

African Journal on Terrorism

Volume 10 . Number 2 . December 2020

A C S R T



ISSN: 2617-8478

A JOURNAL OF THE AFRICAN CENTRE FOR THE STUDY AND RESEARCH ON TERRORISM

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Volume 10 • Number 2 • December 2020

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AND RESEARCH ON TERRORISM**

The African Journal on Terrorism is published by the The African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), Algiers, Algeria (hereafter referred to as the Centre) which was established in 2004 as a structure of the African Union, in conformity with the protocol of the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. The African Journal on Terrorism is strategically positioned as a tool for attaining the objectives of Centre and the African Union guided by African Solution to African Problems.

African Journal on Terrorism aims to create space for robust, rigorous and innovative research and policy-related papers on terrorism and violent extremism, and encourages fruitful intellectual engagement between policy practitioners and academia. In particular, the Editors are looking for empirical, theoretical and policy-oriented articles that recognize the inherently problematic nature of terrorism on the African continent and employ a critical-normative perspective on the subject.

The scope of subject matter of interest for the journal includes conceptual and field research on terrorism, violent extremism, insurgency and radicalization as well as issues related to Human Security and building community resilience in Africa. African Journal on Terrorism provides a forum for the publication of original theoretical and empirical research articles, disciplinary debates and assessments, editorial commentary, special issues and sections, end of mission reports, research notes, announcements and book reviews.



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www.caert-ua.org

Editorial Correspondence: Papers are to be submitted anytime in the year. Accepted papers would be published in appropriate volumes. Articles and papers for submission to the journal should be sent to the Journal Manager, ACSRT, Algiers (Algeria) via email at journalmanager@acrst.org.

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ISSN: 2617-8478

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African journal on Terrorism is a continental, peer-reviewed, interdisciplinary journal. The journal seeks to publish quality grounded research on all aspects of terrorism, counter-terrorism and violent extremism. The journal seeks to provide a platform that encourages critical analysis and sustained reflection of terrorism and violent extremism on the continent.

Procedures

All submitted manuscripts are subject to an initial blind peer-review by the Editors, and, if found suitable for further consideration, to a second peer-review by at least two independent, anonymous expert referees. The Editor In Chief and Editors review the comments from reviewers, and where appropriate communicate them directly to the author. The Editors will inform the author if the original or revised paper has been accepted for publication in the journal.

Length and Format

Authors submitting papers for the consideration of the journal should limit their works to between 5000 and 6000 words, including references, text, all tables and figures. They are encouraged to support their arguments with relevant statistics, pictures and graphical illustrations. The preferred referencing format of the journal is the electronically generated endnotes. The referencing style however, is the Harvard referencing style. Abstract should not exceed 300 words with at least five keywords.

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Editorial Comments

The ability to produce yet another edition of this Journal in this age of COVID 19 readily testifies to our collective commitment to stamp out violent extremism and the associated vices from Africa. It is therefore apt to start this short note by earnestly thanking all those that made it possible. The first are those that submitted papers to us for inclusion in the present volume. We have to equally thank our dedicated external reviewers who advised on which of the papers to accept or reject. We are up standing today by the commitment and support of you all. It motivates us to do more as members of the editorial board and officials of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT).

In this edition of the Journal, we have eleven papers; all bordering on different aspects of violent extremism and the methods for preventing and countering them. The first uses some cases from Nigeria to illustrate how the socio-economic conditions of local communities could help enlistment and recruitment into violent extremist organizations. The paper recommends that those preventing and countering terrorist activities most especially in Africa should focus more of their efforts on community engagement. However such community-based interventions should be informed by scientific understanding of how individuals choose to be engaged in violent extremism. The second paper takes up this issue from the neuro-criminological perspective. It uses an interactionist theoretical approach to explain how different brain functioning patterns goad individuals in wrong directions. Those managing terrorism should take note of this scientific observation.

Intelligence gathering, most especially through investigative interviewing, matters a lot in counterterrorism most especially in understanding issues relating to past and future attacks. This issue is given extensive attention in the third paper. The paper provides the different methods and how they can be combined for effectiveness. In the fourth paper, attention is given to gender perspectives to terrorism focusing particularly on why women participate in terrorist activities and how this awareness should inform counter-measures. The fifth paper focuses on the some specific provisions in Islamic traditions, religion and legal systems on the protection of life most especially in situations of armed conflict. The main lesson of the paper is that though the just war theory originated from western traditions its provisions are strongly supported by Islamic ethos.

