

African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT)



YOUTH AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM ONLINE: COUNTERING TERRORISTS EXPLOITATION AND USE OF THE INTERNET

Richard Apau

YOUTHS EXTENUATION OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN NORTHERN CAMEROON AND NIGERIA

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COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND INSURGENCY IN THE WAKE OF ARAB SPRING: PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN MALI IN PERSPECTIVE

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ANALYZING THE ISIS THREAT IN AFRICA

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THE MIND: A PLAYING FIELD FOR TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

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EDITORIAL

VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM: WHAT MORE SHOULD AU MEMBER STATES DO?

Terrorism and Violent Extremism have become the most daunting threats to international peace, security and development in recent time. The International Community, Regional Organizations, Governments, Military, Intelligence and Security Agencies, Civil Society and Local Communities have all come to terms with the fact that no country or community is immune to these threats and that a collaborative whole-of-society response approach is required to effectively address them.

In line with the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and in compliance with the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions, most African Union (AU) Member States (MS) have passed their Counter-Terrorism (CT) legislations, established their CT structures and have either completed or are working on their national CT strategies and Prevention and Countering of Violent Extremism(PCVE) Plans of Action. The elaborate AU CT architecture which includes the 1999 Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, its 2004 Protocol, the 2002 AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and the AU '**African Model Anti-Terrorism law**' of 2011 have been very helpful in this regard.

Although collaborative efforts are delivering some effective preventative and counter-measure responses to the threats of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa, terrorist and violent extremist organizations continue to hold considerable initiative. This is manifest in their capacity to continue to launch attacks and cause debilitating harm and destruction to security personnel, innocent civilians and property.



Jihadist militancy appears to show its hand in most of the terrorism cases that are occurring on the continent. Currently, Africa hosts some of the world's most notorious militant jihadist groups. Despite the successes chalked by the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) in the Lake Chad Basin(LCB), Boko Haram, a Takfiri oriented militant jihadist group, in pursuit of an aim to have Nigeria ruled by their version of Sharia law, continues to cause devastating atrocities within the LCB.

The Group for the Support of Islam and Moslems (GSIM) or Jama'a Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), a fusion of four Jihadist groups comprising Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar-Dine, Al Murabitoun and the Macina Liberation Front (MLF) as well as other similar oriented groups also continue to dominate territory and communities in the Sahel region. These groups have also taken advantage of the long existing rivalries between local ethnic groups to foster a situation of violence and instability. This in spite of a multiplicity of deployments in the Sahel region.

The situation in Libya remains unstable. In spite the efforts to ensure political stability, Islamic State(IS) affiliated groups and local armed militia groups continue to dominate a number of community areas with South Libya turned into a terrorist stronghold. In Egypt, the IS in the Sanai although highly degraded continue to launch sporadic attacks within the small part of the Sanai region that they are still able to operate in. The October, 2018, terrorist attack in Tunis is also a reminder that Tunisia is also still vulnerable to terrorist attacks in spite of its massive achievements in the prevention of violent extremism and combating of terrorism.

In the East and Horn of Africa, Al Shabaab continues to dominate territory in Somalia, with Kenya and Uganda as areas of influence. Mozambique and Tanzania have also recorded emerging situations of Militant Jihadism.



Central Africa has in recent times experienced a rise in instances of violent extremism. The activities of armed rebel groups have increased in the East of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) with reports of serious atrocities in the North Kivu province. In spite of the deployment of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the preponderance of the activities of numerous rival armed groups in the Central African Republic has led to a breakdown of law and order and a situation that challenges the Government considerably.

It is in the foregoing context that one would ask the question – ‘What more should AU Member States do?’ The question does not only call for an examination of the instigators, drivers and catalysts of the scourge, but a clear appreciation of the attributes of what constitutes legally permissible response and the appropriate lines of operation that when deployed in synergy, could culminate into denying the terrorist groups the will, cohesion, capacity and space to continue to operate.

While the incidence and proliferation of violent extremism and terrorism in Africa cannot be attributed to any single factor, reference is copiously made by scholars and practitioners on the subject matter, to observed grievances, causal factors or root causes that tend to be exploited by terrorist groups to justify the need to distrust government and for change through violent extremism and terrorism. While some scholars categorize these factors as Pull and Push factors, they are herein categorized into internal and external causal factors.

On internal causal factors, poor communication and mistrust between government and local communities, lack of government presence in local communities, inability of government to provide for the basic needs of local communities, unemployment, lack of accountability by political



office holders, corruption, injustice, impunity, discrimination, exclusive politics and other context specific good governance deficits are often cited as creating conditions of disillusionment, hopelessness and frustration in local communities that facilitate radicalization and a resort to acts of violent extremism and terrorism.

The exploitation of historical tribal rivalries and conflicts is also considered as a major contributory factor. It could also be said that perception, and the lack of economic and financial capacities by MS to deliver on the expectations of the citizenry are also internal causal factors to the state of disillusionment, hopelessness and frustration in a number of instances. The incidence of militant religious extremism, the presence and activities of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs), Africa's disadvantaged standing in the current global economic system, and the trafficking of weapons and drugs on the other hand are considered as key external causal factors. An evaluation of the negative yet powerful synergy that the complex mix of these internal and external causal factors bestows would appear to be the baseline from which to address the question of what more AU Member States should do.

At the base of any response generation is the issue of respect for human rights. Respect for the fundamental human rights of individual persons and communities has become a primary determinant of justice, the rule of law and good governance in the international system of today, and this applies to any CT or PCVE endeavour. The provisions of International Human Rights Law, International Humanitarian law, the fourth pillar of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the UN Secretary General's Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism, read together, capture this succinctly as a primary requirement in the effort to prevent violent extremism or combat terrorism.



The May 2015 African Union **‘Principles and Guidelines on Human and Peoples’ Rights while Countering Terrorism in Africa’** also reinforces the centrality of respect for human rights in the fight against terrorism in specific African context. The **‘African Charter on the values and principles of Decentralization, Local Governance and Local Development’** also prescribes a system of good governance that seeks to sustain trust between AU Member State governments and their citizenry. It provides for a whole-of-society human security response approach to governance, National Security and development that sits in sync with the UN Secretary General’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism. A strict adherence to these principles and guidelines and the ratification and implementation of **‘The African Charter on the values and principles of Decentralization, Local Governance and Local Development’** appear to provide the compass bearing for response generation particularly for the internal causal factors. Unfortunately, despite being adopted in 2014, just 13 out of the 55 MS of the AU have signed the Charter and only 3 have thus far ratified it. Suffice it to say that in addition to the AU CT architecture, the ratification and implementation of the charter and adherence to the 2015 Principles and Guidelines, could help build the required trust between governments and the governed and address the internal good governance deficit causal factors that currently create rather conducive conditions for the spread and entrenchment of violent extremism and terrorism in many parts of the continent.

A number of the terrorist organizations in Africa such as Boko Haram and the groups operating in the Sahel could now be conveniently reclassified as insurgent organizations to the extent that they hold and control parts of national territory by use of force of arms, seek to change the ways of life of the communities over which they exercise control and do not intend to negotiate a cessation of hostilities with the governments of those territories



that they hold but aim to overthrow them. Some other groups such as Al Shabaab, tend to profess an extremist religious world view with a strategic terrorism objective. In both of these cases, an examination of the Ways, Means and Ends employed and pursued by these groups reveals that external factors play a major part in sustaining their activities.

An induction that stands out of this examination is that, there appears to be an externally driven grand strategy to suppress Islamic Sufism and aggressively diffuse and propagate a Salafist ideology in Africa through militancy. The activities of most terrorist groups in Africa indicate consonance with this grand strategy. While the Ends that the groups pursue identify with this grand strategy, terrorism could be seen as just one of the Ways they employ to implement the strategy. Education which is another of the Ways, has strategic value in shaping the beliefs of the youth. The drive to award scholarships to African youth to study in Gulf countries and become Islamic clerics with a Salafist orientation of rigid and exclusivist interpretation of Islam would appear to be fundamental to the attainment of the grand strategy. The role of these youthful and often charismatic extremist clerics on return to the continent has contributed in no mean measure to the state of radicalization and mobilization of Salafist following in Africa.

As to Means, while the terrorist groups depend on the spoils of their terrorist activities, they also rely on support and facilitation from well-funded foreign Islamist groups with same orientation, particularly from parts of the oil rich Arab world and other surrogate countries. The irony of this situation and the mischief that it presents derive from the consideration of Sufism as heretical and offensive. This Salafist ideology projects absolute intolerance of the Islam that the local African communities have practiced over centuries and which is tolerant of other faiths and cultures. This is a recipe for confrontation. Under Sufism, religious communities



in Africa whether Muslim or non-Muslim, have coexisted peacefully for generations in a long tradition of tolerance and inter-religious harmony. Under the current wave of Salafism, extremist clerics now profess a particularly conservative interpretation of Islamic scriptures. This Salafist orientation seeks to disregard many basic human rights particularly for women, outlaw aspects of modern education and insist on strict traditions of social relations with ‘unbelievers’ both Muslim and non-Muslim. It is in this context that the Salafist clerics challenge the authority of more moderate Islamic clerics and incite protests and clashes against them leading to the proliferation of confrontation and violence.

One could say that it is time to interrogate this development and for political leadership in Africa to review the growing and creeping influence of Militant Salafist and Takfiri ideologies in many local communities and their impact on the violent extremism and terrorism that Africa currently faces. It opined that if left unchecked, this development could completely obliterate many African cultures and ways of life over time not to mention the lives that would be lost and the property that would be destroyed in the implied confrontation. Response to these two cited situations of militant religious insurgency and strategic terrorism would require the deployment of the full range of measures; Diplomatic, Political, Economic, Education, Military, Intelligence, Law Enforcement, Civil Society and International cooperation, in a conscious time-bound synergy of lines of operation that culminate into the defeat of the insurgency or the strategic terrorist objective. In this also it is humbly submitted that African Union Member States could do more to address the external causal factors.

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YOUTH AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM ONLINE: COUNTERING TERRORISTS EXPLOITATION AND USE OF THE INTERNET

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ABSTRACT

The fight against violent extremism and terrorism has taken a technological turn. In the age of instant gratification, terrorists use the internet as a propaganda tool to recruit, disseminate, mobilize and train people to perpetrate crimes. Although many extremist groups are ideologically and strategically anti-social media, some maintain a strong presence on this platform either directly or through supporters. Youth and Violent Extremism Online examine how terrorists use the Internet to disseminate propaganda and radicalize new recruits. In this anthology encompassing various topics, the author sport a mix of academia and practical experience, all seeking to examine, understand, and offer solutions for society to cope with an ever-changing phenomenon. Acts of terrorism worldwide have challenged our ability to understand the radicalization phenomenon and, most importantly, to generate the knowledge needed to make sense of such acts and to prevent them. Research has become a valid tool for understanding radicalization, constructing collective intelligence, and taking practical steps so as to enable sharing of expertise on this topic. One such area of knowledge-building is the investigation of the role of internet, and social media in particular, in violent radicalization processes and terrorism. This study adopted a robust approach of systematic



literature search using the Preferred Reporting Item for Systematic and Meta-Analysis (PRISMA) principles for literatures review studies. The paper therefore presents some unique findings on how violent extremism purposely targeting youth online can be curtailed. The results show that terrorists have used the internet particularly social media sites such as Facebook, twitter, video games and dedicated websites to radicalize, recruit and train young people.

Keywords: Youth, Violent Extremism Online, Social Media, Terrorism, Radicalization, Internet



Introduction

The fight against violent extremism and terrorism has taken a technological turn. In the age of instant gratification, terrorists use the internet as a propaganda tool to recruit, disseminate, mobilize and train people to perpetrate crimes (Philip & Janbek, 2011). Although many extremist groups are ideologically and strategically anti-social media, some maintain a strong presence on this platform either directly or through supporters. Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (IS) have used Electronic media to promote radical agendas, spread anti-Western propaganda, raise funds, attract new members, conduct psychological operations, mobilize jihadis, instigate anti-Western sentiment, wage cyber war, and train fighters (Alava et al, 2017). Recent violent extremist groups have become more strategic online, demonstrate greater social media sophistication, and operate in cyberspace on a larger scale and intensity than previous terrorist groups.

The United Nations (UN) reported that the number of Internet users in the world reached two billion at the beginning of 2011 representing a fifty percent increase over the period of the previous five years (Alava et al, 2017). One in three people on the planet use the Internet. Cisco estimates indicate that total global Internet traffic increased eightfold over the period 2007-2012, and will increase another 29 percent over the period 2012-2016. Estimates indicate that the total number of Internet users worldwide will reach 2.8 billion by 2015 (Cross, 2013). Social media and social networking has also grown exponentially. The number of Facebook users exceeded 800 million by 2012. Social networking and blogging communities include Vkontakte, Facebook, Odnoklassniki, Linkedin, My Space, Google, Twitter, Ushahidi, and more. Mikhail Yakushev observes that, "...Only a couple of years ago the number of users of Internet blogs or social networks was just a fraction of what it is now (Yakushev, 2010).



Globally, 90 percent of Internet users are under the age of thirty-five [35] (Cross, 2013). The plethora of extremist video sites available at YouTube, Google Video, and other venues featuring highly creative and illustrative images are widely accessed, particularly among the youth (Demidov, 2011). The policy community is sorely in need of innovative and creative approaches crafted with sufficient appreciation of the dimensions of such a threat in an increasingly globalized world where information can be exchanged instantaneously and freely from any point on the earth (Philip & Janbek, 2011). Nations have not been able to keep pace with preparing and responding to the security challenges accompanying the enormous growth of the Internet and social media networks (Fidler, 2015). The threat of cyber war, cyber-crime, and cyber terror has become very real and potentially devastating security challenges for nations of the twenty first century international community (Philip & Janbek, 2011).

The threat of cyber war, cyber-crime, and cyber terror have become very real and potentially devastating security challenges for nations of the twenty first century and the international community. One of the most serious threats we face is violent extremists' harnessing of the Internet and social media to advance their agendas (Philip & Janbek, 2011). The world community must not only confront terrorists and violent extremists in our public venues, as well as in the physical war zones, but equally or potentially even more important are the presence of those perpetrating ideologies of violence in the social networking sites to advance their narratives and interests. Moreover, all trends would only point toward the Internet and social media venues continuing to grow in the future, and we must anticipate that extremists purporting violence will continue to attempt to make full use of these mediums of communication.

According to Fidler (2015), policymakers have long feared terrorists will exploit the Internet for propaganda, recruiting, fundraising, and cyber-



attacks. Although terrorists have not yet shown much interest or skill in cyber-attacks, their use of the Internet to communicate led to expanded government surveillance, sanctions against incitement of terrorism, and efforts against extremist radicalization and violence. Countries also began to remove content and block accounts associated with terrorism. For example, in 2010, the United Kingdom opened a Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit that, in cooperation with companies, addresses Internet activities that violate legal prohibitions against glorifying or inciting acts of terrorism.

The rise of the Islamic State has intensified the challenge. The Islamic State is more strategic online, demonstrates greater social media sophistication, and operates in cyberspace on a larger scale and intensity than previous terrorist groups (Fidler, 2015). Its online propaganda is linked with radicalized individuals traveling to fight in Syria and Iraq or committing “lone-wolf” terrorism in the West (Ryan, 2010).

Islamic State territorial gains, the influx of foreign fighters, the volume of its online propaganda, and extremist attacks in Paris converged to catalyze more policy action in 2015 (Ryan, 2010). The U.S. government convened a summit on countering violent extremism, which discussed extremist use of social media. The European Union established an Internet Referral Unit to address terrorist content on the Internet. The French National Assembly adopted legislation that expanded the government’s surveillance authorities to counter terrorist threats. All these measures by the international communities and authorities are geared towards countering the terrorists’ exploitation and use of the internet for the purposes of violent extremism targeting the youth. Against this background, it is important to provide evidence of the exploitation of the internet by extremist groups, so as to proffered technical and lasting solutions that have the propensity to prevent and counter violent extremism and terrorism online.



Methodology and Systematic Search Strategy

This study was conducted using the literature review approach. The main objective of the study was to examine the violent extremism use of the internet to radicalize and recruit the youths and how counter measures could be put in place to prevent terrorists' exploitation and use of the internet. The research question that is being pursued in this study is therefore: Is Violent extremist groups exploiting and using the internet for the radicalization, training and recruitment of young people? This question was therefore answered using a systematic search and review of studies that have explored the subject under discussion. The study conducted electronic searches to ascertain all pertinent literatures irrespective of publications and language status thus published or not published. Prominent databases were searched using detailed search approaches. Keywords used for the search include youth, terrorism, violent extremism online, boko haram, jihadist groups, ISIS, Al-Qaeda as well as cybercrime.

In order to meet the objectives of this review, the author adapted the highly robust review methodology developed by the Campbell collaboration (Boruch, 2004). The author fine-tuned the details of every step in line with the specific nature and objectives of the study. Campbell's method is also in the core of major systematic review methodologies employed by leading organizations such as Cochrane, and Preferred Reporting Item for Systematic and Meta-Analysis (PRISMA). The data extraction was conducted using the PRISMA principle for systematic review as proposed by Moher et al (2009). . The PRISMA process involves the definition of the scope of the systematic review, identification of potential studies through literature searches using keywords, screening of abstracts and papers to meet inclusion criteria, characterization of articles for mapping by keywords and the Meta-Analysis. These steps are inter-related key steps conducted in a continuous iterative process (Bernard et al., 2014).



Social Media and Radicalization of Youth

The Internet is not in and of itself a lever for radicalization, violence or otherwise, but the current uses of the social media and the issues of regulation of information online merit research as to whether they are effectively used as a contributor to the radicalization of ideas and of development of violent extremist mindsets, and possible actions, especially among young men and young women (Conway 2007).

Since 2012, partly due to the 2011 Arab Spring and the convening power of social media, some research has pointed to the similarity of social media and terror groups in their function as networks in that they are both decentralized, ubiquitous, and mobile (Conway 2007; Schils & Laffineur, 2013). With Internet and the social media, the public shifts from passive to active agents who “gather information on their own, rather than wait for news organizations to filter and then deliver it” (Seib, 2008, p. 78). The socialization extends to the production and sharing of information within such online networks. The features of the Internet have led to a transformation of extremist groups’ tactics. These groups have adapted to the dematerialized potential of the web.

Chat rooms

Chat rooms can be embedded within most Internet-based media. Reports that have looked into the use of chat rooms by violent extremist groups, describe these as the space where at risk youth without previous exposure would be likely to come across radicalizing religious narratives (Quilliam, 2014; Shah, 2012). This goes in line with Sageman’s (2008) emphasis on the role of chatrooms and forums, based on his distinction between websites as passive sources of news and chat rooms as active sources of interaction. According to Sageman, networking is facilitated by discussion forums because they develop communication among followers

of the same ideas (experiences, ideas, values), reinforce interpersonal relationships and provide information about actions (tactics, objectives, tutorials). Chatrooms can also include spaces where extremist people share information such as photos, videos, guides, and manuals (Sageman, 2008). That being said, the role of such for a in actual planning and coordination of attacks is not evident within the literature surveyed by this study.

Facebook

Although many extremist groups are ideologically and strategically anti-Facebook, some maintain a strong presence on this platform either directly or through supporters (Quilliam, 2014). Facebook however, does not seem to be used for direct recruitment or planning, possibly because it has mechanisms of tracking and can link users with real places and specific times. Instead, Facebook at least in the past appears to have been more often used by extremists as a decentralized center for the distribution of information and videos or a way to find like-minded supporters and show support rather than direct recruitment (Quilliam, 2014; Shah, 2012). This may be on the possibility that young sympathizers can share information and images and create Facebook groups in a decentralized way.

Twitter

Micro-blogging sites like Twitter present more advantages for extremist groups because traceability of the identity and the source of the tweets are harder to achieve, thus increasing the communication potential for recruiters (Crettiez, 2011; Quilliam, 2014; Menkhaus, 2014). Analyses of Twitter feeds generated by Islamist violent extremist groups show that they are mostly used for engaging with the opposition and the authorities, in what appear to be tweet clashes that mobilize the two sides, and also used for provocation (Quilliam, 2014). In addition, through Twitter, extremists can easily comment publicly on international events or personalities, in



several languages, thus enabling the activists to be vocal and timely when mounting campaigns (Quilliam, 2014).

YouTube

YouTube remains the video-sharing platform of choice despite the increased competition from other platforms, such as Dailymotion, Vimeo, and the like. It has the advantage of being difficult to trace the identity of people posting content, while offering the possibility for users to generate comments and share contents (Quilliam, 2014). The three major reasons for generating video messages by Islamist violent extremists are praising martyrs, promoting suicide bombing and delivering propaganda in favor of extremist ideology (Conway & McInerney 2008; Quilliam, 2014). The Quilliam Report (2014) publishes a comprehensive analysis of the content of Islamist violent extremist videos published on YouTube. It describes how the content targets a sympathetic audience, and focuses on education and the praising of martyrs, with less overt violent content such as suicide bombings. This might be an implicit strategy to subvert the extremist labeling that might lead to government blocking or censoring, or lead YouTube to act proactively and remove content that is in breach of its user guidelines (Vergani, 2014).

Video Games

Videogames can be placed in a similar category as social media because they increasingly have their own forums, chatrooms and microblogging tools. Videogames, widely used by young people, are under-researched in relation to extremism and violent radicalization. There is mostly anecdotal evidence that ISIS supporters have proposed modified versions of some games to spread propaganda (Grand Theft Auto 5) formats that allow players act as terrorists attacking Westerners (ARMA III) and provide for hijacking of images and titles such as Call of Duty to allude to a notion



of jihad. Selepack (2010) used qualitative textual analysis of hate-based videogames found on rightwing religious supremacist groups' websites to explore the extent to which they advocate violence. The results show that most hate groups were portrayed positively, and that videogames promoted extreme violence towards people represented as Black or Jewish people. The games were often modified versions of classic videogames in which the original enemies were replaced with religious, racial and/or ethnic minorities. Their main purpose is to indoctrinate players with white supremacist ideology and allow those who already hold racist ideologies to practice aggressive scripts toward minorities online, which may later be acted upon offline (Selepak, 2010). It should be noted that some experimental social psychologists show that cumulative violent videogames can increase hostile expectations and aggressive behavior (Hasan, Bègue, Scharkow & Bushman, 2013).

Social media and virtual identity

Research on violent radicalization in Europe, North and Latin America and the Caribbean highlights the importance of collective identities for group mobilization (Hunt & Benford, 2004; Melucci, 1995; Taylor & Whittier, 1992). This makes social media an attractive target for the dissemination of extremist narratives and actions. More precisely, extremist groups target collective identities, through relational and emotional bonds, in order to achieve endorsement of their values. Researchers have referred to processes such as "identity fusion" (Swann & Buhrmester, 2015), whereby an individual personal identity is gradually overshadowed by radicalized group identity. This leads to a total endorsement of the narrative proposed by the extremist group. The process is even faster with those young people who are "lone actors" who are already struggling with needs for belonging (Gill et al., 2014; Malthaner & Lindekilde, 2015) and who may construct a fantasy of belonging to terrorist groups.



Uses of Internet and Social Media by Extremist Groups for “Religious” Radicalization

In recent times, more understanding has arisen about the numerous advantages of the Internet and social media for extremist groups using religion as part of a radicalization strategy. Most current evidence comes from reports on radicalized violent groups, focusing mostly on ISIS’s Internet strategy. The advantages stem from the very nature of Internet and social media channels and the way they are used by extremist groups. These include communication channels that are not bound to national jurisdictions and that are informal, large group, cheap, decentralized and anonymous (Hale, 2012; Neumann 2013). This allows terrorists to network across borders and to bypass time and space (Weimann, 2015). Specifically, these channels provide networks of recruiters, working horizontally, in all the countries they target due to the trans-border nature of the Internet. Infused with particular interpretations of Islam, these channels are used in several ways to:

- Create appealing, interactive user-friendly platforms to attract younger audiences (Weimann, 2015);
- Offer spaces where groups can maintain secret but highly democratic communication modes on the assumption that everyone can participate (Weimann, 2010); 20 Youth and Violent Extremism on Social Media – Mapping the Research
- Disseminate extremist, violent and criminal content, which would not be well received offline;
- Identify potential participants and provide them with information about ‘the cause’ and the groups involved in defending it
- Deliver massive publicity for acts of violence and enhancing a perception of strength



- Provide several opportunities for participation in online and offline activities
- Produce false information using the fact that all types of information on the Internet can be displayed on an equal footing, which can provide an illusion of credibility and legitimacy to extremist narratives
- Facilitate the further process of radicalization post-recruitment, though tactical learning, exploiting confirmation biases (which confirm and amplify people's previous opinions), gathering data and planning attacks
- Establish a 24-hour intimate communication that aims at developing relations of complicity and friendship, via networks like Twitter, Facebook, Snapchat that are heavily used by terrorist recruiters;
- Foster one-on-one dialogue with young people, so as to isolate the young person at-risk and gradually induct him or her into a new "brotherhood" with violent extremist ideas creating strong interpersonal bonds
- Severe offline social ties and replace with online or new offline ties from the extremist group to shape conceptions and inhibit disengagement

Online Violent Extremism in Africa

There is little contemporary research on online radicalization in Sub-Saharan Africa. Yet Africa carries at its heart a powerful extremist group: "Boko Haram" whose real name is Jama'atu Ahlu-Sunna wal Jihad Adda'wa Li (Group of the People of Sunnah for Preaching and Jihad) since 2002 and has recently pledged allegiance to the Daesh. The network is less resourceful and financed compared to Daesh, but it seems to have entered in a new era of communication by the use of social media networks, more



so since its allegiance to Daesh (Ould el-Amir, 2015). To spread their principles this terrorist group uses the Internet and adapts Daesh communication strategies to the sub-Saharan African context to spread its propaganda (also in French and English) with more sophisticated videos.

By its presence on the most used digital networks (Twitter, Instagram), Boko Haram breaks with traditional forms of communication in the region such as propaganda videos sent to agencies on flash drives or CD-ROM (Olivier, 2015). Video content analyses has also shown a major shift from long monologues from the leader Abubakar Shekau, that had poor editing and translation, to messages and videos that have increased its attractiveness among sub-Saharan youth. Today, Boko-Haram owns a real communications agency called al-Urwa Wuqta (literally the most trustworthy, the most reliable way)(Alava et al, 2017)

Moreover, the group multiplies its activities on Twitter especially via their smartphones, as well as through YouTube news channels. Most tweets and comments of the group's supporters denounce the Nigerian government and call for support for Boko Haram movement. The tweets are written in Arabic at first and then translated and passed on in English and French, which reflect the group's desire to place itself in the context of what it sees as global jihad. In a recent study conducted in 2015, researchers have shown how Boko Haram related tweets include rejection of the movement by non-members of the organisation (Varin, 2015).

