African Journal on Terrorism

ACSRT

A JOURNAL OF THE AFRICAN CENTRE FOR THE STUDY AND RESEARCH ON TERRORISM

African Journal on Terrorism

Contributions

African journal on Terrorism is a continental, peer-reviewed, interdisciplinary journal. The journal seeks to publish quality grounded research on all aspects of terrorism, counter-terrorism and violent extremism. The journal seeks to provide a platform that encourages critical analysis and sustained reflection of terrorism and violent extremism on the continent.

Procedures

All submitted manuscripts are subject to an initial blind peer-review by the Editors, and, if found suitable for further consideration, to a second peer-review by at least two independent, anonymous expert referees. The Editor In Chief and Editors review the comments from reviewers, and where appropriate communicate them directly to the author. The Editors will inform the author if the original or revised paper has been accepted for publication in the journal.

Length and Format

Authors submitting papers for the consideration of the journal should limit their works to between 5000 and 6000 words, including references, text, all tables and figures. They are encouraged to support their arguments with relevant statistics, pictures and graphical illustrations. The preferred referencing format of the journal is the electronically generated endnotes. The referencing style however, is the Harvard referencing style. Abstract should not exceed 300 words with at least five keywords.

CONTENTS

Editorial Comments

This is the second edition of the *African Journal on Terrorism* to be published in 2020. Both editions were produced under the stresses and strains of COVID 19: most especially the aspects of its management dealing with lockdowns and restrictions of movement. Despite the pandemic and its challenging social environments, several papers were received by the Journal from scholars across the continent. The intention of these scholars rhyme with ours and it is that terrorism should be fought and defeated in Africa as vigorously being done to the pandemic. This commitment is compelled by the fact that the marauding terrorist organizations in Africa are equally not resting on their oars. They have continued to take human lives and cause human displacements across the African continent. They do not seem to have any respect for COVID 19 as they pandemic has not witnessed any significant halt in their deadly attacks. The countries most affected by their attacks during the pandemic include the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Mali, Kenya, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad. They attack critical state infrastructures, state officials, humanitarian workers, children and women. In Nigeria most especially, Boko Haram and ISWAP have continued to wreak havoc. Those interested in having more detailed reports about these attacks should read the past editions of the monthly Africa Terrorism Bulletin published by the African Centre for the Studies and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT).

The papers in the present edition of the *African Journal on Terrorism* express concerns about the causes, nature and management of these cases of violent extremism. More papers were submitted for consideration by us but only few of them could be accepted for inclusion in the volume due to the painstaking recommendation of our editorial board members, diligent reviewers and committed staff members of the ACSRT. Contributors whose papers are not included in this volume have been advised on how to improve the works for inclusion in future editions. Our appreciation goes to all these critical stakeholders. With their support it is possible to keep the African continent safe of the evil machinations of terrorists.

We have nine papers in this edition. The first is by Henrique Britto de Melo. It encourages the use of interdisciplinary approach for understanding terrorism. The second paper is jointly produced by Babayo Sule ad Sani Yakubu Gombe on the sources of finance, weapons and other logistics for Boko Haram. Nigeria is also bedeviled by incessant bloody clashes between herdsmen and farmers, most especially in the central part of the country. The third paper in this edition of our Journal discusses the role of

climate and environmental changes in these clashes. The main suggestion of the paper is that with better management of climate change there are higher chances of the clashes reducing. The paper is jointly written by Murkthar Suleiman and Arinze Uche. In the fourth paper, Micheal Hanson discusses the gaps in the enforcement of the various counterterrorist legislations and treaties in Nigeria. To the author, terrorism thrives in Nigeria because of slack enforcement of the laws. In the fifth paper, Edouard ErephaneYogo calls attention to how the integrity of the fight against terrorism in Cameroun is sometimes stained by human rights abuses.

Those engaged in preventing terrorism in Africa need to take some regional and domestic causative factors into consideration. These include proliferation of illicit trade in small arms, youth unemployment, endemic corruption, unequal provision of socio-economic resources, unfriendly environmental factors, and the geopolitical contexts of the countries. In the sixth paper in this Journal, Edward Brenya, Dominic Degraft Arthur and Mohammed Sani Saheed call attention to how these factors bolster the chances of violent extremism in Ghana. In the seventh paper, Usman Tar, Samuel Ayegba, and Nufaisa Ahmed remind us that violent extremism is gendered. The paper focuses on the dimensions of this issue in West Africa. They argue that women feature in some of the violent attacks as both victims and perpetrators and should not just be treated exclusively as victims. The eight paper is equally on the issue of gender and terrorism. Written by Blessing Adedokun, the paper takes a critical look at the role of women in the Boko Haram crisis. The ninth and last paper is written by Yilmaz Bayar on the negative impact of terrorism and trade liberalization on tourism in Sub-Saharan Africa. All the papers further expand the frontiers of knowledge on terrorism and counterterrorism in Africa. We invite our readers to enjoy reading them; they should also take critical lessons from them.

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INVESTIGATING INTERGROUP VIOLENCE TO BETTER UNDERSTAND TERRORISM:
An Interdisciplinary Approach

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ABSTRACT This paper stress the importance of using an interdisciplinary approach to analyze intergroup violence, which can strengthen our knowledge about terrorism. It also discusses the existence of a gap between psychosocial and evolutionary explanations of violent extremism and how this false dichotomy holds back research on the topic. The article shows how evolutionary theory and social neuroscience can be used with psychosocial theories to build more detailed explanations about terrorism and what motivates this behavior. Meta-cultural threats and terror management theories were complemented with biological approaches, showing how terrorism might be a result of natural evolutionary and psychosocial processes (Bruneau, 2016) instead of psychiatric disorders. Unilateral approaches can be ineffective because they don't encompass the interaction between sociological and biological factors in intergroup conflict and human behavior in general. This paper was produced to stimulate interdisciplinary explanations of terrorism because simplistic approaches can hinder the understanding of the topic and the subsequent counterterrorism strategies. The methodology used was search terms related topics in google scholar and Microsoft academics ("intergroup violence"; "cultural conflict evolutionary theory"; "evolutionary theory terrorism"; "social neuroscience"; "social neuroscience aggression"; "evolutionary theory and violent extremism"). Priority was given to pertinent articles published in the last 5 years (in case of older articles discussing matters that were not found in recent papers, they were also used as bibliography).

INTRODUCTION

When Explaining Human Behavior, most authors choose areas such as humanities or biological sciences to describe the object of study. However, using knowledge from only one of them is to leave out useful information from other spheres that could complement such analysis. After all, human behavior is a byproduct of the interaction between biological and sociological factors, so there is no reason to ignore one of them. In the subject of terrorism, we can find two sides of this problem : 1 - Authors using biological theories such as genetics and evolution to explain intergroup violence without substantially referring to the related psychosocial theories ; and 2 - Authors using psychosocial theories without explaining the underlying evolutionary and neurological mechanisms of intergroup violence. There are papers bringing together both fields of knowledge to explain terrorism (Reeve, 2017 ; Kiper et al, 2016), but they are scarce. It is difficult to gather articles discussing terrorism from both biological and sociological views, which is a problem because we need to use holistic approaches to better understand the multiple forms of intergroup violence. For the purpose of this paper, the African Union definition for "terrorist act" will be used :

(a) any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number of group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to :

(i) intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles ; or

(ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency ; or

(iii) create general insurrection in a State.

(b) any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organizing, or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a) (i) to (iii). (OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999).

This article aims to stimulate the use of biological sciences and humanities in a complementary way to explain terrorism since there is a lack of such dialogue. The paper describes how evolutionary theory and social neuroscience can be used to support psychological and sociological explanations about terrorism. This fusion is important because despite describing the phenomenon, social theories cannot clarify alone why humankind has inclinations for cultural conflict in the first place.

This gap needs to be filled with theoretical and empirical foundations for these explanations. Besides, we need to use the same social theories to adapt evolutionary ideas to the current cultural backgrounds of human groups, since socialization plays an important role in human behavior as well (Sasaki and Kim, 2016).

Before discussing the main concepts of the article, it is important to clarify what social neuroscience is. As stated by Scheepers and Derks (2016), "The term social neuroscience is used to refer to a range of neural, physiological and endocrine measures that are used to explain social behavior". Beyond analyzing how these features influence social behavior, it also studies how socialization modulates the operation of the human brain (Bagnis et al, 2019). When used with evolutionary theory, social neuroscience can connect psychosocial theories and give them a more solid foundation. This holistic approach explains how evolution shaped our brains and made it possible for us to categorize other people as friends or enemies (which is a core factor in intergroup violence). The evolutionary approach is important to understand that terrorism might be a result of natural biological and psychosocial processes (Bruneau, 2016) since psychiatric disorders cannot sufficiently explain this type of violence (Webber and Kruglanski, 2017). So we need to investigate how these processes created a potential for intergroup violence in humans in general because that is a critical factor in the occurrence of terrorism.

CONCEPTUAL REVIEW

As stated in the abstract, the methodology used was search terms related topics in google scholar and Microsoft academics ("intergroup violence" ; "cultural conflict evolutionary theory" ; "evolutionary theory terrorism" ; "social neuroscience" ; "social neuroscience aggression"). Priority was given to articles published in the last 5 years (in case of older articles discussing matters that were not found in recent papers, they were also used as bibliography).

This conceptual review is based on the findings of this search and it starts discussing why humans need to form groups. Like other social animals, we exhibit group behavior because it raised the probability of survival of our ancestors. As stated by Reeve (2017), these situations stimulated cooperation between individuals, which resulted in a greater chance of survival and reproduction for the group members. This occurred because social living presents some advantages such as resource sharing and mutual protection, beyond the division of labor (Gorman and Gorman, 2018). Currently, there are simulation models based on game theory showing that cooperative groups have a greater probability of outliving other less cooperative ones (Kiper et al, 2016). Due to this evolutionary process, our brain has a natural inclination for socializing, and this inclination can be assessed with neuroscience. Currently, it is possible to identify certain brain regions that are intimately related to social behavior and how these physiological processes occur through the action of neurotransmitters. One example is oxytocin, which has an often oversimplified behavioral influence in the literature.

Kavaliers, Ossenkopp, and Choleris (2018) use the term "Social recognition" to refer to our ability to categorize humans in groups such as potential mating partners, familiar individuals, and strangers. This mechanism is influenced by brain inclinations generated by the evolutionary process but it also has a strong social component. As stated by the authors, social recognition includes information gathered through the life course of the individuals, so it can be learned. The process of social learning of categorization ability is an advantage because it allows us to adapt to the environment without necessarily behaving in a trial by error strategy. We can learn from the experience of our conspecifics because of social learning, and this can lead to the interiorization of concepts toward certain groups (Kavaliers, Ossenkopp and Choleris, 2018).

One of the natural mechanisms of group behavior is parochial altruism. This term refers to the tendency to favor members of one's group, which is often called "ingroup bias". The human inclination to see others as "us" and "them" is usually described as a precursor of hate towards outgroups, but there's evidence that this statement may not be accurate. For instance, individuals can act in favor of their groups because of positive feelings for their members (also called ingroup love) and not necessarily because of out-group hostility. This idea was discussed by Reeve (2017) when the author considered Islamist terrorism as a form of parochial altruism. It is possible to see how terrorist behavior can emerge as a way of protecting one's community from a perceived threat. According to research conducted by Ali (2018), the need to protect Islam was a motivator to Al-Shabaab members, and 97% of all subjects stated that they need to protect the religion because it is under threat. these findings support the premise that terrorism may be an act of altruism that motivates individuals to protect their group and its ideals. Yusoufzai and Emmerling (2017) a gree with this idea and found altruistic motivators in Palestinian suicide terrorists and western terrorists. Therefore, terrorism can be seen as a byproduct of natural psychosocial and evolutive processes (group affiliation and parochial altruism) instead of behavioral abnormalities or psychiatric disorders (Webber and Kruglanski, 2017).

Nevertheless, we also need to discuss certain controversial topics. First, there is lone wolf terrorism, which presents some differences compared to group terrorism. Lone wolves have a higher probability of having psychiatric disorders (Webber and Kruglanski, 2017) and they allegedly act alone. This is a not so well understood subject and we have divergent literature on the topic. For instance, lone wolves generally have contact with other radicalized individuals before executing an attack, so it is simplistic to state that they merely act alone (Silke, 2018). These interactions may also stimulate feelings of group belonging, motivating the individual to defend it. Reeve (2017) states that lone wolf terrorism can be a particular manifestation of parochial altruism because, despite acting alone, the attacker is motivated by feelings of group belonging and a need to defend its members.

This leads to another intricate problem : what makes some individuals engage in terrorism? Several people support violent extremism, but just a small part of the act on it (Reeve, 2017). How to determine which of the supporters will finally commit an attack? We do not have a direct answer for that. There are specific screening techniques undertaken to assess the commitment of an individual to the execution of attacks, but there is no 100% accurate way of predicting who will engage in terrorism. There is a need to investigate motivators on a personal level to better understand what makes some people commit terrorist attacks. Webber and Kruglanski (2017) bring a model to illustrate the main motivational factors on an individual level to engage in terrorism. The model is called the "3Ns", which refers to "(1) the needs or motivation of the individual, (2) the ideological narratives of the culture in which the individual embedded, and (3) the dynamic interplay of group pressure and social influence that occurs within the individual's social network". These variables can stimulate grievances at both individual and collective levels, which is associated with violent extremism. These are common areas that can work as motivators to join terrorist groups, but there is a need to investigate this further and evaluate how these variables can actually behave as risk factors.

Identifying individual risk factors pointing to engagement in terrorism is one of the several challenges in researching the topic, beyond the existence of multiple exceptions to the theories. For instance, radicalism and ideology are usually referred to as core factors in terrorist operations, but some individuals join terrorist groups for different reasons such as money, status, and power (Reeve, 2017). This exception can be explained with the evolutionary approach, which clarifies how motivators different from ideology can also stimulate engagement in terrorism because they are also valuable resources to obtain. Money, status, and power can be viewed as important achievements and they also represent some advantages of joining terrorist groups (Reeve, 2017) when compared to living outside them, but we need more empirical data to make solid generalizations.

Meta-cultural threats

The term meta-cultural threat describes a process when members of a group think that people from another culture see them as a threat. As stated by Obaidi, Thomsen and Bergh (2018), this mechanism can influence individuals to support and/or engage in violent extremism, representing an important component in cultural conflicts. According to the literature, seeing other groups as meta-cultural threats can result in an increased hostility towards them, a factor that encouraged war throughout human history. For instance, even just assuming that one group sees them as a cultural threat can be enough to make people demonstrate higher support for violence against its members. Obaidi, Thomsen and Bergh (2018) demonstrate how this negative anticipation of other group's views damages the relationship between Muslims and non-muslims in their research.

From an evolutionary perspective, there are multiple reasons for humans to socialize and have a hostile inclination towards members of other groups. As described earlier, group affiliation can represent some adaptive advantages such as resource sharing and mutual protection. Regarding the out-group hostility, there are evolutionary explanations for that as well. The presence of outsiders represented a threat in terms of territorial limits, competition for resources, and pathogen contamination. For instance, Reeve (2017) shows parts of ISIS's Dabiq magazine where they accuse the US of creating and spreading AIDS and committing crimes and torture against Muslims. This illustrates how the United States is pictured as a threat by ISIS advertisement.

Harmful encounters with other groups made evitative behavior towards strangers a useful trait in terms of survival. Some of these behaviors involve neuroendocrine mechanisms such as the effects of a neurotransmitter called oxytocin. There are several studies demonstrating the influence of oxytocin on the social behavior of both human and nonhuman primates (Gorman and Gorman, 2018). With regards to its cerebral effects, the usually described ones are inducing group affiliation, parental behaviors, and cooperation. Specifically in humans, oxytocin is also involved in the feeling of interpersonal trust, beyond reinforcing socialization through anxiety reduction when interacting with peers. Nevertheless, the neurotransmitter has an opposite effect as well : It increases violence towards out-groups. For instance, oxytocin is involved in organized aggression between chimpanzee groups, as demonstrated by Gorman and Gorman (2018). In conclusion, it would be simplistic to state that oxytocin is just a neurotransmitter that stimulates social bonding indiscriminately. A more realistic explanation is that oxytocin enhances in-group preferences while stimulating evitative and aggressive behavior towards outsiders.

TERROR MANAGEMENT AND QUEST FOR SIGNIFICANCE THEORIES

Terror management theory explains that the realization that we will eventually die can give us great and constant anxiety. To deal with this feeling, individuals can attach themselves to cultural worldviews and self-esteem, two resources that can reduce the anxiety caused by the fear of death. Concerning worldviews, they can reduce such negative feelings because they offer psychological comfort. They can alleviate the anguish caused by fear of death making us feel like we live in a world that is not so random, dangerous, and chaotic. Besides, certain worldviews can numb the fear of death by convincing people that they can somehow transcend the material world, never ceasing to exist completely (Reiss and Jonas, 2018). This can be achieved by religious ideas about the afterlife or martyrdom, for example.

Worldviews are also shared by other members of the group, which enhances social bonding and the sense of connection between them. In fact, we have empirical findings showing that people become more committed to groups when they are reminded of death. Bartol and Bartol (2017) ; Webber and Kruglanski (2017) state

that this reminder can provoke certain group behaviors : it can lead individuals to protect their groups and their values with greater dedication but also can increase hostility towards outsiders. Death reminders can also make people more supportive of military interventions against other countries (Bartol and Bartol, 2017). Yusouf-zai and Emmerling (2017) corroborate this premise with research that showed how Americans and Iranians became more likely to support military actions after being reminded of death. Here we can see a clear relation between fear of death and increases in group affiliation. Since living with others represented an evolutionary advantage and extra protection, the need for social bonding is a powerful motivator in human behavior. When perceiving threats to their existence, it's expected that people seek the safety of a community and its values.

Beyond worldviews, another resource that can reduce anxiety is self-esteem. According to Reiss and Jonas (2018), self-esteem is "the conviction that one fulfills the expectations and standards suggested by the cultural values". This concept is deeply related to the quest for significance theory, developed to describe the basic human need to be valuable, competent, and to be respected by a community. It also refers to a subjective need to have a meaningful existence. This needs strongly modulated by social background, so individuals often seek to develop competencies and demonstrate behaviors that are approved by certain groups. Success in achieving these goals can lead to a feeling of having a meaningful existence. This process is connected to terrorism because terrorist groups can offer significance to its members and therefore fulfill these needs as well. As stated by Bruneau (2016), even Al-Qaeda can provide deep social connections in the same way as clubs, teams, and military units do. Jasko, LaFree and Kruglanski (2016) state that a need for meaning and belonging are among the common motivators of individuals engaged in violent extremism. However, the need for belonging cannot be referred to as a universal motivator to join terrorist groups. As stated early in the paper, individuals can be attracted by money, status, and power as well. On the other hand, joining a terrorist group without these reasons does not exclude the influence of group belonging once the individual becomes a member of the organization.

The simplistic use of psychosocial and evolutionary theories

Researchers must be cautious when reading explanations about intergroup conflict because they usually focus on only one side of human behavior. Despite being generated by an interaction between biological and social variables, most articles explain it as if this duality did not exist. This is a major problem because an interdisciplinary approach can help us with complementary ideas from diverse fields of knowledge (Schiller, Domes and Heinrichs, 2020), but authors often leave them aside in their analysis. The «tabula rasa» paradigm must be overcome and so do biological determinism. These bias can damage our understanding of terrorism and other forms of intergroup conflict, and also harm our attempts to oppose these challenges. For example, even though intergroup conflict can occur because of dis-

putes to obtain limited resources, it also can manifest itself in other situations. Even in contexts where there are sufficient resources for the groups involved, conflicts can occur because of social insults or resentments (Reeve, 2017) (therefore showing that it would be unreasonable to use only the biological explanation of competition for limited resources). According to Webber and Kruglanski (2017), social humiliation can increase the attractiveness of terrorism.

Another misinterpretation of evolutionary theory is the idea that prejudice, xenophobia, and intergroup violence are biological imperatives. Just because evolution allowed cerebral and behavioral inclinations to categorize people as ingroups or outgroups and favor the ingroup it does not mean that this mechanism is crystallized. Human behavior is modulated by environmental factors and socialization plays an important role in intergroup violence. This can lead to a promising question : how can we use social learning to reduce endorsement and participation in intergroup violence? This question is important because it can lead researchers to investigate how to make people see violent extremism as an unfruitful choice and how to stimulate disengagement from this behavior. But there is a need to use interdisciplinary views to conduct such research since unilateral approaches can be ineffective or even harmful. For example, managing social variables without comprehending the underlying evolutive and neural aspects of the phenomenon.

There is a popular belief that just making groups interact and know each other will serve as some kind of solution to intergroup conflict, but there is evidence that this is not how it works. This situation shows how it can be unfruitful to approach violent extremism without an interdisciplinary interpretation. For instance, Gorman and Gorman (2018) report that intergroup contact is not enough to increase acceptance between them, which highlights the need for targeted interventions. This article's main point is to show that its unfruitful to separate social from biological, and this can be illustrated by Meaney (2006) :

Nature and nurture do not exist in a manner that can ever be considered independently quantifiable. There is, instead, simply a continuing process of development that emerges from the constant dialogue between gene and environment. At no level can the function of a gene be separated from the cellular environment in which functions ; is biologically absurd to assume otherwise. Every trait is a function of gene/environment interaction and, lest you think I'm simply some environmental wolf in sheep's clothing, it's equally absurd to believe that the environmental factors can be studied independently of the genome and the constraints it places on the neural systems that serve as the inevitable bridge between environment and effect.

Conclusion and recommendations

This paper discussed the importance of interdisciplinary approaches to analyze intergroup violence and how explanations from different areas can enrich our understanding of violent extremism. Introductory ideas from evolutionary theory and social

neuroscience were brought to complement some of the usual psychosocial theories of terrorism motivations. It showed how natural, normal evolutive and psychosocial processes can lead to terrorism. This article aims to bring back the use of an interdisciplinary approach to explain intergroup violence and terrorism, specifically. There are still other concepts and peculiarities about terrorism that must be clarified, and this requires further papers discussing topics such as the role of dehumanization in violent extremism and how evolutionary theory can complement this approach.

There is an urgent need to develop holistic explanations for violent extremism because without them we cannot sufficiently understand the phenomenon. And without understanding the phenomenon, we cannot effectively mitigate it. It is necessary to stimulate researchers to analyze terrorism from interdisciplinary views and to distance investigations from the false dilemma of social against biological variables. This can be useful for developing more realistic theoretical models that consider evolutive inclinations for violence and how they can modulate and be modulated by social factors. Although this paper focused on theoretical enhancements, it is directly linked to intervention planning because policies need well-grounded explanation models to achieve their objectives effectively.

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Overview of the Boko Haram's Sources of Finance, Weapons and Logistics

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ABSTRACT   The Boko Haram insurgency is a tragedy that cost thousands of lives and consumed properties worth billions of Naira. It is a traumatic experience in the Northeastern Nigeria and some parts of Northwest in which the inhabitants exist in a constant psychological fear and devastation. The Boko Haram insurgents used heavy weapons and sophisticated transportation in addition to other modern logistics to carry out their insurgency activities. This study is an examination of the sources of finance, weapons, transportation, intelligence and other logistics that the Boko Haram used in their tactical approach. The problem is; despite the superior firepower and financial muscles of the Nigerian Government, the insurgents continued to carry out their activities for a longer period of a time undeterred. The study used a qualitative method of data collection and analysis in which data was collected from both primary and secondary sources. The data obtained were discussed and analysed using a content analysis method in which thematic analytical interpretations were adopted. The research discovered that the Boko Haram insurgents sourced their means of finance, weapons and other logistics internally and externally through various sources which made it difficult for blocking by the government because of the complexity involved in the process. The research recommends among others that, the authorities concerned should blocked the sources of finance, weapons and logistics of Boko Haram insurgents to cripple their activities.

Keywords   Boko Haram ; Finance ; Insurgency ; Logistics ; Northeastern Nigeria ; Weapons.

INTRODUCTION

The Boko Haram insurgency is one of the deadliest insurgents' groups in the globe contemporarily because of their activities and its effects in terms of devastation of lives and properties in addition to other socioeconomic and political problems that the insurgency created. From a radical Islamic preaching anchored specifically in protest against the Western educational system and culture, the group gradually metamorphosed into a full-blown insurgency between the period of 2009 to 2012 claiming thousands of lives and destroying properties worth billions of Naira (El Kaim, 2012).

Historically, Islamic militant movement in Nigeria does not emanate from the Boko Haram insurgency only (Sule, Tal & Sambo, 2018). Some thirty years back, there was a replica of a radical movement called 'Maitatsine' which also claimed several lives and properties in some parts of Northern Nigeria. Thus, the Boko Haram movement does not come as a surprise, but it has taken all by surprise owing to the magnitude of the devastation, loss and the dimension that the crisis have taken. These Islamic militant groups often cite Quranic verses and Prophetic Hadiths to justify their ill-perceived teaching and movements out of ignorance, misinterpretation of the texts, selfishness, hidden motives and an alleged conspiracy of the external enemies of Islam (Isah, 2010:338). However, this position taken by the extremists had been clearly debunked by Islamic scholars of great repute who counter the narratives from the fundamentalists to avoid the dangerous situation warned by the Prophet (PBUH) which will be the reminiscent of the havoc caused by the likes of Boko Haram.

One fundamental issue of concern for all curious Muslims and Nigerian citizens is how the Boko Haram was able to organise itself within a short period of a time, coordinate attacks tactically and strategically, secure weapons, finance and other logistics to undertake these detrimental attacks. Many factors were advanced as the main reasons behind this movement. Some scholars (Forest, 2012 and De Montclos 2014) related the activities of Boko Haram to state failure where the misgovernance of the Nigerian state for many decades led to massive and abject penury, chronic hunger, diseases, illness, unemployment, hopelessness and restiveness for the teeming idle youth in the country and particularly, in the Northeastern part of the country where the scorch of poverty is worse with over 70% of the total population in the region reported as living in absolute poverty (National Bureau of Statistics, 2017). Other factors related to the Boko Haram emergence can be attributed to the culture and nature of Northern Nigeria, religious intolerance and fundamentalism, ignorance, external factors, the terrain of Nigerian geography such as porous borders and the large contiguous nature of the Nigerian state (Harvard Divinity Project, 2018).

The Boko Haram insurgency affected nine states in Nigeria and the Federal Capital Territory Abuja (FCTA) sharply. These areas include all the Northeastern states of Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe because the insurgency movement commenced in the Northeast and these mentioned six states constitute the geopolitical zone. Other affected parts of the country are Kano and Kaduna in the Northwestern Nigeria, Plateau in the Northcentral and the FCTA. These states constitute about 25% of the estimated total population of Nigeria which is currently assumed to be approximately 200 million as at 2018. The states and the FCTA were devastated and terrorised by the activities of the insurgents which displaced millions of the inhabitants in these areas and destroyed properties worth billions of Naira (NBS, 2017).

From the above introduction, this study is an attempt to examine critically the sources of funds for financing the Boko Haram activities, their sources of weapons and other logistics. In doing so, this paper asked the following questions: how does the Boko Haram sourced for their weapons to undertake their insurgency activities? What is the source of funds for the Boko Haram activities? What is the other means of logistics for the Boko Haram insurgents and Why isn't difficult for the Nigerian government to curtail the activities of Boko Haram for many years? In doing so, it is pertinent to discuss briefly other related issues such as the background of the area of study, the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, causes of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria, the manifestations, impacts and the responses of the Nigerian government and the international community.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature is reviewed thematically according to the major issues from the subject of discussion in the context of this work. Based on the themes, the following are critically examined: the Boko Haram insurgency, genesis of Boko Haram insurgency, causes of Boko Haram insurgency, manifestations of Boko Haram insurgency, impact of Boko Haram insurgency and the responses of the Nigerian government and the international community.

The Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria

The Boko Haram insurgency emerged from the Northeastern Nigeria as a reminiscent of the misperception and misinterpretation of the Islamic religious texts which led to extremism from some misguided youth. This phenomenon has been aided by the scorch of poverty, misgovernance, state failure and lack of concern from the authorities in terms of censoring religious extremism (Campbell, 2014). Boko Haram started as a conservative radical preaching against the Western ideology. The Western educational, political, economic and social institutions in Nigeria particularly in the Muslim dominated societies are detested by the sect. But the sect later transformed itself fully into an insurgent organisation with deadly attacks that

claimed thousands of lives and destroyed properties worth billions of Naira. The group formally proclaimed itself as 'Jama'atu Ahlul Sunnah Lid Da'awati Wal Jihad' meaning in English as 'People committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teachings and Jihad'. The group earned the nomenclature 'Boko Haram' in Hausa language being the lingua franca in Northern Nigeria meaning 'Western education is prohibited' because of its critical rejection and resentment of the Western educational system (Bowser and Sanders, 2012).

The group which started in Borno State in the early 2000s was seen as an offshoot of the hitherto, Maitatsine sect which existed in the same parts that are affected by the Boko Haram insurgency in the 1980s and 1990s. the Maitatsine and Boko Haram pronounced unequivocally their resentment of anything Western and they embarked on radical teachings against it (Sule et al. 2018). They later took weapons to establish Islamic state in Nigeria according to their ideology and movement. The Boko Haram might have started since 2000 under the name Taliban in Yobe and Kano States (Ahokegh, 2013). However, the Boko Haram sect emanated from radical preaching in Borno, later spread to Yobe and other Northeastern states and afterwards, the movement spread to some parts of Northwest, Northcentral and FCTA, before it turned into an armed group after the extrajudicial killing of their leader Muhammad Yusuf in 2009 in which they metamorphosed into a full insurgent group.

Genesis of Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria

The actual date, scene and the conditions that led to the emergence of Boko Haram sect is not yet certain with a sacrosanct verdict. There are different views of the early movements of the group as a religious sect. One of the scholars, (Onuoha, 2010:55), argued that the group emerged since 1995 under the leadership of one Malam Abubakar Lawal in Yobe State. The group continued to develop from the period and underwent several forms of transformation and naming such as Ahlul Sunnah Wal Jama'ah Hijra to the Nigerian Taliban to Yusufiyyah sect to Boko Haram. It is believed that the first attack from the group occurred in 2003 in Kanama and Geidam in Yobe State in the Northeast and in Panshekara in the Northwestern Kano State in 2007. This view is contrary to most of the recent works on Boko Haram which emphasised that 2009 is the heyday of the insurgency of Boko Haram.

Boko Haram is perceived and translated from different school of thoughts based on the investigations of the researchers, their activities and personal perception of scholars. It is viewed as a political movement aimed at revolting against the existing oppressive political status quo. It is relatively identified as a religious extremism that was heralded by ignorance and misinterpretation of the Islamic texts which tantamount to the present violence. Yet, the criminal aspect of the movement cannot be divorced as it is seen from the angle of criminal activities from restive youth who became hopelessness in their country land because of poor political and

socioeconomic order. This is because the level of unemployment, poverty and other socioeconomic problems made a retinue of restive youth as easy prey for recruitment into violent groups in Nigeria for many decades. The activities of the Boko Haram group and the antecedents of their relationship with authorities particularly in Borno State led to minor clashes in the early days of the movement. It was argued that there was no aim at becoming violent and insurgent activities in the inception. However, this position cannot be true because the group had been reported to have assembled a large stockpile of arsenal. If there was no intention for violence, possession of weapons is constitutionally for the constituted authority. After a serious clash in 2009 which led to the dead of their leader, Muhammad Yusuf, the group started attacking mosques, churches, army barracks, markets, public gathering with sophisticated modern weapons such as AK-47, bombs, RGPs and other modern warfare (De Montclos, 2014:137).

In another different view, it is stressed that the Boko Haram group was established in 2002 by Muhammad Yusuf in Maiduguri. From 2002 to date, the sect underwent different forms of transformations. Coordination, re-organisation, activities and movements at different stages (Giroux & Gilpin, 2014:2). Sergie & Johnson (2014) subscribed to the above view that the Boko Haram emerged and was established in 2002 by the late Muhammad Yusuf. However, a convincing view is presented by Nkechi (2013) who argued that there are no specific dates, events and activities that can be relied on as a plausible explanation of the establishment of Boko Haram. Preferably, it is better to assume that the movement started underground for many years before it manifested in the public arena and that, the starting point of insurgency has been the first attacks under the name Taliban in 2003 in Yobe State and in 2007 in Panshekara in Kano State but, the movement totally became violent in 2009 after the departure of Muhammad Yusuf, the sect leader.

The Boko Haram group is believed in another view to have been established by Abubakar Lawan in 1995 but, the man got admission in University of Madina and left for Saudi Arabia. Before the departure of Abubakar Lawan, he appointed Muhammad Yusuf to superintend over the affairs of the sect. Boko Haram was initially a peaceful but, rather radical and conservative group which preached against Western education and Western values in the Muslim society. This position above cannot be substantiated because the so-called Taliban attacks in Yobe in 2003 and that of Panshekara in Kano in 2007 cannot be directly linked with the Boko Haram insurgency because the movement has not claimed any attacks during the period even though, it exists since 1990s. However, the 2009 incidence proved otherwise of the peaceful nature of the group from its inception. The group suddenly turned violent with the extrajudicial killing of Muhammad Yusuf in 2009. The group turned itself into an insurgency attacking different places, groups and targets in Nigeria involving Christians, Muslims, Nigerians, foreigners, troops, civilians, northerners and residents in the north. Their activities graduated into international borders of Niger Republic, Cameroon and Chad which led to a concern by the international commu-

nity (Barna, 2014:1). If the group is peaceful initially as suggested by the author above, then how does it procured sophisticated weapons ahead of its clash with the Nigerian security operatives in 2009? There might have been a gradual design to embark on insurgency by the group in stages as it appeared later. This is the position of this work.

The Boko Haram sect since 2009 has been attacking the police. Military, public servants, academicians, politicians, notable figures, schools, places of worship, public institutions and civilians across the Northeast and other parts of Northern Nigeria (Cook, 2014:4). The sect cited the influence of the Western system on the stagnation and moral decadence of the Muslim society in Nigeria. The group blamed the Muslim leaders in Nigeria and politicians of infidelity and subserviency to the Western values and culture as against the provision of the pure Islamic teaching. The sect leaders maintained their position by citing several Quranic verses and Prophetic Hadiths to justify their position of detesting the Western educational and political system (Forest, 2012:3). This position has been adequately debunked by many Islamic scholars such as Sheikh Jaafar Mahmud Adam, Sheikh Muhammad Auwal Albani Zaria and Sheikh Isah Ali Ibrahim Pantami.

The 2009 clash led to the change of leadership in the Boko Haram sect where a new leader Abubakar Shekau emerged and took over the mantle of leadership of the movement. This was the watershed in the activities of the insurgents because on assumption of leadership, Abubakar Shekau declared in an audio tape in 2010 that he has identified the Nigerian government, the US, the European countries and Nigerian Muslims that differ from their views as infidels and he declared war against them. The group alleged that it will establish an Islamic state and a Caliphate in Nigeria and West Africa. The sect attracted most of its members from the suburbs of the Northeastern states where the incidence of poverty and unemployment is higher in the country (Zenn, 2012).

As observed earlier, this was not the first time that an insurgent group emerged in Northern Nigeria. It was experienced in the 1980s and 1990s under the pretext of Maitatsine and the Boko Haram was categorised into the same group with the likes of Maitatsine by their ideology of detesting Western education and revolting against the existing order. (Umar, 2013:1 and Sule et al. 2018). Perhaps, Boko Haram differs with Maitatsine because it has modern sophisticated weapons and its attacks became wider in target than Maitatsine (Blanchard 2014 and Rogers, 2012). Like many radical organisations, the Boko Haram sect believed that full implementation of Shari'ah must be establish by violence and rejection of Western institutions and structures (Montclos, 2014:8). Despite numerous factors that may have suppressed the movement, Boko Haram has emerged not only to continue their operations but to grow and evolve as an organisation (ElKhaim, 2012:1). This is perhaps, because their source of weapons, finance and logistics continue to flourish unabated or unchallenged or even blocked by the Nigerian security.

