points therefore, it is recommended:-

1. That apart from the Liberation Movements already recognized, no further movements should be accorded recognition in any area where armed struggle is already taking place.
2. That no status of Government (in Exile) be accorded to any movement in future as this is a political problem which will be resolved by the situation in each area and by the decision of the people in each territory prior to or after independence.

3. That active support should continue to be given to each recognized movement but review of their activities in the field from time to time should also be undertaken by military missions and the Executive Secretariat in order to ascertain the authenticity of their claims and assess their effectiveness.

4. That the problem of reconciliation and formation of united fronts should no longer be subject to the creation of special committees but be handled where necessary by the good offices of Heads of State of neighbouring countries which have succeeded even in the case of disagreements between independent States. This will save a lot of money and time by making more money available and more attention given to the real struggle and the responsible activities of the movements. While the formation of united action or fronts is important, and this should be encouraged, yet it should be allowed to emerge naturally and in any form possible as perhaps in the case of movements from two or more different territories.

5. Finally, the Executive Secretariat should be empowered to assist more concretely the Liberation Movements which have internal difficulties to find a solution to their problems either through contacts with governments of neighbouring States or even at the Secretarial level.
COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM IN
EQUATORIAL GUINEA
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EQUATORIAL GUINEA

1. Concerning the activities regarding decolonization problems in general and territories under Spanish domination in particular, the General Secretariat has sent, upon the invitation of the Spanish Government, an observer to Equatorial Guinea on the occasion of the people's consultation about the constitution which had been worked out jointly by the Spanish Government and representatives of the various political parties in Equatorial Guinea.

2. To gain a proper understanding of the situation prevailing in the country before the referendum, and at the same time have some ideas of the problems which may arise once the country becomes independent, it would seem advisable to have some information on geographico-economic and politico-social conditions in Equatorial Guinea.

A. GEOGRAPHICO-ECONOMIC SITUATION

(a) Geographical setting

3. Equatorial Guinea is composed of Rio Muni, lying on the mainland, the large island of Fernando Po and a number of small islands, the most important of which are Anobon, Los Elobeyes and Corisco.

4. The large island of Fernando Po lies 300 km. away from Rio Muni. The island is of volcanic origin and therefore very rich. Its main crops are coffee and more especially cacao, and the 30,000 tons of cacao produced annually are purchased by Spain at a price higher than the world market price.

5. The inhabitants of Fernando Po include the Boubis and the Fernandinos. The Boubis are descendants of the island's original inhabitants, while the Fernandinos are descendants of political
exiles from Cuba, Sierra Leone and Liberia. Besides the indigenous population of 15,000 to 20,000, there are between 45,000 and 50,000 foreigners, mainly from Nigeria, and some 6,000 Europeans, mostly Spaniards.

6. The 45,000 foreigners supply most of the manpower required for the cultivation of cacao.

7. Rio Muni is peopled by the Fans, the Bourebas and the Combés. It has approximately 200,000 inhabitants and is particularly rich in timber, industrially exploited by Spaniards for shipment to Spain. The continental part of the geographical unit known as Equatorial Africa is definitely less rich than the island of Fernando Po, and it also has a much larger population.

(b) Economic Situation

8. Since the two major parts of Equatorial Guinea - Fernando Po and Rio Muni - are not equally rich, their economic situation differs considerably.

9. As already mentioned, Fernando Po produces cacao on a large scale. The Boubis, who are landholders, do not themselves cultivate their land. They lease it to white settlers (Spaniards) and also let foreign labourers work on it on a share-cropping basis. If these foreigners wish to remain in the island, they must necessarily accept the terms of their Boubi employers. They must also accept the terms offered by white settlers who own large plantations efficiently operated and well kept. As a rule, the Boubis and the white settlers offer these foreign labourers wretched terms which they are obliged to accept since they have no alternative.

10. In Rio Muni economic relations are different because there are no foreign labourers there who, as in Fernando Po, are compelled to work under any conditions whatsoever if they want to remain in the country. In the few coffee plantations
and timber yards, the white settlers have to use local manpower, and conditions of course differ.

B. POLITICO-SOCIAL SITUATION

11. In Equatorial Guinea, there are three major parties: the MUNGE, the MONALIGE and the IPGE. In fact, there are virtually five parties.

12. As a result of disagreement within the MUNGE and the MONALIGE, the dissident wings or tendencies of the two parties stand as political parties with Secretariats of their own, completely distinct from those of the parties from which they split. In real terms, the situation can be described thus: there are two parties which claim to be the MUNGE, two parties which claim to be the MONALIGE and the IPGE party.

13. The island of Fernando Po presents the appearance of a relatively well developed territory, with an extensive and well-kept road network. The high Commissioner representing Spanish central power has his headquarters in Fernando Po; and Santa Isabel, the principal town, is to be the capital of the State when Equatorial Guinea becomes independent. The island of Fernando Po is a real gem and at first sight reminds one of those delightful islands in the Antilles. People seem to live better there, and apparently there is no unemployment problem.