Processes of Internet and Social Media Usage

While versions of religion provide a particular narrative, there are more general patterns of violent radicalization that are identified in the literature. Weinmann describes extremist groups' use of Internet and social media in eight process strategies: "psychological warfare, publicity and propaganda, data mining, fund raising, recruitment and mobilization, networking,



information sharing and planning and coordination” (Weimann, 2010). Conway identifies five-core terrorist uses of the Internet and social media: “information provision, financing, networking, recruitment and information gathering”. The ones most relevant to social media and radicalization of young people are information provision, such as profiles of leaders, manifestos, publicity and propaganda, and recruitment (Conway, 2006). Some studies show that social media enable people to isolate themselves in an ideological niche by seeking and consuming only information consistent with their views (i.e. confirmation bias) (Warner, 2010), as well as simultaneously self-identifying with geographically distant international groups which, therefore, creates a sense of community beyond borders. This ability to communicate can promote membership and identity quests faster and in more efficient ways than in the “real” social world.

While recruitment is a process, and not instantaneous, it is seen in the literature as a phase of radicalization, taking the process to a new level of identification and possible action. Thus, indoctrination is easier post-recruitment and often occurs in specific virtual spaces where the extremist rhetoric is characterized by a clear distinction between “them” (described negatively) and “us” (described positively), and where violent actions are legitimized according to the principle of “no other option available” (Vergani, 2014). These advantages of Internet and social media open up prospects for extremist groups, by facilitating what used to be referred previously as block recruitment and by substituting group decision to individual decision-making

Countering Violent Extremism Online

Despite long-standing policy concerns about terrorist use of the Internet, democracies were caught flat-footed when the Islamic State went “viral.” Reactions to the extremist attack in Texas in May 2015, including Senate hearings on social media and terrorist recruitment, show how policymakers



and companies are under increasing pressure to do something about the Islamic State's online activities. Internationally, the United States made it a priority to craft an online counterterrorism strategy anchored in liberal principles that delivers legitimate and effective actions from the public-private collaboration needed to respond to this threat.

In the wake of extremist use of the internet, governments across the globe should clearly identify the strategic objectives of countermeasures against online violent extremism. The objectives should reflect government, company, and Internet-users interests and values. Strategic thinking should not be binary in reflecting separate public and private realms, because extremists exploit the online space created by limitations on government power and the private sector's reluctance to police cyberspace. Online counterterrorism should be based on public-private collaboration regarding strategic ends and means.

In terms of ends, given the importance of free speech, clarity is needed most for content-based countermeasures sought and implemented. Through policy directive, the countries should articulate when it would request that a company or individuals implement content-based countermeasures in the online fight against extremism and terrorism. Countries should ask internet service providers as well as domain name providers to remove extremist content, including requesting that social media sites take down the video disseminating anti-western propaganda. Dissemination of videos recording such atrocities perpetuates violations of the victims' dignity and international humanitarian law. Governments should be able to ask companies to take down such videos on these grounds, which, in this example, would align with company policies against violent content.

There should be concerted efforts to mount pressure social media companies that control online content to review and explain more thoroughly their policies for content-based measures against terrorism and extremism.



As pressure has mounted on companies, policies and practices appear to have shifted often without sufficient clarity about the changes. Clear and comprehensive articulation of company policies can help ensure they are anchored in liberal principles and are not the result of bending to the winds of political anger and frustration.

Social media self-regulatory measures

Very little research evaluates the impact of self-regulation measures by social networks against violent extremists (Council of Europe, 2012; Gagliardone et al., 2015). In fact, the need for this research is on the rise due to governments' pressure, as they require social networks and Internet providers to act on information related to alleged terrorists. All major social media platforms have their own statements of rights and responsibilities or Terms of Service whereby they explicitly position themselves in relation to "hate speech" (which is variously defined) and gratuitous violence, discriminatory and unlawful content. They often reserve the right to take down or refuse to distribute such content, while pledging to not disclose user information so as to respect their privacy (except in cases of harm done to others or legitimate requests by the authorities). Over time, several social media providers have created a group of reviewers who examine each complaint sent to them. An analysis of their yearly transparency reports shows the increase in requests from governments rather than from individual users (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2013). There have been recent developments within the industry (bilaterally and through organizations like the Global Network Initiative) to share best practices. One of these enables sharing of digital "fingerprints" dubbed (hashes) which identify "violent terrorist imagery or terrorist recruitment videos or images" so that offending content removed from one company's services can be easily blocked from reappearing elsewhere – at least within the four co-operating entities of Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and YouTube.



Challenges to Effective Countermeasures

Principled, effective online countermeasures are difficult to design, implement, and evaluate. First, the Islamic State's propaganda can be viewed merely as a symptom of a bigger problem. Radicalization usually involves more than consuming extremist tweets. A 2013 RAND study concluded that the Internet's relative significance in radicalization compared to offline factors "remains to be established." Further, the Islamic State's perceived battlefield successes—not its social media prowess—give its online activities more radicalization potential. Put differently, the Islamic State is more a "boots on the ground" than a "bytes on the net" problem. Thus, countering its online propaganda might have limited strategic value.

Second, countermeasures face challenges from liberal principles that are different from the impact of robust government surveillance on the right to privacy. The Islamic State's online efforts play out largely on social media, which does not require covert surveillance to monitor but does create incentives to target the content of communications with implications for free speech. Strict First Amendment requirements explain why Obama administration strategies for countering violent extremism do not include content-based restrictions for online activities. Similarly, the importance of free speech places demands on private-sector enterprises that implement content-based measures.

Third, content-based countermeasures create transparency issues. Removing online communications in democratic countries because of terrorist content happens mainly through corporate, not government, actions. Companies censor, block, or terminate accounts for communications related to terrorism that violate their policies. On one day in April 2015, for example, Twitter suspended ten thousand accounts associated with Islamic State extremism. However, without better transparency, the legitimacy



of these activities is open to criticism, especially when companies act on requests from governments or in response to criticism from public officials and politicians. Governments should not outsource censorship to the private sector in order to avoid legal principles protecting free speech.

Fourth, demonstrating that countermeasures are effective against online terrorist activities is difficult. Counter-narrative measures seek to prevent radicalization by making individuals resilient against extremism, but, as the Executive Director of the nongovernmental Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund, Dr Khalid Koser observed, “It is always going to be hard to demonstrate the success of preventive work.” U.S. government online counter-propaganda efforts aimed at blunting the Islamic State’s appeal have been criticized as ill-conceived and counterproductive.

In terms of content-based measures, the UK’s online actions against terrorist content started in 2010 and, by March 2015, the UK had removed seventy-five thousand pieces of content from the Internet. Yet, the UK is a leading source of radicalized individuals traveling to fight extremist jihad with the Islamic State. Experts analyzing the Islamic State’s use of Twitter identified possible benefits from Twitter’s suspension of accounts associated with the group, but they hesitated to make strong policy prescriptions on such preliminary findings. Further, social media “body counts”—the number of Twitter or Facebook accounts suspended—have the same questionable value to policymakers as the number of Islamic State forces and weapons destroyed by military activities. These issues of effectiveness caution against believing counter-narrative and content-based measures can deliver significant strategic results against the terrorists.



Conclusion

Nations must recognize the magnitude of the task in attempting to manage the Internet and social media platforms for preventing the promotion of violent extremist ideology. The sheer volume of communication passing through the Internet and social media arenas would render attempts to monitor or impose restrictions on communication through these channels overwhelming. National or international government efforts to censor or filter sites or chat rooms have not been effective. Officials in Saudi Arabia have been among the most direct in complaining that while they may be successful at shutting down a website promulgating a violent message in their country; it will not be effective if the same user can find a willing Internet Service Provider (ISP) host in another country. It has been frequently the case that Western ISP's can end up hosting these same sites without realizing it only because of the language barriers.

It is equally daunting task to consider the challenge of building standards acceptable to all nations of the international community for regulating the Internet and social media of the twenty first century. Even for two countries sharing the most common values, the United States and the United Kingdom, there are differences in the level of public and societal tolerance for freedom of speech and unhindered communication. Building commonly accepted standards and norms for managing these new mediums among the diverse global community has proved quite difficult in the United Nations, and may never be fully realized.

The findings of study have demonstrated that violent extremist groups have exploited the vulnerabilities and openness of the internet medium for the radicalization, recruitment and training of the youth. Findings also suggest that chat-rooms, social networking sites such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, as well as online game videos have been used as a medium

of youth radicalizations. Terrorist organizations that have strategically explored the internet for their activities include Boko Haram, Islamic States (ISIS), Al-Qaeda and many other identified extremist groups. Although, the international community and governments across the globe have made efforts towards countering the violent extremist group exploitations of the internet, the terrorist groups continue to find ways of disseminating the content of their information through the internet. It is therefore important for governments to realize that the process of online radicalization of youth is a global and multi-faceted phenomenon in which social media are used as a strategic tool to try to incite violent behavior. The role of such social media should not be isolated but seen in the context of both other communicational platforms and significant social factors such as the political, social, cultural, economic and psychological causes.

Key Recommendations

- There are insufficient studies that effectively address the role of communications in reinforcing or countering incitement for radicalization towards violent extremism. There is therefore urgent need for more studies to properly understand violent extremist use of the internet medium for youth radicalization
- Attempts to combat Internet dimensions of the violent radicalization of youths do not have proven efficacy, but it is clear that they can damage online freedoms, especially freedom of expression, freedom of information, privacy and the right of association. International standards of legality, necessity, proportionality and legitimate purpose are essential in considering any limitations of media including social media.
- There is a need to further explore and research how both online and off-line platforms can be harnessed to mobilize young people



to develop narratives of peace, promote inclusion, equality and intercultural dialogue.

- There is a need to highlight the importance of reliable information, such as professional and independent journalism, as a factor in countering violent extremism and terrorism

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YOUTHS EXTENUATION OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN NORTHERN CAMEROON AND NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

This paper argues that contrary to extant literature which chastises young people for promoting violent extremism, they have been at the forefront of the fight against this extremism unleashed by the Boko Haram insurgents in the North East Region of Nigeria and the Far North Region of Cameroon. When Boko Haram declared war on the Nigerian government and Cameroon and campaigned for the enlistment of young people into their ranks to confront the state, other youths mobilised and pursued the insurgents in the towns and villages of Borno State and the Far North Region of Cameroon. They fought hard to free those villages and towns which had come under the control of these insurgents. They fought energetically to end the violent, atrocious and destructive activities of this extremist group. They were supported by the governments of Nigeria and Cameroon. Their fight against violent extremism has had implications for policy formulation and/or reformulation to curb violent extremism in Cameroon and Nigeria like elsewhere in West and Central Africa. We have in this paper critically interrogated available literature and concluded that although the extremist Boko Haram group recruited many youths to wreak havoc in Nigeria and Cameroon, other youths were created to counter theirs violent and extremist activities. This was aimed at mitigating violent extremism in these two countries and beyond.

Keywords: Youth, Violent Extremism, Cameroon, Nigeria, Boko Haram



Introduction

The African continent has witnessed numerous and diverse conflicts since the independence of different countries. Among the early conflicts that destabilised some countries in the early years of independence from colonial dependency were recurrent violent coups d'état or military take-overs. This was the case for instance, in Nigeria, Togo, Benin, Uganda, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic and Ghana (McGowan and Johnson 1984; Barka and Ncube 2012; Martin 1972; Ayissi 1999). Subsequently, the debilitating effects of the economic crisis of the mid-1980s also created socio-political skirmishes across the continent (Jua 1991). The re-introduction of multiparty politics in the 1900s following the 'wind of change' from Eastern Europe unleashed a venomous spate of conflicts which took on serious ethnic, regional and socio-economic and political dimensions in some of these African countries. Recent crises that have truncated social harmony among citizens of some African countries include natural resource exploitation as is in Sudan, Nigeria and the Central African Republic (Humphreys 2005; Natural Resources and Conflict in Africa 2006; Orogun 2010; Central African Republic Crisis 2014), farmer-herder conflicts like in Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Nigeria and other Sahelian countries of Africa (Sone 2012; Bassett 1988; Uhembe 2015; Moritz 2006), socio-religious conflicts (Fatima 2014; Uhunmwuango and Epelle 2011), and the effects of climate change (Theisen 2012; Raleigh and Kniveton 2012), leadership crisis like in the Central African Republic and South Sudan (Ngaraet *al* 2014) and separatists tendencies like in the Central African Republic, Senegal, Angola, Nigeria and Cameroon (Kah 2014). Such conflicts have seriously affected co-existence among the heterogeneous groups in African countries. These also explain why there have been continuous tensions between groups, regions and political parties in the affected countries.



Among the several other crises plaguing the African continent today is the Boko Haram insurgency that has engulfed North East Nigeria, Northern Cameroon, the Lake Chad Basin and southern Niger. The violent nature of the crisis led to the establishment of a Multinational Joint Task Force (MJTF) comprising of troops from Cameroon, Nigeria, Chad, Niger and Benin. This joint task force had the mandate to bring the insurgency to an end. In spite of the international effort to provide a military solution to the violent extremism of the Boko Haram sect, this extremism is far from abating. Rather, the insurgents have had to change tactics now and then and today are using innocent children as suicide bombers to wreak havoc in several communities in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger. The aggressive appeal of the leadership of this group led to the radicalisation of idle, disenchanted, uneducated and poor youths (Youth Radicalisation 2014). Many of them were recruited in Nigeria and Cameroon and were given remuneration in a region where unemployment is high and infrastructure begs for attention. The very humble beginnings and foundation of the strength and extremist activities of Boko Haram was the mass mobilisation of young people by Mohammed Yusuf, an Islamic scholar, in North East Nigeria (Barna 2014: 14) to purify Islam, chastise their gluttonous northern and national elite, traditional rulers, governors and call attention to the development of a more or less abandoned North East Region of Nigeria (Okonta 2012).

The mass appeal and success in the enlistment of young people into membership and violent extremism of Boko Haram has received overwhelming scholarly attention (Onuoha 2014; Nwafor and Nwogu 2015) and public approval through television debates. This seems to give the impression that all young people in northern Nigeria and Cameroon have embraced violent extremism as a way of life and therefore very irresponsible. This is however not a vivid description of what is on the ground. In a conscious and determined effort to stem the tide of the atrocious activities



of insurgents on people, their infrastructure and communities, many young people took up the challenge from 1913 in Maiduguri in North East Nigeria to fight against the insurgents and end their negative activities. This was through the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) and other self-defense groups in the towns and villages of Borno State. Each job given to the youth in the CJTF was and remains one less potential recruit for Boko Haram and security for the neighbourhoods.⁽¹⁾ Following the spread of the violent activities of the insurgent group into Northern Cameroon in 2014 and the resulting destruction in human casualties, abandonment of farms, destruction of infrastructure, ransom taking and the increase in the number of internally displaced persons, young people came together through vigilantes to repulse the insurgents and bring back normal life to their communities. The Cameroon government also encouraged this community policing with material support which was a boost to the fight against the Boko Haram insurgents. Most of those fighting for the government in a special elite force *Bataillon Intervention Rapide* (BIR) are young people (Seignobos 2011: xv).

Although some youths have been mischievous and politicians have also always used some of them to create chaos for their personal glory (Luqman 2010; Mokake 2013), youth contribution to the war against crime is not very new in Cameroon and Nigeria in particular and Africa in general. In many communities in Africa, young people have played leading roles in the preservation of peace and the curbing of crime. The elders of south western Nigeria developed the capacity to mobilise youths and propose them some security guarantees. In the early days people did not use guns but sticks, canes, whistles and various anti-criminal charms (Fourchard 2008: 14-15). In Northern Uganda for instance, village councils created local security

1 Jacob Zenn, Northern Cameroon under Threat from Boko Haram and Séléka Militants, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=41804#V7INU1srLIU_, accessed on August 16 2016.



groups composed of young people who would impose curfews at night. Suspects were stopped at mounted road blocks and arrested persons were handed over to the police or paid fines before their liberation. The excesses of these youths often resulted in tension with the police called to maintain order (Allen 2015: 372-373). Whatever the case, youths have generally earned a position of legitimacy and respect in the communities they serve in sub-Saharan countries (Schwartz 2015: 15).

The significance of this study lies in the fact that in spite of the youth bulge in Africa and the violent extremism and migration through dangerous routes to seek for a better life in Europe and elsewhere that has resulted from it, many well-meaning young people have taken the destinies of their countries into their hands through supporting their governments in fighting against destabilising forces. They have stayed back home to help in the task of nation-building. Youths should therefore not always be seen to be engaged in negative things. Many of them in different ways have proven to be more patriotic than those who lead them. Others are generating jobs and employ thousands of graduates. The relevance of this study also lies in the fact that African governments must design meaningful educational curricula that are suitable to creating jobs or empowering young people to create jobs for themselves and others and not always to wait or look up to the state to do so. The arguments against the non-development of viable projects to engage young people have often left them vulnerable to any destabilising groups that seek to undermine the authority of African states especially in the 21st century.

Rationale for Youth Mobilisation

Several reasons explain the mass mobilisation of youths against violent extremism in Northern Cameroon and North East Nigeria. One of these was the attack on both Christian churches and Mosques by the insurgents leading to the death of many people. These frequent attacks



led to a marriage of convenience between Muslim and Christian youths to safe their centres of worship from attack and destruction. A Muslim youth leader in Mozogo in the Far North Region of Cameroon for example, by name Ibrahim Moctar said in 2016 that they were fighting to reciprocate for neighbouring churches since the insurgents started attacking Christians (Moki, 2016a) making the war to be more or less only a religious one. He was very conscious of the insecurity that the attack on Muslims and Christians unleashed in his village of Mozogo because it was trying to pit Christians against Muslims.

Many of the youths in North East Nigeria suffered casualties in the past which explained why they collaborated with government troops to restore peace in the region (Pate, 2015). They began by forming vigilante groups in June 2013 in Maiduguri. This was because they were weary of the incessant killings orchestrated by members of the Boko Haram group (Civilian Vigilante Groups Increase Dangers, 2013). An insurgency that began as a religious movement to purify Islam soon turned violent and consumed several lives. Many young people lost members of their families and this made them to see live to have no meaning. The continuous wreaking of havoc on these communities and the insecurity this caused was the motivating factor that led some of the youths to mobilise against Boko Haram and what it represented. The casualties in lives and destruction of property cannot be ascertained today. It will certainly take a long time for the full extent of the casualties to be determined not only in Nigeria but also Cameroon, the Lake Chad Basin area and southern Niger.

Other young people joined the war against violent extremism perpetuated by Boko Haram to protect their towns like Fotokol, Kolofata and homes from decimation by the insurgents. This was also in response to appeals from the Cameroon government for the local population to support the government in the fight against extremism (Moki, 2016b; Cameroon



Vigilantes Fight Boko Haram, 2015). In Kolofata for example, young men armed themselves with machetes and knives as they protected their town located very close to the Cameroon Nigeria border from the destructive activities of Boko Haram insurgents. Their enthusiasm was also due to the appeal from the Minister Delegate at the Presidency in charge of Defence at the time Edgar Alain Mebe Ngo'o. He had while on a visit to the violent hit Far North Region called on young people of the region to create more vigilante groups to cushion the effects of Boko Haram attacks in the region in general and Kolofata in particular. It is worth noting that on several occasions Boko Haram suicide bombers and armed men attacked Kolofata and at one time abducted the wife of Minister Amadou Ali who was only released later on.

On several occasions, different government officials encouraged people to form and join vigilante groups following continuous terrorist attacks.⁽¹⁾ In a speech in 2015, the governor of the Far North Region of Cameroon Midjiyawa Bakari was full of praise for the work of the youths in Kolofata and other localities in the Far North Region in these words:

I am congratulating the vigilante committee whose courage reduced the shock of the Boko Haram attack and I am inviting everyone to emulate their example. The government's message for everyone to contribute in crushing the terrorist group is being adhered to and Cameroon's President Paul Biya is happy (Moki, 2015).

The compelling need to protect Kolofata and other Boko Haram hit towns like Fotokol and Amchide and the massive response to government

1 "More Vigilante Groups to Fight Boko Haram in Cameroon." <http://www.dw.com/en/more-vigilante-groups-to-fight-boko-haram-in-cameroon/a-18714206>, accessed on August 16 2016.



appeal for local involvement in the war against Boko Haram were at the very foundation of the mobilisation of youths in Kolofata and other settlements in 2015. The government of Cameroon through the Governor Midjiyawa Bakari and Minister Delegate at the Presidency in charge of Defence was happy with such show of patriotism by young people who have in many instances been considered good for nothing by gullible politicians, many of whom are in control of power.

The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) in the North East region of Nigeria recruited child soldiers within its ranks with the objective of hunting down members of the Boko Haram militant group headed by Abubakar Shekau. The CJTF was also charged with the responsibility of identifying and turning in Boko Haram suspects to the military although some took the law into their hands by beating up or killing some of them. The formation of the CJTF was a response to a spate of Boko Haram attacks in Borno state (Civilian Vigilante Groups Increase Dangers, 2013; Gaffey, 2015). In Northern Cameroon, young people in Kolofata joined self defense groups to report all suspects and also watch out for strange faces that come into the town (More Vigilante Groups to Fight Boko Haram in Cameroon, 2016). The hunting down of insurgents by the CJTF helped the government forces to secure those communities that were under the grips of insurgents seeking to overthrow the government of Nigeria or create another state out of this colossus of Africa. The job of hunting down insurgents by child soldiers of the CJTF was a laudable initiative since they knew those from among them who fled to the bush and took up arms against the government. As young people, they were also certainly able to march speed with speed in the war against the enemies of the state.

Besides the arrest and presentation of Boko Haram suspected militants to the military, some youths in North East Nigeria and the Far North Region of Cameroon joined the fight against violent extremism following the brutal



killing of members of their families. Boubakari Alioum of Amchide, a border town of Cameroon near Nigeria for example, said that he joined the self-defense group of his town because he lost family members to the brutality of Boko Haram. The insurgents had descended on the town with impunity and killed several people forcing others to flee to safer areas. The case of Boubakari Alioum is one out of the many where young people who lost parents to the insensitive war pitting Boko Haram against the governments of Nigeria and Cameroon mobilised to flush out the insurgents in their towns, villages and neighbourhoods (Moki, 2015a). They were radicalised this time not to join Boko Haram but to fight against its attack on their villages and seizure of property like cattle. Added to this was the fact that in the recruitment of youths into self-defense groups in the towns and villages of the Far North Region of Cameroon, patriotism was a key condition. Mamoudou Adji, a community leader in Amchide, emphasised this criterion which guided them in the recruitment of youths to repel insurgents from making life unbearable for the people of Amchide (Moki, 2015a).

Frustration with the state's failure to ensure security and protection for the local population led to the mobilisation of community self defense groups in the North East region of Nigeria in 2013. These groups began to carefully identify and apprehend suspected Boko Haram members. The several groups that were formed across the North East of Nigeria from the nucleus of the CJTF in Maiduguri clearly indicated that there was a pre-occupying gap in the security sector in Nigeria which was filled by local youths, hunters and former armed actors (Dietrich, 2015: 17-18). The people were eager to fill the gap in the security sector by improving community self-protection in the face of continuous violent extremist activities of the Boko Haram insurgents. In this way, young people were able to track down Boko Haram militants and keep their communities safe from their barbaric activities.



Youth Action to Extenuate Violent Extremism

Following the violent destructive activities of the Boko Haram insurgents which led to the frequent loss of lives, seizure of cattle, burning of homes and loss of other property in Northern Cameroon and North East Nigeria, young people became engaged in certain activities to end this act of barbarism. In the northern states of Nigeria and especially in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State, youth vigilante groups in what has come to be known as the CJTF and the state Joint Task Force tracked down Boko Haram members and prevented suspected members from returning to the city. They had actually carried out a military onslaught on the city in May 2013. In their collaboration with the military forces they developed rules of engagement which guided their mode of operation. Youths in other towns and villages in the North East of Nigeria were also involved in intelligence and information gathering for the military and still others acted as spies while some were cooks for those who were in the firing line (Higazi, 2013; Hussain, 2014). In addition, the Northern Nigeria Youth Council publicly declared its support for the new Nigerian Chief of Army Staff General Kenneth Minimah in 2014 (Agbiboa and Maiangwa, 2014: 84; Pate, 2015: 45; West Africa Insight, 2014: 16; Adewumi, 2014: 8). The open support for the military by the Youth Council boosted the moral of Nigerian government forces in the fight against extremism in the sense that it could also rely on the Council for various forms of assistance. Besides, intelligence gathering was crucial in the planning and organising of attacks on Boko Haram targets in North East Nigeria. The youths should therefore be credited for their support of the fight against extremism through apprehending and engaging some of the insurgents and in crucial information gathering and intelligence which all contributed to the recapture of many of the areas that were once under Boko Haram control.



Members of the CJTF in Borno State of North East Nigeria also benefitted from the support of the state in the training offered to them. It provided financial and material support to the CJTF and also promised to train under the Borno Youth Empowerment Scheme (BOYES) over 5000 members of the CJTF so that they would assist the military in the provision of security. Other forms of professional training were also offered by government forces to assist those seeking for employment (Who Will Care for Us?, 2014: 29). The willingness of youths to receive training in security matters went a long way to stabilise Maiduguri, capital of Borno State and has also empowered these youths to be more efficient in the discharge of their duties.

In Cameroon, young people recruited into the military were and have remained at the battle front at the borders of Nigeria and Chad fighting against Boko Haram. Their bravery, sense of duty and sacrifice in terms of loss of lives and other forms of injuries yielded positive results and today the suicide bombings are not as frequent as they were in 2014 and 2015. Their commitment has remained a show of utmost love for their fatherland Cameroon (Time for Security, 2014: 2). Such bravery and willingness to enlist in the military during recruitment proves the fact that many young people in Cameroon cherish peace. Many are still prepared to give in their utmost to ensure that the territorial integrity of the country is guaranteed. Without these young people in the military, it would have been extremely difficult for the older persons to brave the rugged terrain to chase Boko Haram out of its hide-outs in the swamps of the Lake Chad and the Mandara Mountains. The government of Cameroon has in recruiting people into the special fighting unit known as the *Bataillon Intervention Rapide*, the BIR laid emphasis on young and agile individuals who can sacrifice for the country (Seignobos 2011: xv). The BIR has therefore contributed in no small way to ameliorating the security situation in the Far North Region of Cameroon.



