

African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT)



MAINSTREAMING HUMAN SECURITY RESPONSE IN COUNTERTERRORISM ENGAGEMENTS IN AFRICA

Dr. C. Nna-Emeka Okereke

ANALYSIS OF BOKO HARAM TERRORISM AS AN EMERGING SECURITY THREAT IN WESTERN SAHEL: NIGERIA IN FOCUS

Albert Banunle
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COLLABORATION IN COUNTERRING BOKO HARAM'S FINANCING OPERATIONS IN THE LAKE CHAD AREA: CHARTING THE ROLES OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCE

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ASSESSING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE ERA OF TERRORISM IN NIGERIA

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LE TRAITEMENT EFFICACE DU RETOUR DES COMBATTANTS TERRORISTES ÉTRANGERS

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LA STRATÉGIE DE LUTTE CONTRE L'EXTRÉMISME DES JEUNES, VÉHICULÉ PAR LES RÉSEAUX SOCIAUX

Dr. Aradj Slimane

BOOK REVIEW

Ibifubara Abbiyesuku

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EDITORIAL

Communiqué: The African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council, 812th meeting.

The Editorial of this edition of the Journal is dedicated to the communiqué of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU) 812th meeting held on 23rd November, 2018, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on the 2018 Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the fight against violent extremism and terrorism in Africa. The Editorial Board seeks to disseminate same by this publication and to solicit Member States' and Partners' support for the realization of the decisions therein. The ACSRT is of the view that, the full implementation of the decisions contained in the communiqué will contribute significantly to enhancing the capacity of the ACSRT to deliver on its mandate.

H.E Larry Gbevlo-Lartey (Esq.,)

AU Special Representative for Counter-Terrorism Cooperation/ Director, ACSRT



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PEACE AND SECURITY COUNCIL
812TH MEETING

23 November 2018
ADDIS ABABA, ETHIOPIA

PSC/PR/COMM. (DCCCXI)

COMMUNIQUÉ



PSC/PR/COMM. (DCCCXII)

COMMUNIQUÉ

The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 812th meeting, held on 23 November 2018, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, considered the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the fight against terrorism and violent extremism in Africa and adopted the following decision:

Council,

1. **Takes note** of the report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the Fight Against Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa, which was presented to Council by the Director of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), Colonel Larry Gbevo-Lartey Esq. Council **also takes note** of the presentation made by the Director of the Namibia Central Intelligence Services, Mr. Benedict Katukula Likando, in his capacity as Chairperson of the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA), as well as of statements made by the representatives of Algeria, Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Sudan, European Union and the United Nations;
2. **Recalls** all its previous decisions and pronouncements on terrorism and violent extremism, particularly, Communiqué PSC/AHG/COM.(DCCXLIX) adopted at its 749th Meeting held on 27 January 2018 at the level of Heads of States and Governments, Communiqué [PSC/PR/COMM. (DCLXXXVII)] adopted at its 687th Meeting held on 23 May 2017; Communiqué [PSC/PR/COMM. (DCL)] adopted at its 650th meeting held on 17 January 2017; Communiqué [PSC/PR/ COMM. 1 (DCXVIII)] adopted at its 628th meeting held on 28 September 2016; Communiqué [PSC/ AHG/ COMM.1 (DLXXI)] adopted at its 571st meeting held at the level of Heads of State and Governments on 29 January 2016; Communiqué [PSC/AHG/COMM (CDLV)] adopted at its 455th meeting held at the level of Heads of State and Government on 2 September 2014, in Nairobi, Kenya; as well as Press Statement [PSC/PR/BR(DCCXI)] adopted at its 711th meeting, held on 22 August 2017 in Addis Ababa; Press Statement [PSC/PR/BR (DXCII)] adopted at its 592nd meeting held on 19 April 2016 in Addis Ababa and Press Statement [PSC/PR/BR.2 (DLX)] adopted at its 560th meeting held on 26 November 2016 in Addis Ababa;
3. **Reiterates its strong condemnation** of all terrorist acts, that no what so ever reason could justify, and **stresses the right** of every person to be protected against the scourges of terrorism and the primary responsibility of the State to ensure the protection of life and personal safety of persons on its territories;
4. **Notes with serious concern** that, in spite of the efforts being deployed by Member States and other stakeholders in preventing and combating terrorism and violent extremism, the scourges continue to pose serious threats to peace, security and stability in some parts of the continent, and have severe impact on the enjoyment of human rights and result in depletion of national resources that could be allocated to development. Council **also notes with serious concern** the growing capacity of terrorist organizations in Africa to finance their activities by, among others, running criminal/illicit economies in areas under their control, engaging in illegal



exploitation of, and trade in, natural resources, kidnaping for ransom (KFR), arms, drugs and human trafficking, and other types of transnational organized crime. In this regard, Council **underscores the urgent need** for more concerted and coordinated efforts by Member States to effectively deny terrorist organizations any source of funding, including payment of ransom as well as any form of military, logistical or political support;

5. **Underscores** the AU's continued commitment to inclusive approaches and African ownership in the fight against terrorism, within the context of African solutions to the problems plaguing the continent, as well as Africa's commitment to the international counter- terrorism regime as outlined in relevant OAU/AU treaties and conventions, UN Security Council resolutions, and the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy;

6. **Commends** Algeria, in its capacity as the AU Champion in combating terrorism and violent extremism, for having hosted the High-Level Meeting on Combating Terrorist Financing in Africa from 9 to 10 April 2018, in Algiers, and **requests** the Commission and Member States to expeditiously implement the decisions and recommendations of the High-Level Meeting;

7. **Expresses deep concern** over the growing influx of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) from outside the Continent and the threat they are increasingly posing to peace and security in Africa. In this regard, Council **requests** the Commission, through the ACSRT, CISSA and the AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL), in cooperation with Member States, to urgently compile a continental list composed of a database of persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts, including FTFs. In the same context, Council **calls on** the members of the international community to share with AU Member States, the lists of persons, groups and entities involved in terrorist acts, including their nationals identified as FTFs. In this regard, Council **requests** the AU Commission and partners to continue to assist Member States in building and further strengthening their national capacities, in order to enable them to more effectively deal with this threat;

8. **Recalls, once again**, the press statement [PSC/PR/BR.(DCXXVII)] of its 627th meeting held on 26 September 2016, on the role of cybersecurity in the promotion and maintenance of peace and security in Africa; **reaffirms** the need to counter the use of ICT technologies by terrorist groups, whether in their fundraising, narrative promotion, and recruitment of others to commit terrorist acts; **welcomes**, in this context, UNSC resolution 2354 (2017) and the "Comprehensive International Framework to Counter Terrorist Narratives" (S/2017/375) with recommended guidelines and good practices; and **encourages** Member States to collaborate in developing and implementing effective counter-narrative strategies in accordance with UN Security Council resolution 2354 (2017), including those relating to FTFs;

9. **Underscores the need** for Member States to enact appropriate legislation and develop appropriate psycho-social programs for the terrorist fighters who have voluntarily handed themselves to the authorities in the Member States while ensuring full respect to the rule of law;



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10. **Stresses that** effective responses to terrorism and violent extremism should be holistic and combine dynamic military approaches with sustained efforts that are aimed at effectively addressing the root causes. In this respect, Council **encourages** Member States to adopt approaches aimed at prevention and combating of terrorism and violent extremism. In this context, Council **also encourages** Member States to develop their national legislation and architecture for the prevention and combating of terrorism and violent extremism as well as comprehensive and integrated counter-terrorism strategies and plans of action for prevention and suppression of terrorism;
11. **Commends** CISSA and ACSRT for their relentless efforts in supporting Member States in the fight against terrorism, violent extremisms and radicalization in Africa, in particular, for providing capacity building support to Member States, especially in developing their own national strategies and plans of action, policy harmonization and promotion of information sharing and regional cooperation;
12. **Requests** the Commission to follow up on the adoption of the proposed revised structure of the ACSRT, its infrastructure development and the provision of required support, with a view to ensuring that it more effectively discharges its mandate. In this respect, Council **expresses its gratitude** to the Government of Algeria for continuing to provide support to the Centre and requests the relevant Algerian authorities to authorize the proposed expansion of the ACSRT facilities;
13. **Reaffirms** the continued relevance of the AU normative and policy framework for preventing and combating terrorism, and **reiterates its call** for all Member States, that have not yet done so, to sign and ratify, without any further delays, the relevant AU instruments;
14. **Underscores** the importance of establishing platforms for regular inter-faith dialogue, with a view to promoting mutual tolerance and acceptance among communities of different religious communities;
15. **Requests** the Commission to review all continental legal instruments relating to the prevention and combating of terrorism, including terrorism financing, so as to make them also relevant in fighting the new methods and techniques of terrorist financing. In this respect, Council **further requests** the Commission to urgently update the 2002 AU Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism;
16. **Calls on** Member States to enact and enforce appropriate legislative and law enforcement, as well as traceability control measures to include importation, movement, storage, distribution and use of materials and components used for making improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In this regard, Council **also callson** ACSRT to assist Member States in the development of their Counter IED capabilities;
17. **Requests** ACRST, CISSA and AFRIPOL, working in consultation with AU partners and other relevant stakeholders, to expedite the development of the five-year strategic roadmap for the



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prevention and combating of terrorism and violent extremism, pursuant to Communiqué [PSC/PR/COMM. (DCLXXXVIII)] adopted by Council at its 687th meeting held on 23 May 2017;

18. **Reiterates** the urgent need to fully activate the Council's sub-Committee on Counter-Terrorism and to operationalize the African Union Special Fund on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa, pursuant to Assembly decision [Assembly/AU/Dec.614 (XXVII)] adopted by the 27th Ordinary Session of the Assembly held in Kigali, in July 2016;

19. **Recalls** its decision as contained in Communiqué PSC/PR/COMM. (DCLXXXVII), adopted at its 687th Meeting held on 23 May 2017 and **stresses** that the ACSRT Focal Points for liaison and coordination in Member States are to be those institutions in Member States charged with national responsibility for counter-terrorism policy planning and response coordination;

20. **Expresses its sincere gratitude** to all AU partners for their continued support to the AU counter-terrorism efforts;

21. **Decides** to remain actively seized of the matter.



MAINSTREAMING HUMAN SECURITY RESPONSE IN COUNTERTERRORISM ENGAGEMENTS IN AFRICA

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ABSTRACT

This paper sets out to reflect on mainstreaming human security response approach in counterterrorism engagements in Africa. It contends that investment in human security response approach is fundamental to the attainment of the objectives of counterterrorism offensives in Africa. The paper further posits that the human security response approach is necessary to address the conditions conducive for the emergence and spread of terrorism while creating the enabling environment to sustain the gains of kinetic militaristic approaches already in place. It therefore recommends robust investments that boost human security as vital counterweight measures to combat the scourge of terrorism in region. The paper relies on document analysis through critical reflections to generate logical deductions.



Introduction

A major concern of the international community since the last quarter of the 20th Century is the scourge of terrorism at domestic and international levels. This is not unconnected with the tensions and insecurity that characterise acts of terrorism across the globe. For instance, the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Centre in New York left damning shock on the global psyche taking into consideration the nature of the incident, the professionalism displayed as well as the resources and time invested in the preparation and execution of the devastating attacks. In addition, the incident came with enormous humanitarian casualty figure of about 2,977 persons killed in the incident.¹ Facts from the Cable News Network (CNN) indicate that 2,753 persons were killed at the World Trade Centre site in Lower Manhattan while 184 persons were killed when the hijacked American Airline Flight 77 crashed into the Pentagon. In addition, 40 passengers and crew were aboard the United Airline Flight 93 which crashed into a field.²

The audacity of the 9/11 attack brought to the fore the threat posed by international terrorism to global peace and security. Consequently, there emerged a concert of powers to effectively combat the terrorist challenge. However, as the world invested in counterterrorism offensives, terrorist organisations began seeking for new strategies and tactics. For instance, both the Al Qaeda Network (AQN) and the vestiges of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have found the use of affiliate spread across the globe as potent methods to sustain their aggressions and recreate their existence in a global system committed towards eliminating the scourge of terrorism and related crimes. These groups also resort to illicit transnational trafficking while also constituting alternative governments and stimulating community economies in areas where the presence of the state is significantly absent.



However, while some terrorist organisations sought to fill the absence of state in several vulnerable and relatively neglected communities, there seemed to be the predominance of military and diplomatic measures by several states to combat terrorism. This trend is noticeable in several African countries engaged in combating the scourge of terrorism and related organised.

This overemphasis on kinetic approaches tended to often draws nations away from addressing the condition conducive for the emergence and spread of terrorism. Little or no attention was in most case invested in human security gaps that increased vulnerabilities to recruitment and radicalisation. The realisation of this gap has brought to the fore the need to interrogate the imperative of mainstreaming human security concerns in counterterrorism engagements. This forms the thrust of this paper.

Contextualizing the Problem of Terrorism in Africa

Since the return of Mujahidin that resisted Soviet incursion into Afghanistan in the 1980s and the end of the Cold War between Eastern and Western blocs, Africa has steadily grown as a promising theatre for extremist groups that often resort to terrorism in their quest for visibility and political relevance. These significant phenomena that marked the last quarter of the 20th Century had two significant security implications for Africa. One, countries of North Africa especially Algeria, Egypt and Tunisia which experienced the return of the Mujahidin were confronted with the rise of Armed Islamic Groups (GIA) and Muslim Brotherhood that sought for theocratic transformations in their polities in line with strict Islamic tradition.

Two, the demise of the Cold War and eventual collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, saw several countries in Sub-Saharan Africa became trapped in armed conflicts and civil wars. These conflicts were facilitated



and sustained by the easier access to arms and ammunitions occasioned by the former component of the defunct Soviet Union which suddenly emerged as independent republics with relatively weak economies. Countries like Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire were trapped in intractable conflicts which had enormous implication for human security and the pursuit of development on the continent.

In August 1998, United States interests in East Africa became the target of terrorism attacks as terrorists linked to Osama Bin Ladin successfully attacked Embassies of the United States of America in Nairobi (Kenya) and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania). The official casualty rates indicates that in Nairobi approximately 212 people were killed while an estimated 4,000 victims were wounded while in Dar es Salaam, 11 persons were killed and 85 others wounded.³ In retaliation, then United States President, Bill Clinton, ordered military strikes in which 70 American cruise missiles were launched on Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan killing 24 persons while another 13 cruise missile targeted and destroyed a pharmaceutical plant in Sudan where Osama Bin Ladin made chemical weapons.⁴

Presently, the Al Shabab Al Mujahidin has emerged a major source of regional insecurity and instability in East Africa executing attacks targeted at Kenya, Uganda and Somalia while threatening other East African countries that contributes troops to the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). So far, Southern Africa has largely been isolated in terms of incidences of terrorism in the continent. However, St Elmo restaurant and American owned Planet Hollywood in Cape Town were targets of terrorist attacks in the late 1990s.⁵ However, in the past few years, there have been incidents of suspected terrorist encroachment into Madagascar where the terrorism Index increased from 1.52 and 1.67 in 2002 and 2015 to 3.29 in 2016.⁶ Yet, there was zero incident of terrorism in the country throughout 2007.⁷



Africa's vulnerability to terrorism intensified following the attack on the World Trade Centre, New York in September 2001 and further worsened in the aftermath of the Arab Spring in Middle East and North Africa (MENA). It is reasoned that this is not unconnected to the counterterrorism engagements in Europe, Asia and the United States. This is partly because several countries in sub-Saharan Africa are at various stages of fragility in which they lack basic institutional structures and processes requisite for the effective conduct of governance.

So far, certain characteristics have been identified concerning the trends in terrorism in Africa. First, the scourge of terrorism on the continent has been spreading despite national, regional and continental measures dedicated to counterterrorism offensives in Africa. Second, there has been a geographical spread across the continent far beyond the North Africa to sub-Saharan Africa countries many of which were initially not in the radar of countries of concern for terrorism analysis. Today, several countries across the continent have come to assume centre-stage in discourses on terrorism in Africa. Consequently, West Africa has emerged a strategic theatre for terrorist activities as various extremist groups perpetrating terrorist acts have emerged in the countries. Prominent among these groups include the Boko Haram, Ansar al Din, Signers in Blood Battalion, Movement for Oneness and Jihad in west Africa, Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Macina Liberation Front (MLF) based in Mali which have consistently executed attacks against African interest, against western interests while using parts of African territory for recruitment and sanctuary.

The major activities of terrorist groups in the continent include kidnapping for ransom, illicit transnational trafficking, proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons including attacks on military and various security agencies including the use of information superhighways to propagate extremist narratives across all known traditional border barriers. The



Chibok and Dapchi abductions including the attacks on soft targets such as hotels in Mali, Burkina Faso, Cote d'Ivoire and Somalia and the deployment of suicide bombers to various refugee and IDP camps are glaring indicators of the magnitude of the problem. Other vulnerable spots that have been attacked include Garissa University in Kenya, West Gate attack in Nairobi and shopping malls in different locations.

The consequences of terrorism on the conduct of governance, public psyche and community resilience are undoubtedly enormous. It leads to deaths and despondency, destruction of properties and in some cases, forced migration, displacement of social order and communal life including scarcity of food. The Boko Haram terrorism in Northeast Nigeria had significant cross border implications which included the flight of thousands of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons. For instance, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) declared that about, 13,000 Nigerians fled from the northeast states of Adamawa and Borno to Guider, Gashiga, Bourha, Mogode and Boukouda in northern Cameroon following Boko Haram attacks on Mubi in late October 2014.⁸ Prior to the Mubi attacks, an estimated 43,000 Nigerian refugees were already in Cameroon of which 17,000 were at Minawao refugee camp.⁹ The UNHCR estimated that about 15,000 to 17,000 Nigerians who fled to Cameroon were not officially registered as refugees.¹⁰ Often the displaced population especially those are exposed to several threats which includes diseases, hunger and possibility of terrorist attacks in displaced population. Such threatening exposures heighten the gloomy image on the state of human security in Africa. Yet, the scenario becomes more disturbing especially human security considerations are most often ignored in evolving counterterrorism strategies and responses. It has therefore become necessary at this point to attempt a clarification of the notion of human security and its relevance to robust counterterrorism engagements.



Understanding and Human Security

To understand human security, a tacit reflection on the concept of security is considered important here. The term security implies the safety of people from both violent and non-violent threat. It has often been likened to be the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and functional integrity against forces of change perceived as hostile.¹¹ Buzan further identified three layers of security notably, individual, state and international security systems. In terms of individual security, Buzan focuses on the factor of life, health, status, wealth and freedom and argues that these elements are somewhat complicated. In terms of the state element, Buzan focuses on the essence of the state, the physical base of the state and the institutional expression of the state. He argues that military threats poses direct threats to the security of the state.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, it became glaring that the traditional notion of the state which emphasizes the respect for sovereignty emerged a major threats to lives. The state and its institutions became a perpetrator of insecurities from various fronts by failing to fulfil its obligations towards their subjects while also threatening their very existence. Buzan further contends that the absence of a global government in the international system suggests a sort of anarchy which in itself constitutes another frontier of insecurity. These separate platforms for security considerations exert pressure on the individual such that the concept of human security has come to assume increasing significance in contemporary security discourses.

Since 1994 when the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) drew attention to the protection from chronic threats as hunger, disease and repression including the protection from sudden harmful upheavals of



daily existence touching on housing, employment and community life,¹² the notion of human security has become topical in policy and academic conversations. Shahrbanou Tadjbaskhah observes that there is no consensus on the exact meaning of the term but however notes that it goes beyond traditional notions of security to focus on issues relating to development and respect for human rights.¹³ It is his view that human security deals with the capacity to identify threats, avoid them when possible and to mitigate their effects when they do occur.¹⁴ Put slightly, differently, human security means helping victims cope with the consequences of the widespread insecurity resulting from armed conflicts, human rights violations and massive underdevelopment.

Don Hubert shares Tadjbaskhah views and insists that human security is a condition characterised by freedom from pervasive threats to people's rights, their safety or even their lives.¹⁵ Such pervasive threats could be associated with poverty, diseases, environmental degradation or violence. In other words, access to basic education, gainful employment and social amenities are useful indices of human security in addition to protection from social and political violence, crimes and criminalities, human rights preservation as well as access to justice.

The primary focus of human security is the protection of people than the security of territories or governments and also entails taking preventive measures to reduce vulnerabilities, minimise risks and take remedial actions where prevention fails.¹⁶ Put differently, human security implies that the security of the state is not an end in itself rather it is a means to ensuring the security of the people. The absence of human security therefore creates enabling environment that enhances the vulnerability of local population to extremism and terrorist recruitment.



The UNDP Human Development Report (HDR) of 1994 identified seven distinct categories of human security focusing on the economy, food, health, the environment, security of persons, community security and freedom to engage in political activities. The report further conceived insecurity as a form of structural violence and also reflected on far reaching issues of underdevelopment: international crime, public health, population growth, inequality and environmental degradation. These issues thereafter attracted new focuses for development assistance.

It is noteworthy to observe here that human security requires emphasis on the role of people and communities towards ensuring their safety and security. Consequently, while it is a responsibility for the state, there is the complementary duty of the citizens to be part of the process. Attaining meaningful participation of the citizens in the process therefore requires that they should be adequately empowered.

Nexus between Terrorism and Human Security in Africa

Terrorism and human security are two closely linked phenomena that have a cause and effect relationship. Analysts like Roger Kuitche have often established the nexus between both variables arguing that terrorism is an existential threat to human security in Africa.¹⁷ The point here is that there exist apparent linkages between terrorism and human security as both phenomenon feed into each other. The significant role of human security as a factor facilitating vulnerabilities to terrorism in Africa is underscored by the experiences of countries in the Sahelo-Saharan belt.

