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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON TERRITORIES UNDER  
PORTUGUESE, FRENCH AND SPANISH DOMINATION



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A. TERRITORIES UNDER PORTUGUESE DOMINATION

The developments in the situation of territories under foreign rule reveal the great plot of the imperialist powers against the oppressed peoples of the southern part of the African continent, and more particularly their insane desire to dominate and maintain their hegemony over territories which are not yet freed in the so-called Portuguese Africa. A careful study of the events of the past few years sufficiently illustrate this truth.

African nationalist activities and Portuguese military expenditure

From the end of 1968 to the time when this report was prepared, all available information from Portugal or from the African nationalists in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau prove that the struggle has been intensified and that, far from being daunted by the formidable repressive machinery which NATO has offered Portugal, the freedom fighters have continued to fight and have achieved encouraging results.

2. According to Portuguese military communiques in 1968, intensive guerrilla activity took place in the whole region south of Corubal; in the greater part of the area north of Geba, including the highly-populated region of Oio North-East of Bissau and in the regions bordering Senegal and the Republic of Guinea. Even in the east which is sparsely populated and considered officially to be firmly in the hands of the Portuguese, (a wide publicity was given to the President's visit in February as proof of the Government's total control over the area) there had been sporadic guerrilla activities and especially mines had been planted on the main road between Nova Lamego and Cabuca. The only areas that were not cited in the military communiques during the year were the coastal areas and the sparsely populated coastal inlands that make up the Bijagos constituency.

3. Attention has often been drawn to nationalist attacks on Portuguese barracks or on armed elements ~~going here and there by~~ boats, aeroplanes or helicopters ~~mainly~~ in the Oio area and also to the frequent ~~guerilla~~ activities in the main towns of Mansoa, Farim, Bissora, Bigene, Sao Domingos and ~~Teixaira~~ Pinto.

Official dispatches also admitted that there had been guerilla activities in the concelho of Bissau but not in the city itself, whereas the Partido Africano de Independencia da Guine e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) asserted that there was an attack on the airport of the city in February, 1968.

4. A detailed description of military activities in the so-called Portuguese Guinea was published during the year in the official review, Ultramar. According to the review, the area most affected by the PAIGC activity towards the end of 1967 was Oio in the North-Central region, and about half of the western part of the territory on the north of Geba, including the concelhos of Fulacunda, Catio and part of Bafata. The Ultramar stated further that the rural population controlled by PAIGC lived in small groups, cultivated the land and paid taxes to the nationalist Organization, whereas the Portuguese were confined to the cities and the garrison villages, to which supplies were mostly freighted by light aircrafts and helicopters. Some small Portuguese garrisons are completely isolated during the rainy seasons. The Portuguese troops launch their attacks from their military posts against the areas controlled by the nationalists. Because of the difference in the landscape and the guerilla activities, the Portuguese find it difficult to penetrate the areas and carry out air raids on the areas where they think the nationalists can be found.

5. During the rainy season in 1968 (May to November), PAIGC's own communiques stated that the latter had carried out systematic attacks against the Portuguese military camps throughout the territory. Furthermore, PAIGC stated to have sunk one Portuguese ship at the Tancurual harbour in the North and another one at the Concoli harbour. It had also ambushed a Portuguese military convoy on the road between Nova Lamego and Pitche, near Dara village in the east, destroying one Portuguese tank and one

truck and taking one Portuguese soldier prisoner. In February, 1969, at the resumption of the PAIGC military activities during the past year, Mr. Amilcar Cabral said that the PAIGC forces had killed 1,700 Portuguese soldiers, damaged or destroyed 200 vehicles, 60 boats and 10 aeroplanes or helicopters, and caught 24 war prisoners. PAIGC released six of the prisoners and handed them over to the Red Cross through the Senegalese Red Cross in Dakar.

6. A number of articles were written in the course of the year by the world press, which contained eye witness reports made under the protection of the PAIGC in the liberated areas of the territory. According to the reports, the only areas, which by April 1968 were still controlled by the Government were Bissau, the capital, Bolama island, the small Bijagos Islands and an area in the centre of the territory. In the rest of the country the Portuguese troops were holding only a certain number of isolated "protected villages" (sometimes called strategic hamlets), which depended on helicopters and light aircraft for their reinforcement, ammunitions and food.

7. In another article, which attributed General Schulz's recall to the failure of his strategy in the "protected villages," it was said that after his appointment in July, Brigadier Spinola decided to evacuate the most isolated camps. The same article quoted PAIGC to have said that the first of the camps to be evacuated was that of Boli, the capital of Boe region. In August and September, other camps were evacuated Contabane and Ga-Genia on 1 July, Culbia (probably Colibuia) and Cumbija on 10 July, Catchil on 16 July and Cacao (Probably Cacoca) and Sangonha on 4 August. The Portuguese military communique mentioned some of the camps in the areas where entire villages had to be evacuated owing to intensive guerilla activities.

8. The situation in the so-called Portuguese Guinea is so serious that certain groups of people in Portugal advocate the abandoning of the territory in order to reduce the financial and military burden. The Chief of Defence Staff, General Camara Pina has termed the situation as "very delicate" and has compared the degree of infiltration to that of "microbes into the blood".

9. More recently, PAIGC stated that it had forced the Portuguese troops to abandon their military posts in Balana, Gandembel and Madina, thus liberating the entire Boe area, which covers some 2,100 square miles in the eastern part of the territory.

10. In Mozambique, the nationalists have exerted remarkable efforts, but because of the wealth of the territory, the Pretoria-Lisbon-NATO axis has decided to improve the co-ordination of its efforts against the African nationalists. Giving account of the military situation in September 1968, the Governor General stated at the Legislative Council that infiltration of guerilla fighters had been "progressively eliminated" in the Cabo Delgado and Niassa districts with the help of the local population and the militia troops. He admitted however that there had been "certain" guerilla activities in the Tete district and the aim was to interrupt the building of the Cabora Bassa dam. The Portuguese military communiques do not specify the number of the guerilla fighters captured, because in doing so they shall have to state the number of Portuguese soldiers killed.

11. Portuguese sources indicated that there are guerilla activities in the north and North-West of the Tete district, mainly in the Gago Coutinho and Cassacatiza areas. Because of this new outbreak of guerilla activities, the Portuguese troops in Niassa have been transferred to Tete and the Tete regional Hospital had been transformed into a military hospital. Gago Coutinho, which is on the Zambian border, has also been fortified to serve as commanding post for a large section of the Capoche valley. There is some information to the effect that the population living along the Zambian border have been re-grouped into special villages.

12. FRELIMO, which controls one fifth of the territory, now has from 8,000 to 15,000 men at its disposal. As far as FRELIMO is concerned, important events that occurred in 1968 were, on the one hand, the resumption of activities in the Tete district and, on the other, the meeting of the Party congress in Mozambique itself (it was alleged to have taken place in the Niassa district

in September). In August, FRELIMO forces attacked the Mueda airfield in the Cabo Delgado district, and announced that they had destroyed thirteen Portuguese aircrafts. The Portuguese military communiques, which did not announce the attack at the time it happened, admitted the fact only in January, 1969, after the world press had published it. Portuguese sources had however termed the news as "false propaganda" and had denied that aircrafts had been destroyed.