Causes of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria

Multiple causes were advanced for the emergence of Boko Haram as an insurgent group by different groups. The first cause is the one presented by the sect itself that the injustice, oppression, inequality and failure to institute Islamic law in Northern Nigeria because of total adherence to the Western political system is their justification for the insurgency. This view is not accepted by many scholars of Islam, Western researchers, analysts, academics and other stakeholders in the security sector. For instance, all the Quranic verses and Prophetic Hadiths that they quoted to justify their resentment of Western education were countered brilliantly by the Sheikhs Jaafar, Albani and Pantami. But the numerous verses and Hadith that they quoted were believed by Islamic clerics as misapplication, misguidance, misinterpretation and misperception of the verses. Al Qaradawi (1991:20) submitted that all forms of insurgency and terrorism by the Muslim youth across the globe contemporarily is because of poor understanding of the teaching of Islam and misinterpretation of the Quran and Hadiths. He further suggested that these kinds of extremist are identifiable with some evidences and are exactly the ones that the Prophet (PBUH) warned the Muslim Ummah of their coming and ill-activities among the Muslim Ummah. From the above view, it can be established that extremism emanating from a poor understanding of religion is one of the major causes of the Boko Haram insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria. Other factors or possible explanations are discussed below.

Apart from the above argument, poor socioeconomic and political condition, poverty, unemployment and ignorance in Northern Nigeria propelled the emergence of groups like Boko Haram in Northern Nigeria (Forest, 2012). Forest (2012) identified the major causes of Boko Haram insurgency as youth unemployment, social inequality, social and economic exclusion as well as lack of proper censorship of religious activities by the government. The failure of the Nigerian leaders to utilise the available resources to improve the life of the common man in the country and misgovernance, porous borders and chronic pervasive corruption are other causes of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria (Ahokegh, 2014). Bamidele (2012) identified the salient causes of Boko Haram insurgency to misgovernance, ethnoreligious rivalries, weak political institution and state failure in addition to abject penury and social inequality as well as the legacy of the external forces of global terrorism.

The high level of poverty, extremism courtesy of religious misperception, climatic change which affected the socioeconomic aspect of the Lake Chad inhabitants are also factors that ushered in the Boko Haram insurgency (Sergie & Johnson, 2014). Additional factors identified behind the emergence of Boko Haram are massive corruption among the security personnel, politicians and bureaucrats in the defense sector, poor intelligence from the security agency, unemployment, injustice, religious misperception and intolerance, ignorance, elite rivalry, ethnoreligious crises and inequality (Nkechi, 2013 and Sule, Ahmed, Alhaji, Yahaya &

Gambarawa 2019). Al Qaeda and global terrorism network or globalisation of terror is another reason identified for the emergence of Boko Haram. The 9/11 attacks witnessed the zenith of the global terrorism and that has influenced the emergence of other terror groups (Olojo, 2013).

The condition of poor governance, corrupt practices and socioeconomic malaise in the North created the foundation for the emergence of insecurity in Northern Nigeria (Barna 2014 and Meagher, 2014:1). Ideology and state failure in proffering measures of countering militant groups in the country such as the Niger-Delta militants paved the way for the emergence of other militants' groups such as Boko Haram in Nigeria (Isah, 2010:338). Another scholar added that the dichotomy in educational level and income inequality between the North and the South followed by sharp poverty, inequality and social injustice are what led to the root causes of Boko Haram movement in the North (Umar, 2013). Rogers (2012) supported the above position unanimously. However, in another different view from all the above, a scholar (De Montclos, 2014:8) viewed the cause of insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria as an outcome of the use of force in handling the force during its first clash with the security agency in the region and the subsequent killing of their leader extra judiciously.

Manifestations of Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria

Boko Haram insurgency or attacks were allegedly believed to have started gradually as noticed above in 2003 from Yobe State and in 2007 in Kano. But, the full scale of the insurgents' violence which can be authoritatively linked to the group began in 2009. The attacks have topped its highest zenith in 2013 with the sect controlling more than 20 local governments in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states. The controlled areas captured by the sect constituted nearly 30 percent of the Northeast region. The Group attacked with sophisticated guns such as AK 47, improvised device explosives (IEDs), grenades and other equipment of battle. In the process, soldiers, police and other security personnel were killed including civilians in the mosques, churches, markets, at their residences and everywhere. This study identified these attacks from their inceptions and summarised them below for easy perception.

Table 1: Manifestations of Boko Haram Activities from its Inception to Date

Date	Event	Place	Casualties
2002	Organisation of the group under Muhammad Yusuf	Maiduguri	None
Dec. 2003	Attacks on multiple police stations in Yobe State	Yobe	Unknown
April 2007	Attacks in Panshekara Kano	Kano	11 Policemen

July 2009	Uprising in Bauchi, Borno Kano and Yobe	Northeast	700 Boko Haram died
July 2010	Abubakar Shekau appointed as the new leader	Northeast	None
Sept. 2010	Attack on prison in Bauchi by 50 Boko Haram members	Bauchi	700 inmates released
May 2011	Boko Haram detonates three IEDs near barracks in Bauchi	Bauchi	10 people died
Aug. 2011	Attack on police station in Gombi and two banks	Adamawa	12 people died
Aug. 2011	Attacks on United Nations building in Abuja	Abuja	23 died 75 injured
Nov. 2011	Multiple attacks with IEDs in Yobe and Borno	Northeast	More than 100 died
Jan. 2012	Splinter group known as Ansaru emerged	Northeast	None
Jan. 2012	Coordinated attacks on police stations and barracks	Kano	200 people died
Mar. 2012	Attacks on police station in Gombe	Gombe	23 died
Aug. 2012	Claims on peace talk with government debunked by the sect	Northeast	None
Feb. 2013	A French family of seven kidnapped in Northern Cameroon	Cameroon	Seven
Apr. 2013	Shekau mocked the Government's plan amnesty	Nigeria	None
Apr. 2013	Battle with multinational taskforce in Baga	Borno	More than 200 died
May 2013	Announcement of military offensive in Northeast	Northeast	Uncertain
June 2013	Government proscribed Boko Haram as a terrorist group	Abuja	None
June 2013	Multiple attacks in churches on Sunday in Northeast	Northeast	More than 50 died
Aug. 2013	Ministry of Defense announced the dead of top member	Maiduguri	1
Aug. 2013	Nigeria's Army claimed Shekau died but he debunked it	Nigeria	None
Sept. 2013	Attack in checkpoint in Benisheik	Borno	More than 143 died
Sept. 2013	Shekau appeared in a video claiming he is healthy and alive	Northeast	None
Nov. 2013	United States declared Boko Haram and Ansaru as terrorist	U S A	None
Jan. 2014	Shootings in market in Kawuri	Borno	45 died

Feb. 2014	Militants attacked village in Konduga	Borno	23 died
Apr. 2014	Boko Haram abducted 276 teenage girls in Chibok	Borno	More than 200 gone
May 2014	Shekau claimed the abduction of Chibok girls	Borno	None
May 2014	Attacks on three villages in Borno but the villagers resisted	Borno	200 Boko Haram died
May 2014	Twin bomb blast in a market in the city of Jos	Plateau	118 died
May 2014	United States sent 80 troops to Chad	Chad	None
May 2014	The US Security Council added Boko Haram as terrorist	UN	None
June 2014	Raids by Boko Haram in Borno	Borno	About 500 died
June 2014	More young women were kidnapped by Boko Haram	Borno	20
June 2014	Boko Haram abducted 60 women and killed many in Kumaza	Borno	30 men killed
July 2014	Abducted girls from Kumaza escaped	Borno	None
July 2014	Damboa was raided by Boko Haram	Borno	66 died 15000 fled
Oct. 2014	Announcement of ceasefire by Nigerian Government	Abuja	None
Nov. 2014	Shekau in a video denied the announced ceasefire	Borno	None
Jan. 2015	Baga town taken over by Boko Haram	Borno	More than 2000 died
Jan. 2015	Multiple explosion in Borno	Borno	20 killed 18 injured
Mar. 2015	Two people were beheaded by Boko Haram suspected as spies	Borno	2 died
Mar. 2015	Boko Haram pledged allegiance to ISIS	Borno	None
Mar. 2015	ISIS announced the acceptance of the pledge by Boko Haram	Iraq	None
Apr. 2015	Massive killings in Damasak	Borno	More than 400 killed
Apr. 2015	Nigerian troops rescued many civilians from Boko Haram	Borno	450 rescued
July 2015	Boko Haram militants raid three villages in Borno	Borno	145 killed
Sept. 2015	Nigerian military rescued many civilians from Boko Haram	Borno	241

Sept. 2015	Attacks in a market in Kerewa	Cameroon	30 died 145 injured
Sept. 2015	241 women rescued by Nigerian military from Boko Haram	Borno	241 rescued
Feb. 2016	Attacks on two villages in Northeast by the militants	Northeast	30 killed
Feb. 2016	Suicide bombing in Northeast	Northeast	58 died
Apr. 2016	CNN posted a live video of the kidnapped Chibok girls	Northeast	None
May 2016	One of the Chibok girls rescued by Nigerian military	Borno	1 rescued
Aug. 2016	ISIS announced Musab Al Barnawi as the new sect leader	Borno	None
Aug. 2016	Chibok girls video released by Boko Haram	Borno	None
Oct. 2016	A negotiation led to the release of 21 Chibok girls	Borno	21 released
Nov. 2016	Chibok school girl found by Nigerian Army	Borno	I discovered
Jan. 2017	Another Chibok girl found	Borno	I found
Jan. 2017	Nigerian fighter jet mistakenly hit civilians	Borno	About 100 died
May 2017	82 Chibok school girls released	Borno	82 released
Jan. 2018	Blast in Northeastern town of Madagali	Adamawa	3 people killed
Jan. 2018	Blast in Mosque in Gamboru	Borno	14 civilians killed
Jan.2018	Multiple blast in Maiduguri, Adamawa and Konduga	Northeast	21 killed over 100 injured
Feb. 2018	Attacks in Kala Balge near IDPs camp	Borno	11 killed scores injured
Feb. 2018	110 girls were abducted in Dapchi Town	Yobe	110 abducted
Mar. 2018	Threat to harm Leah Sharibu one of the girls abducted in Dapchi	Northeast	1 Under threat
Mar. 2018	Landmines explosion in Dikwa	Borno	4 killed several injured
Apr. 2018	Attacks on military base in Jere	Borno	20 killed and 84 injured
Apr. 2018	Attack on forest workers in Gamboru	Borno	18 killed
May. 2018	Suicide bombing in the mosque in Mubi	Adamawa	38 killed with 64 injured
May.2018	Suicide bombing in the mosque in Dikwa	Borno	16 killed and 60 injured

June. 2018	Suicide bombing in Damboa	Borno	43 killed 84 wounded
June. 2018	Attacks in Banki	Borno	4 killed 20 injured

Source: CNN Library 2018 (compilation in tabular form made by the authors).

The above compilation is just the major events and attacks by the militants there were hundreds or even thousands that were not reported by this report and some of them are famous like the Abuja Nyanya twin bomb blast which killed more than 100 people, the Kano mosque attack which killed more than 200 people, uncountable bomb attacks in Borno, Yobe, Gombe, Adamawa, Bauchi, Kano, Plateau and Abuja in addition to many local governments that were captured and controlled by Boko Haram such as Gwoza, Bama, Baga, Madagali, Mubi, Damboa and many other bigger towns in the Northeast. If all these are taken into account, there are ten times more than what the CNN Library reported. The report is either bias or deliberately omitted areas that are not of interest like numerous attacks in mosques and churches, capture of many local governments in Northeast and many other incidences. However, still the report is useful in giving a sample of what transpired. This study investigated and compiled additional timeline for Boko Haram attacks in Nigeria from June 2018 as presented in the table below.

Table 2: Timeline of Boko Haram Attacks from July 2018 to October 2019

Date	Event	Place	Casualties
July 2018	Attacks near the village of Damboa	Borno	16 wounded
July 2018	Ambush on military vehicle near Jakana	Borno	6 dead
July 2018	Kidnap of aid workers	Northeast	I dead six kidnapped
July 2018	Attacks on funeral proceedings in Nganzai	Borno	65 killed
August 2018	Attacks in Monguno town	Borno	3 dead
August 2018	Attacks in Gueskerou	Borno	12 dead
August 2018	Attacks on civilians and abduction	Borno	4 dead 12 abducted
August 2018	Attacks on construction workers in Wajirko village	Borno	11 dead several injured
August 2018	Attack on soldiers in Gasarwa	Borno	8 dead
August 2018	Attacks in Balumri village	Borno	4 dead and 6 kidnapped
Sept. 2018	Attacks on Nigerian soldiers in Gudumbali	Borno	Huge unsubstantiated dead

Sept. 2018	Attacks on Cameroonian soldiers in Fotokol	Cameroon	6 dead
Sept. 2018	Execution of an aid worker	Borno	1 dead
Sept. 2018	Attacks on military convoy in Gubio	Borno	7 dead
Sept. 2018	Attacks on Nigerian and Chadian soldiers in Gajiram	Borno	6 dead
Sept. 2018	Attack on Nigerian soldiers in Banki	Borno	1 dead
Oct, 2018	Execution of two female aid workers	Borno	2 dead
Nov. 2018	Villagers totally burned by insurgents and attacks in IDPs	Borno	Over 200 dead
Dec. 2018	Multiple attacks in Northeast	Northeast	Over 160 dead
Dec. 2018	UNICEF accused of spying on Nigeria, ban was lifted	Northeast	None
Dec. 2018	Attacks on Nigerian military	Borno	14 dead
Dec. 2018	Attacks on two military bases in Northeast	Northeast	3 dead
Dec. 2018	Attacks on Nigerian troops between Nigeria-Niger border	Border	10 dead
Jan. 2019	Book Haram attacks displaced 30, 000 people	Northeast	30, 000 displacement
Feb. 2019	Attacks in Rann	Borno	60 dead
Feb. 2019	Attacks on Borno State Governor's convoy	Borno	3 dead
Feb. 2019	Attacks in a village near Borno	Borno	8 dead
March 2019	Attacks on Chadian soldiers near Nigerian border	Border	20 dead
March 2019	Attacks on civilians between Nigeria and Niger border	Border	10 dead
March 2019	An entire town of Jakana was evacuated for fear of attacks	Borno	10, 000 evacuated
April 2019	Five years after, 112 Chibok girls missing	Borno	112 missing
April 2019	Threats on civilians lives by Boko Haram in Niger	Niger	Threats and fear
April 2019	Attacks on IDPs in Borno	Borno	68 dead
May 2019	Refugee camps attacks	Northeast	Several injuries

May 2019	Attacks on Cameroon's island	Cameroon	Dozen dead
June 2019	Multiple attacks on civilians in Northeastern Nigeria	Northeast	20 dead
July 2019	6 aid workers kidnapped in Borno	Borno	6 kidnapped
July 2019	Attacks on mourners in Borno village	Borno	23 dead
July 2019	Additional death toll on attacks on funeral mourners	Borno	49
August 2019	Suicide bomber attack in Chad	Chad	6 dead
August 2019	Attacks in Gueskerou in Borno	Borno	12 dead
August 2019	Attack on Monguno Town in Borno	Borno	3 dead
August 2019	Female suicide bomber in Mafa Town of Borno	Borno	3 dead 8 injured
August 2019	Attack on soldiers on patrol in east Borno	Borno	4 dead
August 2019	Attack on construction workers in in Wajirko village	Borno	11 killed and 26 wounded
August 2019	Attack on soldiers in Gasarwa in Borno State	Borno	8 soldiers dead
August 2019	Attack in Balumri village	Borno	4 dead 6 kidnapped
Sept. 2019	Ambush on Nigerian Military convoy in Gudumbali	Borno	Several dead (unspecified)
Sept. 2019	Attack on soldiers in Fotokol	Cameroon	6 dead 9 wounded
Sept. 2019	An aid worker captured in Maiduguri executed	Borno	I casualty
Sept. 2019	Attack on Nigerian Military convoy in Gubio	Borno	7 dead
Sept. 2019	Attack on Nigerian and Chadian soldiers in Gajiram	Borno	I dead, many insurgents dead and many civilian casualties
Sept. 2019	Attack on Nigerian soldiers in Banki	Borno	2 dead several injured
Dec. 2019	Attack on Chadian soldiers	Chad	Several casualties

Dec. 2019	Battle of Inates	Borno	Several dead
Dec. 2019	Attack on civilian JTF in Borno	Borno	14 dead 1 injured
Dec. 2019	4 aid workers held hostage executed	Borno	4 dead
Dec. 2019	Attack on Fulani herders in Ngala	Borno	19 killed
Dec. 2019	Attack on Lake Chad fishing village of Kaiga	Chad	14 killed, 5 injured, 13 missing
Dec. 2019	Attack on checkpoint near Borno	Borno	6 dead 5 abducted
Dec. 2019	Raid in a village near Chibok	Borno	7 killed
January 2020	Attack on an island in Lake Chad	Chad	50 killed
January 2020	Bombing in Gamborun Ngala	Borno	34 dead 35 injured
January 2020	Attack on a town in Borno	Borno	20 soldiers dead over 1,000 displaced
January 2020	3 aid workers and other civilians abducted released	Borno	None
January 2020	Bomb blast in Kaiga-Kindjiria near Chad	Chad	9 dead
Feb. 2020	Attack on civilians in Bosso District, Diffa	Niger	6 dead
Feb. 2020	Attack in Auno	Borno	30 dead many abducted
March 2020	Raid on Army base in Damboa	Borno	6 killed many injured
March 2020	Assault on Boko Haram group by Nigerian Army near Diffa	Niger	50 killed
March 2020	Ambush on Nigerian soldiers in a village near Yobe	Yobe	75 killed
March 2020	Ambush on Chadian soldiers by Boko Haram	Chad	92 killed
April 2020	Suicide bombing in Amchide near Cameroon	Cameroon	7 civilians dead
April 2020	Assault on Boko Haram fighters in Chad	Chad	1,000 killed

May 2020	Attack on military base in Diffa by the militants	Niger	2 dead 3 injured
May 2020	An operation launched by Nigerian Army on militants	Borno	134 killed
May 2020	Attack on Army outpost near Diffa	Niger	12 dead 10 injured
June 2020	Gubio massacre by Boko Haram insurgents	Borno	81 dead, 7 abducted with over 1,2000 cattle
June 2020	Monguno and Nganzai massacres	Borno	20 soldiers dead 40 civilians killed
June 2020	Ambush by Boko Haram	Borno	11 soldiers dead
June 2020	Attack on soldiers outpost	Borno	6 soldiers dead
July 2020	Attack on helicopter in Damasak	Borno	2 civilians dead and a damage on the helicopter
July 2020	Ambush on Nigerian military convoy in Bulabilin	Borno	35 dead, 18 injured, 30 missing
July 2020	Attack on soldiers in Baga and Gada Bui	Borno	35 soldiers dead
July 2020	Attack on military convoy near Kumulla	Borno	10 dead
July 2020	Attack on several villages near Chibok	Borno	3 farmers dead
July 2020	Execution of aid workers in Borno	Borno	5 dead
August 2020	Nguetchewe attack by Boko Haram	Cameroon	16 dead many wounded
August 2020	Kouré shooting	Niger	6 French aid workers killed
Sept. 2020	Suicide bombing in IDP camp in Goldavi	Cameroon	7 killed 14 wounded
Sept. 2020	Attack on Borno State Governor's convoy near Baga	Borno	30 killed many injured
Sept. 2020	Attack on soldiers' convoy near Marte	Borno	10 killed 8 injured

Octo. 2020	Nigerians soldiers attack militants in Damboa	Borno	10 militants killed
Nov. 2020	Boko Haram massacred in Koshebe About 110 civilians, mostly farm workers	Borno	110 dead
Nov. 2020	Attack on Borno State Governor's convoy enroute to Baga	Borno	15 killed many injured
Dec. 2020	Attack on Borno State Governor's convoy	Borno	3 killed many wounded
Dec. 2020	Zabarmari massacre of rice farmers by Boko Haram	Borno	More than 40 slaughtered

Sources: Daily Trust Newspaper July 2018, Premium Times August 2018, Daily Trust Newspaper October 2018, The Nation Online January 2019, Leadership Newspaper March 2019, Daily Trust Newspaper May 2019, Al Jazeera 2019 and CNN Editorial Research 2020.

There are other attacks that are not captured by this work due to inadequate reports or lack of proper documentation of the daily events of the Boko Haram's activities. This study was able to capture what it came across during the process of the investigation. One of the informants revealed that: "The Boko Haram since 2009 has been constantly attacking in the Northeast unrelented. There was never a day in this world since then that they will not attack. Sometimes the security personnel foiled the plan attacks and suppressed them. In other times, the attacks were repelled by the security operatives and in other times, it was only heard after the incidence particularly in remote areas of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe" (Personal interview with an informant in category A; Security Personnel).

Besides the above detailed account of the activities of Boko Haram, the manifestations of their activities earned Nigeria a notorious position and a worst ranking in Global Terrorism Index emerging as the third country affected most by terrorism in the globe according to the ranking as presented below in the table which picked top ten in the ranking.

Table 3: Nigeria's Profile Ranking in Global Terrorism Index in 2020

Rank	Country	Score	Rank	Country	Score
1	Afghanistan	9.592	6	Yemen	7.581
2	Iraq	8.682	7	Pakistan	7.541
3	Nigeria	8.314	8	India	7.353
4	Syria	7.778	9	DR Congo	7.178
5	Somalia	7.645	10	Philippines	7.099

Source: Global Terrorism Index 2020

Impact of Boko Haram Insurgency in Northeastern Nigeria

The Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria has claimed thousands of lives and destroyed properties worth billions of dollars in addition to halting or grounding the economic and commercial activities in the affected areas (Ahokegh, 2013). The phenomenon of Boko Haram led a breach of national security and Nigeria's sovereignty nationally and internationally because the entire Sahel States of Sub-Saharan West Africa were affected by the insecurity to the extent of drawing the assistance of the international community (Forest, 2012). People in the affected areas lost confidence in the capability of the Nigerian security agencies to secure their lives and properties (Bamidele, 2012). The issue of Boko Haram undermined the prestige of Nigeria and Nigerians abroad as they are being perceived as terror-based citizens. It created a campaign of calumny and stigmatisation deliberately against Islam and the Muslims in which some misinformed academicians, sentimental analysts, biased journalists and other related quarters viewed Muslims and Islam as extremist with a terror-bound nature despite all the rejection of the activities of the insurgents by majority of the Muslims in Nigeria (Aro, 2013).

The Boko Haram insurgency resulted in one of the non-traditional security discourses of food insecurity because most of the inhabitants in the affected areas particularly in the Northeastern Nigeria, Northern Cameroon, Western Chad and Southern Niger were compelled to leave their places and farming land to become refugees in the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) camps spread across the country. This situation created food scarcity in the Northeast, Northern Nigeria and by extension, West Africa (Olojo, 2013). The Boko Haram insurgency set another dimension for mutual suspicion between the two major religions in Nigeria; Christianity and Islam. The Christians perceived the insurgency as a Jihad waged against the Christians in Northern Nigeria to convert them forcefully while the Muslims perceived the conspiratorial collaboration of some Christians to sabotage Islam and destroy Muslims in the North where they are the majority (Blanchard 2014 and Isaiah 2011). The insurgency of Boko Haram has pushed the populace in Northern Nigeria in a serious dilemma where they are constantly being targetted by the insurgents in various places and at the same time, they are being killed and tortured by the security personnel even when they are innocent (Omotosho, 2015). The emergence of Boko Haram revealed how strained and vulnerable the Nigerian state security system has become in terms of the failure of government to improve the lives of the citizenry and to provide defense for the state (El Kaim, 2012).

The Response of the Nigerian Government and the International Community

The Boko Haram insurgency has not been neglected or handled with a nonchalant approach by the Nigerian government. There are serious several measures taken to address the phenomenon. One of these measures is the conventional strategic military operation in the areas that are under the threat of the insurgency especially

the Northeastern states in the country as observed by many scholars (Onuoha 2010, Sulaiman 2014, Umar 2013 and Meagher 2014). In addition, there were series of dialogues, negotiations, re-negotiations, ceasefire between the insurgents and the Nigerian government. Prisoners or Boko Haram captives under the custody of the government are released in exchange for ceasefire and peaceful surrender from the insurgents. On many occasions, this approach has succeeded but, the insurgency still persisted even though, the phenomenon has been recently contained from 2016 to a manageable level.

The international community responded by helping with intelligence information, equipment, logistics and military support too as disclosed by (Serrano & Pieri 2013, Giroux & Gilpin 2014, Barna 2014, Meagher 2014, Blanchard 2014 and De Montclos 2014). However, the responses from both the Nigerian government and the international community failed short of bringing the insurgency to its conclusive end because other fundamental issues are not considered appropriately. For instance, there is a failure in the intelligence of the security to identify the root source of funds, weapons and logistics such as transportation and communication of the Boko Haram insurgents. This has been giving them the advantage to sustain their activities for a longer period than expected. This is why this work identified these challenges as the main focus that should be considered in finalising the war against insurgency permanently in the country.

Theoretical Framework

The work adopted two theories to explain the context of the research, strengthens the literature and support the analysis and findings. The two theories are from the Western and Islamic perspectives. They are:
• The Social Conflict Theory
• The Doctrine of Extremism

The Social Conflict Theory

The Social Conflict theory originated from the Sociological perspective with scholars like Alfred Marshal, Emile Durkheim, Vilfredo Pareto, Karl Marx, Max Weber and Talcott Parson (Dahrendorf, 1958). The Social Conflict theory assumes that conflicts are inevitable in the society and there are different sources, nature and types of conflicts. The theory also assumes that social class struggles is a major source of conflict because all other aspects of human endeavour including political, economic and cultural revolves around class differences and inequality between the classes. Therefore, the theory assumes that for a better approach to conflict resolution in the society, it is pertinent to understand the nature of the varieties of the conflicts and handle them differently accordingly. Conflicts differ from serious ones like wars to mild ones such as intra-party and group conflicts. There are external conflicts brought about by external factors and there are internal conflicts ushered in by internal factors (Dahrendorf, 1958).

The theory further assumes that conflicts is caused by many factors such as religion, class conflict, poverty, unemployment, inequality, social differences, politics, economy, ideology, ethnicity, geography and other similar factors. the theory stresses that in a society like Nigeria with dominant inequality, injustice, hunger, poverty, ignorance, disease and exploitation, there is a likely tendency of rebellion from the aggrieved hopeless unprivileged group. The dominated class will use every means to achieve their goal including violence and aggression. The theory suggests that for a better conflict management, the societal gap of inequality and poverty should be bridged and intelligence gathering should be use or precisely, each conflict should be approach based on the feasible method that will contain it promptly instead of using general approach to resolve diverse conflict. Some of the conflicts require the use of force, some require the use of dialogue or negotiation as appropriate (Dahrendorf, 1958).

The theory is strong in its origin because it has the philosophical root from the famous world sociologist that are the early pioneer founders of the discipline. The theory also is stronger in the sense that it has the leverage of explaining all forms of societal conflicts in practical applicability from all dimensions with a step by step illustrations from its assumptions. The theory is weak in its ambition of categorising every conflict from its own root instead of making a simpler grouping that will enable for an easier discussion. The theory assumes that social conflicts are caused by many factors such as religion, inequality, poverty, unemployment and other socioeconomic indicators which clearly explains the Nigerian context as far as the Boko Haram insurgency is concerned. It is caused by a combination of many factors including the religion, poverty, inequality, ignorance, unemployment and other related factors. the theory assumes that social conflicts should be studied in isolation or separately so that the method of approaching them could be identified since it is not all conflicts that require the same approach.

Figure 1: Showing the Assumptions and Applicability of the Social Conflict Theory in Nigeria

Source: Design by the Authors 2018.

The above figure clearly shows a correlation between the Social Conflict theory and the society or violence in the case of insurgency in Northern Nigeria. This is because among the causes identified in the assumption is religious factor which in the case of this study is the major driving force behind the conflict. At the same time, the theory in the second aspect of the model shows the impacts of the conflicts which consists the use of violence as in the case of Boko Haram insurgency. The theory in the last aspect of the model indicates that every social conflict has its own suitable means or approach of resolving it and this model provides alternatives to the Nigerian government on Boko Haram issues to choose the suitable one after identifying the causes and the implications as designed in the model.

The Doctrine of Extremism

Al Qaradawi (1991) postulates some assumptions using some indicators to identify theoretically the root of extremism in Islam and its impact on the Muslim Ummah. According to him, extremism is like a disease in its early stage in which if it is diagnosed at its early phase, it can be prevented or cured with ease but, if it is allowed despite the identification of the symptoms to continue to manifest, it will escalate beyond repair and lead to extinction of the affected victim. Moving towards extremism is a reminiscent of avoiding the moderation taught by Islam especially by the youth in contemporary Muslim societies. The governments in these countries failed to monitor the youth accordingly leaving them to embrace ideas that are detrimental to the well-being of the Islamic societies. These youths misperceived and misinterpreted the contexts of the Quran and Sunnah and emerged as extremist and violent in their nature and approach to religious matters (Qaradawi, 1991:9).

Extremism manifested in six stages as identified by Al Qaradawi (1999:9). The first stage is bigotry and intolerance. This emanated from the view that an individual's opinion is the supreme and there is no any other opinion that can be tolerated apart from their own (Qaradawi, 1991:20). The second manifestation is an imposition of the extreme end of religious views on the populace despite the moderate alternative provided by Allah and His Messenger (PBUH). These extremists believed that even by force you must agree and follow their teaching and movements or face their wrath (Qaradawi, 1991:23). The third manifestation is "uncalled for austerity" where people are compelled to do what is not required of them like forcing non-Muslims to practice Islam because they live as a minority in the Muslim land. The fourth manifestation is severity and harshness where there is no tolerance for any relieve on situations of necessity. Firmness must be adhered to at all cost according to these extremists even when firmness is only mentioned in connection with two situations in Quran; first in connection with the war against oppression and self-defense (Chapter 9 verse 123) second in connection with carrying out the Islamically prescribed penalties for specified transgressions against humanity (Quran chapter 24 verse 2). In the area of calling one to Islam, there is no place for violence or harshness (Qaradawi, 1991:28).

The fifth manifestation is thinking ill of others that do not share the same view with these misguided youths. The six manifestation is when the perception of the extremists reached the stage of 'Takfir' where anyone that do not conform to their thoughts, perceptions and actions is considered as a 'Kafir' (infidel or a disbeliever even if he is a devoted Muslim) (Qaradawi, 1991:31). In this stage, a dangerous level is reached of taking arms against the public and constituted authorities provided they didn't agree with the views of the groups and this has been the clear explanation of the emergence of insurgents and terror groups in the name of Islam recently across the globe including the Boko Haram and other related sects in the Muslim world. Al Qaradawi (1991) concluded that these groups has nothing to do with Islam since Islam

in all its ramifications is about justice, peace and betterment of mankind. The Prophet (PBUH) warned his future generation of the emergence of these extremists who will take arms against the Muslim and he even directed that they should be fought. This study shares the same position with Al Qaradawi (1991). These manifestations are presented in a model below for a better understanding.

Figure 2: Al Qaradawi's (1991) Six Stages of Extremism and Emergence of Insurgent Groups in Islam

Source: Design by the Authors 2018.

METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

The study is a qualitative approach or research design which gives emphasis on a paradigm of data collection from all sources that are seemingly few in nature but, very rich in contents and value (Creswell, 2014:7). It is precisely a phenomenological form of qualitative data method (Bogden & Biklen, 2007:16) where the phenomenon of Boko Haram is examined clearly in terms of the sources of their finance, weapons and logistics in Northern Nigeria and why from Muslims and Islam and what makes it violent attacking both the non-Muslims and the Muslims despite its claim to establish an Islamic state?

The study used both primary and secondary sources of data. The primary source is a personal interview with some selected informants from the stakeholders that are involved in the security matters. The informants selected are six from the various security agencies of military and paramilitary that are involved actively in operation in the Boko Haram dominated areas. Five academicians were selected from four nor-

thern universities in University of Maiduguri (Unimaid), Ahmadu Bello University Zaria (ABU), Bayero University Kano (BUK), Gombe State University (GSU) and Federal University of Kashere Gombe (FUK). The selected academicians from the above-mentioned Universities are expert in research in the field of Boko Haram and some of them are even participants observants because the attacks and other issues related to it occurred in their presence. Their valuable contribution in the area of study made them an important target for interview to source for additional information from their previous researches to build upon in this work. Six repented insurgents were accessed for the interview in their rehabilitation camp in Malam Sidi in Gombe State. Six members of international donors were interviewed from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), United Nations (UN), Save the Children, Amnesty International, United State Agency for International Development (USAID) and European Union (EU). Six members of the civil societies that are operating in the Northeastern Nigeria were selected and interviewed. 12 IDPs were interviewed with four selected each from Borno, Adamawa and Gombe in the state capitals IDPs' camps. The total number of the population sample selected is forty-one 41 from the six (6) categories. The selection criteria were based on accessibility and feasibility of resources at hand and the consideration of the suggested number for qualitative interview by Sharan (2009) as 30 and Lune & Berg (2013) a maximum of 40. Other primary sources include documented reports from government and international agencies.

The secondary source is the use of books, journals and internet sources. The data collected from secondary sources were used in the formation of the literature of the study, the theoretical framework and to help in the discussion and interpretation of the data collected from primary sources. The data obtained from the primary source was coded into categories alphabetically as A, B and C accordingly. For instance, category A is the security agencies, category B is the academicians, category C is the repented insurgents, category D is the international donor agencies, category E is members of civil societies and category F is the IDPs. The data obtained were presented using thematic analytical interpretations and content analysis where themes were identified from the data and discussed with the existing knowledge in the field of study as well as the application of the theoretical underpinnings used in the work.

Table 4: List of Informants and their Category

Category	Informants	Sample Selected	Population
A	Military and paramilitary agencies	6	6
B	Academicians	5	11
C	Repented insurgents	6	17
D	International donor groups	6	23
E	Civil societies	6	29
F	IDPs	12	41

Source: Field Survey by the Authors 2018

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS: EXAMINATION OF THE SOURCES OF WEAPONS, FUNDS AND LOGISTICS FOR BOKO HARAM INSURGENTS

In this section, the data obtained from the field were discussed according to some formed themes in consideration with the responses from the informants and the existing literature and theoretical framework as presented below.

Source of Weapons for Boko Haram

Boko Haram sourced its own weapons from different means as revealed by many informants interviewed in this work. For instance, one of the informants in category B (the academicians) narrated that:" The Boko Haram secured their weapons through attacks and raiding of military barracks in Northern Nigeria and other security outfits where arsenals are stored". In another view, another informant in category A (security agencies) mentioned that:" Sometimes the disgruntled security personnel used to sell their weapons to the insurgents to survive because of poor motivation by the government". In another view, another informant in category C (the repented insurgents) revealed that:" the Boko Haram groups developed the skills of producing Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), explosives, landmines deposit and other sophisticated means that they used to attack the security personnel". In a similar view from an informant, it has been established that the Boko Haram sourced for their weapons through training on how to produce explosives and guns in addition to operation of the confiscated weapons from the Nigerian security. This has been revealed by an informant in category D (international donor agencies).

A report from the Intelligence Briefing (2015) indicated that Boko Haram possessed varieties of weapons such as assault rifles, rocket propelled grenades, mortars and improvised bombs and shells. The sect also acquired a considerable number of tanks and armoured personnel carriers and anti-aircraft capability. The Report further added that the weapons are stolen, improvised or purchased. The Report alleged that the weapons are mostly stocks from Russian and Eastern European products confiscated from police stations and army barracks.Other sources according to the Report are weapons purchased from black market in Europe, Libya and West Africa. (Intelligence Briefing, 2015). This intelligence report confirmed accurately the position of most of the informants that were interviewed on the major sources of weapons of Boko Haram. Thus, the validity of the findings can be related with the existing knowledge in the field.

Another work suggested that handmade weapons and craft in Nigeria have been boosted and developed rapidly from 2000 to date. The report indicated that many civilians learned how to make rifles, local explosives and other ammunition such as bullets. This has been because of the ethno-religious conflicts and the Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria (Nowak & Gsell, 2018).

From the theoretical perspective, the two theories of Social Conflict theory and the Doctrine of Extremism are applicable here because in the first instance, citizens acquire weapons or groups and turned violent when there is an extreme level of inequality and injustice in the society as in Nigerian case. The theory is further justified in its assumptions that conflict escalate in some societies because the root causes and its dimension are not taken into consideration. For instance, the Nigerian violence or insurgency could be prevented before its occurrence through good governance that will reduce poverty, unemployment, inequality and other social problems.

In the second aspect, the Doctrine of Extremism is applicable here in the explanation of the sources of weapons for Boko Haram because the group manifested all forms of extremism from one stage to another until it reached the last stage of Takfir where it felt the last option is to procure weapons and fight all those who differ with them in their understanding. Thus, the preparation began as earlier thought or expected because the group anticipated violent clashes with the Nigerian security soon during their early stages of extremism.