14. While the visitor is struck by Fernando Po's neatness and cleanliness and its air of relative development, Rio Muni and its capital Bata give an impression of disorder as far as urbanism is concerned, and bad roads, particularly during the dry season when objects seem to fight against the dust.

15. On the whole, Equatorial Guinea appears to have good schools, and in the towns almost everyone speaks Spanish, the official language. There are some very fine hospitals, and the general standard of health seems to be high.
In the larger centres, trade and most of the important services are operated by Spanish settlers, whose dwellings face the sea at Bata, the capital of Rio Muni.

16. The people of Equatorial Guinea were invited to give their opinion on the draft constitution adopted at the end of the second stage of the Constitutional Conference which took place in May-June 1968 between the Spanish Government and Guinean Representatives. If the answer was favourable to the Constitution there would be general elections in September and the country would become independent on October 12th. But if there were a negative answer, then there might have been need to arrange for a third Constitutional Conference.


17. The situation on the eve of the referendum was that there were two tendencies in Fernando Po: one of them expressed by "no", that is to say the rejection of the Constitution, and the other in favour of the Constitution.

Those who were against it said that the constitution on which the people were to vote was too unitarian; in other words, it created conditions under which Rio Muni, with its 200,000 inhabitants would dominate Fernando Po, with its 50,000 inhabitants.

18. They said that they wanted separate independence for the island, because even the climate made the island of Fernando Po different from Rio Muni, on the mainland. (The attention of the representative of the General Secretariat was drawn to the significant fact that Fernando Po has its rainy season in August, while in Rio Muni it is the dry season.) They did not fail to bring up the case of Nigeria and the Eastern Region secession, nor did they hesitate to brandish the scarecrow of genocide following independence. They also pointed out the geographical position of the island, lying as it does 300 km. away from Rio Muni.
Lastly, they stressed the differences in the economic and social development of the two component parts of the unit.

19. In Rio Muni, too, there were some who were against the constitution, but their reasons were fundamentally different from the reasons of those who were against the constitution in Fernando Po.

In Rio Muni, those who wanted the "no" were hostile to the constitution because they did not consider it sufficiently unitarian. They claimed that, whereas Article 1 laid down that Equatorial Guinea would go towards independence as a unitarian, indivisible, democratic and social State, the other articles drained Article 1 of any substance by extending immense powers to the provinces.

20. They said that the independence which would follow the adoption of such a constitution would be purely nominal. In their view, that independence was, in fact, an improved form of self-government. They exerted to explain that the constitution proposed a federal type of State and that about fifteen articles could not be amended. They added that Spain was attempting to confuse the issue of the constitution with that of independence, and that it was perfectly possible to go towards independence without a constitution. They went on to say that the constitution did not meet the requirements of a modern State. And, lastly, they declared that they wanted independence for their country but that they were against the constitution.

21. On either side, the supporters of the constitution whom their opponents accused of being sold out to Spanish imperialism, declared that they regarded this constitution as a minimum and had not hesitated to recommend it as a step in the direction of independence, all the more so as the constitution had been drawn up jointly by the Spanish Government and Representatives of all political tendencies in Equatorial Guinea.

II. CONSULTATIONS OF THE OAU REPRESENTATIVE WITH THE VARIOUS POLITICAL GROUPS

22. Only a few hours after he had arrived, the representative of the General Secretariat received a group of Boubi leaders who were
against the constitution. They outlined the considerations set forth above. After listening to them attentively, the representative of the General Secretariat explained the position of African Heads of State on decolonization questions. He reminded them that all African Heads of State were agreed that their independence was meaningless so long as part of the African continent still remained under colonial domination.

23. The representative of the General Secretariat recalled the existence of the Committee for the Liberation of Africa, which had been set up in 1963, at the same time as the Organization. He gave a detailed explanation of the purpose of the Committee, and spoke about the meagre results which the freedom fighters had so far achieved, despite aid received from independent Africa, in the territories under colonial domination: Mozambique, Angola, so called portuguese Guinea, Rhodesia, South West Africa and South Africa. He also explained that it had not yet been possible to have the principle of independence accepted by a small imperialist country like Portugal, which was actively backed by the whole West.

24. He declared that in Equatorial Guinea the essential point which concerned one and all must be independence, the total liberation of Equatorial Africa, i.e. the definitive departure of the Administering power.

25. The representative of the Secretary-General explained that the OAU and independent Africa regarded the independence of the peoples as something sacred, and that no other consideration should be allowed to impede the achievement of that noble purpose. He added that independent Africa would not forgive the Guinean leaders if by some unfortunate chance the case of Equatorial Guinea were to become a further case of a territory under foreign rule where nationalists would launch an armed struggle.

26. Regarding the parallel with Nigeria, the representative of the General Secretariat explained that the constitution which was being completely different from the Nigerian constitution, the terms of which had given birth to the Biafran problem, and that he was convinced that after independence Africans, if left to themselves and free from foreign interferences would know how to deal with any problems which might exist.
27. Lastly, the representative of the General Secretariat asked them whether, assuming that the island of Fernando Po with its 50,000 inhabitants should become independent, they as political leaders feel that it would be possible to lead a separate life without the need to associate with others.