The Cameroon government assisted young people as members of self-defense groups in the fight against the Boko Haram insurgents. It handed out motorbikes and bicycles to vigilante groups which were used to monitor the porous borders between Cameroon and Nigeria and track down the notorious suicide bombers. This was because the youths were mobile and the military could not be everywhere at the same time to stem the tide of Boko Haram destruction of homes, property and killing of people.⁽¹⁾ It was thanks to this assistance from the government that two out of three teenage boys were arrested at one time in Kolofata as they were planning to install explosive devices on the roads. In Kerewa in the Far North Region of Cameroon, boys armed with machetes, home-made rifles or bows and arrows received the blessing of the government of Cameroon. They accompanied the army on patrols and intelligence gathering missions, questioned travellers and denounced to the military anyone deemed suspect. Through their vigilance, they at one time intercepted two female suicide bombers and handed them over to the army before they succeeded to detonate the bombs they were carrying. The determination of young people to neutralise Boko Haram activities can be deduced from this young member of the civilian vigilante group in Kerewa Timada Bokar who said, “We are here to look out for suicide bombers. I am not scared. They are people, we are people. We must die to live” (Penney 2016). This was a courageous young man who had confidence in the struggle against Boko Haram. He had been emboldened by the atrocious activities of this insurgent group to believe that if dying was the prize to pay for saving Kerewa then it was worth it. It is this determination and show of commitment from young people that has brought about relative stability in many communities in the Far North Region of Cameroon like in Nigeria.

1 Cameroon Pins Hopes on Vigilantes to Defeat Boko Haram, <http://www.dw.com/en/cameroon-pins-hopes-on-vigilantes-to-defeat-boko-haram/a-19104031>, accessed on August 15 2016.



The work of the youths in defense of the fatherland did not go unnoticed by the Cameroon government. The government on several occasions publicly acknowledged and continue to support them. The soldiers gave the militia some training and the state has continued to hand over motorcycles and bicycles so that militia can continue to monitor border areas. Hundreds of young men also went to the battle field armed with machetes and knives and sang of their vow to protect their homes from Boko Haram insurgents. They patrolled the hilly, hard-to-reach border areas because they know the terrain to their finger tips and are capable of outmanoeuvring the insurgents.⁽¹⁾ They were and are still determined in their activities to stop extremists from infiltrating and planting landmines that will kill people once they step on them. Continuous education also made many locals to share information and people in border villages threatened by the extremism also massively joined self defense groups as a show of force (Moki, 2016b). This is a positive sign that young people are living up to the challenge of fighting against violent extremism and keeping their villages safe from destruction.

There were other ways through which vigilantes composed mainly of youths fought against Boko Haram extremist activities in the Far North Region of Cameroon. Many of them in the villages and towns confronted the extremist militants with their bare hands and others made use of their poisoned bows and arrows. In Fotokol, one of the hardest hit areas, and also Amchide, civilian vigilantes risked their lives keeping a look out for suicide bombers from the deadly Boko Haram group. They were on high alert during the day and at night to protect their city from Boko Haram kamikaze attacks. This is a supreme sacrifice in an unrelenting effort to stop the brewing war in the Far North Region of the country. While others

1 “Fighting Boko Haram: Four Cameroonians Killed in a Boko Haram Ambush in Kolofata – Far North Region.” <http://cameroon-concord.com/headlines/item/6297-fighting-boko-haram-four-cameroonians-killed-in-a-boko-haram-ambush-in-kolofata-far-north-region>, accessed on August 16 2016.



continued to provide substantial back-up in the intelligence front, others were being equipped with metal detectors to help them ward off fresh assaults from the insurgents.⁽¹⁾In order to provide these youths with modern equipment, the government of Cameroon through the Far North Governor Midjiyawa Bakari in November 2015 handed over to them metal detectors, microphones, telescopes, whistles, boots, flashlights, knives, torch lamps and light firearms among others. These vigilante groups have made use of these devices to pinpoint the hideouts of extremists and to also directly confront them (Afoni, 2015; Gwani, 2015).

In addition, major risks were taken by youths in local self defense groups to rid their villages and towns of violent extremism. Some of them in trying to do this lost their lives in the process and saved many more people from dying. This was the case as recounted by Ahmidou Founan of the vigilante group in Kolofata when he said that:

The latest success story we had was on Sunday when we detected two strange teenage boys and a girl dressed like a Muslim in our town. They pretended to be fetching water from a stream and when some members of our group went to search them, the girl detonated a bomb killing some of us. Many more people would have died should the suicide bombers have had access to the market, church and mosque they targeted.⁽²⁾

These were and remain risks taken on a daily basis by youths in the Far North Region of Cameroon and North East Nigeria to stop terrorists from

1 “Cameroon Vigilantes Fight Boko Haram with Bare Hands.” <http://thenewsnigeria.com/ng/2015/12/cameroon-vigilantes-fight-boko-haram-with-bare-hands>, accessed on August 15 2016.

2 “More Vigilante Groups to Fight Boko Haram in Cameroon.” <http://www.dw.com/en/more-vigilante-groups-to-fight-boko-haram-in-cameroon/a-18714206>, accessed on August 16 2016.



burning villages, looting food and cattle and slaughtering of its victims. Had these youths not risk their lives many more people would have been killed innocently in crowded market places or churches and mosques. This feat was appreciated by Governor Midjiyawa Bakari of the Far North Region when he acknowledged that had some of these youths not died in pursuit of these teenagers carrying bombs, the casualties would have been more in a region which has been made insecure for human habitation by violent extremist activities of Boko Haram.

Challenges of Youth Struggles against Extremism

Youth involvement in the fight to end or mitigate violent extremism in the Far North Region of Cameroon and North East Region of Nigeria has not been without problems or challenges. There have been repeated fears within the security sector that the CJTF could eventually transform itself into a new militia if its activities are not placed under strict regulation by the Borno State and Nigerian federal government (Agbiboa and Maiangwa, 2014: 84). Some members of this self-defense group in North East Nigeria have been accused of committing some rights abuses and others have acted poorly on the influence of drugs. Some of their unregulated activities equally led to the arrest of dozens of suspects whose cases were never investigated and hundreds of whom died or were killed in detention.⁽¹⁾ The arming of youths received criticisms from some quarters among which was the Director of the Human Rights Monitor Festus Okoye. In a succinct criticism of government support of arming youths in North East Nigeria he said:

Arming and encouraging youths from diverse backgrounds to take up weapons and, in an unregulated manner, to block

1 “Civilian Vigilante Groups Increase Dangers in Northern Nigeria.” <http://www.irinnews.org/news/2013/12/12/civilian-vigilante-groups-increase-dangers-northeastern-nigeria>, accessed on August 16 2016.



roads, make arrests, beat up suspects, kill those ‘found guilty,’ and burn their houses and chase them out of town is dangerous to the rule of law and the current efforts aimed at tackling security challenges in Nigeria.⁽¹⁾

The criticism of the actions of members of the local vigilante groups must be taken seriously although these groups are doing a marvellous job in fighting against violent extremism. Festus Okoye’s criticisms of these groups might also be considered too hard considering the great role they have played in extenuating violent extremism. There is therefore need for weapons to be used in a professional and responsible manner. The assistance in capacity building by the military needs to continue so that these local vigilante groups can be more professional in handling suspects instead of abusing their rights as human beings. People suspected of committing atrocities should be given a fair trial in the competent courts. The leadership of these groups should also be able to ensure that houses are not burnt because it will cost the state a lot to rebuild destroyed homes and villages. It is however important to note that the government of Borno state as well as the federal government of Nigeria have done a lot to organise the CJTF, excesses of some of its elements notwithstanding. Some of these young people in the early days were probably too excited and acted without restraint. The government of Nigeria as well as Cameroon must be aware of this and take the necessary measures to address any security challenges that might be posed by these trained youths when the crisis no longer warrant their involvement to maintain and build peace.

Similar to what happened in the Plateau State of Nigeria when youth vigilantes in supporting the fight against cattle rustling turned to jungle justice which is outside the framework of justice and the rule of law,

1 Ibid.



the ugly side of their vigilantism deserve deep reflection. The young people of Plateau State took to alcoholism and drugs which ruined their good works (Kwaja 2013). Proper education and caution will make these youth groups such as the ones in Plateau State of Nigeria to act with moderation and a lot of professionalism. These self-defense groups should be trained to respect and not enact rules which are in conflict with the laws of the state be it in Nigeria or Cameroon. This will go a long way to prevent chaos and insecurity because of the claim for retaliation from those who suffer maltreatment. In this way, the circle of violence will be considerably reduced and peace and harmony will gradually return to communities affected by various forms of violent extremism. Many more guns which should have been sold by entrepreneurs of war will not be sold. This will considerably lead to a reduction in the proliferation of small weapons and light arms and to security.

Government and Stakeholders Responsibility towards Youths

The volatility of youths in conflict situations as victims, recruits into radical groups that seek to undermine the authority of the state and as members of self-defense groups calls for deep reflection in security sector reforms in Nigeria and Cameroon in particular and other conflict prone areas of Africa in general. This reflection must be on the part of the governments of both countries on one hand and other relevant stakeholders involved in conflict resolution on the other. In this way, it will logically lead to policy formulation and/or reformulation. The policy so formulated and or reformulated should enable young people play a more important role in ending violent conflict and more importantly in working to prevent the escalation of conflict. The policy is also very likely to help many youths from falling prey to radical ideologies intended to destabilise the state and cause suffering to the poor masses.



Young people should be empowered not only in the Northern region of Cameroon and Nigeria but also other regions of these neighbouring countries. They will feel like belonging to a country where young people are thought of and action taken to make them happy and patriotic and ever willing and ready to serve their countries when called upon to do so. Meritocracy should also be promoted because it will go a long way to encourage youths to always give in their best in the service of their countries. Where mediocrity takes the place of meritocracy frustration becomes the norm and people are willing to adhere to any funny ideology that helps to destabilise a country. There is disenchantment today because some politicians consciously create chaos to hold on to positions of leadership. This has alienated many able and willing youths from participating in state building from the local to the national level. Their massive mobilisation against the violent activities of Boko Haram should not actually be mistaken for support for the state. They have all risen to the challenge to defend their people in the villages and protect the little property they have from being looted or destroyed by the insurgents. Without the menacing activities of the insurgents that directly affect the local population in deaths and destruction of property, one would likely not have seen young people mobilise into local vigilante groups to push back or turn in suspected Boko Haram militants to security forces in North East Nigeria and Far North Cameroon.

Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) operating in Northern Nigeria and Cameroon and which are engaged in governance and advocacy should work to address problems of illiteracy, youth unemployment and good governance (Amaliya and Nwankpa 2014: 86). The educational curricula should be adapted to meet the needs of the youths of these localities. Many people have argued that the rate of illiteracy, high levels of youth unemployment and bad governance have been at the root of youth disenchantment and recruitment into radical groups not only in the



northern parts of Cameroon and Nigeria but all over these two countries and beyond. Youth illiteracy in some cases is actually the inability of young people in these parts of Nigeria and Cameroon to read English and French which are the languages of business and recruitment into the public service. Many of the youths are however knowledgeable in Arabic and Fulfulde which have limited relevance in the modern state structure of these two countries. The government and CSOs can do more to encourage these young people to go to western schools. Steps must also be taken to ensure that their Arabic education is used through a redefining of the curricula. It is the over-bearing influence of English and French over Arabic and Fulfulde that has alienated many of the youths and Boko Haram has easily used this to preach hatred for western education as sinful.

Besides, youth unemployment can be tackled in many ways by government and other partners working to end poverty and promote sustainable livelihoods. This is not to say that the governments of both countries have not designed programmes to make young people busy but that there is a lot to do as far as youth employment is concerned. Local self-supporting and practical rather than theoretical programmes need to be encouraged and supported. What moves much of society today is professionalisation of programmes. The job market needs professionals in every domain of life. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) working with young people should seek to empower them through professional training than simply providing them with basic need to barely irk a living. Some have taken to write projects and win grants which are not effectively used to train and empower young people. The government should also make Fulfulde an important language of business and administration so that young people who are knowledgeable in it can be opened to opportunities and transform their lives.



In addition, the governance structure in many African countries is gerontocratic and kleptocratic which generally excludes young people from leadership positions from the local to the national level. In Cameroon for example, even leadership of youth wings of political parties especially the ruling party is in the hands of people above the age of being youths. Besides, those who govern think mostly about themselves and a few cronies who serve as political clients. The slogan that youths are leaders of tomorrow is carefully crafted to keep young people at bay as elders plunder the resources of the state with impunity. To instil greater patriotism in young people and make them less susceptible to radical ideologies that lead to violent extremism is to include many of them and not a select few in the governance structures of Nigeria and Cameroon. This should be a conscious government effort at the level of the local government area through the regions and states to the level of appointments and election into the peoples' legislature.

There is need for adequate measures to be taken to screen membership of youth vigilante groups so that drug addicts do not lead the fight against violent extremism and give youth vigilantes a bad name in the public eye. The unregulated arming of youths could also turn out to be a serious security problem in the future once the Boko Haram insurgency is over. There is compelling need to ensure that those trained by the military are eventually recruited to play important subsidiary roles in the service of the state. It would seem unwise to build military capacity in young people and allow them to waste while Nigeria and Cameroon continue to face security risks. It is also not enough for government officials to appeal to young people's active involvement in the fight against violent extremism without building trust, confidence and giving them assurance of a better future through concrete action that would make them feel that their interests are government's priority.



Conclusion

In this paper we have argued that youths have not always played a negative part during periods of violent extremism but that they have been more than ever before involved in fighting to defeat extremists and save their villages and towns from destruction. The radicalisation of many of them in Northern Cameroon and North East Nigeria notwithstanding, many have not yielded to the intoxicating Boko Haram propaganda and recruitment of idle youths. Rather, they have formed vigilante groups with the support of the governments of both countries to defend themselves, their property and ensure the return to peace and stability in northern Cameroon and North East Nigeria. The government has offered them gadgets including motor bikes, guns and also trained many of the youths in self-defense tactics in the face of enemy attack. The youths are also involved in intelligence sharing, turning over suspects for interrogation to military officials and patrol difficult and accessible areas to keep guard and track down Boko Haram insurgents.

The involvement of youths in stemming criminality is a very old tradition. They have kept the peace in different places throughout history. Their mobilisation in the face of adversity in Cameroon's Far North Region and North East Nigeria should therefore not have been a surprise. They had been ignored and abandoned by their governments for too long but due to the violent extremist activities of Boko Haram they proved to be reliable in combating this menace. They were additionally motivated by the fact that their very survival and the survival of their communities were in doubt since insurgents killed and maimed people, burnt houses, destroyed crops and looted cattle, the main source of income for many. Others offered to support their governments in the fight and served various purposes which have gone a long way to extenuate the violent extremism witnessed in northern Cameroon and Nigeria.



In spite of the positive role of youths in ensuring peace and stability in a violently ravaged area like northern Cameroon and Nigeria, some problems have been registered and there is also a likelihood of problems in the near future. Some of the youths in the local vigilante groups acted in excess of the powers conferred on them. They detained suspects for long hours without any charge and still others beat some of the detained people to death. Others took to drug consumption instead of concentrating in the task of security. Ordinary people have expressed reservations on the arming of these youths who have become a future security risk. They feel that if such people are not integrated into the military after the Boko Haram insurgency would have come to an end, then society would be even more unsafe. The government and other stakeholders must therefore seek new and innovative ways of addressing the youth challenge before it gets completely out of hand. This notwithstanding, this paper has shown that youths have not been passive actors in the war against extremism. They have done their very best to fight against the monster of Boko Haram even if some of their peers have been radicalised to join this group.



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COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND INSURGENCY IN THE WAKE OF ARAB SPRING: PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN MALI IN PERSPECTIVE

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The solution for the Salafists is not to ignore them. If you ignore them, they will be fixed in the national conscience and it will be very difficult to get them out.¹

ABSTRACT

Since her attainment of political independence from France on 20 June 1960, Mali has recorded a history of Tuareg insurgencies in the quest for an independent state of Azawad. The Tuareg insurgency has since the Arab Spring in North Africa transformed into terrorism and violent extremism with direct threats not only to her national security but also regional security in West Africa. One major consequence is the spate of foreign intervention involving the African Union, ECOWAS, United Nations and France. This paper interrogates the challenge of terrorism and insurgency in Mali in light of the Arab Spring and accompanying international intervention. It observes draws attention to the imperative of international sensitivity to events beyond national frontiers drawing attention to the linkages between Libyan conflict and its implications to security in West Africa and the Sahel. It solicits for sustained international support for Mali in its efforts at state building and pursuit of development which are core to countering terrorism and insurgencies in fragile states of West Africa and the Sahel.

Keywords : Violent Extremism, Insurgency, Arab Spring, Peace Operations, Mali



Introduction

The history of Mali is replete with intermittent insurgencies driven by Tuareg irredentism on the one hand and the failure of successive regimes in Bamako to provide requisite developmental presence in the largely Tuareg dominated northern regions.² This is not unconnected with her geo-strategic setting including the dynamics of population and economy.

Mali is a landlocked country geographically located in the interior of West Africa sharing about 7, 908 km of borders with Algeria 1,359 km, Mauritania 2,236 km, Republic of Guinea 1,062 km, Senegal 489 km, Cote d'Ivoire 599 km, Niger 838 km and Burkina Faso 1,325 km. Mali has a total land and water mass estimated at 1, 240 192 sq km and this makes it the eight largest African country in terms of land.³ Its political capital is Bamako. Other major cities in Mali are Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal.

Mali has an estimated population of about 17 million people drawn largely from Bambara, Fulani (Peul), Sarakole, Senufo, Dogon, Malinke, Bobo, Songhai and Tuareg ethnic groups. Its major languages include French (official),⁴ Bambara, Peul/Foulfoulbe, Dogon, Maraka/Soninke, Malinke, Sonrhail/Djerma, Minianka, Tamacheq, Senoufo and Bobo. Islam is the dominant religion spoken by about 95% of the population. Other religions include Christianity and African Traditional Religion.

Mali's climate varies seasonally between sub-tropical to arid conditions. Its weather is usually hot and dry between February and June; rainy, humid and mild between July and November; and cool and dry between December and January. The country experiences intermittent natural hazards such as occasional flooding along the banks of River Niger, hot, dust-laden harmattan haze especially during the dry seasons and recurring incidents of drought. Mali is also prone to desertification, soil erosion, poaching and inadequate access to portable water. She is a signatory to various



international protocols on bio-diversity, climate change, desertification, hazardous waste, ozone layer protection among others.

Some transnational challenges confronting Mali include demarcation issues with Burkina Faso, forced migrations involving refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Mali is also a transit and destination country for human trafficking and falls within the largely vulnerable Sahel belt often exploited by terrorist organisations for recruitment, training and operation. These details are important to understanding the challenge of terrorism and violent extremism in Mali which escalated following the Arab Spring in Libya resulting to new considerations for Peace Support Operations (PSOs). It is in light of the above that this paper considers the dynamics of international interventions in Mali where the quest for an independent state of Azawad based on Islamic theocracy by the Islamic Movement for Azawad (IMA) and Mouvement Nationale pour la Libération de l'Azaoud (MNLA) since 2011 have created space for the proliferation of extremist groups and escalation of terrorism and armed violence across West Africa and the Sahel.

Overview of Extremism and Insurgency in Mali

Like several countries along the Sahel belt, Mali is not new to the scourge of insurgency and violent extremism. Extremism in Mali could be classified into two distinct categories. On the one hand, there exist political grievances that breed rebellion in northern Mali. The other manifestation is the scourge of religious extremism that breeds terrorism. Several factors explain the extremist challenge in Mali. First, north-south relations in Mali remained characterised by deep rooted grievances and mutual distrust that stimulate rebellion and separatist agitations in the northern territories. Second, Mali share international boundaries with Mauritania, Niger and Algeria that have history of extremist activities. Third, her borders with



these countries are largely under patrolled creating room for illegal cross-border movements of extremists. The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) which transformed to Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) found sanctuary in parts of northern Mali which proved conducive to its activities. Fourth, there is in existence large number of vulnerable and impoverished population in northern Mali who are gullible and exposed to prevailing and competing narratives.⁵ Fifth is the accessibility to SALWs by various armed groups with varying degrees of grievances against the Malian government. The experience of violent extremism in Mali is accentuated by the predisposition to terrorist acts.

Since her independence in September 1960, Mali has experienced four rebellions especially in her northern territories. These rebellions were the consequence of deep rooted grievances against the Bamako authority. The first rebellion between May 1963 and August 1964 was led by Zeyd ag Attaher and Elledi ag Alla. It sought for a separate state for Kel Tamashek. Attempts at explaining the causes of the rebellion identified lack of political representation, official neglect of the aspirations of northern population for economic development and under controlled environmental menace as the underlying factors that led to the rebellion.⁶ President Modibo Keita of the *Union pour la Democratie et le Peuple Malien* (UPDM) instead of addressing the root causes of the rebellion with political recognition of special status of northern territories opted to repress the contestations with outright violence.

The second rebellion began in March 1990 and culminated in a military coup in 1991 led by Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumani Traore which brought an end to 23 years regime of General Moussa Traore. Neighbouring Niger also experienced rebellion for an Independent state of Azawad through *Mouvement populaire de l'Azawad* (MPA) - Popular Movement of Azawad and the *Front Islamique Arabe de l'Azawad* (FIAA)



- Arab Islamic Front of Azawad.⁷ Many of the fighters were Malians and Nigeriens who migrated to Libya to escape the 1973-74 drought. Many joined Ghadaffi's Islamic Legion and received military training alongside Libyan troops. Following mediation by Algeria, the rebellion ended with the signing of the Tamanrasset Agreement in January 1991 and *Pacte Nationale* in April 1992. The key provisions of the Pacte Nationale included a strong decentralization of the Malian state and devolution of power and resources to local authorities.

The third rebellion in northern Mali between 2006 and 2009 was started by Iyad ag Ghalli who took advantage of the withdrawal of Malian army from the northern territories in May 2006 to take control of Kidal and Menaka. Algerian government offered to mediate in the dispute leading to the Algiers Peace Agreement in July 2006. The choice of the Traore administration to negotiate with the armed groups instead of military action was considered by some opposition elements in Mali as inappropriate. Certain interests among non Ifogha Tuareg seemed unhappy with their perceived disposition of President Amadou Traore to project Iyad ag Ghali leadership in northern Mali. This led to another rebellion by ag Bahanga who was eventually driven out to Libya in 2009.

Attempts at addressing the grievances that stimulated these rebellions found expressions in the main highlights of various peace accords in Mali. These highlights include:

- a. Recognition of special status for northern territories
- b. Decentralisation of power for northern territories to boost accommodation of northern population.
- c. Pursuit of economic development for northern territories
- d. Reduced presence of Mali military in the north; and



- e. The integration of Tuareg rebels and militants into Malian security forces and military.

So far, decentralisation of power especially to northern Mali and democratic enlargement towards multiparty democracy remains the cumulative gains of the peace agreements entered between Bamako and northern territories. It is however noteworthy to observe that all the peace accords were unable to restore lasting peace in Mali. Several factors account for this. First, the Malian authority in Bamako was repeatedly accused of poor implementation of the agreements. Secondly, there were allegations that the parties to negotiations that led to these peace agreements were not very inclusive. The consequence was that after each agreement, some interest groups that felt under(un)represented usually found faults in the ensuing peace deal. However, in most cases, the cessation of hostilities was facilitated by exit of several fighters to Libya some of who again joined Ghadaffi troops.

The reduced presence of Malian government and military in parts of northern Mali provided a vacuum which violent non state actors like the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC); an originally Algerian group which relocated its activities to northern Mali following serious counterterrorism offensives of the Algerian government exploited to spread its brand of extremist narratives. As a result, the GSPC, which later became the Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), actively operated in northern Mali recruiting vulnerable youths within its ranks and extorting protection levies for traffickers along its zone of influence even before the outbreak of the Arab Spring.

The GSPC/AQIM group combined the spread of its extremist religious appeals with the execution of terrorist acts and other transnational criminal activities to finance its existence. In 2004, six Malian members of AQIM



and one Mauritania were implicated in the botched attempt at arms smuggling between Mali and Algeria on 23 January 2004.⁸ The group was also linked to transnational kidnappings. In March 2008, the group kidnapped 2 Austrian tourists in Tunisia and held them in northern Mali.⁹ Likewise, Edwin Dyer, a British hostage kidnapped from Niger in February 2009 by AQIM was held hostage in Mali but later killed by the group in June 2009. The AQIM also killed Lt Col Lamana Ould Cheikh, a senior Malian Intelligence Officer at Timbuktu in June 2009.¹⁰ Apparently, the activities of the AQIM heightened insecurity within and beyond Mali and facilitated the emergence of other armed groups before the Arab Spring.

It was in response to such transnational crimes and violence associated with AQIM that the United Kingdom issued travel advisory to her nationals on travels to northern Mali. Likewise, the United States Department of State issued warning to all Americans and even aid workers to leave northern Mali.¹¹ The United States Pan Sahel Initiative and Trans Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership with Mali, Chad, Niger, Mauritania and Nigeria among other were aimed at mitigating the threats of violent extremism and terrorism in Mali and the whole Sahel belt. These initiatives were however called to question in the wake of the Arab Spring in Libya.

Arab Spring in Libya and the Strategic Challenge to Mali

The great awakening in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) referred to as Arab Spring represents a demand for socio-political change across the Arab world. Its underlying motivations include the popular quest for social and economic reforms, social and political liberties, and popular aspirations for dignity and respect instead of oppressive regimes.¹² Others are the dangers of youth unemployment and political exclusion among the governing elites. The phenomenon manifested through civil disobedience, rebellions and civil war depending on the response of the respective



ruling elites in the affected countries. Effective use of Information and Communication Technology, social media network and propaganda facilitated mass mobilisation of protesters and international interests.

Historically, the successful overthrow of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi of Iran in 1979 and the mass protests by the Green Movement (GM) against the re-election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2009 are two isolated but significant incidences that inspired protesters during the Arab Spring in 2011.¹³ The GM utilized social media network to awaken and sustain resentments against Ahmadinejad which facilitated the mobilization of mass support and participation in anti-government protests.