Sources of Finance for Boko Haram

There are divergent views from the informants on the sources of finance of Boko Haram. One of the informants in an interview (category C, repented insurgents) narrated that: "Sometimes we were asked to pay some token as membership dues by our leader and in some other times, we kidnapped people or send to them messages demanding for ransom or they should get themselves killed if they failed to pay". In another view, an informant in category B (Academicians) revealed that: "The Boko Haram organised itself and sourced for money internally and externally. Internally, they pay dues, work in different petty businesses and artisanship. Sometimes they receive huge sum of money from the government to release important captives like foreign experts and they extort money from the people as well. Externally, they received money in foreign cash from sister organisations such as Al Qaeda and ISIS and from hidden or invisible hands not yet identified". In another version of the interview, an informant in category E (civil societies), mentioned that: "The Boko Haram sourced for their funds from various sources including collection of donation from wealthy members, kidnapping, exchange of prisoners for cash, external sources and petty business engagements in different towns of the Northern part of the country.

In a detail view from another informant, he revealed to the researchers that: "The Boko Haram is in possession of a huge amount of money in hard currencies especially in dollars. He further confirmed that a classified security sources indicated that these monies were sourced from two major ways. The first is the billions of Naira collected by the insurgent group from the Nigerian government in exchange for the abducted Chibok girls in which some part of them were released

based on that negotiation. Another tranche was collected also in billions to release the abducted Dapchi girls. The insurgents secure dollars from foreign donors and domestic aid workers that they kidnapped in which they will demand for ransom in foreign currencies. The second way is the allegations that some international donors are providing dollars to the group through a clandestine covert way. The group converted their dollars into Naira through the Madagali axis which is the open gateway to Sambisa Forest from Adamawa State. They offered an exchange bonus to the locals in the ration of every N1 million converted, the local agents can get a 10% share which is N100, 000. Some of the insurgents and the locals revealed this information to us" (A Personal Interview with an Informant in Category A, Security Agencies).

The above is a good source that detected the sources what is to be done is the next line of action. Blocking the source is the best alternative and this study has successfully identified some of them. The policymakers can swing into action.

The sources of funding of Boko Haram is identified reliably going by the above statement from the informants. They have different alternatives towards securing funding for running of their activities. It is believed that Boko Haram sourced for their money from within Nigeria and West Africa. Boko Haram is believed to be a well-funded organisation for criminal activities internally and externally. The US Government believed that Boko Haram sourced for their funding from criminal activities especially kidnappings for ransom. Another source from the US identified that the Boko Haram insurgents used the Nigerian porous border in West Africa to transport huge cash into Nigeria (Rock, 2016:2).

Rock (2016) further argued that Boko Haram sourced for funding through eight major means. The first one is Microfinancing. This is done through offering of cash loan to registered members to run local businesses in various parts of Nigeria. The International Aid Organisation Mercy Corps discovered that the Boko Haram offered loan worth N10, 000 ($27.8) up to N1 million ($2778) in recent years. Another source is membership fees. Prior to 2009,the Boko Haram leader Muham-mad Yusuf enforced membership fees ranging from N100 ($0.30) and beyond. A group, Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA) and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) reported that, even after Yusuf's death in 2009, membership fees were collected towards 2012. The Boko Haram sourced for their funding also from external funding from the sister organisations such as Al Qaeda, ISIS and other insurgents' groups. The fourth source is robbing of banks. Boko Haram was reported to have robbed hundreds of banks for over three-year period for an estimated 2.4 billion naira ($6 million). The fifth source is extortion of the citizens through threats of calls, text messages and physical visit to demand ransom from identified targets. Other sources are kidnapping, illicit trafficking and speculations. The above view is also shared by Intelligence Brief (2015), Eme (2016), Moses (2017) andNowak & Gsell (2018).

Figure 3: Model Showing the Sources of Funding for Boko Haram

Source: (Kumar 2014 cited in Rock 2016).

The two theories used in the work are practically applicable here. In the first place, the Social Conflict theory explained that conflict in the society are caused by different means and are divergent in nature as some of the conflicts can be violent such as insurgency with reference to Boko Haram. In the second theory of the Doctrine of Extremism, it can be seen that the nature and level of the extremism of the Boko Haram sect led them into a violence through mobilisation of funds to secure weapons and logistics to achieve their aim. A model is adopted from Kumar (2014) as cited in Rock (2016) to indicate by illustration the sources of funding of Boko Haram as indicated above.

Means of Logistics of Boko Haram

Boko Haram sourced for their logistics such as foods, water supply, healthcare facilities and movement from one place of attacks to another in addition to intelligence through various sources just like their finances. One of the informants in category C (repented insurgents) narrated that: "We have various means of securing our logistics. We raid villages for food and water, we stormed hospitals and abduct nurses and doctors and we rely on locals for intelligence and movement by playing with their psychology that it is a Jihad that they are helping us to do". Another informant in category B (Academicians) opined that: "Boko Haram sourced for their logistics through kidnapping, bribing of local people, stealing, raiding of villages and towns and disguise through sending some of its members to melt with the public and secure their needs for them". In a different version, an informant in category D

(international donor agencies) revealed that: "The Boko Haram secured their logistics through bribing the Nigerian security personnel and bureaucrats, brainwashing the host communities and use of threats, extortion, kidnapping, intelligence gathering, disguise and other means".

The above views of the informants were also supported by many scholars in their works including Intelligence Brief (2015), Eme (2016), Moses (2017) and Nowak & Gsell (2018). Additionally, the theories used in the work can be applied here practically. The Social Conflict theory expresses the fact that conflicts can emerged from religious misperception and social crises and this is exactly the case here because religious misperception and social injustice and inequality compelled some intolerant youths to identify feasible logistics to counter the existing political and social order. In the second theory, the Doctrine of Extremism, the theory stresses that extremism can led some youths in Islam to reach a dangerous level of actions that will drag them into insurgency and terrorism. The Boko Haram fall within this category.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

It is concluded in this study that the Boko Haram is a deleterious phenomenon which devastated the Northern parts of the country for more than ten years claiming thousands of lives and properties worth billions of Naira. The Boko Haram insurgency started as a peaceful but, radical preaching against the Western educational, political and social order but later metamorphosed into a full-blown insurgency in 2009 when their leader, late Muhammad Yusuf was killed in an extrajudicial passion.it is concluded that the Boko Haram has diverse means of sourcing for their weapons, finances and logistics ranging from internal and external sources.

This study concluded that, the Boko Haram sect is not a peaceful movement or a group that has the peaceful intention otherwise, why did they gathered sophisticated weapons prior to the famous 2009 clash with the security personnel in Maiduguri, the Borno State capital which was believed to have set the sect ablaze with insurgency and violence. The group, concluded this work, has a violent motive from its inception. This is supported by the postulations presented by Al Qaradawi (1991) of the manifestations of violent and terror groups in six stages among the Muslim Ummah. It is concluded that the misperception, misinterpretation and misguidance of some ignorant youths dragged them into insurgency through sourcing of weapons and logistics to fight the government and the public at large. It is concluded that the group or the sect can be contained appropriately if their sources of weapons, finances and logistics are identified and blocked to make them surrender in fiasco. Thestudy recommends the following as long-term panaceas to curtail the incidence of Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria and to cater for other militant groups in the country in future.

1. The sources of weapons, finances and logistics of the Boko Haram should be blocked totally to deprive them of the power of attacks and defense for easy defeat;

2. Intelligence gathering should be prioritise in approaching the blockage of the sources of weapons and finance of the group;

3. Religious associations should be censored and monitored closely to identify any radical or extremist groups and deter them in its early stage;

4. The local community should be sensitise to avoid supplying information and intelligence to the Boko Haram insurgentsand;

5. The government in the country should provide a decent, sustainable and reasonable means of survival for all its citizens in terms of good governance, transparency, gainful employment, poverty reduction and bridging the gap of inequality.

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Understanding the Primary Role of Climate and Environmental Changes in the Birth of Social Conflicts and Extremism:
The Herdsmen-Farmers Clash in Nigeria

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ABSTRACT The adverse effect that climate change has on our daily lives is one that we cannot overlook. Despite the outcry by the United Nations and other advocates for climate action, some world leaders have turned a blind eye and deaf ear to the obvious endemic that climate action poses. The herdsmen-farmers clash that has been a source of concern for some time now has recently gotten more attention because of the rampant reports of these clashes by the media in recent time. Other sources of this recent attention include: intensity of these conflicts (six times deadlier than Boko Haram related deaths in recent times); modus operandi of the attacks; and the dire consequences on the Nigerian socio-economic. One of the major drivers of these violent conflicts have been attributed to migration due to increasing scarcity (due to environmental changes) of resources such as freshwater and vegetation for pastoral farmers in the Northern parts of the country where they are predominantly resident. For environmental change, as one of the major drivers of conflict, six types of environmental changes have been implicated: greenhouse induced climate change; ozone layer depletion; loss and degradation of arable land; forest degradation; pollution and depletion of fresh water; and loss of ecosystem services e.g. fisheries. Some mitigation measures to end this herders-farmers conflict include: adaptation of clean renewable energy; tree planting and afforestation; Lake Chad restoration project; livestock ranching; tackling insecurity; development of the northern region; and public sensitization towards oneness.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Rising sea levels, deforestation and dry land degradation, as well as natural disasters, have led to challenges that affect development and livelihoods, settlement options, food security and human health. These environmental events and processes have in some cases resulted in large-scale displacement of people both internally and internationally (Jacobson 1988; Myers 1997, p. 167; 2002, p. 610). Predictions of 50 million environmental refugees from Africa and 200 million to 1 billion all over the world will result from climate change alone by the year 2050 (Brown, 2008, p. 8).

Pastoral farming is a pertinent aspect of the Nigerian history that has been a contributing factor to the larger economic base. According to FAO, there are about 18.4 million heads of cattle in Nigeria of which 82% are used for pastoral farming and accounting for 60% of the job base of northern rural dwellers (FAO, 2019, p. 8). In Nigeria, there is a cultural undertone that predominantly places the Fulani's and the Hausas in the centre of this type of grazing and ruminant livestock base (Ajibefun, 2018, p. 134). Lawal-Adebowale (2012, p. 1) asserts that 90% of Nigeria's cattle base is in the Northern part of the country and are owned mostly by rural dwellers and commercial companies.

However, due to the changes in climatic conditions (such as the dry spells and the rapidly shrinking Lake Chad) and the steady environmental deterioration (such as afforestation due to urbanization and pollution) in the region, there has been movement of nomadic farmers to the southern belt of the country.

Since the existence of the human race, migration has been one of the widely favoured means of coping with environmental and societal challenges (Science for Environment Policy, 2015, p. 14). Evidence of this has been shown by the movement of human populations in response to large-scale climatic changes since as far back as 2 million years ago (Dennell, 2008). While there are several reasons why migration has become a widely accepted phenomenon, environmental and societal problems are among the most common and have gained unprecedented attention in recent years due to the clamour for climate action and social justice (Amusan et al., 2017, p. 35).

Amusan et al. (ibid.) posit that environmentally induced migration poses significant security threat as this tends to upset the delicate socio-economic and demographic composition of any society. In many parts of the world, human migration has been shown to be at the heart of many local or international disputes between the natives and the migrants over the control, access and consumption of available natural resources (Adisa, 2012, p. 101). Most locals fear that the continuous access and consumption of local resources by migrants will lead to a major depletion which may ultimately lead to starvation. While this may not always be the case, it is usually sufficient to initiate territorial and survival instincts, leading to conflicts and violent extremism (Blench, 2004; Majekodunmi et al., 2014, p. 3). This can be likened greatly to the herdsmen-farmers clash in the southern parts of Nigeria.

The conflict among famers and herders has multiple facets. However, this paper takes a closer look at how the changing climate and environmental perturbations have contributed significantly in fuelling conflict and violent extremism. The focus is more on environmental drivers of migration and reasons for rejection of herders by the farmers in the South with a view to provide possible mitigation measures.

2.0 A cross-sectional assessment of the Northern and Southern Nigeria climates

Over the past few years, there has been an alarming concentration on the tenets surrounding the Fulani-herdsmen clash in Nigeria. Due to the rampant killings, loss of properties and also destruction of businesses which significantly affects the GDP of the country, the Nigerian government has been forced to act accordingly. In search for causes and solution, most Nigeria researchers and international stakeholders have attributed the clashes to the climatic condition of both regions and also the ecological stance of the country. According to Zabbey et al. (2019, p. 835) Nigeria rests on a total surface area of 92.38 million hectares that travels across 923,764 km2 of land with a coast line totalling 853 km in length. As a result of the size and ecological diversity, it has been argued that the geographical features and contents have been the main driving force of the demography of each region (Onah, et al., 2016, p. 301).

The challenges associated with climate change are not the same for both regions. The Northern region of the country, due to low levels of precipitation is more prone to desertification, shrinking water bodies, drought and even land aridity. While the South is open to high chances of flood and gully erosions as recently witnessed in the massive flooding of 2012 (Akande et al., 2017, p. 1; Ignatius, 2016).

The Northern parts of Nigeria occupy a land mass of 724,319 sq. km and has an estimated population of about 75 million residents while the Southern parts occupy a landmass of 199,445 sq. km and about 65 million residents (Okafor et al., 2007, p. 2204). The major economic base of Nigeria was agriculture, prior to the oil boom which diversified the economy in the early 70s. A disproportionate level of Nigeria's GDP came from the exports of agricultural produce, which is highly dependent on the climatic condition of the area of the North, its larger landmass and higher human population.

The topography of Northern Nigeria is explained as a semi-arid region sitting on a vast land of desert that cuts across more than half of the land mass. The Sahel climate or tropical climate is the predominant climate setting in northern Nigeria (Adedoyin, 1989, p. 105). According to Harris and Mohammed (2003, p. 25) the raining season in Northern Nigeria only lasts from July to September which makes the rest of the year dry and hot with temperatures as high as 40°C in some cases. This weather condition affects the climatic structure which in turns affects the vegetation for pastoral grazing.

The Southern topography is defined by a tropical rainforest climate with annual rainfall 1,500 to 4,000 mm per year, typically between April and October. Coastal plains are also found with large mangrove areas containing both fresh water and salt water swamps, with its attendant diverse vegetation and rainforest (Adedoyin, op. cit.). Of equal importance is the vast area of grassland due to rich network of water bodies and temperature ranges of 27-33°C. These prevalent weather conditions and soil types make the South a desirable region for grazing.

The United Nations states that currently the world emits 36 billion tons of CO_2 annually into the atmosphere and this affects the nature of the vegetation and also increases desertification, hence, lower yields of grazing fields for nomadic farmers and their herds. Owing to the already existing desert-like feature of Northern Nigeria, it is no surprise that climate action has a more devastating effect on the area than other parts of the country. This has forced the migration of farmers from North to South in search of greener pastures for their herds resulting in a series of clashes between the migrant nomadic farmers and their new hosts in the South.

3.0 SECTORIAL IMPACT OF CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGES IN NIGERIA

One aspect of human endeavour that is adversely affected by climate change and environmental degradation is agriculture, which in turn affects other areas of habitation. According to Amadi and Udo (2015, p. 7) climate action affects the soil which impacts the quality and quantity of food production and this leads to hunger and starvation for humans and animals. This also increases carbon emissions, greenhouse effect and reduction of oxygen in the atmosphere. In Nigeria, over 70% of its citizens in all regions engage in crop farming and livestock rearing for their basic sustenance and livelihood (Onah et al., op. cit.). Due to the shifting climatic condition the unpredictability of rainfall across the country has made it hard for farmers to successfully plan and execute planting seasons which has resulted in food insecurity. This is because the agricultural production is highly dependent on rainfall (Anabaraonye et al., 2019, p. 1393; Idumah, 2016).

Livestock farming is not left out in this endemic situation as this also collectively affects everything else because of the depletion in food production and the availability of vegetation. The cost of climate change in Nigeria may run into millions of dollars as many aspects of the economy are greatly impacted (Haider, 2019, p. 20).

Nigeria is one of the countries experiencing the impact of climate change, with sea levels rising while Lake Chad is shrinking, and desertification advancing rapidly. This has further increased aridity, drought and desertification in the North; and flooding and erosion in the South (Diop, 2009; Ezegwu, 2015). Vulnerability analysis demonstrates that the North experience higher degrees of vulnerability to climate change than those in the South (Haider, op. cit., p. 2; Ignatius, op. cit., p. 11).

A typical example is the Lake Chad, once one of Africa's largest freshwater Lake and a source of livelihood for about 30million people. Located in Northern Central Africa, Lake Chad borders four countries - Chad, Nigeria, Niger and Cameroon and is currently vanishing fast and also initiating a unique and complex humanitarian crisis around the basin, which is among the most severe in the world. The water body has diminished by 90% since the 1960s due to overuse and climate change effects. The Lake Chad Basin covers almost 8% of the African continent and spreads over seven countries: Algeria, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Sudan, Niger and Nigeria (Gao et al., 2011, p. 1). It is estimated that 12% of the over 400million people in these countries live around the lake and depend on it for crop and livestock farming, fishing, commerce and trade. The loss of its water, livelihood it supports and a teeming population in Lake Chad Basin has led to the conflict between herders and farmers. Families, who relied on the lake, have started migrating to other areas especially with the armed conflicts since 2009 (Griffin, 2020; Okpara et al., 2015, p. 318).

Experts have attributed the shrinking to overgrazing, population growth, climate change and insecurity that led to decline in vegetation and increased desertification. Currently, 7million people across the Lake Chad basin are struggling with food insecurity while 11 million people are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance within the region (Onuoha, 2008, p. 55).

4.0 Insurgency impact on food security and migration

Studies have shown that among several other ills, poverty breeds anger, hatred, envy and conflict (Dollard et al., 1939, p. 28; Homer-Dixon, 1994, p. 8). The attendant negative impact of climate change gave birth to insurgency in the North due to poverty. Conflicts first arose among nationals of different countries over control of the scarce resources before turning into full blown insurgency in the region (Ferris and Stark, 2012, p. 8; UNEP, 2012, p. 59; Yusuf, 2013, p. 372).

The migration of people from the Northern region due to the adverse effects of climate change and environmental degradation in search of water holes and grassland, further gave insurgents more space to settle and intensify their activities. This then grew from small scale fighting amongst one another, to large scale fighting against the government, and the need for more members to further their cause. With the need for insurgency groups to recruit more members, came the need to forcefully induct people into their ranks and create fear and terror. As the population of insurgents grew, so did the need for more resources to cater for their welfare. This resulted in livestock rustling, destruction of communal resistance and further degradation of the environment (Olaniyan and Yahaya, 2016, p. 96).

The violence and insecurity disrupted trade and markets, as well as vital infrastructure such as health centres, schools, water pipelines, bridges and roads have also been destroyed. This further intensified the need for migration that has started due to environmental and climate changes (Adigun, 2019, p. 79).

5.0 Climate change/environmental scarcity and the Fulani-herdsmen conflict in Nigeria

The climatic condition of any environment is arguably one of the most important aspects of human settlement. Adigun (ibid.) argues that when the climatic conditions of an environment threaten the life, livelihood or state of comfort of man, migration occurs. And often times this change affects the behaviour and human social interaction (Hutchinson et al., 1940, p. 267).

Odoh and Chilaka (2017, p. 114) posits that environmental factors such as desertification, scarcity, depleting natural resources among others play a significant role in sprawling conflicts around the world, hence the eco-violence framework. The eco-violence framework has been argued to be a survival response by humans in the face of vulnerable situations that are as a result of the unavailability of natural resources. Hence, human reaction towards shortage and unavailability of environmental resources is usually migration or a change in demography and/or even conflicts (Percival and Homer-Dixon, 1998, p. 279).

According to Amobi and Onyishi (2015, p. 205) climate change has created a divide that is existent in the operation of crop farming and livestock rearing. In the Southern parts of Nigeria, due to the rise in sea levels which has led to flooding, farmers have become more frustrated in the trade activities. In a bid to adapt to these environmental changes, which they have no control over, the migration of the herdsmen to the South is seen as a form of intrusion. The destruction of farmlands by grazing cattle further intensified territorial defence behaviours. Due to the rise in temperature in the North which has led to low vegetation, high rate of desertification and low fresh water yields, this migration has led to what could be referred to as a war of resources (Elisha et al., 2017). In a study of perception by Onah et al. (op. cit., p. 302) they postulate that farmers believe that if the herdsmen are allowed to continually graze the land, similar encroachment that has engulfed the North may occur in the South. The study further goes to explain how the farmers complain of farm invasion from the cattle without remuneration for damages especially in a country with teeming population and ethnic bias.

The eco-violence framework sees violence or conflict as the scarcity or fear of the unavailability of natural resources to be evenly distributed. According to Isiugo and Obioha (2015, p. 157) there are at least two primary ways that this could happen;

1. The function of human activities in a given ecological zone has adverse effect on the environmental resources (whether renewable or non-renewable) which defines the per capita remuneration that is available for the total population to share or;

2. The level to which the ecosystem in that region is vulnerable – suffice to say that developing countries such as Nigeria are greatly affected by climate change.

Also, the unwillingness to share or avail these resources to other parties is as a result of biases or pre-existing sentiments. This contradicts the thought that collective identities are passive factors for membership in a society (Bello, 2013, p. 133).

The relevance of the eco-violence framework is prevalent in the assessment of the diversification of Nigeria's cultural system and also the population and the management base of these resources by the government or other responsible organizations.

Bello (ibid., p. 134) also argues that the political ecology of the Fulani herdsmen/farmers clash can be attributed to the unavailability of resources such as land. He argued that cultural undertone that can be perceived in the clashes and disagreement is largely the subtle struggle for protection of declining resources that are ever depleting due to overcrowding, migration and explosive population growth.

Okoli and Atelhe (2014, p. 82) argue that there is sentimental underlay in the attempt of government or intervention in resolving the matter. Policies like heavy taxation, expulsion and even indiscriminate arrests of one party to favour the other has been recorded. These inequalities and partial treatments further leave the masses aggravated and prone to violent extremism in the face of any form of perceived invasion of "personal space".

Increased conflict between herders and farmers in Nigeria was six times deadlier in 2018 than the chaos associated with Boko Haram. The conflict between these groups has sharply risen, resulting in the deaths of more than 1,300 people between January and December 2018. This conflict has evolved from mere spontaneous reactions to provocations and to well-planned deadlier attacks, particularly in Enugu, Benue, Plateau, Adamawa, Nasarawa and Taraba states. It has also displaced hundreds of thousands of people and fuelled pre-existing ethnic, regional and religious polarisation. It further threatens to become even deadlier undermining national stability if appropriate governmental actions are not undertaken rapidly (Chiluwa and Chiluwa, 2020, p. 3).

There are three types of environmental scarcity (Percival and Homer-Dixon, op. cit., p. 280) and they all played significant roles in exacerbating the herders-farmers conflict in Nigeria:

1. supply-induced scarcity is caused by the degradation and depletion of an environmental resource, for example, the erosion of cropland due to events such as desertification, urbanization, increased pressure on the environment and pollution;

2. demand-induced scarcity results from population growth within a region or increased per capita consumption of a resource, either of which heightens the demand for the resource. Such as the unsustainable use and loss of natural resources (e.g. Lake Chad), uncontrolled population growth heightened demand on natural resources and;

3. structural scarcity arises from an unequal social distribution of a resource that concentrates it in the hands of relatively few people while the remaining population suffers from serious shortages.

The six types of environmental change identified as plausible causes of violent conflict between both groups include:

- degradation and loss of arable land;
- loss of ecosystem services e.g. fisheries;
- pollution and loss of fresh water;
- greenhouse induced climate change;
- forest degradation and depletion and;
- ozone layer depletion.

6.0 THE FRUSTRATION-AGGRESSION THEORY

The core tenets of the arguments of the frustration-aggression theory is that often aggressive behaviours tend to stem from other forms of external factors that serve as a catalyst to irrational or other forms of violent behaviours. Dollard et al (op cit., p. 1) succinctly summarized Frustration and Aggression into two bold statements:

1. The occurrence of aggressive behaviour always presupposes the existence of frustration and;

2. The existence of frustration always leads to some form of aggression.

Hence this is to say that aggression arises as a result of frustration. The tenets of the theory explained what the tentative causes of violent behaviour is in any given situation and setting. According to Dollard et al. (ibid., p. 7) "frustration is a condition that arises when a stipulated goal is not met or when a target destination suffers interference", defining aggression as a reaction to that situation of frustration.

Following the core tenets of the herders/farmers clash in Nigeria which has been attributed largely to resource domination, it can then be argued that the depleting effect of environmental changes in the north and south, and the subsequent migration of herders to the south in search of greener pastures plays a protruding role in creating frustration which has stemmed into aggression as stipulated by this theory. While the theory had early strongly argued aggression as a by-product of frustration, Breuer and Elson (2017, p. 4) argue that the frustration often creates the need for a reaction. Due to the levels of desertification that has engulfed the north, an argument can be made that since their livelihood is threatened, the need to move becomes eminent. However, all regions are affected by climate change, as the farmers down south in Nigeria are also facing significant effects of climate change in their region. With the lack of implemented regulation and policy of grazing and ranching, there is a strong issue around control, tolerance and coexistence, hence the current aggression.

7.0 MITIGATION STRATEGIES

Over the course of the past years, there has been series of mitigation strategies put in place by the government to serve as a lasting solution to end conflicts in Nigeria. With respect to the herders-farmers conflict, a very popular strategy by the Federal Government is the Grazing Bill and the Rural Grazing Area (aka RUGA) (Amusan et al., op. cit., p. 40; Ekpo and Tobi, 2019, p. 7). According to Amusan et al. (ibid., p. 41) the grazing bill before the senate in 2013 was aimed at providing establishment, preservation and control of national grazing reserves and livestock with a supporting that seeks to empower the Federal Government with the right to acquire lands from states and the FCT. As directed by the commission that would be in charge, the Fulani herdsmen would reserve said right to these properties regardless of the state or preceding owners. When this bill was made public it was met with an uproar from the Southern region of the country due to pre-existing fears on land use and the ambiguity of the bill. Some of the reason this bill faced backlashes was that:

1. Nigeria is divided around ethno-religious lines and land is a pertinent part of that culture and the idea that land can be collected and redistributed will deprive natives from the right to have access to continue centuries long of agricultural cultural practices. In some cases, this redistribution will cause natives their land ownership and inheritance as the cases may be;

2. Most critics attributed this to an invasion mechanism which is characterized to the Fulani's as being jihadists (Okeke, 2014, p. 76).

Other mitigation strategies that have been used by the government and other concerned parties such as town hall meetings and round table discussions have yielded little or no fruitful outcome because of the socio-political impact the migration will have on the demography and the climate of the regions.

CONCLUSION

In Nigeria, conflicts between the farmers and herders in recent years have been on the rise and have drawn significant attention. According to Abdullahi (2019, p. 649) this could be attributed largely to the social representation of the Fulani's in media outlets using frames such as bandits, gunmen, killer herders. These frames tend to create a revolting feeling in the minds of the locals in the Southern part of the country about the emigrants to the south. Other scholars like Adigun (op. cit., p. 83) argue that the conflict can largely be because of the ethno-religious divide that exists between the Northern and Southern regions.

Following the system of federalism that Nigeria operates, farmer-herders conflict is quite complex in terms of existing laws and how they can be navigated to fit into this new change. Although Okeke (op. cit.) counter the ecological de-

gradation argument as being insignificant to the migration of herders to the south, scholars like Amusan and Jegede (2013, p. 275) opine that the climate plays a huge role in the settlement or migration of a group of people. This is in agreement with many other scholars all over the world (Elisha op. cit., p. 2; Myers, op. cit., p. 610; Stern and Stern, 2007).

The changing climate remains one of the most significant aspects to the change in the demographic trends in Nigeria. The Nigerian government needs to do more in educating the masses on the adaptation of clean renewable energy in our day to day practice. Through the reduction of carbon footprint, more natural resources (such as land and freshwater) will be available to provide vegetation for grazing and also space for farming where there can be coexistence in both regions of the country. The government also needs to encourage modern agricultural practices such as ranching to help mitigate the conflicts between herders and farmers.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The following policies are recommended to curb the herders-farmers conflict:

- **Adaptation of clean renewable energy**: Like many other countries across the world, in Nigeria, power generation and consumption remain at the epicentre of carbon emission. To protect the vast natural resources in the country, the government should start looking at bills and policies around encouraging the use of clean energy in operations by providing incentives for farmers and other organizations in other sectors to adapt to the use of cleaner energy sources.

- **Tree planting and afforestation**: More than 70% of the dwellers in rural areas use wood as fuel for cooking which contributes largely to deforestation in Nigeria. With the afforestation rate of the country only at a 10% ratio to deforestation, more work is greatly needed in this area to increase vegetation yields. The benchmark set by environmentalists is "Plant two trees for every one tree felled".

- **Lake Chad restoration project**: The Lake Chad restoration project first received attention in 2002 by the Lake Chad Basin International Commission and also in 2014 by the World Bank through the Water Resources and Disaster Risk Management, and Environment and Natural Resource Management for the Africa region. Finally, it was revisited by the UNESCO under the name Biosphere and Heritage of Lake Chad (BIOPALT) project 2018. Despite all of these efforts, little or no results have been achieved. An intensified effort on this project is highly desirable.

- **Livestock ranching**: Ranching of cattle would reduce the problems associated with farmland and farm produce destruction. The ministries of envi-

ronment and agriculture should take on this task and properly structure these ranches in a way that avoid encroachment into existing farmlands and ecological sensitive areas.

• Tackling insecurity: The insecurity in the Northern region of Nigeria calls for serious concern and should be given top priority due to the displacement of people, deaths, destruction of basic amenities and other menace associated with it.

• Development of the Northern region: The North East Development Commission should intensify its effort towards developing the Northern region of Nigeria while also instituting educational facilities with a view to change attitudinal mind-set and foster people driven and sustainable development.

• Public sensitization towards oneness: The need to strongly encourage oneness in Nigeria cannot be overemphasized. The government should endeavour to remove structures made to identify people by ethnicity especially with respect to federal activities. Nepotism should be strongly fought and public sensitization via various media outlets towards togetherness and true federalism should be implemented.

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ENFORCEMENT OF COUNTERTERRORISM TREATIES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF TERRORISM (PREVENTION) ACT IN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT Since the 2001 terrorist attack in United States of America (US), many countries have collaborated with one another to combat terrorism. This has been done, particularly, through domestication and enforcement of universal counterterrorism treaties. Although the Nigerian State has domesticated and applied some of the universal counterterrorism treaties, particularly the multinational treaties via the United Nations (UN), terrorism lingers. This paper examines these universal counterterrorism treaties together with existing domestic legislations and their enforcement in Nigeria. Using the doctrinal research methodology, this paper found that with the domestication of many of these counterterrorism treaties, together with other existing legislations in Nigeria, there are adequate counterterrorism treaties and legislations without a corresponding adequacy of enforcement. The paper therefore recommends strengthening of enforcement of counterterrorism legislations in Nigeria in order to make significant progress in combating the lingering terrorism in Nigeria. In doing this, particular attention should be given to due process, increased collaboration with other countries of the world, unnecessary compromise, impunity, sabotage and corruption on the part of the Nigerian State.

Keywords: Counterterrorism, Due Process, Enforcement, Terrorism, Treaties.

1. INTRODUCTION

Understanding the concept of terrorism has often been considered significant in many studies on the subject matter. Accordingly, various meanings, which are identified with different authors, have been shown to exist (Ganor, 2002, p. 289). However, terrorism is generally viewed as any action that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians and non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act either for

political, economic, religious or ideological purposes (Ibanga, 2016; Nacos, 2012, p. 11). The impact of terrorism on target states and other states of the world is usually enormous. In view of this, terrorism has been widely condemned and many countries of the world have therefore taken counterterrorism serious within national and international security architecture.

Counter-terrorism consists of actions or strategies aimed at preventing terrorism from escalating, controlling the damage from terrorist attacks that do occur, and ultimately seeking to eradicate terrorism in a given context (Pratt, 2010). It involves the responses, measures or strategies used in dealing with terrorism. It incorporates the practice, military tactics, techniques and strategy that government, military, organisations and intelligence agencies use to combat or prevent terrorism. Counterterrorism measures, used by nation states in responding to terrorism vary from one state to another. These measures include response through the security agencies (military response), diplomatic response, political response, judicial response, socio- economic response and legislative response (Ibanga, 2016, p. 194). Many countries strongly rely on military response as their primary counterterrorism strategy (Ibanga, 2016, p. 194). However, primary consideration is usually given to legislative measures by all countries of the world in the course of counterterrorism. Thus, there are many universal counterterrorism treaties together with national legislations used by many countries in combating terrorism. The UN has provided the platform wherewith countries enter into these treaties with obligations on member states and all peace loving states to perform in order to combat terrorism. Some of these treaties, for example, the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 of 2001, condemn terrorism as a crime and place obligations on member states and all peace-loving nations of the world to domesticate it and punish perpetrators accordingly (Akani, 2013, p. 218). Consequently, in the early stage of adoption and application of counterterrorism strategy in combating terrorism, these nations have domesticated these treaties to criminalise terrorism in their national jurisdictions in accordance with their obligations (Husak, 2007). This explains the existence of domestic legislations, which define what constitutes terrorism and punishment ascribed to it within specific national jurisdictions. Accordingly, the Australian government, in 2001, passed the Charter of the United Nations (Anti-Terrorism Measures) Regulations 2001 and in 2002, the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 was passed (Jarvis & Legrand, 2018, p. 204). The US, which has been at the forefront of the war against terrorism enacted the Patriotic Act 2001, and began to engineer the globalisation of anti-terrorism legislations around the world (Sampson, 2010, p. 42). Canada responded with the enactment of Anti-Terrorism Act 2001(Jarvis & Legrand, 2018, p. 204). The United Kingdom, which had reviewed and merged its counterterrorism powers under the considerable Terrorism Act 2000, went further to fortify its existing powers with the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (Jarvis & Legrand, 2018, p. 204). These efforts were subsequently followed by many other countries of the world.

Nigeria is one of the state parties to many of these treaties on terrorism (multilateral, bilateral and regional). Nigeria has also domesticated many counterterrorism treaties, which they are parties, particularly, the UN treaties on terrorism. However, in spite of the domestication of many of these treaties in Nigeria, the crime of terrorism dilly-dallies. These counterterrorism treaties, which have been domesticated by the Nigerian State are provided and outlined in the annexure A at the end of this paper.

2. Universal Counterterrorism Treaties

Universal counterterrorism treaties domesticated by the Nigerian State and used in the counterterrorism fight are associated with the UN. The concern of the UN with terrorism has a long history and it is traceable to its establishment at the end of the Second World War with the aim of ensuring world peace and security (Agbebaku, 2006, p.137). Thus, in its response to the threat of terrorism, which constitutes serious threat to world peace and security, the UN has brought into existence many treaties - conventions and protocols, amongst other legal instruments, in order to help member states combat terrorism. They are grouped in this work into the Pre-9/11 Conventions and the Post-9/11 Conventions. These treaties are outlined in the Annexure at the end of this article. However, it is important to note, on the one hand that the UN came up with Pre-9/11 conventions shortly after its establishment but before 9/11. These conventions have, by section 40 of the TPA 2011 as amended, been incorporated into the *corpus juris* of Nigeria and are enforceable. On the other hand, the Post 9/11 conventions came into existence after the 9/11 attack.

By these treaties, state parties have the responsibility or obligation, amongst others, to make the offences listed in the conventions punishable and to prosecute the offender or extradite the offender for prosecution by requesting states. The principal obligations set forth in these treaties against terrorism are to incorporate the crimes defined in the treaties in question into the domestic criminal laws of state parties, and to make them punishable by sentences that reflect the gravity of the offence. These are contained in the treaties, for instance, Article 2 of the 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (T.I.A.S. No. 11081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205). State parties are also obliged to participate in the construction of universal jurisdiction over these offences, including jurisdiction based on territoriality, jurisdiction based on the nationality of the offender and the victims and; according to many of these treaties, jurisdiction based on the mere presence of a suspect in the territory of the state. Example of this is as identified in Article 4 of the 1970 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft which provides for jurisdiction based on the registration of the aircraft and the presence of the suspect. In addition, these treaties require various types of co-operation among state parties, ranging from cooperation in preventing terrorist acts, to co-operation in the investigation and criminal proceedings of the relevant offences. However, the duties of state parties to enforce these treaties are subject to ratification (formal acceptance

to be bound by the terms of a treaty by member states) and domestication (incorporation of a treaty into the national legislations of member states).