In the Lake Chad Basin area, the shrinking of the lake has stimulated new security challenges that feed the vulnerability of local population in the communities to terrorism and violent extremism. First, the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) was established in 1964 to ensure equitable and



sustainable management of the Lake Chad while preserving the ecosystem and promoting sub-regional integration, peace and security in the basin.¹⁸ The four littoral countries of the Lake Chad include Nigeria, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Central Africa Republic and Libya joined the LCBC in 1996 and 1998 respectively. The area is prone to desertification and the vagaries of climate change with attendant implications on the local population. For instance, from being the 6th largest lake in the world, the Lake Chad has lost about 90 percent of its size, from a peak of 25,000 square kilometers (km) to currently about 1,350 square km.¹⁹ It has therefore lost its capacity to sustain large population which it previously provided access to freshwater and platform for fishing and livestock. The accompanying ecological threats have resulted to forced migrations, environmental stress and sometimes violent conflicts.

President Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria noted that the shrinking Lake Chad adversely affected the caloric intake of the local population. He linked this to the disappearance of varieties of fishes in the water which further dispossess several fishermen of their main source of income and nourishment and compel itinerant pastoralists to move southwards into the hinterland in search of pastures. This trend has further ignited the spiral of violent conflicts between pastoralist and sedentary farmers over access to scarce fertile farmlands including land and water resources conducive for grazing as evident in Nigeria's Middle Belt. The combination of famine, desertification and violent conflicts therefore threatens food production and supply chain with implications for human security as more than 7 million people in the sub-region are threatened by famine with half a million children suffering acute malnutrition.²⁰

Another accompanying consequence of the dwindling Lake Chad to terrorism and human security is that it heightens the vulnerability of youths to recruitment and radicalization by active cells of terror groups scattered



across West Africa, the Sahel and Maghreb. Several unemployed and disillusioned youths genuinely in search of explanation for their existence are sometimes lured by the seductive narratives propagated across the regions by terrorist groups that provide material and social support to such vulnerable population. The point here is that several youths resort to joining terrorist groups to escape difficult economic conditions associated with lack of opportunities especially in environment where extremist groups have been known to stimulate local economies along border areas.

In Mali, the recurrence of the incidence of terrorism and violent extremism is the inescapable consequence of a combination of factors relating to the contradictions in governance, human rights and environmental stress. In addition, Mali play host to several aggrieved socio-cultural and political groups comprising of individuals that feels marginalized in the country's political structures and processes. It is such political grievances that have bred the Tuareg extremism and rebellions in northern Mali. In addition to political extremism is the incidence of religious extremism in Mali which was festered by the activities of the Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).²¹ With the advent of the Arab Spring in Libya and eventual overthrow of the Ghadaffi regime, there was a quickening of events that escalated the incidences of terrorism and violent extremism in Africa.

Mali has a long history of insurgencies which got heightened by the activities of the Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb. Politically, governance in the country has been conducted through weak institutions unable to make its impact felt throughout the country and especially in the northern regions like Kidal. Such has sustained deep rooted grievances, crisis of social cohesion and feeling of alienation especially among the Tuareg population. The inability of successive administrations in Mali to effectively reconcile these anomalies has often been exploited by terrorist groups in the country to perpetrate terrorist acts against the state which sometimes has signifi-



cant implications for the security of West Africa and the Sahel. The sudden collapse of the Ghadaffi regime in Libya served as a catalyst that activated the concealed contradictions of the Malian society under former President Ahmadou Traore. The climate of terrorism in Mali swiftly changed in 2012 following the return of several Malians of Tuareg extraction many of who were experienced combatant in the Ghadaffi military, the intrinsic discrepancies in governance and development became more glaring while stimulating the quest to change in the Mali polity.²²

Yet, the loss of remittances accruable to several Malian nationals arising from the Libyan crisis and xenophobic attacks on Black African worsened economic conditions of the population and compelling several parents to exchange their children for stipends from the extremist groups operating in Mali. The United Nations Security Council noted that the sudden return of Malian migrant workers from Libya placed additional strain on their poor host communities that already suffered social exclusions and lacked access to basic health infrastructure and educational services.²³ The sudden loss of this means of income adversely affected their families. The loss of remittances has been particularly hard-hitting in the light of the looming food security and nutrition crisis. The forced return of these migrant worker posed additional burden to their host families and communities in Mali as several parents released their children as recruits for the various extremist groups in exchange for monetary rewards.²⁴

Added to the environmental stress and extreme poverty, the enhanced circulation and availability of several Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) carted away from Libya facilitated the resort to terrorism within and beyond Mali. The diaspora Tuareg population who returned from Libya took opportunity of their combat experiences, possession of huge military arsenals got emboldened to demand for the independence of Azawad from Mali, Niger and Algeria. The implications of this trend to security and stability in Mali and the Sahel remain enormous.



Rationalising the Human Security Response Approach to Counterterrorism in Africa

The utility of the human security response approach to counterterrorism in Africa cannot be overemphasised bearing in mind that conditions associated with human security constitutes driver and enabler of terrorism. This therefore presupposes that addressing the human security imperatives could significantly boost investments in counterterrorism measures at national and regional levels in Africa. Such human security concerns draws from the political, economic, legal, environmental, health and social realities that enhance the living conditions of people. It is therefore necessary that issues relating to these dimensions are taken into consideration.

Mainstreaming human security concerns in counterterrorism engagements is targeted at addressing the conditions that are conducive to the emergence and sustainability of terrorism. This includes respect for human rights and rule of law including compliance to constitutionalism in pursuit and utility of state power. This presupposes that the governing elites in a country should carry on the conduct of governance as public service in its strictest sense bearing in mind that maladministration constitutes the trigger for political violence, rebellion and terrorism. Such measures appeals to the hearts and mind of local communities especially when their aspirations are integrated in public policy formulation and implementation processes.

In circumstances relating to the authoritative allocation of values, the principle of inclusiveness should be adhered as unjustifiable deprivation breeds resistance and terrorist violence. With regards to the environment, requisite interventions to mitigate the threats associated with climate change especially desertification and shrinking of scarce water bodies and inherent resources should be put in place in timely and adequate levels. The



case of northern Mali is significant. Similarly, the utility of development assistance from international partners could also become necessary to facilitate the provision of basic infrastructures. However, donor nations and partners remain sensitive to corruption perception of recipient countries. This puts the onus on recipient nations to put in place robust structures that attracts confidence of stakeholders at domestic and external levels.

The growing acceptance of the security-development nexus has found expressions in the experiences of Mali and countries in West Africa and the Sahel has stimulated new initiatives such as the Sahel Alliance bearing in mind the looming threat and the apparent weakness of concern countries to effectively engage the evident threats to security. Within the framework of the Sahel Alliance, the World Bank, African Development Bank (AfDP), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) including countries like France, Germany, United Kingdom, Spain and Italy pledged commitment to the implementation of over 500 socio-economic and security projects in the region between 2018 and 2022. The spirit of the Sahel Alliance for security and development is captured as captured Remy Rioux, is to pool and coordinate, as never before, our common commitment for a prosperous, resilient, inclusive and dynamic Sahel region for its populations. It is this understanding of the dynamics of security and development that constitutes the core of human security response approach to counterterrorism engagements in Africa.



Conclusion

Experiences from across Africa suggests that local population are more predisposed to provide support and protection to several non-state actors and organisations that work to fill the socio-economic needs within communities literarily side-lined by the formal structure and institutions of the state. In such circumstances, it becomes easier to recruit and radicalise vulnerable population on the part of extremism that breeds terrorism.

In light of the foregoing analysis, it is evident that mainstreaming human security concerns in counterterrorism engagement is necessary for the attainment of the desired goals prevention and combating terrorism. This is not unconnected to the fact that commitments to strengthening human security through the eradication of poverty and other conditions that enhance vulnerability to recruitment and radicalisation of extremists are supportive of kinetic approaches in terms of intelligence and military operations. It is therefore necessary that while the reliance on military and security requirements for counterterrorism offensives are necessary to coerce compliance to order and stability in a state, adequate fairness should be devoted to the provision of basic amenities that enhance the living standards of local population.



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ANALYSIS OF BOKO HARAM TERRORISM AS AN EMERGING SECURITY THREAT IN WESTERN SAHEL: NIGERIA IN FOCUS

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ABSTRACT

The study provides an analysis of the Boko Haram terrorism as a security threat in Western Sahel with focus on Nigeria. The Conflict Analysis Framework of the UK Department for International Development (DFID) was employed to critically examine the different stakeholder groups (primary stakeholder, secondary stakeholders and shadow actors) and their activities, structural and dynamic analysis of the insurgency created by the Boko Haram militant group as well as analysis of response measures. From the findings, the primary stakeholders were identified as the leaders' of the Boko haram as the perpetrators of conflict, government of Nigeria and the citizens' especially in Northern Nigeria. There are secondary stakeholders who include international organisations and other nations. From structural analysis of the Boko Haram insurgency, it was found that there are political, social and economic undertone and implications for their activities. The response analysis to the Boko Haram group has been in three (3) forms, viz., avoidance strategy, military approach and dialogue. Evidently, all these response strategies have not been successful as the activities of the group still persist. It has therefore



been recommended that a well-designed and coordinated extra-ordinary intelligence networks is needed to curtail the activities of the group. Also, coordinated high level security intelligence should be employed and aimed at identifying shadow/actors/stakeholders that has been anonymous yet influencing the activities of the group.

Key words: Boko Haram, Terrorism, Conflict, Security, Sahel, Stakeholder Analysis

Background and Historical Perspective

Boko Haram is a militant organization based in northeastern Nigeria and also active in Chad, Niger and northern Cameroon (Chandler, 2015). The group was founded in 2002 by Mohammed Yusuf upon the principles of the Khawaarij advocating Sharia law. It turned into a violent extremist group in 2009 and has been responsible for loss of lives in many parts of Northern Nigeria. The Boko Haram group are thought to exist as the Islamic State in West Africa Province (ISWAP or ISWA) and previously as Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wahwa'l-Jihād (Chandler, 2015). One of the goals of the Boko Haram group is to champion for the establishment of an Islamic State, ruled by strict sharia law especially in the Northern part of Nigeria where the majority of the populations are Muslims. Boko Haram believes that democracy is too lenient and violates Islam. It also opposes the Westernization of Nigerian society and also the concentration of the wealth of the country among members of small political elite, mainly in the Christian south of the country (Bartolotta, 2011).

Before colonization and subsequent annexation into the British Empire in 1900 as Colonial Nigeria, the Bornu Empire ruled the territory where Boko Haram is currently active (Apine, 2014). It was a sover-



eign sultanate run according to the principles of the Constitution of Medina, with a majority Kanuri Muslim population. In 1903 however, both the Borno Emirate and Sokoto Caliphate were captured and brought under the control of the British. Christian missionaries at that time spread the Christian message in the region and had many converts (Metz, 2012). Since Nigeria's attainment of independence, the country has been governed by series of military dictatorship from 1966 to 1999 except for 1979 to 1983 which was a civilian rule. Ethnicity is thought to have been one of the causes of the 1967–1970 civil war; religious violence reached a new height in 1980 in Kano.

In 1980 the Muslim fundamentalist sect Yan Tatsine (“followers of Maitatsine”) instigated riots that resulted in four or five thousand deaths (Apine, 2014) at Kano. In the ensuing military crackdown, Maitatsine was killed, fuelling a backlash of increased violence that spread across other northern cities over the next twenty years (Ewi, 2013). According to Adesoji (2010) social inequality and poverty contributed significantly to the Maitatsine insurgency and the Boko Haram uprisings. Indeed, ever since the end of colonization, politicians and academics from the mainly Islamic North of Nigeria have expressed their fundamental opposition to Western education. Political ethno-religious interest groups, whose membership includes influential political, military and religious leaders, have thrived in Nigeria, though they were largely suppressed under military rule. In civilian rules, paramilitary wings of the Northern Nigeria, have been implicated in much of the sectarian violence in the years following. The Arewa People's Congress, the militia wing of the Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF), the main political group representing the interests of northern Nigeria, is a well-funded group with military and intelligence expertise, and is considered capable of engaging in military action, including covert bombing (Ross, 2014).



Since the 2009 Boko Haram uprising conflict between the group and Nigerian security forces, many other violence erupted across several states in northeastern Nigeria resulting in more than 1,000 deaths, with around 700 killed in the city of Maiduguri alone (Umar, 2012). The government inquiry into what was supposed to be the first insurgency found that there was long standing tensions which existed between Boko Haram and the Nigerian Security forces, the immediate cause of the violence stemmed from a confrontation between a group of sect members and police in the city of Bauchi and spread to Maiduguri. The Boko Haram members were en route to bury a comrade at the cemetery. The officers, part of a special operation to suppress violence and rampant crime in Borno State, demanded that the young men comply with a law requiring motorcycle passengers to wear helmets. They refused and, in the confrontation that followed, police shot and wounded several of the men (Umar, 2012).

The initial media reports noted that the violence began on 26 July when Boko Haram launched an attack on a police station in Bauchi State. Clashes between militants and the Nigeria Police Force erupted in Kano, Yobe and Borno soon after. But President Umaru Yar'Adua disputed this version of events, claiming that government security forces had struck first. "I want to emphasize that this is not an inter-religious crisis and it is not the Taliban group that attacked the security agents first, no. It was as a result of security information gathered on their intention ... to launch a major attack," he said. Nigerian troops surrounded the home of Ustaz Mohammed Yusuf, the founder and spiritual leader of Boko Haram since 2002, in Maiduguri on 28 July after his followers had barricaded themselves inside. On July 30, the military captured Yusuf and transferred him to the custody of the police which summarily executed him in public outside police headquarters (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

Amidst the growing controversy of the real cause of the Boko Haram insurgency, an article on Islam online by Rafiu Oriyomi in 2009 suggested that politics, not religion, was the cause of the violence (Oriyomi, 2009),

but people such as Christian pastor George Orjih were murdered specifically because they refused to convert to Islam (Ola, 2009). The persistence of Boko Haram attacks of the sect even with the emergence of President Muhammadu Buhari (a Muslim and a Northerner) as the Head of the current civilian dispensation has raised doubts on the myth or belief in some quarters that Boko Haram emergence was particularly targeted to pulling down the defunct President Goodluck Jonathan's administration and resist southern domination of the helms of affairs in the country.

Stakeholder Analysis of the Boko Haram insurgency using the DFID framework

Just as in every conflict, there are stakeholders or actors who are involved at different stages of the conflict or have interest in the matter. Stakeholder analysis within the DFID conflict analysis framework provides a structured way to identify stakeholders, and to explore how potential interactions among them may affect or influence conflict resolution or management. There are many ways stakeholders can be classified. Basically, stakeholders are either supporters, opponents or indifferent to the conflict. In conflict analysis, different stakeholders provide atmosphere, expertise, financing and power to a conflict. Based on the extent to which some individuals, a group or institution are affected or can influence conflict, there are classified as Primary or secondary stakeholders. The Boko Haram terrorism group has numerous interest groups that can be classified as primary stakeholders, secondary stakeholders or even shadow actors. A brief analysis on the primary, secondary and shadow actors in the Boko Haram insurgency are presented below.

Primary Stakeholders

The primary stakeholders of the Boko Haram insurgency consist of groups that are ultimately affected, either positively or negatively by the



activities of the Boko Haram group. The primary stakeholders are physically on the surface and activities of the conflict or insurgency. In this vain the members of the Boko Haram insurgency, the Federal Government of Nigeria and the victims of the activities of the Boko Haram as well as their families and communities are considered the main primary stakeholders of the insurgency.

1. Members and Leaders of the Boko Haram Group

Founded by Mohammed Yusuf in 2002, the Boko Haram group is the major primary stakeholders of the insurgency as it is directly involved and responsible for all the mutiniesthat have taken place in the name of the group. Since 2009, Boko Haram has been responsible for the death tens of thousands and displacement of 2.3 million from their homesas a result of which there have been ranked as the world's deadliest terror group by the Global Terrorism Index in 2015 (Pisa and Hume, 2015).

The Late Mohammed Yusuf (born 29th January, 1970 at Girigiri village in Gashua Local Government of Yobe state), the founding leader and Abubakar Shekau, the current leader are all primary actors in the Boko Haram insurgency (AEPC, 2015). Since Abubakar Shekau took over the leadership of the group, they have maintained a steady rate of attacks. The group has also been involved in mass abductions including the infamous kidnapping of over 200 schoolgirls from Chibok in April 2014. In 2013, Boko Haram spilled the conflict to include Chad, Niger and Cameroon.

2. The Federal Government of Nigeria

The Federal Government of Nigeria is also considered a primary stakeholder in the Boko Haram insurgency. Since the formation of the Boko Haram and in particularafter their deadlier attacks in 2009, the Federal Government of Nigerian has been taking counter terrorism measures to try and bring the group down. Many parastatal institutions of the Federal Government such as the Police Service, Military and Other



Security Agencies have become key actors in the Boko Haram insurgency. An example of some activities such as the “Operation Flush” undertaken by the police that led to the death of Mohammed Yusuf, the founder of the Boko Haram sect show the extent to which the Federal Government is involved as a primary stakeholder.

In some instances, the Federal Government of Nigeria declared state of emergency at different times, to mobilize the military and also tried to seek support from other countries to counteract the Boko Haram insurgency. These are efforts taken by successive governments of Nigeria following the rise of the Boko Haram insurgency.

Secondary Stakeholders

Secondary stakeholders are the ‘intermediaries’, that is, persons or organizations who are indirectly affected by an organization’s actions. These groups of people are often referred to as external stakeholders. Most of the time, they have a relationship with one or two groups of the primary stakeholder. In some cases secondary stakeholders are even more involved in the conflicts than the primary stakeholders. When necessary, the secondary stakeholders can also get involved in the conflict. Among the secondary stakeholders in the Boko Haram insurgency include various state governments in Nigeria especially those within or closer to the affected states. The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is one of the secondary stakeholders in the Boko Haram conflict. On March 9, 2015, Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shekau pledged allegiance/loyalty to ISIS. On the 12th of March, ISIS accepted the allegiance and sent a delegate to Nigeria later in the year but was actually caught on his way to Nigeria. This in a way makes ISIS a secondary stakeholder.

Neighbouring countries to Nigeria such as Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Benin can also be considered as secondary stakeholders. Although Boko Haram is based in the Northeastern part of Nigeria, these neighbor-



ing countries are also affected by Boko Haram and have therefore agreed to fight side by side with Nigeria against the activities of the Boko Haram group. Besides being a direct victim of Boko Haram's activities, displaced people from Nigeria move to these countries as refugees. Other countries outside Africa have also promised to help in the fight against Boko Haram. The United State of America, France, the United Kingdom, Israel, Canada among other countries have also been involve in providing some form of assistance to the Nigerian government to help fight Boko Haram making them all parts of the secondary stakeholders of the conflict.

Religious groups in Nigeria in one way or the order have also voice out their concerns and offer support for the fight against the Boko Haram group making them also secondary stakeholders. Alhaji Muhammad Garuba Akinola Ibrahim, the Chief Imam of Lagos State has condemned the killings done by Boko Haram and says it is improper for Muslims to commit such a gruesome crime(Global Peace Index, 2016). Pastor Ayo Oritsejafor, the President of the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) also said that he feels that religious leaders in the North and not President Goodluck Jonathan can bring an end to the Boko Haram insurgency (Peace Index, 2016).

Shadow Party Stakeholder

Shadow Actors in conflicts are people or groups who fuel the conflict between the primary stakeholders by providing them with finance, ammunition or just by affiliating with them(Peace Index, 2016). Shadow group actors always try everything possible to remain anonymous. As a result of their anonymity and concealed action, shadow actor/stakeholders are very difficult to identify and requires lots of intelligence gathering. Shadow actors/stakeholders have not been officially identified even though there is no denying the fact that there are shadow actors in the insurgency. Accusing



fingers have been pointed to many individuals and politicians but none have been convicted or found guilty being a shadow actor in the insurgency.

Structural Analysis of the Boko Haram terrorism

Political

Globally, terrorism is now accepted to be a major feature of the international political system in the 21st century and the Boko Haram terrorism is not an exception. Like most other terrorist groups, the activities of Boko Haram have gone beyond the traditional conceptions of mere terrorism. Alongside conspiracy theories that purport to explain Boko Haram, politics has been one of such an issue. While some people have pointed to the tensions between Christians and Muslims in the year 2000, many have also seen Boko Haram as a consequence of political power between the Northern Part of Nigeria and that of the South.

The year 2003 election was a clear signal of looming security threat; the election was marred by delays, ballot-rigging, and corruption (Human Right Watch, 2012). Violence between Christians and Muslims was witnessed with mass casualties occurring on both sides. Oil prices would rise due to violence, then fall suddenly, causing budget cuts, leading to more political insecurity and an insecure population. This decade was also characterized by constant corruption, including arrests of a former president's daughter and two health ministers who were charged with embezzling over 4 million dollars of public health funds.

Sarah Chayes, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, studied the links between systemic corruption in governments around the world and the emergence of extremist insurgencies.. "Many Nigerians suggest the emergence of Boko Haram was in part a reaction to this systematized corruption," (Chayes, 2015). According to the U.S. State



Department's 2013 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, Nigerian politics engages in, "massive widespread, and pervasive corruption affected all levels of government and the security forces" (U.S. Department of State, 2014).

Indeed, Boko Haram was a creation of the political climate created by the 2003 election. The group was formed in 2002 and launches its terrorist campaign to bring Sharia law to the entire region, becoming increasingly violent as time went on. Initially, Boko Haram, which means "Western Education is Forbidden," was a reflection of the Nigerian education situation, which was left over from British imperialism. For someone to get a job in the Nigerian civil service, they have to go to school, but they go to the imperial schools for the connections, buying their way in and buying their way through exams (Oriyomi, 2009). This naturally leads to corruption within the government, continuing the cycle of corruption and distrust of government. Of course over time, as the military and police cracked down on the group violently, the group radicalized to where it is today, pledging its allegiance to ISIS.