13. According to article which appeared in The Washington Post, after a tour of the eight positions held by the Portuguese in the three war zones, the Portuguese policy now consists in grouping the people together in protected villages. About half of the 800,000 inhabitants of the Niassa and Cabo Delgado districts have been regrouped into about 350 villages or aldeamentos, surrounded by barbed wire fences, and guarded and administered by officers of the military or paramilitary forces. The general situation in the war zones was described in the following terms in the article:-

"The Portuguese hold the Cities in which they have stationed troops, which receive their supplies by air. In certain sectors, however, the FRELIMO guerilla fighters move somewhat freely in the bush, enlisting either by persuasion or by force the support of the majority of the inhabitants and preventing the Portuguese from plying the roads, except the military convoys, which are exposed to mines and ambushes."

(Unofficial translation)

14. In February 1969, the Portuguese Minister of Defence, General Sa Viana Rebello, went to Mozambique and spent five days in touring the northern districts. This visit, paid shortly after the death of the President of FRELIMO, Mr. Edouardo Mondelane, coincided with the announcement that the Portuguese intended carrying out a combined operation against the guerilla fighters in the north. In an address to the armed forces of Mozambique, General Rebello said that Portugal would do everything to "restore peace and security in Mozambique as soon as

possible". Though up till that day the circumstances surrounding the death of Mondelane had not been exactly brought to light, there is no doubt that the heinous crime was committed by Portugal or by its allies. They believed that if tragedy struck at the leadership of FRELIMO, they would be able to put an end to the nationalist activities and transform the courageous Movement into a headless serpent. But, alas, later developments have proved and will continue to prove, as it is usually the case in other parts of the world, that the enemies of the oppressed people will always miscalculate.

15. Nationalist activities have increased in Angola also, mainly in the northern districts and along the eastern border which stretches from the Democratic Republic of Congo border as far as the promontory of Southern Caprivi. In order that the Government may face what it describes as "growing subversion at the interior", it has tightened the security measures in all districts, except the four South Western districts. It has increased the role of the military and paramilitary forces and has adopted various economic and social measures to support the military operations in the territory. In Cabinda in the Sango-mombo region, Portuguese soldiers and militia troops were ambushed on 2 December, 1968. Five out of the 17 victims of the ambush were killed.

16. Portuguese military communiques indicated that there were guerilla activities during the year in the northern districts of Zaire, Uige, Luanda, Guanza-Nord as well as in the northern part of the Lunda district. Apart from the Dembo area, which has been in the hands of the partisans since 1961, there have been reports about guerilla activities near Luanda, mainly in the Dande area near Ambriz, a city on the northern coast of the territory. The Portuguese communiques reported of the attack and destruction of partisan camps in the Zala-Nambuango area (at about 108 miles from Luanda).

17. The freedom fighters were active along the eastern border and the fighting was intensified towards the end of 1968. In the four frontier districts (Luanda, Moxico, Bie and Cuando-Cubango), there were a number of clashes between the Portuguese troops and the freedom fighters on a front which, apart from Teixeira de Sousa (on the border of the Democratic Republic of Congo), stretched towards the south along the Zambian border and towards the West as far as the Silva-Pinto region in the centre of the territory (some 420 miles from the Zambian border). Cago Coutinho, Cuito Cuanavale, Cuemba, Luso, Nova Chaves, Teixeira de Sousa and Casombo were among the main areas where there were partisan activities (see the map). In April and May 1968, the nationalists caused four derailments along the Benguela railway lines. In April, 1968, the nationalists cut the line at some twelve miles from Cangombe and 180 miles from the border of the Democratic Republic of Congo. During the last week of April 1968, the railway lines were cut twice, thus causing two derailments between Simoge and Cangonga. Towards the middle of May 1968, two locomotive engines and four coaches were derailed between Savinguila and Chitende, bringing to eight the number of derailments caused by the nationalists since December 1966.

18. Official military communiques published towards the end of 1968 reported of several ambushes laid for Portuguese troops as well as of attacks on African villages and Portuguese military camps by the nationalists. According to the official communiques, the Portuguese troops destroyed a certain number of camps believed to have been built by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). In the last week of January 1969, special military communiques published in Lisbon reported of serious clashes in Angola, including attacks by the nationalists, during which 18 workers on the Benguela railway lines were reported to have been killed and 33 others wounded. According to the communiques, the workers were attacked in the Teixeira de Sousa area, near the border. This attack was considered to be the bloodiest against civilians in Angola for many years.

19. The world press, in its report towards the end of 1968, put the Portuguese military losses during the seven years of fighting at 2,000. The figures show that the annual losses of the Portuguese in Angola has increased by thirty percent since 1965, whereas in Mozambique and Guinea Bissau the figures have doubled (Financial Times, London, December 1968). The figures published in the Portuguese military bulletins however, were considerably lower. The losses reported by the Liberation Movements were greater than they had actually inflicted on the Portuguese troops. From one of those sources, the total number of Portuguese soldiers killed in Africa was alleged to be 5,000 since the outbreak of the war.

20. Since the end of the war is not yet in sight, Portugal has not spared any effort during the past few years in preparing itself militarily. In October 1968, it decided to reconsider its war effort and tactics. The Council of National Defence and the Supreme Military Council each convened its meeting for the first time since their establishment in 1956 (Law No.2084 of 15 August). In its first meeting, the Council for National Defence composed of cabinet members and high ranking civil servant and military officers, examined the military policy of Portugal, the organization of national defence, the general armament programme, the organization of civil defence and the international military agreements. The Governors General of Angola and Mozambique and the Governor of the so-called Portuguese Guinea were invited to Lisbon in November to give account of the situation. The supreme military council also heard the reports of General Almeida Viana, Commander-in-Chief of Angola, General Costa Gomes, military commander of Mozambique and General Spínola, Governor of the so-called Portuguese Guinea on the military situation in their respective territories.

21. After these meetings, seven additional battalions of Portuguese soldiers were sent immediately to reinforce the armed forces in the so-called Portuguese Guinea. In December 1968, the Minister of the Army went to Angola apparently because of the intensification of the fighting in the eastern

part of the country. In January 1969, General Kaulza de Ariaga was appointed commander of the military region of Mozambique in replacement of General Costa Gomes with effect from the beginning of the second half of 1969. In February 1969, General Sa Viana Rebelo, Minister of Defence, visited the three territories in Africa.

22. The reinforcement of the overseas forces reflects the increase in the numerical strength of the Portuguese army from 150,000 to 180,000. Out of this total, 150,000 serve in the colonies; some 55,000 in Angola, 60,000 in Mozambique and more than 30,000 in Guinea Bissau. But an increase in the numerical strength of the army means ipso facto an increase in the military expenditure.

23. The budget statement for 1969, which laid down budgetary guide lines, gave top priority to the task of national defence, that is to say, to the safeguard of the territorial integrity of Portugal and its territories. According to the Prime Minister, "any effort of the overseas army has been and will be supported by the compulsory savings, which have hitherto been used for development purposes. Now, we have to meet **this** expenditure through loans." For the first time, the extract of the 1969 budget published in the Portuguese newspapers showed the actual expenditure on defence and security and the total income of the previous years.

24. A study of this information shows that during the 1965-1967 period, the actual expenditure on "defence and security" were double the estimates of the extraordinary budget most of the time, not only because the ministerial expenditure relating to defence is included in the ordinary budget, but also because additional estimates were made during the year. It is therefore obvious from these facts that during the period under review, defence and security absorbed **44%** of the total public expenditure and continues to cover more than 50% of the annual income every year.