In view of the demands of the UN in many of its instruments on terrorism, the US, which is at the forefront of the Global War on Terrorism enacted the Patriotic Act 2001 and began to engineer the globalisation of anti-terrorism legislations around the world (Sampson, 2010). The US also enacted the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDP), which makes provision for the designation of a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) (8 U.S.C. s 1182). In Nigeria, apart from other multilateral and bilateral treaties on terrorism, all UN treaties on terrorism have particularly been signed, ratified or acceded to (Adedayo, 2013, p. 10). But there is a gap in the treaty network against terrorism from the Nigerian perspective in that, where Nigeria is a signatory to any treaty without ratification and domestication, such treaty remains not binding and/ or in force until it is ratified and domesticated (Ezeilo, 2011, p. 157; Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 as amended, s. 12). As such, where the Nigerian State fails to domesticate any of these treaties, such treaty remains not applicable or enforceable. For instance, none of the pre-9/11 terrorism treaties and the post-9/11 treaties on terrorism was domesticated as at the time of ratification in Nigeria until in June 3, 2011 when the Terrorism Prevention Act was enacted and in February 21, 2013 when the amendment came into effect. These domestications were done by virtue of re-enactment and reference in section 40 of the Terrorism (Prevention) (Amendment) Act, 2013. It is the unenforceability of these treaties in Nigeria until they are domesticated that constitutes one of the limitations of these treaties on terrorism.

3. Domestic Legislations on Terrorism in Nigeria

In Nigeria, the compliance with UN instruments on terrorism, particularly UN Resolution 1373 of 2001, resulted in the enactment of counterterrorism legislations. These include; the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment, etc.) Act 2002 as amended, now the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act 2004 (EFCCA), Terrorism Prevention Act, 2011 as amended in 2013 (TPA 2011 as amended) and Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2004, which was repealed by the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act No. 11 of 2011, then Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2012 (MLA), which amends the 2011 Act. Other existing laws in Nigeria, which had made certain particular acts of terrorism criminal, include the Criminal Code Act, Cap C. 38 LFN 2004 (CCA), Penal Code Act, Cap. P. 3 LFN 2004 (PCA), Explosives Act Explosive Act, Cap E 17 LFN 2004, Firearms Act, Cap F 28 LFN 2004, Immigrations Act, 2015, Customs Excise Act, 2018, Public Orders Acts, Cap P 42 LFN 2004 and Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps (Amendment) Act 2007, Cap. N 146 LFN 2004 (NSCDCA), which amended the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps Act of 2003 Act.

3.1 The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act, 2004

This Act deals with crimes relating to financial transactions. Section 46 of the Act defines terrorism, while section 15 of the Act creates some offences relating to terrorism. In establishing offences in this Act, intention or knowledge on the part of the offender is the required *mens rea*. Most terrorism matters in Nigeria were charged with this legislation prior to the coming into effect of the Terrorism Prevention Act of 2011 and the amendment in 2013. Howbeit, these two sections were inadequate to be used in combating terrorism in Nigeria. The definition of terrorism in this Act is too restrictive and the acts constituting terrorism within this Act are also not clearly specified and they are equally linked to the violation of the Criminal or Penal Code. It is this link that made it difficult for one to establish that an act constitutes terrorism without showing that such an act is equally prohibited under the CCA or the PCA.

3.2 The Money Laundering (Prohibition) (Amendment) Act, 2012

The Money Laundering Act, 2012 (MLA) amends the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act No. 11, 2011. This Act expands the scope of money laundering offences and enhances customer due diligence and for related matters. Section 15 of the Act prohibits the offence of money laundering, prescribes punishment for the commission of money laundering and lists acts that constitute money laundering. The Act also makes provision for the identification of customers and the beneficiaries of customers' transactions, together with verification of their transactions in both financial and non-financial institutions in Nigeria. The Act in section 3 obliges the institutions to take due diligence in every transaction, where there are links and where there are suspicions of money laundering or terrorist financing, regardless of any exemptions. This Act also makes provision for reporting suspicious transactions. It is noteworthy that this Act prohibits the offence of terrorism and terrorist financing but fails to enumerate those acts which constitute terrorism or terrorist financing. Also, the extent to which the provisions of this Act have been enforced against terrorism remained to be seen in view of the preoccupation of the officials of financial institutions in Nigeria, in recent time, with the prosecution of financial corruption matters.

3.3 The Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 as amended

This is the main Act that deals with terrorism in Nigeria. The 2013 Act amends the Terrorism (Prevention) Act No. 10 of 2011, makes provision for extra-territorial application of the Act and strengthens terrorist financing offences and other matters related to them. The Act in sections 1(2) prohibits all acts of terrorism and fi-

nancing of terrorism and makes an offender liable on conviction to a maximum of death sentence. It also defines what acts of terrorism mean and enumerates the acts, which constitute terrorism in its Section 1(3). It empowers the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA), in section 1A (1) to be responsible for coordinating all other security and enforcement agencies and to support all relevant security, intelligence, law enforcement agencies and military services to prevent and combat acts of terrorism in Nigeria. Furthermore, it ensures the effective formulation and implementation of a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy for Nigeria. The Act, in its Section 1A(2) makes the Attorney-General of the Federation (AG), the authority for the effective implementation and administration of the Act in order to strengthen and enhance the existing legal framework to ensure conformity of Nigeria's counter-terrorism laws and policies with international standards and the UN Conventions on Terrorism. Also, he is required to maintain international cooperation, as required, for preventing and combating international acts of terrorism and to ensure the effective prosecution of terrorism matters for punishment of culprits.

A provision for designation of organisations as terrorists' organisations, which is similar to the provision in the AEDP Act 2001 of the US, is also provided for in section 2 of the Act. The Act has also in section 40, by referrals, made twelve of the UN Conventions on terrorism, of which Nigeria is a signatory, part of the Act. Apart from making the twelve UN Conventions part of the Act by referral, the Act has also incorporated several provisions of the UN Conventions on specific acts of terrorism into its provisions. For instance, section 2 of this Act provides for the proscription of persons or an organisation as terrorist group and the procedure to do so. Section 3 incorporates the International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents 1973. Sections 10 and 13 of the Act incorporate the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 1999. In addition, section 15 incorporates the International Convention against the Taking of Hostages 1979. In this Act, for a proceeding to be successful in court for the purpose of proscribing a group of persons or any organisation as a terrorist group, such persons or organisation (i) must be shown to have engaged in participating or collaborating in an act of terrorism or, (ii) must be shown to have engaged in promoting, encouraging or exhorting an act of terrorism, or (iii) must be shown to have engaged in setting up or pursuing acts of terrorism. This provision clearly establishes the procedure to be followed and conditions precedence that must exist for a group to be proscribed. In the event of absence of these conditions, and a group is nonetheless proceeded against before a court and finally proscribed, it raises concerns on the rationale of such proscription and the achievement of the advantages of such proscription (Inyang & Hanson, 2019, p. 34). This is so because when an organisation is proscribed, for instance, the rationale is not only to cripple the operation of the organisation in the target state, but also to, amongst others, cripple all supports for the group from within and outside the target state. But where other countries of the world condemn and reject such proscription, the purpose of such proscription,

is partially defeated (Inyang & Hanson, 2019, p. 34). The succeeding government crackdown on such organisation therefore exposes the target state to both domestic and global denunciation (Junker, 2017). This was the case with the proscription of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) by the Nigerian State, a group that is considered by many, not to have ever been involved in committing acts of terrorism in Nigeria (Junker, 2017). On the contrary, the Fulani herdsmen have been involved in wanton destruction of lives and property in Nigeria, together with the commission of other acts which are accommodated under the TPA 2011 as amended as acts of terrorism. But regrettably, in spite of several violent attacks carried out by the Fulani Herdsmen across the country and their recent listing at the global level as a terrorist organisation, the Nigerian state has failed to proscribe the group (Buchanan, 2018). This has raised serious questions on the political will of the Nigerian State to enforce counterterrorism legislations in its current war against terror.

4. Enforcement of Counterterrorism Legislations in Nigeria

The gamut of legislations available in Nigeria for use in combating the crime of terrorism is, without doubt, adequate. The TPA 2011, as amended, is a comprehensive statute that meets international standards. Twelve of the international conventions on terrorism have, by section 40 of the TPA 2011 as amended, been made part of this Act and, as such, they are in force in Nigeria. Apart from the TPA 2011 as amended, there are the EFCCA, CCA, PCA, MLA, NSCDCA and other legislations, which could be used in combating terrorism in Nigeria. As such we have adequate legislations to combat terrorism in Nigeria. However, our challenge is that there is no adequate enforcement of these legislations. This is because there are challenges in the Nigerian Criminal Justice System, which operate as roadblocks against effective enforcement of these legislations. One of such challenges is, firstly, that of ensuring due process. The arrest and detention of some persons on allegation of terrorism are not based on reasonable grounds. This explains why many detainees are sometimes allowed to go after spending several months or years in military detention without trial, and those tried are hardly convicted at the end of prosecution (*Talal Ahmed Roda v. FRN* (2015) 1-2, SC. Pt. 11, p. 31 at 51). In this case, Talal Ahmad Roda was convicted of terrorism and jailed for life while two others were discharged and acquitted by the lower court in Nigeria because of improper investigation. This conviction was also set aside by the Supreme Court on appeal because of lack of jurisdiction as was shown on the charge sheet.

Secondly is the procedure for enforcement of terrorism legislations in Nigeria. Notably, before 2015, the CPA and the CPC were the major procedural statutes used in the enforcement of terrorism laws in Nigeria. These Acts were too obsolete to deal with the 21st century crime of terrorism. Fortunately, in 2015, the Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) came into effect with laudable provisions, particularly in the area of witness protection, reduction of delays and strengthening of the prosecution, the defence and the Courts (Udoh & Edoho, 2019, p. 228-230).

However, in spite of the coming into existence of the ACJA five years ago, there has been diminutive progress in investigation and prosecution of terrorism cases. This is evidenced in the continuous existence of low detection rate and various political obstacles, like impunity and lack of cooperation of some people and countries providing safe havens for the terrorists (Hanson, 2019, p. 26). In the event of detections being made, the procedure for not bringing terror suspects to justice, and on time, is even permitted by the TPA 2011, as amended in its section 27(1), which makes for a prolonged detention period of 90 days together with an indefinite renewal period of such detention. As such, the situation of high terrorism violence, longer detention period without trial, low prosecution and gross impunity remains. Such high state of low capacity and commitment to prosecute suspects fuel dissent and contribute in some ways to the radicalisation of those who otherwise were innocent but made to suffer unnecessarily alongside the terrorists while in detention. This is part of what happened when in 2009, Mohammed Yusuf, the former leader of Boko Haram was extra-judicially executed and many of his followers together with innocent civilians arrested and detained. Some of those arrested and detained were never tried and were released after a prolonged period of detention. It is some of these people that joined with Abubakar Shekau, after being radicalise, to continue with the acts of terrorist violent of the group. Also, section 1A (2) which empowers the AG to ensure conformity of Nigeria's counter-terrorism legislations and policies with international standards and the UN Conventions on Terrorism, is generally violated. For example, the AG, amongst others, fails to ensure the prosecution of many terrorists and never to negotiate with them or yield to their demands. Instead, he makes way for grant of amnesty, training, rehabilitation and reintegration of terrorists into the Nigerian State (Nwachukwu, 2020). This arrangement is antithetical to the demands of all UN treaties as well as domestic legislations on terrorism in Nigeria.

Thirdly is the existence of a disconnection amongst the security and law enforcement authorities for the enforcement of terrorism legislations in Nigeria. The military personnel are the ones majorly involved in the terror war, yet they can only investigate and prosecute their personnel and not the terrorists. With regards to prosecution of the terrorists, they are absolutely not in control and can only testify as witnesses for the prosecution, which sometimes they grudgingly do, in the light of glaring complicity and unwarranted compromise on the party of the government. This usually frustrates the military more in the terror war and inhibited their morale, particularly as it happened in February, 2020, when 1,400 terrorists that ought to be prosecuted in accordance with the law were released by the President (Owolabi, 2020). Also, the ONSA is the coordinating body for all security and law enforcement agencies on matters of terrorism in Nigeria. The AG has the ultimate responsibility for the prosecution of offences of terrorism in Nigeria. This prosecution is sometimes carried out by legal officers in the Office of the AG and a few times, by external lawyers who are briefed for that purpose. In spite of these, there exists still huge backlog of terrorism cases in courts. The disconnect between the military, who are primarily involved in the terror war and other security and law enforce-

ment authorities who investigate and gather information, and that of the AG that prosecutes, remains a roadblock to effective enforcement of the laws on terrorism in Nigeria. The result is sometimes the production of evidence which is not cogent enough to sustain the charge of an accused by proof beyond reasonable doubt. This sometimes results in the dismissal of terrorism charges and the acquittal of persons accused of terrorism by courts on grounds of procedural irregularity the affected the jurisdiction of the court. An example of this is what happened when Senator Ali Ndume was discharged and acquitted on the charge of terrorism on the ground that the prosecution failed to make out any case against him enough to entitle him to answer or defend it (Bashir, 2017).

The fourth is that the Nigerian Courts are overstretched. Sometimes judges and magistrates still sit two to one court room (Idem, 2015, p. 277). This, without doubt, constitutes yet another challenge in the Nigerian Criminal Justice System that constrains effective enforcement of terrorism legislations. An average day in court witnesses a judge hearing more than 10 cases in parts. The manner of recording of proceedings, which is sometimes done in long hand, and the use of interlocutory applications by lawyers, slow down proceedings. With hours spent in hearing these cases in part, it is practically impossible to attend to all the cases waiting to be listed on the cause list on daily basis. For these same courts to be saddled with the duty of attending to the numerous terrorism cases effectively, in addition to other cases, is highly demanding. The existence of the huge case docket in these courts has been shown to usually result in delay of justice. (Essien & Udofia, 2012, p. 20).

Fifthly is corruption which constitutes one of the challenges or roadblocks that constrain effective enforcement of the legislations on terrorism in Nigeria. Corruption is known in Nigeria to cut across all arms of government. Within the Judiciary, both the bar and the bench have been involved (Odunsi, 2019). Some judicial officers, including Justices of the Supreme Court of Nigeria, have been arrested on allegations of corruption (Essien, 2016, p. 16). Many have been made to stand trial on charges bordering on corruption. Corruption has contributed to a weak law enforcement sector that is an impediment to Nigeria's response to terrorism. From the budgeting of funds to the release of such funds for use in the security sector for the prosecution of the war on terror in Nigeria, it has been observed that some of those funds were actually fraudulently misappropriated (Hanson, 2019, p. 27). And as such, we have a situation where soldiers are deployed in locations with personnel, equipment and other resources which are not enough to secure such locations from terrorist attacks (Hanson, 2019, p. 27). Consequently, terrorists overrun military bases on several occasions with little or no resistance (Ogundipe, 2018).

Corruption has greatly soiled the hands of government officials in Nigeria such that even when the former President, Jonathan stated that Boko Haram had infiltrated his government, no investigation or prosecution was carried out to punish those involved till date. However, some persons involved in the diversion of funds

meant for combating terrorism, for example, former National Security Chief, Sambo Dasuki and other military chiefs have been put on trials in courts on that account (Hanson, 2019, p. 27). In 2013 and 2014, N923bn was the budget allocation for the security sector, while N934bn was for 2015 (Hanson, 2019, p. 27). This trend continued progressively showing that between 2018 and 2019 the allocation for the security sector was high and steady. In spite of these allocations, complains of none availability of functional equipment resulting in military and police absconding and consequential trial and conviction for mutinies pervaded the security agencies (Hanson, 2019, p. 27). Also recently, there has been apparent suspicion of corruption having regards to huge funding of the defence and security forces without a corresponding positive result in the terror war. Accordingly, President Buhari stated that he was surprised that Boko Haram still existed (Olanrewaju, 2020). Also in the course of the terror war in Nigeria, numerous cases of prison break resulting in the escape of terrorists have been recorded. This is evidence of existence of leakages within the national security architecture in Nigeria, which may not be unconnected with corruption within the security forces. Unfortunately, no government official, within the security forces, has ever been held accountable for these incidents. In the light of the endemic corruption in Nigeria, the enforcement of legislations to deal with terrorism remains a far cry.

5. Conclusion

Legislative response to terrorism is usually associated with existing treaties both multilateral and bilateral treaties together with domestic legislations of involved states. Many UN Conventions, which are examples of multilateral agreements, exist for combating terrorism. All signatories to these conventions and all peace-loving nations of the world are required, amongst others, to domesticate these conventions in their national legislations for use in responding to terrorism. This is one of the fundamental obligations or responsibilities placed on members states, which they are expected to perform. It is the discharge of this central responsibility that provides the basis for enforcement of these treaties in the target states as well as other states of the world. Nigeria is a state party to many UN treaties on terrorism and has complied with the demands of these treaties. Accordingly, the Nigerian State has enacted specific legislations on terrorism. Relevant international conventions on terrorism, has also been domesticated into its national laws. However, it remains to be seen the extent of Nigeria's application of these legislations, by way of enforcement, in responding to terrorism, particularly those committed by Boko Haram. This is so because, it is shown that whereas there are adequate counterterrorism legislations for combating terrorism in Nigeria, the enforcement of these legislations is inadequate. Many identifiable obstacles, including non-application of due process, non-adherence to procedure and corruption exist to undermine the enforcement of these legislations. Strengthening the enforcement of these legislations therefore remains the *sine qua non* for combatting the lingering terrorism in Nigeria.

6. Recommendations

In view of the finding that inadequacy of enforcement of legislations in combating terrorism in Nigeria constitutes one of the causes of the lingering terrorism in Nigeria, what needs to be done is to strengthen the enforcement of these legislations. Thus, particular attention should be given to the TPA 2011, as amended, with particular regards to sections 10, 13 and 35, EFCCA, the MLA and other laws. Accordingly, drying up financial resources of terrorists must be done by the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU), which is responsible for tracing financial transactions associated with the terrorists from where they originate and reporting same to relevant authorities as required by section 14 of the TPA 2011 as amended. In addition, appropriate sanctions should be taken against individuals, groups or institutions identified with such terrorist financial transactions. Grant of pardon to terrorists, in whatever name, with attendant reintegration, rehabilitation and reformation benefits, is viewed as rewarding criminality. This measure also operates to weaken the criminal justice system with regards to the terror war. Accordingly, the AG should ensure that terrorists are prosecuted and punished. This would bring the administration of counter-terrorism legislations in Nigeria in conformity with international standard as required by section 1A (2) of the TPA 2011, as amended. There must be strict adherence to due process, particularly during arrest, detention and prosecution of terrorists. The challenge of poor collaboration, arising from mutual distrust amongst the security and law enforcement authorities, in the enforcement of terrorism laws in Nigeria, should be addressed. Accordingly, there should be an increased synergy amongst them through consistent advance training, particularly in the area of information gathering and sharing as well as collection of evidence, investigation and preparation of witnesses for prosecution. All traces of impunity associated with government businesses in relation to enforcement of terrorism legislations should be addressed. This could be done by forging increasing stronger synergy amongst the different monitoring units of all the security forces in Nigerian. This would make way for easy information sharing and enhanced performance within the dictates of the law.

More special courts should be established, strengthened and more judges should be employed and trained on counterterrorism adjudication with encouraging welfare packages for the trial of only terrorism, corruption and financial crimes cases in Nigeria. This, together with other variables could help decongest not only the courts, but also detention centres and ensure fair dispensation of justice with regard to terrorism matters. On corruption, social orientation on the consequences of involvement in corruption should be increased. Corrupt officials should be punished without prejudices. The institutions responsible for punishing erring government officials should be made to do so in accordance with the law devoid of sentiments. The welfare of government officials need be properly addressed while honesty and hard work should be rewarded. To avoid jail breaks, which is a tactic used by terrorists to amongst others, free their members, recruit new ones and frustrate the prosecution,

it is recommended that security in existing correctional centres should be further strengthened. Staff training and re-training, together with provision of other logistics should be undertaken periodically. The building of new correctional centres should also be considered for terrorist suspect. Such correctional centres should also be provided with current technological facilities for surveillance, interrogation, medicals and others to guarantee proper treatment of detainees and maximum security. The security of these facilities should be properly strengthened and the vulnerability of the environment for citing of such facilities should be taken into consideration. Accordingly, such facilities should not be cited in terror prone areas.

In addition, the Nigerian State should be swift in responding to terrorism. Perpetrators should be prosecuted or extradited for prosecution in accordance with the law as done by other countries of the world. Terrorism is a serious crime against the state and humanity. As such, perpetrators should not be made to surrender and be prosecuted or fight on and be killed. Grant of safe corridor, which operates to exonerate terrorists of all criminal and civil liabilities and cloth them with the benefit of reintegration, rehabilitation and reformation should be discouraged and discontinued. The safe corridor initiative is antithetical to basic norms of criminal jurisprudence, which insist on punishment of offenders of serious offences to serve as deterrence to others. Violent groups should be monitored, trailed and members arrested and prosecuted before their activities escalate to an uncontrollable point. Organisations who are actually involved in the commission of acts of terrorism should be designated as terrorist organisations by the Nigerian State within reasonable possible time and treated as such in accordance with extant legislations. The decision of doing so should be guided by the law and due process devoid of sentiments, after being satisfied based on the facts on ground that such a group has actually been involved in the commission of offence of terrorism. The relevant legislations on terrorism should constantly be used to establish and continue to strengthen cooperation and further enhance collaboration with other states involved in the terror war. Thus, this continuous strengthening of international corporations in counterterrorism engagements amongst target state and other states of the world would operate to prevent those states from being used as safe havens for terrorists. Stronger friendly ties should be heightened with our allies. New ones should also be developed and strengthened in order to further enhance collaborations so that these countries could also proscribe organisations labelled as terrorists in Nigeria. This synergy will ensure that the terrorists have no safe haven and continue in terrorism and at a low cost. Our criminal justice system should not be jettisoned but should be enforced against perpetrators of terrorism within and outside the Nigerian.

ANNEXURE A

(A.) THE PRE- 9/11 CONVENTIONS

These are the treaties on terrorism, which came into existence shortly after the establishment of the UN, but before 9/11 terrorist attack in the US.

1. The 1963 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (20 U.S.T. 941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219).

2. The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft of 1970 (Adedayo, 2013, p. 11).

3. The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation of 1971 (24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 167).

4. The 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167).

5. The 1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (T.I.A.S. No. 11081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205).

6. The 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The Convention was amended in 2005 by the 2005 Amendments to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1456 U.N.T.S. 101).

7. The 1988 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation (1589 U.N.T.S. 474).

8. The 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1678 U.N.T.S. 222).

9. The Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms located on the Continental Shelf 1988 (1678 U.N.T.S. 374).

10. The 1991 Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (2122 U.N.T.S. 374).

11. The 1997 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (2149 U.N.T.S. 256; United Nations Treaties Collection, 2017).

12. The 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (2178 U.N.T.S. 197).

Notably, all these pre-9/11 conventions have, by section 40 of the TPA 2011 as amended, been incorporated into the body of laws on terrorism in Nigeria and are enforceable.

(B.) Post- 9/11 Conventions

These are the conventions on terrorism, which came into existence after the 9/11 attack. They include;

1. The 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (INFCIRC/274/Ref.1/Mode.1, 2016).

2. The 2005 Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf.

3. The 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (2445 U.N.T.S. 137).

4. The 2010 Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation.

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Cameroon and human rights in the wake of counter-terrorism

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ABSTRACT Even if terrorism is severely punished by international, regional and national regulatory instruments and protection mechanisms with principles and strategies, it must not be fought outside the international law and principles of containment of this phenomenon. In the context of Cameroon, the fight against this phenomenon is marred by the difficulty of respecting principles or demonstrating respect for human rights, the law of war or simply international law. This leads the central State to constantly justify itself and expose itself to world criticism in its way of defeating violent extremism within it. While the geopolitics of terror reports the occupation of the far north, northwest and southwest regions by a brutal insurgent phenomenon that highlights the difficulty of defeating without infringing on human rights because of both the state and the rebels. This confirms that reconciling these two notions seems to be a utopian dream, provided that cognitive frameworks for counter-insurgency are consolidated by drafting a white paper on the issue or by developing a national plan for the prevention of terrorism based on education. This will therefore require mastering counter-insurgency mechanisms through an emphasis on intelligence and the inclusion of populations in the pacification effort.

Keywords Counter-terrorism - anti-terrorism - counterinsurgency - human rights.

General introduction

Unlike counter-terrorism, which is part of the preventive or pre-emptive component of the fight against terrorism, anti-terrorism is part of the reactive phase to respond to counter-terrorism failure(Baud, 2003). After having long been seen as a land of calm in a tumultuous and tenebrous region in view of its security situation, Cameroon is emerging at the end of this decade as one of the Central African countries most affected by terrorism. Or better still, it now appears to be one of the most populated States in the subregion with centrifugal forces that rightly or wrongly challenge the centrality, authority, territoriality and sovereignty of the State. In this anarchic environment, in terms of the inability to assert the command power of the central authority, this country has, to a greater or lesser extent, set up a system based on regulatory instruments and mechanisms to protect counter-terrorist and anti-terrorist action.

Whether political, economic, diplomatic, special or strategic (Thual, 1996), the mechanisms mobilized by Cameroon do not seem to satisfy, for the moment, the national and international strategic community on the issue, because the indicator: *human rights*, divides. This sometimes highlights the impotence or operational weakness of public authorities in the face of the constraints and demands of low-intensity wars. From Boko Haram to the armed gangs operating in the north-west and south-western regions, the Cameroonian General Staff is caught in the grip of an adversary's irregularity, which exploits the populations and turns them into a shield to impose a dirty cause and spread terror. This pushes the latter to mobilize strong strategic and operational dynamics whose collateral damage invites itself into the sphere of human rights.

At least this is the general idea conveyed in the arenas of discussion or popularization of debates on the relationship between human rights and counter-terrorism. In this sense, counter-terrorism would cover normative, strategic (in terms of guidance) and operational aspects. At the normative level, since 11 September and from the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Office, the fight against terrorism has seen a proliferation of texts, treaties, declarations or other forms of regulatory elements of State conduct in their quest to contain the phenomenon(FIDH, 2017). At the strategic level, the world has adopted a global anti-terrorism strategy aimed at shaping the instruments and mechanisms for managing the terrorist phenomenon. Some States have also followed the trend at the national level(CCTS, 2003). As for the operational dimension, most States have created or adapted, depending on the circumstances, their forces by creating special or specialized units to deal with this phenomenon. In Cameroon, one of the operational tools dedicated to this subject is the Rapid Intervention Battalion (BIR)(Heungoup, 2011).

The scientific aspect of this work will be based on a twofold approach. At the theoretical level, it will be based on a constructivist reading in order to put into perspective the processes and interactions, the symbols and motivations, or the per-

ceptions and sensations that motivate the different actors on both sides, in their project either to build or to deconstruct the established order to achieve their respective objectives.

Therefore, at the analytical level, it will be a question of convening the geopolitical method to decipher the mechanisms mobilized by actors, the stakes of their actions, the configuration of their resources and the modalities of manifestation of their capacity for nuisance for the purposes of control, emancipation or domination. Can the fight against terrorism in Cameroon therefore be effective without infringing on human rights? Or how to reconcile counter-terrorism with respect for human rights? In the end, what are the priority areas for reconciling human rights and counter-terrorism? While hammering that this hypothesis is utopian, it is important to note that in a context of asymmetric conflicts, human rights are the very issue of legitimizing sovereign action to the detriment of centrifugal forces. Aware of this symbolism, they make it the target of their operations with a view to pushing the State to the fault. Hence the need for the latter to work on counter-speeches and to involve the populations in its anti-terrorist strategy. Moreover, to curb this phenomenon and limit human rights violations, the State must first become aware of terrorism and its negative impact on human security (I) before reconciling counter-terrorism and human rights (II).

I. Cameroon faces the challenge of terrorism

The mapping of the contestation of Cameroon's territoriality reveals the emergence of new allegiances parallel to the collective benchmarks instituted. This confirms the emergence of a real crisis of territoriality. It is led by insurgents for reasons of either resource control or change of the social organization format. To this end, Cameroon faces Boko Haram in the far north, whose territorial anchoring is obvious and whose containment measures seem to be taking effect in view of the relative calm observed in recent months. Also, in the north-western and south-western regions, this country faces the greed and nuisance capacity of a constellation of armed gangs, most of which are grouped around a secessionist project (I). They therefore intend to confirm the triple crisis of identity, territoriality and sovereignty in Cameroon. In the theatre of operations, this configuration or relationship between the latter and the central state leads to collateral damage, in terms of power, affecting human rights. In addition, it highlights the impact of the rebels' bellicose logic through the abuses committed as a means of expressing and disseminating their message of protest (II).

A. Geopolitics of terrorism in Cameroon

If we want to take a look at the spatial anchoring of insurgencies in Cameroon and set aside other categories of insecure situations, three out of the country's ten regions are affected, parasitized and hit by the effects and harms of the phenomenon

on human security or human rights. This is the far north region where the Islamist sect Boko Haram (1) and the English-speaking regions of the northwest and southwest (NOSO) where a plethora of armed gangs are more or less coordinated at times in order to materialize their supposed desire for secession (2).

1. BOKO HARAM IN FAR NORTH CAMEROON

To examine the Boko Haram phenomenon in far northern Cameroon at this time, it is essential to set the August 2016 milestone as the starting point for the analysis. This date marks the emergence of a new strategic and operational dynamic within the group, imposed by an arsenal of multi-level responses, addressed to it by the State and its partners from 2014 onwards. Following a material and immaterial response from Cameroon, the movement experienced impressive entrenchment further away from its favourite attack zones.

In August 2016, a split broke out within Boko Haram, which mainly led to the emergence of two opposing forces or factions on strategy and tactics. From then on, they each operated in their own space or territory. After the eviction of Abubakar Shekau, the sect placed Habib Yusuf alias Al Barnawi, son of founder Mohamed Yusuf, at the head of the «Jamaa'atu Ahlis-Sunnah Lid-Da'wati wal-Jihaad», Boko Haram's real name. The latter, aged about 25, forges very close ties with the Islamic State or Daech whose unified group swore allegiance in 2015 (RFI, 2018). Thus, Abubakar Shekau, now heads the Group of the People of Sunnah for Preaching and Jihad and Abu Musab al-Barnawi, the Islamic State of West Africa Province, in reference to allegiance to the Islamic State (Gilpin, 2015).

This situation has led to a change and repositioning of the cult in the theatre of operations. In this sense, the fallen SHEKAU was now operating mainly in the Sambisa forest on the Nigerian side, relying on a network of corrupt politicians in that country. He was associated with a network of criminals, groups that had allegiance to him. Al Barnawi, on his part, «controls the crime and arms trafficking routes from Ndjamena, transiting through Cameroon via the Logone and Chari (Kousséri - Goulfey - Bodo) to Nigeria via the Mayo-Sava (Banki, Amchide, Kerawa, Kolofata) or the Mayo-Tsanaga (Mora, Mémé, Mayo Moskota)»(ISS, 2018).

In response to this phenomenon, the State of Cameroon has deployed its military and security arsenal to work jointly and has engaged collectively with the concerned Lake Chad Basin States, associated with Benin, to contain the phenomenon and «nip it in the bud». This is visible with the mobilization of 1st, 2nd and 3rd category forces in addition to its very active participation in the Multinational Joint Task Force.

In addition to this military mechanism, civil society and the populations of the region are also particularly active. Their courage and self-sacrifice in marking their stamp in this process of containment of the phenomenon highlights the strategic

awareness of the Cameroonian General Staff, which admits them in the theatre of operations, of the need for a multidimensional response whose effects seem perceptible today. If the situation in this region reveals a lull that does not mean much victory and is interpreted within the army as a strategic withdrawal, the time has come to be vigilant. This is far from being the case in English-speaking regions where the defence of territorial integrity is at its height.

2. Armed gangs in the NOSO

NOSO represents the two English-speaking regions caught in a vice by a constellation of armed gangs challenging the authority of the state and calling for secession. Historically, these two regions, known as Southern Cameroons or Ambazonia, constitute the former British Cameroon. This part was colonized by the English, who, through federalism in October 1961, found themselves integrated with the French-speaking part in the federal state. Later in 1972, the federal state of Cameroon was abolished and evolved into a unitary state. Today, this country has been a decentralized unitary state since 1996. It is therefore the ineffectiveness of this decentralization for some, or the failure to respect the commitments made at the time of the federation (Esser, 2015) between the two French-speaking and English-speaking parties, in addition to the injustices they consider to be victims on a daily basis, which, it seems, have degenerated into the current crisis in Cameroon by bringing into play the form of the State and the issue of resources.

Located between Cameroon to the east and Nigeria to the west and north, Ambazonia, which includes the Cameroonian regions of South-West and North-West, covers an area of 43,000 square kilometres and would have 13 states.These states correspond to the different departments of the NOSO regions as structured in the official administrative district of Cameroon. It is about: Manyu State, Donga-Manyu State, Lebialem State, Lebialem State, Ngo-Ketunjia State, Koupe-Manengouba State, Mezam State, Fako State, Momo State, Meme State, Bui State, Ndian State, Boyo State. According to the Ambazonians understood here as all the actors and movements defending this area politically and militarily with a view to making it an independent state, this territory of about 6 million inhabitants or nearly 20% of the population of Cameroon is ready and must take care of itself. This is why, like any normal state, they did propozed a government made up of the three powers: the legislative, the judiciary and the executive. It consisted of a President and a Prime Minister surrounded by several sectoral departments serving as ministries. This is obviously woven on the basis of a politico-military structure leading a bloody war in the theatre of operations.

In fact, the main political movements and armed gangs operating in Ambazonia and supporting the independence of this part of Cameroon's national territory are among many others: the Ambazonian Tigers, the Bangem Red Dragons, the Ambazonian Defence Forces (ADF), the Southern Cameroons Defence Forces

(SOCADEF), the Southern Cameroons Defence Forces (SCDF), the Ambazonia Restoration Army (ARA), the Southern Cameroons National Council (SCNC), the Southern Cameroons People's Organization (SCAPO), the Republic of Ambazonia Consortium (RoA), the Southern Cameroons Youth League (SCYL), the Ambazonia Governing Council (AGC) and the Movement for the Restoration of the Independence of Southern Cameroons (MoRISC).

In the theatre of operations, these groups are now evolving as a mesh network, as the coordination structure for strategic action was dismantled and torn apart following the arrest of Sisiku Julius Ayuk Tabe, the self-proclaimed President of the Republic of Ambazonia. Since then, this rebel network has not had a fixed structure and is being reconstituted according to the evolution of the conflict and its challenges. Consisting of hotspots, this network no longer has any real and clearly identified leadership(Baud, 2003).

This phenomenon, as well as that of Boko Haram, has made Cameroon, particularly in these areas, a country in search of peace and above all a victim of an unprecedented humanitarian crisis affecting both its macroeconomic and microeconomic performance, but also its social indicators. This makes any prospect of development even more difficult.

In their operationality, they endanger human lives, rape, murder, raid, burn houses, schools, churches and human beings, justifying all this by their desire for secession. This undoubtedly puts human rights at risk, whether because of them or because of the response of the Cameroonian armed forces.

B. Outstanding rights in the theatres of operations

In counter-insurgency matters, it is constant to highlight the question of human rights, because it is even the issue of legitimizing terrorist and anti-terrorist action. In reality, for both rebels and the State, they serve either to make themselves heard and be considered as a true political actor, or to legitimize the use of military violence and justify it as a cause of humanity. However, collateral, these rights have often been, rightly or wrongly, based on the quality of political regimes and systems, mocked for various reasons, because the State (2) and the rebels (1) in their cooperative relationship are constantly in conflict.

1. Due to the insurgents: the disputed state

On the ground, the constellation of armed gangs supporting the independence of the NOSO, commit abuses and other forms of human insecurity on a daily basis. In reality, they proceed by surprise by avoiding direct confrontation with the armed forces since the objective is to create an extension of social fatigue (Yogo, 2017).

By mobilizing mysticism as the main mode of protection, NOSO armed gangs acquire the courage and capacity to harm populations and create or accentuate conditions of social tension by trying to legitimize themselves. By seeking to bypass the power of the strong (La Grange, Balencie ; 2009), the weak (Wicht, 2010) orthe insurgent, takes advantage of the weakness of social regulation by dislodging the rule at the centre of social relations(Badie, Smouts, 1999)in the NOSO. In this sense, they challenge the State both materially and immaterially.