Over the years, Boko Haram has become powerful and has affected the political system of Nigeria. The election of 2015 had to be postponed from February, 2015 to late March as a result of the activities of Boko Haram. It was suspected that the postponement of the election might have been a political move to garner more support. However, it worked well, considering Boko Haram captured several towns near Lake Chad and were raiding neighboring Chad and Cameroon in early 2015. Hundreds of people in the north-east were killed and thousands more displaced. However, this offensive worked, reducing the territory Boko Haram operates in, capturing their stronghold, and leaving them with only two cities to operate from.

Finally, Muhammadu Buhari wins the presidential election, becoming the first opposition candidate to do so in Nigeria's history. He has a reputa-



tion of being incorruptible, and as a Major-General, he had a reputation for being better able to handle Boko Haram. It was also considered the first generally safe and fair election, and is largely seen as a positive change, despite his record previously running the country from 1st January 1984 to 26 August 1985, where his human rights record was abysmal. However, there exists hope that he has learned from his previous mistakes and with his Vice President who is known for working for human rights, will at least start changing the culture of corruption that is endemic to Nigeria while what is hopefully the final offensive against Boko Haram is underway.

Economic

The economic dynamics of the Boko Haram group have been known since the emergence of the militant group. This was evidence in some of the measures used by the Goodluck Jonathan's led administration in response to the insurgency such as poverty alleviation programs, economic development, education and social reforms. These programs resulted in the provision of modern basic education schools for the Almajiri and the establishment of nine new federal universities in Northern States. The government also aggressively addressed the challenges of poverty through its youth empowerment program like YouWin, and investing massively in infrastructure to promote economic development. At the height of the insurgency, the government set up an administrative panel to discuss with the insurgents, but they bluntly refused to meet with the government team.

It is well recognised that the activities of Boko Haram especially in the Kano, Kaduna, Bornu, Yobe and Bauchi States are gradually changing the economic structure of the whole of northern Nigeria. Many researches have predicted that if the violence persists, development in the affected regions will be tampered and the gap between the North and other regions will widen further. The reason is that even before the insurgency, the difference



between the North and South in terms of education alone is not a gap but a gulf that will take centuries to fill not to talk of the present state of the northern region especially the Northeastern region.

The evidence and fast changing economic indices (in form of changing migration patterns, cost of insurance in the North, mass repatriation of funds, dearth in skilled labour, etc) speaks volumes. In economic terms, what the insurrection effects is a systemic distortion of existing economic patterns and structure in the Northern region. For a cause that is neither war nor natural disaster, the nation, according to a recent report by the Human Rights Watch (HRW), lost more than 935 of its human capital between 2009 and 2012. For many analysts, Nigeria is a paradox: so peaceful but yet at war, so wealthy but poverty reigns among the majority of its citizens, so endowed but yet so deprived. Counting the cost ever since the activities of the militant group 'Boko Haram' assumed horrendous dimension, the loss of properties with commercial value and forfeited local and foreign investment have been of a great disaster to the domestic economy. Some experts believe there are no criteria to quantify the loss to the economy. In terms of finance and investment, though direct and indirect losses are unquantifiable, a World Investment Report (WIR) of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), estimated that the domestic economy lost a whopping N1.33 trillion Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), owing to the activities of terrorists going by the name 'Boko Haram' (Eme and Ibietan, 2012).

Historically, each region in Nigeria compliments the other. What the North lacks in access to the sea, the south provides. The North wields 78 percent of Nigeria's land which supports most of Nigeria's agriculture (food, cash crops and livestock). The south-west's terrain supports both domestic and international commerce and provides an import/export route. While the South-South and some parts of the South-East wield Nigeria's oil wealth. If Boko Haram's activities persist, this economic symphony



will be altered significantly. Farmers in Borno state known to be agrarians have fled in millions in their search of safe haven. Lands for agricultural production have become battle fields of Boko Haram group thus creating hunger and starvation in the region. The rate of serial killings by Boko Haram group and several attacks on prisons, Police and Army stations in Borno, Jos, Yobe, Gombe, Bauchi, Abuja, are enormous evidence of the wanton destruction by the group thus creating a severe setback to the Nigerian Nation. Also, the rate of incessant bombings of markets, schools, motor parks and Government offices have negative effect of engendering poverty, ignorance, primitivism, hunger, diseases, hopelessness and complete misery of life to the people of the region (AEPC, 2015).

Social

Boko Haram attacks have caused a Humanitarian Crisis. Their targets are repeatedly focused at areas where necessary and innocent civilian life is lived; markets, schools, churches, and hospitals. Nigerians and their neighbors have fled the brutal and fatal attacks by Boko Haram by dispersing into other countries or internally with family and friends. More than 470,000 refugees are internally displaced in Nigeria. Nigerian authorities have not set up camps for refugees due to the threat of Boko Haram attack. Villages such as Mafa received direct threats of violence from Boko Haram, prompting mass exoduses.

In March of 2015, a report from the Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN), indicated that an estimated 350,000 refugees have been displaced since 2013, with 290,000 of that number being internally displaced, the remaining number fled to Cameroon, Chad and Niger. With government restrictions on news and communications, and no official camps, an exact number is impossible but the real number is probably dramatically higher, as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees estimates the internal displacement number to be closer to 470,000.



In Yola, Nigeria, the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) set up a few camps, but there is hesitation in going to them due to reports of rape and kidnappings, but are still widely more accepted than the alternative. The NEMA report noted that between 10,000 and 20,000 people are being assisted. There yet still some refugees who prefer to stay with family or local residences, even if the conditions are less than desirable. The displaced population in Yola left their lives, homes and jobs to flee on foot at a moment's notice for hundreds of miles. Many of them formerly housed refugees in their own homes. Aid workers themselves become IPD's when insurgents reach their locations. Food isn't distributed daily, so to bridge the gap, men will find work with vendors in the market, and women can sometimes find housework for pay. There are growing concerns with regards to food security, as refugees have resorted to eating seed corn since 60 % of the farmers in areas like Lake Chad have also fled (Human Right Watch, 2012).

Security

The Boko Haram menace has had damaging security implications for Nigeria since its emergence. The most obvious one is that it gives signal to the international community that Nigeria is unsafe for even ordinary visit. Statistics released by Global Peace Index, (GPI, 2012) have shown that between 2011 and 2012, there is a significant decline in peace as Nigeria dropped four places to 146th out of 158 countries in global peace ranking. As a matter of fact, Nigeria has been identified as the least peaceful country in West Africa (Igbuzor, 2011). The widespread insecurity in the North has caused decline in the development of the country with implication for human, economic, political, security and psychological dimensions. There is symbiotic relationship between development and security. Expenditures on security are essential components of the development process. The use of resources to improve a country's security system could be more



beneficial in others areas. Therefore, insecurity is a drain on national resources at the expense of people's well-being.

The adverse effects of insecurity on the economic growth and development of a nation is quite enormous. Most often when terrorists destroy human lives and property, the government responds by providing relief materials for the victims of terrorism. The huge amount of money that is released in such circumstances is a drain on the public treasury and the nation's economy. For instance, in the 2012 budget, the federal government allocated 21.91 (US\$5.58) billion to security agencies (Opukri and Etekpe: 2013:377). Therefore, terrorists' act such as the Boko Haram hinders the development of the nation and increases the level of poverty.

Another damaging consequence of the phenomenon of Boko Haram terrorism is that it is tarnishing the image of Nigeria abroad. With the designation of Boko Haram as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) by the United Nation Security Council via Resolution 2349 in 2017 with the potential to kill foreigners; Nigeria is on the list of countries that are unsafe for foreign nationals. This situation is diminishing the integrity or rather the prestige of Nigeria in the comity of nations. Within Africa, the consequence of insecurity for Nigeria's leadership role is disturbing. The implication of the above assertion is that Nigeria cannot give what it does not have. In essence, Nigeria's leadership position in African region is questioned as she cannot guarantee her own security that is threatened by Boko Haram.

Dynamic Analysis

Response

Since 2009 when the activities of Boko Haram became an issue of significant public national and international interest, the Federal Government



of Nigeria has been responding to the activities of the group. In public discourse, most Nigerians consider the Government's response to be reactionary rather than proactive. Many of the discussions on the response of the Nigerian Government to the insurgency suggest that the Government usually waits for the insurgents to launch attacks on churches, schools, police stations and other public institutions before it reacts.

In the aftermath of the 2009 uprising and a couple of violence and attacks were launched by the militant group, the Federal Government of Nigeria declared a state of emergency in affected states where the insurgents have strong holds and have attacked several times. This did not stop the insurgents from attacking and killing both security agents and innocent citizens. Noticing that this strategy was not going to work, the Federal Government has used many more different response approaches as discussed below;

Avoidance Strategy

The escalation of the insurgency in early 2010 caught the government flat-footed. It initially believed the violence would peter out. (International Crisis Group Africa Report) The Federal Government avoided confronting the Boko Haram crisis at the initial period because it thought the group will fizzle out like others that had emerged in the past, this however turned out to be a grave mistake on the part of the government. The Former President of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan was quoted by the Daily Trust newspaper on August 8, 2013, to have said the Boko Haram group took the Federal Government of Nigeria by surprise. This was an admission by the President that the initial avoidance strategy did not result in the expected outcome.

Earlier, the posture and comments of the government and some of its officials suggested that they didn't expect the group to last. On 25 December



2011, the then President Jonathan was reported to have said, “the bombing is a burden we must live with. It will not last forever; I believe that it will surely be over.” The former President was also quoted in the Vanguard of 26 December, 2011, with the caption: “Bomb blast: A burden we must live with –Jonathan.” On 23 January 2012, the then Chief of Defence Staff, Air Vice Marshal Oluseyi Petinrin was also reported to have said the militants would soon run out of “idiots” willing to carry out their suicide bombings. These comments from the President and security operatives showed the response at time was somewhat an avoidance strategy with the hope that the group was going to fizzle out by itself.

Military Approach

After realizing that the avoidance strategy could no longer be justified as the attack by the insurgent was getting out of hand, the Nigeria government decided to tackle the crisis headlong with full military might. A military approach became the order of the day as Boko Haram captured several territories in Bornu, Yobe and Adamawa States. To achieve the full military approach, the federal government by increasing the defence budget from N100 billion (\$625 million) in 2010 to N927 billion (\$6 billion) in 2011 and N1 trillion (\$6.25 billion) in 2012, 2013 and 2014 in order to sufficiently arm the military to defeat Boko Haram.(International Crisis Group Africa Report)

Beginning from 2011, the FG deployed about 3,600 personnel to Maiduguri and other major north-east towns as part of the Joint Task Force (JTF), a special formation of military, police and SSS units. They were supplemented by small contingents from Chad and Niger, members of Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF) initially created to combat smuggling. The troops, however, were stretched too thin to control the large region. Towards the end of Jonathan’s administration, the government stepped up



its military campaign against Boko Haram and succeeded in recapturing the territories captured by the insurgents. This was done shortly after the 2015 election was postponed to allow the government time to scoop out the insurgents from the nation's territories. The current government led by President Muhammadu Buhari continued the military strategy and with multi-approach military tactics against Boko Haram with help from Chad, Niger and Cameroun succeeded in driving them away from most parts of the nation's territories.

Dialogue Approach

It appears dialogue approach was also on the table as option in the whole Boko Haram insurgency. However, ever since the menace started, no meaningful dialogue has been held between the government and the insurgents towards ending the crisis. Jonathan canceled a move to dialogue with the terrorists following the kidnap of the over 200 Chibok girls in April 2014.

With a new government at the helm of affairs, the Pentecostal Fellowship of Nigeria (PFN) In July, 2015 backed plans by the Federal Government to dialogue with Boko Haram sect, provided the insurgents are truly ready to surrender and embrace peace. The body urged the government during negotiation with the insurgents, to continue its military operations in the northeast. (Nation Newspaper, July 14, 2015). The new government however, speaking through the president's his spokesman (Femi Adeshina) said that his administration would not beg the Boko Haram terrorist group for dialogue. He maintained that the Federal Government had the capacity to defeat the insurgents through the use of force. According to him, President Buhari's administration is not opposed to dialogue if the sect wants it and especially if it is with the authentic leadership of the insurgents. (Daily Trust, July, 15, 2015).



During a media chat with the president on 30 December, 2015, President Buhari was reported to have said that his government is not against dialogue with Boko Haram. He said if a true leader of the insurgent group would show up, he government would be ready for dialogue. The president said he did not want to dialogue with the wrong leader of the group. As at now, no meaningful dialogue has been held between the Nigeria government and the insurgent group. There appears to be suspicion between the government and the insurgent groups. The Federal Government believed it is already winning the war against the terrorists, hence, exhibiting nonchalant attitude to explore the joint problem solving approach to ending the crisis.



Conclusion

Since gaining popularity in 2009 after the conflict with the Nigerian security forces, the Boko Haram terrorist group has gained notoriety and has since been a security threat in Northern Nigeria and other parts of the Western Sahel. With several conspiracy theories, it yet unclear what the true cause of the insurgency is. Nevertheless dynamic, structural and stakeholder analysis provides a closer view of the objectives of interest group and the implications on the insurgency. The study provides an analysis of the Boko Haram terrorism as a security threat in Western Sahel with focus on Nigeria. The UK Department for International Development (DFID) Conflict Analysis Framework was employed to critically examine the different stakeholder groups (primary stakeholder, secondary stakeholders and shadow actors) and their activities, structural and dynamic analysis of the insurgency created by the Boko Haram militant group as well as analysis of response measures.

Base on the findings, it appears, the response measures employed by the various stakeholders especially the Federal Government of Nigeria has not been markedly successful. Avoidance strategy did not lead to fizzling out of the group as was aimed, military approach could not eliminate the group nor dialogue brought understanding. It is therefore concluded that despite the efforts and response to the insurgency created by Boko Haram, the results has not been desirous. There is the need for response measures to reflect the underlying true cause and motivation of the group through abroad base interconnected military and security intelligence system.



Recommendation

The following recommendations are suggested for dealing with the menace of Boko Haram;

- There is the need for a well-designed and coordinated extra-ordinary intelligence networks. The authorities in charge of security such as the military and police service need to use a smart and extra ordinary intelligence networks in order to be able to combat the Boko Haram group. Intelligence needs to be gathered, coordinated and shared among the various agencies in Nigeria and neighbouring countries. There is also the need to elicit the cooperation of local communities in the affected areas of their operations. To be able to elicit the cooperation of the local communities, the defense and intelligence establishments need to respect the fundamental rights of the residents. There is also a need for international assistance especially in the areas of intelligence sharing, counter-insurgency operations, the detection of improvised explosive devices, forensic analysis, intelligence gathering and analysis, and the mounting of a de-radicalization programme.
- Shadow actors and sponsors of the Boko Haram insurgency should be identified, exposed and dealt with in accordance with applicable national and international laws
- There is also the need for the Federal Government to aggressively address the issues of poverty, low development and ignorance especially in the Northern part of the country. All along Boko Haram used poverty, low development and ignorance (poor education) as weapons to cause mayhem. It is therefore recommended that the Federal government should commence a national development plan



especially for the North East in order to alleviate the high level of poverty and underdevelopment in the area.

- The Government of Nigeria should also de-emphasize religion in politics by clearly separating political matters from religious matters and run the affairs of the nation as a secular state as stipulated by the constitution of the country.
- Nigerian government need to take back and control effectively all its borders by all means. The borders have become routes for illegal arms, illegal immigrants, criminals and contrabands. The security establishment should deploy officers to patrol the illegal and regular routes to Nigeria. This cannot be done by one arm of the defense and intelligence establishments. The Nigerian Air Force should be tasked with air patrol; the Navy should handle the maritime sides of the border, and the Nigerian Immigration Service should work with the customs, police and other security agencies in policing the borders. These establishments should be provided with the necessary surveillance, logistical and operational facilities to effectively patrol and manage the borders. Also, there should be inter-service training among the defense and intelligence establishments aimed at coordinated patrol of the borders.



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COLLABORATION IN COUNTERING BOKO HARAM'S FINANCING OPERATIONS IN THE LAKE CHAD AREA: CHARTING THE ROLES OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES ⁽¹⁾

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ABSTRACT

Boko Haram's brutality in the Lake Chad area is well known. The insurgency that started as a localised uprising in Nigeria's northeast in 2009, has transformed into a regional security threat following intensification of cross-border attacks from 2014, targeting Cameroon, Chad and Niger. What has received less scholarly attention, however, is how the group generates funds to sustain its reign of terror. This article therefore charts the outline of potential collaboration among three broad actors – special operations forces (SOFs), civilian ministries/agencies (CMAs) and civil society actors (CSAs) – in draining Boko Haram's funding streams in the Lake Chad area. It argues that these actors have diverse but mutually reinforcing roles to play in countering terrorism financing. They therefore need to synergise their efforts to achieve maximum results with the limited resources available to them. Given that the tasks of the SOFs are often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments, the article contends that SOFs should be used for rescue, surveillance, neutralisation, decapitation and sometimes interdiction operations. At best, the SOFs

1 *An earlier version of this paper was presented at Exercise Flintlock 2017 Senior Leaders Seminar, organised by the Special Operations Command – Africa (SOCAFRICA), Special Operations Command Forward – North and West Africa (SOCFWD-NWA), and the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies (ACSS) at Ledger Hotel, N'Djamena, Chad, 28 February – 2 March 2017



should be reserved for high-risk 'kill or capture' operations. It concludes that collaboration by key actors is vital in achieving the desired objective of starving terrorist of funds.

Keywords: Boko Haram, Terrorists Financing, Lake Chad Basin, Special Operation Forces, Insurgency, Violent Extremism

Introduction

Boko Haram's brutality, savagery and destruction in the Lake Chad area are well known.¹ The insurgency is estimated to have claimed over 24,000 lives, displaced more than 2.6 million people, created over 75,000 orphans and caused about \$9 billion worth of damage since 2009 in Nigeria.² Although the Boko Haram has largely operated in its stronghold in North-Eastern Nigeria, the group emerged as a regional security threat in 2014 following intensification of cross-border attacks in the Lake Chad area targeting Cameroon, Chad and Niger. As of September 2016, the insurgents have killed at least 1,300 civilians, 120 soldiers and abducted an estimated thousand people in Cameroon. Its brutal acts of destruction of hundreds of schools, businesses, infrastructure and homes, has led to a humanitarian crisis in one of Cameroon's highly impoverished regions, The Far North. The region now hosts 87,000 of Cameroon's over 360,000 refugees, 191,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) and 36,000 Cameroonian returnees.³ Since carrying out its first attacks in Niger on 6 February 2015, the terrorists killed at least 177 civilians in Diffa region between February 2015 and September 2016.⁴ The number of casualties has increased with each successful attack since then. Similarly, attacks in Chad by Boko Haram since early 2015 have killed hundreds and led to over 100,000 displaced and 7,000 refugees on Chadian territory by the beginning of 2017.⁵



What has received less attention from scholars and analysts, however, is how the Boko Haram gets funds to sustain its reign of terror.⁶ Yet it has been noted that “Boko Haram’s access to funding may be its centre of gravity, rather than the leadership (personalities) *per se*”.⁷ Exploitation of diverse revenue streams provides it with the liquidity for operations – membership recruitment, procurement of weapons and explosives, provision of welfare to members, sourcing of information, and facilitation of logistics, among others. To this end, several efforts are being made at the international, regional and national levels, both unilaterally by countries directly affected or collectively by partnership with countries within and outside the region, to contain the insurgency. For ongoing attempts to defeat the group to be successful, serious attention needs to be paid to the group’s strategies for generating funds.

This article therefore charts the outline of potential collaboration among three broad actors, namely; special operations forces (SOFs), civilian ministries/agencies (CMAs), and civil society actors (CSAs) in draining the funding streams of Boko Haram in the Lake Chad area. It draws much of its insights from the Nigerian experience of Boko Haram funding operations to make some generalisation that may apply to the Lake Chad area where the groups have operational footprints. The article relies mainly on secondary sources but complements it with primary sources from some of the relevant cases.

With this caveat, the outline of the article is as follows. First it briefly clarifies the meaning of two key concepts - countering terrorism financing and SOF. It then discusses the critical elements of terrorism financing infrastructure. The article then turns to some of the notable means the Boko Haram has adopted in generating funds. The next section highlights the crucial roles that SOFs, CMAs and CSAs can play in a collaborative manner to neutralise terrorism financing in the Lake Chad area. The last part of the article contains some concluding remarks.



Conceptual Foundation

Before we delve into the intricacies of the subject of concern, it is germane to conceptualise the terms ‘countering terrorism financing’ and ‘special operations forces’. This is to gain a shared understanding of their usage in this article.

Countering Terrorism Financing

In academic, business and government circles, the term ‘countering terrorism financing’ (CTF) has been used interchangeably with ‘combating terrorism financing’ or counter terrorist financing. In order to understand what CTF is, it is important to explain what constitutes “financing of terrorism”. The term “financing of terrorism” is defined broadly by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) as “the financial support, in any form, of terrorism or of those who encourage, plan or engage in it”.⁸ In this light, *Investopedia* posits that CTF involves “investigating, analyzing, deterring, and preventing sources of funding for activities intended to achieve political, religious, or ideological goals through violence and the threat of violence against civilians”.⁹ For the purposes of this paper, CTF is defined as deliberate measures and activities conducted to detect, deter, disrupt, dismantle and destroy all the multiple layers of activities, actors, networks, means and objects of value used to generate funds to support terrorists or terrorist groups.