They replied that sooner or later that need would inevitably makes itself felt. The representative of the General Secretariat then asked them whether they did not feel that the danger of what they had termed domination arising from association with more populated and larger neighbours was infinitely greater than that of association with Rio Muni with its 250,000 inhabitants. They agreed.

The representative of the General Secretariat then said that, in his view, everything pointed to union with Rio Muni, with which they had a common language, a common culture, a common history, the colonial past, and well rooted economic relations.

28. When the visitors left, about two and a half hours later, the representative of the General Secretariat felt sure that his explanations had not fallen on deaf ears.

29. In Rio Muni the same thing occurred. As soon as he arrived in the continent, the representative of the General Secretariat asked to see Mr. Francisco Macias, President of the dissident wing of the MONALIGE and champion of opposition to the constitution.

30. Mr. Macias, who is Vice-President of the autonomous Government made arrangements for a talk to be held with his MUNGE dissident friends and with representative of the IPGE party, all of them involved in the campaign against the constitution. The meeting was attended by about twenty five persons representing the IPGE as well as dissident tendencies within the MONALIGE and the MUNGE.

31. Mr. Macias developed the theories held by himself and his friends as outlined above. After speaking for about an hour, his other friends Mr. Eworo, President of the IPGE, and Mr. Obamua, President of the MUNGE, (in turn spoke) and both of them agreed with what he had said. The representative of the General Secretariat then told them his views in the whole matter.
32. The representative of the General Secretariat started off by agreeing that the constitution was not good, and that it was in fact bad, but that Spain might be seeking a pretext, as they themselves had so aptly pointed out, to confuse the issue of independence with that of the constitution, and that political leaders should therefore not give Spain that pretext.

33. The representative of the General Secretariat proceeded to develop the position of the OAU and of the Heads of State on the decolonization questions and the sacred principle of independence. He explained that constitutions were drawn up by men for men, and that they were subject to constant change as a means of adapting them to political circumstances according to politico-economico-social evolution of the country concerned.

34. The representative of the Secretary-General gave several examples of agreements relating to independence (the Evian Agreements, the Independence Agreement of the Mali Federation) and constitution (constitution of Congo Kinshasa, etc.) which had been altered and sometimes fundamentally changed immediately after independence. He pointed out that political leaders in Equatorial Guinea should not lose sight of the essential fact that the country was achieving independence, and that in this particular case independence lay within hand-reach; that the adoption of the constitution was all that was needed for Equatorial Africa to become independent on 12 October 1968; that all independent Africa would greet that independence with joy, and that African States looked forward with genuine pleasure to seeing Equatorial Guinea swell the large family of independent countries.

35. The representative of the General Secretariat went on to explain that the independence of Equatorial Africa, like the independence of every country in the world, would entail problems and that it would be for Guineans to solve those problems among themselves, without any false advice from any foreign power.

36. After three hours talk, Mr. Macias made what amounted to a confession to the representative of the General Secretariat, in the presence of his general staff. He admitted that he had been mistaken. He in fact, lost sight of the most important question, the essential question of independence; but, if he had been wrong,
he has not entirely responsible; independent Africa was to blame, because he and his companions had not been given advice whereby they might have avoided the position in which they found themselves. He added that during the constitutional conference in Spain no assistance had been forth coming from the African Missions in Madrid, and that when they had gone to the United Nations they had again failed to meet with the full understanding they might have expected their African brothers to show.

37. He said that he agreed with the analysis and the suggestions made by the representative of the General Secretariat but that it was too late in the day to ask his supporters to change their position and recommend that they vote for the constitution. He asked the OAU representative what he should do.

38. The representative of the General Secretariat suggested that he could leave matters as they were and not persist in his campaign against the constitution, particularly as only one day was left. This meeting, in fact, took place on Friday evening, from 7.30 to 11 p.m. and there was only Saturday before the referendum was held on Sunday.

39. As the representative of the General Secretariat left the group they decided to hold an emergency meeting to decide on the attitude they would adopt. The following morning, the representative of the General Secretariat learnt that the Secretary General of the IPGE had broadcast a communique over the radio calling upon his political supporters to vote for the constitution.

III ATTITUDE OF SPANISH LOCAL AUTHORITIES

40. On his arrival, the representative of the General Secretariat felt he was faced with a paradox. In fact, the Spanish Government, through the local authorities, was doing everything or distinctly conveying the impression that it insisted on the adoption of the constitution so that the country might accede to independence. That insistence might seem odd, since it was the first time in the history of decolonization that a colonial power adopted such an attitude. One might therefore rightly wonder what were the Spanish Government's real intentions. All through his stay the representative of the General Secretariat tried to see through their intentions.
41. He may not have succeeded in this, yet he feels that, Spain being sensitive to pressure from the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, and in addition having a colonial problem on its hands (the problem of Gibraltar), it is doing everything it can in order not to lose the sympathy of not only Equatorial Guinea but also of the whole of independent Africa.

IV THE HOLDING OF THE REFERENDUM

42. Despite all fears to the contrary, the referendum was held democratically. Not a single incident occurred and on 11th August real peace reigned all over the country.