In practice, they carry out several attacks targeting both infrastructure or civilian and military populations. For example, in the southwest, several localities were attacked on April 13, 2018and october 2020 with the killing of the Kumba students at school by the terrorists or bandits. Today, according to Pan-African television channel Afrique Media, Kalashnikov and machine gun fire put the populations of Kumba, Mundongo and many others in the total panic, as armed bands from Ambazonia blocked several roads and attacked the regular forces (Afrique Media ; 2018). On June 10, 2018, Agence France Presse announced the death of a Cameroonian soldier killed in the northwest region near Furu-Awa in the Menchum department. He was the victim of an ambush while patrolling with a colleague in the community (AFP, 2017).

Since January 2017, these armed gangs committed abuses that can be categorized in terms of violations of the right to education: pupils, teachers have been brutalized and mutilated in places by terrorists, high schools have been burned down (Kang-Barombi Technical High School in Meme, Kumbo Bilingual High School in Bui or Afap High School, and many others. Attacks against the administrative authorities too are parts of the said abuses (Sub-Divisional Officer of Batibo, Divisional Officer of Lebialem, Governor of the south-west, etc.). They are followed by attacks against traditional authorities (more than a dozen attacks have been recorded, such as that of the 3rd degree chief of the Esukutan locality in Toko district or the fire in the Etam chiefdom in Kupe-Manengouba). Another one is the expectations against infrastructure and economic or commercial activities in the region (communication company pylons, attacks on industries such as PAMOL and CDC in the southwest) or attacks against the defence and security forces (DSF). As of 11 June 2018, 123 attacks reported 84 deaths among the DSF. One also notices raping and slaughtering human beings as main abuses as well as enlisting children in their groups.

The insurgents intend to put an end to the State and the nation. To do this, they catalyse the bursting of the irredentist feeling of an English-speaking fringe by building a rebel network to extend their propensity to nuisance. Thus, they promote the loss of collective labels and citizen symbols to create division by pushing the state, more or less, through its regular army, to blame.

2. Because of the army: the state pushed to the fault

In terms of counter-terrorism, it is utopian to fight without collateral damage on the issue of human rights. This struggle takes place between a regular force and an irregular force that uses the prohibitions as permission by challenging the principles of International Law and the Law of War. For them, prohibitions are indeed the appropriate method of operation.

According to Amnesty International, the Cameroonian army has violated human rights in the fight against terrorism in the NOSO by conducting security operations in Dadi, Akwaya district, Manyu department, southwest region, committing unlawful killings and destruction of property, carrying out arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detention, torture, causing deaths in custody, committing unlawful killings, extrajudicial executions and destruction of property in Bodam, Akwaya district, Manyu department, southwest region. That NGO says that Cameroon has violated human rights by committing unlawful killings and destruction of property in Kajifu, Akwaya district, Manyu department, southwest region, conducting security operations in Belo, Boyo department, southwest region, organizing extrajudicial executions, organizing beatings and arbitrary arrests at the checkpoint. Or by causing the deaths in custody of four men (Amnesty International, 2017).

In this confrontation, opposing the DSF and Ambazonian fighters, different cultural and psychological, social and economic systems oppose each other while referring to different logics. Here, victory can only be built by deconstructing ordinary tactics, since «strategic success is built on the opponent's tactical successes» (Baud, 2003). The number, space and territory no longer constitute the main matrices for the elaboration and development of the strategy, because this time everything is based on immaterial dimensions of the fighter's motivation. In these operations, the Ambazonian fighters reject fair methods and act on the populations with means disproportionate to those of the DSF. As a result, they exploit the weaknesses or flaws of the national military apparatus to mark their stamp in the theatre of operations and in the minds of the populations, the national and international community.

Despite the use of non-sophisticated weapons by these combatants, their inability to use drone technology for the time being, their targeted attacks and their withdrawal or installation of command posts in inaccessible areas, the State is unable to contain them permanently. This is due to their constant evanescence at the political and military levels, which offers no opportunity to count them, decipher them and grasp the meaning of their itinerary. Their different packages, the echo of which sometimes creates panic among the populations, justify their characterization as guerrillas.

Indeed, the NOSO rebels are overturning the strategic paradigms that have often structured the logic and operational dynamics of state security, because their action is undeniably part of the sphere of new conflicts. For Cameroon, this is not

a surprise or better, new. Certainly different in etiology from the period of the maquis and more or less from the Boko Haram phenomenon, this war highlights the question of Cameroonian military culture. It strongly sets the scene for a profound reflection on Cameroonian military art, which on every occasion is distinguished by an immeasurable singularity and specificity.

In a context where the enemy does not respect any rules and uses the population as a shield, it is impossible for an army like the Cameroonian army, insufficiently equipped at the technological level, to encroach on human rights. If the Ambazonian fighters hide in the population and benefit from the help of part of it as is the case at the moment, then it will be difficult for the army to distinguish and remove the fighter from the crowd. This does not justify human rights abuses, but it explains the high probability in such an environment of contributing to human insecurity. At a time of global reticulation, the Cameroonian army, the secular arm of politics, can only resemble the system in which it operates. There is nothing that predisposes it to a strategic height that could prevent these abuses. On the contrary, it is predisposed to reduce its level of anchoring on the issue by taking into account its historical trajectory as a strategic lesson and by further professionalizing its people. To this end, it is up to the State to work on its strategic and operational cognitive framework to better harmonize its security practice with the requirement of respect for human rights.

II. Reconciling counter-terrorism
and respect for human rights

In any case, counter-terrorism will remain antithetical to respect for human rights in fragile states in sub-Saharan Africa. This is not due to the will or pusillanimity of the strategic community of these countries, but rather to their structure inextricably linked to their history and conscience. To contain or reduce the coldness of this observation, the technology to be used will strategically consist in civilizing customs and conducts, by consolidating the central State's cognitive counter-insurgency frameworks with their entourage and increasing control over counter-insurgency operations.

A. The consolidation of national counter-insurgency
cognitive frameworks

These are the principles, doctrines, concepts and norms governing security practice in Cameroon. The aim is to develop a national counter-insurgency strategy or doctrine, a defence and security white paper and a specific plan to prevent terrorism (2).

1. The development of a national counter-terrorism strategy and a defence and security white Book

This requires proceeding upstream at the counter-terrorism level, which in reality makes any counter-terrorism strategy relevant.

Developing a national counter-terrorism strategy means becoming aware of the lack of neutrality of the international context in the misfortunes that have plagued Cameroon. In reality, it is not a question of blaming agents external to the internal state structure, but rather of making visible the prospective weakness in the strategic and essentially cognitive system of national defence and security.

The anchoring of terrorism in Cameroon today depends on the inability to anticipate and effectively prevent the serious trends of disorder in the country. The crisis in the English-speaking regions does not surprise the State of Cameroon, whose internal security services had all the signals pointing to a strong anomie in Cameroonian society. However, the strategic uncertainty built around the issue has contributed to exacerbating the radicalization of these armed gangs, which today want to be associated with a new state for which they legitimately believe they are fighting.

The White Paper on Defence and Security should be a guide setting out and implementing the new strategic parameters (Yogo, 2016) that will serve as a reference in the operationalisation of SDS missions. To this end, it must present the strategic framework that will govern national security conduct and practice. It will allow Cameroon to know itself better in terms of threats and operational or prospective capacity. It will therefore provide an opportunity for the national general staff or, better still, the national strategic community to know how to prevent and respond to a new type of conflict or to consolidate peace processes. Basically, this strategic document will make it possible to identify the keys to weakness and/or operational power, but also and above all, the relationship between the army in an insurrectional context and the population (Livre Blanc, 2008).

In reality, Cameroon is dragging its historical trajectory through episodes of deconstruction of the political and security order through the challenge of the authority and sovereignty of the State. For NZOKOU Wilfride, these different insurrections are influenced, designed and implemented «in convergence with schemes valued elsewhere» (Nzokou, 2016). For him, Cameroon would not have an original doctrine based on its own referentials, because the latter, although combined according to strategic meetings throughout its history with various partners and its French and English citizens, would not be based on an internal construction unleashed by any external inspiration. In this regard, he considers that «It is therefore in a dynamic of imitation of the traditional Maoist model that the post-independence upheaval can be analysed, both in terms of the construction of its partisan ideology and its operational deployment (ibid, 2016)». Building on the success of simi-

lar circumstances, Cameroon has finally adopted through «different mechanisms for the transfer and dissemination of foreign operational knowledge (ibid, 2016) a counter-insurgency practice that in time and space has received a revised mix that now allows it to respond to the insurgency situations it is experiencing. For this researcher, Cameroon would have a specific doctrine based on the contingencies of history and applied in a counter-insurgency context. If this seems verifiable in practice, it would therefore be necessary for this country to write its White Book on defence and security in order to create the strategic and operational automatisms necessary for the management and operational maintenance of the forces at all times and in all circumstances.

The White Book is essential because of its strategic and operational necessity. While it would contain Cameroon's original counter-insurgency doctrine inspired, worked on and crossed by local cognitive referents, it could also be the frame of reference by excellence for the troops. Understanding current strategic games and issues is useful at all levels of defence. In the 21st century, the national strategic community must promote the new spirit of defence, which consists in making it more versatile and multidimensional and thus involving the populations in the effort to defend and secure the territory. Only a reference document would be the ideal framework for promoting this new spirit, provided that it is accompanied by programmes, projects and plans for the operational dimensions.

2. The national plan for the prevention of terrorism: educating for peace

Developing a national terrorism prevention plan (PLAPT) is equivalent to implementing an operational dimension of the national counter-insurgency doctrine.

The national plan for the prevention of terrorism must take into account the etiology of the anchoring of the insurrectional phenomenon in Cameroon in order to respond effectively to the reality on the ground. In view of the burning news in this country and the contingencies of history, it will operate as a pre-positioned, mobilizable and adaptable tool according to circumstances, time and space. The PLAPT in question must determine the legislative aspects that will regulate the projects that will result from it. By focusing on the etiological dimensions of the phenomenon, this plan should focus on intangible dimensions such as poverty and education.

If we look at the causes of the Boko Haram and Ambazonian phenomenon in Cameroon, for example, we will see that they undoubtedly highlight poverty. It is not only about material poverty. Thus, education appears to be a strategic element for peace. Lack of or non access to education is a fertile ground for the rapid recruitment of children, girls and women. Thus, the Cameroonian strategic community, the authorities responsible for the management and dissemination of education must insist on peace pedagogies and peace education.

PLAPT must be part of a preventive and, above all, a dose-based approach to the terrorist phenomenon. Therefore, it must insist on capacity building programmes for resilience. At the moment, such programs exist in a scattered manner. They are generally the work of associations, NGOs and other private actors acting in the wake of the prevention of violent extremism. This is visible in the far north region where Boko Haram has been active for several years. There, associations such as the Collective of Civil Society Organisations Against Radicalisation and Terrorism (COSC-CRT) or the NGO called : Action Locale pour un Développement Alternatif (ALDEPA), carry out impressive field work in view of the difficult conditions and lack of various resources they face on a daily basis.

These experiences could be exploited as explained by Marthe Wandou in an interview granted to her, around a prevention plan in the region that would involve these actors, each in its own quality and competence, in order to accelerate its effects on the population.

In general, PLAPT must include in its operationalization pedagogies of political integration, citizenship, inclusion (UNESCO, 2007), diversity and multiculturalism. If these elements are forgotten, the sociology of identities in Cameroon, a factor of insecurity in recent years, would confirm its current status as an Achilles heel to the effectiveness of peace. Not only should this plan make it possible to understand the games and challenges of disorder for a fragile state like Cameroon, but it will also make it possible to detect terrorist trajectories and networks, dismantle terrorist networks, adapt strategic and operational measures to meet threats and produce counter-causes to rebel projections.

B. The mastery of counter-insurgency mechanics

To curb the terrorist phenomenon in Cameroon, the national strategic community must equip itself with the necessary means to understand the modus operandi of the insurgents operating on its territory. To this end, it must establish an intelligence anchor (1) and include the population in the peace effort (2).

1. The emphasis on intelligence

The new strategic context in Cameroon requires a very strong intelligence requirement in order to increase the strategic and operational effectiveness of the army tenfold. Marked by «the omnipresence of the strategic uncertainty that terrorism brings» (Bentegeat, 2005), this context, punctuated by «a single true distinctive sign, that of diversity», must respond to the challenge of controlling rebel initiatives and actions. In this context, intelligence sharing appears to be a measure of erosion of the operational inextricability of these rebels.

By maintaining its ambition to be part of a geostrategic and intelligence perspective, investing in electronic intelligence, Cameroon's Direction Générale de la

Recherche Extérieure (DGRE) has been able to thwart several attacks by Boko Haram in the field(Dougeli, 2018). Although this system needs to be built and consolidated, the scope of its results remains impressive in view of Cameroon's exposure to terrorist attacks. In reality, Cameroonian intelligence must boost its current operational momentum by pursuing the democratization of its intelligence sources. In fact, it is important for Cameroon to persist in its collective work at the level of the defence and internal security forces (army, gendarmerie, police, customs, eco-guards), to control the corridors and potential heavy and light trends that could create or avoid a crisis.

This process has created a real intelligence community.

The national security and defence policy has led in recent years to the development of a permanent intelligence activity that is more visible and known to the general public. Today, it is being modernized and accepted as a regular activity of the defence and internal security forces and therefore requires information control (De Langlois, 2005). This requires further promotion of civil-military cooperation to access strategic information. For Jacques BAUD, information management, from an operational point of view, is at three levels. The first is the mastery of communication between the armed forces and the political and civil world and management of conflict perception. The second deals with the control of information before decision-making and the last one is on the control of information downstream of the decision (Baud, 2003).

Basically, it is a question of the SDS mastering the content of the information disseminated by integrating all relevant information in the theatre of operations in order to effectively carry out the expected missions. BAUD also believes that information literacy is about understanding its drivers in terms of «active and passive measures to preserve the civil, economic and military information environment (ibid)». By information content, it includes three components, namely:the control of data in (or against) networks, in order to ensure the functioning of the company, the mastery of knowledge wchich clearly allows to win or anticipate by displaying superiority and strategic advantage in the theatre of operations and the control of influence in order to control rebel operational spaces (ibid).

Mobilized to strip the decision of any grey area, intelligence builds the channels of objectivity in the strategic choices of the national strategic community and thus makes it possible to thwart several actions, but also to anticipate their conceptions. By anticipating rebel tactical action, it defines the orientations of the services, their means and resources as well as their personnel. There are three types of information. Investigative or police intelligence, archival information which aims to rely on collected documentation to make tactical choices and prospective intelligence. The latter's role is to look to the future and anticipate the taking of certain decisions on the basis of an in-depth analysis of the major and minor trends in current events in its multiple dimensions or sectors.

Even if the current Cameroonian intelligence structure is sufficiently equipped, it would not lose anything by deepening its strategic depth in order to anticipate more and more quickly, with greater acuity, precision and technological means. The technology would be very useful for collecting and building collection networks with or without partners. Indeed, it would facilitate the process of integrating intelligence into the ultimate political decision making process.

2. Including the people in the peace efforts

On Saturday, July 07, 2018, the Cameroonian media announced a spectacular scene produced in the English-speaking regions. Indeed, today, they published a motorized parade, led by nearly fifty Ambazonian fighters, which is said to have taken place in these regions. In this parade, we saw Ambazonian forces welcomed as heroes by the people. Sitting on «motorcycles», weapons in hand that they brandish as a sign of their revolution, they were applauded by a crowd in jubilation. Young, old, children, all were there to encourage their brothers who, according to them, brave all reprisals in the name of their liberation from the Republic of Cameroon (Cameroonweb, 2020). Such a scene highlights the failure of the Cameroonian State to calmly propagate its authority on its territory and, above all, it highlights the lack of trust in the central State, which is expressed and manifested through the construction of a parallel allegiance to the Ambazonia or the Ambazonians.

In a counter-insurgency context, the challenge of legitimizing an action is based on the population's support or control. This inability to propagate a counter-cause shared by the latter not only marks the weakness of the State in question, but also symbolizes its illegitimacy to act in part of its territory.

While the Ambazonians are presented as centrifugal forces that deconstruct and undermine the foundations and symbols of the central State and the Cameroonian nation, such images contribute to weakening efforts to stabilize and/or secure its territory; this implies that in the field of propaganda, whose strategic scope is fundamental, the State is behind. And, as such, popular defence cannot be effective.

By popular defence, we mean «the generalized and manifest expression or willingness of the population, grouped into diverse communities or categories, to mark their stamp in the defence of their interests and their country; in particular, the integrity of their territory (Yogo, 2015)». Its effectiveness, even if it can be politically recovered, is based on the existence of a relationship of trust between the State and its populations, which in the long term could contribute more or less to national integration (Batchom, 2016). Frankly, it is only possible in a context where the State fully assumes its responsibilities on a daily basis, because counter-sensitization on the issue is based on, exploits or instrumentalizes the irresponsibility of the State to spread a counter-cause.

Basically, on the counter-insurgency field, there is a battle in the immaterial and psychological sphere, in which the only real arbiter can only be the people who ultimately act as real regulators of tension between the State/military and centrifugal forces. They are the ones who legitimize each other's actions according to their rate of adherence and level of victimization.

In this sense, it is the responsibility of the Cameroonian State and its army to respond to the human development challenges that are required. This contributes to and highlights its daily management, whose democratic impulses are increasingly criticised and demanded. For this country, the centrifugal nature of these forces is a sign and an opportunity to revisit its relationship with its population, to take stock and draw lessons that seem obvious.

At the operational level, this means that the national strategic community must have a competitive counter-cause against the Ambazonians. It must forge and consolidate the construction of propaganda. This propaganda must be aimed at populations that allow it to encourage their support for centrifugal forces by subjugating journalists in its favour, as is done in the context of the fight against Boko Haram. This practice will make it possible to disseminate a citizen's cause and gain in psychological ground, as shown by the efforts of the Communication Division of the Ministry of Defence of Cameroon, led by Colonel Didier Badjeck.

It must therefore conduct its propaganda to obtain from the populations «signs of approval» (Galula, 2016) or understanding of the stakes of the struggle it is waging, to cut off the relationship they have with these forces and to politically engage local supporters for the national cause. This is only possible if the State itself becomes aware of its absence in these areas and its ultra-centralized political management of the country. Because, with regard to the crisis in the English-speaking regions, for example, this is, without any possible ambiguity, the crux of the problem. For David GALULA, the takeover of the population is based on three main objectives that should also be taken into account by the Cameroonian army, namely to restore the Loyalist's authority over the population, to isolate the population from the guerrillas as much as possible by physical means and to collect the information necessary to eliminate the political cells of the insurgency (Ibid, p 171).

These objectives can only be effective if there is genuine contact with the populations, if they are sufficiently controlled, if they are effectively protected (Ibid, p 171-180). These are fundamental conditions for psychological victory and the support of the people for the cause of the said Loyalist.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

On 1 March 2019, the Human Rights Council held a debate on the issue of the protection of human rights while countering terrorism. The debate was organized as part of the interactive dialogue with the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and

protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Ms. Fionnuala Ni Aolain. She recalled that security and human rights were not incompatible but, on the contrary, interdependent. This is the main lesson to promote and put into militaries head. Hence the state of Cameroon too should take note avec that. For the Special Rapporteur, it is urgent to encourage States to promote interdependence. It must be said that from the point of view of International Law, there is no ambiguity to respect human rights in the context of a cessation of hostilities. In the wake of terrorism, Cameroon is weakened, because at times it manages to fall into the human rights trap. In truth, it is important to demand strategic height and a minimum of cleanliness in the defence of its integrity, authority and sovereignty. To this end, the Cameroonian staff must itself work to avoid being pushed to the fault by centrifugal forces with success. This success is the very mark of its fragility and that of its strategic community. The latter is unable to accept the reality of the phenomenon and courageously take the necessary democratic measures, empowering the regions and negotiating with these rebels.

In any case, this analysis has examined the terrorist threat in Cameroon by focusing on the Boko Haram phenomenon in the far north and the ambazonian phenomenon in the NOSO. The result is that three regions are caught in a state of terrorism and that despite the initiatives undertaken by the State, the threat persists on both sides as the country plunges into a worrying international debt situation.

This situation calls for an immediate response and quickly puts on the critical examination table the fragility of the State of Cameroon and its ability to remain in this double war for so long, whose economic, social and humanitarian effects open up and offer an opportunity for the voracity and greed of international actors, the UN system and the Bretton Woods system to mingle with all the implications that may result. It is up to Cameroon to anticipate, because the wise man does not let himself be surprised by events.

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Unraveling the Dynamics and Options for Curbing the Emerging Threat of Terrorism in Ghana

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ABSTRACT The phenomenon of terrorism has gained currency in the contemporary period, nonetheless, ongoing discussions have not significantly addressed some critical issues of this canker.This paper draws on interviews and documentary analysis to unravel the dynamics and options for curbing the emerging threat of terrorism in Ghana. This paper submits that a web of domestic and regional dynamics such as the proliferation of illicit trade in small arms, youth unemployment, endemic corruption, unequal provision of socio-economic resources, and role of Ghana on the international scene could lead the country into an emerging threat of terrorists' attacks. Following the above, the paper recommends some steps to address the emerging threat of terrorism in Ghana including;effective implementation of anti-terrorism programmes, public education and sensitisation on terrorism and security consciousness, and provision of adequate logistics, and equipment to equip the police and military to provide effective border control to fight the threat ofterrorism in Ghana.

Keywords Development, Religious Tolerance, Governance, Media, Pressing Poverty, Terrorism.

1.0 Introduction

Generally, the twenty-first century has witnessed the evolution of images of terrorism around the globe. The incidenceof terrorism and the everyday threats which werecommonly found in the west have now become widespread in the developing countries(Blomberg, Broussard, &Hess, 2011). Scholarly explanations reveal that the emerging trends of this phenomenon which has gained prominence are daunting for politicians, academics, and policymakers because, over the past decades, the world has experienced several acts of violent terrorism, such as the dramatic hijacking of commercial aircraft and crashing them into the World Trade Centre and the murder of the former Prime Minister of Pakistan, all purportedly in the pursuit of some socio-economic, political or religious objectives or the realisation of certain conditionsof affairs in the state(Ismail,&Amjad, 2014; Giugni,&Grasso, 2015). A key proposition posits that this phenomenon which usuallyleads to the betrayal of human rights and security, democracy and the rule of law, and economic growth and development,have become complex and multifaceted to handle based on the continuous and unpredictable nature and the changing dimensions it is assuming at the global level(Argomaniz, & Orla,2015;LaFree, & Joshua, 2017). For example, a recent study has shown that terrorist menace is a lithe, global network scheme, which is aided by loose networksand vibrant interconnection systemscommonly found among individuals and groups in the various countries and regions within the globe. In this way, an extremist group with an intent to launch a strike on one country or region can solicit assistance from other extremist organisations in different countries or regions. For instance, in 2001, three affiliates of the Irish Republican Army were imprisoned in Colombia, alleged of training the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a Marxist-Leninist guerrilla group founded by Manuel Marulanda and Jacobo Arenas in 1964 on how to carry out an urban bombing campaign(Nazih, 2002). Traditional literature on terrorism alludes that terrorism is not a contemporary phenomenon; it was applied as an instrument of the political strategy by some key stakeholders during the French Revolution in 18th-century Europeand has engrossed many debates in recent literature after the 11th September 2001 attack on the United States (McPhee,2002). In practice, while, terrorism is a global phenomenon, Middle East and South Asia are extremelyaffectedin that theyflunga war on terrorism soon after the 11th September 2001 attack on the United States(Sandler,&Enders, 2008).Theoretically, despite the long presence of the concept in the international arena, there has not been a single commonlyaccepted suitable definition of terrorism in theliterature(Bruce,2013). Nevertheless, pioneeringwork on terrorism has defined the concept as the illegal use of power to threatencitizens, property, and the government or any sectionof the population thereof in the fulfillment of the political, socio-economic,and religious interestsof a specific group of people within a state(Schmid,2004; Crenshaw, 1981).

Taken together, studies on terrorism in Africa have underscoredthatthe explosion of terrorism has not left the continent untouched based on the fact that the phenomenon has been athreat to human security and polarisation of socio-economic acti-

vities of many countries for many years andalso continue topose serious headaches tothem (Gaibulloev, & Sandier, 2011). Classic examplesarethe bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi in 1998, and the suicide vehicle bombing attack of the Paradise Hotel near Mombasain Kenya in 2002 (Andre,2005), and the recent armed attacks on innocent civilians at the Westgate shopping mall in Kenya in 2012 (Aronson, 2013). To be sure, a recently emerged strand of research proffersthat while terrorism is an evolving threat to human security and socio-economic development around theglobe, countries in Africa south of Sahara have recordedabout three-quarters of all terrorist attacks(Zuma, Ingyoroko,& Akura,2013). This argument resonates with the erstwhilereport which acknowledgesthat this era of widespread terrorism has adverse implications on developing countries than the developed nations. This isbecauseunlike developed countries thathave diversities within their economies, the developing countries overly concentrate on the resources of certain specific sectors;consequently, they are affected whenever terrorists strike on these sectors of their economies(Sandler, & Enders, 2008).

Largely, across the African continent, Ghana is being hailed amongthe few countries which are locally and internationally labeled as countries of peace and stability primarily because Ghana has not experienced any threatening civil disorder since gaining independence in March 1957(Alhassan,Abdul, &Arthur, 2017). Nonetheless,in recent times, credible intelligence from security agencies indicates that Ghanacould be a target for international terroristssuch as al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Theevolving terroristthreats have been reinforced by accounts of some Ghanaian youth in the ranks of ISIS(Stephanie, 2016). Importantly, whilethe media and intelligencereports of a possible terrorist strike haveincreasingly heightened anxiety among the populace and created uncertainties within the business communities, and has put the whole country's security into perpetual alert, there is markedly little scholarly attention in this subtle area. In this paper, the researchers seek to specifically contribute to the broader debate on the rise of terrorismin the global environment byunravelingthe specific reasons why Ghana is vulnerable to terrorist attackswithin the African sub-region. Besides, options for curbing the emerging threat of terrorist attacks are traced by the study. In what follows, the paper is organised into five parts. This introduction is followed by a review oftherelevant literature. The next part of the paper presents the methodological approachfollowed by the presentation ofresults and discussion. The last sectionconcentrates on theconclusion and recommendations.

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0.1 ISSUES AND STRATEGIES OF TERRORISM

The discussions on terrorism in the contemporary era have vigorously occupied the center stage of the policy agenda in both developed and developing countries around the globe chiefly because terrorism universally poses a horrendous

risk to the welfare and security of individuals and communities (Conte, 2010).In principle, the term terrorism is conceptualisedas the systemic and unpredictable act of violence which is typically designed and directed at certain symbolic targets to producegeneraldisparate emotional responses likely to sway attitudes and behaviour, as well as gain social, political, and economic control in the state(Sandler, & Enders, 2008).Relatedly, analyst of terrorism has also documented that the term terrorism entails crime, politics, war, propaganda, and religion. As espoused by the writer, by convention, almost all activities typically carried out by terrorists such as indiscriminate bombings, armed attacks on civilians, planned assassinations, and suicide attacks are considered illegal and unlawful by the International Community(Schmid, 2004).

Congruently, scholarly literature on terrorism reveals thatterrorist activities are generally continuous principallybecause ofthe longer-term motivations of terrorists' organisations. According to the writer, terrorist act of violence gains political import even when the motive is religious or criminal, in that these activities typicallycontest the authority which is possessed by the state and its ability to offer protection to its citizens (Ismail, &Amjad, 2014). This argument echoeswith a recent study on terrorism. In the words of these scholars, terrorism is an aspect of communication that islinked to propaganda by deeds. Terrorism by its ability to attract general attention could be effective as propaganda in that one act of terrorism may, in a few days, awaken the spirit of revolts by producing more propaganda in the society. In this way, terrorism should be understood in terms of propaganda since one act of violent terrorism against one victim seeks to coerce or persuade others to modify their behaviour, consequently, the success of a terrorist operation depends on the amount of publicity it receives from the public(Zuma, Ingyoroko, & Akura, 2013).

Akin to the previous submissions, some scholars of terrorism highlight that religious terrorism which focuses on unwarranted human rights violations is rationalised in the name of certain divine doctrines. According tothem, such reframing of inhuman acts in the mind of the terrorist is elevated to heroic deeds and turns murder into a perceived sacrifice. For example, Yigal Amir, who assassinated Yitzhak Rabin, claimed that he acted on the orders of God. In this manner, the religious fundamentalists believe that he has gained moral imperative to defend the attacks on innocent civilians who are non-combatants and, characteristically, see the world in a polarised form– that is, "us" versus "them".Viewed from this perspective, they then turn every conflict into a war between the profane and the sacred(Ismail, &Amjad, 2014).

Similarly, another stream of research documented that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons accounts for the growth of insurgency of terrorist activities posinga huge threatto human security around the globe. Small arms and light weapons are recurrentlydeployed to forcefully displace civilians, obstruct humanita-

rian aid, halt development projects, anddelay peace-keeping and peace-building processes. In non-conflict areas, small arms are regularly deployed to conduct criminal violence such as homicides, suicides,and accidents thereby causing human insecurity in the societies.Also, research on terrorism posited that corruption aidsterrorists' activities because it weakens governance, economic structures, healthcare systems, and sustainable developments of a state(Stohl, & Hogendoorn, 2010). Following the preceding standpoint, a recent study posited that terrorists are organised criminals that engage in corrupt practices with public officials to survive. Some of these practices arelinked with the movement of needed logistics, people, and goods across borders, paying off corrupt officials, aiding the illegal financial flows, and supplying weapons required for terrorists' operations (Adeniran,2018).

Additionally, some scholars (Ismail,&Amjad, 2014) argued that studies on terrorism largely focus on the negative implications of terrorism on the welfare and security of citizens in the state. However,a recent scholarship on terrorism alludesthat theseextremists that engage in violence and otheratrocitiesare envisioned to championa belief system that interprets social and economic conditions and proffers explanations onhow to realise or carve out an ideal society for both the privileged and underprivileged individuals. One such widespread ideologyis Marxism that has provided a philosophical foundation to the political violence and atrocities in many parts of the world.As echoed by the scholars, the Marxistideology vehemently contends that the existing labour relations are exploitative to the advantage of the ruling class (bourgeois); consequently, it predicted a revolution against the ruling class to alter the status quo and usher in an egalitarian communist society where the interest of the working class (proletariats) could also be protected. To this end, in the 21stcentury, for instance, many Marxist insurgents and revolutionaries have employed terrorist attacksspecifically in Latin America, Africa, and Asia to champion their course of marginalisation and vulnerability whiles those who succeeded in establishing governments such as Uruguay, Cambodia and Vietnam applied state terrorism in an attempt to build a communist society (Martin, 2017).

2.0.2 A Theoretical Insight on Terrorism

Studies on terrorism are replete with competing perspectives on why there is a resurgent incidence of terrorism in Africa. In the search for an understanding of this phenomenon, the theory of relative deprivation, commonly used within the realm of social science discourse,was used in this study(Ronald, 1976).The theory is imperative in the sense that it focuses on deprivation and its divergent effects on diverse forms of social and political actions in the state. Relative deprivation is conceived as the tension that develops due to the discrepancies between legitimate value expectations and value capabilities which eventually turn to generate violence against the state. It has become a distinct feature in the study of social justice in society(Smith, Pettigrew,Fraser, Pippin, &Bialosiewicz, 2012; Schmid, 2013). The central thesis of the relative deprivation theory is that individual or group satisfaction is only

somewhat connected to objective conditions. It is also more focused on circumstances comparative to other individuals' or groups. In particular, relative deprivation is associated with considerable attitudinal and behavioural effects including engagement in a group action, the adoption of a certain political culture, and the experience of stress. It is also considered as a great contributor to intergroup attitudes and discontentment in somestates (Botha, 2008). Another evidence ofthe theory of relative deprivation comes from the earlier study by Gurr in 1970. In his analysis of the implications of crisis of participation and inequalities in a nation-state, the writer argued thatrelative deprivation denotesthe dissatisfaction people feel when they compare their positions to others and realise that there are inequalities in the society. This largely arises due to the failure of state authorities to meet people'slegitimate needs and expectations. This phenomenon can lead to social and political upheavals to enable the vulnerable and marginalise to register their displeasure towards those they believe to have caused their deprivationin society. In other words, individuals are more likely to engage in rebellion when they lose the prospect of achieving their societal values (Gurr, 1970).

Drawing on the above, scholarly analysis posited that social scientists such as sociologists, political scientists, and psychologists contend that state actions and inactions usually cause the dissatisfaction of individuals, which commonly result in intergroup tension, enmity, and gruesome violence because these people feel that their interests and aspirations have not been catered for in the society (Smith, Pettigrew, Fraser, Pippin, &Bialosiewicz, 2012). Relatedly, another study also reveals that in many developing countries, increased income disparity, rising levels of poverty, and formalisation of the economy have created social systems and structures that have practically intensified the sense of marginalisation and vulnerability of many citizens in modern society (Giugni, &Grasso, 2015). As noted by the scholars, these problems largely contribute to violent crimes and atrocities in the state (Giugni, &Grasso, 2015).

In particular, the theory of relative deprivation has helped us to understand that the feelings of deprivation of value expectations such as food, shelter, health services, power values, suppression of political expressions, and repression or marginalisation inaccessing collective goods and services are crucial to stimulating citizens to engage in unconventional actions such as aggression, conflict and terrorist attacks that are against the standard and valued societal norms (Wilson, Angela,& Elizabeth, 2010). Additionally, the theory of relative deprivationargues that most of the terrorist attacks which erupt in many parts of the world are spurred by individuals' dissatisfaction or frustration in relative comparisons of current living standards to some other situations in the society(Pettigrew, 2016).

3.0 Methodological Approach

This study was philosophically anchored by social constructivism. Based on the constructivist worldview, the researchers used the qualitative tradition for the study. The basis of the research, then, was to rely on the case study to unravel the dyna-

mics and options for curbingthe emergingthreat of terrorism in Ghana.In sampling the participants, the researchers ensured to cover the diversity of professionals who are expertsin conflict, security studies, and terrorism. These participants were purposefully selected because the information sought could only be provided by identified categories of people such asofficials from the Ministriesof Defense, Interiorand the National Security, and West Africa Network for Peacebuilding, Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy, Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Centre for Human Security and Peace Building, National House of Chiefs, the Christian Council of Ghana, the National Council of Muslim Chiefsand the Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College. Eventually, there were twenty-eight (28) participants selected for the study. Data were collected within two months starting from 1st March to 30thApril 2018.In-depth interviews and documentary analysis were used as instruments for the study. All responses were consistently tape-recorded together withcomprehensive handwritten notes taken by the researchers.The analytical approach was mainly thematic and coding was inductive (Patton,2002).

The analysis was done manually and followed some steps. First, the raw data were reviewed systematically to classify initial themes and concepts that emerged from the data. The next step was to build a thematic framework that consisted of themes and sub-themes after classifyingcommon patterns in the data. Third, the themes identified were indexed by assigning the same numbers to themes that had related interpretations;this allowed for proper categorisation of thematic areas. This step was followed by a descriptive analysis of the themes where elements were properly defined by inspecting each column of the thematic areas. The final step involved a discussion on the findings of the study in the context of secondary sources of data.

4.0 Resultsand Discussion

This section was focused on the results and discussion of the study. Key findings that evolved from the analysis of data on the dynamics and options for curbingthe emergingthreats of terrorism are described under the following themes:the proliferation of illicit trade in small arms, youth unemployment, and poverty,the role of Ghana on the international scene, andprevalence of endemic corruption.

4.0.1 Dynamics for Ghana's Vulnerability to Terrorism

4.0.1.1 The Proliferation of Illicit Trade in Small Armsand Light Weapon

Information gathered from participants revealed that Ghana is vulnerable to terrorism due to the proliferation of illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in neighboring countries. An interview with a regional conflict analystunderscored

that Ghana is not immune to terrorism, particularly in the wake of the "violent extremism" in neighboring Burkina Faso.Probing the issue further, he remarked:

> There is aserious "gun-running" business thriving in the whole of West Africa. These cross-border arms trades are carried out illegally mainly by criminal gangs and professional smugglers. Seemingly, the proliferation of illicit trades in small arms and light weapons posesserious security threats to Ghana (Fieldwork, 2018).