The immediate cause of the Arab Spring in 2011 is generally located in the self immolation of a vegetable seller, Mohammed Bouazizi, to protest his frustrations over police corruption and ill treatment in Sidi Bouazid, a town about 200 kilometres from Tunis.¹⁴ Bouazizi's action sparked off a nationwide protests that forced President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali of Tunisia out of Office on 14 January 2011.¹⁵ The success of mass action in Tunisia subsequently inspired similar uprisings in Egypt, Yemen, Syria, Algeria, Morocco, Sudan, Bahrain and Libya.¹⁶ Generally, the Arab Spring scrambled power dynamics in the MENA. It also stimulated and sustained numerous security challenges associated with illicit flow of arms, violent extremism and acts of terrorism at various national and regional levels. This is clearly demonstrated by the rebellions in Libya and Syria.

In Libya, the detention of Fathi Terbil, a human rights lawyer representing the over 1000 prisoners killed at Abu Salim prison in 1996 sparked protests in February 2011 against the Ghadaffi regime at Benghazi which spread to Abu Bayda, Brega and other major cities.¹⁷ Further detention of protesters and official clampdown on the demonstrations escalated tensions with



protesters demanding an end to political corruption in Libya and the exit of Colonel Ghadaffi who had been in office since 1969. The Libyan Revolutionary Council (LRC) which transformed to National Transitional Council (NTC) was established to integrate the leadership, give political direction and expand the outreach of anti-Ghadaffi coalition.¹⁸

Ghadaffi regime's resort to extreme coercion sparked the defection of some key government officials, decline to civil war and subsequent intervention of the international community. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolutions 1970 and 1973 on Libya as response to escalating violence, inflammatory rhetoric and deplorable loss of life in the country. Both Resolutions provided the justification for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) intervention in Libya characterized by targeted attacks on real and perceived assets of the Ghadaffi military and hierarchy.

The Libyan conflict stirred several challenges for peace and security beyond her frontiers which include forced migrations of internally displaced persons and refugee crisis. An estimated 280,614 people including migrant workers fled Libya to become refugees in neighbouring countries. Tunisia harboured over 150,000 of which only 12,256 were native Libyans.¹⁹ Egypt harboured about 118,000 refugees many of whom were from third countries such as Ethiopia, Bangladesh and Sudan among others.²⁰ The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) embarked on humanitarian evacuations while providing relief materials to the growing number of refugees arising from the conflict.

The link between the Arab Spring in Libya and political development in Mali is traceable to the flight of Tuareg fighters back to West Africa in the heat of the anti Ghadaffi rebellion. On 6 September 2011, two



fleeing convoys, comprising of about 250 Libyan heavily armed military vehicles and fighters of Ghadaffi forces entered West Africa through the Republic of Niger.²¹ The convoy carried Mansur Dawul, in-charge of Ghadaffi's personal security and several former Tuareg commanders and fighters who fought alongside Ghadaffi's forces in Libya. The Republic of Niger acknowledged the presence of the convoys and granted asylum to Ghadaffi's principal officials but insisted that neither Col Ghadaffi nor anyone, wanted by the International Criminal Court, (ICC) for war crimes in Libya is in their territory. Burkina Faso responded in similar manner.²² The return of heavily armed Tuareg fighters to West Africa posed serious challenge to regional security in general and national security of Mali in particular. This is not unconnected to the fact that the several of the returnee Tuaregs were part of the Ghadaffi fighting forces with commendable battle experience especially having fought alongside Ghadaffi's military to protect the Ghadaffi regime in its last months. The returnee Tuareg fighters also came back with enormous military hardwares with which to engage the Malian Government in their quest for an independent state of Azawad.

The NATO alliance whose forces in Libya under the guise of "protection of civilians" were involved in the bombing of civilian centres including homes, schools and hospitals suspected of hosting command and operational assets of Ghadaffi forces ignored these two large convoys of military vehicles despite its deployment of high tech surveillance equipments and widespread international media coverage the movement attracted.²³ This was contrary to the declaration of its Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen that "We have carried out this operation very carefully, without confirmed civilian casualties,"²⁴ Further speculation raised on NATO's role in the anti Ghadaffi rebellion in Libya was that the NATO troops under US Africom Commander (Army) worked in concert with the Tuareg fighters whose exit weakened Ghadaffi tactically and strategically. The implication



of this conspiracy was the exportation of Libya's insecurity to the larger Sahel belt.

The anti Ghadaffi rebellion ended on 20 October 2011 with the defeat of pro Ghadaffi forces, the capture and murder of Colonel Ghadaffi and the declaration of victory by the National Transitional Council (NTC) in Libya led by Mustafa Abdel Jalil. The NTC announced that Ghadaffi's officials some of who fled to West Africa carted away huge amount of gold and currency from the Libyan Treasury. The NTC further discovered that several Russian-made, Surface to Air Missiles (SAM-7) were missing from the Libyan armoury. Each of the SAM-7 is adjudged by experts as capable of bringing down a plane flying at 11,000 ft above sea level thereby threatening aviation security in the region. The new NTC regime in Libya was also weary of Ghadaffi loyalists using West Africa as a staging post to launch attacks on her interests and advised countries in the region to deny asylum to Ghadaffi's loyalists.

Apparently, the proliferation of SALWs in the Sahel belt escalated as a result of the Arab Spring in Libya. Likewise the activities of various armed groups competing to occupy the space created by the forceful overthrow of the Ghadaffi regime. Libya remained awash with weapons and various armed groups from West Africa, Central Africa and North Africa got new access to arms and weaponry thereby providing explanations for the Tuareg rebellion in Mali, Seleka rebellion in Central African Republic and escalation of the Boko Haram activities within and beyond Nigeria.

Mali and the Extremist Challenge since the Arab Spring

The nature of extremism in Mali in the aftermath of the Arab Spring in Libya had attributes of insurgency and terrorist acts. Deficit of strong institutions, deeply rooted grievances, crisis of social cohesion and scourge of extremism were internal contradictions within Mali as at the time of the



anti Ghadaffi rebellion in Libya. Others included fragmentation within the population and the inability of the Malian government to assert its political and military presence in the northern territories. These contradictions facilitated the spread of armed groups and acted in concert with intervening variables from post Ghadaffi Libya to usher in the atmosphere of instabilities and political uncertainties for Mali.

The sudden return of Malian migrant workers from Libya, placed additional strain on their poor host communities that already suffered social exclusions and lacked access to basic health infrastructure and educational services.²⁵ The sudden loss of this means of income adversely affected their families. The loss of remittances has been particularly hard-hitting in the light of the looming food security and nutrition crisis. The forced return of these migrant worker posed additional burden to their host families and communities in Mali as several parents released their children as recruits for the various extremist groups in exchange for monetary rewards.²⁶

The return of diaspora Tuaregs from Libya many of who have received military training and fought alongside Ghadaffi's troops during the anti Ghadaffi rebellion led to a reawakening of irrendentism and the historical struggle of Tuaregs for a sovereign state of Azawad from territories in Mali, Niger and Algeria. The visit of Belmokhtar, then an AQIM commander, to Libya in 2011 in search of arms deals and the access to huge array of weapons arising from the collapse of the Ghadaffi regime by armed non state actors facilitated the Tuareg insurgency. The consequence was the temporary loss of state control in cities like Gao, Kidal, Timbuktu and other parts of northern Mali. A shortlived military coup in March 2012 (prior to the scheduled April 2012 presidential election) toppled the regime of former President Ahmoudou Toure while the threat of violent extremism in Mali escalated due to the multiplicity of active extremist groups.



Mali's fourth rebellion erupted following the return of Malians exiles from Libya in 2011. Pierre Buyoya identified four main groups of non state actors operating with slightly differing but somewhat related strategic and ideological objectives which fought against the Malian government. These groups initially included the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), Ansar Dine, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO).²⁷ Subsequently, there were splits in the groups and emergence of new cells that introduced a new wave of extremism was blended with criminality and terrorism within and beyond Mali.

Between January and April 2012, the fragility of state in Mali became very glaring. Combined assaults by Iyad ag Ghali's Ansar Dine and the MNLA led to the death of over 100 Malian troops as the insurgents occupied Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu and MNLA declared the independence of a secular state of Azawad claiming that the Tuareg population is marginalized in Malian society and that earlier agreements to address this issue were not honored by the central authorities in Bamako, claims reminiscent of those voiced to justify the rebellions of the 1990s.²⁸ On 22 March 2012, young officers in the Malian military led by Major Sanago overthrew the administration of President Amadou Traore in a shortlived military coup which the ECOWAS, African Union and other international organisations condemned as unconstitutional change of government.

The rebellion was not without its accompanying humanitarian consequences as about 230,000 persons were internally displaced within Mali of which about 50,000 fled to Bamako.²⁹ Following the escalation of the conflict an estimated 175,000 Malian refugees fled to neighbouring Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mauritania and Niger.³⁰ Mauritania hosts about 64,000 Malian refugees while Burkina Faso hosts about 43,000 Malian



refugees.³¹ By March 2013, about 5,600 Malian refugees fled to Niger where the UNHCR documented 17,000 other Malian refugees.³²

The inability of Malian troops to subdue the rebellions, the apparent weakness of the state and the withdrawal from the northern territories left a vacuum that emboldened extremist groups to escalate their activities in the northern territories. Increases abductions, recruitment and radicalization of Mali's increasingly vulnerable population and perpetration of terrorist acts increased as these non state actors sought to expand their activities southwards towards Bamako.³³ The major extremist groups that operated in northern Mali are briefly discussed below.

a. **Harakat Ansar ul Dine**. This translates as Movement of Defenders of the Faith. It claims to be an independent Islamic Salafist movement. Harakat Ansar ul Dine was established by the Ifoghas Tuareg under the leadership of Iyad Ag Ghali in December 2011. The Ansar ul Dine initially collaborated with the MNLA against the Malian government. However, following the capture of Timbuktu in June 2012 by MNLA alliance, the Ansar ul Dine declared its commitment to the enthronement of an Islamic theocracy in Azawad contrary to the secular goals of the MNLA.³⁴ The membership of the Ansar ul Dine was drawn largely from former pro-Ghadaffi fighters who returned from Libya. The sect was instrumental to the capture of Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal by mid 2012.

b. **Islamic Movement of Azawad**. A split in the Ansar ul Dine led to the formation of the Islamic Movement of Azawad (IMA) in January 2013. The IMA exists as a political movement seeking autonomy for the Tuaregs. The group favours and advocates conservative but non Jihadist Islam. Its major ally is the MNLA and the fighters are equipped with small arms, armed trucks and RPGs. The main operational theatres are Kidal and Meneka regions of



Mali. While it advocates negotiation as an approach to solving the Malian crisis, it has the potentials to engage in guerrilla warfare.³⁵ The IMA under the leadership of Alghabass Ag Intalla claims to reject all forms of extremism and terrorism while pledging commitment to dialogue for peaceful solution of the Malian crisis.³⁶ The emergence of the IMA expanded the number of actors in the Malian conflict.

c. **Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb.** The AQIM represents the Al Qaeda in North Africa which has its roots in Algeria. However, following counterterrorism measures of the President Abdoulazeez Bouteflika, the sect moved its operational theatre to under-governed spaces in Northern Mali. The AQIM declared goal is the spread of Islamic law. Prior to 2007 when it became a franchise of the Al Qaeda Network, the AQIM existed as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). Its activities have however spread beyond Algeria and it has attracted membership from Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Morocco. The AQIM further engages in kidnapping of western tourists for ransom and facilitates illicit transnational trafficking in the Sahel.³⁷ In the advent of the Azawad struggle, the AQIM which acquired new weapons from Libya allied with the Ansar ul Dine and other jihadist groups operating in Mali against the Malian authorities.

d. **Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa.** The Al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad which means the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) was formed as a splinter group from the AQIM in 2011. Its membership was drawn largely from the Tilemsi Arab population drawn from the Lamhar tribe in the Azawad region. The goal of MUJAO was the spread of jihad to the whole of West Africa. The Al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad joined alliance with the Ansar ul Dine in Northern Mali and waged war against the Tuareg separatists in conquered parts of Northern



Mali.³⁸ The MUJAO orchestrated the kidnap of 3 Europeans in the Saharawi camps of Rabbouni managed by the Polisario in October 2011. It also carried out the kidnap of 7 Algerian diplomats in Gao.³⁹ The MUJAO introduced and enforced the strict Taliban style interpretation of Sharia and was engaged in the destruction of historical sites in Timbuktu. In December 2012, the US Government included the MUJAO on its list of Foreign Based Terrorist Organisations (FBTOs). Similarly, its 2 top commanders, Hamad el Khairy and Ahmed el Tilemsi were added to US list of Designated Global Terrorists (DGT).⁴⁰ MUJAO is believed to be led by a Mauritanian called Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou. Prior to France military intervention in January 2013, MUJAO's sphere of influence was mainly in north-eastern Mali, where it controlled key towns such as Kidal and Gao. On 4 January 2012, the MUJAO announced the formation of Ansar al Sunnah Brigade which has 4 katibas. The katibas include:

- i. The Abdullah Azzam Katiba (named after the Osama bin Laden mentor and al Qaeda co-founder who was killed in a bombing in 1989);
 - ii. The Al Zarqawi Katiba (named after al Qaeda in Iraq emir Abu Musab al Zarqawi, who was killed in an airstrike in 2006);
 - iii. The Abu al Laith al Libi katiba (named after the al Qaeda ideologue and senior leader who was killed in a drone strike in 2008); and
 - iv. The Martyrdom-Seekers Katiba.⁴¹
- e. **Signers in Blood Battalion.** The SBB is another extremist group in Mali that broke away from the AQIM. It is also known as Signers in Blood Battalion, Al-Mouwakoune Bi-Dima, Signed-



in-Blood Battalion, Signatories for Blood, Those Who Sign With Blood, Al-Mua'qi'oon Biddam, We Sign with Blood. It comprises of mostly foreign fighters committed to the enforcement of Sharia in northern Mali. The SBB was responsible for the January 2013 hostage incident in the Norwegian Statoil run oil and gas facility at Amenan in eastern Algeria. The SBB was led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar who was also known as Mr Malboro for his role in tobacco smuggling across the Sahel. The existence of the katibas heightened violence and insecurity thereby constituting threats to sub-regional security in the West Africa.

In the heat of the Libyan civil war in 2011, Mokhtar Belmokhtar visited Libya to negotiate arms deals in a bid to expand the operations of the AQIM demonstrates AQIM preparedness to expand its activities in the Maghreb and wider Sahel belt. The availability of Libyan weapons including shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles to AQIM and other extremist groups in Mali has led to the transnationalisation of terrorist acts beyond Mali. Major terrorist acts that have links with incidents in Mali include:

- a. The kidnap of 3 European aid workers at Tindouf camp in Algeria for refugees fleeing the Libyan crisis in October 2011. The MUJAO claimed responsibility for the kidnap. The hostages were freed in July 2012. This demonstrates that the MUJAO could extend its activities beyond West Africa.
- b. The terror attack on a heavily guarded and jointly operated oil facility in Amenan Algeria run by British Petroleum, Norway's Statoil and Algerian state hydrocarbons giant, Sonatrach. The attack was executed by the Signed-in-Blood Battalion (SBB) claiming that they attacked the facility in retaliation for French military operations in Mali.⁴²
- c. The kidnap of 7 French nationals belonging to the family of Moulin-Fournier in Dabanga around Waza National Park, Cameroon in



February 2013. The kidnap was allegedly perpetrated by the Boko Haram operating from Nigeria and linked to French Operation Serval in Mali. The 7 hostages were released after 2 months on 19 April.⁴³

- d. In mid-summer of 2011, 7 suspected Boko Haram members were arrested while transiting through Niger to Mali for training. Items recovered from the suspects include documentations on manufacturing of explosives, propaganda leaflets and names and contact details of AQIM members they were to meet in Mali.⁴⁴ This incident contributed to confirmation of the link between Boko Haram and the AQIM.

It is imperative to observe that the attacks on oil facility at Amenan and the kidnap of French hostages at Dabanga were linked to French military intervention in Mali. The US Department of States consequently issued warning to American travellers in Africa that AQIM has declared its intention to attack western targets throughout the Sahel from Senegal in West Africa's Atlantic coast to Eritrea on the Red Sea.⁴⁵ Evidently, the scenario constitutes pointer that Mali emerged a theatre for planning and executing acts of terrorism within and beyond West Africa.

Responding to the Malian Challenge

The emerging insecurities in Mali especially the obvious inability of the Malian government to effectively contain the escalating violence which also posed threats to security in West Africa and the Sahel stimulated moves at the ECOWAS, African Union and United Nations. Efforts made by the ECOWAS and African Union in April 2012 to obtain authorization from the UN Security Council for the deployment of an African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) to dismantle terrorist and transnational criminal networks in northern Mali was delayed. The ECOWAS inability



to provide the UNSC with requisite details of the mission objectives and logistics for six month partly contributed in delaying the authorisation till December 2012 when the UNSC passed Resolution 2085 approving the establishment of AFISMA.

The UNSC Resolution 2085 tasked AFISMA with rebuilding the capacity of Mali's defence and security forces, supporting Mali in regaining territorial control in the north and assisting Malian authorities in their "primary responsibility to protect civilians."⁴⁶ The AFISMA was transformed to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), comprising of 11,200 personnel and 1,440 police personnel in April 2012. The MINUSMA was authorised to deploy all necessary means to enforce its mandate. The UNSC Resolution 2100 establishing the Mission tasked it as follows:

- a. Support the transitional authorities of Mali in the stabilization of the country and implementation of the transitional roadmap, focusing on major population centres and lines of communication
- b. Protecting civilians, human rights monitoring,
- c. Creation of conditions for the provision of humanitarian assistance and the return of displaced persons,
- d. Extension of State authority and
- e. Preparation of free, inclusive and peaceful elections.⁴⁷

Since its adoption in April 2013, the UNSC Resolutions 2100 has been renewed annually as Resolutions 2164 of 25 June 2014 and 2227 of 29 June 2015. The last renewal took place at the end of the 7727th Meeting of UNSC on 29 June 2016, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2295



authorizing ‘More Proactive and Robust’ Mandate for United Nations Mission in Mali extension of MUNISMA mandate to 30 June 2017.⁴⁸ Each review and extension of MUNISMA mandate took cognizance of situation report on the Mission and therefore sought to address unfolding challenges in the mission area.

Following the collapse of state presence in northern Mali, the armed groups had greater latitude to pursue their criminal and terrorist activities. This is perhaps what drove their daring attempt to extend their occupation southwards in the first week of January 2013. This strategically-miscalculated move justified the deployment of a French military operation called “Serval” around January 10, 2013. It also accelerated the deployment of the African-led International Support Mission for Mali (AFISMA) from mid-January 2013. By March 2013, one could argue, all three northern regions had been liberated from armed groups, except the MNLA, because the French military operation had approached it in a different manner, sparing it from any attack.

Consequent on the opposition of the MNLA to redeployment of the Malian state authority and its Security and Defense Forces in the region of Kidal, there was a need to engage in negotiations with the MNLA group and other armed groups that adopted the same position, hence the Ouagadougou Agreement of June 18, 2013. This agreement, titled “Preliminary Agreement to Presidential Elections and Inclusive Peace Talks in Mali,” allowed the holding of presidential and legislative elections throughout the country and Ibrahim Boubacar Keita emerged victorious in the run-off of the presidential poll held on August 11, 2013.

The Ouagadougou Agreement also called for inclusive talks while permitting a gradual redeployment of state authority in regions where it was absent because of the armed conflict in the north. This brought about a lull in the conflict because various armed movements awaited the launch



of the inclusive talks are agreed in the Ouagadougou Agreement to address the root causes of the conflict. The talks were to start about two months after the formation of the new government following the August 2013 presidential elections.

It is however noteworthy to observe that, the delay in the launch of this process and a visit of the Malian Prime Minister to Kidal on May 16, 2014, to which the MNLA, (still armed and present in the city), was opposed, triggered violent confrontations between rebel forces and the national army, resulting in great losses in the governmental camp, as well as among civilians. An attempted attack by government forces on May 21, 2014, aimed at regaining control of the situation, ended in yet another rebel victory. This did, however, give renewed impetus to the peace process, leading to the Algiers process that started on June 16, 2014. So far, various international organisations including the African Union (AU), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the United Nations have committed enormous diplomatic efforts and resources at addressing the security challenges in Mali.

Diplomatic and Political Efforts

Diplomatic and political efforts in the Malian crisis began in early 2012 through the various summits of ECOWAS and meetings of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) of the AU. Already in December 2011, in anticipation of potential regional ramifications of the Libyan crisis, the AU Commission (AUC) and the UN Secretariat jointly undertook a multidisciplinary fact-finding mission in the Sahel region from December 7 to 23. On March 14-15, 2012, the two institutions organized a joint experts meeting in Addis Ababa that analyzed the report of this fact-finding mission and developed a series of recommendations on how best the AU and the UN, working together with countries of the region and other international



partners, could assist in addressing the numerous challenges identified in the Sahel region.

In the context of growing concern at the turn of events in northern Mali, the PSC held a ministerial level meeting in Bamako, on March 20, 2013, to examine and endorse the conclusions of this joint AU-UN experts meeting. With the military coup, ECOWAS and the AU not only condemned the unconstitutional change of government, particularly occurring as it did at a time when they were striving to address the armed rebellion in the north, they also made concerted efforts towards the restoration of constitutional order in the country. ECOWAS had appointed President Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso as its official mediator in the Malian crisis. The latter managed to negotiate a Framework Agreement for the restoration of constitutional order, which was signed on April 6, 2012, with the military junta. In accordance with the Malian Constitution, this Agreement saw the transfer of power from the head of the military junta, Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, to the Speaker of Parliament, Dioncounda Traoré.

In June 2012, a Support and Follow-up Group on the Situation in Mali (SFG) was established under the co-chairmanship of the AU, ECOWAS, and the UN. The SFG held its inaugural meeting in Abidjan on June 7, 2012. This meeting, and subsequent ones, ensured a more inclusive and coherent transitional government in Mali, which was important for the success of other aspects of the international community's engagement in the country.

The AU and ECOWAS also decided to engage in dialogue with the armed groups, while not excluding the military option in support of the diplomatic one, or in case the latter failed. After these groups had indicated their readiness to negotiate under the mediation of ECOWAS, the Mediator urged them to clearly articulate their demands for the dialogue with the



Malian authorities. More formal talks were held in December 2012, which were interrupted by the aforementioned attempt by armed groups to move southwards in early January 2013, and the subsequent international military intervention.

In summary, between April 2012 and September 2014 the PSC held no less than eight meetings on Mali and the Sahel, including one at the level of Heads of States and Government, on January 25, 2013. The latest such meeting was held on September 16, 2014. Meanwhile, the SFG held five meetings between June 2012 and November 2013. ECOWAS also held several summits, including emergency ones, during the same period.

The Algiers Process, 2014

The concerns of the Government of Algeria was key to the commencement of the all inclusive dialogue of parties in the Malian conflict. The Algiers Process 2014 had the support of a number of regional and international organizations (i.e. the AU, ECOWAS, UN, European Union, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation) and the following four countries of the region; Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger. After several weeks of preliminary work, particularly with armed movements, the Algerian authorities assembled in Algiers from July 7-14, 2014, a group of experts representing above mentioned countries and international organizations with the objective to prepare the inclusive talks through a “Draft Roadmap of Negotiations within the framework of the Algiers Process.”

A Ministerial High Level meeting comprising of representatives from countries and organisations above me on July 16, 2014, to consider the draft roadmap prepared by the experts. The outcome of this Ministerial level meeting and subsequent ones laid the frameworks that ensured a more inclusive and coherent transitional government in Mali. This was



considered an important aspect that will guarantee the successful engagement of the international community in the search for peace in Mali.

On 24 July 2014, the AU and ECOWAS which opted to dialogue with various armed groups in Mali adopted and signed the Roadmap to peace agreed by the Government of Mali and the armed groups. The Roadmap spelled out the basic principles and references of the talks and determined the different issues to be discussed in order to resolve the Malian conflict. It also established the format of the talks and the composition of the Mediation team led by Algeria. In addition, the mediation team also included representatives from the AU, ECOWAS, UN, European Union, and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation) and the following four countries of the region; Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger. It further identified other parties to the talks while outlining a time-frame lasting to 100 days for the peace engagement part of which recognised periods of suspension for consultation with groups in Mali. The actual talks commenced with a one-week period of hearing from Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) on 1 September 2014 after a break on 26 July. The engagement of CSOs agreed by all the groups was a significant innovation different from previous peace engagements in Mali.

Military Efforts

The African Union and ECOWAS had a two-fold approach to the situation in Mali. This involved giving priority to diplomatic and political efforts, while also preparing for an eventual military intervention in the event of the failure of diplomatic and political approaches. Consequently, efforts were simultaneously made for any eventual military deployment if the need arose. In light of the above, the ECOWAS took steps towards the deployment of a stabilization force in Mali (MICEMA) from early 2012 and the planning meetings was characterised by the active involvement of the AU, UN and other strategic partners.



Following decision to expand the scope of the mission to a continental engagement, Chad expressed interest and readiness to contribute to the planned Mali intervention force. The involvement of Algeria and Mauritania was also considered as crucial to the success of the peace initiatives for Mali. The outcome was the deployment of the Africa-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA). This was in accordance with relevant decisions of the ECOWAS, AU and UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 2085 of December 20, 2012 led by His Excellency, Pierre Buyoya, former President of Burundi.

The mandate of AFISMA as approved by the UNSC included helping to strengthen Mali's defence and security forces, in coordination with the European Union and other partners and supporting the Malian authorities in their primary responsibility to protect the population.⁴⁹ The mandate also include support to the Government of Mali in recovering its territories under the control of terrorist and armed groups, maintain security, and consolidate state authority throughout the country. The AFISMA was further tasked with supporting the Malian authorities in creating a secure environment for the civilian-led delivery of humanitarian assistance and the voluntary return of internally displaced persons and refugees.

The AFISMA was transformed into the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in line with the UN Security Council Resolution 2100 (2013) of April 25, 2013. The MINUSMA was deployed from July 1, 2013, with an authorized troop ceiling of 11,200 military and 1,440 police personnel. At inception, the MINUSMA absorbed the military and police personnel of AFISMA before integrating new elements, and was therefore a "re-hatting" process. The mandate of the MINUSMA has repeatedly being extended yearly since the Security Council Resolution 2164 (2014) of June 25, 2014.