On the whole, voting was brisk, even though torrential rains fell on the island on Sunday morning.

43. The voting was as follows:

In Rio Muni, out of 105,601 votes cast, 67,695 voted for and 35,711 against, and 2,195 voting papers were null and void.

In Fernando Po, 4,763 voted for and 4,486 against.

Altogether, 72,458 voted for and 40,197 voted against the Constitution which gives us 63.1 per cent for and 35 per cent against the Constitution.

44. When the voting was over, the representative of the General Secretariat again had an opportunity to talk with Vice-President Macias and his group, this time without MUNGE representatives.

45. Mr. Macias claimed that the referendum had not been held under ideal conditions; that there had been acts of intimidation on the part of the Spanish Government; that those voting for the constitution had not been allowed to proceed from the voting booths to the halls and that he had received about a dozen telegrams protesting against the Spanish Government's manoeuvring. He said that the referendum had been a lesson. He felt that he and his friends had scored a moral victory.
Had they perhaps persisted in their campaign against the constitution and had there been no manoeuvering by the Spanish Government, they would undoubtedly have won.

He explained to the representative of the General Secretariat that a great many people had been unable to vote because their names had not been on the electoral list, and that all of them would surely have voted against the constitution.

He also asked for suggestions as to their attitude regarding legislative and presidential elections and in the face of acts of intimidation committed by local authorities.

46. The representative of the General Secretariat said that, in his view, the best thing would be to prepare the elections quietly, to avoid provoking the local authorities and also to avoid his friends and supporters being arrested.

47. In closing the talk, Mr. Macias expressed regret that the OAU was unable to remain there until the general elections were held and he thanked the Organization for having been able to send a representative whose mission he and his friends had greatly appreciated.

48. The representative of the General Secretariat also had talks with Mr. Bonifacio Ondo, President of the Autonomous Government, who is extremely popular in the country (at Bvjayong, in his electoral district, only one vote was recorded against the constitution, and 10,960 for it). President Ondo expressed his satisfaction at the mission of the OAU representative and hoped that Equatorial Guinea would accede to the African family as from 12 October.

49. The representative of the Secretariat also met the Secretary-General of the orthodox MONALIGE party, together with the President of the party and other leaders, who handed him a letter in which they expressed their gratitude to the Organization of African Unity (Annex 1).
50. He also succeeded in meeting the Secretary-General of the MUNGE party, who described MUNGE's historical background and evolution, and also gave some useful particulars about the evaluation of the other two parties.

V. GENERAL IMPRESSIONS AND CONCLUSION

51. Most Guinean political leaders are politically aware, but there is a real danger that some of them may allow themselves to be swayed by materialistic and personal considerations.

52. After independence there will be problems: the problem of Fernando Po and the separatist tendency of the Boubis; the problem of Macias, who does not conceal the fact that he is the only leader who has not gone into exile, and who therefore expects to play the role of the country's leader. Then there is the economic problem and the problem of the 45,000 foreigners living in Fernando Po, most of them Nigerians. When independence comes, the inhabitants of Rio Muni, which has a great deal of unemployment, may think they can go over and replace the foreign labourers whom the Bonbis and the Spanish planters are exploiting. It is possible that Guinea's from Rio Muni, owing to the fact that they are nationals, will not accept the conditions which are now being imposed on foreigners. This may lead to problems.

53. Yet the country has responsible leaders who will be able to solve these problems, so long as they can put the country's interests above their passions and all their personal interests.

54. The second phase of the country's evolution will be the general elections, in which the President of the Republic, Deputies to the National Assembly and Deputies to the Provincial Assemblies will be elected. After that, the pioneers will be handed over, and the country will become independent on 12 October next.
55. Political leaders have already expressed their sincere wish that the country may become a member of the Organization of African Unity, and have agreed in principle to send observers to the Algiers Summit meeting.

56. Lastly, the complete co-operation of the Spanish authorities has been very gratifying. They have done everything to enable the representative of the General Secretariat to carry out his mission. Without that co-operation, the representative of the General Secretariat, being alone, would not have been able to go to and fro between the two parts of the country, separated by 300 km, of sea; nor could he have had all those talks with persons representing different political tendencies. This may be the best indication that the Spanish Government is sincere and well disposed. It may be regretted that despite its friendly attitude and its undertakings, Spain failed to maintain the date originally fixed for independence - 15 July - but the delay may have proved useful by unpriming the powder-keg of the Boubis, all of whom were staunch upholders of separation in the preliminary phase of the Constitutional Conference. In this context, a noteworthy fact is the return to ideas of unity of Mr. Gori Malubela, pre-eminently a Bonbi and President of the Guinean General Assembly, who admitted to the representative of the General Assembly, who admitted to the representative of the General Secretariat, that he had for long defended the case for separation, but soon realized that would not provide the solution for their problems.
SECRET

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
Eleventh Ordinary Session
 Algiers - September 1968