According to the evidence unveiled from the findingseven though trafficking of small arms and light weapons is a violation of international law, some residents fromneighboring states had taken advantage of the structural deficiencies in the immigration policies such as lax immigration and security laws, and weak border control systemscoupled with the ECOWAS Protocol on the free movement of people and goods and regularly cross Ghana's border easilyto engage in illicit trade in small arms andlight weapons. Prominently, the trade-in of massive armshavecreated leeway for individuals to acquireweapons and firearms such as AK 47, riffles, and submachine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers easily in Ghana. These weapons and firearmsare particularly misused to fueling conflicts, crime and atrocities, intimidation, and harassment of peoplein Ghana due to the simple nature to use and easy to hide them. The rising trend ofethnic conflicts, crimes, atrocities,intimidation, and harassment of people has been widespread and destructive leading to the loss of lives and propertiesin Ghana. This findingcorroborates with the earlier studies that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons accounts for the growth of insurgency of terrorist activities posing a huge threat to human security, obstruct humanitarian aid, delay development projects, and also exasperate peacekeepingand peace-building process (Stohl,&Hogendoorn, 2010).

4.0.1.2 YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT AND POVERTY

The surge in relative deprivation caused by a lack of employment opportunities is liable to violencesuch as terrorist threats in Ghana. Interview with an official from the West Africa Network forPeacebuilding aptly stated that:

> The youth are critical agents for terrorism in this country because many of the youth are jobless due to the high incidence of unemployment.For example, inNorthern Mali, the dissidentsengaged and recruited themassiveyouth who were marginalised and vulnerable groups from Gao,Timbuktu,and Kidal into their camps to conduct terrorist attacks to register theirdispleasure and grievances such as the denial of equal access to political participation and socio-economic services (Fieldwork, 2018).

Prevailing anecdotal and corroborated narratives from the field submitted that in Ghana,a substantial size of youth experienceda high incidence of financial hardships. Consequently, many of these youths migrate to cities to engage in menial

jobs for their socio-economic livelihoods. Prominently, many of these youths lose prospects of achieving their societal values as they sleep on open spaces, whilst others live in temporary structures build within the cities as their places of abode during the night.Paradoxically, state officials consider these phenomena as normal despite the level of risks they encounter in the cities. These people who are dissatisfied with their national government due to marginalisation, unmet economic expectations and the feeling of exclusion from decision-making could be lured and recruited to join anddevelop new subjectivitieswith dissidents toreconstruct their aspirations through a range of new social relationships with the view of conducting violent crimes and atrocities to register their displeasure of the frustrationsin the state.This finding reinforced the theory of relative deprivation which claims that the failure of the state to provide people's needs and expectations which theybelieve they are legitimately entitled to ultimately leads todisorientation amongst the populace and disapproval on the part of the citizens towards those they believe to have caused their deprivation (Gurr, 1970).

4.0.1.3 ROLE OF GHANA ONINTERNATIONAL SCENE

Data from the field also established that Ghana's role in the international scene such as peacekeeping operations in countries plagued by terrorism might attract retaliatory attacks from international terrorist groups.For example, international terrorist organisations including AQIM, Ansaarul deen and Ansaarul Shariah have established a united front to form Al Muraabitum and their leaders such as Mokhtar Belmokhtarhave instructed the followers to attack all western interests and their collaborators in Sub-Saharan Africaso that they can communicate their intentions to larger communities around the globe. Ghana has recently gone into a defense cooperation agreement and initiatives with the United States of America.With the signing of this defense agreement and initiatives with the United States of America, the countrycould now become the target of these dissidents. Also, Ghana's military support to peace missions in Mali could attract the attention of terrorists to the country.These findings are consistent withthe earlier study which concluded that the dominant goal for terrorist attacks in most places around the globe is to communicate ideological and religious messages to a larger human audience in the society (Ismail,&Amjad,2014).

4.0.1.4 PREVALENCE OF ENDEMIC CORRUPTION

Data from the field revealed that the prevalence of endemic corruption could also account forGhana'svulnerability to terrorism. This social canker is pervasive in all spheres of Ghanaian society.A recent report on Ghana's performance fromthe Corruption Perception Index of TransparencyInternational showed thatGhana has over the years scored less than 50 points which is the average score on the Index. For example, in 2017, the CPI ranked Ghana 81 out of 180 countries, scoring 40

points out of 100, which implies that Ghana is number 81 in the most corrupt countries in the world. Similarly, the report of Transparency International in 2014revealed continuous and widespread corruption evidenced by the deep-rooted patronage network coupled with many corruption scandals in public procurement and petty corruption among the security services.A report from the Afro-barometer alsoshowed that corruption is a common practice in Ghana's public and civil services such as police administrationand judicial service (Ayee, 2016). In an in-depth probe into the issue with the Director of Centre for Human Security and Peace Building, he aptly remarked:

> The issue of corruption among the police service is a security threat to the country. For example, if you look at how the police stopvehicles and ask for money, it shows how the police officers on the highway check-pointsare compromising the security of the state fortheir parochial financial gain (Fieldwork 2018).

The findings from the study indicated that corruption is a common practice in Ghana's public administration and civil services. From the study, it was found that the practice was commonly associated with public officials including police officers, and immigration officers. Additionally, it was established that in Ghana, police officers are the first point of call, in case one observes any potential threat of terrorism;therefore, if the police officers are highlyengaged in acts of corruption,the incidence of domestic terrorism is likely to increase, since these terrorists can easily maneuver their way into the country and carry out hideous activities. Thisfinding confirmsprevious work which documented that some of the bombings staged by terrorists in many parts of Africaislargely facilitated by the incidence of corrupt practices by public officials (Ayee, 2016).

4.0.2 Curbingthe Emerging Threat of Terrorism in Ghana

In this section, the researchers sought to explore the evolving strategic responses to curb the emerging threats of terrorism in Ghana. In our analysis, five-pronged strategies were identified which included; strengthened the resources of police service, law enforcement on corruption and money laundry, growth of religious tolerance and freedom, strengthenedthe capacities of the armed forces, Ghana's engagement with regional cooperation, and provision of initiatives in tackling youth unemployment and poverty.

4.0.2.1 Strengthened theResources of Police Service

Data from the fielddocumented thatthe Government of Ghana hadstrengthened the resources of police service in contemporary times. These included the provision of satisfactory personnel and logistics to empower them to deliver on their core mission. Report from the documentary analysis showed that the Government

had provided 568 vehicles, including 15 operational buses, modern communication equipment, and 4,500 fragmentation jackets to the police service. Empirical evidence also established that police service had been provided with twenty (20) horses to assist them in riot and crowd control.Also, the Government had approved the recruitment of four thousand (4,000) personnel to support the police service to carry out proactive or preventative duties to help curbemerging threats of terrorism. Moving forward, the Government has provided logistics and financial support to enable the Police Administration to organise series of workshops and trainingin investigations on human rights standardsand digital forensic directed at building and developing the investigative skills of special branches such ascriminal investigation divisions, and key task forcesmandated to fight threats of terrorism, trafficking, and crime. For example, the Criminal Investigations Department had been equipped with a digital forensic science laboratory to helpthe unit improvethe forensics capacities and signals intelligence capabilities of reliable threats of terrorist attacks in Ghana (Ministry of Interior, 2019).

4.0.2.2Law Enforcement onCorruption and Money Laundry

Law enforcement on corruption and money laundry havebeen instituted and strengthened to curb the emerging threats of terrorist activities.Anti-corruption institutions such as the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), Economic and Organised Crime Office (EOCO), Ministry of Justice and Attorney General's Department, Office of Special Prosecutor are tasked to investigate all alleged and suspected corruption and the misappropriation of public funds by officials. These institutions have aided in resolving corrupt acts and practices that seek to facilitate the entry and movement of drugs and arms into the country which hinders the efficiency of civil-military in combating criminal acts. Also, Anti-Money Laundry Act 2008 (Act 749) has been passed to ban money laundering in all its kinds. Section one of the Act 2008 forbids every person from supporting money laundry practices in the country. For example, Section five of the Act 2008 (Act 749) makes provision for the court to try the case of money laundry if the act is committed outside the shores of Ghana.Besides, the Anti-Money Laundry Act 2008 (Act 749) gives provision for the creation of a body that supervises the execution of the Act. Thus, Section Four clause one of Act 749 provides for the establishment of the Financial Intelligence Centre in agreement with section 4 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, 2008 (Act 749). The body with perpetual succession is authorised by law to request, receive, analyse, interpret, and disseminate financial intelligence in Ghana and abroad. Also, money laundry is recognised to be mainly associated with kidnapping, illicit drug trafficking, and human trafficking because funds generated from these unlawful practices are used to finance the activities of terrorism. Accordingly, the Government has put measures to curtail the rise of kidnapping, illicit drug trafficking, and human trafficking in Ghana. The Act 2008 (Act 749) is imperative to curb the threats of terrorism because by criminalising money laundering practices in

the shores of Ghana, it is becoming difficult for terrorists to obtain access to funding through money laundering practices (Ministry of Interior, 2019).

4.0.2.3 GROWTH OF RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE AND FREEDOM

According to narratives, the growth of religious tolerance and freedom is another highly relevant response to emerging threats of terrorism. Empirical findings established that in Ghana, all religious groups worship freely; hence, there is very little, if any, abhorrence among the various religious sects. In practice, it is a common tradition for the heads of the Christian, Islamic and Traditional religions to exchange hearty pleasantries whenever they meet in state ceremonies. Thus, it is not common to incite one religious' sect against another religious group. Also, inter-religious marriages are very common as a huge number of Ghanaians have cousins, in-laws, aunties, and uncles who profess other faiths than their practiced doctrines. The religious tolerance and freedom indorse harmony and peaceful coexistence among all religious groups, thus, holding the fabric of the Ghanaian society together and making it challenging for violent extremists to exploit religious differences to conduct their violent atrocities(Ministry of Interior, 2019).

4.0.2.4 STRENGTHENED THE CAPACITIES OF THE ARMED FORCES

Data from the field revealed that the Government has improved the capacities of the Armed Forcesthrough training, and provision of equipment to fight threats of terrorism in Ghana. According to the report, in the past decade, peacekeeping capabilities of the Army Forces have been built through the support of the government, and bilateral training efforts such as the U.S. and Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance Programme. For example, in July 2018, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) sponsored peacekeepers from Ghana and other African countries to undertake a twelve (12) month training programme aimed at enhancing their technical know-how in combating terrorism in their line of duty. Data from the field further documented that in September 2018, a set of high-ranking officers with expertise in counterterrorism from the Israeli Defense Forces trained twenty (25) military officers from Ghana Armed Forces. The key focus of the training was to strengthen their signal intelligence and forensiccapabilities in combating terrorism. Investigative evidence pointed out that in the Africa continent, Ghana was among the first countries to benefit from such training aimed at preparing the military and other security institutions tofight the emerging trends of terrorist repressions. According to the field report, such capacity-building drills for the security forces hadfacilitated an improvement in intelligence sharing by the security agencies patrolling the territorial waters and land and thereby had aided to curb any act of terrorism in Ghana (Ministry of Defense, 2018).

4.0.2.5 Ghana's Engagement with Regional Cooperation

Data from the field further revealed that at the regional level, Ghana has signed the Africa Union Pact on the Prevention and Fighting of Terrorism in Algiers in 1999. Similarly,Ghana is a signatory to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Agreement on Small Arms and Light Weapons, their Ammunition, and Other Related Materials. Importantly, thisAgreement bans the transportation of arms and ammunitions into and out of the Sub-Sahara African countries without genuine and concrete approval from the Economic Community of West African States. Moreover, Ghana has convened a series of anti-terrorism conferences in Accra, which brought togetherHeads of States and Ministers from member states, security experts, and chiefs to deliberate on strategic plans to fight the proliferation of small arms and light weapons,money laundry, and threats of terrorism.Evidence from the study highlighted thatthe Government of Ghana had also sanctioned a lot of International Agreements sought to fight terrorism in the country. For instance, a report had documented that Ghana is a party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997), and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999). Also, the documentary analysis showed that Ghana had implemented the United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 1267 of 1999, 1373 of 2001, and 1718 of 2006. The underlying purpose of the United Nations Security Councils Resolutions (UNSCRs) was to empower Ghana to freeze or seize terrorist assets and associated cases imported into or exported from the country. Technically, these International Agreements and Protocols are envisioned to aid combat threats of terrorism in Ghana (Edward, 2006).

4.0.2.6 Initiatives in tackling youth unemploymentand poverty

The documentary analysis revealed that the Government has takengiant steps to provide diverse policies and initiatives focusing on the reduction of youth unemployment and poverty in Ghana.One of such initiatives (interventions) isthe Nation Builders Corps (NABCO) programme. More strikingly, this new initiative that focuses on minimising the growing phenomenon of unemployment and disillusionment among young people leaving tertiary institutionsis designed and implemented to augment existing employment initiatives (interventions) that continue to positively improve the lives of many non-tertiary graduates through the innovative modules. According to the report, the Nation Builders Corps (NABCO) programmeis initiated to; provide temporary employment to unemployed graduates,improve skills and employability for the transition from programme to permanent employment, improve public service delivery, improve on government revenue mobilisation, and to provide needed infrastructure to improve access to basic public services. For example, available evidence revealed that Nation Builders Corps (NABCO) and erstwhile youth interventions have created employment prospects for young graduates and marginalised youth who would otherwise engage in banditry or join armed groups to

perpetuate violence and atrocities have rather become agents of positive and transformative change because they aresupporting the state institutions to promote peace and stability in Ghana (Office of the Ministry of National Security, 2018).

5.0 Conclusion and Recommendations

This paper has provided shreds of evidence to show the potential rising threats of terrorism in Ghana. These include the proliferation of illicit trade in small arms, the incidence of youth unemployment, unequal provision of socio-economic resources, the role of Ghana on the international scene,and the incidence of endemic corruption. Based on the above, the Government of Ghana has put up measures including;the creation of social intervention programmes such as Nation Builders Corps (NABCO) to helpcreateemployment prospects for young graduates and marginalised youth in Ghana. Additionally, the Government has equipped the anti-terrorism forces such as armed forces and police service to conduct their border security efficiently to control the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Finally, the Government has also equipped the law enforcement bodies to fight corruption and money laundryacross the borders to finance terrorist activities in Ghana.

Despite the foregoing measures, the following recommendations are also made by the paper to help resolve the emerging threats of terrorism in Ghana. First, the state should endeavour to equip the police, military, and intelligence agencies to improve on their proactive and operational capabilities at critical infrastructure and soft targets, such as airports, seaports, major roads, government offices, markets, and shopping malls, social theatres, and foreign diplomatic premises to detect and disrupt terrorist groups, and acts. Second, the state must suppress the sponsorship of terrorist acts by freezing all terrorist funds and assets and also impose stringent rules on financial and non-financial institutions on money transfers in Ghana. Third, the state must strengthen its technical capacity tohelpenhance cybersecurity to detect, monitor, and suppressterrorists from using cyberspace and other types of wireless and electronic communication systems to conduct their activities in Ghana. Fourth, the Government must proscribe and criminalise the use of territories, such as air, land, and maritime spaces, for planning, recruiting, financing, and assisting terrorist activities against other states. Finally, faith-based organisations such as churches, and mosques, must be encouraged to engage in government policies, and activities to enable them to take initiatives to help avert deep-seated philosophies and extremist ideasof groups in these religious sects linked with terrorists' acts.

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Gendered Dimensions of Violent Extremism in West Africa

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ABSTRACT The frequency and lethal consequences of incidences of violent extremism are not new to African continent. The West African sub region has suffered devastating effects on cases of violent extremism that have manifested in various forms and dimensions. Of major concern to the sustainability of peace and security is the gendered violent extremism which has succeeded in aiding terrorism, insurgency and other forms of transnational organized crimes. Against this backdrop, this article examines the gendered dimension of violent extremism in West Africa with a view to some implementable recommendations. The article establishes that gendered violent extremism accommodates dynamics of women as victims and women as perpetrators. It further reveals that manipulation of religion, structural crisis, unabated grass root radicalization, substance abuses and misguided parental influence are partly the drivers of gendered violent extremism in West Africa. The article concludes that the involvement of women in extremism epitomizes one of the essential fundamentals of contemporary extremism. Therefore, the article recommends that the African Union liaise with Regional Economic Communities and national government to ensure the implementation of legislative and policy frameworks to counter gendered extremism, increase gender awareness, economic and political empowerment as well as gender equality and mainstreaming in the security sector.

Introduction

In recent times, violent extremism as a global threat has continued to evolve. This has occasioned the increasing destabilization of the international security environment. However, there is a commonly held gender mindset about the involvement of men, women, boys and girls, in violent extremism (Dudwick and Kuenast, 2016). Thus, women and girls in particular are generally expected not to be involved in violent extremism. However, this assertion gradually began to change, when thousands of women from across the globe travelled to join the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), when it proclaimed its caliphate in 2014; the group which was established on the lines of an extreme and violent ideology, instituted severe standards for women's involvement as wives, mothers, and lately, as combatants (Bryson, 2018). Consequently, this mass migration to join ISIS, was a shock reminder that women take part in violent extremism just as easily as men. Thus, shattering the commonly thought notion that jihadi terrorism is a man's domain.

According to the United States Institute of Peace (2018), gender is a cultured outline of behavior that is entrenched in all that we do at the individual, community, and institutional domain; it is a dynamic unifying principle in society. Hence, it is more than an individuals' biological sex (male/female). In the context of violent extremism, it the analysis about women's role in violent extremism; how gender inequalities and power imbalances could be key drivers of women involvement in extremism, either as victims or perpetrators. Consequently, violent extremism is defined by USAID (in United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2018), as any act amounting to supporting, engaging in, formulating, or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic or political aims. Furthermore, introduced as part of an Obama administration counterterrorism strategy the axiom "Countering Violent Extremism" (CVE) is defined by the US Department of Homeland Security (2016) to denote proactive actions to counter efforts by extremists to recruit, radicalize, and mobilize followers to violence.

The increasing interconnectedness of global societies, paves way for international movement of people and illegal weapons from one country to another. Thus, the West African region has become the epicenter of Jihadism in Africa, as Islamist groups such as Boko Haram have continued to use the vast and relatively empty area in the Sahel to hide, recruit and organize Jihad (Pujol-Mazzini, 2018). In Nigeria, the incidence of violent extremism is not a new experience, as the country has witnessed numerous activities that are associated with violent extremism over the years; issues ranging from political to religious violent extremism, have dominated Nigeria's political landscape. For instance, during the Fourth Republic in particular, the spread of organized violent extremist groups became preponderant, largely as an indicator of the unsettled national question, posing serious danger for the country's sovereignty (Tar, 2016).

Consequently, this paper examines gendered dimensions of violent extremism in West Africa; it interrogates the changing role of women in violent extremism from victimhood to perpetrators, and ask the questions, why do they join? What are the factors that drive women into violent extremism? To achieve this objective, the paper is divided into six connected sections. Following the introduction, we examine the background of violent extremism in the West African region. The third section maps the dynamics of gendered violent extremism. In the fourth section, we examine the drivers of gendered violent extremism, while we identify the various strategies and trajectories for countering gendered violent extremism in the West African subregion in the fifth section. In the sixth and final section of the paper, we draw conclusions on gendered dimensions of violent extremism in West Africa.

BACKGROUND: MAPPING VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN THE WEST AFRICAN SUB-REGION

The countries of West Africa are among the world's poorest and face complex security challenges, including ethnic conflict and separatism, banditry, and organized crimes. They also have a history of poor governance and military intervention in politics. While violent Islamist ideology does not appear to have been embraced by most West African people, it likely resonates with certain marginalized populations, as do the financial resources wielded by AQIM and other groups (Botha and Abdile, 2014). Armed Islamist groups have proliferated in North and West Africa since 2011, amid political upheaval in the Arab world, governance and security crises in Libya and Mali, and an Islamist insurgency in northern Nigeria. Many of these groups appear primarily focused on a domestic or regional agenda, but some have targeted U.S. or other foreign interests in the region and some may aspire to more international aims. According to the Caliphate Global Workforce (2016), West Africa is also a prominent source of foreign fighters for Al Qaeda-linked groups and the Islamic State organization in Iraq, Syria, and Libya. (Caliphate Global Workforce, 2016).

Figure I: The Topography of Conflict in West Africa

Islamist attacks, year to October 31st 2016
● AQIM and affiliates; ISIS; Unidentified/unaffiliated ● Boko Haram
Source: Africa Centre for Strategic Studies

Source: Economist.com

In Nigeria, Boko Haram's ideology encompasses a worldview that combines an exclusivist interpretation of Sunni Islam, one that rejects not only Western influence but also democracy, constitutionalism, and more moderate forms of Islam, with "politics of victimhood" that resonate in parts of Nigeria's underdeveloped north. Some of Boko Haram's fighters have reportedly been drawn into the group by financial incentive or under threat. According to some scholars, conditions in the northeast Nigeria gave rise to Boko Haram, which is responsible for a far higher level of deadly violence than any other violent Islamist group in Africa (Comolli, 2015). Key factors include a hangover of overlapping intercommunal and Muslim-Christian tensions in Nigeria; perceived disparities in the application of laws and access to development, jobs, and investment in the north; and popular frustration with elite corruption and other state abuses. Nigerian forces at times heavy-handed response to Boko Haram since 2009 has reportedly fueled recruitment in some areas. The reported erosion of traditional leaders' perceived legitimacy among local populations in northeast Nigeria and northern Cameroon may also have contributed to the group's ascendance. The shrinking of Lake Chad, once one of Africa's largest lakes and now described by the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization as an «ecological catastrophe,» has exacerbated tensions among communities in the area that Boko Haram has reportedly sought to exploit (Mercy Corps, 2016).

From the foregoing, it is safe to say that the conflict arising from violent extremism in individual West African states are not happening in vacuums, rather, it's an indication of an entire region embroiled in conflict. However, these developments in the West African region are the products of both local and global dynamics, which gave impetus to the proliferation of violent extremist groups. Among the dynamics that gave impetus to the proliferation of violent extremism in West Africa is the explosion of African-led violent groups in Somalia, Nigeria and Mali who have become Al Qaeda affiliates for planning, training and operations of ideological radicalization (Forest, 2011). Similarly, state collapse in North African countries like Libya, Tunisia and Egypt with the proliferation of arms over border shave provided new vistas of opportunities for armed groups to recruit and form operational bases in West Africa as an avenue to create safe havens for training, increase their geographic spread, recruit followers, and equip themselves. Lastly, a shift in tactics from regular to irregular warfare by violent extremists through employing asymmetric tactics and expansion of the scope of their targets has made the ungoverned space in the Sahel an attraction for perpetration of these groups aims. Cases in this regard are the Boko Haram in Nigeria and Islamic State-linked groups in Libya in 2014 (Alvi, 2019).

THE DYNAMICS OF GENDERED VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN WEST AFRICA

Men and women experience violent extremism and conflict in general differently, as onlookers, victims and perpetrators; women have suffered violence and abuse by Boko Haram and its splinter groups. Accordingly, women are not only victims, as some joined the extremists voluntarily. Thus, in this section, we examine the dynamics of gendered violent extremism with special focus on the Lake Chad Basin (LCB); the reason is not farfetched, as the LCB remains the epicenter of violent extremism in West Africa, as epitomized by Boko Haram's activities. Hence, information from the LCB, could be used to make deductions for other parts of West Africa. For this paper, the following taxonomy of "women as perpetrators" and "women as victims" is developed to articulate the gendered dimension of violent extremism in West Africa.

Women as Victims

Women and children have been identified to be majorly affected by acts of violent extremism in many forms. The physical and psychological impact of violent extremism on the people of the West Africa has been most prominent with the huge toll of internally displaced persons in the region. Many women have lost their husbands, homes, means of livelihood, friends and sense of dignity of which they are left in camps or host communities to bear the brunt (Ochoche, 2016). In this regard, women and children were found to be more vulnerable in terms of their physical and social capital which subjects them to the risk of abuse, exploitation, coercion and manipulation because of their gender and status. The Human Rights Watch in

their report documented about 43 cases of sexual exploitation in seven IDP camps in Maiduguri, Borno State (Human Rights Watch, 2016). Again, abductions of women by the Boko Harm groups is very much prominent in West Africa especially in the Lake Chad Basin. In a video circulated online in March, 2014, Boko Haram leader, Shekau told followers to kill men but "spare the old, women, the lunatic, and the repentant" (*Premium Times,* 2014).Although several cases of abductions remain undocumented, the abduction of more than 200 schoolgirls on the 14th of April 2014, from the town of Chibok, Southern Borno State, the kidnapping of 110 schoolgirls from Dapchi in February, 2018 (Wilson, 2018), the killing of 59 Shuwa women, trying to escape from Kirenowa in June 2014 (they were pursued and shot dead at the mosque in Ngalori) are some among the abductions of women by the sect. Furthermore, at the apex of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria in 2014, young women have been used as suicide bombers in violent attacks which have killed hundreds at a blow. The use of women for such acts who are often than not, victims themselves have become symbolic of Boko Haram's brutality (International Crisis Group, 2016).

Women as Perpetrators

The changing role of women in violent extremism from victims to perpetrators of violent extremist acts have been visible in their submissiveness to serve as combatants and suicide bombers.In this role, adult women are known to carry weapons and, in some cases, bombs voluntarily, in a bid to advance extremists' agenda (Nagarajan, 2015). There are women's brigade in some West African extremist groups, such as those in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Unlike these groups, Boko Haram does not have a women's brigade. However, when the group came under pressure from Nigerian security forces, especially from 2014, some women and young girls were trained and joined in attacks; armed female fighters were sighted in Sambisa forest, engaging government forces (Pearson, 2014).Hence, women can be regarded as conscious, political and religious activists, and not just some sort of subdued, abducted and passive apolitical actors in violent extremism. Furthermore, women have served as recruiters and sympathizers of other women, their husbands or young men, as spies, messengers and smugglers (including of food). Their supposed harmlessness, allowed them to circulate more easily than male militants in numerous areas (Botha & Abdile, 2014).

DRIVERS OF GENDERED VIOLENT EXTREMISM

There are multiple influences, reasons, causes *and* factors that each directly *and* indirectly contribute in a more complex way to the phenomenon of gendered violent extremism. Ideology alone without any grievances often produces no action. Most members of BH, both male and female, have had their own critical cocktail of experiences that moved them over the edge, beyond their elastic limits, from mere anger, insults, hate speech, threats, disillusionment and frustration, to the "ti-

pping point" of actually joining, recruiting or supporting the violence and terrorism of the group; the pathway to extremism is also often not a straight one, even for a particular member. Like streams and tributaries that come together, through various topographies and landscapes to form a river, there are very many diverse reasons, contexts and pathways for *joining* or supporting the group. Each member may also have more than one reason for joining (Lemu and Ayegba, 2018).

Furthermore, to complicate matters further, there are also often other very different reasons for deciding to be violent, *actively fight* and even get killed for the group. These are sometimes, also, different from the reason members have for *remaining* in the group. An individual may for example *join,* the group for ideological reasons, be involved in *fighting/violence* for vengeance reasons (or because they were forced to), and decide to *remain* in the group for safety/security reasons, even if they no longer buy into the ideology. This diversity of reasons given in this example for *joining*, *fighting* and *remaining,* could also just as easily be the other way around for someone else. Consequently, and very often, there are a number of sometimes, apparently conflicting "ingredients" - grievances and push or pull factors ("drivers") - that combine to create radicalized and violent individuals and groups. This has sometimes created apparent contradictions in reports on the drivers to violent extremism. This fact has also made the data and statistics surrounding this issue very difficult for many to interpret (Lemu and Ayegba, 2018). Accordingly, in this section, we examine some of the key drivers of gendered extremism in West Africa and the Lake Chad Basin in particular:

Religion: Religion does provide an obvious backdrop to most of the activities of extremist groups. For instance, it influenced the inner workings of the organization, as 43% of former Boko Haram fighters indicated that religion had a strong influence among others. This therefore, underscores the need for religious and community leaders, to also play an appropriately similar critical role, in countering the ideology of BH members at the lower levels of the organizational ladder (Botha and Abdile, 2017). Before, Boko Haram turned to mass violence, when it was essentially one of a variety of revivalist Islamic movements in the Nigerian North, its founder, Mohammed Yusuf, attracted female followers. Yusuf put special emphasis on treatment of the female body to show adherence to correct Islam. He encouraged wearing the *niqab*, a Saudi-style dress introduced in Nigeria in the 1970s that fully covers face and body. Initially, women could hear him preach at the mosque, where they sat apart from the men. Subsequent debate among Boko Haram clerics over whether to allow women in public led to the decision they should be taught at home and not allowed in mosques (Abubakar, 2015). The sect values Quranic education for women so they can take part in the religious community and obey its rules. Some women joined because they found this attractive and were eager to "acquire knowledge, to memorize the Quran and to learn about Islam more deeply, these they counted as unique opportunities. As they grew in militancy, they considered any non-supporter an apostate or non-Muslim and an enemy to be fought. Conse-

quently, after the 2009 crackdown, some women already loyal to Boko Haram left Maiduguri, following their husbands to other towns or the Sambisa forest, a large savanna area south of Maiduguri where Boko Haram had bases. Yet others stayed behind to care for families or covertly support husbands (Abubakar, 2015).

Indoctrination and Radicalization: Insurgent groups acknowledge the importance of capturing the sympathy subconscious minds of their operatives and members of the public. This is usually hinged on the breakdown of societal values, law and order, and value crisis associated with the poverty and underdevelopment. Insurgent groups target both the individual and the norm of society. The individual sympathizers are put through elaborate process of "mind cleansing" and reprogramming through intense process of indoctrination and proselytization. Evidence abounds that the Boko Haram commenced its indoctrination long before it became armed: followers were forewarned to be prepared to make any sacrifice to advance the cause the movement. They were also availed of copious scriptural evidence of the mundane and divine merits of fighting for the cause in the hereafter. Available evidence tends to focus on radicalization as an exclusive domain for men as if women are not prone to radicalization. In addition, even where radicalization and indoctrination of women become apparent, this is usually captured as forced initiative of the men. The masculinization of indoctrination/radicalization appears to be overrated: evidence suggests that as wives, mothers and daughters, some women have – with or without the consent of their husbands - freely availed themselves for radicalization. Even where they are rescued by counterinsurgency operatives and undergoing rehabilitation, some of them have expressed strong desire to be allowed to return to the "solemn life of insurgency."

Structural Crisis: In some parts of West Africa, the crisis of governance which has bred chronic poverty, illiteracy and infrastructural decay has reinforced masculine power and material dispossession amongst women. According to Usman et al (in Nagarajan, 2015), research on radicalization and the role of women has found that, societal and cultural expectations of women to depend economically on men, leave them with few options when husbands or fathers leave to become active members of Boko Haram or if they die. Thus, without education and with little or no access to jobs, women have few ways to support themselves and their families. Then, Boko Haram gives money, food and other benefits to members and has a dedicated fund for widows of insurgents, in contrast to the lack of compensation or social safety net provided by the Nigerian state.

Substance Abuse: The abuse of psychotropic substance – which have become rampant and endemic in many parts of West Africa – has provided a mechanism for the willingness of disillusioned men and women (especially young girls) to join violent extremism and insurgency. In Northern Nigeria, there has been rising incidence of substance abuse due to poverty and crisis in the control of drugs in the country. Evidence suggests that both young men and women indulge in this act. As a

result, insurgent groups have developed an elaborate mechanism for luring impressionable young girls (and boys too) into their networks by making these drugs feely available to them. The insurgent themselves procure these drugs through both legitimate and illegitimate means. Legitimately, their collaborators in cities and towns procure and transmit on their behalf, and illegally they run elaborate schemes and operations on rural markets purposely to steal drugs, condiments and sugar from to sustain their operations. In addition to using drugs to lure would be militants, insurgent groups also use drugs to hypnotize and therefore, remote control, their operatives who are sent out on suicide missions. Thus, psychotropic substances have become a weapon of choice for insurgency groups. Using it to target women has proved to more useful, as women are, under normal circumstance, not expected to join killer missions and operations that are carried out by insurgency groups/

Marriage of Convenience and Forced Marriages: In Boko Haram-controlled areas, marriage could bring a measure of security and well-being for women and their extended family. In a village near Kerenowa in the Local Government Area (LGA) of Marte, Borno state, insurgents married 80 girls, offering dowries of 15,000 naira (about $70 in 2014), a considerable sum in a war-torn rural area. Some fathers gave their daughters to fighters under pressure from Boko Haram, and at times women chose such marriages against family wishes. In 2014, Kanuri elders and officials in Niger became more and more concerned about a small but swelling number of single women leaving the Diffa region for Boko Haram-controlled areas in search of business opportunities or a "lucrative" marriage (International Crisis Group, 2014). In order to maintain steady supply of young girls to sustain the marriage needs of young male insurgents, Boko Haram often carry out targeted operations to forcefully abduct young girls in their schools, homes and whilst on errand. Suffice it to note that the "culture of abduction for marriage" is a long tradition amongst some communities in many parts of Africa. It appears insurgents are reviving this profane culture to bolster their demand for young women.

Strategies for Countering Gendered Violent Extremism

Most strategies for CVE involves the adoption of either Kinetic Approach which employs Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency (CT-COIN) Operations (Agastia, Perwita, & Subedi, 2020), or Non-Kinetic Approach which implements preventative approaches using mostly non-coercive means such as socioeconomic and political empowerment targeted at countering violent extremist recruitment and ideology (Selim, 2016). However, with the changing nature and roles of actors involved in violent extremism in West Africa, there is need for the adoption of wholly inclusive countering and prevention strategies designed to embrace a gendered perspective. In this regard, substantial efforts could be exerted in an array of relevant fields which includes security, governance, socio-economic development, conflict prevention and other related spheres that will enhance effective success in efforts employed at countering gendered violent extremism. The preceding para-

graphs would offer practical strategies that would aid efforts of the African Union (AU) and national governments in countering gendered violent extremism in West Africa.

Legislative Amendments in Policy Frameworks: Although women and men, girls and boys are liable victims of violent extremism, however, women specifically serve either as targets in sexual and gender-based violence in achieving tactical, strategic and ideological aims or as active/voluntary supporters to terrorist groups ideology or operations. In this context, numerous women human rights and socio-economic development are impeded, including loss of livelihoods, internal displacement crisis due to terrorist threats as well as lack of access to justice as victims of violent extremism (Hudson et al, 2009). Despite the fact that many national and international strategies towards CVE have been employed by African national governments, the inclusion and recognition of women and the roles they occupy in violent extremism has nevertheless been relegated. Albeit at global level, the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 of year 2000 being the first to recognize the risks and experiences of women in armed conflict and their important roles in conflict prevention and resolution gave rise to series of subsequent Security Council Resolutions that reinforced the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda (Patel & Westermann, 2018). Closely following suit was the 2016 UN Plan of Action for Preventing Violent Extremism which gave acute attention to women and priority to gender considerations in the formulation of CVE strategies (Ndungu & Shadung, 2017). More recently, in 2018, the Sixth Review Resolution of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy called for UN member states to integrate into the programs a gender-based analysis on the key drivers of women radicalization to violent extremism while partnering with women-led civil organizations to develop CVE strategies (True et al, 2018).

Consequently, there is the need for the AU to liaise with both the UN and national governments within the West Africa region to ensure full-scale adoption and compliance with the letters of these resolutions. Additionally, a more focus driven approach at the African regional level is required to integrate a gender perspective in legislative policy frameworks that will recognize the significant and unique roles of women and girls as well as preservation of their identity in the design, implementation and evaluation of CVE efforts. This will reflect the status of gender dynamics in the conditions of CVE strategies and the inclusion of the under-represented societal fractions- women and girls in national laws and conventions that will ensure more responsiveness to emerging challenges especially gender victimization. Closely related to the viability of legislative functions in preventing or countering gendered violent extremism is the enforcement of law and strict compliance with human rights.

Law Enforcement and Human Rights Compliance: Many conflict-driven African nations have been faced with questionable state legitimacy due to the deteriora-

ting nature of law enforcement. This situation has exacerbated harsh conditions for violent extremism to thrive. Civil societies have identified discriminatory practices and disregard for human rights and gender equality as negative experiences that has over time metamorphosed into grievances and feelings of marginalization and other related governance grievances. Others have experienced human rights violations and abuses premised upon ethnic or gendered profiling by security officials (Cortright et al, 2008). More worrisome is that CVE efforts treat women and girls' fundamental rights with less decorum by ignoring their roles in violent extremism. Hence, protection mechanisms for this underrepresented fraction are neglected which serve as push factors and increase the risks of the vulnerable to submit to terrorist inducement, recruitment and radicalization (Giscard d'Estaing, 2017).

Therefore, a gender perspective on CVE strategies is needed to uphold human rights and gender equality without discrimination during policy formulations. Also, independent human rights bodies and interest groups should take up the responsibility to checkmate human rights violations by the police or security personnel. Accountability mechanisms through reporting, documentation, transparency and cooperation should be reinforced at local and national levels to enable credible and prompt reporting of human rights violations during CT operations especially regarding gender specifications. This will enhance the preservation of the sanctity of human life and dictates of international law as well as aid in addressing the public outcry for human rights compliance. This will further ensure success in institutional efforts in responding to gendered violent extremism. The AU could therefore employ its institutional and accountability instruments to cause West African governments to institutionalize viable mechanisms that support human rights compliance and law enforcement efficiency.