Special Operations Forces

The usage of the term ‘SOFs’ has gained traction among governments and military leaders, especially in countries battling unconventional threats such as terrorism, insurgency and highly organised crimes. For all the attention that the term has received, there is the absence of clear and universally accepted definition. For the purposes of this article, SOFs is defined as “elite, highly trained military units that conduct operations that



typically exceed the capabilities of conventional forces”.¹⁰ As argued by Bucci, they “are valued for their out-of-the-box thinking, imagination, and initiative. SOFs can and do operate with a small footprint and can survive and thrive with a very light support tail. These SOFs are seen as the consummate military professionals”.¹¹ Martinag notes that what makes SOFs ‘special’ is because they are carefully selected, highly trained personnel that can conduct challenging missions—including in hostile, denied or politically sensitive environments—that often exceed the capabilities of general purpose forces.¹² Although SOFs do have different configurations depending on the state, they can operate as a cohesive joint service team or as a single service unit.

Having conceptualised the relevant key terms, it is necessary to overview the nature of terrorism financing. This will help to show that Boko Haram’s funding operations follow a known trajectory in the history of terrorism financing.

Critical Pillars of Terrorism Financing Infrastructure

Terrorism financing is a global phenomenon that not only threatens States’ security but international security, as well. Terrorists require money to operate. Without funding, they cannot purchase weapons, equipment, supplies, or services.¹³ Globally, terrorism is funded from various sources and in many different ways. The methods and sources used vary from country to country or region to region as well as terrorist groups to terrorist groups.¹⁴ In general, terrorist groups can draw on financing from two primary sources – internal and external streams. Internally, funds are generated by members through the engagement in both licit and illicit activities. Externally, funds are garnered through receipt of financial donations or grants from individuals, groups, organisations or states sympathetic to their cause. Funds generation by terrorist groups often involve complex and clandestine activities that are perpetrated by diverse actors or facilitated through different networks.

In recognition of the threat posed by terrorism, the international community adopted the *International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism* in 1999 that provides for concerted efforts to counter the funding of terrorism. In this light, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 calls on Member States to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism, by criminalizing the collection and provision of funds for terrorist purposes. It equally urges them to set up effective mechanisms to freeze funds and other financial assets of persons involved in or associated with terrorism, as well as to prevent those funds from being made available to terrorists.¹⁵ Terrorism financing involves multiple layers of, activities, actors, networks and objects of value operating in a variety of ways. Therefore, any successful attempt at interdicting terrorist financing should as a matter of necessity focus on the four-crucial interwoven elements that forms the infrastructure of terrorism financing, namely; money, asset, networks and actors – MANA. Figure 1 provides a rough illustration of these core elements of terrorism financing.


Figure 1: The Four Interwoven Elements of Terrorism Financing

Pillar 01

- Coins
- Banknotes
- Etc.

Pillar 04

- Donors
- Rustlers
- Robbers
- Smugglers
- Traffickers
- Kidnappers
- Etc.



Pillar 02

- Drug
- Gold
- Animal
- Humans
- Artefacts
- Charcoal
- Etc.

Pillar 03

- Banks
- Charity
- Business
- Organisations
- Bureau de change
- Etc.

Source: F.C Onuoha, February 2017



Pillar 01: Money– This is composed of raw cash or currencies of different form such as local or international coins and banknotes. Such cash could be earned from diverse ways, and it is needed for sustaining daily operations, such as feeding, medication, payment of salaries, purchase of weapons, and provision of welfare services, among others.

Pillar 02: Asset–This entails all object of value which can be used in exchange for any services rendered or to generate raw cash. This include, but not limited to, artefacts, human beings or human organs, solid minerals (diamond, gold), and other objects of value such as Ivory, charcoal, and stolen cars. Such assets are usually generated by terrorists through extortion, looting, and exploitation in territories they may control.

Pillar 03: Network –Terrorist financing do not only involve money and assets, it also includes criminal and transactional connections, relationships and outfits that enable or facilitate the generation and/or transfer of funds and assets to terrorist groups. Such criminal and transactional relations are usually conducted or facilitated through legitimate platforms such as business, charities/foundations, *hawala* and *Hundis* systems, banks, bureau *de change*, and organisations, among others. Network therefore covers the matrix of different avenues and organisations that work in ways that enable money and assets to get into the hands of terrorists.

Pillar 04: Actors – This refers to various individuals, groups and criminal gangs that may or may not be proven members of terrorist organisations but generate money or assets for terrorist activities. In this regards, traffickers/smugglers (humans, organs, drugs, ivory), animal rustlers/poachers, armed robbers, kidnappers, and pirates, among others, are some of the actors believed to have aided or funded terrorist groups in one way or the other.



Boko Haram's Evolving Funding Operations

Like in any organisation, fund is the oil that lubricates the engine of terrorism. It ensures the smooth operation of its inner workings. In the case of the Boko Haram, the group maintains an evolving diverse and adaptive funding operations. Interviews with Nigerian, Cameroonian, and Chadian military, intelligence and security personnel as well as local residents reveal that the Boko Haram has engaged in both licit and illicit activities to fund its operations and line its pockets. In the past, Boko Haram had survived on collection of membership dues and donations from politicians or wealthy persons. Over time, it leveraged grants from foreign terrorist groups, bank robberies, and kidnapping for ransom to sustain itself. The group has also used extortion of 'protection fees' from wealthy individuals, engagement in 'front' businesses, collection of taxes in communities it had occupied, cattle rustling, internet scam, and trafficking in arms, stolen cars and drugs as means of financing.¹⁶

- **Membership dues** – The payment of membership dues was the basic source of funding for the group, particularly at its early stages. Before Mohammed Yusuf was killed, members had to pay a daily levy of 100 Naira to their leader.¹⁷ The known members then were predominantly peasant farmers, traders, road-side car washers, and commercial motorcycle riders (*Achaba*). Some of the motorcycles were owned by Yusuf, who collected daily returns from them. However, since the death of Yusuf, the activities of the sect have become more secretive, making it difficult for security officials and analysts to accurately identify the kind of economic activities they are engaged in to generate funds and whether members still pay dues and the significance of such dues to the group's sustainability.
- **Donations** - Financial donation from individuals, organisations, politicians or government officials within Nigeria constitute



another source of funding. In January 2011, the Nigerian police celebrated what it described as “landmark” achievement, when security operatives arrested AlhajiBunuWakil and 91 other persons. BunuWakil, a contractor and an indigene of Borno State, was alleged to be a key financier of the Boko Haram. A month later, the police shot dead Alhaji Salisu Damaturu, another major financier of the sect, during a raid on one of the group’s hideouts. They also arrested Mohammed Zakaria, who supplies the sect arms trafficked from the neighbouring countries of Chad and Cameroon. Weapons recovered from the hideout included, among others, 12 rocket launchers, two pistols, one loaded AK-47 rifle, two detonating bomb cables and more than 3,000 rounds of ammunition.¹⁸ Donation to a terrorist group like Boko Haram is not new but what has been the most controversial aspect of its funding was the alleged roles of politicians and some in government, although government is yet to successfully identify and prosecute such persons.

- ***External Grants***– Financial assistance from other like-minded terrorist groups is another source of funding for the Boko Haram. The issue of foreign financial assistance to the Boko Haram dates back to the era when the sect was known as the ‘Nigerian Taliban’. In February 2004, for instance, the Nigerian Taliban was alleged to have received huge financial support from a Saudi Arabia-funded charity, Al-Muntada Al-Islami Trust. The director of Al-Muntada Al-Islami Trust, Sheik MuhiddeenAbdullahi – a Sudanese Muslim businessman – was arrested following the discovery of financial transactions running into millions of dollars between him and an Islamic fundamentalist cleric, AlhajiSharu.¹⁹The trust funds were used, among others, to promote Islamic militancy in northern Nigeria, especially in Yobe State. Al-Muntada al-Islami is a charity reputedly funded by wealthy Saudi individuals.²⁰Also, late



Mohammed Yusuf and Mohammed Bello Damagun were tried in 2007 for terrorism financing and other-related offences.²¹ There is no evidence however that a case of this magnitude that should be treated with urgency has been effectively concluded. In addition, the Boko Haram reportedly received \$250,000 from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2012.²² Another evidence in this regard emerged during the trial of Kabiru Abubakar Dikko Umar, alias *Kabiru Sokoto*, who masterminded the 2011 Christmas Day bombing of a church in Madalla, Niger State. A prosecution witness informed the Federal High Court in Abuja court that “Sokoto included in his statement details of funding received by the group from an Islamic group, *Musilimi Yaa’maa*, based in Algeria and how the funds led to the fragmentation of Boko Haram, following disagreements over the sharing of the money”.²³

- **Bank robberies** – Attacks on banks, bureau de change and bullion vans is another source of Boko Haram funding. Kabiru Abubakar Dikko Umar, had confirmed that the group raises money for its operations through bank robbery. To be sure, not all bank robberies are carried out by the group. In November 2011, a robbery suspect, Sheriff Shettima, confessed that his gang was responsible for some robbery operations in Borno State to raise funds for the Boko Haram. One such incident was the 12 December 2011 attack at First Bank Nigeria Plc, Damboa branch, where they stole 21 million Naira.²⁴ This partly contributed to the sharp rise in bank robbery in the North-East, particularly between 2011 and 2012. For example, about 100 bank installations were attacked in 2011, and over 30 of these were attributed to Boko Haram.²⁵ Twice in 2013, Boko Haram attacked all the bureau de change in *Layin Yan Changi* area in Mubi market, Adamawa State, and were successfully interdicted by troops of the Special Operations Battalion (SOB) of the Nigerian Army



stationed in Mubi. On 4 August, the special forces interdicted the Boko Haram attackers and recovered about two million Naira and five million Central African Franc (CFA) stolen by them. Four of the attackers were captured alive.²⁶ During the second attack on 18 December, the Special Forces recovered about five million Naira, twelve million CFA and other foreign currencies stolen by the attackers. About thirteen of the Boko Haram attackers were killed during the attack.²⁷ It is pertinent to stress that Boko Haram terrorists believe in the principle of *Fa'i*, which is the religious argument used by terrorists to justify the robbing of banks and jewellery shops to finance their jihadist operations.

- ***Kidnapping for ransom*** – Kidnapping for ransom is one of the growing criminal industries that sustain terrorism. The United Nations estimates that around \$120m (£77m; 98m euros) in ransom payments was paid to terrorist groups between 2004 and 2012. The act of kidnapping for ransom has become a notable source of terrorism financing in North and West Africa for groups such as the AQIM and Boko Haram. The Boko Haram began in mid-2012 to engage in kidnapping for ransom to fund its operation. For example, on 19 February 2013, the Boko Haram kidnapped a French family of seven (including four children) in Cameroon and then transported them to Nigeria, where they were freed on 18 April 2013 after allegedly collecting \$3.15 million as ransom.²⁸ Similarly, 27 Cameroonian and Chinese hostages held by the Boko Haram were released in October 2014, after the group has allegedly collected about **\$400,000 (N66 million) in exchange for their release.**²⁹ **Ransom is often collected in foreign currencies such as Dollars and Euro, which significantly reduces the burden of carrying bulky money for operation compared to a situation where the ransom was in local currencies such as Naira or CFA.**



- ***Extortion*** –Terrorist groups are known to “use extortion and protection rackets to raise money. Terrorist organisation force legitimate businesses or other people to make payoffs to avoid being attacked”.³⁰ Typically, Boko Haram terrorist also generate huge amount of money from wealthy individuals and politicians who they intimidate to pay them ‘protection’ fee. Their tactics involved identifying such rich persons and sending them messages demanding that they pay a stipulated amount of money or risk being killed by them. They have also compelled some successful Cameroonian traders (business) that are involved in cross-border trade to pay them ‘passage fees’.³¹ As an analyst recently argued, one unit close to al-Barnawi’s faction of the Boko Haram and led by a Cameroonian has since July 2016, exacted money, rice and fuel from local fishermen and sold dried fish from Niger.³² Convinced of the group’s savagery and the weak capacity of state security forces to protect vulnerable individuals, many victims have paid such fees out of fear.
- ***Imposition of taxes or levies***– Collection of taxes or levies swelled the purse of the Boko Haram during its heydays between mid-2014 and early 2015, when it controlled about 20,000 square miles of territory in Nigeria - an area the size of Belgium.³³ At that time, the group hoisted its flag in 13 Local Governments in Borno State and several other towns and villages in neighbouring states of Adamawa and Yobe States. Its militants forcibly imposed and collected different kinds of taxes and levies from local residents, commonly known as *Jizyah* (money collected in exchange for protection). These levies were imposed on grains, cattle and other assets like farmland, business centres and houses, among others.³⁴ The levies can equally be imposed on an individual as ‘protection fee’. Boko Haram’s collection of taxes or levies have taken a serious dip, if not



dried up, owing to loss of most towns it previously controlled to the Nigerian military and troops of neighbouring countries.

- ***Cattle rustling*** – Cattle rustling is an important source of terrorist financing for the Boko Haram. Boko Haram terrorist raid communities to steal cows for consumption or sale to generate money. They usually hand over the cows to their agents in the city who will then sell them and repatriate either cash or other items to them. In March 2016, the Borno State government banned the sale of dried meat and also suspended trading in four livestock markets – Gamboru, Dusuman, Shuwarin and Ngom – to ensure that only legitimate cattle were sold at the market. The suspension was based on credible evidence revealing that most of the cattle being traded at the markets were the direct proceeds of cattle rustling perpetrated by the Boko Haram terrorists.³⁵ In April 2016, the Department of State Services (DSS) arrested one Bello Danhajiya, who engaged in criminal activities such as gun-running and cattle rustling in support of Boko Haram terrorist activities.³⁶ Similarly, in October 2016, a suspected Boko Haram agent was arrested while transporting stolen cows from the Mafa, Kalabalge and Bomboshe areas in the state to cattle market in Maiduguri.³⁷
- ***Commercial Activities or ‘front’ businesses***: – Globally, “terrorist do not limit their financial activities to underworld networks and illegal revenue sources. Many groups engage in legitimate business activities to raise and distribute funds”.³⁸ Some Boko Haram members engage in legitimate economic livelihoods or commercial ventures such as selling of GSM recharge cards, fish trading, hawking of goods, and poultry farm, among others business, to generate and remit part of money to the group for funding its activities. For instance, about 31 Boko Haram members were



arrested in Jimeta, Yola, Adamawa State, in mid-2013, who were alleged to be involved in such business to generated funds to the group.³⁹ The very legitimate nature of some of the ‘front’ businesses that Boko Haram agents operate makes it difficult most times for state security and intelligence outfits to easily detect, monitor or neutralise.

- **Trafficking in humans, arms/cars/drug** –Trafficking in drugs, weapons, stolen cars and even humans plays a growing role in the funding operation of terrorist organizations in the 21st-century. Shelley contends that human trafficking serves three main purposes for terrorist groups: generating revenue, providing fighting power, and vanquishing the enemy.⁴⁰ Human trafficking in Nigeria is a serious problem long before the outbreak of Boko Haram insurgency, and analysts speculate that the group may be exploiting it to fund its operations. On 14 April 2014, Boko Haram members abducted 276 girls from the Government Girls Secondary School in Chibok, Borno State. The group’s leader, Abubakar Shekau, threatened to marry them off or sold as slaves. It remains unclear if the Boko Haram has actually sold any of the girls, amidst reports that some of the girls had been forced to marry their abductors, who paid a nominal bride price of \$12 (£7).⁴¹ Although some of the girls have been released through negotiation with the Nigerian government or rescued by the military, many are still in captivity with little or no credible evidence of having been sold off. It was alleged that Boko Haram have relied “on the sale of women and children from captured villages to fund their operations”.⁴² Thus, independent reports on incident of child trafficking in refugee and unregistered, makeshift camps for internally displaced persons (IDPs) in North-eastern Nigeria have heightened apprehension over human trafficking as a source of revenue for the Boko Haram.



Conceivably, unaccompanied children or orphans are those most likely to be trafficked from the IDP camps or local communities.

It is important to note that while some of these funding avenues have survived due to their very clandestine or legitimate nature, others have thrived owing to the complacency, complicity or connivance of state security actors – military, police, customs and immigration officials. For example, the Nigerian military commenced discreet investigations into the activities of some of its personnel following Boko Haram attack on troops' location in Gashigar, on 22 October 2016. It was reported that the Army was seeking to unravel two established cases against the arrested military suspects, who were involved in the leakage of information on troops' movement to the terrorists and the raising of funds to finance Boko Haram operations through cattle rustling.⁴³ Similarly, it is alleged that a tacit non-aggression pact existed between a unit close to al-Barnawi's faction of the Boko Haram and Cameroonian soldiers, who tolerated fishing and dried fish smuggling in exchange for bribes.⁴⁴ It is safe to contend that states are making efforts to deal with the criminal-corruption nexus that have allowed such terrorist funding operations to flourish.

As intelligence and military pressure mounts on the Boko Haram, it remains unknown how the organisation is financing itself at the moment. One thing is certain, the Boko Haram will continue to explore and exploit new avenues offered by both licit and illicit ventures to generate and distribute funds for its survival and operations. The ability of some critical state and non-state actors to collaborate to identify, monitor and dismantle sources and networks of Boko Haram funding will prove crucial in defeating the group.



Imperative of Collaboration in Countering Boko Haram Financing in Lake Chad Area

The task of identifying, countering and neutralising the funding streams of terrorist groups is not a job one single agency can successfully accomplish. In this regard, several stakeholders have diverse but mutually reinforcing roles to play in mitigating or countering Boko Haram financing. Suffice it is to say that these stakeholders or actors need to collaborate and synergise their efforts to achieve maximum results with the limited resources available to them.

In this wise, SOF is one of the outfits that have critical roles to play in countering Boko Haram financing in the Lake Chad area. Given that the tasks of the SOFs are often conducted in hostile, denied, or politically and/or diplomatically sensitive environments, they should be used for rescue, surveillance, neutralisation, decapitation and sometimes interdiction operations. At best, the SOFs should be reserved for high-risk 'kill or capture' operations. SOFs often deploy with a small force, including limited intelligence personnel and equipment. Direct augmentation from external intelligence organizations and reach back will often be necessary to rapidly respond to emerging requirements.⁴⁵

Therefore, for the efforts of the SOFs to be successful, there is the need for robust collaboration and synergy with other CMAs and CSAs in countering terrorism financing. (see Table 1). Civilian ministries and agencies such as intelligence and security establishments have vital roles to play in the area of intelligence gathering and sharing, interdiction and arrest of terrorists, investigation and prosecution, and seizure and freezing of terrorist assets and finances. Thus, other CM/As could enable or provide needed intelligence complements, among other supports that are vital for the success of any SOFs operation.



Table 1: Core Roles and Utility of Key Actors in Countering Terrorism Financing

Item	Key Actors		
Actor	Civil Society Actors (CSAs)	Civilian Ministries/ Agencies (CMAs)	Special Operations Forces (SOFs)
Core Roles	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Research ▪ Advocacy ▪ Sensitisation ▪ Early Warning ▪ Prognostication ▪ Information supply 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Arrest ▪ Prosecution ▪ Investigation ▪ Dissemination ▪ Seizure/Freezing ▪ Intelligence gathering 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Rescue ▪ Recovery ▪ Interdiction ▪ Surveillance ▪ Decapitation ▪ Neutralisation
Basic value added to Countering Terrorism Financing	Locally placed and embedded to generate basic data or useful information that will aid the activities of CMAs and SOFs	Institutionally structured to obtain and process information into actionable intelligence to aid its operations and those of SOFs and enhance the knowledge, work and safety of CSAs	Possess exceptional training and skills to conduct short-duration strikes in hostile, denied, or diplomatically sensitive environments to seize, destroy, capture, or recover designated targets (evidence, objects or persons) in support of overall CoTF


Source: F.C Onuoha, February 2017



The CSAs that are relevant in this regard include, but are not limited to, livelihood associations, professional bodies, and civil society organisations that are embedded in local communities. In relation to countering Boko Haram financing, their role will include; conduct of research, sensitisation and advocacy, supply of useful information to security and intelligence agencies, and identification of early warning signs of criminal activities or developments in the communities. Just as an example, the Miyetti-Allah Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria (MACBAN) is in a good position to work with the military and intelligence forces to monitor and mitigate illicit transactions in cattle trading that may be supporting Boko Haram.

Collaboration among the various actors will help in reducing the funds available to the group, thereby mitigating the financing of terrorism in the region. For instance, the outcome of study on patterns and trends of crime in a community could provide credible information on illicit activities that potentially or actually funds terrorism. This lead could be further processed by CMAs to gain evidence or actionable intelligence on the dynamics of these illicit activities, particularly the actors involved, routes used and strategies of laundering or remitting funds to the terrorist group. Based on the processed actionable intelligence, SOFs could be deployed for rescue, interdiction, neutralisation or decapitation operations in such a hostile, denied, or diplomatically sensitive environments harbouring terrorists (see figure 2). The troves of documents and evidence recovered by SOF from such operations will serve the needs of the CSAs committed to researching and producing new knowledge on terrorism financing, much as it will facilitate the works of CMAs tasked with identifying, investigating and prosecuting terrorists and their financiers.

Figure 2: Imperative of Collaboration in Countering Terrorism Financing



Source: F.C Onuoha, February 2017

For example, the issue of payment of ‘protection fees’ by wealthy persons as one of the sources of funding by Boko Haram was courageously reported to the military and security agencies by local community leaders.⁴⁶ The government intervened by advising people not to pay such fees, instead they were encouraged to supply useful information to the military, security and intelligence outfits for appropriate response.

In the case of Nigeria, for instance, such CMAs will include the Department of State Security Services, Immigration Services, Customs Service, Police, and Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC), and Ministry of Justice, among others. In Cameroon, for example, the efforts



of the SOFs known as the Rapid Intervention Brigade (RIB) will need to be synergised with, or complemented by, other CMAs such as the National Agency for Financial Investigation (ANIF), the police, and gendarme. Similar outfits exist in Chad and Niger, making room for both intra-state and inter-state collaborations for containing Boko Haram funding operations in the Lake Chad.