THE ADMINISTRATIVE SECRETARY GENERAL'S
REPORT OF THE OAU MISSION TO BOTSWANA
9 - 24 June 1968
Genesis

At the Twelfth Regular Session of the OAU Liberation Committee held in Conakry, Republic of Guinea, from 10 to 16 January, 1968, the problem of the infiltration of trained cadres into the dependent territories in Southern Africa through the neighbouring independent Member States of the OAU and the difficulties faced were raised in the memoranda submitted by the various movements operating in Southern Africa. During the personal representations made before the Committee by the representatives of the ANC, PAC, SWAPO, ZAPU and FRELIMO, the following common problems were highlighted viz. The need to:

1. Request for transit facilities for trained cadres through neighbouring States of Rhodesia, South West Africa, Mozambique and South Africa;

2. Release of detained freedom fighters by Governments of independent African States and the return of the weapons and the money seized from the men when arrested.

That the OAU should:

3. Request the Governments of the Member States concerned to turn a blind eye to the movement of the freedom fighters through their territories in the future where they cannot be offered any further concrete assistance.

2. After discussing these problems in detail, the Liberation Committee recommended to the Tenth Ordinary Session of the Council of Minister:

"That in view of the tremendous importance of the infiltration of trained cadres into the areas where armed struggle is being conducted, this Committee urges the Council of Ministers to appeal to the countries adjacent to these areas, particularly the dependent territories of Zimbabwe, South Africa, Mozambique
and Angola to provide transit facilities to bona fide cadres to infiltrate into their respective fields of operation" vide CM/193, page 9.

3. Consequently, the Council of Ministers in operative paragraph 3 of its resolution CM/Res.136 (X):

"Appeals to the countries adjacent to territories still under foreign domination particularly those adjacent to Zimbabwe", South Africa, Mozambique and Angola to provide facilities to bona fide cadres of the resistance movements to infiltrate into their respective fields of operations and requests the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa to co-ordinate details of their passage".

4. Apart from the problems related above concerning the infiltration of cadres, the Committee of Five also reported in paragraphs 23 and 24 of its Report submitted to the Tenth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers about the cadres of ZAPU and ANC arrested and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment in Botswana and of the large quantity of arms seized and requested the OAU to take any action it deemed necessary for the release of the men and the arms held by the Botswana Government. In adopting the Report of the Committee of Five, the Council of Ministers decided to send emissaries to the Botswana Government with a view to discussing all the matters raised above in order to find a satisfactory solution to the problems.

5. When these decisions of the Council of Ministers were communicated to the Botswana Government, the Government took the initiative to invite the OAU to send emissaries to Botswana during the month of June 1968. As a result, the Administrative Secretary-General, H.E. Mr. Diallo Telli, appointed Mr. O.O. Adesola, the Assistant Executive Secretary of the Liberation Committee and Mr. F. O. Olufolabi, the Deputy Head of the Political Department in the General Secretariat to go to Botswana and discuss the issues involved with the Botswana Government.

Mission to Botswana

6. After meeting in Nairobi on 10 June 1968, we proceeded to Lusaka on
11 June 1968 en route to Botswana. On arrival in Lusaka, we were met by representatives of the ANC and the PAC resident in Lusaka who apparently had been apprised of our coming. When it later transpired that there was no flight from Lusaka to Botswana until Thursday 14 June, 1968, and that we would be compelled to spend the next three days in Lusaka, we employed the period of our stay there in interviewing the representatives of the two movements.

7. The following points emerged from our discussions:

- The Commander of the PAC, Mr. Ntantala submitted a list of six PAC cadres arrested in August and December 1967 and appealed for their release.

- In addition, the PAC requested:

  1. Transit facilities for their cadres to infiltrate through Kazungula in Botswana to South Africa or through Kasana and Francistown to Transvaal.

  2. Issue of travel documents to principal leaders of PAC.

  3. Meeting between Acting President Leballo and Botswana Officials in order to discuss co-operation between the Liberation movements and the Botswana Government on the question of infiltration of cadres with or without weapons into South Africa.

  4. The lifting of the status of Prohibited Immigrant on PAC members.

  5. Facilities for safe transportation to Zambia of all their cadres in detention in Botswana when released or of allowing them to find their own way out of Botswana.

8. The ANC also made similar requests concerning the lifting of P.I. and the release of detainees. In addition, the SWAPO representatives had made similar requests to Mr. Adesola before the latter left Dar-es-Salaam on this mission and also wanted a meeting between SWAPO representatives and Botswana Officials to discuss the question of transit facilities through Botswana to South West Africa.

9. We finally left Lusaka on Thursday 13 June 1968 and arrived in
Gaborones, the capital of Botswana at 5.30 p.m. on the same day. Mr. A.C. Sikunyane, the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs was at the Airport to meet us. At this juncture, it must be stated that our discussions with the Botswana authorities which started on the following day must therefore be seen in the light of the decisions of the Tenth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers and of the request from the Liberation movements as enumerated above.