Adoption of Evidence-Based Approaches to Checkmate Women and Girls Involvement in Violent Extremism: Given that individual involvement and support for violent extremism is often ascribed to some push and pull factors believed to initiate causative factors in violent activities, it is vital to provide a division of responsibilities and practices among community, civil society and state apparatuses to engage in enquiries into such causal factors. In this regard, certain elements such as complexities of gender dynamics and their relationship to violent extremism, gender equality in mainstream politics as well as gender discriminatory policies against women's rights could be addressed so as not to impede CVE efforts (Bloom, 2011). However, CVE policies and programs fall short in addressing the various motivations and manifestations of gendered radicalization especially regarding women involvement in violent extremism (Cunningham, 2007).

Hence, CVE strategies should include a gender sensitive approach that will be responsive to the various factors that compel women and girls to venture into extremism. Most importantly, priority should be given to women as active key stakeholders in the development and implementation of these strategies. Consequently, the

community and civil societies should focus on empowering the vulnerable ones with the needed skills and knowledge for better resilience and courage in adversity. Additionally, sensitization campaigns and awareness on dynamics of radicalization should be promoted. More logically this means the community should work towards addressing the push factors of violent extremism. The state and security actors on the other hand should be strategically positioned to carry out and manage risk assessments while also working towards apprehending extremists' recruitment and mobilization efforts.

Strengthening Capacity and Awareness on Gender Roles for CVE: Research in the field of peace and conflict studies for decades has recognized the central role of women and their contribution to sustainable peace and strategy developments for conflict prevention and resolution (Regan & Paskeviciute, 2003). The drive for sustainable peace and stability in society is identified to be duly reinforced by the contributions of women in peace processes, discussions and strategy implementation. The position they occupy within this realm is premised upon their influences and roles beyond family formations which strengthens their potential to serve as mediators and architects of models aimed at countering terrorism and violent extremism (O'Reilly, Suilleabhain, & Paffenholz, 2015). Moreover, 'their voices may be especially compelling when they speak out as victims or survivors of terrorist attacks' (Fink, Barakat, & Shetret, 2013, p.4). Therefore, it is perceived that women can detect early warning signs of radicalization within their immediate environment for prompt intervention and formulation of preventive mechanism (Schlaffer & Kropiunigg, 2015). Many analysts have articulated the desired outcome and sustainability of CVE policies to be premised upon gender inclusion in mainstream efforts and the need to recognize the diverse roles women can play at local and national levels for CVE and PVE. This is feasible due to their experiences either as perpetrators or victims of violent extremism and their understanding of underlying factors that drives violent extremism at the local level (Huckerby, 2015).

Thus, it is pertinent to emphasize the need for African Union to encourage West African governments to adopt a gender-sensitive CVE approach that is all-encompassing to cater for the sustainability of CVE policies and strategies at various governmental levels. This involves the inclusion and recognition of women and girls' capacities, influences and vulnerability to violent radicalization and the consideration of their needs in the development and implementation of CVE policies. Noteworthy is the need to promote awareness on the divergent role women can play in CVE and supporting local strategies at community levels as well as promoting their understanding on the impacts of violent radicalization on women identity and development. The media is a viable tool to change attitudes towards gender and addressing critical issues by educating the large populace about the various roles and behaviors that relate to CVE. Civil society organizations and government officials can leverage social media outlets for outreach and crowdsourcing support for CVE strategies. This will enhance trust and support for CVE responses across gender dimensions.

Gender Equality and Empowerment: Numerous challenges have been identified to be faced by women and girls especially in aspects of skills acquisition, safety and security, cultural and religious restrictions, inaccessibility to resources for growth among others. Even within the political space, women continue to be underrepresented in decision making processes especially as it regards the push and pull factors that drives individuals to violent extremism (Global Counterterrorism Forum, 2016). Thus, it is desirable to strengthen influential relationships and legitimacy for women in political structures and commands from the grassroot up to international levels. This will enable overcoming barriers to their prosperity and support for community peace and stability. Similarly, it is mandatory to equip women and girls with education and knowledge in religious and social affairs which will give them first hand protection against vulnerability to radicalization and extremism temptations. This will enhance better chances for their participation in CVE initiatives while challenging and questioning extremism narratives. Their empowerment in all spheres and inclusion in formal and informal policy process for CVE will reinforce democratic gains in gender, peace and security agenda.

Gender Mainstreaming in Security Sector: In contemporary times, indications from research has shown that profile desirability in recruitment requirements into the security sector especially the police force has shifted preferences on masculinity credentials to appealing qualities and skills such as compassion, emotional intelligence, problem solving and patience (Sandifer, 2006). Similarly, research has shown that women are the custodians of such potentials as they are the gatekeepers of family unity and community at large through their unique attributes and configurations. They are probable to use their influence and networks in security engagements to expand the reach, effectiveness and influence of the organization's objectives. Most importantly, the influx of women within security institutions is presumed to impact institutional gender awareness and prompt reportage and investigation of crimes especially GBV (Lonsway et al, 2003). Thus, women should partner with security bodies especially the police on a range of security and crime-related issues and build sustainable engagement roles on CVE. Law enforcement agents need to also consider gendered needs and dynamics in the society and deliver appropriate justice and fairness in discharging their duties towards CVE. Lastly, gender integration in CVE requires reforming the security sector to address gender representation and the formation of policies and operational conventions to deal with the divergent needs across gender dimensions. This will boost legitimacy and operational effectiveness of the security sector and CVE strategies. The foregoing recommended strategies therefore emphasized the need for AU to compel West African national governments to ensure gender representation, equality and protection in the security sector.

CONCLUSION

The West African region has been branded as one of the most conflict-ridden sub-regions in the world. In the past, there was well-ordered distinction between national and international extremism. Today, this incongruity is no longer substantial, as the activities of supposedly indigenous violent extremist groups exceed national borders. This is marked by a complex network of private sponsorship, financial and mutual commitment that links dispersed groups together. Accordingly, the involvement of women in extremism epitomizes one of the essential fundamentals of contemporary extremism.

The transformation of the world into a global village through the use of internet has well explained the escalation of violent extremism in the West African region. This is so, as globalization challenges individual state's capacity to manage economic affairs, as well as serving as a facilitator and force multiplier for Violent Non-State Actors. The global flow of arms, for example, is no longer under the exclusive control of nation-states, as illicit arm dealers have become transnational players and have contributed to a diffusion of military power that has provided VNSAs with weapon capabilities that allow them to challenge government forces. Similarly, globalization has allowed violent extremist groups to develop transnational social capital and to create alliances and generate support outside their immediate area of operations. In addition, the strategic location of the Sahel corridor, which runs through the West African Sub-region, and its vast ungoverned spaces has provided "centre of gravity" for violent extremist groups to operate unchallenged.

Lastly, the paper concludes that, Boko Haram and other violent extremist groups along with CVE measures have dramatically changed the lives of thousands of women and girls, casting them voluntarily, by force or for lack of other options into new, evolving roles outside the domestic sphere. Some joined the movement, first as members of a religious community, later as insurgents, while many are targets of its violence. How roles evolve and relate to discrimination or empowerment have significant implications for CVE strategies in West Africa. The inadequacy of coercive counterterrorism approaches to countering violent extremism in the West African region is underlined by the failure of international actors on a common line of action, limited resources, institutional weaknesses, conflicting political agendas, corruption, sensitivities over domestic sovereignty, regional rivalries, and uneven engagement among affected states. Accordingly, the paper suggests that an all-inclusive gendered approach to CVE should be enhanced by the African Union Commission through the instrumentality of national governments.

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Gender and Terrorism: A Critical Analysis of the Roles of Women in Insurgency and Violent Extremism. The Boko Haram in View

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ABSTRACT   Over the years women have played an active role in violent extremism and insurgency. Though most women roles have been pushed behind the scenes, nevertheless, their participation is invaluable in the cycle of the terrorism landscape. An understanding of the gender dynamics that exist in women's participation reveals gender stereotypes which accrue from social and cultural constructs as one of the chief factors responsible for the assigned traditional roles of women in terrorist groups. This paper highlights the varied roles women play ranging from traditional, operational or supportive functions. In addition, the paper provides an historical overview of women's long involvement and highlights the shift in operation by the Boko Haram insurgents since 2013, analysing the gendered rationale for the instrumental use of females within its modus operandi. It underscores that several studies have recognised the need for mainstreaming gender into the security sector through the integration of a gender perspective, because when the security sector is inclusive and people oriented, a plethora of problems like human right violations and deficit in accountability which can serve as breeding ground for radicalisation into violent extremism, insurgency and terrorism can be addressed. The paper concludes that most terrorist organisations or violent extremist movements which have their roots in patriarchal societies are guided by social and cultural constructs when assigning tasks to women. It therefore stresses the need for a gender lens to be utilised when developing measures for countering violent extremism and insurgency. The paper recommends among others, need for national governments to carry out gender sensitive awareness raising campaigns in order to sensitise women and increase their capacity to take up leadership roles in monitoring, evaluating and designing of strategies for counter-violence extremism, peacebuilding, reintegration and rehabilitation processes.

Keywords   gender, gender-sensitivity, insurgency, terrorism and violent extremism.

INTRODUCTION

Over the years, women's role as active actors and combatants in insurgency, terrorism and violent extremism have been largely relegated to the back stage or less visible. A contributing factor to this is the gender difference which plays out in the roles assigned to women and men respectively. Understanding the gender dynamics of these roles will therefore shed light on the scope of women's participation in violent extremism, terrorism and insurgency. To this end, it is imperative to know that gender stereotypes stemming from social and cultural constructs have been the resulting factor for men to hold the chief combat, leadership and operational roles in violent extremism and insurgency. Likewise, this have resulted in men dominating the fighting ranks, hence, the propaganda of armed men from the battlefields. Although the participation of women in these activities is limited when compared to the male folks, nevertheless, there are indeed a number of women who hold operational and leadership roles in some terrorist organisations. Despite the low numbers reported, there is a need to understand the gender dynamics and the impact of women's role in violent extremism, terrorism and insurgency. This understanding will help address the misperception which portrays women as solely victims or passive and irrelevant in these groups, thus, bridging the gap that leads to gender blind policies in countering violence to which women similarly contribute (Organisation for Security and Cooperation 2019).

Given that women's role in terrorist organisations is not a recent phenomenon, their roles are varied when compared to what is reported. Consequently, according to the Committee of Experts on Terrorism (2016, pp. 5-8), the participation of women who are active players in the act of insurgency or violent extremism ranges from the role of active contributors as (wives, mothers, healthcare providers, teachers or logistic managers), to performing recruiting functions as well as playing active combat roles as suicide bombers or supporters of the cause. Studies show that from 2014 to 2015 women fighters accounted for 13% for the numbers of terrorist fighters, while in 2017 11% of the suicide attacks conducted was carried out by females (Council for Foreign Relations 2019). For instance, in the period between 2014 and 2018, Boko Haram largely drove the use of women suicide attackers. Its emergence in 2009 launched the sects' insurgency campaign in the Northern parts of Nigeria. This later spilled into the rest of the Sahel region of Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Nevertheless, after a significant increase in the trends of suicide bombing in the years 2014 to 2017, the group substantially decreased suicide attacks in 2018 with the military success recorded in most part of the region. Leading to female suicide bombing to decrease by 80% and the male by 53% (Institute for Economic and Peace 2019, pp. 62-65).

Given that studies have shown that violent extremist, terrorist movements and insurgent groups utilises gender stereotypes to propagate their agenda, a number of policy frameworks were developed by regional and international bodies. This

was with the aim to arrive at effective policies, strategies and programmes for gender-based prevention and countering insurgency and violent extremism to promote women's rights (Organisation for Security and Cooperation 2019). For instance, the UN adopted series of landmark UN Security Council Resolutions (SCR), one of which is the UNSCR 2242 adopted in 2015. The resolution calls on national governments to integrate their agenda on Women, Peace and Security (WPS), first formally recognised with the adoption of the UNSCR 1325 (2000) to counter violent extremism and terrorism. In addition, the UNSCR 2178 (2014) and UNSCR 2396 (2017) respectively encourages Member States to involve non-governmental actors and local communities concerned by empowering women and civil society groups, as well as ensure women participate in the leadership in formulating and designing strategies to address the lot of female terrorist fighters (UNSCR2178 2014). Preceding these resolutions is the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2006, which highlights the important need to promote the participation of women by integrating gender perspective to the efforts of countering terrorism and preventing violent extremism (Organisation for Security and Cooperation 2019).

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF WOMEN'S PARTICIPATION IN INSURGENCY AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM

The history of women's involvement in terrorism dates back to the late 19th century. Rapoport (2001, p. 419; 2004, p. 45) in his generally recognised analysis of terrorism history named and acknowledged four (4) waves of terrorist acts in which women acted as both fighters and supporters. The first wave was the anarchist wave from 1880-1920. Example of a woman who actively participated in terrorist actions at this time was Vera Zasulich, a key member of the Russian terrorist organisation (People's Will), who attempted to assassinate the St. Petersburg governor general in 1878. Also, Fanny Kaplan who was a member of the anti-Bolshevik Socialist Revolutionary Party was another woman who attempted to assassinate Vladimir Ilyich Lenin in the year 1918 (Weinberg & Eubank 2011, pp. 23-25). The second wave was the anti-colonial wave dating from 1920-1960 (an example is Geulah Cohen who was arrested by British authorities in 1946 for her involvement in terrorist activities), followed by the new left wave of 1960-1979 (with the involvement of for instance, Leila Khaled, a female terrorist who attempted to hijack a plane in 1970 under the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)) and recently, the religious wave dating from 1979 to date. An example of women in the religious wave, which is the latest wave of terrorism, can be seen when in 2004 Wafa Idris became the first female Palestinian suicide bomber (Naaman 2007, p. 933). Also, since 2013, Boko Haram modified tactics by utilising women for suicide bombing of installations as well as uses them as pawns. In addition, women have been actors in many waves of terrorism in Peru, Northern Ireland, Turkey, Philippines and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) (Agara 2015, p. 116).

Additionally, Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (2019) stated that in the 1960s and 1970s, women were key players in the far-left terrorist organisation like the Red Army Faction (RAF) in Germany. Also, in Europe, Ulrike Meinhof and Andreas Baader for instance held in 1968, key combatant and leadership roles as founders and intellectual heads. Moreover, women have also been active and continue to serve in affiliates to al-Qaeda and ISIS. From the above, suffice to say that throughout history, women engagements in terrorist networks and groups have always been and are becoming increasingly prominent globally as frontline activists, recruiters, propagandists and fundraisers (Bloom 2017).

UNDERSTANDING OF CONCEPTS

• Gender

Gender refers to the social construct and power dynamics attributed in differentiating the relationships that exist between women, girls, boys and men. These attributes, relationships and opportunities are not static but change overtime through the process of socialisation as they are learned. In most societies, gender is determined by the different responsibilities assigned and undertaken by women and men, as well as the varying access and control they have over resources and the opportunities made available for making decisions. These therefore create the gaps, inequalities and differences that exist between the male and female (Bloom 2017 and West Africa Network for Peacebuilding 2009, p. 16). A fundamental element of terrorism and insurgency therefore is gender, as gender analysis can play a pivotal role in furthering the understanding of women's involvement. While they can act as perpetrators, nevertheless, their role in preventing, curbing and countering insurgency can be better understood with a gender lens.

• Insurgency

Insurgency refers to a protracted political-military tussle directed towards dislodging the legitimacy of a government in order to control the resources of that territory and the population in part or totally. It involves unconventional military tactics comprising of terrorism, ethnic cleansing or guerrilla warfare. In addition, it utilises violent warfare, campaigns or sequenced battles which span over a decade, resulting in a high proportion of civilian casualties basically because of the blurred distinction between combatants and non-combatants (United States Government 2012, pp. 1-2). For the purpose of this paper, the term insurgency will be used interchangeably with terrorism.

• Violent extremism

The changing nature of violent extremism makes the term difficult to define, because in reality an ideology, religion, individual or group of individuals may be

extremist but non-violent. However, this is not to rule out the possibilities of an ideology producing a group of persons who resort to violence in order to support their ideological motives. Hence, violent extremism is not associated with a particular religion or ideology and is distinctive from terrorism. To this extent, violent extremism is described as the violent actions of people to support their belief in order to achieve their religious, ideological and political objectives which are extreme in nature (Canada Centre for Community Engagement and Prevention of Violence 2018, p. 7). This definition is closely related to the United States Agency for International Development (2011, p. 2), which refers it as "advocating, engaging in, preparing or otherwise supporting ideologically motivated or justified violence to further social, economic and political objectives".

- **Violence against women and girls or gender based violence**

Violence against Women and Girls (VAWG) or Gender Based Violence (GBV) is a universal pandemic that have received global attention. With the increasing conflicts around the world, this situation is amplified, owing to the fact that most armed groups and militias tend to use women as tools or battlefields for the conflicts. The reason for this is not farfetched from the aim at realising a strategic end state, because it is believed that the use of violence against women, girls and boys will usually draw the attention of the media, increase fear and result in greater sympathy for the militias (Banks 2019; World Bank 2019).

- **Gender sensitivity**

The issue of gender sensitivity is critically relevant to the subject of terrorism and insurgency. For such reasons, gender cannot be dismissed specifically because of the human rights violations women and girls encounter in the broad spectrum of conflicts be it armed conflict, terrorism, insurgency or violent extremism. Their use as tools and battlefields for such conflicts underscores the important reason to understand in terms of physical, economic, political and social violence the experience of militarisation women encounter during times of insurgency.

- **Gender and terrorism**

The concept of terrorism has become a debatable issue among governments, experts and academics alike. This is owing to the varying and different definitions of the term by nationals. Nevertheless, for the purpose of this work, the United Nations definition will be utilised. According to the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (2019), the UN from its three (3) series of International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997), International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (1979) and the International Convention on Offences and Certain other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (1963), refers to terrorism as a set of criminal acts that involves bombing, hostage taking and

attacks on board civilian aircrafts. The UN further describes the activities of any group it considers terrorist in the UNSCR 1267 (1999), 2253 (2015) as an act of terrorism. Furthermore, the UNSCR 1566 (2004) stressed the purpose of terrorism as "criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act…". This definition of the term 'terrorism' is important in considering the gender differentiated impact of terrorism, insurgency or violent extremism on the livelihoods of the different sexes. It also helps to understand and address the vulnerabilities of men and women in ensuring policies are void of discrimination when formulating responses at all levels.

Women as actors

Until recently, there existed a widespread perception that the act of terrorism is usually done by the male counterparts. This assumption is largely due to the attributive factors of gender stereotypes, the small number of women involved in terrorism and minimal literature of women in terrorism studies (Banks 2019). Nevertheless, in actuality women have taken up roles as active or supporting actors (perpetrators or domestic staff as wives and cooks etcetera).

Moreover, women have held a variety of roles willingly and unwillingly with terrorist organisations. These tasks run from occasional leadership positions, recruiters, outright terror operations, espionage, logistics support and moral. Nevertheless, their participation varies in each organisation, given that every terrorist or insurgent group have ideologies that are unique to them. In this regard therefore, trends and studies have shown that these organisations have patterns in which they operate, as such this influences women's varied participation (Spencer 2016, pp. 74-98). For instance, in the leftist terrorist organisations that fight for the liberation from oppressors or dictators and state independence, it is likely to find women hold operational roles which make it attractive bait to women in quest of a better life through their participation (Jacques & Taylor 2009, p. 510). Likewise, in revolutionary armies like that of the German Red Army Faction (RAF) and the Provisional Irish Republic Army (PIRA), women acted as conventional terrorist, conducting bombing operations on installations of the US and throughout Germany, as well as on British targets respectively (Raghavan & Balasubramavan 2014, p. 200). However, according to some scholars the operational roles of women were limited and less visible in the right-wing terrorist organisations, because their objective was not transformative but to tear down the structure of societies. Accordingly, women performed supportive, traditional and operational roles like child bearing, nurturing, activists, facilitators, espionage and head of local gangs in the right-wing National Democratic Party (NDP) of Germany (Jacques & Taylor 2009, p. 510). Closely related is the extremist Islamic organisation of al-Qeada and Hamas, which assign predominantly traditional roles to women. In

this vein, women's responsibilities were simply to transmit family morals, values and provide logistical supports to the organisation, while remaining hidden and relegated to the background (Byrd & Decker 2008).

Using an African example, in Nigeria for instance, the Boko Haram militant began recruiting, equipping and deploying female members as suicide bombers in 2014 (Deutsche Welle 2017). While some willingly participated to carry out the act of terrorism as a result of their alliance as relatives or friends of the insurgents, the others were forcefully recruited. Statistics shows that not less than 123 female suicide bombers have been recruited willingly or forcefully indoctrinated to commit attacks. For the involuntary perpetrators, these women were victims and vulnerable targets of insurgency, brain washed and compelled to join as a result of fear, poverty and ignorance (Foundation for the Defence of Democracies 2016). Regardless of the circumstances surrounding their indoctrination, their roles as fighters were to inflict maximum casualties by targeting installations such as churches, mosques, markets, bus stations and schools to mention a few (Deutsche Welle 2017).

In addition, in many instances the women's bodies become the battlefield, hence, they find themselves becoming wives of the insurgents through forceful marriage or sex slaves. Also, in some cases they are torn between making the choice of being raped, giving sex in exchange of vital resources such as food or both. In line with this, Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2015) Africa, stated that an estimated 2000 women and girls in the north-east of Nigeria have been abducted since the year 2009 for the purpose of forced labour or sex slavery. An example is the abduction of 276 Chibok girls abducted from a school in Borno State, Nigeria, in April 2014 by the Boko Haram (BBC News 2017).

The Women of Boko Haram: Driven by Extremism?

The rise in the Boko Haram's insurgency changed the ordeal, lives and livelihoods of a number of women and girls dramatically in the North Eastern part of Nigeria. According to studies, some of these women and girls were forcefully conscripted by enslavement or abduction or voluntarily radicalised to escape the harsh realities of the times that stared them at the face (International Crisis Group 2016).

Like many insurgent groups, the Boko Haram since its emergence in 2002 and especially in 2013 recognised that women's involvement either as a tool or battlefield can be instrumental to achieve their strategic end state, as it increases local and international attention from the government, media and the general populace. Although against western education, the Islamic terrorist group promoted Islamic education and financial emancipation through empowerment. Drivers such as extreme poverty, patriarchy, illiteracy, corruption and early marriage, led the voluntary women participants to embrace the opportunities of the group for the purpose of liberating themselves from untold hardship and advancement of freedom (International Crisis Group 2016). Between February and May 2013, abductions of dozen

more government officials and their families were carried out. Significant at this time was the capturing of twelve (12) women and children by the Boko Haram from the police barracks in Bama. In a video that later surfaced, the group threatened to make these hostages servants if their conditions for the release of Boko Haram members, their wives and children in the prison was not met (Agence France-Presse 2013). This therefore translated to mean that the capturing of women is for an instrumental purpose and suggested the gendered responsive shift in the tactics of the Boko Haram militants. Research shows that between June to August 2013, at least five (5) women were arrested on the grounds of concealing, smuggling and attempting the execution of suicide bombings (Zenn & Pearson 2014, pp. 46-57). Similarly, from June 2014 to January 2015, data shows that out of the 17 female suicide bombings in Nigeria, 15 were successfully carried out, while 2 were abortive, leading to the arrest of the girls (George & Onuoha 2015). Correspondingly, studies show that in the period between 2011 and 2018 more than 60 incidences of suicide bombings against civilian targets, involving girls aged below 15 had been attempted or actualized (Vesna 2019). Likewise, men disguised as women to evade security checks because of the general notion of women as more savage than men and attracting less suspicion. To this end, evidence shows that three (3) men in July 2013, dressed like veiled women were killed and twenty (20) others who attempted attacking a police station were arrested (Daily Trust 2013).

Furthermore, gender in the ideology and culture of the sect depicts violence against women generally and more specifically Christian women in line with its command to Jihad (War on Unbelievers, be they Muslims or Christians), which often features sharia law to facilitate GBV through rigid structures of gender ideologies (Onuoha 2010, p. 57). Also, studies shows that the group's choice of women as suicide bombers is directly linked to the high incidences of abducting and kidnapping women. Subsequently, according to the Global Terrorism Index (GTI), data shows that in the past five years, the Boko Haram have been responsible for the majority of female suicide attacks when compared to the other 137 countries being impacted by terrorism. This has resulted in 87% deaths which translate to over 900 fatalities from female suicide attacks with at least 146 suicide attacks (Institute for Economics and Peace 2019, pp. 62-65).

Table 1: Comparing Boko Haram female suicide attacks with other groups.

Serial	Terror group	% of female suicide incidence
1.	Boko Haram	48%
2.	Unknown	24%
3.	Others	16%
4.	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LLTE)	6%
5.	Chechen Rebels	3%
6.	Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)	3%

Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations

From the above table, data highlights that suicide bombings attributed to females have been linked to 26 known terror groups, with the Boko Haram sect responsible for 48% of all female suicide bombings since 2014 when it commenced including women in terror attacks.

GENDER MAINSTREAMING AND AWARENESS IN THE SECURITY SECTOR AND IN COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM

Several research studies show that approaches of the security sector when inclusive and people oriented can aid address a plethora of problems like human right violations, corruption and deficit in accountability all of which can serve as a conducive breeding ground for radicalisation into violent extremism, insurgency or terrorism (United Nations Development Programme 2017).

Furthermore, mainstreaming gender through the integration of a gender perspective into the security sector can help ensure the operational effectiveness and legitimacy of the sector. With regard to this, it is required for all law enforcement personnel to recognise the gendered dynamics, needs and experiences of men and women alike in the given community they are deployed to work (Organisation for Security and Cooperation 2019). According to the UN Women (2015), given that women usually have first-hand information and knowledge about events and people through their social and informal networks, evidence shows that women can contribute meaningfully in establishing the situational awareness necessary for security efforts.

Although findings show that women can divulge important information to male and female law enforcement personnel, nevertheless, according to the National Centre for Women and Policing (2003), women are more expressive to female law enforcement personnel on certain crimes such as Sexual and Gender Based Violence (SGBV). Consequently, this make the female law enforcement personnel better positioned for community policing as a result of the favourable evaluations they get from the citizenry.

While the above is not suggestive that women are experts in gender issues and therefore should attend to women issues, it rather highlights the need for the equal representation of women and men in order not to arrive at counterproductive responses in decision making processes in countering violent extremism and terrorism. To this end, a gender analysis is required to ascertain the differential context-specific gaps that exist between women/girls and men/boys in order to assess the extent to which strategies, programmes and policies developed and implemented will be sustainably effective.

CONCLUSION

From the foregoing, inferences can be made that for most terrorist organisations or violent extremist movements which have their roots in patriarchal societies, social and cultural constructs is a determining factor in assigning the task and roles women play for such groups. In addition, the use of women for insurgent enterprises has been viewed as a strategic advantage for most of such groups, this is owing to the increased propaganda and apparent sensational attention it derives from the media, locally and internationally.

Furthermore, this paper reveals that there are inherent complexities with the gender dimension of terrorism and emphasises the need for gender-sensitivity when developing responses to counter the terrorism landscape. Moreover, it stresses the need to use a gender lens in analysing gender dynamics when putting in place broad measures for counter-insurgency and counter violent extremism. Moreover, the paper recognises that gender entails both the female and male sexes and as such the experiences as perpetrators, supporters or victims vary between women and men.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

From the foregoing, the following policy recommendations are hereby proffered:

1. Women's experiences as actors in terrorism, insurgency and violent extremism should be taken into account as this will improve the responses on countering terrorism and violent extremism and increase the success rate of addressing the issues that impact on the human rights of women.

2. National governments globally should carry out gender-sensitive awareness raising campaigns in order to sensitise women and increase their capacity to take up leadership roles in monitoring, evaluating and designing of strategies for counter-violence extremism, peacebuilding, reintegration and rehabilitation processes.

3. AU Member States and their governments should put in place effective measures to counter radicalising gendered messages online as it is the fastest mode terrorist groups, insurgent movements and violent extremist utilise to recruit women and men alike. This will help dissuade women and enlighten them of the manipulative use of gendered narratives of these groups.

4. There should be a robust reintegration and rehabilitations support, as well as tailored prosecution strategies for women who have been active players in terrorism related offences. This will help minimise the risk possibilities of re-radicalisation and recidivism.

5. International, regional and sub-regional organisations should work closely with academia, experts and think tanks to develop and consistently record gender-disaggregated data in order to bridge the knowledge gap on women's involvement in the act of terrorism, insurgency and violent extremism. In addition, this data can capture variables such as the numbers, national and possibly the sex, demographics, ideological and religious affiliates of the persons radicalised, consequently, this will promote the management of information, analyses of emerging threats, trends and developments on the discourse.

6. State actors should address human rights violations and violence against women which results from the counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency measures that generates grievances which are conducive for the radicalisation of women and men.

7. Effective community policing should be developed in synergy with the state, civil society, families, peers, private sector including telecommunication and internet provider to track trends of radicalisation and build resilience against violent extremism and insurgency.

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The Impact of Terrorism and Trade Liberalization on Inbound Tourism in Sub-Saharan African countries

By

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ABSTRACT The tourism sector has become a significant part of economic growth in the globalized world. Extensive studies have been conducted on the impact of socioeconomic, natural, and cultural factors on tourism sector development in the related literature. In this study, we explore the influence of terrorism together with trade liberalization on inbound tourism in Sub-Saharan African countries for the period of 2002–2016, using second generation cointegration and causality tests. The empirical analysis revealed no significant causality among terrorism, trade liberalization, and tourism development. However, the long run impact of both terrorism and trade liberalization on terrorism development varies from country to country in the sample. The results indicate that terrorism will be a key factor in countries' attempts to achieve their projected goals in the tourism sector.

Keywords Inbound Tourism, Panel Data Analysis, Sub-Saharan Africa, Terrorism, Trade Liberalization.

INTRODUCTION

Since the 1980s, the tourism sector has become an important component of economic growth for many countries, together with the removal or reduction in barriers to the international circulation of goods, services, and capital. It contributed USD 8.8 trillion to the global economy in 2018, equaling 10.4% of global GDP (World Travel & Tourism Council-WTTC, 2019a), and has many positive economic implications for economic growth, balance of payments, employment, tax, income, public or private investment, and the demand for goods and services (Marcouiller et al., 2004). In this context, the employment promotion by the tourism sector is 10% of total employment, or 1 in 10 jobs worldwide. Furthermore, 1

in 5 of all new jobs generated globally were created by the tourism sector in the past five years (WTTC, 2019a).

The tourism sector can make a positive contribution to economic growth in the long run through five different channels: first, tourism provides significant foreign currency earnings (Lutz and Lutz, 2006), enabling payment for imported capital goods and basic inputs; second, tourism plays a significant role for local companies and companies in the touristic countries, so new infrastructure investments and investments in competition can increase; third, tourism supports other economic industries either directly or indirectly; fourth, tourism creates employment and increases revenue; and fifth, tourism has a positive effect on economies of scale in national companies (Schubert et al., 2011). However, the negative economic, environmental, social, and cultural effects of tourism may come into question depending on the process management.

The determinants of tourism sector development gains are important, given the positive effects of tourism. In the related literature, the impact of economic, institutional, social, and cultural factors on tourism sector development have been explored by numerous scholars (Assaf and Josiassen, 2012; Zidana, 2015; Malec and Abrhám, 2016). In this paper, we focus on the effect of terrorism together with trade liberalization on the development of the tourism sector, in light of the related literature. The sector is highly sensitive to shock situations such as terror attacks and infectious disease (Edmonds and Mak, 2006), and these situations may affect both the choice of destination and the risk status of the destination (Ahlfeldt, Franke and Maennig, 2015). It may also be adversely affected by political instability such as chaos, corruption, violence, and terror, because tourists aim to spend their time and money engaging in fun activities and travel in peaceful countries (Bayar and Yener, 2018). Terrorism or terrorist events can cause unwanted outcomes in the countries in question, such as uncertainty, panic, restlessness, and chaos (Sönmez, 1998); homelessness and deflation (Baker, 2014); and anxiety, panic, and insecurity (Alam and Mingue, 2018); and this in turn may negatively affect the tourism sector development through a decrease in demand (Neumayer, 2004; Reisinger and Mavondo, 2005). In addition, terror attacks can damage a region's infrastructure resources (Llorca-Vivero, 2008), cause political riots (Yap and Saha, 2013), hinder tourism competition, and be detrimental to its cultural heritage (Das and Dirienzo, 2010) and destination image (Witt and Moore, 1992). For this reason, terrorism or terror attacks are expected to negatively influence the development of the tourism sector. However, tourism can also lead terrorism if the countries do not have sufficient capability to check and monitor the international tourists.

Trade liberalization also has the potential to contribute to the development of the tourism sector through stimulating business travel, increasing networking, raising awareness via product and country advertisements, and improving countries' infrastructure (Kulendran and Wilson, 2000; Turner and Witt, 2001; Santana, Le-

desma and Perez, 2011). However, the growth in the tourism sector also enhances trade liberalization (Tandogan and Genc, 2016). In this way, a reciprocal interaction between trade liberalization and tourism sector development is theoretically expected. However, lack of effective border controls mainly from insufficient staff and equipment at customs), excessive price differences among countries (Golub, 2015), weak institutions and law enforcement (Pitt, 1981), difficulties in obtaining visa, costly and high export and import taxes (Abrego et al., 2020) can lead informal cross border trade and in turn foster the terrorism.

The SSA (Sub-Saharan African) region is rich in terms of untouched resources, which can be translated into opportunities with increased commitment (World Economic Forum-WEF, 2019a). In addition, the region has 17% of the UNESCO World Natural Heritage and 15% more endemic plants compared to other countries (WEF, 2019b). However, only 67.1 million international tourists arrived in 2018 (4.8% of global tourist arrivals), of which 43.3 million (3.1% of global tourist arrivals) came to SSA (World Tourism Organization-UNWTO, 2019a). Furthermore, the world annual growth average of international tourist arrivals in 2010–2018 was 5%, whereas it was 3.6% for Africa. North Africa grew by 2.4%, and SSA grew by an average of 4.4%. SSA has, on average, more international tourist arrivals from both the African continent and North Africa (UNWTO, 2019b). However, there is a large gap between the resources of the region and the data for travel and tourism. There are several reasons that may prevent the closure of the gap, including government policy, governance problems (Magombo et al., 2017), infectious diseases, limited openness, health concerns, security problems (terrorism), inadequate air transport, travel costs, taxation (ticket) (Soshkin, 2019), inadequate infrastructure, water scarcity, poor sanitation (The African Capacity Building Foundation-ACBC, 2016), and limited ICT (Oshikoya and Hussain, 1998). Furthermore, the terrorism events by transnational groups in the region verify the problems in border security and institutional and regulatory framework. Therefore, the countries have strengthened the border security and constrained the terrorists' provision and mobilization of financial resources and tried to improve the cooperation in identification of transnational groups, reducing their mobility, and monitoring the flows of illegal weapons and capital. However, the region's travel and tourism capacity are projected to grow by 60% from 2018 to 2029 (Soshkin, 2019). For this reason, for the region to reach the projected level, the determination and implementation of the right policies for the tourism sector is crucial.

In this context, we explore the effect of terrorism and trade liberalization on inbound tourism in SSA countries. The study aims to contribute to the relevant literature in two ways. First, the study is one of the first to investigate the impact of terrorism on tourism sector development for the SSA region and also make a contribution to the limited literature. Secondly, the econometric tests regarding cross-sectional dependence and heterogeneity enable us to reach relatively more reliable results. The rest of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes

the related empirical literature and Section 3 describes the dataset and methodology. The applied analysis and discussion are presented in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes the study.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Tourism has both positive and negative implications for the economic, environmental, social, cultural, and political health of nations. In this context, the tourism sector has become a significant component of national income, and the positive impact of tourism on economic growth has been verified by numerous empirical studies (Balaguer and Cantavella-Jordá, 2002; Dritsakis, 2004; Srinivasan et al., 2012; Eeckels et al., 2012; Jayathilake, 2013; Simundic and Kulis, 2016; Fahimi et al., 2018; Habibi et al., 2018; Pan and Dossou, 2019). Furthermore, the tourism sector also makes economic contributions through employment creation due to its labor intensive structure, foreign exchange generation, FDI inflows, regional development, enhancement of trade and entrepreneurship, tax revenue increases, and new infrastructure investments (Harcombe, 1999; Tomohara, 2017). However, the sector may lead to negative economic and non-economic effects through the shadow economy, regional and income inequality, and environmental and ecological deterioration (e.g., see Wen and Tisdell, 1997, Høyer, 2000; Gössling, 2002; Black, 2004; Scheyvens and Momsen, 2008; Lv, 2020).