Lessons from Mali

Northern Mali has been a theatre for recurring armed rebellions since its independence in 1960. These crises have their roots in the question of political governance, particularly the issue of management of the ethnic diversity of Malian society, economic governance – in that corruption has hindered the undertaking of many meaningful developmental projects – and the weakness and limited resources of the state. Any attempt to find a lasting solution to these recurrent crises must therefore address these issues.

The criminal and terrorist dimension in the 2011 crisis added to its complexity. The flourishing of terrorism and other forms of transnational organized crime in the Sahara in the build-up to and during this crisis in Mali brought to the fore some of the main challenges facing the region that make it difficult to police effectively. These challenges include the following: (i) the desert nature of much of the region; (ii) the fact that many parts of it, particularly in the Timbuktu and Kidal regions of Mali, the southern parts of Algeria and the northern regions of Niger, are sparsely if at all populated; and (iii) lack of adequate financial and logistical resources at the disposal of governments of the region, particularly Mali and Niger. Some observers have added the apparent complicity of some local communities or even some government agents with the rebels and traffickers. One important lesson here is the need for regional cooperation, for no single country can face, on its own, the whole gamut of these challenges. This is why the AU Commission and the AU Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), which I have headed since its establishment in August 2013, strive to convince the countries of the region to engage in more collaborative work, through what is known as the Nouakchott Process, which was initiated by the AU Commission in March 2013. This Process brings together the chiefs of intelligence and security services of the countries of the region



every two months to discuss the challenges and strategies for strengthening regional cooperation in the areas of information-sharing, border control, and the fight against terrorism, amongst others. The AU is now working on a generic concept of operations for the effective establishment of joint patrols and mixed units along the borders. International involvement in Mali has been remarkable, as shown above, and crucial in the resolution of the complex crises that began in late 2011. This makes Mali very fortunate compared to other countries in similar situations. What this proves, and the lesson to be drawn, is, that when there is a combination of efforts by the various regional and international actors concerned, the chances of success are greater, particularly when there is coordination among them. The Support and Follow-up Group was a successful mechanism to ensure the coordination of efforts of the international community.

Another illustration of this international coordination is the collegial way in which the Ouagadougou Agreement was negotiated and the way in which the Algiers Process is being facilitated. This approach ensures effective complementarity between the various actors and their comparative advantages. Another important lesson to be learned, particularly from the latest Malian crisis, is the acknowledgment of the multidimensional nature of the crisis. This explains why various actors seem to have adopted holistic programs for addressing the root causes of the crisis in Mali, where these causes have manifested themselves into an armed rebellion, but also in other countries where different interventions are aimed at structural conflict prevention. This is very clear in the focus of the Sahel strategies developed by a number of regional and international organizations, particularly the AU, ECOWAS, the UN, and the EU. Almost all of them have identified issues of governance, security and development as their main pillars. The hope is that these strategies are effectively implemented, with true national appropriation and in a context of genuine coordination between all the



actors. Should this happen, chances are great that some of the root causes of recurring conflicts in Mali and elsewhere in the Sahel-Saharan region will be transformed into opportunities for the countries and the people of the region.

The problem is further escalated by the spread of extremist narratives to largely gullible population, heightened poverty arising from drastic reductions in the inflow of remittances from embattled Libya and other accompanying insecurities including porous borders and access to large cache of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) by various non state actors. The combination of domestic response and international interventions has at best prevented the overthrow of De Jure political structures in Bamako (which is largely dependent on external support) but armed resistance still persists such that Mali still suffers the risks of violent extremism.

The MNLA that spearheaded the armed rebellion was comprised mainly of combatants that had fought in Libya and had returned to Mali with their arms following the downfall of the Qaddafi regime in October 2011. The 2011 civil war in Libya, therefore, played an important triggering and/ or aggravating role in the resurgence of armed rebellion in Mali.

As in the 1990s movements, although to a different degree, the MNLA that spearheaded the armed rebellion was comprised mainly of combatants that had fought in Libya and had returned to Mali with their arms following the downfall of the Qaddafi regime in October 2011. The 2011 civil war in Libya, therefore, played an important triggering and/or aggravating role in the resurgence of armed rebellion in Mali. But there are other factors that must be taken into account in any attempt to explain the situation. Among these, one could mention the weakness of the state security apparatus and forces that were unable to defeat the armed groups.



Ultimately, what Mali has been lacking is representativeness, compounded by the fact that the rebel groups that profess to speak for everyone actually speak for very few. Those few should not be ignored, but Bamako's focus needs to be on including everyone else in the country's polity and key institutions. This relates to the question of security, the inefficacy of Mali's armed forces, and their tendency to alienate northerners. Focus must be given to the question of how Mali's army can be changed so that northerners no longer regard it as an "occupying force." Another focus should be on helping Mali's government become more legitimate in the eyes of northerners. The idea of bringing traditional chiefs on board to involve them is intriguing and merits further consideration. Similarly, the chiefs and other community leaders might well hold the key for local contributions to maintaining security. Niger also offers important lessons with respect to alternative government policies, approaches to integrating Tuareg in government, and the value of development-focused policies. Finally, it should also be clear that there is no quick fix for Mali. Mali's terrorism problem is nested within a larger security problem, which is, in turn, nested within several other problems, ranging from economic constraints to governance.



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ANALYZING THE ISIS THREAT IN AFRICA

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ABSTRACT

The continuous presence and activities of ISIS and allied organization pose serious threat to security in Africa especially in countries where they are rampant. This paper provides analysis of the ISIS threat in Africa; provide stakeholders, structural and responses analysis of the impasse. The study also provides structural analysis in terms of the political, social and security implication of the presence of ISIS as well as the response strategies that have so far been implemented by various stakeholders to address the menace of the ISIS insurgency. A preponderance of the information gathered revealed that, the ISIS threat in Africa is real as the number of fighters in the nine cells in the continent are alarming. From the stakeholder analysis it was also found that the main primary stakeholders of the ISIS insurgency include religious and minority groups, citizens, State actors and governments of ISIS operational areas. The secondary stakeholders include organizations such as the UN, AU and ECOWAS, government of foreign countries and many local and international Civil Society Organizations. The study also observed that the structural dynamics of the operations of ISIS has been changing along religious belief system and politics as well as social beliefs while causing security threats. The paper therefore recommends among other things that efforts be made to improve education and economic development to prevent many youth from joining the group either as a result of ignorance or poverty.

Key words: Islamic States (IS), conflict, security, stakeholder analysis, and terrorism,



Introduction

In the last two to three decades, one of the strongest security threats the world has had to grapple with is the rise of “Islamic State (ISIS)” militant groups. With operations across continent they have been responsible for some of the gruesome killing of many people and destruction of properties. At the early years of operation, it was quite understandable that their targets were the West and their attacks were concentrated in these countries. While they continue to be a danger and security threat to the West, there have spread into other continents with Africa as one with significant presence.

Arguable, ISIS has been one of the most formidable and well-organized terrorist groups in history and is unlikely to cease operations anytime soon. Many scholars are predicting that a more likely scenario for the group following decades of struggles in the Middle East is that the group, along with its many followers, the group may attempt to disperse to a new base, with Africa as a possible destination (Warner and Hulme, 2018; Browne, 2018; Griffin, 2018 and Stout, 2014). This prediction is supported by the increasing number of bases and fighters the organisation has been aligned with in many African countries.

As noted by Mannik, (2009), terrorists’ groups such the ISIS have gone beyond the concepts of instilling fear, creating awareness for a particular cause and forcing governments to change specific policies, to tangible and disruptive objective like the creation of viable political and administrative political units. Traditional terrorist groups rely on tactics like suicide bombings and armed assaults have evolved to include other forms of attacks like asymmetric warfare, cyber warfare, cultural warfare, airplane-borne suicide bombing, the use of conventional military strategies and tactics, lone actor terrorist, and genocidal and fratricidal attacks (Mannik,



2009). As a result of these new formats of terrorism, the political and territorial landscapes of states in the international political system have been greatly altered. This is evident by the fact that although ISIS claim their ideology, political and social existence is rooted in Islam, this has however do not stopped them from targeting Muslims and their religious places of worship. To be able appreciate and counteract their activities, it is therefore necessary identify the key stakeholders of concern in their operation, provide a structural analysis of their operations and evaluate the response action that have been used on them.

Background History of ISIS

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Islamic State of Al-Sham or simply Islamic State (IS) is an extremist terrorist organisation and former unrecognized proto-state that follows the fundamentalist Sunni Islamic doctrine of Salafi. They were previously referred to as Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The ISIL were first noted in the global stage in the early part of 2014 when they drove Iraqi government forces out of key cities in its Western Iraq offensive and follow up with the capture of Mosul and massacre of Sinjar. According to Zelin (2014), ISIL was founded in 1999 by a Jordanian named Abu Musab al-Zarqawi under the name *Jamā'at al-Tawhīdwa-al-Jihād* which is translated as “The Organisation of Monotheism and Jihad”).

Following the 2003 invasion of Iraq by Western forces, al-Zarqawi and *Jama'at al-Tawhidwal-Jihad* achieved notoriety in the early stages of the Iraqi insurgency for their suicide attacks on Shia mosques, civilians, Iraqi government institutions and Italian soldiers involved the US-led ‘Multi-National Force’. In October 2004 al-Zarqawi swore loyalty to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda and renamed the group *Tanzīm Qā'idat al-Jihād fi Bilād al-Rāfidayn*, translated as The Organisation of Jihad's Base



in Mesopotamia also known as al-Qaeda in Iraq [AQI] (Whitlock, 2006). In January 2006, AQI in collaboration with several smaller Iraqi Sunni insurgent groups formed an umbrella organisation called the Mujahideen Shura Council (MSC).

On 12 October 2006, MSC united with three smaller groups and six Sunni tribes to form the Mutayibeen Coalition, pledging “To rid Sunnis from the oppression of the rejectionists) and the crusader occupiers ... to restore rights even at the price of our own lives ... to make Allah’s word supreme in the world, and to restore the glory of Islam”(Roggio, 2006). A day later, MSC declared the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), comprising Iraq’s six mostly Sunni Arab governorates, with Abu Omar al-Baghdadi its emir and al-Masri Minister of War within ISI’s ten-member cabinet.

On 8 April 2013, al-Baghdadi released an audio statement in which he announced that the al-Nusra Front had been established, financed, and supported by ISI and that the two groups were merging under the name Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIL, Al-Sham also translates as the Levant). However, Abu Mohammad al-Julani and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leaders of al-Nusra and al-Qaeda respectively, rejected the merger. Al-Julani issued a statement denying the merger, and complaining that neither he nor anyone else in al-Nusra’s leadership had been consulted about it. In June 2013, Al Jazeera reported that it had obtained a letter written by al-Qaeda’s leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, addressed to both leaders, in which he ruled against the merger, and appointed an emissary to oversee relations between them to put an end to tensions. That same month, al-Baghdadi released an audio message rejecting al-Zawahiri’s ruling and declaring that the merger was going ahead.

On 29 June 2014, ISIL proclaimed itself to be a worldwide caliphate. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi – known by his supporters as Amir al-Mu’minin, Caliph



Ibrahim – was named its caliph, and the group renamed itself *ad-Dawlah al-Islāmiyah* (“*Islamic State*” (*IS*)). As a “Caliphate”, it claims religious, political and military authority over all Muslims worldwide. The concept of it being a caliphate and the name “Islamic State” have been rejected by governments and Muslim leaders worldwide. In June and July 2014, Jordan and Saudi Arabia moved troops to their borders with Iraq, after the Iraqi government lost control of (or withdrew from) strategic crossing points that then came under the control of either ISIL or tribes that supported it. There was speculation that Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki had ordered a withdrawal of troops from the Iraq–Saudi crossings in order “to increase pressure on Saudi Arabia and bring the threat of ISIS over-running its borders as well”.

Islamic State Fighter in Africa

The emergence of ISIS affiliated groups in Africa is said to have begun when Jund al-Khilafa, or the “Soldiers of the Caliphate,” pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Algeria in September 2014 (Stout, 2014). One month after this, the Shura Youth Council, a band of 300 fighters in the city of Derna, Libya, comprised largely of Libyans who had fought in the Battar Brigade in Syria’s civil war, followed suit, pledging allegiance to the Islamic State. As of now there are about nine of such groups in Africa namely Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWA (P)), Islamic State in Sinai, Islamic State in Libya (ISL), Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS), Islamic State in Somalia (ISS), Islamic State in Tunisia, Islamic State in Egypt, Islamic State in Algeria Province (ISAP) and Islamic State in Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda (ISSKTU).

Increasingly ISIS groups are formed across the African continent with fighters growing in alarming proportions. Although the exact number of the fighter cells and the number of militants is hard to know, the approximations



made by various intelligence agencies present a worrisome situation. Generally, there is scarcity of detailed open-source data on Islamic State cells in Africa, but institutions and intelligence agencies have been able to approximately estimate the fighter cells of ISIS in Africa. For groups such as the Islamic State in Libya and in Egypt (Sinai), as well as on the Islamic State's West Africa Province (formerly Boko Haram), journalistic accounts of smaller Islamic State cells are rare, and existing work only occasionally reports on fighter number (Warner and Hulme, 2018). One of the reasons why it is difficult at estimates of ISIS cells and fighters particularly for small groups is largely because the numbers are constantly changing couple with poor information gathering and efforts by the group to prevent information about their sizes from becoming public.

Notwithstanding the difficulty in gathering data on ISIS fighters, the author through perusal of open-source information from news organizations, think-tanks, governments, and international organizations and published materials have identified and solicited estimates of ISIS cells in Africa, the number of fighters and their operational areas. Key among the materials that have provided valuable information on these groups include Warner and Hulme (2018) publication on "the Islamic State in Africa: Estimating Fighter Numbers in Cells across the Continent" published by Combating Terrorism Center at West Point; reports of the US intelligence agency, U.N. estimates as cited in Nichols (2015), "Islamic State in Libya hampered by lack of fighters published by Reuters on December 1, 2015; US Department of Defense by David M. Rodriguez on 7th April, 2016 among others.

The resultant estimates from the preponderance of sources consulted which are yet at best tentative are presented in Table 1. Clearly from the numbers presented in Table 1, Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWA (P)) has the highest number of fighters in Africa and estimated to be 3500 fighters with the Islamic State in Algeria Province (ISAP) and Islamic

State in Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda (ISSKTU) having the least number of fighters as 25 each. Based on the estimates in Table 1, it is noted that cumulatively the number of ISIS fighters in all the cells in Africa is approximately 6050.

Table 1: ISIS cells in Africa and number of fighters

ISIS cells	Number of Fighters
Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWA(P))	3500
Islamic State in Sinai	1250
Islamic State in Libya (ISL)	500
Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS)	425
Islamic State in Somalia (ISS)	150
Islamic State in Tunisia	100
Islamic State in Egypt	75
Islamic State in Algeria Province (ISAP)	25
Islamic State in Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda (ISSKTU)	25

Source: Warner and Hulme (2018)

Stakeholder Analysis

Just as in every conflict, there are stakeholders or actors who are involved at different stages of the conflict or have interest in the matter. Stakeholder analysis involve the detailed process of identifying individuals and groups who has interest in the subject of consideration and may affect or be affected directly or indirectly by actions in relation to the issue of interest (Gunaratna and Oreg, 2010). Basically different stakeholders, support, oppose or are indifferent to the issue or subject of consideration. With regards to the ISIS impasse, it has been noted that that different stakeholders provide atmosphere, expertise, financing and



power to oppose or promote their operation. Based on the extent to which individuals, group(s) or institution(s) are affected or can influence their operation, there are classified as primary and secondary stakeholders or shadow actors.

There are observable groups and organisations that can be classified as primary stakeholders of the ISIS impasse. To be classified primary stakeholder, the group and individual must be seen to be ultimately affected, either positively or negatively by the activities of the organisation under consideration, in this case ISIS. The primary stakeholders are easy to identify and physically present on the surface and activities of the ISIS. Across Africa, ISIS primary stakeholders include Religious and minority groups, citizens, State actors and governments of ISIS operational areas, Founder and leaders of the ISI group (Abu Musab al-Zarqawi).

There are preponderance of reports and evidence that have suggested in addition to the above individuals and groups as primary stakeholders, other organisations and groups also have a stake in the affairs of ISIS in Africa. These groups and individuals who can be grouped as secondary stakeholders include the UN, US and France and other Non-Africa nations and organisation that taken interest in the ISIS impasse in Africa. Although these nations and individuals are not directly affected by the presence of ISIS in Africa, there have become stakeholders by virtue of their support and actions taken in the wake of the impasse in Africa. To this extent there are considered secondary stakeholders.

Structural Analysis of the ISIS in Africa

Ultimately, the question of ISIS in Africa is complicated by the intricacies of local, state, and regional variation; competing factions and shifting loyalties, as well as the evolving situation within the continent. Each of these issues could provide its own opportunity for a deep dive



for structural analysis of the ISIS situation in Africa. In this section, the author seeks to provide an overview of the various considerations at play in influencing the structure of ISIS operations in Africa.

Political

ISIS's initial objectives and ideology did not make Africa a natural priority for the group. Yet since 2014 the group has expanded its influence on the continent through a network of affiliates in West, North and East African regions. North Africa was most significant for ISIS, with affiliate groups in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt. In West Africa and the Sahel regions the presence of ISIS is notably influenced by socio-economic conditions and local political grievances. Based on the initial ideals of ISIS, Africa did seem to be a direct target but over the years the group through its numerous affiliates seek to avenge military offenses against some Africa countries with the aim of destroying any political or social activity associated with Western society.

ISIL's prospects in North Africa hinge to a considerable extent on the future of the region's politics, especially in Libya. Ongoing tensions between rival political and armed factions in Libya continue to threaten to escalate into a high-intensity civil conflict, with destabilizing effects for the rest of the region. Spillover from Libya would test Tunisia's already fragile young democracy. Algeria's political future is similarly uncertain, given the lack of a clear successor to the ailing president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Political turmoil could provide ISIL with the

opening it needs to rebuild its flagging networks.

Social

The activities of ISIS in the Sahel and West Africa have resulted in a burgeoning state of worsening humanitarian crisis. Innocent civilian in



their homes, markets, schools, churches, and hospitals are displaced by bombing and attacks by ISIS. Boko Haram, an affiliate of ISSI alone have displayed more than 470,000 people in Nigeria leading to the establishment of refugees camps and other social interventions. However with increasing military expenditure, governments of nation affected by ISIS tend to limited resources to dedicate to economic development and key areas of socioeconomic development.

What with the increasing presence of ISIS in the Sahel is a social imperialism that seems to be gaining ground in the affected countries. In many of the Jihadist hotspot especially northern Nigeria and the Lake Chad basin region; the Horn of Africa; and Mali and its neighbours in the Sahel region there is an increasing acceptance of the ISIS ideology and message. Several incidence of the social influence of ISIS in these regions have been reported. For instance the Sudanese government in October 2015 confirmed that 70 of its nationals had joined ISIS in Syria or Libya. In South Africa, more than 20 people, including eight families with children, are reported to have travelled to the so-called 'caliphate'. ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi has shown an interest in establishing new provinces in Africa. This circumstance if continue will make the ISIS ideology popular and difficult to eliminate from the affected societies.

Security

The security implication of ISIS presence in the Sahel and West Africa has long been a subject of international and global discussion. Countries that have been attacked by ISIS are regarded unsafe in the eyes of the global community. This is also evident by low rating of such countries in Global Peace Index. In some cases there are already existing security threats and that get heightened by the presence of ISIS. According Hadiza (2015), factors such as (local) ethnic tensions, social and economic



dislocation, geography, political instability, weak public institutions, demographic challenges, poverty and unemployment, underdevelopment, and ungoverned spaces all contribute to making the African continent an appealing one to ISIS in terms of developing and strengthening affiliates — particularly in Egypt, Libya, and the Sahel (Barfi). ISIS's cause is also furthered by a growth in the Sahel and Sahara of radical interpretations of Islam and violent extremism (Boukhars). Therefore, it is apparent that in some cases the activity of ISIS flamed up existing social and economic lapses that have security implications.

Response Analysis

There are different ways that stakeholders respond to the ISIS crisis. Some of the known response mechanisms to the activities of ISIS are follows;

Dissociation and Criticism from Islamic World

As groups that claim to be promoting Islamic ideology and religion, dissociation of the Islamic religion from the group constitute a significant response mechanism. Around the world, Islamic religious leaders have overwhelmingly condemned ISIS/ISIL's ideology and actions, arguing that the group has strayed from the path of true Islam and that its actions do not reflect the religion's real teachings or virtues (Hassan, 2015). All divisions of Islam have dissociated themselves from ISIL referring to them as Khawarijes. Islamic scholars have also described the group as neither Sunnis nor Shia although they claimed to be true Islam. Sunni critics, including Salafi and jihadist muftis such as Adnan al-Aroor and Abu Basir al-Tartusi, say that ISIL and related terrorist groups are not Sunnis, but are instead modern-day Kharijites (Muslims who have stepped outside the mainstream of Islam) serving an imperial anti-Islamic agenda (The Economist, 6 September 2014).



Designation as a terrorist organisation

Another response to the ISIL/ISIS group is designating and announcing them as terrorist. The United Nations Security Council in its Resolution 1267 (1999) described Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda associates as operators of a network of terrorist training camps. The UN's Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee first listed ISIL in its Sanctions List under the name "Al-Qaida in Iraq" on 18 October 2004, as an entity/group associated with al-Qaeda. On 2 June 2014, the group was added to its listing under the name "Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant". Besides the UN, many world leaders and government spokespeople have called ISIL a terrorist group or banned it, without their countries having formally designated it as such. Germany, Switzerland, Pakistan are some of the countries that have regarded ISIL as terrorist group. In both the Sahel and West African countries including Nigeria and the other countries that ISIS have made attacks, there have been referred to as terrorist groups.

Counter Military Attack

Over 60 countries are directly or indirectly waging war against ISIL. As recent as October 2017, attack from affiliates of self-proclaimed Islamic State on U.S. special operations forces in Niger and other part of Nigeria were met with counter military attack. In all Africa countries that have experienced the presence of ISIS, military actions have been taken to eliminate the group from the countries' territory.



Conclusions

The emergence of ISIS in Africa although quite recent has been attributed to many destructions and formation of allied groups. This notwithstanding, efforts to address the threat they pose has not been visibly successful. This study examined the activities of interest groups and response measures. Clearly, the wide criticism and opprobrium of public towards the group, dissociation and criticism from Islamic world, designation as a terrorist organisation and counter military attack meted to the group has not eliminate them. It is therefore concluded, that new and novel response measures informed by in-depth security intelligence need to be put in place.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are suggested for dealing with the menace of ISIS.

- There is the need for a well-designed and coordinated extra-ordinary intelligence networks. The authorities in charge of security such as the military and police service need to use a smart and extra ordinary intelligence networks in order to be able to combat the cell groups of ISIS in Africa. Intelligence needs to be gathered, coordinated and shared among the various agencies in ECOWAS, AU and UN.
- Shadow actors and sponsors of the ISIS should be identified, expose and dealt with in accordance with applicable laws.
- There is also the need to de-emphasize religion and politics from the ISIS debate and treat it as security issues Black, I (2014). "Saudi Arabia rejects Iraqi accusations of Isis support". The Guardian. Retrieved 19 June 2014



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WORDS CANNOT BE FOUND: TERRORISM AND EXTREME VIOLENCE IN ANGLOPHONE CAMEROON, 2016-2018

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ABSTRACT

This article focuses on terrorism and extreme violence in Anglophone Cameroon between 2016 and 2018. It takes into account what has become the Anglophone problem and conflict in Cameroon political chessboard and has made news in the national and international media. The pith and kernel of the paper is that terrorism has been given a new fillip in Cameroon. Who has given it? For whom and to whom does the terminology is applied in the two years that has witnessed it and extreme violence? On 21 November 2016, the Anglophone lawyers and teachers called for an indefinite strike asking the government of Cameroon to maintain the bijural nature of the legal system as well as the British-inspired subsystem of education which was being assimilated and sub-colonized by the French system of education and culture. By 'sub-colonize', we mean that France had colonized French Cameroun and French Cameroun is attempting to establish a further subordinate colony in Anglophone Cameroon. The strike paralyzed the education sector, and Common Law lawyers were brutalized by the military for attempting a peaceful march to express their grievances after memos to the government fell on deaf ears. This strike in 2016 was the result of longstanding and ongoing marginalization and the attempted assimilation and sub-colonization of the Anglophones and their identity in Cameroon. The causes of the conflict goes as far back as 1961, when



the Cameroun Republic and the British Southern Cameroons gave up their identities and became known simply as East and West Cameroon states in the new Federal Republic of Cameroon.

Keywords: Ambazonia, Assimilation, Marginalisation, Terrorism, Violence

Introduction

On Wednesday 27 July 2018, Gam Lambert Ful, a young man who had just clocked 50 years, a worker with Cam Water (a water cooperation in Cameroon) in Njinikom, Njinikom sub Division, Boyo Division of Northwest Cameroon, married and a father of four children was pulled out of his house in front of his wife, parents and his own children at 11:30pm by an armada of young men armed with Dane guns and by 5:45am he was found in his own pool of blood. He had been shot directly at his heart. Words could not be found to describe such a horrific, harrowing and heinous act; an act of extreme barbarism and at best ferociousness. Onlookers stood speechless looking at a corpse of a person who the previous day was ebullient and waxing with life. Lambert's case was not an isolated one as it has become a daily occurrence in Anglophone Cameroon since 2016, where kidnapping cases either carried out by the Cameroon armed forces or the Ambazonia restoration forces ends up consuming the lives of innocent citizens. Some have been found without heads as well as arms amputated. This article is about terrorism and extreme violence in Anglophone Cameroon between 2016 and 2018.

Anglophone Cameroon is the present South West and North West Regions of the country. This region was known between 1961 and 1972 as



the Federal State of West Cameroon. The South west region is divided into six administrative units known as divisions and this include Fako, Kupé Manengouba, Lebialem, Manyu, Meme, and Ndian. The administrative units are broken down into subdivisions and districts. Politically at the helm of the region is the Governor who is assisted by Senior Divisional Officers (*préfets*) who are appointed to govern divisions and sub Divisional Officers (*sous-préfets*) to govern the subdivisions. The Northwest Region is the third most populated in Cameroon with one major metropolitan city, Bamenda, with several satellite towns such as Wum, Kumbo, Mbengwi, Ndop, Nkambé, Batibo, Fundong, Bali, Bambui and Njikwa. According to the 2010 census population of the region has increased from 1.2 million in 1987 to an estimated 1.8 million. Like other regions in Cameroon, the North West Region is made up of administrative divisions. The region was created in 1972 after the hastily organized referendum with five divisions namely Bui, Donga-Mantung, Menchum, Mezam, and Momo. In 1992, following a Presidential Decree, the number of Divisions were increased to seven. These were: Boyo, which was carved out of Menchum Division, and Ngo-Ketunjia, split from Mezam Division. Each division is further subdivided, with a total of thirty-one total subdivisions in the Northwest Region. The administrative machinery of this region is the same as the Southwest region. The population of this region is 5 million out of a total population of 24 million. Geographically it occupies 1/5 of the total land surface and harbours the country's richest natural resources.