25. This means in concrete terms that even if these percentages, which are not up to date, of course are deducted from the total 25,325 million escudos for public expenditure in the 1969-budget, 11,143 millions are ear-marked for defence and security. It is interesting to know how and for what purpose this huge sum - huge in relation to Portuguese economic resources - will be used. The Government has signed a contract with the French National Aeronautic Construction Company, Sud-Aviation, in the sum of 90 million escuados for the supply of alouette III helicopters. According to the estimate, the contract covers about ten helicopters to be used by Portugal in its African territories. New patrol boats of about 250 tons have also been ordered to be used in the overseas territories. They are estimated to cost 105 million escuados in all.

26. It could be asked how such a small and under-developed country as Portugal allocate such a huge sum, the equivalent of 44% of its budget or 9% of its gross national product for military purposes? Very few countries have reached such a figure, and it is obvious that the expenditure incurred exceed the estimates. This question is all the more emphasised if it is remembered that the income per capita in Portugal is 360 dollars, that 40 percent of the population are illiterate, that the annual production of electric power is 400 Kilowatt-Hour per capita, that the labour productivity is one of the lowest, that there are virtually no heavy industries, that about half of the population are engaged in Agriculture and that the other half is emigrating in increasing numbers. The answer is quite simple. It can be found in the collusion of the imperialist powers within NATO with Portugal and the massive support of all kinds they give to Portugal. It can also be found in the ever stronger relations between Portugal and the Western capitalists, the monopolists and exploiters and the South African racists, and also in the large investment of capital of these powers in the rich "overseas territories" of Portugal.

### Portugal's International Relations

27. In 1968, the press reported that the strategic role of the territories under Portuguese rule had become the leit-motiv of Portugal's international relations. Mr. Franco Nogueira, Minister of Foreign Affairs, made this statement several times and emphasised it in his usual press conferences and speeches.

28. In April, for instance, he expressed the opinion that the proposed withdrawal of British forces from East of the Suez would create an "immense void" and that the Portuguese islands of Madera, Acores in the Atlantic and the territories of Cape Verd and Sao Tome would then become the "stronghold" of western defence. If the Suez Canal still remains closed and if the need to use the Cape route going round South Africa arises, the long coast of Mozambique in the Indian Ocean could, with its well equipped ports and airports said Mr. Nogueira, "defend" this large area and guarantee sea communications with the help of the Republic of South Africa. "The developments in the situation since the beginning of the year, he added, justifies the policy of Portugal to remain in Africa."

29. At the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of NATO, held in Lisbon in October, Mr. Noguera uregently requested that the NATO zone of influence be extended from the north to the south of the Atlantic, covering Angola and the so-called Portuguese Guinea. Portugal, he said, has never understood how the security of one part could be ensured without considering the other part. Portugal will therefore apply its African policy firmly in the interest of NATO and the world as a whole. During the meeting, a resolution was adopted, which said among other things that "overseas Portugal" could count on the Organization in time of danger. (O Leculo 19.10.68).

30. In December 1968, Mr. Nogueira said that his Government was not able to request for the co-operation of the Western Powers to defend the Portuguese territories in Africa. Indeed, he said, the military leaders of the western nations now realize the importance of the position of overseas Portugal in the defence of the western world." He claimed that Portugal had

learnt from reliable sources that the military leaders of the big western powers would be concerned if Portugal's position in the world were to be shaken or weakened."

31. Mr. Nogueira announced also that Portugal was going to study as soon as possible the question of U.S.A. military bases in Acores and that the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence would make concrete proposals during the negotiations with the Government of the United States. The previous agreement on Acores, which expired in 1962 had been renewed for another year and that the United States had since continued to use the installations under the terms of an arrangement to be renewed every year.

32. It was reported that the military attaches of the Embassies of the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Spain, Republic of South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America visited the so-called Portuguese Guinea, Angola and Mozambique in February, 1969.

33. In October 1968, for the first time since the second world war, the German Chancellor, Herr Kiesinger, visited Portugal, thus strengthening obviously the traditional bonds of friendship between the Salazar Government and the Third Reich of Hitler. Herr Kiesinger said: "I share your happiness, Mr. President of the Council, about the excellent relations in all fields between our two countries and the long standing bonds of friendship." On 25 October, the "Sueddeutsche Zeitung" forecast: "In this way the Lisbon talks will cover not only the future of the development of the metropolis, but also the consolidation of Portugal's presence in Africa". Four months later, on 17 February, 1969, the Vice-Chancellor, Brandt passed through Lisbon to have talks with the Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs and told journalists that: "It gives me great joy to be in this wonderful city of a country with which Germany is united by bonds of Friendship within the NATO." And added: "The Germano-Portuguese friendship has been given concrete expression through close economic relations." In order to understand the latter sentence

well, it should be recalled that Bonn sells, if not gives, war materials to Portugal. In 1962, the "Spiegel" a magazine (issue No.6, page 21) published an article which said that the 10,000 machine guns bought by the Bundeswehr from Israel had been delivered to the Portuguese army in Angola and Mozambique. It could also be recalled that according to the West-Berlin newspapers, "Tages Spiegel" and "Kurier" of 17 and 18th February, 1965 respectively, sixty F.86 fighter planes bought by Germany from Canada had been directed to Portugal to be used of course in Angola and Mozambique. It would also be recalled that the "Luftwaffe" has been granted the Beja airforce base (in Aleutejo) and the other in Alverca in the Lisbon area. It should be pointed out that about fifteen thousand German soldiers are in Portugal to support the fascist regime and can thus be used in the obnoxious colonial war.

34. In September 1968, Henry Ford of the United States was received by Mr. Tomas, President of Portugal. He went to Portugal for an on the spot study of the possibilities of increasing the capacity of the branch of his factory, "Ford Lusitania". In November 1968, Mr. Dean Rusk, then American Secretary of State, had talks on the future of the Acores base. At the funeral of the late General Eisenhower, Mr. Caetano had fruitful talks with Mr. Nixon on the harmonization of their policies. It is known that America has for a long time been maintaining military bases in Lajes and Acores and that most of the Portuguese army's weapons are of American origin, for example the Lockheed PV2 and P2 V5 and the North American F.84 and F.86 jets.

35. As for France, Mr. Antoine Pinay, french industrialist and a man of great influence in French and international financial circles, visited Portugal and Angola and made statements inferring unconditional support for the criminal policy of the Portuguese colonialists. It would be recalled that the French naval construction bases are building sub-marine ships and other war units for the Portuguese navy. As has been said above, the Portuguese army equips itself every year with "Alouette" helicopters,

which are used in the massacre of civilians in the liberated areas of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau. Furthermore, France possesses a satellite observation station in the Acores. The large sums of money, that Portugal receives from the concessions, agreements and the military bases are a reliable and constant source of revenue to be used in the colonial war.

36. The international relations of Portugal are not, however, limited to the western powers alone. They extend to South Africa and Rhodesia. This is obvious to anyone who knows the true nature of imperialism and neo-colonialism and to the observer, who is aware of the unholy alliance between the western imperialists and the white racist minorities, who control and exploit the wealth of the southern part of our continent.

37. As Portugal says, its relations in Southern Africa are based on the principle of "good neighbourliness" and "Common interests" and, as every country needs neighbours, it is difficult for each one to act as it pleases. Such was, according to statements of Portuguese personalities in 1968, the general policy governing Portugal's relations with African countries bordering Angola and Mozambique, but as said by Mr. Nogueira, it was mainly with the Republic of South Africa that Portugal shared the "same values", which the two countries were determined to defend.