First Meeting with the Botswana Cabinet

10. Our first formal meeting with the Botswana Government took place on Friday 14 June, 1968, in the President's Office. Representing the Government of Botswana were:

i) The Hon. Q.K.J. Dr. Masire, Vice-President and Minister for Economic Development and Planning - (acting for President Khama who was away on vacation leave).

ii) The Hon. P.M.K. Nwako, Minister of State for External Affairs.

iii) The Hon. A.M. Dambe, Minister for Home Affairs.

iv) Mr. A.M. Mogwe, Permanent Secretary in the President's Office and Head of the Civil Service.

v) Mr. P.L. Steenkamp, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs (an Afrikaaner who had been declared a prohibited immigrant by South African Government but has now acquired Botswana citizenship).

vi) Mr. T.J. Molefe, Private Secretary to the President.

11. In his address of welcome to us the Acting President, Dr. Masire, apologized for the unavoidable absence of President Seretse Khama who, he said, would have very much liked to meet us but had proceeded on vacation leave up-country shortly after the date we were previously scheduled to arrive in Botswana.

12. Our negotiation with the Botswana Government took the form of a humble appeal for its co-operation and assistance in the following respect:

1. Provision of two-way transit facilities for freedom fighters to enable them to infiltrate through Botswana both into and out of South West Africa, South Africa and Rhodesia.
2. Release of the freedom fighters who were being held as prisoners by the Botswana Government.

3. Return of all arms, ammunition and money found on the said persons at the time of their arrest or incarceration.

4. Grant of political asylum to bona fide refugees who have fled from the oppressive regimes in Southern Africa to Botswana.

5. Issue of travel documents and other facilities to the aforementioned refugees and grant of safe passage to those among them who may seek to leave Botswana for another country that may be prepared to receive them.

6. Lifting of the status of prohibited immigrant which had been imposed on certain offending refugees and freedom fighters.

13. In reply to these points the Botswana side felt that none of the matters raised was new to them. They expressed regret at the insinuations made by certain OAU Member States about Botswana's non-co-operation with the OAU in the liberation struggle and about her alleged collaboration with South Africa. This attitude portrayed a misunderstanding of the problems confronting Botswana and lack of sympathy for the predicament in which she has been placed by reason of her contiguity to the territories of the racist regimes in Southern Africa. They believed a study of the prevailing circumstances which affect the independence of certain Member States might help tremendously in the understanding of some of Botswana's insurmountable difficulties, some of which were listed as follows:

1. The fact of Botswana's geographical position as a buffer State sandwiched on all sides by those States against which military action is directed by the liberation movements.

2. The fact of long and common history, cultural heritage and traditions which Botswana shares with her neighbours.

3. The fact of common boundaries and essential services shared with these States, services which are essential for the promotion of good neighbourliness.
4. The fact of the economic interdependence of Botswana vis-à-vis her neighbouring States - Rhodesia and South Africa.

14. The position held by the Botswana Government was that, with all these factors taken into consideration, it would be inconceivable for Botswana to do anything or act in any way that would easily jeopardize her existing relationship with her neighbours. On the contrary, it was of utmost importance to Botswana that the services commonly shared and enjoyed with South Africa and Rhodesia should be guarded most jealously and not be endangered in any way. The Botswana Government maintained its abhorrence for the policy of apartheid, in much the same way that it deprecated the seizure of independence by the illegal regime in Rhodesia and would gladly welcome any formula that could help to regularize the anomalous situation there. She could, however, only accomplish this normalization of the unfortunate situation slowly because of the circumstances mentioned above which render her helpless for the time being at least.

15. The Botswana Government believed that much could be said for the conduct of the armed struggle by the liberation movements since Botswana herself was not happy about the state of things in the yet dependent territories in Africa. Botswana however doubted very much if anything could be accomplished by the infiltration of trained cadres into South Africa. The Botswana Government was apprehensive of the serious consequences of her collaboration with the freedom fighters as regards the grant of transit facilities either positively for passively. Such a practice, they believed would only invite reprisals on Botswana. South Africa, as a precautionary measure, could swiftly move her forces into Botswana as she had done in Rhodesia to ward off what she considered as an imminent threat to her security and as an excuse for thus keeping danger farther away from her territory. If South Africa could threaten Zambia how much less a defenceless country like Botswana.

16. Also on the pretext that Botswana was not sufficiently armed to defend herself against the incursions of freedom fighters, South Africa could, in disregard of international opinion, order a military occupation of Botswana in order to protect her interest against what would be described
as external aggression. In other words, Botswana had either to declare positively that she was granting free passage to freedom fighters or admit that she was unable to keep them out, in both of which cases South Africa would step in to drive them across Botswana and beyond into the State of their original departure.

17. The Botswana Government furnished us with detailed account of the assistance it was clandestinely giving to all categories of refugees who had fled Angola, South West Africa, Mozambique and Rhodesia and who chose Botswana as their first country of refuge. By harbouring these people inside her territory, Botswana inevitably risked incurring the displeasure of the regime to which they were opposed and under which life had become impossible for them. It was only natural to recognize equality of sacrifice in such circumstances. Botswana had neither the capacity nor the means to cope with such a gigantic problem and therefore seeks for an understanding of her vulnerability if such assistance should continue to be afforded to the refugees indiscriminately. Besides, Botswana ran the risk of harbouring informers who masquerade as refugees.