The article argues that terrorism is not always static and that the government as well as the “other” could as well be terrorist. Consequently, the essay questions, what is terrorism? Who coins the term and in which context? Who is a terrorist? And what are the characteristics of terrorism? Until we start understanding the nuances of such a concept we will not grasp fully its holistic meaning. There are many arguments of terrorism and the basic



assumption is that it always refers to the “other”. In other words governments which always claim legitimacy and righteousness always see other groups which want to claim legitimacy as terrorists. Therefore terrorism is always pertaining to the minority groups who are searching for autonomy or recognition in political spaces.

Prior to the 11 September 2001 attack on the twin tower of World Trade Centre (WTC) in New York, the word, terrorism had been silent amongst the nations of the world. After that incident the United Nations has been at the forefront of the global campaign against terrorism giving the campaign legitimacy and universality. The UN Security Council acted with remarkable speed and immediately evoked its Resolution 1373 and set up the Counter Terrorism Committee with extensive powers. Its United Kingdom Chairman provided able leadership but reservations over human rights issues, lack of funding for assistance, and the danger of duplicating the work of other UN bodies with specific mandates have been revealed as deficiencies. The UN General assembly condemned the events of 9/11 and held debates on the subject later. The Secretariat's views were expressed by several eloquent statements of the UN Secretary-General. Counter terrorism is only one tool in tackling terrorism. Human rights concerns must be addressed. A separate, functional commission under the Economic and Social Council is recommended to provide the international community with a universal forum for a focused discussion on terrorism (Dhanapala, 2015)

Conceptualising Terrorism and extreme violence in Cameroon

The word terrorism has become a buzzword today in both national and international politics. It has received a plethora of literature as well as multifarious meanings. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) defines terrorism as the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a Government, the civilian population, or



any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004) defines terrorism as a criminal act, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act. Even acting as the policeman of the world since 1946, this definition is still wrap in obscurity and less binding. It apparently lacks any legal binding in international law (Onuoha, 2013). This is because there has not been any consensus or compromise on the definition of the concept just like in most concepts in social sciences. According to his regional expose on terrorism, Onuoha (2013), contends that the lack of consensus is compounded by the persistent debate within scholarly and diplomatic circles on whether states could be regarded as terrorist or what has better been termed as state terrorism in other circles. It is perceived and seen differently by different scholars and observers (Cronin, 2004: 40)

However, notwithstanding the above observation, there exists a plethora of literature on terrorism and we can only take up a few. In his missive, *Terrorist Trap*, Simon (1994) suggested no fewer than 212 different definitions of terrorism and that out of this 90 of them are used by governments and other institutions. Randu (2002; 275) defines terrorism as “any attack, or threat of attack, against unarmed targets, intended to influence, change or divert major political decisions.” Furthermore, Wardlaw (1982:3), terrorism refers to “the use, or threat of use of violence by an individual or a group, whether acting for or in opposition to established authority, when such action is designed to create extreme anxiety and or fear including effects in a target group larger than immediate victims with the purpose of coercing that group into acceding to the political demands



of the perpetrators” What is terrorism? Who coins the term and in which context? Who is a terrorist? And what are the characteristics of terrorism? Until we start understanding the nuances of such a concept we will not grasp fully its holistic meaning. There are many arguments of terrorism and the basic assumption is that it always refers to the “other”. In other words governments which always claim legitimacy always see other groups which want to claim legitimacy as terrorists. Therefore terrorism is always pertaining to the minority groups who are searching for autonomy or recognition in political spaces.

A closer look at the various definitions of terrorism suggests that its redlines tends to give the impression that all forms of prohibited violence-violence with political and ideological coloration as terrorism by the state. It insinuates that any form organized resistance against the legitimacy of the state is terrorism according to the defenders of the state. However, such branding has come under serious contestations. Yet it is a truism that post-colonial African states are mired in a pool of social, economic and political challenges. The 1990s ushered in a brief period of democracy whose concrete role in solving its copious problems remain a forlorn cry of disillusionment and political frustrations in most of the African countries.

In Cameroon, in particular, the role of democracy in societal transformation and nation-building has been compromised by political and social structures created during more than three decades of autocratic rule that still underline the practical and moral workings of the state today. Western democracy remains mired in rigging cleavages that find expression in parochial tendencies ranging from divide and rule to ethnicity and to regionalism being orchestrated by the state’s political elites and those loyal to the ruling regime in a neo-patrimonial manner (Nkwi, 2013). As a result, the ability to mobilise all and sundry towards a meaningful democratic culture and development is limited. In this context good governance



has remained, for the vast majority of Cameroonians, illusory. With the end of the Cold War which characterised world politics since 1945, the United States of America and Europe have descended on the continent and re-launched a crusade for democracy without paying any attention to the structures which could harness meaningful democratic culture and development (Nkwi, 2006).

In Cameroon “the politics of the belly” (Bayart, 1989); politics of divide and rule; clientelism and patrimonialism; unbridled embezzlement of state resources and uneven of the sharing of national cake; the criminalization of the state (Bayart et. al); the politics of inclusion and exclusion as well as the marginalization of the minority has become the order of the day. These vices have collectively and individually given birth to many factions in Anglophone Cameroon with different aspirations but almost all looking for a redress of the imbalances which this part of the state has suffered since 1961 in the hands of the Francophone led political elites.

In turn the Francophone led government has branded these Anglophone groups who have stood as restorationists and federalists as terrorists. Such naming has been borne out of emotion and assumed pretence and near lack of understanding and appreciation of why the groups are behaving the way they are doing. This could simply be explained by the fact that it is organized violence seeking to redress grievances against the state which is claiming legitimacy. Bruce Hoffman, Professor of Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service in his *Inside Terrorism*, provides an understanding of the historical evaluation of the concept and mind-set. While analysing the new adversaries motivations and tactics of global terrorism he, amongst other things said:

Terrorism is a pejorative term. It is a word with intrinsically negative connotations that is generally applied to one’s enemies and



opponents or to those with whom one disagrees and would otherwise prefer to ignore. Hence, those decisions to call someone or label some organizations ‘terrorists’ becomes almost unavoidably subjective, depending largely on whether one sympathises with or opposes the person, group, and cause concerned. If one identifies with the victim of the violence, for example, then the act is terrorism. If however, one identifies with the perpetrator the violent act is regarded in a more sympathetic if not positive (or worst, an ambivalent) light and it is not terrorism (Hoffman, 1998:32-33).

No other definition could have fitted in the Cameroon situation than what Hoffman insinuated here.

Cameroons Terrorism: An appreciation

By Cameroons terrorism I simply mean terrorism in Cameroon context. Terrorism has long been in Cameroon political chemistry predating the 2016 uprisings and new appellations of the word. This goes back to 1962 following the defeat of the *Union des Populations du Cameroun* rebellion which in earnest started in the last decades of the French colonial administration in Cameroon and soon engulfed the entire Sanaga-Maritime region extending its tentacles to the British Southern Cameroons and the Eastern Grass fields of Cameroon. By using the French colonial forces, divide and rule tactics and finally branding the rebellion to be communist inclined (Joseph, 1977). Two years after independence, President Ahidjo passed into law in 1962, anti-subversion law.

It was an emergency law passed then to speedily combat the high wave of terrorism that prevailed in the country in the early days of independence. Cases tried on this law circumvented the normal judicial process in the regular courts and went to military courts which are supposed to be speedier with no appeals except with presidential interventions to reduce or cancel the court sentence. Most persons tried under the 1962 statute were either



sentenced to death or to one of the political prisons which were actually torture houses as most of its inmates came back less human, if at all (Ndefru, 1990:8)

In 2014 President Paul Biya (one of the longest serving presidents in the world), promulgated into law, Law No. 2014/028 of 23 December 2014 on the suppression of acts of terrorism. This was following the Boko Haram insurgency which has been operating in the North and Far North regions of the country in an attempt to carve out a caliphate. Amongst other things, the purpose and scope stated that, the law relates to the suppression of the acts of terrorism; the provisions of the penal code, the criminal procedure code and the military justice code that are not repugnant to this law shall remain applicable while offences provided for in this law shall fall under the jurisdiction of military tribunals.

Section two of that law dealt with offences and penalties relating to acts of terrorism and maintain *inter alia*: Whoever, acting alone as an accomplice or accessory, commits or threatens to commit an act likely to cause death, endanger physical integrity, cause bodily injury or material damage, destroy natural resources, the environment or cultural heritage with intent to: a). Intimidate the public, provoke a situation of terror or face the victim, the government and/or a national or international organization to carry out or refrain. From carrying out an act, adopt or renounce a particular position; b). Disrupt the national functioning of public services, the delivery of essential services to the public to create a crisis situation among the public; c). Create widespread insurrection in the country; d) shall be punished with the death penalty.... Section three provides acts of terrorism and these acts maintain, whoever directly or indirectly provides and/or collects funds and provides or offers or collects funds with the aim of financing acts of terrorism and by whatever means, shall be punished with the death penalty and the financing of terrorism shall be deemed to have been perpetrated even where the goods



are collected and the services are offered in the territory of another. Section four is about laundering of proceeds of terrorism which whoever, procures, receives, keeps, converts, dissimulates or disguises goods that are proceeds or acts of terrorism; partakes in the use or sharing even occasionally, of proceeds of acts of terrorism, shall be punished with the death penalty. Section five handled recruitment and training and maintains that whoever recruits and or trains people to participate in the act of terrorism, regardless of where they are committed, shall be punished with a death penalty and this penalty shall be applied to whoever offers promises gifts, presents or any kind of benefit to another with the intention of getting the later to be part of a group that has been established or a deal reached to commit acts of terrorism; threatens or pressurizes another to be part of a group that has been established or a deal reached to commit acts of terrorism; whoever deliberately joins or undergoes training in a terrorist group with intent to commit acts of terrorism within the country, shall be punished with imprisonment of from ten to twenty years; In the cases provided for the subsection (2) above, the offence shall be deemed to have been committed even where urging someone to be part of the group or deal fail to materialize. Section eight states that whoever publicly acclaims acts of terrorism shall be punished with imprisonment of, from fifteen to twenty years or a fine of, from twenty-five million francs (25,000,000) FCFA to fifty million (50,000,000) or both such imprisonment and fine. Section nine maintains that whoever makes of a false statement of defamatory report to an administrative or judicial authority pursuant to section 7 and 16 of this law shall be punished with imprisonment of twenty years.

Coined in a typical *letter de cachet* fashion in the 16 and 17th centuries France, a closer look at the meaning and the act to suppress terrorism according to the Cameroon government has been condemned by several critics as illogically matured. This is borne out of a government which seems to have apparently lost legitimacy with the people whom she is governing.



Cameroon is a democratic country when it comes to making laws and putting structures in place. The influence of the state is really felt only when violence is concern. Repression has become the watchword of the regime since 1962 and has taken a higher velocity since the 1990s. In most African countries, the repressive and ideological apparatus are used interchangeably because the state always wants to balance the two but in Cameroon the repressive apparatus is omnipresent and is used most of the time. Police and military camps have become sites of fear and intimidation to the population. To most of the population gendarmes, police and soldiers are simply worse than tigers and hyenas.

The difference between the Suppression of terrorism law of 2014 with the subversion law of 1962 is so tiny and shows a country that since independence has been battling with what she calls terrorism. The Anglophone groups who have been labelled terrorist emerged to redress some of the grievances that have plagued this part of the country stretching as far back as 1961 and it is important that we appreciate these grievances before focusing on extreme violence. The military has been employed at all levels to deal with issues that have been branded as terrorism. The Anglophones assume that they have been marginalized for close to 50 years since they came into union with their “brothers” in French Cameroon. An attempt to demand for a redress of their grievances has led to the government to call and brand most of them as terrorist. It is relevant to examine in details their assumed grievances and the government’s reaction to such “dissenting voices”.

The Anglophone grievances and the beginnings of terrorism and extreme violence

For a better understanding of extreme violence and terrorism in Anglophone Cameroon it is relevant to know the background to these twin concepts. The Anglophone regions of the Cameroon – the South-West and



North-West - make up approximately 20% of the country's population, 5 of the 24 million people. Many of their grievances date back to the early 1960s, when these regions were included in the newly established, mostly French-speaking, Republic of Cameroon. Appreciation of the Anglophone conflict in Cameroon and the longer term historical background of the country is important. Although there are various accounts and counter accounts about the origin of the state of Cameroon, the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that Cameroon is a child of the Berlin Conference of 1884, after which it became a German protectorate for 30 years (Mbembe, 1986; Ngoh, 2001; Johnson, 1970; Ardener, 1967). Using outright force after containing all the dissenting voices, the Germans succeeded in creating what became known in western jargon as a "modern Kamerun." Their brief stay of the Germans came to an end with the First World War in which the Anglo-French and Belgian forces succeeded in pushing them out of Cameroon (Elango, 1987; Fanso, 1989; Ngoh, 2001). However, the Germans had strengthened Cameroon's participation in the "international economy" (Ardener, 1967). Germany had introduced a plantation complex, in which many cash crops were cultivated, including cocoa, coffee, rubber, and palm oil. Germans also started a modern transportation network and a modern or western-styled system of administration (Rudin, 1938).

The First World War rendered Cameroon an international orphan. From 1916, Cameroon became "two Cameroons" – the English and French Cameroons – which were administered as separate entities, first under the League of Nations Mandate and then under the United Nations Trusteeship. This has been elaborately captured in the literature of Cameroon historiography (Ardener *et. al.* 1960; Ardener, 1967: 285-337; Johnson, 1970; Rubin, 1971; Joseph, 1978; Kofele-Kale, 1980; Fanso, 1985: 23-43; Mbuagbaw *et. al.* 1987; Chiabi 1989: 170-199; Njeuma, 1989; Ebune, 1992; Ngoh, 1996 and 2001; Milne, 1999; Mbile, 2000; Awasom, 2004: 86-116).



During the interregnum years of 1914 to 1916, the French and British attempted a joint administration of the territory which quickly collapsed because of disagreements over authority and territorial control (Elango, 1987; Fanso, 1989). France and Britain resorted to the partition of the territory as war booty and to administering it under the mandate of the League of Nations from 1922 to 1945 and under the United Nations Trusteeship from 1946 to 1961. Britain took one-fifth of the territory and administered it as part of the Southern Provinces of Nigeria and later as part of the Eastern Region of Nigeria. France took four-fifths and administered it as part of French Equatorial Africa. After the Second World War, Africa experienced winds of change. Those colonies that had not already become independent, demanded independence from their erstwhile colonial masters. On January 1, 1960, French Cameroon obtained independence from France. On October 1, 1961, British Cameroons gained independence, and reunification, through a plebiscite organized by the United Nations (UN) on 11 February 1961. However, in April 1961, the General Assembly of the United Nations had voted by a majority for the independence of Southern Cameroons. It is this vote, contained in a UN resolution, that separatists, also called restorationists, reference today when calling for a breakaway of English-speaking Cameroon from the Republic of Cameroon.

The two territories, which had been under different colonial administrations, became the Federal Republic of Cameroon, which lasted from 1961 to 1972 (Fanso, 1999; Kale, 1967). In a hastily organized referendum in 1972, federal structures were superseded, and replaced by the United Republic of Cameroon (Fanso, 1989; Chem Langhee, 1995; Bayart, 1993). Ahmadu Ahidjo, its first president, resigned in 1982, and power changed hands to his constitutional successor, Paul Biya. Two years into Biya's presidency, through a Presidential Decree, the name of Cameroon was unilaterally changed from the United Republic of Cameroon to the Republic



of Cameroon, which was the same name that French-speaking Cameroon had at its independence on January 1, 1960. The implication and interpretation of such an action suggest that the Anglophone territory was not part of the francophone state, so to say. To a large extent, their assumptions are tenable. If the name of the country was changed through a popular vote the interpretation would have been different.

The Anglophone minority constitutes 20 percent of the total population of Cameroon; the Anglophone provinces constitute one-fifth of the total land surface of the country. The Anglophone minority has cried foul at their marginalization, assimilation and sub-colonization by the Francophone-led government. These people claim the right to exist as citizens of Cameroon and to be treated as equals with other Cameroonians. They decry marginalization and treatment as second-class citizens. In as much as the conflict is touted as having to do with intergroup relations, the Francophone political elite have been at the centre of Anglophone grievances. However, the conflict can only be fully understood within the politics of decolonization. The grievances take on their full meaning within the historical context of the political, social and economic periods spanning 1916-1982, under Ahmadu Ahidjo's regime; 1982-1990, under the first autocratic Biya regime; and 1990-2018, under Biya's period of liberalization and political reforms.

Politically, there is general consensus that the roots of Anglophone conflict can be traced back to the partitioning of the former German Kamerun Protectorate after the First World War into British and French Mandates (1922-1945) and a UN Trust territory (1945-1961). The partition sowed the seeds of the subsequent development of territorial differences in language and cultural legacies, which laid a very strong foundation for the construction of Anglophone and Francophone identities to the present. Even more relevant to understanding the Anglophone conflict is the type of state that the Francophone political elite imposed on the Anglophone



minority during the constitutional deliberations which gave birth to the reunified state in 1961. During the constitutional negotiations, John Ngu Foncha who led the Anglophone delegation proposed to Ahmadu Ahidjo who was the leader of the Francophone delegation a “loose” federation which would have protected both “identities” in a union. This was also for the preservation of the cultural heritage and identity of each. Contrary to Anglophone expectations, the political elite of the Francophone territory, which was already independent as of January 1, 1960, opted for a highly centralized form of federation, which, moreover they considered a transition to a unitary state.

The nation-state project after reunification was the most decisive stage in the marginalization and near complete colonization of the Anglophones. For many Anglophones, nation-building was and is continuously driven by the firm and resolute determination of the Francophone political elite to dominate the Anglophone minority in the post-colonial state and to erase the cultural and institutional foundation of Anglophone identity through unitary government controlled from Yaounde. This has gradually created an Anglophone consciousness which is the feeling of being recolonized and marginalized in all spheres of public life, thus becoming second-class citizens in their own country. (Nyamnjoh and Konings, 2004: 192; Nyamnjoh and Konings, 2000; Eyoh, 1986: 262)

Nowhere were the frustrations of the Anglophones been so blatant than with Biya’s unilateral change of the name of the country from the United Republic of Cameroon to the Republic of Cameroon in February 1984 through a Presidential Decree. Anglophones protested because they saw in the name an independent Francophone Cameroon before reunification in October 1961. The new name therefore appeared to deny that the Cameroonian state was composed of two distinct entities, namely the English and French speaking entities. Biya argued, unconvincingly, that the change of



name reflected the maturity of the Cameroonian people who for close to 25 years of independence and reunification had finally overcome divisions caused by 70 years of European colonization (Biya, 1987: 6). Yet he has apparently forgot that the name of the United Republic of Cameroon came into vouch through a referendum although it was riddled with political acrobatics.

Within Anglophone circles, this was the boldest step taken towards their assimilation by the Biya regime. The circle seemed to have turned complete circumference. For them the new name was clear evidence that as far as Biya was concerned, the Anglophone territory and people had lost their identity and become an indistinguishable part of the former Republic of Cameroon. Other Anglophones argued that by this action, *La République du Cameroun*, the name of French-speaking Cameroon before reunification, had unilaterally seceded from the union and thus lacks a constitutional basis and legitimacy to continue claiming control of the former British Southern Cameroons. Those who defend this school of thought have often been inclined to appeal to the United Nations for assistance to its former Trust Territory in peacefully separating from Francophone Cameroon. This view was first expressed by the eminent Anglophone lawyer and first President of the Cameroon Bar Association, Fon Gorji Dinka. On March 20, 1985, Dinka addressed a memorandum to President Paul Biya titled *The New Social Order*. In that memorandum, he declared the Biya government as been unconstitutional and called for the Southern Cameroons to become independent and to be re-baptized as the Republic of Ambazonia (Nyamnjoh & Konings, 2004).

Anglophones feel that there has been too much monopolization of power by the Francophone elite, with the crumbs going to some gluttonous and self-seeking Anglophone elites. They complain that certain positions and ministries in the country have been monopolized by the Francophones, so



that Anglophones are always playing second fiddle. Even the recent appointment of two Anglophones as Ministers of Territorial Administration and Secondary Education in 2018, has been considered as mere window dressing intended to appease Anglophones. Ethno-regional favoritism has intensified from the 1990s onwards. For instance, Joseph Takougang, Professor of African history in the Department of Africana Studies and an affiliate faculty in the Department of History at the University of Cincinnati, and Milton Krieger stated in August 1991 that of the 47 senior district officers, 37 were Beti, as were three quarters of military generals, directors and general managers of parastatal or state-owned enterprises, and 22 of the 38 high ranking bureaucrats who had been appointed in the newly created office of the Prime Minister (Takougang & Krieger, 1998: 94-96).

In the economic domain, Anglophones argue that their natural resources have over time and space been exploited by the Francophone-led government. They complain that their region has failed to benefit substantially from its rich oil resources, derived from the only oil refinery in the country, *Société Nationale de Raffinage* (SONARA), located in Anglophone Cameroon but predominantly staffed by Francophones. Furthermore, the Anglophones complain that the Francophones were responsible for the destruction of economic institutions in their region. For instance, the National Produce Marketing Board (NPMB), where West Cameroonian farmers saved their money, was destroyed in 1972 when it went under the control of the unitary government. In 1972, the reserves in the NPMB amounted to 72 billion FCFA which suggested that the institution was economically healthy. Huge amounts of money were quickly embezzled. In later years, the NPMB was liquidated due to mismanagement. (Laan, 1988)

Socio-culturally, Anglophones complain of continuous attempts at “frenchification” or what Kofele-Kale (1987) describes as “the gallicising of public life,” which refers to the pre-eminence of French as the special



language and of inherited French institutions and bureaucratic practices in all aspects of state administration and public life, not least in the Anglophone territory (Nyamnjoh and Konings, 2004: 193). Although, by constitution, the country is bicultural and bijural in nature, the common law and English sub-system of education has been gradually eroded over the years. In the face of these challenges, Anglophones have a sense of frustration and disillusionment. Even the recent creation of the National Commission on Bilingualism and Multiculturalism (NCBM) as a palliative has not solved the problem, say so many Anglophones. It is a good initiative, but coming too late, it is merely cosmetic.

There is widespread tendency amongst Anglophones to put all their predicaments on the doorstep of the Francophone elite, and even the Francophone population, however, it is undeniable that the Anglophone political elite bears some share of responsibility for the Anglophone conflict. One would have expected them to resist the erosion of federal structures in 1972, but this was not the case. Some of them campaigned vigorously for the supplanting of the federal structure. When they realized that their influence within the federal state of West Cameroon had begun to dwindle and that the federal arrangements no longer suited their designs, they started competing first for Ahidjo's and later Biya's favours, aspiring for power positions first within the single party and federal governments and eventually within the unitary state and thus blatantly neglected the defence of West Cameroon's autonomy and interests (Kofele-Kale, 1987).

Perhaps the co-optation of the Anglophone political elite into the "hegemonic alliance" (Bayart, 1979) by Ahidjo partially explains why Anglophones could not raise their voices. But when Biya assumed power in 1982 and "opened the gates of freedom" through his New Deal policy program, Anglophones were expectant and hopeful that he would address their pre-occupations. More so because he had been in the government since 1962. They were impressed that he addressed all Cameroonians from Bamenda



and Buea in English, something which his predecessor did not do in his 22-year reign. The Anglophones felt that their complaints would be listened to, but to their chagrin, the Anglophone Problem has aggravated to unprecedented levels since 1990 reaching the apotheosis in 2016 and turning violent in 2017.

Drawing from Eastern Afghanistan, Kleinfeld and Bader (2014:5) maintains that in many cases, however, citizens have turned to violence precisely because they see their government as illegitimate. Instead of serving citizens, officials may be focused on maximizing their personal, familial, or ethnic group's interests. They may put themselves above the law in order to gain wealth through corruption, theft of state assets, smuggling rackets, or collusion with criminal forces. Or they may be working to expand their power base through partiality in distributing state resources to their in-groups. Often, individuals and agencies within the government are themselves involved in violent activity, from selling police or military armaments to gangs or insurgents to extrajudicial killings to moonlighting as members of the organizations they officially work to eradicate. It is the failure to govern for the benefit of all citizens through the rule of law that often generates violent insurgency from political militants seeking to unseat those in power. Where political groups have not formed to capitalize on public grievances, government rule-of-law failures open space for violent criminals to provide some of the goods generally offered by officials, such as justice and social services.

Instances of extreme violence

The material for this section was gathered from Amnesty International website corroborated with the researcher's observations in Cameroon. According to Amnesty International Armed separatists in Cameroon's Anglophone regions have stabbed to death and shot military personnel, burned down schools and attacked teachers, while security forces have



tortured people, fired on crowds and destroyed villages, in a spiral of violence that keeps getting more deadly. “People in Cameroon’s Anglophone regions are in the grip of a deadly cycle of violence. Security forces have indiscriminately killed, arrested and tortured people during military operations which have also displaced thousands of civilians. Their heavy-handed response will do nothing to calm the violence - in fact it is likely to further alienate Anglophone communities and fuel further unrest,” said Samira Daoud, Amnesty International Deputy Director for West and Central Africa. According to the Centre of Human Rights in Africa, since October 2017, 106 villages have been raided, 71 severely affected. 65 villages in the South West Region and 41 in the North West Region. Out of 65 affected villages in South West Region, 45 are severely affected while out of 41 affected villages in North West Region, 25 are severely affected while some like Kwakwa and Kembong have been reduced to ashes.