38. The Prime Minister of South Africa expressed a similar opinion in a statement he made in May 1968. Referring to the participation of South Africa in the building of the Cabora Bassa dam, he said that the decision had been the fruit of the good relations and understanding between the two countries and that the good neighbourliness was in keeping with the stand taken by South Africa, which felt that such relations could exist between nations inspite of their different internal policies, for it was known that Portugal's internal policy with favoured assimilation was diametrically opposed to that of South Africa which favoured separate development.

39. In 1968, South African officials, ~~the Minister of Transport,~~ Mr. Jocabus Schoeman and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, Mr. A. Roux, went to an ~~official visit to Portugal.~~ During his stay, Mr. Roux visited the Portuguese atomic energy and nuclear science laboratories and held talks with the officials of the Division of Studies and Planning of the Atomic Energy Commission and also with General Kaulza de Arriaga, who was then chairman of the Commission.

40. Many South African military personalities and other officials also visited Mozambique, especially Mr. Carel de Wet, Minister of Health, Planning and Mines and General Charles Alan Fraser, Chief of Defence Staff of the South African armed forces. In February 1969 the Portuguese Minister of Defence, General Rebelo stated after a visit to South Africa that he was perfectly satisfied with the discussions he had had with South African Ministers and high-ranking officials. He said also that further rounds of talk would be held in Lisbon and Pretoria and expressed his gratitude to the people of South Africa for their support in the form of assistance and relief funds.

41. It is obvious that South Africa is ready to help Portugal in the pursuit of the war the latter is waging in Angola and Mozambique. The organization of the assistance to Portuguese troops, has been intensified and the South African Aid Fund for Portuguese Troops which was set up in 1967 to send Christmas presents to Portuguese troops in Mozambique has recently collected 25,000 Rands for the purchase of two sanitary planes for Mozambique. Other presents in the form of sanitary planes are expected, especially from the Durban drama troupe. The founder of the Association of Friends of Rhodesia, Mr. Stanley Cox, has again set up another group known as the Society of Southern Africa in Natal to collect funds for the relief of Portuguese troops.

42. In August 1968, the leader of the opposition in South Africa said that it was high time the means of sending non-military aid to the "brave soldiers fighting to defend the territorial integrity of Portugal and also theirs, were examined." South Africa, he was reported to have said, should be convinced that the war being waged by the Portuguese was to some extent the war of South Africa.

43. Military aid being given by South Africa to Portugal has assumed an alarming proportion. Portugal is more and more dependent on South Africa. There is an air agreement between Portugal and South Africa and air transport communications between Lisbon, Johannesburg, Salisbury Windhoek, Luanda and Lorenzo Marques have been established. There has recently been a coastal traffic between the ports of Angola, South-West Africa, South Africa and Mozambique. The larger part of South Africa's and Rhodesia's external trade are carried out through the Lorenzo Marques and Beira harbours in Mozambique and the goods are transported to Johannesburg and Salisbury by train. Moreover the South Africans are considering the possibilities of constructing a railway line between Malawi and the Nacala harbour in Mozambique. A tarred road linking Luanda, Windhoek, Johannesburg and Lorenzo Marques has recently been opened, its military significance is obvious. A pipe-line from Beira harbour in Mozambique and serving Rhodesia has for a long time been exploited by the Louro Company, an Anglo-Portuguese enterprise. Its strategic purpose needs not be emphasised. Telecommunication links were developed in February 1969 with the commissioning of the sub-marine cable between South Africa and Portugal.

44. In the frenzied search for reliable allies and "good neighbours", Portugal can not afford to forget Rhodesia. Is this territory not the third link in the Pretoria-Salisbury-Lisbon axis? As Portugal says, its relations with Rhodesia are governed by the same principle of good neighbourliness and positive neutrality concerning the outlet into the sea as those that govern Portugal's relations with the African countries bordering Angola and Mozambique. As regards sanctions, the declared position of Portugal in 1968 was the following:

(a) its trade with Rhodesia is so negligible that it cannot affect Rhodesia's economy;

(b) the trade going through Angola and Mozambique to or from Rhodesia is limited to business being done by people who are not Portuguese nationals;

- (c) no ship flying the colour of Portugal has transported goods to or from Rhodesia.

It is clear therefore that these lies mislead nobody but the 40% illiterates of Portugal, particularly when the National Institute of Statistics in Lisbon has made it known that the trade between Portugal and Rhodesia in 1967/68 involved 240 million escudos - a figure which had not been reached before; that Portugal imported 5,038 tons of beef from Rhodesia as against only 776 tons in 1966/67, that the imports of sugar from Rhodesia amounted to 26,584 tons as against 7,079 and imports of tobacco to 605 tons as against 524.

### III. Foreign Economic and Financial interests in Portugal and in the Colonies.

45. The importance of these political, diplomatic and "friendly" relations and the so-called good neighbourliness is best understood when it is known how they are given concrete economic and financial expression in favour of the Caetano Government. After the outbreak of the armed struggle, the Government of Portugal widely opened the door of Angola to all sorts of investment, so that the imperialist sharks may have direct interest in the war and make the Angolans pay the price of the war. The decree No.46.312 of 26 April, 1965, laying down a new very liberal investment code, gave legal backing to the new orientation of the Portuguese colonial policy. Thus, to the old American, British, Belgian and South African investments in the "Diamond Company, the German contribution to the "Lobito Mining Company," and the Belgian capital in the "Oil Company" have been added others such as the "Nippon Mining Company", a Japanese Company which started working the Uige Copper Mines, formerly the monopoly of the Portuguese CUF. A complete chain of processing factories have been built, mainly in Luanda, with the financial and technical assistance of the International monopolists, such as Nestle (Switzerland), Coca-Cola (United States), Hitachi (Japan).

46. West Germany. In March 1969, the German Banks: Deutsche Unionsbank and the Hamburgische Landesbank and the Lavoro Bank Ltd of Zurich decided to grant a credit of 80 million Marks (22 Million dollars) to the Lobito Mining Company to enable it to increase its yield from the Kassinga mines.

47. United States of America. In January 1969, two new contracts were signed on foreign investments in oil works. Under the terms of the agreement, a branch of the United States Texaco Oil Company was authorized to take part in the prospection for oil in Angola in the concessions obtained by the Petrangol and Angol Companies for the prospection of oil in Angola. In February this year, a concession of 107,200 hectares was granted to Tanneco Oil, an American Company for the prospection and mining of sulphur and gypsum. The United States R.N. Corporation and Koppers Company is associated with the new studies on the new steel works which the Compania Uranio de Mocambique has been authorized to build in Tete. The "Government of Mozambique" has furthermore ordered 15 diesel locomotive engines from the General Electric Company of New York. More recently, the DETA Airways Company, a commercial airlines for internal services in Mozambique, has bought two Boeing 737 - 700 jet aircrafts from the United States at the cost of 120 million escudos

48. France. The General Electric Company Ltd, which forms part of the FASOL group, is supposed to build a pulp factory in Mozambique at the cost of 1,000 million escudos. The Societe des Etudes et entreprises siderurgiques Schercider Creuzot et Sestig is also associated with the study on the new steel works of the Compania Uranio de Mozambique. Under the terms of an agreement signed between the French ironworks Company, Usnion and the Compania Mineraria de Lobito, Angola will supply two million tons of iron ore from the Kassinga mines to the French Company for five years. The Compagnie Francaise des Petroles d'Aquitanie mines oil in Angola in close association with the Petrangol-Angola group, and this business is controlled largely by Belgian interests. During 1968, Angola exported more than

two million tons of iron ore to the tune of 700 million escudos. The iron ore were exported to France, Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and Portugal.