18. Botswana was of the opinion that the racist regime in South Africa based its policy of apartheid on the fear of what would happen to the whites in the event of a non-white government. This was why Botswana on her part was striving hard to set a good example by proving how successful a black government could be, and for that reason one that shared a border with South Africa, Botswana had strong conviction that she would succeed in this fashion to bring about a change of heart in South Africa.

19. When reminded that the position of things with regard to South West Africa was entirely different from that of South Africa or Rhodesia in view of the fact that the sovereignty of South Africa over that mandated territory had been challenged by the United Nations, the Botswana delegation could not agree with us and felt rather that any operation to infiltrate cadres into South West Africa would surely boomerang on Botswana. The cadres who transit via Caprivi and Angola would, when repulsed, still have to retreat into Botswana. Since South Africa had overall jurisdiction over South West Africa, the position would be the same as if the infiltration had been
effected into South African territory and would smack of collaboration with the freedom fighters.

20. Concerning the question of issue of travel documents to refugees, the Botswana Government expressed some apprehension about the wisdom of such a practice since these refugees, if refused at their destination, would be forced to return to Botswana and there would inevitably be a clogging of the channel.

21. The Botswana Government explained that the freedom fighters who were sentenced to terms of imprisonment had been so convicted not for reason of being freedom fighters but because they had not only violated the immigration laws of Botswana by entering without valid travel documents but also for carrying firearms not duly registered and without import permit contrary to the laws on importation of firearms into the country. The prisoners had been tried and convicted according to the law of Botswana and were free like any citizen or resident to exercise the right of appeal. The Botswana Government had never surrendered any freedom fighter to the South African Government as this would amount to loss of its sovereignty and independence. All freedom fighters arrested were tried and convicted by an impartial judiciary, have been treated in the most humanitarian manner and had, on completion of their terms of imprisonment, been despatched to Zambia and not South Africa, in co-operation with the Organization of African Unity.

22. There was nothing the Botswana Government could do by way of transiting freedom fighters to their respective fields of operation. The Government intimated that if it were possible for them to seek for exemption under the OAU Charter from allowing infiltration of freedom fighters through Botswana, they would be more than pleased to do so.

23. On the question of release of prisoners and their weapons, the Botswana delegation reserved their decision until after they had had consultation with the other members of the Government.
Second formal meeting with the Botswana Cabinet

24. Our second formal meeting with the same six representatives of the Botswana Government as at our first meeting took place in the Cabinet Room on Sunday 16 June 1968 at 5 p.m.

25. In our final address we touched on some of the points raised by the Botswana side during our first meeting and emphasized that certain issues merited special consideration. These were:

1. Full realisation of the purpose of the armed struggle as the only possible solution for the liberation of the yet dependent territories of Africa, all other answers having failed. The offer of independence on a platter of gold ceased to be feasible from the moment Zimbabwe was refused self-government whilst Zambia and Malawi were granted independence. The stage had been reached when the people had to fight for their independence.

2. The inevitability of infiltration of liberation forces through the territory of other independent African countries since man being a rational being could not be restrained in his struggle to adopt any action towards the accomplishment of his goal for self-determination.

3. The futility of any endeavour to prove to South Africa what a black government could achieve, as was being tried out by the Botswana Government, since there have been successful independent African Governments since 1958 and earlier which have accomplished in a century what many European nations accomplished in 20 centuries. We warned the Botswana Government that the fascist regimes in Southern Africa were afraid of what a black government could successfully do and could never be impressed nor could a change of heart be brought about merely by the progress made in neighbouring independent African States.
4. The need for immediate release of the imprisoned freedom fighters without any apprehensions about South Africa's reaction. We made reference to the release of the Congo white mercenaries by African States as an example of good faith and goodwill to the non-white nations of the world. If Africa showed clemency to white prisoners whose crimes were more than heinous what would then be expected of Africans towards fellow Africans for less odious crimes.

5. Our apprehension that Botswana might be constrained to enter into Diplomatic relations with South Africa, as Malawi had done, and thus retard the possible hopes of further mutual understanding and collaboration with the rest of Africa.

26. The Botswana Government's comments were as follows:

1. That there were no plans in the foreseeable future to approach South Africa with a view to establishing diplomatic relations in spite of the pressure put upon the Government. Even assurances had been given by the South African Government that Botswana diplomats would be accorded full diplomatic immunity and privileges and that they would not be subjected to any form of racial discrimination.

2. That assurance should be given and observed that freedom fighters would not infringe the territorial integrity of Botswana any more.

3. That much as Botswana was an independent State, the Botswanans are not necessarily masters of their situation.

4. That if Rhodesia had been isolated rather than coupled with South Africa in the armed struggle directed by the liberation movements against Rhodesia, South Africa might not have been constrained to intervene on the side of Rhodesia.
5. That Botswana was very much alive to the situation in South Africa and was as eager as any other nation to have the situation regularised.