Given the positive aforementioned economic effects of the sector, many researchers have explored the determinants of tourism sector development. We analyze the effect of terrorism together with trade liberalization on tourism development regarding the related literature. The relevant empirical literature has generally revealed a negative and disruptive effect of terrorism on tourism sector development (Enders et al., 1992; Sloboda, 2003; Yaya, 2009; Feridun, 2011; Raza and Jawaid, 2013; Akıncı and Yılmaz, 2015).

In this context, Enders and Sandler (1991) analyzed the influence of terrorist attacks on tourism sector development in Spain for the period of 1970-1988 through VAR analysis and disclosed that terrorist events negatively affected Spanish tourism sector and a one-way causality from terrorism to tourism. On the other side, Enders et al. (1992) explored the effect of terrorism incidents on tourism in Austria, Greece, and Italy through ARIMA models for the period of 1968-1988 and revealed that terror attacks adversely affected the tourism revenue for each one country.

Drakos and Kutan (2003) analyzed the influence of the terrorist attacks on tourist arrivals in Turkey, Israel and Greece employing SURE (seemingly unrelated regression) method for the period of 1991-2000 and revealed that the terrorist attacks negatively affected the number of tourist arrivals in the countries and reduced the tourism arrivals. Yaya (2009) analyzed the impact of terrorism on tourism in Turkey over the period of 1985-2006 and disclosed that terrorist attacks had negatively and very little impact on tourism and one-way causality from terrorism to tourism development.

Basu and Marg (2010) examined the effects of political instability and terrorist attacks on the tourism sector, using the AR-MA method for Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon. Consequently, they reached that political instability and terrorist attacks in Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon have decreased both the number of foreign tourist arrival and tourism revenues.

Raza and Jawaid (2013) investigated the impact of terrorist activities on tourism sector in Pakistan during the period of 1980-2010 through cointegration analysis and revealed a negative effect of terrorism on tourism sector development to short and long term. Altay et al. (2013) analyzed economic effects of terrorism in a panel of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey for the period of 1996-2010 through regression analysis and disclosed that terror incidents negatively affected tourism sector and a 1% increase in terror incidents led a 14.79% in tourist arrivals.

Saha and Yap (2014) examined the effects of political instability and terrorism on tourism demand for the period of 1999-2009 in 139 countries through regression analysis and revealed a negative impacts of political instability and terrorism on tourism development. But the impact of political instability on tourism development were found to be much more severe when compared with the impact of terrorism. On the other side, Bassil (2014) examined the impact of national and international terrorist attacks on tourism sector in Lebanon, Turkey and Israel over the period of 1995-2007 through seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) analysis and disclosed that terrorist attacks had a negative impact on tourism sector development in all three countries.

Özcan and Özmen (2016) analyzed the impact of terrorism on tourism sector in 26 European Union and 13 Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries for the period of 2002-2013 through cointegration and causality analysis and revealed a negative effect of terrorism on tourism sector and also MENA region was affected more adversely than the European Union by the terrorist attacks. Liu and Pratt (2017) investigated the short and long-run impacts of terrorism on international tourism in 95 countries for the period of 1995-2012 through ARDL cointegration analysis and revealed no impacts of terrorism on international tourism in the long run, but a very low negative impact of terrorism on international tourism in the short run.

Alam and Mingque (2018) investigated the impact of terrorist events on international tourism arrivals in Pakistan for the period of 1995-2016 through ARDL cointegration and Granger causality tests and revealed that terrorism negatively affected the tourism sector in short and long term. Furthermore, they revealed a one-way causality from terrorism to tourism sector development.

Radić et al. (2018) examined the causality between terrorism and international tourism arrivals in Spain, Turkey, Germany, Britain, and Italy for the period of 2001-2015 and disclosed a negative effect of terrorism on the number of international tourism arrivals. Tourism-led terrorism was found to be valid for Germany,

Turkey, and the UK and terrorism-led tourism was valid for Spain and Italy. On the other side, Boojhawon and Seetanah (2018) analyzed the impact of terrorism on tourism demand for the period 1983-2015 in Mauritius employing time series analysis and disclosed that terrorism negatively affected the tourism demand in the short-run, but it had no significant effects on tourism demand in the long-run.

Bassil et al. (2019) analyzed the effect of domestic and international terrorism on tourism demand in Turkey, İsrael, and Lebanon during the period 1995-2017 through SUR method and reached a negative effect of domestic and transnational terror attacks on tourism demand in all three countries. Furthermore, they revealed that terror incidents in a country affected not only origin countries but also neighbor countries in the same geography.

Santana-Gallego et al. (2019) examined the impact of security threats on tourism for the period 1995-2013 in 171 destinations through regression analysis and disclosed that terrorist attacks and homicides reduced the tourist arrivals significantly. Stankova et al. (2019) examined the relationship between terrorism risk and international tourism revenues for 37 countries from European and American tourism regions, for time period of 2012-2017 through causality and regression analyses and revealed the negative effects of terrorist incidents on tourism. Lastly, Karamelikli et al. (2019) investigated the effect of terrorism on tourism sector for the period of 2007-2016 in Turkey through non-linear autoregressive lag (NARDL) approach and disclosed a negative tourism effect of terrorism.

Several empirical studies have revealed an insignificant or positive impact of terrorism on tourism sector development. In this context, Gut and Jarrell (2007) examined the influence of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on visitors to Chimney Rock Park in the United States for the period of March 2000–July 2005 through the ARDL model and disclosed a positive effect on visitors to the regional park. Meanwhile, Gazopoulou (2011) analyzed the impact of terrorist attacks on tourism revenues in Greece during the 1980–2009 period and discovered no significant effects on tourism effects from terrorism. Furthermore, neither Karaçuka and Çelik (2014) nor Çelik and Karaçuka (2017) were able to determine a significant effect of terrorism on tourism sector development.

The limited literature regarding the effect of trade liberalization on tourism development has generally concluded a positive contribution of trade liberalization on tourism sector development. In this context Leitao (2010), Surugiu et al. (2011), and Chaisumpunsakul and Pholphirul (2018) have revealed the positive effect of trade on tourism development in different countries.

DATA AND ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY

In the article, the impact of terrorism and trade liberalization on inbound tourism has been investigated by second generation cointegration and causality tests.

In the empirical analyses, the outcome variable of inbound tourism was proxied by international tourism receipts as a percent of GDP given the data availability and related literature. The international tourism receipts consist of expenditures of international inbound visitors and payments to national transporters for international carrying, and prepayments for goods and services in the destination country. Meanwhile, the explanatory variable of terrorism was represented by the GTI (Global Terrorism Index) of the Institute for Economics & Peace (2019), and trade liberalization was proxied by the sum of export and import as a percentage of GDP. The GTI, which varies between 0 and 10 (a higher value means a higher level of terrorism) is calculated by five year weighted averages of 4 different components and includes 163 countries which constitute 99.7% of the world's population (Institute for Economics & Peace-GTI, 2018). The components include incidents (total number of a terrorist attacks in a given year), fatalities (total number of fatalities owing to terrorist attacks in a specific year), injuries (amount of injuries due to terrorist attacks in a certain year), and property (amount of material damage owing to terrorist attacks in a given year). In addition, all variables are annual, and the study period was determined as 2002–2016 due to the availability of tourism receipts.

Table 1. Dataset description

Variables	Variable description	Data source
TOURISM	International tourism receipts as % of GDP	World Bank (2019 a&b)
GTI	Global terrorism index	Institute for Economics & Peace (2019)
TO	Sum of export and import as % of GDP	World Bank (2019c)

SSA countries were selected by considering World Bank data (2019d), and the study sample consisted of Angola, Burundi, Cote d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. In this context, we excluded Botswana, Gabon, Malawi, Mauritius, and Togo from the study, because their GTI index was 0 during the study period. The remaining countries in the region were not included in the study due to data non-availability.

The econometric analyses were implemented through the software of EViews 10.0, Stata 14.0, and Gauss 10.0. The main characteristics of the dataset are presented in Table 4. The average of international tourism receipts was 2.218% of GDP, the average of global terrorism index was approximately 2.964, and the average of trade liberalization was approximately 57.616% of GDP. Although the trade liberalization in the sample changed considerably among the countries, both international tourism receipts and global terrorism index exhibited no considerable variations among the countries.

Table 2. Summary statistics of the dataset

Variables	Mean	Std. Deviation	Minimum	Maximum
TOURISM	2.218	1.930	0.0359	9.168
GTI	2.964	2.175	0	9.280
TO	57.616	22.260	19.101	122.446

In the applied section, the short and long run effects of terrorism and trade liberalization on tourism sector development are analyzed by second generation cointegration and causality analyses. The cointegration relationship among tourism sector development, global terrorism index, and trade liberalization is analyzed through the Westerlund (2008) Durbin-Hausman cointegration test. This test considers both cross-sectional dependency and heterogeneity and can be employed in case the independent variables are different integration levels on condition that the dependent variable is I(1). The test calculates two different test statistics, the Durbin-Hausman group (DH_g) and Durbin-Hausman panel (DH_p), as seen in equations (1) and (2). The DH_g statistic is considered when the panel is heterogeneous, whereas the DH_p test statistic is considered when the panel is homogeneous (Westerlund, 2008). The refusal of the null hypothesis reveals the existence of the cointegrating relationship among the variables.

$$DH_g = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \bar{S}_i \left(\tilde{\phi}_l - \bar{\phi}_l \right)^2 \sum_{t=2}^{T} \bar{e}_{it-1} \qquad (1)$$

$$DH_p = \bar{S}_n = \left(\tilde{\phi}_l - \bar{\phi}_l \right)^2 \sum_{i=1}^{n} \sum_{t=2}^{T} \bar{e}_{it-1} \qquad (2)$$

The long run coefficients are estimated by the panel AMG (Augmented Mean Group) estimator of Eberhardt and Teal (2010). The AMG estimator considers the existence of cross-sectional dependence and heterogeneity, and is utilized when all of the variables are I(1); it calculates the panel cointegrating coefficients and each country's coefficient. The panel cointegration coefficient is estimated by weighting the arithmetic averages of the cross-sectional cointegration coefficients, and it therefore yields more reliable results when compared with Pesaran's (2006) estimator of common correlated effects. Furthermore, the panel AMG estimator considers the common factors and dynamic effects of the series, produces efficient results for an unbalanced panel, and can be used in the case of an endogeneity problem resulting from error terms (Eberhardt and Bond, 2009). The AMG estimator decomposes the variables in the following way:

$$y_{it} = \beta_i^l x_{it} + u_{it} \qquad (3)$$

$$u_{it} = \alpha_i + \lambda_i^l f_t + \varepsilon_{it} \ (i = 1... N, \quad t = 1... T, \quad m = 1... k) \qquad (4)$$

$$x_{mit} = \pi_{mi} + \delta_i^l f_t + \varepsilon_{mi}^l g_{mt} + \rho_{1mi} f_{1mt} + ... + \rho_{nmi} f_{nmt} + v_{it} \qquad (5)$$

$$f_t = \tau^l f_{t-1} + \varepsilon_{it} + v e g_t = \psi^l g_{t-1} + \Omega_{it} \qquad (6)$$

where x_{it} represents the vector of observable covariates in the above equations, f_t and g_t are the unobserved common factors, and the l_i are the country-specific factor loadings.

Lastly, the reciprocal interaction among tourism sector development, terrorism, and trade liberalization was analyzed with the Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) causality test regarding heterogeneity and yields robust results under cross-sectional dependency.

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

In the applied part of the study, first prestests of cross-sectional dependence and heterogeneity were conducted to specify the right unit root, cointegration, and causality tests. The cross-sectional dependence was tested with LM, LM adj. and LM CD tests, and the test consequences are reported in Table 3. The null hypothesis in favor of the cross-sectional independence was denied at the 1% significance level. Therefore, the aforementioned tests highlight the presence of cross-sectional dependence among the three series.

Table 3. Results of cross-sectional dependency tests

Test	Test statistic	P value
LM (Breusch and Pagan, 1980)	186.6	0.0000
LM adj. (Pesaran et al., 2008)	9.385	0.0000
LM CD (Pesaran, 2004)	0.816	0.0145

The slope coefficients' homogeneity was tested with the adjusted delta tilde test of Pesaran and Yamagata (2008) after investigation of cross-sectional dependence and test consequences, as reported in Table 4. The null hypothesis suggesting the existence of homogeneity was rejected in light of the p values of both tests. Therefore, the slope coefficients of the cointegration equation were heterogeneous.

Table 4. Results of homogeneity tests

Tests	Test statistic	P value
$\tilde{\Delta}$	5.887	0.000
$\tilde{\Delta}adj.$	6.798	0.000

The integration level of the series is important for the selection of the right method and in turn the reliability of the findings. In the study, the stationarity analysis of the study variables was examined with the Pesaran (2007) CIPS (Cross-sectionally augmented IPS [Im- Pesaran-Shin, 2003]) unit root test taking note of cross-sectional dependence, and the test consequences are reported in Table 5. The test consequences revealed that all the series except GTI were I(1), but GTI was stationary at the level. Therefore, we employed the Westerlund (2008) Durbin-Hausman cointegration test, which can be used with the series having different integration levels.

Table 5. Results of CIPS unit root test

Variables	Constant	Constant + Trend
TOURISM	1.316	− 1.422
D (TOURISM)	− 4.068***	− 1.915**
GTI	− 2.328***	− 1.789**
D (GTI)	− 4.819***	− 2.904***
TO	− 0.104	0.300
D (TO)	− 2.370***	− 0.987*

Optimum lag length was specified as 1 taking notice of Schwarz information criterion.

***, **, * indicated that it is respectively significant at 1%, 5% and 10%.

The cointegration relationship among inbound tourism, terrorism, and trade openness was tested by Westerlund's (2008) Durbin-Hausman (2008) cointegration, considering the different integration levels of the series, and the existence of cross-sectional dependence and the test consequences are reported in Table 6. The Durbin-Hausman group statistic was utilized due to the existence of cross-sectional dependence and, therefore, the null hypothesis suggesting the non-existence of a cointegration relationship was rejected. As a result, we found a significant long run relationship among the series.

Table 6. Results of Westerlund's (2008) Durbin-Hausman (2008) cointegration test

	Statistic	P-value
Durbin-Hausman Group Statistic	2.145	0.016
Durbin-Hausman Panel Statistic	− 0.935	0.825

The long run coefficients of the independent variables were forecast by the panel AMG estimator of Eberhardt and Teal (2010), considering the cross-sectional dependence and heterogeneity after the detection of a significant cointegration relationship; the estimation results are reported in Table 7. The estimations disclosed no significant effects of both terrorism and trade liberalization on inbound tourism on the overall panel. However, the individual coefficients revealed that terrorism negatively affected inbound tourism in Angola, Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, and Tanzania, whereas terrorism positively affected inbound tourism in Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe. Meanwhile, trade liberalization positively affected inbound tourism in Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, whereas it negatively affected inbound tourism in Angola, Mozambique, Sudan, and Tanzania.

Table 7. Results of cointegration coefficients' estimation

Countries	Coefficients	
	GTI	TO
Angola	− 0.0907287**	− 0.0070066***
Burundi	0.0281471	0.0006665
Cote d'Ivoire	− 0.1835854**	− 0.0030303
Guinea-Bissau	0.6530964***	0.0702103**
Kenya	− 0.4967731***	0.0558916**
Madagascar	1.265596**	0.0761395*
Mozambique	− 0.0095541	− 0.0104409**
Niger	0.0352948	0.0035016
Nigeria	0.0108508	0.0011625
Rwanda	0.2916719**	0.1348284***
South Africa	0.0360052	− 0.0261907
Sudan	− 0.1219125	− 0.0302003***
Tanzania	− 0.1970692**	− 0.0367726**
Uganda	0.119632	0.0751018***
Zimbabwe	0.7754737**	0.0918356***
Panel	0.000318	0.0223611

***, **, * indicated that it is respectively significant at 1%, 5% and 10%.

Terrorism or terrorist events are theoretically expected to affect the inbound tourism negatively through different channels such as leading anxiety, insecurity, uncertainty, panic, restlessness, chaos, homelessness, and deflation, as well as damaging the cultural heritage, destination image, and infrastructure resources. The relevant empirical literature aligns well with the theoretical expectations. Our results reveal that terrorism negatively affected inbound tourism in Angola, Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya, and Tanzania in line with the related theoretical and empirical literature. However, we reached the opposite findings for Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe, and this may have resulted in the relatively lower terrorism indexes of the countries and country specific characteristics. In this context, Guinea-Bissau is one of the countries included in the e-Visas African Economic Outlook 2017, and Madagascar is an important destination for lovers of adventure and nature tourism due to its Lemur walks (Signé, 2018). In addition, the government's reduction in transportation taxes and relaxation of visa requirements made Madagascar a more preferred destination by decreasing the costs (Christie et al., 2014). Rwanda also had lower terrorism levels, is a member of e-Visas (African Economic Outlook, 2017), and offers tourists trekking opportunities with endangered mountain gorillas – a valuable competitive advantage (Nielsen and Spenceley, 2011) – and tourism sector development has accelerated through the privatization of nearly all of the hotel and entertainment sector (Chuhan-Pole and Devarajan,

2011). Zimbabwe also has low terrorism levels and is a member of e-Visas (African Economic Outlook, 2017), the Kavango-Zambezi Visa (KAZA), and the East Africa Visa (African Development Bank Group, 2015). The country is under ADS (Approved Destinations Status), and has destinations such as national parks and waterfalls which are highly attractive for both domestic and foreign tourists, all of which has contributed to the development of tourism.

Meanwhile, trade liberalization also can improve the inbound tourism through simulating business travel and increasing networking, raising awareness via product and country advertisements, and improving the infrastructure; vice versa, inbound tourism growth may enhance trade liberalization through increasing the trade of goods and services. Our findings revealed that trade liberalization positively affected inbound tourism in Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, whereas trade liberalization negatively affected inbound tourism in Angola, Mozambique, Sudan, and Tanzania. However, both the positive and negative effects of trade liberalization on inbound tourism remained at very low levels. The negative effect of trade liberalization on the development of Mozambique's inbound tourism mainly resulted from high imported input costs, insufficient transportation and logistics services, slow and long border crossing of imported goods, high taxes on imported goods, and uncommon cultural tourism (Subramanian et al., 2006). Trade liberalization also negatively affected the development of the inbound tourism in Angola due to inadequate infrastructure services, poor management of the economy, and high taxation on imported inputs (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2016; Signé, 2018). Because the infrastructure services and the access of goods to market are limited in Tanzania, the goods and services required for tourism activities are imported from other countries (for example, most furniture is imported from China), and this in turn increases the costs and negatively affects inbound tourism (Signé, 2018). The poor governance of Sudan adds additional costs to touristic activities by extending the process of procuring the goods and services coming into and leaving the region, in addition to various taxes and tariffs. Furthermore, the barriers to the markets limits the satisfaction of business needs and reduces productivity and competitiveness (GIEO, 2019).

The causal interaction among tourism sector development, global terrorism index, and trade openness was tested by the Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012) causality test, and test results are reported in Table 8. The results revealed no significant causality among inbound tourism, terrorism, and trade liberalization.

Table 8. Results of causality analysis

Null Hypothesis:	W-Stat.	Zbar-Stat.	Prob.
GTI ↛ DTOURISM	1.68514	0.77840	0.4363
DTOURISM ↛ GTI	0.56512	− 1.22514	0.2205
DTO ↛ DTOURISM	0.77798	− 0.84438	0.3985
DTOURISM ↛ DTO	0.99603	− 0.45431	0.6496
DTO ↛ GTI	1.63398	0.68688	0.4922
GTI ↛ DTO	1.19649	− 0.09572	0.9237

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Tourism has become an important sector in the global economy due to the contribution of globalization and liberalization processes and improvements in the transportation industry. The positive economic impacts of the sector have motivated countries to develop policies to attract more international tourists. Therefore, the determinants of tourism sector development have been explored by many scholars. In this context, the impact of both terrorism and trade liberalization on inbound tourism has been relatively under-studied, and the interaction between terrorism and inbound tourism has yet to be researched for the SSA region with an extensive touristic potential yet also experiences significant terrorism. Therefore, we investigated the influence of terrorism together with trade liberalization on inbound tourism in the SSA region through second generation econometric tests.

The causality analysis disclosed no significant interactions among tourism, terrorism, and trade liberalization. However, the long run analysis revealed that terrorism has the potential to negatively affect tourism sector development, mainly through insecurity, chaos, and damage to cultural heritage, destination image, and infrastructure resources. The positive impact of terrorism on tourism development is evaluated to result from the countries' relatively low terrorism levels and country specific characteristics. Meanwhile, trade liberalization generally has a positive effect on tourism sector development, which is in compatible with theoretical and empirical considerations. However, the negative impact of trade liberalization on tourism sector development in Angola, Mozambique, Sudan, and Tanzania may result from the fact that these countries have relatively low openness levels, which negatively affects the sector's development.

SSA has significant natural and cultural resources, and the projections of the African Economic Outlook (2014) revealed that international tourist arrivals to the region will increase more than twofold until 2050, and the tourism sector will be the locomotive sector of the economy if the correct policies are followed. Terrorism will thus play a key role in whether these targets foreseen in the tourism sector in the SSA region are met.

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THE THREAT OF TERRORIST FIGHTERS IN AFRICA

ABSTRACT The purpose of this note is to draw attention to the resurgence of foreign terrorist fighters in Africa. It describes the phenomenon of the return of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) through its various motives and its influence on the security landscape. It also examines the different facets of the response, reviews the various measures adopted and mechanisms implemented to avert, halt and eradicate this threat, and produces a series of recommendations on avenues to be explored to strengthen the response to this phenomenon.

INTRODUCTION

Several reports have raised the alarm about the growing presence and activity of foreign fighters in the current conflicts on the African continent, and their impact on the spread and perpetuation of such violence. The recent statement by Stephanie WILLIAMS, Acting Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Libya, on the presence of 20,000 foreign fighters on Libyan territory, corroborates this state of affairs. Most recently, the 457th meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC), held on October 27, expressed deep concern over the threat FTFs pose to peace and security in the continent. FTF activity is seen as an aggravating factor in the continued growth of terrorism and violent extremism on the continent. It competes, along with other pre-existing factors in the African context, to undermine the efforts of the AU and other actors to achieve lasting peace, security and stability on the continent.

This note provides a brief historical overview of the development of this phenomenon in Africa, the mapping of the threat, and an attempt to understand the reasons behind their current influx on the continent, as well as the different facets of their influence on the security situation in their areas of settlement and operation. An analysis of the current response, as well as recommendations for its improvement, complete this article.

I. FOREIGN FIGHTERS IN AFRICA

1. CONTEXT OF EMERGENCE

The presence of foreigners committing unlawful armed violence, is by no means a new phenomenon in Africa. These foreigners are of two distinct types: mercenaries and foreign terrorists.

Mercenaries' activities in Africa have intensified since the beginning of the post-colonial period. Mainly carried out to stifle the aspirations for the completion of the process of accession to international sovereignty of the newly independent states, this action was so destabilizing that it led African States to adopt, in July 1977, the Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa. However, despite the efforts made, its effective implementation is rather mixed, as the phenomenon has not been eliminated, and is even tending to become rooted in the continental security landscape.

In a more recent period, starting in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a different type of violence actors, referred to as Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs), were juxtaposed with mercenaries. They are, according to Resolution 2178 of the United Nations Security Council, individuals who join a State other than their States of residence or nationality, for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, preparation of, or participation in terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with an armed conflict or not.

The dividing line between the two types of actors is becoming increasingly diffuse, according to several analysts. The former are more and more involved in terrorist crimes, and the latter are increasingly attracted to financial gain. The words of the UN Secretary-General, António GUTERRES, at a high-level debate held by the Security Council on February 3, 2020 on the threat of the use of mercenaries for peace in Africa, arguing that "the presence of mercenaries and other foreign fighters worsens conflict and threatens stability in the African continent…Mercenaries are exploiting and feeding off other ills such as transnational organized crime, terrorism and violent extremism", illustrate this trend perfectly.

Speaking only about the recent past, the continent has experienced two waves of terrorist fighters flows. One in the late 1980s, throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, and a second one that began around 2012 and continues to this day. These waves are linked to the arrival on the continent of fighters who took part in the two wars in Afghanistan and the conflicts in Iraq and Syria. They are mainly composed of Africans returning to their countries of origin or other destinations, usually areas in which the terrorist threat is active. Non-Africans are also part of these waves. The African context is also witnessing significant movements of individuals having or not combat experience who, without leaving the continent, move from one African state to another to take part in terrorist actions.

2. FTF MAPPING OF IN AFRICA

FTFs are present in all African regions.

i. *North Africa*

The presence of FTFs in North Africa is not new. This region has recorded most of the first FTF wave. Currently, the presence of FTFs in the region is fairly well

documented. A 2019 report of Egmont Think Tank provides fairly precise details about FTFs for three countries: Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia. This report shows, for instance, that since 2012, more than a thousand of the 5,000 FTFs originating from North Africa, having travelled to the Syrian-Iraqi zone, have returned to these three countries, and that 2,000 others traveled to Libya. According to the OCP Policy Center's January 2017 ranking, these four North African countries are among the 20 countries of origin of the largest FTF contingents in Iraq and Syria. While Algeria, another country in the region, is relatively safe from the phenomenon of FTFs returning from the Iraqi-Syrian zone due to the low participation of its nationals in the ongoing conflicts there, the situation is quite different for the Sahel-Saharan region, from which these returns are to be feared, as several of its nationals are still active there, particularly in the Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, one of the groups constituting the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (JNIM), one of the two major terrorist groups operating in the Sahel-Sahara region. Two Algerian terrorists, released a few days earlier, among two hundred others from Malian prisons, following the transactions that led to the release of hostages in Mali last October, were arrested in October and November in Tlemcen and Tamanrasset in Algeria.

ii. *West Africa - Sahel*

In this region, the presence of many groups active in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and Nigeria make the territories of these countries the most likely to constitute a privileged destination for the FTFs. Although viable data regarding the FTF population in this region are not available, several studies and reports have shown that FTFs, from North and West Africa in particular are active in Mali, and to a lesser extent in Niger. Boko Haram and ISWAP (the Islamic State's West Africa Province), which have extended their scope of action from Nigeria to neighboring Cameroon, Niger and Chad, also have among their ranks, many FTFs, mainly from the sub-region.

The 2016 Grand-Bassam attacks and this year's Kafolo attacks, were carried out by FTFs. These attacks provide a clear indication that countries, relatively unaffected by active terrorism, may be the target of attacks, because of the great planning and execution capacities of the FTFs.

States in the region, such as Ghana, which in 2016 reported the presence of two of its nationals in the Iraqi-Syrian zone, and Senegal, which in 2018 had tried 13 of its nationals for joining Boko Haram and Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, are also affected by the phenomenon. This in no way precludes the possibility of other countries in the region, not currently mentioned, also being affected.

iii. *Central Africa*

Cameroon and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are the two main states affected by the FTF phenomenon in the region. In Cameroon they are mainly members of the Boko Haram group, which is active in the far northern part of the

country. In the DRC, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), which have become the Islamic State's Central Africa Province (ISCAP) since 2019, concentrate most of the FTFs coming from neighboring states, particularly Uganda. Reports indicate close contact between this group and the Mozambican group Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaa (ASWJ), which also pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in 2019. Congolese joining ASWJ were reported throughout 2019.

iv. *East Africa*

El-Shabab and the Islamic State in East Africa are this region's two terrorist groups capable of harboring FTFs in the region.

El-Shabab has a long history when it comes to FTFs. Several reports, since the 2010s, have reported the presence in Somalia of Al Qaida members, including Americans and Europeans, to continue the fight started in the Near and Middle East. Famous FTFs such as the Comorian Fazul Abdullah Mohammed (killed in 2011), the American Omar Shafik Hammami (killed in 2013) or Samantha Lewthwaite, the "white widow", were part of this group. Strong internal differences between the proponents of the international "Jihad" agenda and those of the "nationalistic objective" that led El-Shabab to execute in 2013, Ibrahim Jama Mead also known as al Afghani and Abul Hamid Hashi Olhayi, two of its historic leaders, were the reason why this presence ended, as many FTFs preferred to join Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). To date, the El-Shabab FTF contingent is mainly composed of nationals of States in the region.

There is no indication to date of FTF presence in the Islamic State in East Africa. However, being the result of a split of Al-Shabab, this group, which presumably uses the same recruitment methods as Al-Shabab, could count some in its ranks. Its affiliation with the Islamic State also makes it a possible "rallying point" for the terrorists of this organization, after the military setbacks the latter suffered in the Iraqi-Syrian zone.

v. *Southern Africa*

The Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaa group, being the only active group in the region - it is active in the Mozambican province of Cabo Delgado - is the one that, according to several analysts and reports, has FTFs among its ranks. Individuals of different nationalities, including Congolese (DRC), Tanzanians and Burundians were reported there. To date, no non-African national has been reported there. However, reports indicate possible material and technical support from abroad.

It should also be noted that several states in the region, including South Africa, indicated having detected the presence of their nationals in the ranks of the Islamic State in the Iraqi-Syrian zone. South Africa had even managed in the past to thwart departure attempts to this area made by its citizens.

3. Influence on the security landscape

Once back, the FTFs, if they are not taken into account by the appropriate mechanisms of rehabilitation and reintegration, can be extremely dangerous. Several of them create new groups (Aissa Massaoudi's "le jugement dernier" group, the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group…), or join existing groups (Qari Said, Murad SI Ahmad, Belmokhtar…).

FTFs usually join either conflict zones in their own countries or terrorists to whom they are recommended in other countries. They also use local habits and customs to settle in areas previously chosen for strategic and operational reasons (the case of Belmokhtar in northern Mali). In this particular case, in addition to the benefit of customary solidarity, Belmokhtar's knowledge and experience in transnational organized crime, including his ability to set up and manage networks of illicit trafficking of prohibited goods and hostage-taking for ransom were crucial in generating the funds which enabled him to secure his action.

Once settled in these areas, they bring to the fore their "professional" knowledge and experience as fighters, planners, commanders, sophisticated weapons experts, improvised explosive devices makers and trainers. Here it is essential to mention their knowledge of specific training techniques intended for children, women, propaganda training... They come to support local terrorist groups, in which they serve as mentors to aspirants and new recruits, reinforcing by proven ways, drawn from their experience of combat zones, the methods of recruitment and violence. They also help to build or strengthen the capacities of sleeper cells and further radicalize the members and sympathizers of these groups.

The FTFs also develop their own logistics and financial networks to support their actions. In doing so doing, they become entry points and facilitators for local terrorist groups, and essential intermediaries. This not only streamlines exchanges between the various networks through the establishment of a larger and more solid network at the international level, but also and above all, improves the coordination of actions between local terrorist groups.

FTFs also bring new technologies and innovations to the African battlefields. The increasing sophistication of improvised explosive devices, the frequent structural readjustments of local groups, the constant improvement of their use of new ICTs, and particularly of their propaganda tools, are all indicators that show the influence of FTFs on local groups.

Finally, the concept of "Caliphate", established by the "Islamic State", and widely promoted by the FTFs, which delegitimizes national governments, constitutes an additional threat to the peace, stability and territorial integrity of States, with local groups tending to promote and even idolize this concept.

4. REASONS ATTRACTING FTFs TO THE AFRICAN CONTINENT

With a contingent of at least five thousand fighters, Africa has been one of the largest FTF providers in the Iraqi-Syrian zone. The return of these FTFs to their countries of origin partly explains the current influx.

The profusion of terrorist groups active on the continent is also one of the main factors attracting FTFs to Africa. The multitude of active terrorist groups, almost proportionally spread over the entire continent, makes it a first-rate rallying point for "jihadists" around the world, who, when put in difficulty in other combat zones, intend to continue their action there, as these groups offer them all the basic "amenities" necessary to do so. Africa is, along with Asia, one of the two continents with the largest number of active terrorist groups. In about thirty years, the continent has witnessed the birth of some twenty terrorist groups, of which a good dozen is still active. These groups, with rare exceptions, are for some affiliated with Al Qaeda and others with the Islamic State. If Southern Africa and the Great Lakes Region are the prerogative of the Islamic State, we note the presence of affiliates of the two organizations of the "global Jihad" in the rest of the African regions. In North Africa, Al Qaida is mainly present with AQIM and the Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade. The Islamic State, on the other hand, after the failure of Jund-al-Khalifat to settle in the countries of the region, is mainly represented there by fighters isolated or organized in small groups, notably in Libya and Tunisia. Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, who had pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in July 2015 and renamed itself "Sinai Province", has not to this day received any formal acceptance from the Islamic State. The Sahel-Saharan strip is bitterly disputed between Al Qaeda through JNIM and the Islamic State through the Islamic State in the Great Sahara (IS-GS). The situation is almost similar in the Lake Chad Basin or the Islamic State's West African Province (ISWAP) and Boko Haram, which appears to have joined Al Qaida after being rejected by the Islamic State.

The proximity to the Iraqi-Syrian zone, the most recent FTFs battlefield with Africa, can also be seen as one of the factors that attract FTFs to the continent. This proximity is not only geographic for the FTFs coming from other parts of the world. It is also linguistic, religious and in some respects cultural, at least with regard to a certain number of African territories, where FTFs could find an environment almost identical to the one left behind.

The will to regenerate the declining capacities of terrorist groups, the proliferation of long latent conflicts, unresolved or poorly resolved, the numerous demands of populations unmet by governments, the deterioration of the socio-economic environment, the lack of prospects for the youth, and many other factors, are what made African populations particularly vulnerable to extremist discourses of all kinds. This situation attracts the FTFs, because it offers them, with their knowledge and experience in the matter helping, immense potential for relatively easy and rapid radicalization, conversion to their theses and recruitment of new members in the ranks of terrorist groups.

The weak border control and territory surveillance mechanisms in most African states, are also an attractive factor for FTFs which are often already identified and "expected" in their countries of origin and use African countries as places of refuge, while still being "useful to their cause".

II. The response to the FTF phenomenon in Africa

1. Current state of the response

The essential part of the response to the FTF phenomenon is contained in the UN Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014), which enacts a series of measures aimed at preventing the possibility of travel between two or more FTF countries, as well as their entry or transit. Further measures were enacted in Resolution 2396 (2017) relating to building the capacity of States to collect and analyze information on travelers with the aim of detecting FTFs. General Assembly Resolution 72/284, on the other hand, encouraged States to strengthen cooperation in information sharing and border management. These measures are included in several recommendations of the AU Commission and Peace and Security Council, which constantly call on member states to increase vigilance and put in place appropriate measures, based on those adopted by the UN bodies, which are supposed to prevent and eliminate FTFs.

On the ground, the answer is unevenly applied. States implement the measures indicated above in a disparate manner. While some States have already put in place legal measures to strengthen the legal foundations for the action of their security services to effectively implement these measures and have put in place programs for the rehabilitation and reintegration of former terrorists, including FTFs, others apply piecemeal measures, often without coordination between the different national agencies in charge of these issues. Worse still, others are lagging behind, and in many cases, have yet to take any action to implement these measures.

2. Recommendations for improving the existing response

The FTF phenomenon affects all of Africa. The answer must be inexorably thought out and coordinated at the continental level. In its 2019 report, the Egmont group called for the implementation of a holistic regional approach in the Maghreb, including legal action, detention, post-detention follow-up and reintegration. In endorsing this recommendation, ACSRT considers it appropriate to extend it to the entire continent, as the threat has become continental. The development of a harmonized and coordinated continental program for the implementation of measures to prevent and combat the FTF phenomenon is of utmost necessity. This program will necessarily have to be inspired by the GCTF's Hague-Marrakech Memorandum on FTFs, which draws a very clear line of appropriate measures to be put in place for the proper prevention and elimination of the FTF phenomenon. The establishment of a task force on the issue is urgent, it could focus, for instance, on identifying the measures to be implemented in order to strengthen the legal arsenal of States for

the effective implementation of the measures contained in UN Resolutions 2178 and 2396, and the measures and means of coordination at national, regional and continental levels. It should also suggest concrete measures aimed at overcoming the challenges identified, including in the sharing of information relating to FTFs between States, in the investigation and prosecution of dual nationals and other FTF-related cases, and other difficulties identified in numerous forums dedicated to the issue. This task force could also look into the issue of establishing a continental FTF database.

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