49. South Africa, however, remains the excellent and the most powerful partner of Portugal, for it is the only country through which foreign investments are channeled to Portugal. In other words, many western investors prefer allying with South Africa because of the financial guarantees that it offers for investing in the Portuguese colonies. A study of the two major projects now being implemented in Angola and Mozambique shows to what extent South Africa has penetrated the colonies and also gives insight into the extent of involvement of South Africa and the Western capitalists.

50. In January 1969, Portugal and the Republic of South Africa signed another agreement on the joint utilization of the Cunene water supply and the electric power produced in the southern part of Angola and Namibia. During the first phase of the work, a new dam will be built on the Gove in the central plateau in the centre of Angola, at about sixty miles from the city of Nova Lisboa, and an artificial lake of about 108 miles long. Five hundred thousand hectares of arid land will thus be converted into arable land in Angola and Namibia for the benefit of about 500 million inhabitants.

51. The new dam will help modify and regularize the flow of Cunene all along its course, and increase the capacity of the hydro-electric station in Matala, from which Sa da Bandeira and Mocamedes will be supplied with electricity. On the Angolan bank, it will be possible to irrigate 20,000 hectares of land between Quiteve and Humbe, when the work is completed and to supply the people and livestock with water in an area of 80,000 hectares. On the Namibian side, 100 million gallons of water will be supplied every day to Ovamboland.

52. The first phase of the work involves an investment of 1,500 million escudos. 400 million out of which will be spent on the Gove dam alone. The final cost will probably rise to

17,000 million escudos. Each country will supply half of the capital. Portugal has undertaken to supply a minimum quantity of water and the Republic of South Africa will pay a fee to Portugal for the supply of water above the agreed minimum, in the same way as for the supply of electricity generated at the Ruacana hydro-electric station.

53. The other project is much more ambitious. It is the Cabora Bassa dam, which is said to be the biggest in tropical Africa. It will be built jointly by ZAMCO, the Cabora Bassa Construction Consortium and the Cabora Bassa Builders, which has its head office in Paris and whose main partners are Siemens (West Germany), the Anglo-American (South Africa), the General Electric Company and the International Construction Company (France) and the ASEA (Sweden). The Anglo-American of South Africa is the chief owner of the consortium. The second consortium is based in London, and is composed of the Anglo-Swiss group which includes the AEI, the English Electric and Sir Alexander Gibb and Associates Company and also another Genevese Company. The third group, the Cabora Bassa Builders is composed of Morisson Munder (United States), the Compadec (France) the Compagnie des Forges de la Loire and the Compagnie Electro-Mecanique, both of which are French companies, as well as the strong GEC Company (United States), Brown Beveri (Switzerland), Moriss de Maia (Portugal and another South African Company called Roberts Construction). As it appears clearly, the Cabora Bassa project is a joint South African-Portuguese enterprise, but it will be entirely controlled financially by South Africa. Once again, the names of the important groups associated with these projects show how much the financial power of the West, which is being attracted and lured by South Africa's gold reserves, is being used and placed at the service of the Pretoria, Lisbon and Salisbury interests.

54. During 1968, a team of eleven Portuguese experts visited Johannesburg and Pretoria to negotiate for an agreement on South Africa's purchase of 10 million dollars worth of electric power to be produced by the Cabora Bassa dam. Under the agreement, South Africa has decided to buy 1,000 megawatts of electric

power per annum as from 1974. This quantity will rise to 1,700 megawatts from 1980 onwards. It is clear that these initial arrangements reached between Portugal and South Africa on the development and pooling of hydro-electric resources in Angola and Mozambique will strengthen both the trade and other relations between the two countries. Talking on the strengthening of these relations, the so-called Minister of Economic Affairs of South Africa, Mr. Haak, said that it was absolutely necessary, in his opinion, to establish closer economic co-operation in southern Africa and that the co-operation was already developing.

55. One of the most serious consequences of these projects is that South Africa, Rhodesia and Portugal intend to take advantage of that to encourage a greater white immigration into southern Africa. It is known that the white racists of this region are haunted by their small numbers as compared with the African populations. According to the Portuguese press, another agreement between Portugal and South Africa on the development of the Cunene Basin would effect a greater colonization of the southern area of Angola. A provincial colonization office has already been set up.

56. It is considered that the acceleration of the colonization of Mozambique as in Angola will be an important factor in the occupation and defence of the territory. A suggestion has officially been published to the effect that the colonization of the northern districts of Niassa, Cabo Delgado and Tete by the demobilized soldiers should form an integral part of the defence plans of the territory. It has especially been suggested to colonize the following areas: the Maconde plateau, including the areas of Montepuez and Porto Amelia in the Cabo Delgado district; the plateau areas of Villa Cabral, Marrupa, Valadim and Amaramba in the Niassa district; the area of Maravia, Macanga and Angonia in the Tete district. (It will be noted that the areas suggested in the two most northern areas are between two main war zones). It has also been suggested that the zones of military colonization be established around the borders of Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia, thus forming a security circle and a first line of defence.

57. At the moment, the main colonization plan is linked with the building of the Cabora Bassa dam and the development of the Zambezi valley which it entails. According to recent information, the Government was considering the possibilities of settling 12,000 Portuguese, including 5,000 emigrants from France, on the land that will be irrigated in the Zambezi valley. During the year, the Government set up a special commission to evacuate 24,000 Africans from the dam site and settle them elsewhere. The press reported that the first phase of the work had already started.

58. The Maputo valley development plan, which forms part of the third development plan promises to be great. One billion escudos will be spent in the development of the area, one of the first to be colonized by Europeans. The plan covers an irrigation and reclamation of about 34,000 hectares of land for colonization purposes. The project cannot, however, be carried out until Portugal, South Africa and Swaziland have reached an agreement, after a general survey of the Maputo, Embeluzi and Incomati basins.

59. The provincial colonization office played an unimportant role before 1968 in the implementation of the major colonization plans of the territory, because each of the plans was provided with a team of technicians and personnel for their necessary implementation, as has been pointed out earlier. Indeed the budgetary estimates of the colonization office for 1968, published in March, only amounted to 21.6 million escudos, 8.8 out of which came from the budget surpluses of the previous years. The estimates of the expenditure included 8.86 escudos for salaries and personnel expenses, and 8.6 million for the various colonization plans, including 2 million escudos for the colonization commission in the Cabo Delgado district, 0.4 million as aid to farmers and assistance relating to rural and community development projects and 1.3 million escudos for the drainage of an area along Anglusane.

60. As part of the third development plan, the provincial colonization office proceeded in August, 1968 to allocate a 40 million escudo contract on the clearing and surveying of a 10,500 hectar land in the Montepuez area in the Cabo Delgado district for the settlement of 800 families of farmers. The clearing and development of the land will spread over three years: 3,000 hectares were to be ready in 1968, 4,000 hectares in 1969 and 3,500 in 1970. The office has also conducted geological and magnetic surveys in the various regions and districts of Mozambique.

61. But besides the giant Cunene and Cabora Bassa projects, South Africa and its allies control a number of big factories and economic and financial enterprises, which cannot be enumerated here. Agreements are signed and implemented every day. Most recently, for instance, there have been many other companies, in which South Africa has great interests. There are The Angola Exploration Company for the prospection of diamonds, the Angola African Oxygen a chemical industry, the South Africa Angola Investment with capital in fisheries and other projects carried out jointly by South Africa oil companies and their monopolists, all in Angola alone, without mentioning Mozambique, which is richer.