Thus, it is important to emphasise that the collaboration has to be both intra and inter-state. At the intra-state level, synergy is needed among these critical actors to produce maximum effect in countering terrorism financing. For instance, information supplied by civil society actors could form the critical feed in processing and producing actionable intelligence by government ministries or agencies such as national security and intelligence outfits. Credible intelligence made available to SOFs could then inform proactive and reactive rescue, decapitation or neutralisation operations.

At the inter-state level, there is need for continuous collaboration between and among agencies of one state and their counterparts in another state. For instance, intelligence on Boko Haram funding tracks gathered by Nigerian intelligence or security agencies can help their counterparts in Cameroon, Chad and Niger to act proactively in counteracting terror financing by Boko Haram cells in their territories, and vice versa.



Conclusion

Funding represents the lifeblood of terrorist groups, much as it is also one of their most significant vulnerabilities. Boko Haram's survival and resilience is significantly linked to its funds generating operations. Detecting and dismantling the funding sources of terrorist groups such as the Boko Haram will ultimately precipitate their demise, as it will dry up the oil that lubricates their machinery of violence. The responsibility of doing this is not limited to one agency or establishment of the state. Several agencies need to work together to achieve the result. Thus, collaboration by key stakeholders at different levels is vital in achieving the desired objective of starving terrorist of funds. Terrorist groups such as the Boko Haram do not respect borders in either their funding operations or their brutal campaign of violence. Hence, undue attachment to sovereignty and territoriality by states are no longer adequate justification for refusing to cooperate. To this end, robust collaboration between CSAs, CMAs and SOFs, is a desideratum for identifying, interdicting, disrupting and dismantling Boko Haram's financing in the Lake Chad area. This article has made only a modest attempt to sketch the outline of such envisaged collaborations that need to be initiated where they do not exist, strengthened where they are weak, and consolidated where they have proven successful, for enhanced security and stability in the Lake Chad area.



Endnotes

(Endnotes)

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ASSESSING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION IN THE ERA OF TERRORISM IN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

Since the last three decades, Nigeria has experienced incidents of terrorism where groups with various grievances resorted to attacks on vital critical infrastructure to register their grievances to government. A case in point is the Niger Delta crisis, where militants resorted to acts of terrorism by vandalizing oil pipelines as well as the kidnapping of innocent individuals and expatriates to draw government attention to their demands. Beginning from 2009, the country has also experienced disturbances in the North Eastern part where BHT began an insurgency against government. All these attacks have targeted critical infrastructure in order to undermine national security and development in Nigeria. The paper establishes the major implications of terrorism on critical infrastructure in Nigeria, some of which include amongst others, decline in foreign direct investment hence decrease in employment opportunities. It also revealed the absence of legal framework to tackle the menace, also the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corp which was constitutionally mandated to protect public infrastructure, were not visible in the protection of the oil infrastructure. This was because it lacked capacity for the task, which led other security agencies to be co-opted to assist. This consequently, led



to a clash in responsibilities by security agencies. In order to address the implications of the terrorist attacks on critical infrastructures, which have negatively affected the national development and security of Nigeria, some measures aimed at protection of the critical infrastructure for enhanced national development were proffered; some of the measures include military assistance by Nigeria's allies and the Civilian Joint Task Force. Others are the Presidential Committee on North East Initiative and the recent plan by the International Civil Defence Organization to partner with NSCDC. The paper therefore recommended amongst others The Ministry of Interior should through the National Assembly should sponsor a bill for the enactment of critical infrastructure protection. The FGN should provide special budgetary allocation to Nigerian Security and Civil Defence for the procurement of logistics to corps Nigeria's critical infrastructure. The office of the National Security Adviser should establish a central intelligence coordinating cell for counterterrorism activities.

Keywords: *Critical Infrastructure, Nigeria, Protection and Terrorism*



Introduction

Human survival has been the most pressing problem for mankind since the beginning of time. To this end, mankind has been engaged in all kinds of warfare for self-defence and preservation. Similarly, nations have also been engaged in wars for these reasons. Until recently, conventional warfare has been the most applied form of warfare where belligerents employed conventional weapons and tactics to destroy their adversaries. The wake of the 21st century brought a new kind of warfare where belligerent groups, mostly violent non-state actors, employed asymmetric warfare such as insurgencies and terrorism as forms protest. Terrorism however, does not have a universally accepted definition due to differences in interpretations by stakeholders, as one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. For instance, while Israel, in the 1990s, perceived the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) as a terrorist group, Arab states saw them as freedom fighters. Despite the divergent views, the UN panel on terrorism defines terrorism as an act intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or noncombatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act¹

Terrorists use all forms of tactics to drive home their point. One of it is attack on national monuments, personalities, historic sites or objects to draw attention. Terrorists have also engaged in the most graphic or barbaric acts, like the decapitation of people and suicide bombing, to attract media and international attention or jolt the sensibilities of law abiding citizens. Additionally, terrorists have also resorted to attacks on critical infrastructure to degrade a nation's capacity to survive. To safeguard these assets, nations require well laid-out plans and security architecture that will deny access to terrorists. One of the most dramatic



terrorist events in the history of the 21st century was the spectacular attacks launched by al Qaeda terrorists on the World Trade Centre in New York, the Pentagon and the failed attempt on the White House in Washington DC, the United States of America (USA) on 11 September 2001. Apart from the mass casualties sustained, the attacks were aimed at immobilizing critical decision-making assets of the USA. The attack on the World Trade Centre resulted closure or relocation of about 200,000 jobs and destruction of physical assets estimated at \$16 billion.² The attack also resulted in the rescue, cleanup and related costs estimated at \$27.2 billion.³ The success of this attack exposed lapses in the security architecture of the USA and brought home the need for extra security for critical infrastructure. This led to the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and the subsequent measures adopted in the protection of critical infrastructure in the USA to enhance her national security.⁴

Similarly, Africa witnessed its major terrorist attack in 1998 when al Qaeda terrorist attacked the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, destroying them and resulting in 253 fatalities including massive destructions of properties.⁵ In 2013, the Al Shabab terrorists attacked the Westgate Mall mostly patronized by Western diplomats and tourists in Kenya. The attack led to the death of over 61 people and resulted in massive damage to the infrastructure. Additionally, on 2 Apr 15, the al Shabab terrorists attacked Garissa University College North East Kenya, murdering over 100 people in cold blood to deter students from attending schools. These and other attacks on tourists and Kenya's critical infrastructures led to a massive drop in tourism in Kenya which affected her Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and national security.⁶ In the 1990s, Nigeria experienced incidents of terrorism when groups with various grievances resorted to attacks, sometimes on critical national infrastructure, to register their protest and make political points. The Niger Delta Militants in 1992 resorted to acts of terrorism by



vandalizing oil facilities and power infrastructure and engaged in kidnappings to draw government's attention to perceived grievances.⁷ Additionally, by early 2009, Nigeria began experiencing insurgency in the northern part of the country. The insurgents were engaged in killing of innocent citizens and destroying properties. Increasingly, the terrorists attacked some critical national infrastructure to undermine the capability of government and make the state appear weak.⁸ Despite the attempt by governments to protect these infrastructures, the terrorists' attacks on these facilities still persist with devastating effects.

The purpose of the paper therefore is to assess the critical infrastructure protection in Nigeria's era of terrorism. In to achieve this, the rest of the paper is divided as follows: section two examines the critical infrastructure in Nigeria, section three investigates the terrorist threats to critical infrastructure in Nigeria, and section four observes the implications of terrorists' attacks on critical infrastructures in Nigeria. Section five takes a cursory look at the measures aimed at critical infrastructure protection in Nigeria. The six section examine the challenges faced by government at critical infrastructure protection in Nigeria. While the seven section is the policy recommendations and the conclusion of the paper.

Understanding Critical Infrastructure in Nigeria

Critical infrastructure in Nigeria represents the processes, systems, facilities, technologies, networks, assets and services essential to the health, safety, security or economic well-being of Nigerians and the effective functioning of government. It also refers to those systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the Federal Republic of Nigeria that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on national security, national economy, national public health or safety of Nigerians.⁹ Infrastructure that is critical is of utmost importance



to a nation. This is why such infrastructure should be taken seriously. These infrastructure ranges from road, electricity, health, national assets all targeted at the comfort of the society and overall development. Even to image a decay of such infrastructure is horrible not talk of a real decay. One major factor that has contributed to the development crises in Nigeria is that of critical infrastructure decay. The problem has manifested in the form of high level of unemployment, poverty, frustration, desperation, criminality, relocation and migration from Nigeria to other parts of the world.¹⁰ The increase terrorists attacked on some critical national/critical infrastructure in Nigeria has contributed to undermine the capability of government and make the state appear weak. Despite the attempt by governments to protect these infrastructures, the terrorists' attacks on these facilities still persist with devastating effects.

Infrastructure as a critical form of development plays an important role in any country or region or state and often constitutes the hub upon which socio-economic aspects of society revolve.”¹¹ Expectedly, protection of critical infrastructural in Nigeria is key to raise the quality and standard of living in the life of its citizens. For instance, availability of critical infrastructures like; power, quality health care system, quality educational system, water, rail transport system with good road network, good service sector, and its protection and maintenance will bring about good life to its citizens.

A well-protected critical infrastructure is an essential driver of national prosperity and a pre-requisite for economic expansion and growth to occur. Critical Infrastructure enhances a nation's productivity, quality of life, and economic progression by driving growth, creating jobs, and improving productivity, quality of life and efficiency. It underpins growth by providing the supporting networks upon which we all rely. Nations infrastructure, such as transportation and communications, boost long-term economic output



because they provide benefits to other sectors, such as improved business efficiency, effective mechanisms to coordinate and manage supply chains and product delivery. Resilient and dependable networks enable business confidence which leads to increased business investment and growth and the creation of new economic opportunities.

Critical Infrastructure is the backbone to modern society and it is essential to national prosperity. Resilient and secure infrastructure is vital for economic prosperity because it not only underpins the effective operating of businesses and services, but also underpins long term confidence and planning in a region, and thus ongoing investment levels. Providing this resilience and security can therefore act as both a direct injection into the regional or sectoral economy as well as a catalyst to further economic growth and investment. However, when there are disruptions to the services critical infrastructure provides, such as energy, transportation, and communications networks, it can lead to costly direct economic impacts, such as the cost of repairing damage to physical structures, and indirect economic impacts to society, such as the business disruption to the global supply chain and an increase in short term and long-term unemployment. These disruptions of critical infrastructure can affect the timely delivery of goods and services that are imperative to national economies, which can be measured in the loss of business and tax generated revenue in the affected areas. In addition, when critical infrastructure is disrupted there can be broader regional and national impacts. When large-scale disasters strike there are tangible and measurable direct and indirect economic impacts to a disrupted and dispersed workforce, to commerce and manufacturing sectors denied power, transportation, supply chains, and society as a whole. Persistent or irrecoverable damage and prolonged recovery times to businesses and economies serve to extend losses. These serve to underscore the importance of enhancing critical infrastructure resilience within organizations



Terrorist Threats to Critical Infrastructures in Nigeria

Since independence in 1960, Nigeria has experienced acts of conflict including terrorism that have affected her critical infrastructures negatively. Some of these acts were in the form of religious violence, attacks against security personnel and facilities and vandalization of national infrastructures. In 1972, the Maitatsine sect led by one Mohammed Marwa, emerged in Kano preaching its own brand of Islam that threatened national security. The sect evolved from a controversial group into an extremist religious group that resorted to violence to spread its message. In December 1980, the sect started attacking police formations, government infrastructure and other religious groups opposed to their philosophy. Their violent activities spread to Maiduguri, Kaduna and Yobe in the 1980s, prompting the involvement of the Armed Forces of Nigeria (AFN) to crush them. The ensuing clashes that erupted between the group and the AFN, led to over 4000 fatalities and destruction of property. The group was finally defeated in 1983 restoring normalcy to the affected cities.

In 1990, the people of the Niger Delta began to agitate for a fair share of the oil wealth and against the activities of oil companies that cause environmental pollution. Their agitation led to the formation of vigilante and militant groups that began to target multinational oil companies and government interests. The militants initially employed piracy and kidnapping of foreign workers to press home their demands, but this quickly developed into attacks on oil facilities and other critical infrastructure. Between 2003 and 2014, a total of 15,685 oil pipelines were vandalised, representing 97.5 per cent of total breaks. This resulted in a loss of \$10.9 billion in revenue accruable to the government.¹² Oil exports, which accounted for about 70 per cent of Nigeria's GDP began to suffer. Initial attempts to prevent militant activities were bedeviled by operational difficulties as there was no any legal framework to tackle the menace. This prompted the



drafting of a Critical Infrastructure Bill in 2008 for the protection of critical national infrastructure.¹³

In late 2009, Boko Haram insurgency started in North East Nigeria leading to the wanton destruction of lives and properties. The BHT group which began as a non-violent religious sect in the late 1990s, quickly transformed into a violent jihadist group when its leader, Mohammed Yusuf was summarily executed by security forces in July 2009. Subsequently, the sect began attacking security forces personnel and installations, creating insecurity in the North East. The group attacked HQ 1 Division Nigerian Army, Kaduna, towns in the Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states and killed innocent civilians. By 2014, the insurgency had developed into a full-blown conflict where the militants attacked critical government infrastructures like schools, bridges, hospitals, banks and telecommunication facilities. According to Onuoha, Boko Haram destroyed about 150 telecommunication base stations to disrupt security forces operations in the North East.¹⁴ The group extended its operations to Abuja in the same year, using car bombs to attack the UN Regional Office and Police Force Headquarters, leading to fatalities and destruction of infrastructure. The ease with which the insurgents carried out their operations has negatively affected the protection of critical infrastructure thus, national security and development in Nigeria.

The Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC), Act 2003, which was constitutionally mandated to protect public infrastructure, were not visible in the protection of the oil infrastructure. This was because it lacked capacity for the task, which led other security agencies to be co-opted to assist.¹⁵ By 2013, a multiplicity of security forces was engaged in the Niger Delta Region to tackle the militancy problem. The result was lack of coordination and rivalry problems that led to a clash in responsibilities by security agencies. However, in 2009, the Federal Government of Nigeria (FGN) negotiated a ceasefire agreement with the militants' groups and granted them



amnesty, to forestall further attacks on oil infrastructures. The action by the FGJ, engendered relative peace in the Niger Delta Region thereby enhancing the safety and protection of critical infrastructure in Nigeria.

These therefore, brought to fore the need to co-opt civil society into the national security infrastructure. Currently, many critical assets of Nigeria are not well protected, exposing them to the vulnerability of terrorist attacks. These also include, power generation facilities, refineries and some private communication base stations which are not guarded by the requisite security personnel. The protection of public infrastructure is facilitated by the military, police, Civil Defence Corps and numerous others institutions without a lead agency to coordinate activities. Critical infrastructure has therefore not received the needed protection against terrorism which has implications for the overall national development and security in Nigeria. The numerous problems enumerated above presents implications for the overall national development and security in Nigeria. This are subsequently discussed.

Implications of Terrorism Attacks on Critical Infrastructure for Nigeria

The implications of terrorism on Nigeria's critical infrastructure include decline in foreign direct investment, decline in gross domestic product and unemployment. These are discussed subsequently. A major implication of terrorism on Nigeria's critical infrastructure is decline in foreign direct investment (FDI). Incessant attacks on Nigeria's critical infrastructure by the Niger Delta have led to decline in FDI to the country. Also, persistent kidnapping of expatriates involved in construction or maintenance of critical infrastructure within the country have further discouraged amount of FDI to the country. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), FDI inflows to Nigeria declined from \$8.65 billion in 2009 to \$6.1 billion in 2010 due to the increasing rate of



insecurity in the country. The reduction in FDI has affected the development and maintenance of critical infrastructure in Nigeria thus, national development. ¹⁶The Ashaka Cement Company was also attacked by the BH terrorist on 5 November 2014 during which 5 soldiers were killed and large quantity of dynamites meant for the company's operational needs carted away.¹⁷ Furthermore, on 20 February 2013, 7 foreign expatriates' workers were kidnapped at Jama'are in Bauchi state. These nefarious activities of the BH terrorists have contributed to the decline in foreign direct investment to the country and the relocation of some companies from Nigeria to other countries, such as Dunlop Nigeria which now operates from Ghana. Consequently, this adverse security environment has discouraged inflow of FDI for development and maintenance of critical infrastructure in the country.

Another major implication of terrorism on Nigeria's critical infrastructure is decline in Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The emergence of militant and terrorist activities in Nigeria has led to decline in Nigeria's GDP due to low investment opportunities in the country, occasioned by adverse business environment as a result of activities of terrorists in the North East and militants in the Niger Delta region.¹⁸or instance, Nigeria's GDP declined from 7.13 per cent in the first quarter of 2011 to 6.17 per cent in the first quarter of 2012.¹⁹ The decline in Nigeria's GDP impacted negatively on employment opportunities and standard of living of the citizenry, thereby undermining the country's national development.

In addition, increase in unemployment opportunities could create chances for the terrorist groups and the militants to attract unemployed able-bodied youths in the country with pecuniary means into their group as recruits. Consequently, these attacks on critical infrastructures by terrorist have impacted negatively on business opportunities, thereby leading to decline in gross domestic product in Nigeria. Unemployment is one of the



implications arising from terrorism on critical infrastructure that can undermine national security and development in Nigeria. Attacks on critical infrastructure have led to the relocation of businesses from Nigeria which can lead to unemployment and undermine national security. The slowing down of economic activities in the Niger Delta region in the late 2000 as a result of insecurity attests to this. The reduction of FDI and capital flight has resulted to further stifle economic activities.

Furthermore, insecurity and attacks on critical infrastructure in the North East has affected jobs leading to unemployment.²⁰ For example, the destruction of over 150 telecommunications base stations in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa led to the closing down of the facilities leading to loss of jobs and means of livelihood with its attendant implication on national security and development in Nigeria. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, the unemployment rate in the North East of Nigeria rose from 11.8 per cent in January 2009 to 23.9 per cent in January 2012 as a result of numerous attacks on critical infrastructure such as markets and private businesses.²¹ This translates to about 5 million people rendered jobless in the region. Acts of terrorism on critical infrastructure therefore has negative implications for national security and development in Nigeria.

Measures Aimed at Critical Infrastructures Protection in Nigeria

In order to address the implications of the terrorist attacks on critical infrastructures, which have negatively affected the national development and security of Nigeria, the Nigerian governments put in place some measures for the protection of the critical infrastructure for enhanced national development. Some of the measures include military assistance by Nigeria's allies and the Civilian Joint Task Force. Others are the Presidential Committee on North East Initiative and the recent plan by the International Civil Defence Organization to partner with NSCDC. These are discussed subsequently.



Protection of critical infrastructure against terrorist activities has received assistance recently from the Nigerian military allies. Following the designation of the BH as a terrorist Organisation by the international community, the AFN have received assistance in the area of capacity building for personnel and equipment support in the fight against insurgency and terrorism as well as protection of critical infrastructures. The USA and UK, for example, have provided training for the AFN personnel such as the Special Boat Services of the Nigerian Navy among others. Furthermore, India and Pakistan have trained NA personnel in counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations. This assistance in the form of specialized training, equipment and weaponry, has enabled the AFN to protect critical infrastructure against terrorist activities in Nigeria.²² The formation of Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) has assisted the government in the protection of critical infrastructure against terrorist activities in Nigeria. Some of the CJTF members have recently been organized into paramilitary groups, trained and provided with light weapons for mainly policing duties.²³ The CJTF comprises mainly youths organised into informal militia groups, their potentials were exploited for the protection critical infrastructure in the affected communities.

In addition, the formation of the Borno Youths Empowerment Scheme (BOYES) by the state Government was also a laudable initiative that used to support the efforts of CJTF members.²⁴ In view of the inadequate strength of security personnel and the enormous landmass of the North East, the CJTF and BOYES were used to man critical infrastructure in the areas affected by terrorist activities. The Presidential Initiative on the North East (PINE) was formulated in October 2015 following acts of terrorism and destruction of socio-economic base of the affected areas. In line with this, the Presidential Committee on North East Initiative (PCNI) was consequently inaugurated to coordinate the activities of the programme. Other initiatives such as Victim Support Fund and Safe School Initiative are also



aimed at ameliorating the effects of terrorism in the North East. The specific objectives of PINE are to be achieved in a short and long-term manner for the provision of basic humanitarian needs and services while restoring livelihood and confidence in the nation and its economic system.²⁵ The PINE is also expected to address the destruction of critical infrastructure in the region for the overall maintenance of peace, security and development of the region.

The International Civil Defence Organisation (ICDO), Geneva at a recent meeting, acknowledged the contribution of the NSCDC at providing security in Nigeria. ICDO cited the protection of Nigeria's energy, oil and gas sectors against vandals, kidnappers and militant's areas of major success. In light of the above, ICDO agreed to locate its proposed regional headquarters in Nigeria with an overall objective of using the NSCDC as the hub of civil defence activities in West and Central Africa.²⁶ The recognition of the role being played by the NSCDC in Nigeria and the resolve of ICDO to locate the regional headquarters in Nigeria, would go a long way to strengthen the capacity of the NSCDC to protect Nigeria's critical infrastructure against terrorism. Thus, the location of the regional headquarters of ICDO in Nigeria is major measures taken by the government for the protection of critical infrastructure for Nigeria hence national security and development.²⁷

Challenges Faced by Government on Critical Infrastructure Protection in Nigeria

The challenges militating against measures emplaced by the Nigerian government for the protection of her critical infrastructure from terrorism include absence of enabling law, inadequate manpower and logistics, lack of central intelligence cell, lack of collective commitment and inter-agency rivalry. These are discussed in the subsequent paragraphs. The absence of an enabling law that coordinates the activities of agencies involved in



the protection of critical infrastructure against terrorism is a problem for Nigeria's national development and security. Effective protection of critical infrastructure such as seaports, post offices, hospitals, oil pipelines and telecommunication equipment from terrorism would boost the nation's economic growth for enhanced national development. To this end, the enactment of the Critical Infrastructure Bill into Law by the Senate will go a long way to enhance the effectiveness of stakeholder organisations. The prevention of critical infrastructures from terrorist attacks or sabotage requires an effective framework which depends on an enabling law. Also, the ineffectiveness of the coordinating body is partly blameable for the challenges that confronted security forces in tackling vandalisation of oil infrastructure in the Niger Delta in the 1990s to 2000. The absence of specially trained security personnel to protect public infrastructure is also partly accountable for the successes of terrorist attacks on some critical infrastructures in the country.