“For their part, armed separatists have killed dozens of members of the security forces. They also carried out attacks designed to strike fear amongst the population, going as far as burning down schools and targeting teachers who did not enforce the boycott.” Violence and unrest escalated in late 2016 after a series of strikes and protests against what teachers, lawyers and students viewed as further discrimination against Anglophones. Between 22 September and 1 October 2017, large-scale protests were organized across the Anglophone regions to symbolically proclaim the independence of a new state of “Ambazonia.” Lately, the separatists have also embarked on kidnapping and summary killings of civilians who have been suspected to be doing anything with the government. The number of people executed through this means is not yet known

Torture and killings by the military

Cameroon’s military has responded to these protests with arbitrary arrests, torture, unlawful killings and destruction of property. In one



striking incident, satellite images and other photographic evidence obtained by Amnesty International show the complete destruction of the village of Kwakwa, a few kilometers from Bole, Kumba, Meme Division of Southwest Region looking for information about a soldier killed there on January 14, 2018. With little success they burnt the village in January 2017. Residents of Kembong, one of the largest villages of Upper Bayang in Manyu Division of Southwest Region in southwest Cameroon call Dec. 18 “the day of misfortune”, when troops in search of rebels came to the town and within a few hours the village was razed to the ground.

In some cases, following these security operations, people were arbitrarily arrested and tortured while detained in illegal detention facilities and in secret. For instance, at least 23 people, including minors, were arrested by the security forces in the village of Dadi on 13 December 2017 and spent three days in incommunicado detention. They told Amnesty International that during this time security forces tortured them to extract “confessions”, to force them to admit having supported the separatists. Victims described being blindfolded and severely beaten with various objects including sticks, ropes, wires and guns, as well as being electrocuted and burnt with hot water. Some were beaten until they lost consciousness, and Amnesty International documented that at least one person has died in custody.

One man who was arrested on 13 December 2017 in Dadi gave a harrowing account of the torture he suffered:

“... They tied our hands behind our backs, gagged us and tied our faces with our towels and shorts, which they tore. They, then made us lie in the water, face down for about 45 minutes... During three days, they beat us with shovels, hammers, planks, and cables, kicked us with their boots and poured hot water on us... when I tried to move and shouted, one of them used the cigarette he was smoking to burn me.”



Amnesty International also received information about numerous instances of deaths in custody. In one case, on 3 February 2018, the bodies of four men, who had been arrested in the town of Belo by the security forces the day before, were found at the Bamenda Regional Hospital mortuary, bloodied and with signs of torture. Amnesty International has also documented unlawful killings, including during three security operations conducted by the army in the villages of Dadi, Kajifu and Bodam (South-West) in December 2017.

Attacks on schools, teachers and military by separatists

The report also documents how teachers and students have been targeted by separatists for not participating in a boycott of schools perceived by many as a symbol of how the English language and cultures in the Anglophone regions have been marginalized by the authorities. At least 42 schools were attacked by armed separatists between February 2017 and May 2018. Amnesty International has documented various attacks on students and teachers. On 30 January 2018, a masked gunman, suspected to be a member of an armed separatist group, stormed the Government Primary School in Ntungfe (North-West region). Armed with a locally-made gun, he shot one teacher in the leg, and set fire to a motorbike before escaping. The wounded teacher told Amnesty International that, “The assailant [...] told me that I was still coming to school in defiance of calls for a schools boycott. [...] He then asked me to raise my hands, but before I could do so, he shot me. I fell to the ground...”

Between September 2017 and May 2018, at least 44 members of the security forces were killed in attacks at checkpoints, in the streets, or on their duty stations in both the North-West and South-West regions. In one attack, on 1 February 2018, in the locality of Mbingo, North-West region, two gendarmes manning a checkpoint were stabbed to death by a group of young separatists armed with knives and machetes. The Ambazonian pro-



independence fighters have continued to abduct Cameroon officials and burn properties within their reach that belong to perceived collaborators of the Biya regime. A major catch is Christopher Tazisong, the Police Boss of 3rd Police Division in Muea around LA Fresher Hotel nearing Bolifamba (Mile 16). It is alleged that the Superintendent was involved in the torture and arrest of students of the University of Buea during the November 2016 students' uprisings for their bursaries to be paid. This abduction which occurred in broad daylight seemingly sent danger signals as Buea had been previously considered a safe city prior to the incident. It is noteworthy that even while being tortured in detention, Mr Tazisong asked to be killed than release information to the Ambazonia pro-independence militants as shown in the video I received on the incident. Ambazonia freedom fighters under the ASC/RF also arrested 4 military and security personnel of Cameroon at Nguti under Kupe-Muaneguba Division and forced them to make confessions under camera coverage. With all these, it does not still qualify them as terrorist as the government forces too have been committing equal atrocities if not worse.

Amnesty International has also documented five attacks on traditional chiefs, who separatists accuse of sympathizing with the government. "The armed separatists repeated targeting of the general population demonstrates a total disregard for human life, and is another example of the threat faced by people in the Anglophone regions," said Samira Daoud. "Authorities must ensure accountability for crimes committed by the security forces as well as by the armed separatists. They must immediately end the use of unlawful, unnecessary and excessive force and ensure that people are protected."

There is thus a connection between violence and power and this insinuates that analysing the ways in which it is politically meaningful and the political implications it may have (Chabal et. al. 2005). African political



scientists hold that politics in most of Africa is best understood as the exercise of patrimonial power. This means that despite the formal political structures in place power transits essentially through the informal sector. Concretely it is the interplay between the formal and informal that power is exercised on the continent. This form of governance often dubbed neo-patrimonialism, rests on well understood, if unequal, forms of political reciprocity which link patrons with their clients along vertical social lines (Chabal, *et. al*, 2005:2). The operation of political institutions is thus very largely conditioned by the exercise of personalized power. Politicians use official bodies for their own patrimonial purposes –regardless of the effect such behaviour may have on the institutional well-being of the government (Bayart *et.al*. 2009). A close look at the African countries and politics suggest that conflict has been a hallmark in most of them during the post-independence period. The continent has endured violence in a very large scale and examples abound. For instance, the Central African Republic; the civil wars of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Angola are some of the most salient. African men, women and children have endured excruciating sufferings and hardship (Reid, 2009: 338-9). In other parts of the continent, violence has truncated daily livelihoods of the people ranging from the abuse dispensed by the military and other authorities in government. These types of governments and systems of which they ruled their people often give rise to people with dissenting voices who in turn are branded terrorists.



Conclusion

As I am finalizing this article, news appeared on my WhatsApp page which read thus, “Breaking News (September 15, 2018); At least 13 patients in a local community health centre in Tadu, Ambazonia have been roasted to ashes by *La Republique du Cameroun* terrorists.” This is just one of the many atrocities that have been seemingly committed in Anglophone Cameroon. It is not the subject of this paper to ascertain whether who is to be blame but one thing is clear-extreme violence have been committed by both parties and both parties have also held their opponents as terrorists. The government has held the Ambazonia liberators as terrorists whose only crime is that they have attempted to redress grievances committed against Anglophone Cameroonians by the *La Republique* government.

The article cannot be finished in its totality with activities and events still going on in the region. One thing is clear, the terrorism and extreme violence cannot be the responsibility of one group. Both the state and separatists have performed acts of extreme violence. The state has performed more extreme violence and terrorism acts than the separatist based on available evidence so far. Like in the days of Benjamin Disraeli when the First World War clouds were gathering in Europe and the British anti-Russian antagonism in the Balkans, a song developed: “We don’t want to fight, but by jingo if we do; we’ve got the men, we’ve got the ships, we’ve got the money too” (Richards, 1967:206). The Cameroon government and her anti-separatist stand suggests that she has the military capability to do what she wants and at any time. Houses have been burnt; villages have been burnt down with some of the houses burnt with people and children inside into ashes and individuals have been killed summarily by both camps.

On a final note, with 1st October looming around the corner which is always celebrated as Independence Day in Anglophone Cameroon albeit



repression from the regime and Presidential elections built for 7 October 2018, the stage appears set, then, for a drama of terrorism and extreme violence on an old theme, with perhaps, a new twist. It is still the struggle for freedom and liberation in Anglophone Cameroon which is being played out, just as it was 50 years or more ago. But this time the protagonists are not the old octogenarians but young resilient, resolved and determined Anglophones who have emerged from all the nooks and crannies of the region and bought a one way flight ticket to Buea, their presupposed political capital. They claim to be able to achieve the best life not for the privilege few but for humankind in the entire Anglophone territory even if their methods are violent, cruel and ferocious. If they achieve their dream, then the history of Cameroon and Africa would have turned over a new leaf. Whether for good, better or worse is anybody's guess. History would have been made. For now Cameroon still works but on a tiny rope that is threatening to cut at any time although it could continue for some time. It is a matter of wait and see the outcome. Although history is hardly futuristic, one thing is crucial. In the eyes of the world Cameroon's heavy-handed machinery response to peaceful protests has been a litmus test to its identity as a multi-cultural state, setting it on more than a slippery slope of prolonged conflict which if serious care is not taken by the government will carry the state into an abyss leading to its disintegration into component parts.



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THE MIND: A PLAYING FIELD FOR TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS

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ABSTRACT

Terrorism is defined as the deliberate attempt to create and exploit fear through violence or the threat of violence with a political aim (Hoffman, 1998). According to Hoffman (1998), the aim of terrorism is to create or combine/amass power where it is none existence or very little. However, through the media their acts of violence seem to give them the illusion of influence and power that they obviously lack to cause any political change on either a local or an international level (Roser, Nagdy & Ritchie, 2013). Currently, researchers have concluded that terrorism is no longer for a political aim but rather to cause destruction (Morgan, 2004). The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) stipulates that the act of terrorism should be intentional, must portray some level of violence and be carried out by sub-national actors (Roser, Nagdy & Ritchie, 2013). This paper is interested in the part of the definition by GTD that it should be “intentional”. Therefore, before an act is classified intentional; some thought and preparation might have gone into it to cause harm. The mind might have been manipulated or the individual forced to commit act which is fatal to themselves and other innocent individuals. Now the question is what would motivate another to cause such grievous crime as terrorism? This paper intends to look at the mind of the terrorist, religion and martyrdom. It is guided by Martha Crenshaw’s (1981) analysis on terrorism, that links psychology and the character traits of terrorist looking at “terrorist personality or terrorist predisposition exist” (Roser, Nagdy & Ritchie, 2013, para 16).



The paper looks into and analyse the activities of suicide bombers like Mohamed Atta, Dhanu and Saeed Hotari, to determine whether there is a link between the mind, religion and terrorism. Based on the findings, the paper further discusses the possibility of religion being used to coerce or manipulate the mind directly or indirectly and whether that has a bearing on the subconscious mind. However, since there are no empirical evidence to ascertain the mind of the terrorist, this paper relies on speculative theory and subjective interpretation of available data.

Keywords: martyrdom, religion, suicide terrorism, the mind

Introduction

What changed over the years with terrorism? Indeed there has been a striking transformation in the practice of terrorism. The current development of terrorism characterizes continuity rather than change. It is as if after 9/11 in 2001, radical Islamic ideologies have categorized terrorism. However, the media has contributed in the upsurge and change of the nature of terrorism. Wilkinson (1990) posited that “the saturation of the media with images of terrorist atrocity has raised the bar on the level of destruction that will attract headline attention” (Morgan, 2004, p. 31). Morgan (2004) however attributed the change to the categorical fanaticism. The National Commission on Terrorism indicated that fanaticism is now the motivation instead of any political interests adding that terrorists are more uncontrolled than ever before in their methods (Morgan, 2004). Currently, the fanatics are more prone to destruction and chaos rather than looking for support from people for the cause (Morgan, 2004). According to the National Commission on Terrorism, R. James Woosley was reported to have stated that: “Today’s terrorists don’t want a seat at the table; they



want to destroy the table and everyone sitting at it” (Morgan, 2004, p.30). There has actually been a “shift from politically motivated terrorist to the vengeful and hard-line fanatic” (Morgan, 2004, pg. 31). Terrorists seek annihilation and disorder as ends in themselves (Morgan, 2004) without considering the consequences to their life. For instance suicide bombers die with the intention of not dying alone but rather use their death to kill other people (Pape, 2005). Now, terrorists seem to consider their acts of “sacrificial” death and destruction as “sacramental or transcendental on a spiritual or eschatological level” (Morgan, 2004, p. 32). This act is considered the martyrdom, dying for a higher cause. According to Pape (2005), “the more suicide terrorists justify their actions on the basis of religious or ideological motives that match the beliefs of a broader national community, the more the status of terrorist martyrs is elevated, and the more plausible it becomes that others will follow in their footsteps” (p. 22).

Osama bin Laden was quoted to have declared a fatwa that:

- Praise be to God, who revealed the book, controls the clouds, defeats factionalism and says in his book:
- But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the papers wherever ye them...
- On the basis and in compliance with God’s order, we issue the following fatwa to all Muslims:
- The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies-civilians and military – is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it (Morgan, 2004, p. 34).

The above fatwa gives terrorism fanatics the motivation and, the basis to sacrifice themselves for a “worthy cause” leading individuals/attackers to self-destruction. According to Pape (2005), “suicide terrorism is the most



aggressive form of terrorism; they pursue coercion even at the expense of angering not only the target community but neutral audiences as well” (p. 10). The interesting aspect of suicide terrorism is the fact that the attacker is aware that he/she is not going to stay alive through the mission (Pape, 2005). Suicide bombers usually employ suicide vests, car bombs, hijacking airplanes and ramming into building (Pape, 2005).

What is Terrorism?

Researchers have exposed different reasons that lead to terrorism; thus the complexity of the definition of terrorism. Walter Laqueur (2003) gave a word of caution to researchers and analysts not to try and “categorize or define terrorism at all because there are “many terrorists” and he emphasizes the particularities of various terrorist involvements and approaches” (Morgan, 2004, p. 31). Despite the warning, this school of thought would try to define terrorism to suit the topic under study. Moreover, Ganor (2010) argues that definition of terrorism or who a terrorist is largely dependent on the “subjective outlook of the definer” (p. 287). Nonetheless, before this school of thought tries to define who a terrorist is, terrorism is broadly defined as the deliberate use of violence to cause fear and destruction for a political aim or change. The Global Terrorism Database (GTD) defines terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” (Roser, Nagdy & Ritchie, 2013, para. 28). According to GTD, three attributes make up an incident being described as terrorist act.

The incident must be intentional – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.

The incident must entail some level of violence or immediate threat of violence -including property violence, as well as violence against people.

The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors.

The database does not include acts of state terrorism (Roser, Nagdy & Ritchie, 2013, para. 28)

Crenshaw (1981) noted that terrorist groups usually take cautious assignment before engaging in any terrorism act adding that terrorism is a “political behaviour resulting from the deliberate choice of a basically rational actor” (Roser, Nagdy & Ritchie, 2013, para. 17).

Crenshaw (1981) further indicated that terrorism is caused by three different perspectives:

1. Situational factors: This can be subdivided into two parts; (1) conditions that allow the possibility of radicalization and motivate feeling against the ‘enemy’, and (2) specific triggers (events) for action.

2. Strategic aims:

- Long-run; political change, revolution, nationalists fighting an occupying force, minority separatist movements
- Short-run; recognition or attention to advertise their cause
- Disrupt and discredit the process of government
- Influence public attitudes; fear or sympathy
- Provoke a counter-reaction to legitimise their grievances

3. Individual motivations: This is concerned with psychology and the character traits of terrorists; why do individuals turn to terrorism in the first place? Does a ‘terrorist personality’ or ‘terrorist predisposition’ exist (Roser, Nagdy & Ritchie, 2013, para. 17)?



Suicide Terrorism

On the other hand suicide terrorism is “any operation that is designed in such a way that the terrorist expect to die, even if he or she is actually killed by police or other defenders” and dies with targeted and neutral individuals with the aim to cause a political change (Pape, 2005 p. 10). Suicide terrorism lies in between issues of “brainwashing, indoctrination, grooming and radicalization of vulnerable personalities” (Silke, 2015, p. 12). Suicide terrorism does hardly happen ones, an attacker’s “heroic act” seem to motivate the others to embark on such event (Pape, 2005). Attackers see the act as martyrdom and it encourages others to follow in the same vein. The hardest part to fathom is that suicide attackers are willing to die for the cause of the terrorist group. Available reports indicate that suicide terrorism has claimed more than 80,000 people, injured close to over 40,000 people and the damage caused is estimated at £100 billion. It is estimated that for 30 years there have been about 20 different terrorist groups that operated in 19 separate countries using diverse suicide tactics (Silke, 2015).

As far as this article is concerned, a suicide terrorist is any individual who strongly believes, or is possibly coerced or influenced to believe in an agenda that he/she may not fully understand, or know the genesis of; or simply a fanatic who willingly agrees to die for his/her “belief system” or through mind manipulation or grievance, and intentionally plans a violent act to die with the targeted audience and other neutral individuals. This definition is not to simplify terrorism but rather to draw attention to another aspect which is the state of mind of the attacker in order to help counter terrorism from the root by “reducing the psychological factors nurturing the next generation of potential terrorism” (Victoroff, 2005, p. 36). The issue is to “prevent people from becoming terrorists” in the first place (Atran, 2003; p. 1535). As Morgan (2004) puts it “a suicide terrorist is a



product either of indoctrination into religious extremism or of the suicidal inclination of individual who would likely end their lives in any event” (pp. 14-15). We need to find the “right mix of pressure and inducements to get the communities themselves to abandon support for the institutions that recruit suicide attackers” (Atran, 2003, p. 1538). It has become apparent that religious leaders, recruiters, and trainers emotionally manipulate and exploit individuals to accept certain religious ideologies to the benefit of the organizations rather than the individual (Atran, 2003).

The writer is being guided by the aspect of GTD definition that says terrorism should be intentional and that of Martha Crenshaw’s thought on the fact that there could be psychological and character traits underpinning the actions of terrorists. But there are no terrorist to assess to determine their state of mind. However inferences can be made via their actions and available records of their attacks to assess their minds. The question is could there be mind manipulations or belief systems that drives them? Also we should not lose sight of the fact that terrorism is a strategy of coercion on the opponent (government) or to cause a political change (Pape, 2005).

Now what if the “coercion” is also exerted on the individual attacker to wear the suicide vest, or hijacks a plane or believes in the act of violence? The coercion is used reservedly to mean forceful yet subtle manipulation of the mind or forceful “unconscious” attempt to indoctrinate the individual. Post (2004) asserted that suicide bombers came about probably because they were “instigated by the organizational leader and by a type of negative group therapy focusing on extreme religious values and revenge for past wrongs, a sort of lust for or addiction to martyrdom and death” (Marazziti, Veltri & Piccinni. 2017, p. 147). In the later part of 1985, the spiritual leader of Hezbollah, Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah reportedly mentioned the forceful nature of suicide attack (Pape, 2005). According to reports, he is said to have stated that; “We believe that suicide operations should only be carried out if they can bring about



a political or military change in proportion to the passions that incite a person to make of his body an explosive bomb” (Pape, 2005, p, 24). It is just unfortunate suicide bombers do not live through their “ordeal” to tell their story whether they were pushed into it, or they have been undergoing daily indoctrination or they have suicidal inclination or they have been predisposed to the act or to determine whether it is their character traits.

The study would be centred on the individual player (terrorist) and not the entire group activities even though group activities can influence terrorist acts. The concentration on the individual actor is only to determine whether indeed he is a “rational” actor with willpower and the ability to think rationally. Atran (2003) however suggests that “there should be more research on suicide terrorism to understand and know what psychological and cultural relationships that lure and bind thousands of ordinary people into terrorist organization’s martyr-making web” (p. 1538).

The article would therefore attempt to answer these questions: What would make an individual want to kill himself/herself and others? Is there a link between religion, martyrdom, state of mind and suicide terrorism? There are few studies on suicide terrorism that looks at the individual attacker and mostly the researchers concentrate on the individual motives for suicide such as religious indoctrination and psychological predisposition (Morgan, 2004). The psychological predisposition largely concentrated on profiling which has been concluded that terrorists are uneducated, unemployed, socially isolated, single men in their late teens and early twenties (Pape, 2005, p. 15).

But this article would look into the mind of the terrorist. Even though as Pape (2005) indicated, psychological predisposition alone cannot account for suicidal terrorists, it cannot also be ruled out either. Atran (2003) noted that interviews with surviving Hamas and Al-Qaeda survivors indicated that there may be some differences in the relative weights and con-



sequences of both groups but the ideology and grievances that motivate them are the same. We should not also forget that the concept of ideologies and grievances all have its roots in the human mind. The human mind is a powerful and complex asset of man (Fieser, 2008). The mind produces human behaviour because it is an embodiment of processing information and a goal-getter (Pinker, 2009). The mind is a package of human “thoughts, hopes, desires, memories, beliefs and experiences” (Nussbaum, n.d., p.30). Nassbaum (n.d.) stated that the mind is basically what is done with it. According to Sigmund Freud theory of the mind in 1890s, the mind is made up of the conscious mind, subconscious mind, and unconscious mind (Sharan, n.d.). The conscious mind tries to use willpower to control behaviours, habits and beliefs but loses out to the subconscious minds’ greater influence (Okyere, 2018). The subconscious mind influences our belief systems, creativity, developmental stages, emotions and feelings, habits and addictions, imaginations, intuitions, long term memory, protective reactions, values and hypnosis. Hypnosis uses the subconscious mind for change (Pedersen, 2018; Okyere, 2018). Human thoughts are simply the command of the subconscious mind (Tracy, n.d). According to Stone (2014), the formula for programming the subconscious mind is genuine intention + repetition + burning desire. Atran (2003) asserts that people readily “obey destructive orders under the right circumstances” (p. 1535). The unconscious mind on the other hand is the region of automatic function, immune system, heart, programming, quantum leap among others (Okyere, 2018).

The article would review the biography of Mohammed Atta, leader of 9/11 hijack; Dhanu, Tamil Tigers; and Saeed Hofari, Hamas; as reference point to assess the mind of the suicide terrorists from Robert A. Pape (2005) *Dying to Win: Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* article and to determine whether there is a link between religion, ones’ state of mind and suicide terrorism.



History of Suicide Terrorism

Terrorism has been in existence for a long while but it wasn't until the 9/11 incident in the United States where over 3,000 people lost their lives, that it has gained international recognition. Terrorism before the 9/11 was concentrated in Latin America and Asia, but shifted to the Middle East after the 9/11 (Roser, Nagdy & Ritchie, 2013). Suicide terrorism actually gained root in the early 1980s in Lebanon. Suicide terrorism was used as political coercion tool (Pape, 2005). In 1981, the first major contemporary suicide terrorist attack caused the death of 27 people and injuring about 100 at the Iraqi embassy in Beirut (Atran, 2003). In September 1982, suicide terrorist became the strategic political weapon after the assassination of pro-Israeli Lebanese President Bashir Gemayal (Atran, 2003). Soon after in 1983, Hezbollah truck bombed 300 American and French servicemen (Atran, 2003). Between 1985 and 1988, about 600 terrorist attacks were recorded annually. However after 1988, the numbers decreased to about 450 in every year and went to barest minimum point between 1996 and 1998 when the attacks recorded were approximately 300 yearly. In the 1990s, suicide terrorism spread through several countries (Pape, 2005). For instance, there were series of attacks mid 1990s against the Sri Lankan political leader and was also used to kill former prime minister Rajiv Gandhi; then it moved to Israel in 1994 where suicide attackers killed civilians and troops; and then rose against the American military in 1995, the Persian Gulf and in 1995 there were several attacks against the Turkish military and the government (Pape, 2005). Even though the frequency decreased but the danger did not because in 2001, things took a drastic turn when over 3,000 people died in a terrorist attack in the United States. Between 2001 and 2008 more than a quarter of terrorist attacks took place in Iraq (Roser, Nagdy & Ritchie, 2013). In 2002, two British national carried out an attack in Tel Aviv (Silke, 2015). Suicide terrorism has gained root in the “number of attacks and in geographical spread from one region to another” (Pape, 2005, p. 13).



Who is a Suicide Terrorist?

Suicide terrorist is a “deliberate self-destructive” individual (Hudson, 1999, p. 32). Suicide terrorists live a normal life; their lives are not lacking in justifiable life opportunities comparative to their general population (Atran, 2003). Research has proven that suicide terrorists have no substantial psychopathology; they live and have ordinary lives as their surrounding population (Atran, 2003). But they are rather seen to be secluded from childhood friends and relatives (Silke, 2015). Suicide terrorists are gradually led into radicalism through the socialization of small groups of friends or relatives (Silke, 2015). Within these small groups, individuals gradually adopt the beliefs and faith of their more extreme members which makes them more dependent and loyal towards the group. With this small group their faith becomes more important and intense (Silke, 2015, pp. 10-11).

“The polarized experience within the group, combined with an increased sense of group identity and commitment, helped to radicalize individuals and facilitate their entry into the jihad in a way which was approved by their own social peers” (Silke, 2015, p. 11).

It is therefore the association with these small groups that are causing ordinary people to enter into suicide terrorism largely because of loyalty to close friends and relatives. This is what terrorist recruiting organizations often exploit through religious empathy (Atran, 2003). Silke (2015) indicated that the process involved in being a suicide terrorist is very gradual; “the decision to a martyrdom operation did not happen abruptly” (p. 10).

An analysis by Atran (2003) of 39 recruits to Harkat al-Ansar, a Pakistani-based supporter of Al-Qaeda indicated they were all males who were not married; most have studied and have appreciable knowledge in the Quran. They all believed that by sacrificing themselves to martyrdom “they would help secure the future of close friends and relatives in Paradise;



it is portrayed that “each [martyr] has a special place—among them are brothers, just as there are sons and those even more dear” (Atran, 2003, pp. 1538-1539). Whoever commits suicide for the sake of martyrdom apparently “sacrifices himself for the sake of his religion and his nation... The Mujahed is full of hope” (Atran, 2003, p. 1539).

Researchers have dispelled the idea that suicide terrorists are uneducated, impoverished and comes from dysfunctional families. Even though there are some suicide terrorists that fall within this profile. According to Marazziti, Veltri & Piccinni (2017), research has shown that “70% of Muslim terrorists have formal education and 50% are professionals. Terrorists from the Middle East were found to be university students, professionals, married men in their late 40s and even young women” (p. 146). Many studies have postulated that “terrorists are even more psychologically healthier and far more stable than other violent criminals” (Silke, 2015, p. 8). It is even a requirement to be mentally stable before being recruited. In September, 2004, it was reported that Sheikh Hamed Al-Beawi, a spiritual leader of Hamas told Nablus in an interview that “those who undertake martyrdom actions are not hopeless or poor, but are the best of our people, educated, and successful. They are intelligent and uses advanced combat techniques for fighting enemy occupation” (Atran, 2006, p. 137). Hudson (1999) confirmed that currently terrorist groups are employing individuals with “expertise in fields such as communications, computer programming, engineering, finance and the sciences” (p. 4). Hudson (1999) further noted that “Ramzi Yousef, the individual who led the plot to destroy the World Trade Centre graduated from British Swansea University with a degree in engineering” (p. 4).