#### IV. C o n c l u s i o n

62. Only one and important conclusion can be drawn from this limited study, and that is that the so-called Portuguese colonies are immensely rich and constitute the source of raw materials for the Western powers. Portugal, a small and poor country without financial means cannot tap this wealth. Moreover, the African nationalists, aware of the seizure of the wealth of their motherland by foreigners, have started a justifiable liberation war in order to recover their legitimate rights. Portugal has launched an urgent appeal for help to the NATO powers, indicating the great loss of raw materials, which the Organization needs. The Westempowers have come and intend

to remain. Another urgent appeal for help to safeguard the white supremacy in southern Africa has also been launched to South Africa. The latter has answered the appeal realising that it can kill two birds with only one stone, in other words, it can use the "Portuguese colonies" in the vanguard to stem the nationalist tide of this region and also take advantage of the situation to consolidate its economic interests with the prospects of exhausting the gold, diamond and copper mines of the Cape, Natal, the Orange State and also of emptying the waters of Transvaal and Namibia. The picture is now complete in that Portugal, with the active support of South Africa and the NATO powers, has decided to remain in Africa. Neither the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations nor the condemnation of the retrogressive colonialism by men of good will can do anything about the situation.

63. The one and only way out of it is the armed struggle, a revolutionary struggle. The African nationalists in Guinea Bissau, Angola and Mozambique started this struggle some years ago. It is going on and every means should be used to strengthen it. The Organization of African Unity supports it with all its force and will continue to do so as long as Portugal and its allies remain blinded by the brutal power of money and refuse to listen to the voice of reason. This, the United Nations Organization should understand and increase its assistance to the freedom fighters of the southern part of the African continent. All peace-loving people of the world, who believe in the Declaration of Human Rights should also understand it and create conditions, if they can not provide any means, to help strengthen this just and legitimate struggle of the African nationalists.

#### B. TERRITORIES UNDER FRENCH DOMINATION

64. General elections were held in November, 1968 in the so-called French Somaliland. The party of Mr. Ali Aref, the outgoing President of the autonomous Government, won 26 seats out

of 32. France, this time more than ever, applied its golden principle: "divide and rule." Indeed the opposition, which had that time decided to take part in the election, was encouraged by the local authorities to break into splinter parties, each of which presented candidates. As a result of this Mr. Ali Aref's party which presented a somewhat united front won the elections easily. According to information received, about 30% of the electors, who because of their nomadic life, had crossed the border, were not allowed to return during the elections.

65. It has recently been reported that during the elections, a great number of persons, most of whom were nationalists recognized as such for their nationalism and their will for independence, were not authorized to return to the territory, they continue to live in exile. Since the Opposition accepted to take part in the elections, thus entering into "legality", the people in exile, who are supporters of the Opposition should now be allowed to return home.

66. It is regrettable that inspite of the resolution CM/Res.152 adopted by the O.A.U. Council of Ministers at its Eleventh Ordinary Session and endorsed by the Fifth Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the question of Comoro Islands has not been put on the list of non-autonomous territories by the United Nations Decolonization Committee. Through all sorts of manoeuvres, France has succeeded in pushing the examination of this matter to later date. The attitude of certain Member States which has enabled France to achieve this result should be deplored. It is clear that France will leave no stone unturned to prevent the Comoro question coming to the forefront. Instead of combating openly the legitimate aspirations of the people of Comoro to independence, France is on the contrary, maintaining its domination on the territory through persons it has pitchforked to rule.

67. The O.A.U. Council of Ministers should re-affirm the right of the people of Comoro to self-determination and independence and recommend, once again that the Assembly of Heads of State and Government give firmer directives to their Permanent Representatives at the United Nations with a view to frustrating the manoeuvres of the Government of France during the 24th Session and to obtaining the application of resolution CM/Res.152 (XI).

C. TERRITORIES UNDER SPANISH DOMINATION

(1) Ifni

68. It will be recalled that on 4 January, 1969, the representatives of Morocco and Spain signed a treaty at Fez, known since then as the treaty relating to the return of the enclave of Ifni to the Government of Morocco.

69. The most important clauses of this Treaty are by far the first two. Indeed, Article I stipulates that:

"Spain shall return to Morocco, the territory of Ifni as a full sovereign state and such as has been delimited in the Treaty. The Government of Morocco shall take over from the Government of Spain, all the rights and obligations relating to the territory as defined in the Treaty." (Unofficial translation)

And Article 2 stipulates that :

"the transfer of powers and the simultaneous handing over of rights and obligations shall be effected within the three months following the entry into force of the present Treaty, at a date and according to the procedures agreed upon by the two parties." (Unofficial translation)

70. It is provided for in the Treaty that the latter shall enter into force within the three months following the exchange of the instruments of ratification by the two parties.

The Treaty, moreover, contains other provisions among which should be noted, the fishing right, which the two parties mutually agreed to grant to each other in their respective territorial waters; Spain shall retain its long standing fishing interests on the coast of Ifni and, in exchange, Morocco shall enjoy the same advantages on the Spanish coast.

71. The two Governments ratified the Treaty in Rabat on 13 May 1969 and the exchange of the instruments of ratification took place between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Morocco and the Ambassador of Spain. As it is provided for that the transfer shall take effect within the three months following the exchange of the instruments of ratification, there is hope that the parties will agree on the procedures of this ceremony as soon as possible.

72. The Moroccan press has reported that His Majesty the King has decided to visit the territory either in the first or the second week of July. And according to the most recent information, the transfer took place on 30 June at 12.30 p.m. The Spanish flag was removed and was replaced by that of Morocco.

(2) Spanish Sahara

73. Although we are pleased with the developments in the Ifni question, there is no reason to be satisfied with the state of affairs in the Spanish Sahara. In fact, there is no indication as to whether Spain is willing to find a happy ending to the problem of Spanish Sahara, at least in the near future, and information received on the territory confirm rather that there is no solution in sight.

74. It will be recalled that the General Assembly of the United Nations, meeting in its 22nd Session, adopted resolution 2354, confirming its resolution 2229(XXI) which particularly invited the Administering power to:

"determine at the earliest possible date, in conformity with the aspirations of the indigenous people of Spanish Sahara and in consultation with the Governments of Morocco and Mauritania and any other interested party, the procedures for the holding of a referendum under United Nations auspices with a view to enabling the indigenous population of the territory to exercise freely its right to self-determination."

75. Spain voted in favour of this resolution, which means that it adhered to the principle of self-determination for the territory. But, since Spain has not taken any step to apply nor an indication that it is going to apply the above-mentioned resolutions, the General Assembly adopted the resolution 2428 during its 23rd Session, in December 1968, requesting especially the Secretary-General, in consultation with the Administering Power and the Special Committee, to appoint the special mission provided for in paragraph 5 of resolution 2229 (XXI) and to expedite its dispatch to Spanish Sahara for the purpose of discharging its duties as defined in paragraph 4.

76. On 10 January, 1969, the Secretary-General, in pursuance of the resolution 2428 (XXIII), informed the Government of Spain about this matter. At the time when this report was being drawn up there had not been any reaction on the part of the Government of Spain at the U.N. Secretary-General's Office. There is every reason to believe that Spain will treat the Secretary-General's request in the same way as it did to the preceding resolutions. This anxiety is justified more especially as Spain has now launched a psychological campaign aimed at influencing the people of the territory. Perhaps when the Pavlov experiment for creating political responses is over, Spain will agree to apply the resolutions of the General Assembly, knowing very well what the result will be.