Consequently, the lack of enabling law to protect critical infrastructure like the facilities of the Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN) and power plants in the country exposes them to danger.²⁸ The destruction of these assets can affect power supplies and national security/development. There is therefore the need for the FGN to expedite action on the Draft Bill to NASS so that facilities such as power and telecommunication facilities in the country would receive the best protection.²⁹ The PHCN poles, transformers, telecommunications installations are critical national infrastructure that should not be left in the hands of operators alone to protect.³⁰ There is therefore, a need to enact the critical information bill to facilitate critical infrastructure protection. This is aimed at addressing the challenge for the protection of Nigeria's critical infrastructure against terrorism. Inadequate manpower and logistics is a factor militating against the protection of critical infrastructure against terrorism for national security



and development in Nigeria. The capacity of NSCDC is impaired by inadequate equipment to carry out their functions and responsibilities which negates the realization of the objective of protecting Nigeria's critical infrastructure. The NSCDC lack logistics such as communication gadgets, fire-fighting equipment, operational vehicles, trucks, cranes, speed boats, surveillance equipment and helicopters to carry out its task.³¹ As a result, they are unable to deploy at short notice on distress call. The absence of surveillance equipment to monitor critical infrastructure has also places a lot of pressure on manpower, which is already lacking in the organisation.

Furthermore, the organisation also lacks requisite expertise in protection of critical infrastructure.³² Though their security personnel are trained in the provision of security, they are not proficient in counter terrorism measures to adequately protect vulnerable installations. Also, the personnel deployed to protect these infrastructures, though trained, are only provided with rifles that are inadequate to withstand the type of weapons use by terrorists.³³ Some duty posts even lacked hand-held radios for short range communication.³⁴ Hence, inadequate manpower and logistics has therefore been identified as a challenge to the protection of Nigeria's critical infrastructure against terrorism for national development in Nigeria. The lack of a central coordinating cell within ONSA to facilitate intelligence sharing is a problem militating against terrorism and the protection of critical infrastructure for national development in Nigeria. This has adversely impinged on intelligence sharing and coordination. A central intelligence cell at the ONSA is necessary for such purposes. Thus, the problem of production and dissemination of intelligence is largely the dearth of coordination which has resulted in low protection of Nigeria's critical infrastructure against terrorism.³⁵

The absence of a coordinating centre deprives ONSA the use of the capabilities of the various agencies. Currently, intelligence gathered by the



individual agencies are sieved and disseminated based on authorisation by the agency involved. Modern surveillance systems such as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), radars and satellite-based systems that ought to feed into a central cell are not optimized. The lack of a central coordinating cell is therefore an impediment to the provision of intelligence to mitigate the challenges of terrorism on critical infrastructure for Nigeria's national security. Another major challenge to protection of critical infrastructure in Nigeria against terrorism in Nigeria is lack of commitment by the public and private sectors on protection of the critical infrastructures located within their vicinity. The unabated attacks on Nigeria's critical infrastructure by the terrorists, the Niger Delta militants and other criminal elements within the society have been attributed to inability of the public and private sector to aid protection and safety of Nigeria's critical infrastructures. Consequently, rather than being watch dogs for these critical infrastructure, they view them as government property with little or no concern for their protection and safety.

The ease at which the terrorist groups carry out attacks on critical infrastructure in the country was further strongly criticised as the activities of some unpatriotic elements bent on destroying the nation's commonwealth for their sadistic gains.³⁶ The need to provide useful information to security agencies on activities of militants and terrorists, communities will be assisting the security agencies to apprehend criminals, and by so doing, helping to guarantee their well-being and safety.³⁷ It could also be reasoned that the lack of collective commitment by the civil society and the private sector in the protection of critical infrastructure in Nigeria against terrorism has therefore impacted negatively on national development of the country.

Inter-agency rivalry amongst security agencies is another identified challenge against the protection of critical infrastructure in Nigeria from terrorism. The need for cooperation and synergy by all security agencies



is vital in every aspect of operations especially in joint operation against terrorism. Coordination facilitates cooperation between 2 or more parties or stakeholders in joint operations, especially where roles of each of the parties are defined.³⁸ However, inter- agency rivalry amongst security agencies in Nigeria in the fight against militancy and terrorism has been hindering the effectiveness of Nigeria's fight against terrorism for the protection of the country's critical infrastructure. Inter-agency rivalry among security agencies in the country have impinged negatively on effectiveness of the fight against terrorism in protecting critical infrastructure for enhanced national development. For example, the Bombing close to the eagle square on 1 October 2010, necessitated the need for inter-agency cooperation and collaboration by all security agencies. However, inter-agency rivalry among the agencies was rekindled in the process of investigation. This manifested in the Nigerian Police Force and the Department of State Services working at cross roads by denying each other of available intelligence in the course of the investigation. The Department of State Services saw the assignment as a national security issue which it could handle alone, while the Nigeria Police believed it was their constitutional duty to handle the case. The seemingly inter agency rivalry among security agencies has often stalled several investigations against other terrorist and militant attacks in the country. Thus, inter agency rivalry is a major drawback in the protection of critical infrastructure in Nigeria against terrorism for enhanced National Security and development in Nigeria.



Conclusion

The incidences of terrorist attacks on Nigeria's critical infrastructure to register their grievance to government have since independent affected the overall national security and development of the country. A case in point is the Niger Delta crisis, where militants resorted to acts of terrorism by vandalizing oil pipelines by the Niger delta militant and also the destruction of about 150 telecommunication base stations to disrupt security forces operations in the North East, the car bombs attack on the UN Regional Office and Police Force Headquarters by the Boko Haram Terrorist, leading to fatalities and destruction of infrastructure amongst others. The ease which they carry out their operation has been identified as major threats to critical infrastructure protection in Nigeria. The paper further identified some of the implications of attacks on critical infrastructures development in Nigeria some of which includes; decline in foreign direct investment, decline in gross domestic product and unemployment. Furthermore, the paper tried to look at measure at critical infrastructure protection in Nigeria by government such as military assistance by Nigeria's allies and the Civilian Joint Task Force. Others are the Presidential Committee on North East Initiative and the recent plan by the International Civil Defence Organization to partner with NSCDC. Some challenges militating against the measures were further noted these challenges includes; Absence of enabling law, inadequate manpower and logistics, lack of central intelligence cell, lack of collective commitment and inter-agency rivalry. Lastly the following policy recommendations were proffered:

- a. The Ministry of Interior should through the National Assembly should sponsor a bill for the enactment of critical infrastructure protection.



- b. The FGN should provide special budgetary allocation to Nigerian Security and Civil Defence SCDC for the procurement of logistics to Corps Nigeria's critical infrastructure commencing.
- c. The Office of the National Security Adviser should establish a central intelligence coordinating cell for counter terrorism activities.
- d. The Federal Ministry of Information and Culture should on behalf of government engage in continues mass awareness campaign on critical infrastructure protection in Nigeria.
- e. The need for the office of the National Security Adviser to initiate inter agency consultative forum aimed at improving inter-agency cooperation for enhanced critical infrastructure protection against terrorist attacks in Nigeria.



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LE TRAITEMENT EFFICACE DU RETOUR DES COMBATTANTS TERRORISTES ÉTRANGERS

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Résumé

Le combattant terroriste étranger est un individu qui rejoint une insurrection. Mais, il n'est pas citoyen des États en conflit. La personne doit se rendre dans un pays autre que celui de sa nationalité ou de sa résidence pour participer à des actes terroristes. Après avoir été intégrés dans les unités de combat, les terroristes subissent des entraînements qu'on peut assimiler à une sorte de formation continue ou de spécialisation. Le retour de ces combattants dans leurs pays d'origine, pose de sérieuses menaces sur la sécurité et la stabilité nationales et exige un traitement spécifique et une coopération intense entre les pays pour échanger les renseignements sur les éléments armés regagnant leurs pays respectifs. Face à la menace qu'a la population, à l'égard des combattants étrangers de retour au pays, des mesures peuvent être prises, elles incluent la révocation de citoyenneté et l'interdiction de réadmission, le but étant ici d'empêcher les retours, tandis que, sur le plan pénal, les poursuites et les peines d'emprisonnement. La difficulté de contrer la menace que représente le retour des combattants étrangers par les décideurs est de mettre l'accent sur les politiques relevant de la lutte contre l'extrémisme violent, telles que la réinsertion et la prévention. Se doter d'un programme offrant aux combattants étrangers de retour au pays des aides à différents niveaux en matière d'emploi, de formation, de logement, de soutien psychologique et de soins médicaux.

Mots clés : retour, combattants, terroristes étrangers

Introduction

Le combattant étranger peut être défini comme l'individu qui rejoint une insurrection au cours d'une guerre civile, mais qui n'est pas citoyen des États en conflit. Thomas Hegghammer fournit une définition plus étoffée en établissant quatre critères. Le combattant étranger est un individu qui a rejoint une insurrection et qui opère en son sein, qui n'a pas la citoyenneté ou de parenté avec les parties en conflit, qui n'est pas affilié à une organisation militaire officielle et qui n'est pas payé. Le combattant terroriste étranger ne semble pas être caractérisé par ce seul élément d'extranéité. On parle souvent à leur propos de « combattants étrangers terroristes ». Cette notion a été consacrée par les Nations Unies avec l'adoption de la résolution 2178 le 24 septembre 2014. Celle-ci les définit comme les « *individus qui se rendent dans un État autre que leur État de résidence ou de nationalité, dans le dessein de commettre, d'organiser ou de préparer des actes de terrorisme, ou afin d'y participer ou de dispenser ou recevoir un entraînement au terrorisme, notamment à l'occasion d'un conflit armé* ». Cette catégorie à part entière de combattants se singularise par la menace globale qu'ils posent. D'une part, ils « *contribuent à intensifier les conflits, à les prolonger et à en compliquer singulièrement le règlement* ». D'autre part, « *ils peuvent (...) être une menace considérable pour les États dont ils viennent, ceux par lesquels ils transitent et ceux où ils se rendent, ainsi que les États qui jouxtent les zones de conflit armé où ils combattent et qui doivent faire face à de sérieux problèmes de sécurité* ». Dès lors, « *la menace que représentent les combattants terroristes étrangers peut atteindre toutes les régions et tous les États membres, même ceux qui sont éloignés des zones de conflit* ». La notion de « combattant terroriste étranger » est donc bicephale, c'est un « combattant étranger » soit un individu qui a quitté son pays d'origine et qui a rejoint un groupe armé non étatique dans un conflit armé à l'étranger par idéologie, croyance ou affinité, c'est



un terroriste, ce qui signifie deux choses. Soit c'est un individu qui part vers des pays sur les territoires desquels les organisations terroristes disposent de camps d'entraînement lui dispensant une formation qui lui permettra d'opérer des attentats à son retour dans le pays d'origine. Soit c'est un combattant qui commet des actes terroristes sur le territoire où se déroule le conflit armé. Le terroriste est le criminel qui commet un attentat en temps de paix, l'enlèvement. Ce crime relève du maintien de l'ordre (moyens de police judiciaire et de police administrative). En effet, l'attentat terroriste est un acte isolé et sporadique de violence pouvant être rattaché aux tensions internes ou aux troubles intérieurs. Dans le cadre de notre étude sur : « *Le traitement efficace du retour des combattants terroristes étrangers* », il convient d'analyser, les formations et destinations possibles des combattants terroristes étrangers(I) ensuite, nous verrons, l'évaluation de la menace, la nature et les mesures importantes (II) III, pour terminer, nous allons faire des suggestions de mesures (III).

I. Les formations et destinations possibles des combattants terroristes étrangers

Pour le recrutement des combattants terroristes étrangers, il faut connaître leur filiation.

1.1. Les combattants terroristes étrangers

Les combattants doivent subir une formation étudiées et ciblées.

1.1.1. Les formations des combattants terroristes étrangers

Les conditions sont ici au nombre de trois. La personne doit se rendre dans un pays autre que celui de sa nationalité ou de sa résidence et avoir pour dessein de participer par quelque moyen que ce soit à des actes terroristes ou d'y recevoir ou dispenser un entraînement au terroriste, une précision est ajoutée concernant le cadre du conflit armé.



En effet, lorsqu'une recrue rejoint l'organisation terroriste, elle est envoyée dans un camp de première préparation qui qualifie le candidat et le prépare à rejoindre les zones de combats. Il y subit un entraînement intensif qui couvre le maniement des armes (fusils, Kalachnikov, pistolets, explosifs) ainsi que des épreuves sportives et d'endurance. Les combattants entraînés par Da'ech dépassent ceux d'Al- Qaeda en termes de barbarie : «plus que l'Afghan arabe des années 1990 qui était inhumainement violent, le combattant terroriste étranger actuel est inhumain de manière barbare, cruelle et atroce». Da'ech s'appuie dans sa barbarie sur l'ouvrage du théologien égyptien Abou Abdallah Al Mouhajer intitulé «La jurisprudence du Jihad» (Masa'il min Fiqhi Ljihad) qui légitime la décapitation et l'assassinat de musulmans même des femmes ou des enfants. Cet enseignement a fini par convaincre les recrues de la légitimité et de la légalité de la barbarie qu'ils pratiquent. Ces commandos font l'objet d'un processus de formation extrême destiné à ébranler l'ennemi en accomplissant des missions terroristes ou suicides à l'étranger. La première semaine, les candidats passent des heures à courir, à sauter, à faire des pompes, des barres parallèles, à ramper. La deuxième semaine commence l'entraînement avec un fusil d'assaut Kalachnikov. La consigne est de le garder avec soi, même pour dormir, jusqu'à ce qu'il devienne «comme un troisième bras». Ce programme des forces spéciales comporte 10 niveaux de formation. C'est sur ce genre de combattants que Da'ech compte pour ses opérations spéciales. Si les sources de renseignement affirment que de nombreux combattants sont déjà retournés chez eux, la défaite annoncée de Da'ech accentue le risque (Abdelhak Bassou , 2017).



Illustration n°1 : Les Marocains enrôlés volontairement dans les rangs de Da'ech.

1.1.2. Une formation et une qualification étudiées et ciblées

Il s'agit ici de l'entraînement que subissent toutes les recrues de Daech. Une sorte de programme de base qui qualifie le candidat et le prépare à rejoindre les zones de combats. Ainsi, lorsqu'un Djihadiste rejoint l'organisation, il est envoyé dans le camp de première préparation. Il y subit un entraînement intensif qui couvre aussi bien le maniement des armes, y compris des fusils et des mitrailleuses Kalachnikov, des pistolets que des épreuves sportives et d'endurance. Cette formation est assortie de cours de religion destinés à légitimer toutes les atrocités qu'il est demandé aux combattants d'exécuter. Ces cours sont beaucoup plus des séances d'endoctrinement et de radicalisation que de simples cours de théologie musulmane. La nature de cette formation, dite religieuse, la destine à faire du combattant une machine à tuer qui exécute des actes barbares sans émotions ni remords. Selon un rapport diffusé par Europol en janvier 2016, la formation des recrues de Daech porte essentiellement sur l'utilisation d'armes et d'explosifs ainsi que sur des différentes techniques pour tuer. Elles sont également formées pour des actions clandestines, pour le



renseignement et la contre-surveillance comme techniques de guérillas ou de terrorisme urbain. Après avoir été intégrés dans les unités de combat, les terroristes subissent des entraînements plus spécifiques dans des camps de continuité qu'on peut assimiler à une sorte de formation continue ou de spécialisation.

Les combattants de Daech n'ont à ce niveau rien à envier à ceux entraînés par Al Qaeda. Si les niveaux des performances en termes de rigueur, des règles de survie, d'endurance et de maniement des armes et explosifs s'équivalent chez les deux organisations, les combattants entraînés par Daech dépassent ceux d'Al Qaeda en termes de barbarie. Plus que l'Afghan arabe des années 1990 qui était inhumainement violent, le combattant terroriste étranger actuel est inhumain de manière barbare, cruelle et atroce. Daech s'appuie dans sa barbarie sur l'ouvrage intitulé مسائل من فقه الجهاد « Questions tirées de la jurisprudence du Jihad » (Masa'il min Fiqhi Ljihad) d'un théologien égyptien nommé Abou Abdallah Al Mouhajer. L'enseignement des théories d'Al Mouhajer finit par convaincre les recrues de la légitimité et de la légalité de la barbarie qu'ils pratiquent.

1.2. La formation des unités d'élite

Harry Sarfo, ancien combattant allemand de l'État islamique qui purge une peine de trois ans pour une accusation de terrorisme dans une prison de Brême, a été interviewé en l'été 2016 par Gordon Welters pour le New York Times. C'est à travers cette interview que l'on connaîtra le plus sur la formation des unités d'élites de Daech, les commandos destinés aux missions à l'extérieur. Ils sont, durant une longue période, questionnés, recensés et réinterrogés. On retient aussi qu'après les formalités administratives, le test de volonté de combattre commence : « *Se doucher était interdit. Manger aussi à moins qu'ils ne vous donnent de la nourriture, la caverne qui sert de dortoir est partagée entre cinq ou six*



personnes. L'eau potable était sévèrement rationnée. Chaque habitation recevait un demi-litre d'eau par jour, mis sur le pas de porte, l'objectif étant de tester les recrues pour s'assurer de qui en voulait vraiment de manière inflexible. » rapporte Harry Sarfo (Abdelhak Bassou , 2017). La punition pour désobéissance était sévère. « *Un garçon a refusé de se lever, parce qu'il était trop épuisé,* » a déclaré Sarfo aux autorités. « Ils l'ont attaché à un poteau pieds et poings liés et l'ont laissé là ».

Ce programme des forces spéciales comporte 10 niveaux de formation. Après avoir obtenu le diplôme de niveau 2, le candidat est emmené sur une île d'une rivière de Tabqa, en Syrie. Le couchage des recrues était fait de trous dans le sol, recouverts de bâtons et de brindilles. Ils sont entraînés à la natation, à la plongée sous-marine et à l'orientation.

C'est sur ce genre de combattant que Daech compte pour ses opérations spéciales, celles qui selon le jargon de l'organisation « font mal à l'ennemi ». Si plusieurs sources de renseignement européen affirment que plusieurs combattants de ce genre sont déjà retournés en Europe et dans d'autres pays d'Afrique, leur renforcement par ceux qui seront obligés de retourner après la défaite de Daech accentue le risque et augmente la menace.

1.2.1. La formation des enfants

L'organisation Djihadiste accorde une grande importance aux enfants qu'elle appelle les garçons « lionceaux » et les filles « perles ». D'où viennent-ils ?

Certains parmi eux vivaient en Irak et en Syrie avant que la conquête par Daech des terres où ils vivaient ne les rattrape. D'autres ont accompagné leurs parents venus d'Occident, en famille, pour mener le djihad au Moyen-Orient. Il y a également ceux nés sur le territoire du « Dar al islam » selon la dénomination employée par Daech pour désigner les territoires tombés



sous son contrôle depuis 2013. Dans ces zones, les femmes sont tenues d'enfanter, durant un an à dix-huit mois maximum à compter de la date de leur mariage. Selon le témoignage de deux enfants syriens qui ont fui les camps de Daech, les enfants suivent un même programme répété à l'identique de manière à transformer les gestes en réflexes et les pensées en instincts. Lever à 8 heures, petit déjeuner puis entraînement physique. Les garçons devaient courir lestés de poids. Quand ils lambinaient, leurs instructeurs n'hésitaient pas à tirer autour d'eux à balles réelles. Ensuite, tir au fusil et au pistolet.

Après le déjeuner, leçon sur la ceinture explosive. Puis, comment tuer un ennemi en lui plantant un couteau dans le cou. Chaque mouvement répété jusqu'à atteindre la perfection. Tuer devenait la chose la plus normale au monde.

1.2. Des destinations probables

Trois solutions possibles se présentent devant les combattants terroristes étrangers aussi bien ceux affiliés à Daech que ceux de Jabhat Fath Al Sham :

1.2.1. Mener les combats ultimes

Les succès enregistrés sur le terrain par les coalitions occidentale et russe ainsi que les avancées de l'armée turque ne signifient nullement que la fin des combats est pour les semaines ou les mois prochains. Si en Irak Daech est à son dernier combat où elle défend son dernier bastion à Mossoul, sa situation sur le territoire syrien est plus favorable. L'organisation contrôle encore de larges pans du territoire syrien à Raqqa ; Dir-Ezzour, et sur la frontière irako-syrienne notamment dans la région d'AlQaïda. L'organisation a également repris le contrôle de Palmyre. Dans ces derniers fiefs, Daech maintiendra des poches de résistances où certains

combattants étrangers préféreraient lutter jusqu'au souffle ultime. Il en est de même de la région d'Idlib en Syrie où s'est retiré Jabhat Fath Al Sham et les groupes qui lui sont alliés après leur défaite à Alep. Les combattants étrangers de cette organisation peuvent encore rester dans ces régions et mener de la résistance.



Illustration n°2 : combats anti-Daech près de Syrte, en Libye, en octobre 2016.