According to Silke (2015), most suicide terrorists are volunteers and are readily possessed with the intention to willingly take part in suicide attacks. Silke (2015) adds that “suicide bombers tend to be volunteers who have



chosen the option of a suicide action even when other avenues for violence remained open to them” (p. 12). Such volunteers see suicide bombing as rewarding because the individual has been promised martyrdom. Meaning they will go to paradise after death and after murdering those who do not believe their religious values. Religion has become the link between martyrdom and the state of mind of a suicide terrorist. Religion makes an individual feel close to God, feel the presence of God, be at emotional height which is associated with “signs of limbic lability including subthreshold temporal epileptic phenomena, particularly of the right brain” (Marazziti, Veltri & Piccinni. 2017, p. 147). According to Saver & Rabin (1997),

“the limbic system plays such a crucial role in the integration of emotions and thoughts, functional abnormalities therein may allow for a particular emotional state that interferes with higher cognitive processes” (Marazziti, Veltri & Piccinni. 2017, p. 147).

Suicide terrorism is largely the most destructive form of terrorism, using force to antagonize not only the targeted people but civilians as well (Pape, 2005). Suicide terrorists attack without the expectation of survival, or plan of escape; they kill themselves and kill others as well; even if they do not die they are killed by the police or other defenders (Pape, 2005).

Religion and Terrorism

Religion has a great influence on people; Karl Marx (1843) calls it the opium (addictive drug) of the masses/population (Mckinnon, 2005). People tend to be servitude to religion and its leadership which could be negative or positive. Religion has been a motivating factor for both good and evil (Tarlow, n.d. p. 4). Jerusalem syndrome shows how powerful religion is to human behaviour and emotions (Tarlow, n.d.). Some tourists who visit the holy land are caught up in the Jerusalem syndrome where they seem to act out/exhibit some of the bible characters. For example it has been



reported that, an Irish school teacher who was not pregnant was convinced she was about to deliver Baby Jesus; one Canadian tourist also believed he was Sampson, the bible character (Tarlow, n.d.). Religion is indeed addictive as Karl Marx indicated.

According to Tarlow (n.d.), “human history has known countless wars based on religious creeds or fought against other religious beliefs” (pp. 3-4). History has recorded a number of religious wars or conflicts, but now the question is, is religion a catalyst for violence. As Tarlow (n.d.) also enquired if “religion act as the cover for political, economic or other factors” (p. 5). It has been reported that religious groups with the mind-set of millenarian, messianic and apocalyptic were the first to use weapons of mass destruction (Hudson, 1999). Morgan (2004) stated that religious terrorism increased in the 1990s because religion provided the only justification for terror.

Terrorism today is seen as a sacred activity that advances spiritual and righteous cause (Morgan, 2004). Religious terrorists see “violence as a divine duty ... executed in direct response to some theological demand ... and justified by scripture” (Morgan, 2004, p. 34). In the 1990s, “religious fundamentalists and new religious sects advocating for mass destruction terrorism were birth forth; groups such as Aum Shinrikyo, Hezbollah, and al-Qaeda” (Hudson, 1999, p. 1). The most dangerous new religious group is the Islamic fundamentalists (Hudson, 1999; p. 3). As Morgan (2004) puts it, “religious terrorists are often their own constituency, having no external audience for their acts of destruction” (p.32). These groups seem to live by extreme normative standards and “seek to maximize violence against perceived enemy essentially anyone who is not a fundamentalist. Interestingly, their outlook of issues divides the world simply into “them” and “us”” (Hudson, 1999; pp. 1-2).

Post (1997) projected that the most dangerous terrorist would be the religious terrorist (Hudson, 1999, p. 2) and it is indeed the most dangerous form of terrorism to exist. According to Post (1997), such religious terror-



ists tend to justify their hideous acts “in the name of Allah” or in the name of Aum Shinrikyo’s Shoko Asahara” (Hudson, 1997; p. 2). Perry & Negrin (2008) indicated that jihadists and their preachers eulogize “the honour of martyrdom as the most declaration of faith, the noblest deed a Muslim can perform” (p.199). Such individuals seem to believe in death more than life because “they are convinced that it brings not only victory but the assurance of eternal life in Paradise with all its rewards” (Perry & Negrin, 2008; p. 199). This idea is projected in Hamas statement to justify martyrdom:

“Allah builds good and pleasant dwelling in heaven. The inhabitants receive rooms, under which flow rivers. There are also tents in heaven, each one made of pearl sixty miles high and sixty miles wide. Each mile contains a special corner for family members of the believer, hidden from the others In paradise Allah provides the inhabitants...with rivers of water, milk, honey and wine....The shahid (martyr) for Allah receives immediate atonement of all his sins with the first drop of his blood being shed ... and he weds seventy-two virgins. The shahid receives the potency of seventy men” (Perry & Negrin, 2008; p. 199-120).

Atran (2006) in his article also confirmed this statement relating to martyrdom and indicated that some students of Hamas who were being trained to be suicide bombers in an interview stated that duty to God cannot be delayed when one is called to it, family does not stand in the way even if a family member needed them. According to Atran (2006), questions were posed to emir of JI, Abu Bakr Ba’asyir in Jakarta’s Cipinang prison on reasons for suicide terrorism, “he responded that martyrdom for the sake of jihad is the ultimate fardh’ain, an inescapable individual obligation that trumps all others including the four pillars of Islam (pilgrimage, almsgiving, fasting, prayer)” (Atran, 2006, pp. 138-139). Atran (2006) noted that;



“This is a radically new interpretation of Islam, where only the profession of faith in Allah and his prophet counts as equal to jihad. What matters for Ba’asyir, as for most would-be martyrs and their sponsors whom I have interviewed, is the martyr’s intention and commitment to God. It is inspired by love of one’s group and by rage at those who would humiliate it, but certainly not blind rage. The power of faith is something many understand at home but few deem worthy of consideration for enemies abroad. Yet, responses from jihadist, as well as their actions, suggest that sacred values are not entirely sensitive to standard political or economic calculations regarding costs or payoffs that come with undertaking martyrdom actions, nor are they readily translatable from one culture to another” (Atran, 2006, pp. 138-139).

Morgan (2004) stipulated that religious terrorists are personality-driven in that members are devoted to one leader and it leaves followers dependent on them. In this regard if a leader is emotionally unstable one can only imagine the risky consequences of the group’s activities.

Religious people seem to live a life of servitude to their leader. The leader is seen as a god and his words are final. This brings to focus the idea of indoctrination to commit suicide terrorism without fear. Walter Laqueur in his article “Indoctrination is the central factor” noted that “suicide terrorists are indoctrinated and trained receiving intelligence information to guide them-eventually are given arms and explosives to carry out their mission” (Perry & Negrin, 2008; pp. 125). According to Perry & Negrin, (2008), there is evidence to indicate that wherever suicide terrorism happen clerical supporters/preachers/nationalist propagandists play a crucial role in creating the enabling environment for such activities to thrive.

In some regions where martyrdom is hailed, parents and relatives of suicide bombers commend their son’s heroic acts. Relatives of suicide ter-



rorists are comforted with the belief that the holy warrior (suicide terrorist) is in heaven advocating for them, pleading for their entrance into heaven (Perry & Negrin, 2008). The community has martyred the suicide attacker. For example, the father of Saeed Hotari, a twenty-one year old Palestinian who blew himself at a discotheque in Tel Aviv killing twenty-one people was happy and proud for what the son had done. "My son has fulfilled the prophet's wishes. He has become a hero!" (Perry & Negrin, 2008; p. 120).

Biography of Suicide Terrorists

- **Mohamed Atta, Leader of the September 11 Hijackers**

Family Life

He had a normal family life in Egypt with a stable professional family background. He had two sisters who are university professors and a father who is a middle-class lawyer. He had a normal childhood by Western standards. He was the last born of three, his father encouraged them to work hard and have socially laudable ambition. He aimed to be an engineer and earned a bachelor's degree in Cairo. He later went to Germany for graduate work in urban studies at Hamburg Technical University where his professors described him as good student. Atta was only moderately religious in his youth. No traumatic life had been recorded. His family supported him in his education.

Academic

His father trained him with the idea that a degree from Europe or the United States would allow him to prosper in Egypt. He earned a degree in engineering from the University of Cairo and graduated in 1990. He furthered his education at the Hamburg Technical University in Germany to study town planning.



He later left school and Hamburg, traveled for fifteen months. He returned with a renewed interest in completing his degree. He finally presented his 152-pages thesis on urban planning, earning a top grade.

Religion

As a boy, Atta was trained to be a moderate religious person, observing basic Islamic practices such as daily prayers from his early teen years.

At the work place he quietly did his prayers, often kneeling at midday beside his desk.

Mohamed Atta travelled to Mecca for hajj, a pilgrimage Muslims embark on once in their lives. After his return he supposedly wrote a will and in it he stated that his life and death is dedicated to Allah and warned that no woman should ever visit his grave.

He formed Islamic prayer group and moved into an apartment with two other Muslims. Atta is reported to have had connection with the famous al-Qaeda group and even met with some known al-Qaeda operatives.

Association

Atta is said to have refused to join a basketball league because it was organized by the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt's main Islamic fundamentalist organization. Nonetheless the Muslim Brotherhood actively recruited in Atta's engineering department at the University of Cairo.

Work

After he graduated from University of Cairo, it was difficult to secure a job. However, he was able to get a part time job at Hamburg with Plankontor, a respectable urban planning firm in an upscale section of the city to supplement his studies.



Social Relation

Atta was deemed as a respectable person. He was accepted both at school and work. He earned good grades in school and graduated in 1990. He received a 1974 Fiat as a reward from his father as a graduation present.

His co-workers at Plankontor saw him as a peaceful Muslim in Germany. He even spoke to colleagues about his intention of going back to Egypt to better people's lives with the knowledge gained. He was seen as a principled and meticulous, conscientious and rational individual with steady emotion.

At the University in Germany, Atta's department chairman, Dittmar Machule; a specialist on the Middle East described him as passionate with issues in the Middle East. Machule described him as "tender, sensitive ...he had deep, dark eyes. His eyes would speak. You could see the intelligence, the knowledge and the alertness" (Complete 911 Timeline, n.d. para. 3).

"Terrorist" Trainings

In November 1999, Atta and others reportedly left Hamburg to Afghanistan for several months of training and even met with Osama bin Laden, a privilege reserved for those on important mission.

Sometime in 2000, he reportedly took classes in piloting in California, Arizona and Florida for a year.

According to a video tape by bin Laden, Atta and the other Muslim colleagues did not know they were on a suicide mission before they arrived in the United States. Atta handed instruction to the team to undertake the suicide mission. The instruction was supposedly to prepare for the mission. They were to read some portions of the Quran and to be happy that "you are on your way to everlasting paradise" (Pape, 2005, pp 147-151).



- **Dhanu, Tamil Tigers suicide bomber of Indian Politician**

Family life

She is described as a beautiful woman from Jaffna, principal town in Sri Lanka. Her home was reportedly looted by Indian soldiers, gang-raped and her four brothers were killed.

She was seen as a strong woman, “nerves of steel”.

Terrorist Tactics and Mission

On May, 21, 1991, she hid a suicide belt made of grenades underneath her gown, presented a garland to Rajiv Gandhi, India’s top political figure and exploded killing them both.

Terrorist Training

She was part of the suicide bomber unit of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam that goes by the name Black Tigresses. For three weeks she was trained and prepared for the mission.

The group LTTE usually conducts dress rehearsals near the intended location of an attack, they study past operations.

Motivation

She was given money and encouraged by the LTTE. She apparently went to shop for clothes, jewelleryes, cosmetics and accessories.

She had a revengeful outlook because she was a victim of rape by Indian soldiers. In Sri Lanka it is reported that there is a stigma on victims of rape at the hands of Sinhalese and Indian soldiers. The prospect of marriage and child birth is taken away from a woman who is a victim of rape and these are things cherished in such community.



She was privy to constant viewing of past suicide missions. The LTTE actually films the execution of suicide missions.

Group, LTTE Guerrilla

She was a member of the Black Tigress of the LTTE. The group's main selection standard is a high level of motivation to complete the mission, a process that puts priority on mental stability over tactical military competence. The Black Tigress motto is "You die only once". She had been a member of the group since the late 1980s possibly after her personal trauma. Members of the LTTE have one mission, is to achieve results not simply by their own death but of others. The Black Tigers are a special unit trained especially for suicide missions (Pape, 2005, pp. 151-153).

- **Saeed Hotari, Hamas**

Family life

He is one of nine children from a poor Palestinian family who lived in Jordan. He died at the age of twenty-one years.

Religion

He was a devout Muslim, who fasted and prayed; and performed all his religious obligations to the letter and spirit.

Occupation

He was an electrician.

Group, Hamas

He was a member of the Hamas. The Hamas recruit individuals with intense interest in Islam, a clean criminal record and a strong nerve to undertake suicide missions. Hamas leaders supposedly initiate discussions



of dying for Allah with small groups of young people and invite those who seem particularly interested to join a special Hamas-led class on Islamic study. After just several weeks, many in such classes willingly volunteer to be suicide bombers. At these classes individuals are ushered into reading various passages emphasizing the birth of the nation Islam, the importance of faith, the duty of jihad and Allah's favours for those deemed most faithful (Pape, 2005, pp. 153-155).

Analysis and Review of the Biographies Suicide Terrorists

The synopsis of the biographies seems scanty but would help this school of thought to determine whether there is a link between the mind, religion, and the act of suicide terrorism. These three are separate individuals belonging to different terrorist groups but achieved a specific result. All three individuals had a target to destroy and they were achieved but their methods were different.

Mohamed Atta's early life was not so much of a religious person but during his university life in Germany there are records of his active participation in religion to the extent that he had a Muslim prayer cell. There are diverse reports on whether he joined the Egypt Muslim Brotherhood or otherwise. Nonetheless, there was a point he had contact with religion. Now it comes to the question of how could a normal individual raised by a middle class lawyer turn to be radical Islamic activist and willingly sacrifices himself for a 'worthy' cause. Atta may have gradually become radical through his association with the friends at the University in Germany. Silke (2015) projected that more often than not it is within such small groups that faith becomes more intense and essential. It leaves little doubt that he was not indoctrinated at any point because there was no sign of any mental instability. But the subconscious mind with the right programming can get an individual to act without a push or fear of withdrawal (Atran, 2003).



Stone (2014) indicated that genuine intention plus repetition plus burning desire would indoctrinate anyone. Who determines genuine intentions? Is it the general public, the “programmer” (i.e. leaders of terrorists group) or the one being “programmed”? The “programmer” would not see his intentions as evil since “one man’s terrorist is another’s freedom fighter” concept exist. The programmer believes they have to fight by whatever means possible. The one being programmed can hardly tell the authenticity of the intentions because the willpower of the conscious mind that makes him make rational decisions has been overtaken by the subconscious mind of belief system, desires, feelings, habits, addictions among others. The “general public” depends on which angle one is standing the sympathizers would certainly agree with the intentions of the leader/programmer due to various factors such as economic, political and religion. On the other hand the general public would see the intentions as criminal. The willpower gives one the ability to control ones behaviour, habits and beliefs (Okyere, 2018) therefore if one loses the battle of the willpower then one is prone to manipulations, moving according to the dictate of the fleshly burning desires. Through the constant information being given to would-be suicide terrorist with time leaves no doubt in their minds that it is an act of martyrdom. The subconscious knows no logic it cannot differentiate between good and evil and that every thought is welcomed (Okyere, 2018). Have a thought repeated by fuelling it with burning desire or feelings/emotions and it manifest into reality (Stone, 2014).

On the side of Dhanu, little is said of her religious affiliation but had the right triggers to lead her into suicide bombing. There are other factors that contributed in her decision to join the Black Tigress but the mind received good amount of information to influence her decision as well. It was stated that there were constant viewing of past suicide missions which probably made her obsessed with the idea of suicide terrorism. A weak willpower



will drag one into mud of menace (Okyere, 2018) such as suicide terrorism. Moreover, “whatever one plants in the subconscious mind and nourish with repetition and emotion, will one day become a reality” (Stone, 2014, para 7). Stone (2014) asserts that consistent and repetitions are the basics of programming the subconscious mind as well as visualizing.

Saeed Hotari falls within the earlier psychological profile for terrorists that they are uneducated, poor, unemployed, single men in their late teens and early twenties (Pape, 2005). He was a staunch Muslim that is what supposedly made him a liable candidate for the Hamas because they recruit individuals with intense interest in Islam. That is what Perry & Negrin (2008) allude to when they indicated that the terrorist leaders use skilful recruitment and indoctrination methods and they understand the strategic importance when they launch suicide missions (p. 121). They do it in a way to radicalize the Muslim masses (Perry & Negrin, 2008). The biography on Saeed clearly shows how Hamas used religion to indoctrinate him to accept his role as a suicide terrorist. Apparently, after just several weeks, many in such classes willingly volunteer to be suicide bombers.

“At these classes individuals are ushered into reading various passages emphasizing the birth of the nation Islam, the importance of faith, the duty of jihad and Allah’s favours for those deemed most faithful” (Pape, 2005, p. 153).

His father celebrated the son for his heroic act; “My son has fulfilled the Prophet’s wishes” was reported to have stated (Pape, 2005, p. 120). Relatives are eulogizing him, giving him a status of heavenly being to advocate for them to gain entrance into Paradise (Pape, 2005, .p 120).



Discussion

Terrorism is a criminal act whether the action is justified or not or whether they identify themselves with military or civilian imagery (brotherhood) it is a criminal act (Zalman, 2017).

Religion implies a link between mankind and God or god, according to its (particular) beliefs and its adherents will govern (manage) their behaviour according to a certain morality and will abide by determined rituals (such as prayer, processions etc.) (Tarlow, n.d.; p. 11).

1. “Mohammed Atta and perhaps many others are not simply orthodox believers turned violent, but rather violent extremists who manipulate religious concepts for their own purpose” (Zalman, 2017). Atran (2006) noted that in an interview he had with Muja-hideen who rejected suicide bombing, it was made known to him that they do not justify suicide bombings with religion. According to Atran (2006), JI, similar to many of the militant Salafi groups that are sympathetic to Al-Qaeda, is riddled with internal divisions over the wisdom of killing fellow Muslims and civilians. “Not one verse in the Qur‘an contains an order for Muslims to make war on people of another religion,” (p. 141). Wilkinson (1990) also affirmed this assertion that religion is hardly the root cause of suicide terrorism but it is often used by terrorist organizations in recruiting and in other efforts in service of the broader strategic objective (p. 7). Wilkinson (1990) continued by saying that there is little connection between suicide terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism or anyone of the world’s religions. In fact, those who are noted for suicide terrorism are actually against religion especially the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, a Marxist-Leninist group whose members are from Hindu families (p. 7). What has made religion the cause for terrorism is the fact that terrorist organization exploits the religious



inclination of members for their benefit instead of the individual. Also researchers tend to focus on the irrationality of the act from the perspective of the individual attacker instead of the group dynamics. As a result, they focus on the individual motives for suicide which has skewed the scale to either religious indoctrination, or psychological predisposition (Pape, 2005, p. 14). Tarlow (n.d.) quoted Steve Mariotti, Huffington Post article that “we blame religion and ignore the economic underpinnings of terrorism at our peril” (p. 5).

2. In order to demystify the manipulative role of terrorists’ leaders there is the need to turn altruistic suicide bombers to believe that they can carry their message across to others without violence. These terrorist leaders may also be encouraged to religiously promote sacred values, such as spreading the faith and promoting equal economic opportunity. They could also support social and political advancement through educational achievement and personal piety. Sincere alternative appeals to sacred values could undermine consensus for violent jihad (Atran, 2006, p. 141).

3. Currently is it reported that most jihad recruits have never been to Iraq, Afghanistan or Israel (Silke 2015). They have no direct connections with those countries. No friends or family living there. However, they do have a sense of connection with the conflict and the media coverage of the conflict – combined with the often very graphic coverage in jihadi videos which acts as an important catalyst in the radicalization process (Silke, 2015; p. 12). The media is being exploited to fuel this agenda of suicide terrorism.

4. Religious martyrdom is a status conferred on terrorists by the support from the community. Individuals do not become martyrs on their own. According to Pape (2005), terrorist groups



need their suicide attackers to be accepted as martyrs by the wider community (p. 57). It is a community that confers martyrdom on individuals but if the community refuses to accept or qualify the individual as a martyr, the actions are riddled with condemnation and not socially accepted (Pape, 2005). Such could actually undermine support for the terrorist campaign on martyrdom; ones voluntary sacrifice could go unnoticed by the community. So this is important for terrorist groups; so should it be to counter terrorism.

5. Walter Laqueur's "Indoctrination is the central factor" stated that "suicide terrorism seem to be confined to members of a certain generation. Once it is realized that the martyrdom of these young people do not bring the desired goal any nearer, the readiness to sacrifice one's life is bound to wane" (Perry & Negrin, 2008, pp. 125-127).

6. The current generation thrive on information, the wrong information repeated will skew people's mind off rational thinking to belief systems which is difficult to deal with. The world has become borderless due to globalization. Cultural concept of identity is being manipulated constantly and it is prone to drive us into conflict (Issa, 2018). This cultural identity in a way explains why individuals trained in western countries tend to be radicals. According to Pape (2005), terrorism is largely about fighting westernization. To him there is a religious difference between the United States and terrorist groups. That is what Pape (2005) says they are using to portray that the United States is using religion to force them to accept and transform their societies. Thus the only way to stop the United States is to appeal for collective martyrdom operations as the means to protect the self-determination of threatened communities (Pape, 2005).



7. Perhaps to stop the suicidal terrorism, there is the need to really explore the possibilities that make mostly ordinary people to configure their psychological and cultural relationships; and are lured by terrorist organizations to live as terrorists and are bounded into martyr making web (Atran, 2003).

8. Based on the premise that individual actors are indoctrinated to lose their willpower i.e. conscious mind to the subconscious mind such that they cannot differentiate between good and evil just as religious extremism. Through this idea it can be assumed that suicide terrorists are controlled by the subconscious mind and are no longer rational individuals. This is confirmed by Victoroff (2005) who talks about the outrageous inhumanity of attacks on innocent civilians' challenges the commonplace understanding of 'rational' behaviour (p. 15). The typical terrorist is not a "rational actor" (Victoroff, 2005, p. 15).

9. It should be noted that there is no one obvious suicide terrorist personality, their personality is heterogeneous (Silke, 2015). Victoroff (2005) also indicated that any attempt in analyzing the mind of the terrorist, it would be best to understand the heterogeneity of terrorist because it involves the temperaments, ideologies, thought processes and cognitive capacities which would lead one to uncover a spectrum of terrorist minds.

10. Accepting that terrorists are heterogeneous, four traits may possibly be characteristics of "typical" terrorists who lead or follow in substate groups:

- a. High affective valence regarding an ideological issue
- b. A personal stake-such as strongly perceived



oppression, humiliation, or persecution; an extraordinary need for identity, glory, or vengeance; or a drive for expression of intrinsic aggressivity that distinguishes him or her from the vast majority of those who fulfil such characteristic

c. Low cognitive flexibility, low tolerance for ambiguity, and elevated tendency toward attributing error

d. A capacity to suppress both instinctive and learned moral constraints against harming innocents, whether due to intrinsic or acquired factors, individual or group forces—probably influenced by a, b, and c (Victoroff, 2005, p. 35)

11. Some researchers argue that indoctrination is of no importance because “jihad is a religious obligation because individuals volunteer to be used for such mission” (Perry & Negrin, 2008; p. 126). The conscious mind helps to make decision and translates them into actions that have been planned by the subconscious mind. The conscious mind just follows rules. So an individual might think he/she is volunteering but unknown to the conscious mind the subconscious mind is influencing the process. The subconscious mind acts before the conscious mind. Both minds think but the individual is only aware of the conscious mind. The subconscious mind learns voraciously which much of it is outside awareness (Nussbaum, n.d. pp. 38-40). That means one’s subconscious mind would learn information unaware to the conscious mind but it is the conscious mind that would act out. Therefore the act of volunteering is not entirely so when there is some form of deliberate and conscious effort to draw ordinary people into the terrorist organizations.



Conclusion

There is indeed some kind of link between terrorism and religion. It means we cannot state categorically that there is a link between religion and terrorism neither can we say otherwise. There is actually no doubt that there is somewhat a powerful hold on followers with divine oriented-ideologies (Tarlow, n.d.). If we understand “religion as nothing more than ideology, then next world ideologies, be it deity-oriented or secular oriented, would likely show high levels of intolerance that may lead to violence” (Tarlow, n.d. p.19).

“If religion is a celebration of life over death, then religious leaders dare not allow their ideology to be co-opted into ideological excuses for the creation of violence or exploit ordinary people’s intense interest in religion into violence. When religion inspires terrorism then it ceases to be religion” (Tarlow, n.d. p. 19).

Tarlow (n.d.) did not mince words when he said “religious leaders who permit religion to inspire death have made a major leap backwards into the medieval period” (p. 19). Religion is merely a subset of ideology. If religion is used as an access point to influence major decisions then in the end it will not only become a force for good, but rather a major political force. If on the other hand, “religious leaders permit themselves and their ideologies to become servants of war, then in the end, religion will become merely one more ideological relic of the past” (Tarlow, n.d.; pp.19-20).

The mind of suicide terrorist is skilfully being exploited directly and indirectly by terrorist organization leaders, small groups of close friends and relatives who are radicals/extremists. Directly, because some intentionally inform the individual about martyrdom; others are also incited to fight westernization or see themselves as freedom fighters. Indirectly,



some individuals are shown videos and told success stories of suicide attacks by the terrorist group. These are all done to manipulate the mind to undertake such heinous crime but make it look like it was an individual volunteering assignment. Interestingly, no man ever realizes he has been brainwashed or indoctrinated. Those who are normally brainwashed turn to defend the cause of their leaders/manipulators passionately, claiming they have been “simply shown the light” (The Unbounded Spirit, n.d. para 3) or Allah gave them the brain to think for themselves. The subconscious mind is an extraordinary processor of knowledge that we are not naturally aware of (Nassbaum, n.d.) but until we come to that realization the mind would be the play field for suicide terrorist organizations.

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