77. In order to bring the new Pavlov experiment to a successful issue, Spain is taking steps daily, mainly at two levels: in the first place, the Spanish civilian and military authorities in the territory are now organising meetings and activities, which ostensibly tend to lead to a sort of referendum in which the people of Sahara participate in close collaboration with Spain. Our information is correct and reliable and is confirmed by the Spanish press. Moreover, the establishment of provincial institutions, the setting up of an assembly which, according to the Spanish public law, seem to play the role of a shadow Government that will assume power in the future, the arrival of a Saharian delegation at the Spanish Cortes where they made irresponsible statements and the replies of certain members of the Cortes to these statements give much anxiety.

78. On 7 February 1969, a delegation of the Provincial Assembly of Sahara, led by Mr. Seila Ould Abeida Ouled Ahmed, visited Madrid. It was formally received by the Cortes, and below is an article from the ABC, a Spanish newspaper, which never writes fictitious articles in Spain:

"After referring to those who claim to speak on behalf of Sahara without being Saharians, Mr. Seila said that he was bearer of a document addressed to the United Nations and signed by all the members of the Assembly, in which the will of the people of Sahara was clearly expressed. He recalled the traditional characteristics of his people, who with the assistance of Spain, were driving towards a future of progress in all fields. In a striking speech, he pointed out that the people of Sahara were deeply religious, hospitable and were proud of their honour and their dignity. He ended his speech by emphasising the order and calm now prevailing in Sahara and conveyed the greetings and gratitude of his people to the supreme legislative organ and requested that these be transmitted to the remotest parts of Spain." (Unofficial translation)

The ABC continued to point out that the speech delivered in arabic by Mr. Seila was interrupted by the applause of the Sahara nationals before it was translated. After its translation into Spanish, there were "wild applause and cheers" from all the benches. Mr. Iturmendi, the Speaker of the Cortes, replied to the speech of Mr. Seila by saying that "the emotion-charged statements" made by the Saharian deputy had "greatly touched the deputies." And added "Spain responds with emotion and love to your adherence and Spain is firmly decided to fulfil its obligations that it has contracted with you."

79. Arriba, another newspaper, published in the issue of the same day the following precise details of the reply of Mr. Iturmendi, Speaker of the Cortes: "the people of Sahara have shown their firm and unequivocal will to remain united to

Spain and want to attach their destiny to ours as long as they have not attained the necessary maturity to act on their own. Spain is in Sahara because of the freely expressed will of the Saharians. Spanish Cortes expresses its fervent adherence to the legitimate cause of Sahara.

80. It has been reported that there are now 9,000 civilian administrators and 10,000 soldiers in the territory with less than 35,000 indigenous inhabitants. The purpose of the administrators and soldiers is not mistaken by anybody. Their ~~true~~ objectives are obvious especially when the Permanent Representative of Spain at the United Nations says honestly before the Committee of 24 that "the people of Sahara shall have freedom in order to control their own destiny, when the time comes for them to request for it." (The sentence is not underlined in the original). We must understand that the expression "when the time comes" is referring to the end of the Pavlov experiment. Does "to request for it" mean that the order of things has changed and that it is for the colonised to dictate his will to the coloniser, especially when the coloniser has pledged his obligations before the International Community? What is the significance of the freedom that the people hope for if we know, without being experts in applied mathematics, that every group of two inhabitants of the territory are under the political, economic and cultural influence of one and half representatives of the Administering Power?

81. But, we have seen through Spain's trick. With this tragic incident in Spanish Sahara, we can believe that Spain feels that by washing its hands off Equatorial Guinea and Ifni, it could mislead independent Africa and have a freer hand in Spanish Sahara. O.A.U. should be firmer and more vigilant and do everything so that Spain may apply the resolutions that it has freely accepted.

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The resolutions already adopted on this matter by the Ninth Session of the Council of Ministers can be found in the appendices.

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS  
 Ninth Ordinary Session  
 Kinshasa - September 1967

RESOLUTION ON TERRITORIES  
 UNDER PORTUGUESE DOMINATION

The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in its Ninth Ordinary Session at Kinshasa, Congo, from 4 to 10 September 1967,

Having noted the report of the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity, the report of the Neutral Military Commission and the report submitted by the Foreign Ministers of Tunisia, Liberia, Madagascar and Sierra Leone;

Recalling the numerous resolutions concerning the territories under Portuguese domination adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and the Council of Ministers;

Noting that Portugal is increasing its repressive measures in the territories of Angola, Mozambique and so-called Portuguese Guinea,

Deeply concerned at the strife between the nationalist movements of these territories, which renders the formation of a common front against the enemy impossible, and encourages Portugal to persist in its repression of the indigenous population,

Convinced that the only means of effectively fighting Portugal is for a common front to be formed by the liberation movements in each territory;

- (1) Earnestly entreats all the nationalist movements to close their ranks, co-ordinate their activities and intensify their struggle in order to achieve self-determination and independence;

- (2) Welcomes the resolutions adopted and the measures taken by the United Nations to enable the largest possible number of Africans living under Portuguese domination to benefit from the special training programmes provided by UN specialized agencies;
- (3) Denounces Portugal's refusal to respect the UN resolutions;
- (4) Condemns Portugal for its acts of aggression against independent African States bordering on territories under its colonial domination;
- (5) Calls upon independent African countries to render every possible assistance to refugees and to the liberation movements of the territories under Portuguese domination;
- (6) Recommends that a Committee be constituted comprising Congo-Brazzaville, Congo-Kinshasa, Ghana, the United Arab Republic and Zambia, to study the situation prevailing in Angola, and to use every endeavour to induce the liberation movements to form a common front, with a view to making the struggle for the liberation of Angola more effective.

RESOLUTION ON TERRITORIES UNDER PORTUGUESE DOMINATION

The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity meeting in its Tenth Ordinary Session at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 20 to 24 February, 1968,

Having noted the reports of the Administrative Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity and of the Liberation Committee,

Recalling all the previous resolutions adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government and the Council of Ministers,

Deeply concerned by the fact that Portugal is systematically evicting the indigenous population from the territories under its domination to South Africa, and is promoting the influx of foreign immigrants into these territories,

Noting with satisfaction the unrelenting struggle of the peoples of these territories for their freedom and independence

Having noted with appreciation and satisfaction the statements of the representatives of both the Democratic Republic of the Congo and of the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) whereby both governments have agreed to facilitate the free passage, on their respective territories, of freedom fighters of both GRAE and MPLA on their way to Angola;

Realizing the threat of Portugal's presence in these territories to the struggle being waged in Zimbabwe;

1. Condemns as a crime against humanity the atrocities perpetrated by the Portuguese against the African people fighting for their freedom and independence;
2. Condemns the economic, financial and other interests impeding the progress of the African people towards independence;

3. Requests member States of NATO to desist forthwith:
  - (a) from giving the Government of Portugal any military assistance, including the training of Portuguese Military personnel within or outside the framework of NATO, which might encourage the Government of Portugal to continue its repression of the African people in territories under its domination;
  - (b) To prevent the sale or supply of weapons and military equipment and the shipment of such arms or material for the manufacture or maintenance of such weapons or ~~ammunitions~~;
4. Appeals to the IMF and IBRD not to grant aid to the Government of Portugal until that Government has recognized the right of the people under its domination to freedom and independence;
5. Condemns once more Portugal's refusal to respect the United Nations resolutions;
6. Draws the attention of the international community to the threat to world peace and security which Portugal's presence in these territories creates;
7. Strongly condemns Portugal for its aggressive policy against neighbouring independent African States and in particular the Democratic Republic of the Congo;
8. Appeals once more to all the independent African States to increase their material and moral support to the peoples of these territories in their struggle;
9. Calls upon the Liberation ~~Movements~~ to close their ranks in the struggle they are waging;
10. Requests the Committee of Five for Angola to meet immediately in order to bring MPLA and GRAE together in a united front. In this connection, the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and of the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) are called upon to use their influence in order to secure the release - before the said meeting - of detainees held by either Movements on either of their territories, so as to ensure an atmosphere of reconciliation and eventual unity between the two Movements.