1.2.2. Rejoindre d'autres pays, des zones grises ou d'autres foyers de tension

Certains pays des Balkans peuvent servir de refuge même provisoire aux terroristes de retour des foyers syro-irakiens. Des pays comme la Bosnie, le Kosovo ou encore l'Albanie, conservent des traces des réseaux d'Al-Qaïda qui ont rejoint ces pays dans les années 1990. Répondant à la question de savoir si l'État islamique avait un intérêt particulier à s'implanter dans les Balkans, Jean-Arnault Dérens, rédacteur en chef du «*Courrier des Balkans*» déclare que «*c'est effectivement un sujet d'inquiétude... les Balkans sont un terreau particulièrement favorable pour les candidats au*



Djihad et que ces derniers peuvent bénéficier de relais dans la région. Les Bosniens qui se rendent en Syrie et en Irak pour combattre au côté de l'État islamique sont pour la plupart des hommes jeunes qui ont souvent grandi à l'étranger avec le «mythe» des moudjahidines venus «sauver la nation» et le Djihad est parfois vu par cette génération comme un moyen de recoller à leur identité... »

Deux destinations attirent l'attention en Afrique du nord, d'une part le Sinaï, où s'implante l'organisation 'Ansar Beit Al Maqdis' affiliée au soi-disant État Islamique et d'autre part, la Libye où pullulent des organisations et groupes terroristes de tout bord.

Si la première destination se caractérise par sa proximité des foyers Ira-ko-syriens, la seconde est une destination possible en raison de l'absence d'un véritable État et de la persistance notamment au sud d'un chaos où se mêlent influences tribales, criminelles et terroristes. Plusieurs combattants de retour, peuvent choisir de continuer l'action Djihadistes dans ces foyers.

La région est ici infestée de groupes de tendance Al-Qaïda, elle est donc ouverte aux maghrébins de cette tendance et qui pour la plupart se trouvent aujourd'hui aux côtés de Jabhat Fath al Sham. Certains combattants de Daech peuvent également opter pour le Sahel moyennant un changement d'Allégeance.

Les foyers asiatiques, en Asie du sud-est, 22 groupes et groupuscules Djihadistes ont prêtés allégeance au Calife autoproclamé, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Parmi ces groupes, les deux plus influents sont la Djamaa Islamiya en Indonésie, et le groupe Abou Sayyaf aux Philippines. L'Indonésie constitue l'épicentre du phénomène islamiste radical en Asie du sud-est. Le pays connaît des violences depuis de nombreuses années. Une analyse fondée sur l'antécédent afghan montre que les années 1980-1990 sont marquées par des centaines d'Indonésiens, de Malaisiens et de Philippins qui

étaient partis combattre les Soviétiques en Afghanistan. Ils étaient revenus entraînés et endoctrinés par Al-Qaïda, et avaient commis plusieurs attentats et prises d'otages.

En Asie centrale, certains experts craignent aussi pour l'Ouzbékistan après la mort du président Islam Karimov qui a mené la lutte contre les extrémistes d'une main de fer. La vallée de Ferghana comme foyer de groupes et groupuscules radicaux pourrait également en raison de tendances radicales autochtones et de la proximité de l'Afghanistan devenir un nouveau foyer d'asile pour les combattants étrangers issus de toute la région. L'Afghanistan peut à nouveau constituer une terre d'asile pour les combattants terroristes étrangers obligés de quitter le foyer syro-irakien.

1.2.3. Le retour dans leurs pays d'origine

Les pays d'origine sont très nombreux, certaines sources citent plus de cent pays soit plus que la moitié des États du monde. Cependant, le risque lors des retours ne sera pas de la même intensité au vu du nombre de combattants que chaque pays a vu partir vers la Syrie ou l'Irak pour rejoindre Daech ou Jabhat Annousra.




Illustration n° : carte des flux de combattants étrangers vers la Syrie.



Le retour de ces combattants dans leurs pays d'origine, pose au-delà de la question du traitement qui doit leur être accordé, celle de savoir si, dans ces pays, les conditions qui les ont poussés à se radicaliser ont changé ou s'ils vont revenir pour revivre dans le même environnement qui a facilité leur départ. Dans ce cas, non seulement la réinsertion et la réintégration de ces vétérans de Syrie et d'Irak seraient difficiles, mais cela leur donnerait des arguments de radicalisation des plus jeunes.

Il serait peut-être édifiant sur ce point de citer le cas du quartier de Sidi Moumen à Casablanca d'où sont sortis les kamikazes des attentats de 2003. Les autorités locales ont non seulement à changer les conditions de vie dans ce quartier, mais dans tout l'arrondissement dont il dépend. On lit dans l'économiste édition n° :4844, le 26 août 2016, le témoignage d'un Marocain résident à l'étranger installé en Italie : « Je suis originaire de Bernoussi. Pourtant, à mon retour durant ces vacances, je n'ai pas reconnu mon quartier. J'ai cru que je me suis égaré à l'entrée de l'autoroute ». C'est ce genre de réflexion que doit avoir tout combattant en retournant dans sa ville, son arrondissement ou son quartier d'origine.

Le traitement de ces jeunes radicalisés à leur retour dans leurs pays d'origine serait donc d'autant plus facile que les conditions ayant présidé à leurs départs auraient changé.

D'une part, cela faciliterait leur réinsertion en leur donnant matière à réflexion et en les encourageant par conséquent à se réviser et, d'autre part, cela priverait les incondtionnels d'entre eux qui aurait décidé de continuer l'embrigadement des plus jeunes des arguments (la marginalisation et la précarité) qui leur avaient servi auparavant pour recruter les victimes de ces aléas.



II. Évaluation de la menace : nature et mesures premières

Le retour des combattants étrangers est un danger pour la sécurité. Ils subissent la menace du pays d'origine d'où nécessité de renforcer les cellules de renseignement à leur égard.

II.1. La menace

La question de ces retours de combattants terroristes étrangers est d'autant plus préoccupante que des statistiques reprises par plusieurs études révèlent qu'un combattant sur neuf, parmi ceux qui retournent, réussit à échapper aux mesures de sécurité et à perpétrer un attentat. Cela signifie que sur chaque mille combattants qui retourneront les deux prochaines années, 111 échapperont à la vigilance des services de sécurité et perpétreront un attentat.

Près de 6.000 africains ayant combattu au Moyen-Orient avec l'organisation d'État islamique (Daech) pourraient revenir en Afrique, a indiqué, à Oran, le Commissaire de l'Union Africaine pour la paix et la sécurité, qui a appelé les pays africains à se préparer *«fermement»* à la gestion de ces retours. *«Des rapports font état de la présence de 6.000 combattants africains parmi les 30.000 éléments étrangers ayant rejoint ce groupe terroriste au Moyen-Orient»*, a déclaré S.E Smail Chergui, lors d'une rencontre sur la lutte contre le terrorisme. *«Le retour de ces éléments en Afrique pose de sérieuses menaces sur la sécurité et la stabilité nationales et exige un traitement spécifique et une coopération intense entre les pays africains»*, a-t-il estimé. Le Commissaire de l'Union Africaine pour la paix et la sécurité a appelé les pays concernés à notamment *«échanger les renseignements sur les éléments armés regagnant leurs pays respectifs»*, après leurs défaites en Irak et en Syrie.

En 2004, Kofi Annan, endossant le rapport de United Nations High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, avait relevé la complexité

des menaces de notre temps, disant ce qui suit : « *Nous ne pouvons pas gérer des enjeux comme le terrorisme, les guerres civiles ou l'extrême pauvreté de manière isolée. Les implications de ces interdépendances sont profondes et nos stratégies doivent être globales. Nos institutions doivent aller au-delà de leurs propres préoccupations pour apprendre à travailler de façon concertée sur un ensemble de sujets* ». Depuis toujours, le terrorisme s'est étendu à de nouveaux espaces (G.A.BA., 2017).




Illustration n°4 : chiffres sur les combattants étrangers de Daech et sur ceux qui seraient rentrés dans leur pays (Source Soufan Center).

L'Afrique du nord et Sahel : « *Voyez le Sahel avec toutes les zones de trafics de tous genres. Ensuite, la Somalie. Donc, si on n'a pas les réponses appropriées, fortes évidemment, tout ce qui a été défait au Moyen-Orient va se retrouver encore sur l'espace sahélo-saharien* », avait déjà averti le président sénégalais Macky Sall . Il est vrai que cette région d'Afrique, déjà soumise à de fortes tensions en raison de conflits avec des islamistes locaux qui ont trouvé dans la déstabilisation de la



Libye une grande occasion de se renforcer, est en première ligne pour subir le retour éventuel des combattants chassés du Moyen-Orient. En plus, l'Afrique du nord, et notamment le Maroc et la Tunisie, est l'autre région réputée avoir fourni beaucoup de combattants à Daech au moment de son expansion. Au Maroc, par exemple, 213 Marocains ayant combattu dans les rangs de Daech sont rentrés au pays, selon les chiffres du ministre de l'Intérieur Abdelouafi Laftit. Au total, selon le ministre, ce sont quelque 1669 Marocains qui avaient rejoint les organisations Djihadistes au Moyen-Orient. En tout cas le pays se dit prêt : *«Tout Djihadiste qui rentre au Maroc est arrêté, présenté devant la justice et condamné à la prison. La loi condamne même le fait de rejoindre un groupe terroriste. Et les peines sont lourdes : jusqu'à 20 ans de prison»*. Même inquiétude en Tunisie, où des manifestations ont déjà eu lieu fin 2016 contre le retour des Djihadistes (Pierre Magna, 2017).

II.2. Le renforcement des cellules dormantes

Les publications de Daech, les rapports de services de renseignements et les interrogatoires et interviews de combattants arrêtés et emprisonnés confirment l'existence de cellules dormantes dans plusieurs pays du monde. L'interview d'Harry Sarfo cité plus haut est très édifiante à ce sujet. L'ancien combattant affirme que *« un paquet de gens vivant dans les pays européens attendaient les ordres pour attaquer les populations européennes »*. Plus d'autres combattants retournent et plus les cellules seront renforcées, non seulement en nombre d'individus mais également en apport de savoir-faire terroriste.

II.2.1. La radicalisation d'une nouvelle génération

Les combattants terroristes étrangers qui retournent dans leurs pays d'origine ne représentent pas seulement le danger de perpétration d'attentats mais aussi de diffusion de messages de haine prônés par les organisations



terroristes. Ils constituent à ce titre un prolongement idéologique en tant que véhicule de concepts radicaux, extrémistes et haineux. Ce prolongement s'exprime par la conversion d'un maximum de jeunes à l'idéologie de Daech.

La leçon de l'Afghanistan nous apprend que la deuxième génération d'Al- Qaïda est une génération dont les individus n'ont eu aucun contact avec l'Afghanistan ni le Djihad contre les soviétiques. Ils ont été recrutés, radicalisés et formés par les vétérans de la première génération.

II.2.2. La constitution de nouveaux groupes armés

Il est à ce stade judicieux de revenir au parallèle avec les retours des vétérans d'Al- Qaeda. Les années quatre-vingt-dix ont vu dans plusieurs pays arabes et musulmans la constitution au gré des conjonctures, de nouveaux groupes combattants armées. Un dénominateur commun rassemblait ces groupes, ils avaient à leur tête des vétérans tous retournés d'Afghanistan. En Algérie, au Maroc, en Libye et ailleurs, ces anciens Djihadistes entraînés, endoctrinés et radicalisés par les concepteurs d'Al -Qaïda se sont regroupés dans d'autres structures qu'ils ont créées en Algérie, au Maroc et en Libye. A la différence des groupes qui ont vu naissances après la guerre de l'Afghanistan et qui n'ont concerné que des pays arabes et musulmans, les groupes futurs peuvent s'implanter même dans les pays européens qui aujourd'hui comptent un nombre important de Djihadistes bien plus qu'avant.

III. Les suggestions de mesures

Face à la perception de la menace qu'a la population, les approches fermes à l'égard des combattants étrangers de retour au pays demeurent populaires : elles incluent diverses mesures d'ordre administratif, telles que



la révocation de citoyenneté et l'interdiction de réadmission, le but étant ici d'empêcher les retours, tandis que, sur le plan pénal, les poursuites et les peines d'emprisonnement de longue durée sont les approches privilégiées. Les mesures administratives appliquées diffèrent toutefois selon les juridictions, et de nombreux pays indiquent qu'il est difficile de poursuivre les combattants étrangers en justice, car les éléments à leur charge ne satisfont souvent pas aux exigences en matière de preuve, ils ne peuvent généralement être poursuivis que pour des délits relativement mineurs, ce qui signifie que les peines d'emprisonnement, à supposer qu'elles soient prononcées, sont plutôt courtes. Par ailleurs, tenter de résoudre le problème par des moyens avant tout pénaux ajoute une complication supplémentaire, due au lien encore trouble entre emprisonnement et radicalisation : certains témoignages anecdotiques laissent en effet entendre que plusieurs auteurs d'attentats Djihadistes se sont radicalisés en prison. Vu la difficulté de contrer la menace que représente le retour des combattants étrangers par la seule voie pénale, les décideurs prennent de plus en plus conscience de l'importance de l'approche bienveillante, qui met l'accent sur une série de politiques relevant de la lutte contre l'extrémisme violent, telles que la réinsertion et la prévention. Une telle évolution est utile, car elle prend en compte le fait que toutes les personnes qui rentrent du Djihad ne sont pas à mettre dans le même panier, mais forment au contraire un groupe hétérogène incluant non seulement des radicaux désireux de commettre des attentats, mais aussi des désabusés de la vie sous l'égide de Daech, et même, potentiellement, des victimes du recrutement terroriste, comme des enfants ou d'autres membres de la famille des combattants étrangers. Comme l'ont récemment montré les travaux du Forum mondial de lutte contre le terrorisme, il est indispensable, pour être efficace, de recourir à la réinsertion pour traiter le problème des retours, il est tout aussi important d'éviter, en premier lieu, la radicalisation des personnes vulnérables et de contrecarrer l'influence des grands réseaux extrémistes chargés de recruter

de nouveaux adeptes. Les États doivent donc investir dans les deux approches (Revue de l'OTAN ,2017).

III.1. La détection à l'entrée

Le plus grand danger que peuvent encourir les pays où ces combattants vont retourner est de ne pas les détecter à l'entrée. S'ils arrivent à rejoindre les pays de manière anonyme, ils disposeront alors du temps nécessaire pour construire les labyrinthes d'une vie clandestine (faux papiers, planques, réseaux d'approvisionnement), ce qui les mettra alors de plus en plus hors de portée des services de sécurité.

Une grande vigilance est donc à observer au niveau des postes frontaliers, notamment en ce qui concerne l'usage de documents falsifiés ou contrefaits comme demandé par le Conseil de Sécurité de l'Organisations des Nations Unies. Les itinéraires et les techniques utilisés par les combattants terroristes étrangers rendent le travail des agents de premières lignes, notamment aux frontières, très ardues et très délicates, ce qui nécessite des formations spécialisées et très poussées.

De telles mesures rencontrent cependant des obstacles dus en grande partie aux moyens financiers que ces mesures mobilisent. L'ensemble des États constituant la communauté internationale ne disposent ni des mêmes moyens ni des mêmes capacités pour installer à leurs frontières des dispositifs capables de détecter les faux et les contrefaçons. Or, la menace étant globale, la chaîne sécuritaire internationale est rompue dès lors que l'un de ses maillons est défaillant.

D'après le rapport du Comité Contre le Terrorisme du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies, seuls 51 États, soit environ un quart de tous les membres des Nations Unies, se sont dotés d'un programme d'information préalable sur les voyageurs, à savoir de systèmes permettant d'améliorer



la sécurité des frontières et de l'espace aérien, et de détecter l'arrivée ou le départ de combattants terroristes étrangers potentiels. Le rapport ajoute que la moitié seulement de ces 51 États utilise ces systèmes dans la pratique.

L'aide au développement dans le cadre de la sécurité humaine devra prendre cet aspect en considération de façon à dédier une part de l'aide à la sécurisation des frontières. Les bailleurs de fonds doivent également veiller à ce qu'une part de leurs prêts et dons soit consacrée aux mesures qui puissent entraver la libre circulation des terroristes en général et des combattants terroristes étrangers en particulier.

III.2. La répression et réinsertion

L'une des questions épineuses à laquelle font face les politiques publiques destinées à réagir face au problème des retours des combattants étrangers est celle de choisir entre la répression, la réinsertion ou la combinaison des deux. En effet, cette catégorie de personnes peut être rassemblée sous une seule enseigne comme constituant un contingent qui est allé, en dehors de tout cadre institutionnel étatique, participer à des actes de violence non légitime, dans un pays tiers. Cependant, il ne serait ni judicieux ni juste de les traiter de manière standard qui s'appliquerait à l'ensemble en dépit des différences qui peignent leur degré d'implication.

À leur retour, ils constitueraient au moins trois strates : ceux qui constitueront le prolongement du bras armé des organisations terroristes ; ceux qui formeront le corps de missionnaires pour continuer à prolonger l'idéologie Djihadiste et ; ceux qui prendraient conscience de l'hérésie dont ils ont été victimes et qui pourraient servir la contre-propagande du Djihadisme.

Non seulement les réactions des gouvernements doivent être déclinées en politiques adaptées pour réduire les risques, mais les opinions publiques et les expressions populaires doivent également être sensibilisées pour

prendre en considération les différences entre degrés d'implication et ne pas presser les gouvernements à adopter des mesures inappropriées. Les États doivent parfois difficilement arbitrer entre le légalement correct et les penchants populaires dictés par le subjectif et l'affectif.

Opter pour la répression automatique et à outrance ne peut, au point de vue de plusieurs spécialistes, constituer la solution idoine : les politiques restrictives et répressives découragent les combattants qui ont pris conscience de leurs erreurs et qui se sont révolté contre les actes barbares de Daech et d'Annousra de choisir le repentir et le retour ; de telles politiques réduisent également la probabilité que les familles encouragent leurs membres engagés auprès des organisations terroristes à revenir, de peur qu'ils ne soient condamnés à de lourdes peines sans véritable étude de leurs cas et sans différencier entre ceux, inconditionnels, irrécupérables et ceux qui manifestent le désir de repentir, toute exagération ou automatisation de la répression ne peut générer que des injustices qui peuvent à leur tour être sources de radicalisation et de violences futures.

Comme pour la lutte contre la radicalisation, le tout sécuritaire et répressif ne semble pas récolter des opinions favorables ni parmi une grande majorité de décideurs, ni dans les rangs des chercheurs, analystes et experts, ni évidemment parmi les défenseurs des droits de l'homme.

Il ne doit également pas y avoir de politiques automatiques d'amnistie sur les simples déclarations de repentis des candidats au retour. Cette manière de faire pourrait permettre aux terroristes usant de la technique de la Taqqia de cacher leurs jeux et de pouvoir ainsi échapper aux contrôles qui pourraient déterminer leurs véritables intentions.

La solution ne peut donc venir que de la combinaison intelligente de la répression et de la réhabilitation. Les lois ou réglementations intérieures, communautaires ou nationales devront aller dans le sens de création de



hot spots où les opérations de tri devront s'effectuer. Le combattant terroriste étranger qui formule le vœu de revenir dans son pays ou qui est intercepté à la frontière devra être conduit dans des « centres spéciaux » où son régime n'est pas celui de détenu, mais de personne dont le statut est à vérifier. Là étant, le candidat au retour verra sa situation examinée par des commissions spécialisées (juges, théologiens, imams, psychologues, sociologues, spécialistes du renseignement) qui détermineront si l'intéressé doit : être confié à des organismes civils ou gouvernementaux qui doivent l'aider à dépasser les traumatismes des conditions de vie dans lesquelles il a évolué lors de son séjour en Syrie ou en Irak et par conséquent faciliter sa réintégration ; être confié aux services de renseignement pour débriefing et éventuelle participation à des programmes de contre propagande idéologique du Djihad , être confié aux services judiciaires pour instruction de procédures de présentation devant les juridictions compétentes.

III.3. L'implication des familles

Les familles des combattants terroristes étrangers, leurs amis et proches, constituent un maillon important dans le dispositif de traitement de ces personnes lors de leur retour dans leur pays d'origine. Ils peuvent même, pour les pays qui veulent encourager les retours, constituer un outil qui peut aider à convaincre les plus récalcitrants parmi eux.

Plusieurs de ces combattants, voire même une majorité, est restée en contact avec leurs familles après leurs départs. Certains membres des familles ont même fourni des informations fructueuses sur la vie de leurs proches en Syrie et en Irak, car parfois, dans leur désespoir, les personnes qui ont rejoint Daech se confient à leurs amis ou parents pour décrire les affres de leurs aventures.

Ces mêmes proches peuvent jouer un rôle important dans la réinsertion de ceux parmi les combattants terroristes étrangers qui se révéleraient

récupérables. Cette implication des parents et proches implique la participation de la société civile aux côtés de la justice, de la sécurité, des services de santé et des communes afin que soient organisés des débats, des formations, des sensibilisations et des collectes d'idées sur la meilleure manière de faire des familles des combattants terroristes étrangers un acteur agissant dans le traitement des retours.

III.4. Une nouvelle résolution du conseil de sécurité

Plusieurs dispositions de la résolution 2178 du Conseil de Sécurité des Nations Unies sur les combattants terroristes étrangers peuvent servir aux États pour leur inspirer les nouvelles mesures concernant le retour de cette catégorie de personnes. Certaines mesures telles que celles prises aux frontières pour empêcher les départs des combattants vers la Syrie et l'Irak peuvent aussi aider dans la détection des retours. Cependant, la question des retours qui se posera avec plus d'acuité durant les deux prochaines années et qui concerne plus que la moitié des États de la planète, nécessite la mise au point d'une nouvelle résolution du Conseil de Sécurité : d'une part, la résolution inciterait les États à prendre la menace au sérieux et à l'appréhender en tant que danger global qui ne peut être combattu ou endigué que par l'implication de tous ; d'autre part, la résolution servirait de guide pour l'inspiration de bases communes pour les mesures régionales, nationales voire locales . Cependant, il serait opportun qu'une éventuelle résolution à prendre mette plus fermement l'accent sur la coopération internationale, notamment pour ce qui est des aides aux pays qui ne peuvent s'acquitter de leur part de mesures pour répondre aux soucis de la communauté internationale sur la question.