The sixth paper warns that we should be concerned with not just what happens before terrorist attacks but also the consequences of possible attacks. The focus in this respect should be on reducing possible damage and casualties. This requires substantial investment on training emergency responders. The paper calls attention to a few things to take into consideration in organizing such humanitarian interventions. The seventh paper argues that the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria is gradually entering its post conflict phase. This, according to the author, requires that the media and journalists should be more circumspect in reporting the incidents. They need to focus more on issues of reconciliation, reintegration and resettlement using credible sources and appropriate analytical tools. In the eighth paper, the discussion focuses on the use of proscription orders as a counterterrorism measure. Is it effective? Using doctrinal methodology, the paper answers the question in the affirmative but argues that proscription orders work best if issued in a timely manner. It prevents the terrorists from waxing stronger. The ninth paper interrogates the ongoing counterinsurgency operations by the Nigerian military against Boko Haram insurgents and makes a case for the adoption of a hybrid strategy for improving the present situation. The tenth paper debates the extent to which the adopted early warning of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) serves as a counterterrorism strategy in West Africa. It argues that the early warning alerts are not sufficiently backed up by early response and recommends that this lacuna should be looked into. The last and the eleventh paper offers a comprehensive impact of the terrorism and business climate on entrepreneurship development in Nigeria by employing an interactive form of terrorism and business climate on entrepreneurship development in Nigeria.

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LOCAL COMMUNITY AND CONCEPT OF ENLISTMENT, RECRUITMENT, RADICALISATION AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN AFRICA*

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ABSTRACT

Violent extremism poses significant threat to peace, security and development around the world. This is very well evident in Africa where the activities of violent extremist organisations (VEOs) such as the Boko Haram have not only challenged the ability of states to govern, but have unleashed untimely death, population displacement and colossal destruction. This article contends that VEOs need regular supply of sympathisers or recruits to continue to survive, including sometimes committing acts of horrific violence. Its central proposition is that local community provides the nursery for enlistment and recruitment into VEOs, and therefore should serve as the primary site for inoculation and counter initiatives against violent extremism. It highlights groups at-risk of extremist recruitment and racialisation and proffers recommendations on how community engagement – creating or enabling some local community-driven projects – could help mitigate the forces of violent extremist recruitment and radicalisation in the continent based on insights gleaned from the Nigerian experience.

Keywords

Boko Haram, Community engagement, Enlistment, Radicalisation, Recruitment.

INTRODUCTION

Violent extremism poses significant threat to peace, security and development around the world. This is very well evident in Africa where the activities of violent extremist organisations (VEOs) have not only challenged the ability of states to

* An earlier version of this paper was presented at a national workshop on “*The Root Causes of Violent Extremism: A Human Security Response Approach*”, organised by the National Defence College (NDC) and the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), held at NDC, Abuja, 8-9 December 2016.

govern, but have unleashed untimely death, population displacement and colossal destruction. In Nigeria, for instance, over a decade of Boko Haram insurgency has claimed at least 36,000 lives, displaced more than 2.6 million people, created over 75, 000 orphans and caused about \$9 billion worth of damage since 2009.¹

For VEOs to continue existing, they must find a regular supply of sympathisers or recruits. More importantly, the recruits must be convinced, deceived or intimidated into performing some tasks, including sometimes committing acts of horrific violence. Hence, the project of recruitment and radicalisation are central to the existence and activities of all terrorist and VEOs, from the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) that has become the dominant terror brand globally to Boko Haram that operates largely around the Lake Chad area in West-Central Africa. In many ways, *local* communities provide the arena these groups prey on vulnerable, impressionable and sympathetic individuals in their campaign of terror.

This article, therefore, conceptually engages with the idea of local community, enlistment, recruitment, radicalisation and violent extremism. It reflects on how the dynamics of local community is relevant in our understanding of enlistment, recruitment, radicalisation and violent extremism. This is so because whether we are talking of the spatial (offline) or virtual (online) community, this environment constitutes the very space from where VEOs draw their members, either through enlistment or recruitment. The objective of this paper therefore is twofold. First, is to examine how the concept and dynamics of local community help us understand the processes of enlistment, recruitment, and radicalisation by VEOs. Second, to highlight the role *local* community can play in mitigating or countering these complex processes. The central proposition of this discourse is that *local* community provides the nursery for enlistment and recruitment into VEOs, and therefore should serve as the primary site for inoculation and counter initiatives against violent extremism.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

Before we delve into the intricacies of the subject of concern, it is germane to conceptualise some key terms – local community, enlistment, recruitment, radicalisation and violent extremism. This is in order to gain a shared understanding of their usage in this article vis-à-vis their complex dynamics and interrelationship within a given local community.