RESOLUTION ON THE QUESTION  
OF SO-CALLED FRENCH SOMALILAND (DJIBOUTI)

The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity meeting in its Tenth Ordinary Session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 20<sup>th</sup> to 24 February 1968,

Having noted the report of the Administrative Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity and that of the Co-ordination Committee for the Liberation of Africa,

Reaffirming all the previous resolutions adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government and the Council of Ministers,

Recalling United Nations resolution N° 2356 (XVII) on the question of the so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti) :

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of French Somaliland (Djibouti) to self-determination and independence in accordance with the principles enshrined in the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations Charters;
2. Expresses its disappointment that the Administering Power has failed to co-operate fully with the Organization of African Unity and United Nations to accelerate the decolonization of the Territory;
3. Calls upon the Administering Power to :
  - (a) take the necessary measures to prepare the Territory for independence, including the full exercise of political freedom;
  - (b) allow the return of all those who have been expelled to their Territory;
  - (c) to co-operate fully with the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations in bringing about early

independence in the so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti);

4. Requests the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa to make<sup>a</sup> progress report on the situation of the Territory;
5. Reassures the brotherly people of the so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti) of the Organization of African Unity's continued support to bring about their freedom and independence and appeals to them to unite their ranks in their liberation struggle;
6. Decides to keep the question of the so-called French Somali-land (Djibouti) ~~on its agenda.~~

RESOLUTIONTERRITORIES UNDER PORTUGUESE DOMINATION

The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in its Eleventh Ordinary Session in Algiers, Algeria from 4 to 12 September 1968,

Noting the reports of the Administrative Secretary-General of the Liberation Committee and of the Committee of Five on Angola,

Recalling the relevant resolutions adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government and by the Council of Ministers,

Welcoming the progress achieved by African nationalists in their legitimate liberation struggle,

Deploring the assistance of all kinds which Portugal receives from its NATO allies and from its economic and financial partners,

Gravely concerned at the threats and the acts of aggression constantly perpetrated by Portugal against the African States adjacent to the territories under its domination,

Reaffirming its conviction that the crimes perpetrated by Portugal against African peoples constitute an odious crime against mankind,

1. Reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle waged by the peoples fighting against Portugal's colonialist oppression;
2. Firmly condemns the odious crimes of genocide committed by Portugal, in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter, through the use of napalm, poison gases and other weapons against African peoples fighting for their freedom and independence, which constitutes a threat to international peace and security;
3. Condemns Portugal for the acts of aggression committed against the independent States adjacent to the territories under its domination;

4. Condemns Portugal for its persistent refusal to acknowledge the right to self-determination and independence of the peoples in the territories under its domination, in defiance of the United Nations resolutions;
5. Vigorously condemns NATO for its military assistance and requests Member States of NATO to desist from affording Portugal the economic and military assistance which enables it to continue its colonialist war;
6. Condemns the unholy alliance between Portugal and the racist minority regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia, which is designed to perpetuate colonialism and oppression in the southern part of Africa;
7. Appeals to the Member States of the OAU to grant additional material assistance to the liberation movements in order to enable them to restore the economy and organize the lives of the populations of the liberated areas;
8. Requests the African Group at the United Nations to take action so as to ensure the application of mandatory sanctions against Portugal in accordance with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter;
9. Appeals to all states to extend both moral and material assistance to those engaged in the legitimate struggle against Portuguese oppression in Africa;
10. Congratulates the African nationalists on their continued progress in the legitimate struggle for the liberation of their countries and calls on them to maintain good relations with all the Member States of the Organization in the best interest of the struggle which they are waging.

RESOLUTION ON THE COMORO ISLANDS

The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in its Eleventh Ordinary Session in Algiers, Algeria, from 4 to 12 September 1968,

Reaffirming the inalienable right of all the peoples and territories of Africa to freedom and independence;

Considering that the Comoro Islands are not inscribed on the list of colonial territories under the terms of the U.N. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples;

Having regard to the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in Resolution 1514 (XV) of the United Nations General Assembly;

1. Calls upon the French Government to take immediate measures to enable the people of the Comoro Islands to exercise their inalienable right to self determination and independence.
2. Invites the African Group at the United Nations to request the inclusion of the Comoro Islands on the list of non-self-governing territories of the Decolonization Committee of the United Nations.
3. Asks the Administrative Secretary-General to communicate to the Chairman of the U.N. Decolonization Committee the request of the O.A.U. concerning the inclusion of the Comoro Islands on the list of the Decolonization Committee.

RESOLUTION ON DECOLONIZATION

The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, meeting in its Eleventh Ordinary Session in Algiers, Algeria, from 4 to 12 September, 1968,

Taking note of the report of the Administrative Secretary-General relating to the problem of decolonization contained in documents CM/223/Add.1 and 2, CM/224, CM/224/Add.1, CM/225, CM/225/Add.1, CM/226 and CM/227 as well as U.N. General Assembly resolution 1415 (XV) on decolonization,

Gravely concerned at the attitude of NATO Member States which, despite the resolutions and appeals of the United Nations and the OAU, continue to give Portugal and the racist minority regimes in Southern Africa constantly increased military and economic support,

Convinced that the support given in various forms by NATO Member States enables these racist regimes to intensify their war of colonial domination and that it therefore constitutes a major obstacle to the national liberation struggle of the African peoples concerned;

Deploring the aid which Portugal and the racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia receive from IBRD and certain UN specialized agencies,

1. Recommends that the Assembly of Heads of State and Government should in the most appropriate manner urgently and vigorously request Member States of NATO to ensure that that organization ceases to give the Government of Portugal support enabling that country to intensify its colonial war against the populations of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissao, since any assistance rendered to Portugal in its genocidal war in Africa constitutes an unfriendly act vis-a-vis the African States,

2. Recommends that the Assembly of Heads of State and Government should take all necessary measures to ensure that in their respective countries the press, radio, television and any other media of psychological action should exert vigorous and sustained efforts to denounce to international opinion the odious crimes committed by the colonialist powers and their allies against the African populations in the colonial territories;
3. Further recommends that the Heads of State and Government give instructions to their respective delegates to the conferences of specialized agencies and international organizations associated with the United Nations, in particular the IBRD and the International Monetary Fund, with a view to taking concerted African action designed to bring about the cessation, or at least the limitation, of assistance afforded by these institutions to Portugal and the racist minority regimes in Southern Africa.



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1969-08

# Report of the Secretary-General on territories under Portuguese, French and Spanish domination

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