Conclusion

En définitive, le phénomène des combattants étrangers est en perpétuelle évolution et leur retour massif représente sans nul doute le prochain grand défi auquel seront confrontés les décideurs. De nombreuses voix se feront entendre pour appeler à une approche ferme mêlant poursuites judiciaires et peines d'emprisonnement de longue durée, mais soyons clairs, cela ne règlera pas entièrement le problème et les mesures pénales doivent absolument être assorties de politiques de prévention et de réinsertion. Les programmes de prévention et de réinsertion variant de pays en pays, il est crucial d'y intégrer des dispositifs d'évaluation adéquats et de faire en sorte que leurs résultats fassent l'objet de débats aussi larges que possible, afin que tout le monde puisse profiter des enseignements tirés et éviter de répéter les erreurs du passé. Toutefois, il est utile de se doter d'un programme, dont l'objectif n'est pas de condamner mais de réinsérer, offrant aux combattants étrangers de retour au pays des aides à différents niveaux en matière d'emploi, de formation, de logement, de soutien psychologique et de soins médicaux. L'absence d'une politique de déradicalisation, favoriserait la persistance du terrorisme. Il en est de même des résultats mitigés des politiques de désarmement, démobilisation, réinsertion qui entraînent le recyclage des combattants dans d'autres formes de violence.



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LA STRATÉGIE DE LUTTE CONTRE L'EXTRÉMISME DES JEUNES, VÉHICULÉ PAR LES RÉSEAUX SOCIAUX ;

RÉALITÉ ET PERSPECTIVES

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Résumé

La sécurisation des relations humaines, tout comme la liberté de pensée et d'expression, est devenue une nécessité jumelée à la notion de sécurité, surtout dans un contexte où les menaces sont croissantes du fait des mutations de la société. Ces dernières justifient l'évolution des mécanismes de protection et de défense des intérêts de l'Etat et de la société.

La non maîtrise crée de la réaction négative entre jeunes et réseaux sociaux menant à l'extrémisme, nécessite de s'intéresser à la stratégie de lutte contre l'extrémisme propagé par les réseaux sociaux, et qui impose l'identification et l'observation de l'ennemi.

Il est aussi essentiel de revoir les modes et mécanismes d'intégration ainsi que l'utilisation des moyens de communication qui jouent un rôle important dans la vie des jeunes, surtout, si l'actualité liée au terrorisme prend une ampleur médiatique sans cesse croissante.

Enfin, il est important de souligner que la guerre contre le terrorisme, passe également par la production d'un contre narratif contre l'extrémisme.

Mots clés : L'extrémisme, réseaux sociaux, Les médias, la sécurité, les jeunes.

Introduction

Les médias jouent un rôle essentiel dans la formalisation et la constitution de la réalité des sociétés démocratiques, dans lesquelles l'élite s'exprimant sur des sujets de crises multidimensionnelles, notamment politiques, économiques ou sécuritaires, usent des moyens médiatiques pour véhiculer leurs avis et positions afin d'impacter l'opinion publique.

La problématique de la sécurisation des relations humaines, fruit de la liberté de pensée et d'expression, est donc devenue une nécessité jumelée à la notion de sécurité, qui est un des besoins humains innés, surtout à l'état actuel où le niveau élevé des menaces est en relation avec les mutations de la société. Ces dernières imposent le développement des mécanismes de protection et de défense des intérêts de l'Etat et de la société, ce qui se reflète sur la notion de sécurité. Aujourd'hui, la sécurité est devenue un synonyme du développement et du progrès économique, social et politique sous l'égide d'une protection garantie (**Robert S. McNamara, 1968.**). A ce sujet, **Robert S. McNamara** parle même d'un progrès continu jusqu'à aboutir au développement comme objectif civilisationnel et étroitement lié à la problématique de la sécurité.

A partir de la réalité de la menace, la question de la pertinence est devenue essentielle, d'où l'intérêt croissant qu'on lui porte, en relation avec la prolifération et le développement des Nouvelles Technologies de l'Information et de la Communication (NTIC). Par définition, l'efficacité de l'Etat et de ses structures dans l'édification de systèmes de défense pour faire face à la croissance des masses médias encouragée par l'avancée technologique et cognitivistes, en garantissant une protection commune des acquis civiques individuels et sociétaux.



1. Le progrès technologique et la logique de protection de l'information :

Le progrès enregistré dans le domaine des NTIC a participé au flux abondant de l'information, au point où on mesure le développement d'une société par le débit et la flexibilité de transmission de cette information, qui est devenue une des conditions pour l'exercice de la citoyenneté, mais parallèlement à cette avancée, les sociétés connaissent aussi une croissance des menaces, causée par le développement de la cybercriminalité, dans une ère où la primauté du numérique est un indicateur de développement et de modernisation de la gestion et de l'administration publiques en tant que nécessité.

L'Etat est donc appelée à relever le défi de l'efficacité et d'être en mesure de répondre avec professionnalisme aux sources de la menace liées à l'information et à sa numérisation (حمدون توريه, 2006). Celles-ci prennent diverses formes : actes de sabotage, hacking, atteinte à la confidentialité, espionnage. Egalement, ces cyber-menaces portent atteinte à la sécurité d'Etat, et ce, à cause du paradoxe imposé, à savoir que le développement technologique participe à l'élargissement des horizons et de l'épanouissement du citoyen. Par conséquent, il doit être accompagné par anticipation, d'un niveau technologique et organisationnel requis, ce qui engendre une limitation de la société de profiter, à son gré, de l'information.

La cyber-sécurité n'est pas restreinte à la mise en place de mécanismes de défense des installations des institutions nationales contre le piratage, l'espionnage et la destruction des programmes informatiques des secteurs de souveraineté, en tant que devoir politique et sécuritaire. Par conséquent, la réalité impose à de protéger notre économie, en commençant par le e-commerce, jusqu'à donner confiance à ce mode d'achat et les transactions y afférentes. Et de surcroit de protéger d'une part, notre culture et notre

identité de toute infiltration d'idées intégristes, et d'autre part nos enfants, des risques du Net, au nom des obligations nationales et sociales. A cette fin, nos services de sécurité spécialisés dans les crimes informatiques garantissent la sécurité essentielle, sans pour autant porter atteinte à la vie privée du citoyen ou limiter ses choix. Ainsi, la culture du cognitivisme à l'ère des libertés individuelles, est d'une efficacité dans l'élargissement des horizons du développement de la société.

2. L'extrémisme chez les jeunes moyennant les réseaux sociaux :

Les sociétés de notre temps ne sont plus divisées, restrictivement, horizontalement selon la rente, la richesse et les opportunités, elles sont divisées diagonalement selon des facteurs linguistiques, culturels et religieux. Cette division amène à une structuration, des stratégies et à des conditions sociales dans des approches différentes sur comment atteindre les objectifs sociaux escomptés. Dans un contexte d'accroissement des NTIC et l'impact sur les jeunes.

L'accroissement des NTIC son tour, renvoi à de multiples caractéristiques, dont les plus importantes sont l'élargissement du rayon de participation, le flux important des informations introduites, et surtout la rapidité de leur transmission, dans le but d'atteindre des objectifs publicitaires, de marketing et même de propagande.

L'avancé des NTIC a participé, indéniablement, au développement des méthodes de propagande et de l'exercice d'une influence sur les esprits, en prenant l'exemple sur les principes de la propagande.

La propagande a des relations systématiques avec les moyens d'information des masses et soulève la problématique du niveau de l'auditoire, de la capacité de convaincre, de la nature du discours véhiculé,



et d'autres paramètres influant sur le raisonnement, l'orientation et le comportement. C'est pour cela qu'on constate que l'actualité liée au terrorisme prend une ampleur médiatique croissante, pour leurs contenus émotifs tels que la conflictualité, l'effet d'impressionner, la sensibilisation...etc, ce qui les rendent importantes pour les médias, sans omettre que la propagande terroriste s'est amplifiée avec l'émergence des groupes terroristes, parmi lesquels DAECH, qui privilégient l'interaction communicative.

Aussi, l'interaction existante entre les technologies de communications et les jeunes dans l'accès à l'information est devenue une philosophie existentielle individuelle qui diminue dans le cadre de l'extrémisme. Car, l'extrémisme apparaît comme un sentiment existentiel spécial, lié à un comportement humain négatif et à sa culture d'ego et d'égoïsme, donc un rejet de la vie commune.

Les jeunes sont dans un besoin essentiel de consolider leurs capacités par l'introduction de l'aptitude et la création de conditions. Ils considèrent le développement comme une liberté, et cela en se référant aux droits naturels renforcés par l'information qui se matérialisent par : la liberté d'expression, la facilité de l'accès à l'information qui est véhiculée et échangée par les réseaux sociaux qui eux-mêmes se développent grâce aux NTIC. L'attrait des jeunes pour les NTIC rend difficile le contrôle et la maîtrise ce qui engendre des conflits qui se manifestent par l'absence de dialogue, qui à son tour produit la violence née de l'extrémisme. En somme, la non maîtrise crée de la réaction négative entre jeunes et réseaux sociaux et conduit à l'extrémisme.

- **Pourquoi cette réaction négative ? :**

En se référant à la courbe de marketing des technologies, la problématique qui s'impose est la suivante : la vitesse de propagation, par ex-

emple : la propagation de l'énergie électrique à duré 46 ans, celle de la télévision 35 ans, de la radio 30 ans, la télévision de couleur 18 ans, du téléphone cellulaire 13 ans et celle de l'internet 07 ans, ce qui veut dire qu'entre l'invention du produit et sa propagation la durée est à chaque fois amoindrie, en d'autres termes, l'impact du changement est plus rapide que la capacité des êtres à s'adapter au nouveau produit et ses dérive politiques sociales et-économiques.

Face à cette réalité, il est observé des activités offensives des mouvements terroristes pour une interconnexion et une adaptation en vue de profiter des NTIC qui leur permettent de développer des stratégies militaires et médiatiques simultanément. En effet, l'internet et les réseaux sociaux sont des bases qui permettent aux terroristes d'arriver à leurs objectifs dans un contexte de mondialisation de la menace..

Les réseaux sociaux nous mènent aujourd'hui à une confrontation idéologique, au moment où le cadre référentiel est en recule devant la croissance du cadre de l'intérêt pragmatique, découlant lui-même d'un grand changement des principes et du comportement des jeunes.

3. La lutte contre l'extrémisme : quelle approche et quelle stratégie ? :

La base de l'importance du discours médiatique et des contenus communicatifs (حسن عبد الله الدعجة, 2014.) repose essentiellement sur leur impact à différents niveaux, et la vague de l'extrémisme actuel impose un défi qu'il faudrait relever avec précision, surtout avec sa propagation et son élargissement, résultant de la participation, de l'information, et des niveaux d'interaction aux contenus diffusés.

La situation actuelle est inquiétante, devant la croissance de l'extrémisme et la propagation du terrorisme (Philip Seib & Dana M, 2011) illustrée



par le profil des recrues, comme les femmes de DAECH, les enfants de DAECH (les cadets de la Khilafa) qui nous attirent à l'autre dilemme de leur attachement aux idées des hommes terroristes.

On constate aussi de nouveaux moyens modernes de communication et de médias propageant le message extrémiste. Grâce à la détermination des terroristes ils arrivent à trouver des sites de remplacement pour la diffusion de leurs informations, chaque fois qu'ils sont censurés. Comme exemple, on peut mentionner le journal DABEK de l'organisation DAECH, qui s'est avancé jusqu'à la création d'un jeu interactif appelé SALIL ES-SAWARIM, en outre l'organisation recrute 80% des recrues via les réseaux : Facebook, Twiter et Youtube.

La nécessité est donc de parler de stratégie de lutte contre l'extrémisme propagé par les réseaux sociaux, qui imposent l'identification et l'observation de l'ennemi, parallèlement à la croissance des voix de l'ego, et les conflits d'intérêts dans la société (**DENNIS HAWITT, 1982.**).

Devant l'absence d'un mécanisme arabe informationnel uni et aux objectifs claires, on constate une division plus qu'une unification, pour preuve les multiples appellations du groupe terroriste DAECH, c'est-à-dire l'ORGANISATION DE LA KHILAFAT ou l'ORGANISATION DE L'ETAT ISLAMIQUE. Aujourd'hui, les groupes terroristes ont tendance à s'unifier et à mobiliser leurs capacités, pour bénéficier des retombées du mécanisme de l'allégeance qu'ils exploitent pour exister.

La stratégie de lutte contre l'extrémisme via les réseaux sociaux commence par une sensibilisation des jeunes par les voies passives et positives, pour un meilleur usage des technologies et des moyens de communication, et dont le besoin actuel demande une éducation interactive réelle qui doit contribuer au système éducatif et scolaire, qui permet aujourd'hui d'y

intégrer des contenus pédagogiques aux méthodes adoptées notamment aux lycées et universités, qui apprendront aux étudiants de sélectionner les contenus informationnels issus des réseaux sociaux.

Il est aussi essentiel de revoir les modes et mécanismes d'intégration des prisonniers et des repentis à l'intérieur des établissements pénitenciers, pour garantir une intégration effective des anciens recrues, et leur dés-endocrinement...

D'une autre part, il est obligatoire de passer du conflit contre le terrorisme vers la guerre contre le terrorisme, en produisant aussi des discours contre narratif, et donc concrétiser une approche préventive en continuité des outils de l'approche défensive (les mécanismes de protection, les moyens de censure des sites extrémistes et de contrôle d'internet sans passer outre le principe de la libre expression, aux USA par exemple, il est créé et contrôlé plus de 70% du contenu du Net), et qui doit commencer déjà par une définition de la responsabilité sociale des opérateurs de communication, et la consolidation de plus d'accords internationaux sur la lutte contre le cyber-terrorisme.



Conclusion

La croissance observée du phénomène de l'extrémisme, parallèlement au progrès technologiques qui a engendré une vitesse de la communication, est un dilemme qui a participé à la création d'un faussé qui représente une importante difficulté de régularisation et de contrôle des contenus informationnels véhiculés essentiellement par les réseaux sociaux. Cette situation expose les jeunes à des risques, et le sentiment régnant de désarroi et de l'étonnement est confondus avec l'union des jeunes et des réseaux sociaux, pour leur incapacité de s'exfiltrer de ces réseaux, des moyens de communication, et la communication de masse.

Il est donc devenu important, à notre ère, de priver les organisations terroristes des couvertures médiatiques et communicatives, considérées comme une récompense pour ces organisations. Elles leur permettent de s'adresser au public par la médiatisation de leurs activités. En même temps, il serait opportun de produire un cadre humain spécialisé dans les nouvelles techniques de la communication, qui se chargera de l'administration des affaires de lutte contre le terrorisme et l'extrémisme via les réseaux sociaux. Cette recommandation permettra de garantir l'efficacité du message médiatique et atteindre ses objectifs, et d'éviter une réaction qui pourrait être souvent spontanée et magistrale il serait opportun d'offrir une protection optimale et méthodique des jeunes contre l'extrémisme intégriste.



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BOOK REVIEW

Title: The Globalisation of Terrorism from Sicaris, Assassins to ISIS

Author: Dr. Mustafa Y Ali

Reviewer: Ibifubara Abbiyesuku

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This book contains six chapters totaling 200 pages and focuses on the historical antecedents of terrorism from Sicariis, Assassins to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The main strength of the book lie in the emphasis on building community resilience against violent extremism through programmes targeted at ideologically driven pushback actions. The author stressed on countering terrorism through all-of-society approach with emphasis on community engagement and collective responsibility. He drew lessons from the experiences of Rwanda and other societies at various stages of post-conflict reconstruction.

In the book, the author clearly demonstrated that security is the collective responsibility of all people and consequently argues that all fabric of the society should acknowledge common vulnerabilities and apply measures to counter individual and shared insecurities. The author reviewed the engagement of online resources such as the internet for the perpetration of terrorist acts but however failed to show adequate fairness on the role of the internet in countering terrorism and violent extremism as demonstrated by Philippines. The discussions in the various chapters are summarized below



In the first chapter, the author traces the use of terror and terrorism from antiquity. The Sicariis (Zealot of Judea) referring to dagger-men launched attacks on the Roman occupation forces in the 1st Century AD while the Hashshashins (or Assassins) which emerged in the 11th Century AD were based in Northern Iran. He noted that both the Sicariis and the Hashshashins caused significant shocks on their communities. The author further differentiated the act of terror and terrorism arguing that acts of terror could be perpetrated by individuals, groups and the state without any ideological tinge whereas in terrorism, the use of violence is programmed. He therefore classified terror and terrorism as tactics used by gangs, governments, insurgents, freedom fighters and dictators to achieve certain goals.

In the second chapter, the author asserts that the international community needs to prescribe realistic solutions to defeat terrorism because terrorism has had an extremely negative impact on international relations. He identified different perspectives in combating terrorism such as the;

- a. the realist perspective which allows the use of all instruments of state power including violence in pursuit of its national interest because realism holds that state actors are the only true actors of international relations.
- b. the libertarian internationalist pacifist perspective which believes that to end terrorism, non-violence means such as legal, diplomatic, economic and political means should be adopted.
- c. the clash of civilization perspective which holds that the impact of terrorism on international relations will yield to a severe clash of civilization from the western civilization on the one hand which is considered to be triumphant militarily, diplomatically, economically, culturally, and technologically and the Islamic civilization on the other hand which is seen as humiliated, full of resentment and one that opposes modernity and globalization. and



- d. the anti-imperialist perspective which claims that imperialist powers use their favorable positions in the international community for their own good and interest while at the same time aggrieve other nations states. However according to the author citing Robert Keohane, international relation theories are not specific enough to deal with the diversity of the dynamics of terrorism and its impact on international relations.

In chapter three, the author observes that globalization as a useful analytical construct has been a subject of debate among scholars and policy makers. On one hand of the argument, it is seen as a vague concept with limited impact on everyday living and events in the 21st century. On the other hand, he argues that the concept is both conceptually relevant in understanding and practically effective in political, military, socio-cultural, economic, environmental and geographical dynamism of human interactions. It is his view that globalization has come to stay in global conversations and discourses relating to terrorism. Hence, globalization which is seen as the widening, deepening and speeding of interconnections is reflecting the meaning, aim and impact of terrorism especially considering its structural and asymmetrical challenges in the state centric global system, terrorism has attempted to use globalization to its advantage.

In chapter four, the author focuses on the historical patterns and periodization of the globalization relating to terrorism and traces the phases of globalization of terrorism starting from the pre-modern, early modern, modern and contemporary period. He further categorizes them as germinal, incipient, take off, struggle for hegemony and uncertainty phases. Mustafa locates the germinal phase to the period from the 15th Century to the 17th Century. Many wars involving acts of terrorism were fought during this period. There was also deliberate suppression of the influence of the protestant reformation which resulted in the Church of England separating



from Rome. Populations were terrorized not to go against the authority of the Pope and this captures what is happening in the non-state actors phase of the globalization process in which groups like ISIS are employing similar tactics that the early popes and others applied during the crusades and acquisition in the 11th to 15th centuries.

The incipient phase started in 1750 and ended in 1875. In this phase ideas about the unitary and homogeneous states were conceived. The take-off phase succeeded the Incipient Phase and lasted from the 1870s to 1920. It coincided to when some European countries such as United Kingdom, France, Belgium, Germany and Spain terrorized Africa, Asia, Middle East, Caribbean and Latin American countries into submitting to their plunder.

The Stage of Struggle for hegemony began in 1920s and ended in 1970s. Its highpoint coincided with the critical stage of the cold war, conflicts, wars and terrorism where colonialism, imperialism and expansionism created problems they could not solve. For instance, in Africa, the artificial boundaries created by colonialists became the flashpoints and triggers for wars and terrorism today. Also in the Middle East, the Skyes-Picot Agreement between the French and the British prepared the ground for future and violent conflicts. Finally, the uncertainty phase took its roots from the late 1960s and lasted till early 1990s. During this period, the international community became more preoccupied with human rights. The Arab-Israeli conflict became more violent and globalized. Also Al-Qaida and Osama Bin Ladin became the infamous products of terrorism during this phase of globalization. Mustafa is of the view that the understanding of these phases is important to appreciate the historical trajectory that preceded contemporary terrorism in a globalized world.

In the fifth chapter, Mustafa focused on the role of Media in the globalization of terrorism. It is his view that no single group of persons has taken



advantage of the globalizing media than the terrorist groups like ISIS and Al-Qaida. They have perfected the strategic communication that combines the use of old and new media to devastating effect and in cases where mainstream media do not broadcast the terrorist messages, they have created their own platforms mainly online to reach out to their intended targets.

Mustafa captioned the sixth chapter, “Rolling Back Terrorism: Ideological Pushback of Terrorist Ideology.” He argues that in order to push back terrorism, it is important to understand its ideology i.e. that which provides motivation and justification for terrorist actions. Thus in order to prevent and address terrorism and violent extremism, states and communities should look into the heart of the ideology that fuels it and afterwards use the knowledge to develop effective strategies of counter-ideology pushback programs. He also proposes the shared security theory which involves all sectors of the society to acknowledge common vulnerabilities and address them.

In conclusion, the book provides an understanding of the historical trajectories that culminated in contemporary terrorism and further gives a peep into the future of terrorism in a rapidly globalized world. The author further suggests that how the subject of terrorism is framed can drive people into an incorrect analysis and therefore incorrect response. However, in response to counter terrorism, one must get into the loop to get the objectives, to know how the movement uses violent and non-violence as a force multiplier, who are the allies outside the movements, and what are its contents then offer them something better to join and counter them. Finally, the book is valuable as a snapshot of a movement of considerable transition, it is therefore recommended for policy makers, decision makers and scholars with special interest in terrorism analysis, conflict studies and peace building.



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