6. That in the event of freedom fighters being allowed to infiltrate through Botswana into South Africa, then South Africa could march in on Botswana on the excuse that she could hardly afford to have an undefended neighbouring country invaded by "terrorists". If Botswana should connive at the activities on her territory then reprisal action would be taken against her. Any confrontation or shooting war between armed freedom fighters and the security forces of Botswana should be avoided.

27. The Botswana Government's decisions

1. For these reasons, the Botswana Government regretted that it could not accede to our request for the transiting of cadres. Any cadres who infiltrated in future ran the risk of being shot at sight as the Government would no longer be prepared to capture armed guerrillas." This attitude on the part of the Botswana Government should not be taken as a playing down of the importance of liberation struggle or as contempt for freedom fighters.

   It is simply that the case is not worth it at present".

2. Travel documents would be issued to refugees to enable them to proceed abroad for further education. The documents would be issued only after agreement had been reached with the receiving country so as to avoid the clogging of the pipeline.

3. It was considered desirable that a formula should be worked out for the release of prisoners. There was however the fear of the psychological effect which the release of the imprisoned freedom fighters would have on other prisoners. The Government had therefore, after careful and sympathetic consideration of the merits and demerits of the matter, reached a decision that as an act of clemency the sentences a propos all freedom fighters held as prisoners by the Botswana Government be commuted by a general period of 6 months, subject to the prisoners being accepted by any independent State north of Botswana and subject to a firm undertaking that the freedom fighters would not return to Botswana.
The prisoners would be released the very moment negotiations were completed with the receiving country.

5. Twenty-five out of thirty-four would have been released by November 1968 whilst two were immediately due for release at the time the offer was made.

5. A full list of all the prisoners showing the estimated new date of their release after taking into consideration the 6 months remission, is shown hereunder.

6. We must add at this juncture that shortly before our departure from Gaberones, the Minister for Foreign Affairs informed us that the Acting President had further decided to take into account the remission generally earned by prisoners, usually not less than two months in the recalculation of the terms which remain to be served. This would further bring nearer the date of the release of the prisoners as listed hereunder.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>DATE OF RELEASE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. KENETH KABASO</td>
<td>5/11/68</td>
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<td>2. JACKSON MOSOMI</td>
<td>IMMEDIATE</td>
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<td>3. OSCAR MNGADI</td>
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<td>4. JEREMIAH NONNAKGOTLA</td>
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<td>5. SEGALAGALA DWENA</td>
<td>5/11/68</td>
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<td>6. JOSEPH RADEBE</td>
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<td>7. LESLIE MAREMA</td>
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<td>8. LIVUKA NGUANYAWE ALIAS ALFREDWAN A</td>
<td>25/6/68</td>
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<tr>
<td>9. EDDISON MASIZA</td>
<td>25/6/68</td>
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<td>10. HENRY MAJOLA</td>
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<td>11. JAMES APRIL</td>
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<td>12. GEORGE VOYANI ALIAS WEZO TSINGOYI</td>
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<td>13. HENDRICK MOEPENG</td>
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<td>14. MOLEFE PHITSHANE ALIAS MOLEFE MAIEPE</td>
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<td>15. ZWABANTSU SITSHITSHI</td>
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<td>16. JOSE EDDIE</td>
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<td>17. DOCTOR LINDWA</td>
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<td>18. ANOS NDLOVU</td>
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<td>19. SHADRACK ILUBI</td>
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<td>20. MARTIN HAWI</td>
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<td>21. REUBEN ROY SIZWE</td>
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<td>22. ALIAS JUSTICE MNANZA</td>
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Apart from the tight security measures in operation in Botswana and guided by South Africans themselves we are firmly convinced that no clandestine infiltration of cadres can take place in the bare semi-desert and open veld of Botswana which are constantly surveyed from the air by helicopters and small aircraft. In the foreseeable future freedom fighters caught transiting through Botswana may be shot at sight or captured and kidnapped into South Africa by South African security forces even without the knowledge of the Botswana Government. We do not wish for the day to come when South Africa would use the infiltration of cadres through Botswana as a pretext to overrun and occupy that defenceless country of only half a million people.

The Botswana Government is fully apprehensive of such a possibility and is not convinced that any independent African State could or would intervene on her side. In such an event the Government is not certain of the amount of support it would even be able to rally round itself from among its people whose degree of political consciousness is not sufficiently high to comprehend or justify the sacrifice of their economy and sovereignty for the liberation of any neighbouring dependent territories in Africa in the interest of African Unity.

We therefore recommend strongly that infiltration of cadres through Botswana be suspended for the mentime, that the possibility of using alternative routes be explored, that Botswana's offer of grant of asylum to political refugees from dependent territories be exploited and that the struggle be intensified in Rhodesia with a view to liberating a territory which constitutes the key to the opening up of other dependent territories in Southern Africa and which constitutes the backbone of South Africa itself.
30. We further recommend that the OAU should without any delay avail itself of the offer of remission of the sentences of incarcerated freedom fighters made by the Botswana and that further contact be made with the Botswana Government with a view to helping that country to fully realise its independence and to reduce its economic dependence on South Africa.
1968-09

Report of the OAU Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa to the 11th Session of the Council of Ministers

Organization of African Unity

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