Local Community

In order to explain what is local community, it is important to start with a basic understanding of what “community” means. The concept of community has been an enduring theme in modern social science but nevertheless represents an elusive term with regard to its actual definition.² The term ‘community’ can mean different things to different people depending on the subject or contextual reference. Hence, reference could be made of physical (spatial) community, virtual (online) community

or professional community (interest groups). This article adopts a working definition of community as a group of people with common interests and values. It is characterized by ‘wholeness incorporating diversity’ and may include people of different ages, ethnicities, educational backgrounds and incomes.³ Seen from this angle, individuals may be members of two or more communities; for example, one of geographic residence and another of employment.

Aphysical community is therefore defined as “a place designated by geographical boundaries that functions under the jurisdiction of a governance structure, such as a town, city, or county”.⁴ The professional community entails people sharing particular talents, hobbies, trade, purposes, or natures that are linked in a network of social relations because they share such similar interests. The virtual or online community is defined as “an Internet-connected collective of people who interact over time around a shared purpose, interest, or need. Almost all online communities rely upon people’s voluntary commitment, participation, and contributions. They need visitors to return and members to interact with others to maintain the community infrastructure, generate new and updated information, and provide social and emotional support to other members.”⁵ It is pertinent to note that these various dimensions of community are somewhat linked temporally, spatially, physically and psychologically in a wide variety of ways, ranging from a world community scale down to very small groups of individuals (Figure 1).⁶ The intricate linkage reflects the fluidity and dynamism of communities in an era of globalisation.

Figure 1: Schema of fluidity and dynamism of community types and interactions.



A community is fluid given that people are constantly coming in and leaving the referent space, making it often difficult to definitively designate where the boundaries of its social relations begin or end in relation to the next community. Thus, a community is dynamic because its character, nature and assets do change with time, in response to factors emanating from within or outside of its boundaries. The subject of community is critical to the present discourse because it provides avenue for interactions and social relationships which are vitally important to individuals in all cultures, and at all times throughout their lives.⁸ Therefore, it is the inevitable elements of interaction and relationships inherent in every 'community' that groups, including VEOs, exploit to gain members through enlistment or recruitment.

Yet the question of whether we can talk of 'local' community *per se* is now contestable. This is essentially because the forces of globalisation have significantly diminished boundaries of what may be referred to as local community in the traditional understanding of the term. This is the case given the unprecedented speed of diffusion or penetration of ideas and services made possible by advances in information, communication and technology (ICT) on the one hand, and rapid movement of people and objects (goods) as a result of efficient modes of transportation on the other hand. From a policy and programming point of view, therefore, it may be more useful to talk about 'glocal community' rather than 'local community'. The idea of 'glocal' suggests that the local community is distinct in its uniqueness but still an integral part of the *global* community, and the *global* community is vast in its embrace as an ensemble of 'distinct' local communities that equally exert influence on the global. This observation is important in understanding and countering the processes of extremist recruitment, enlistment and radicalisation, because it directs policy and interventions to focus on addressing the specificities of the local context while hedging external influences from the global environment.

Enlistment

There are fundamentally two pathways VEOs gain membership: enlistment and recruitment. However, debate exists among contemporary scholars about the nature and extent of terrorist recruitment, at least as it relates to militant jihadism.⁹ Terrorist expert like Sageman posits that there is no recruitment *per se* to militant jihadism, arguing instead that "enlistment" (because people want to join) is the mechanism by which new militants emerge. Thus, he advocates using the terms "joining" the jihad or "mobilization," as opposed to recruitment. Sageman maintains that nearly 90% of the individuals "join the jihad" through friendship and kinship.¹⁰ One is persuaded to disagree with the point about enlistment as the only pathway to mobilisation. That terrorist organisations or VEOs have members who joined out of their own volition does not foreclose that such groups do not take deliberate or coercive efforts to get people to join them. Direct coercion into joining VEOs generally occurs through abductions or forced conscription, and has been well documented. For example, on 11 May 2015, ISIS militants in charge of recruit-

ment entered various high schools in the Hay al-Tamin region of eastern Mosul, Iraq, and imposed compulsory recruitment of the children, refusing them the right to decline.¹¹ Also, Boko Haram terrorists in Nigeria are known to forcefully recruit from some detainees freed during jail breaks staged by them.¹²

Cognisant of these realities, enlistment is defined here as the act by a person or group of persons to wilfully seek out and join the membership of an organisation or by subscription indicating membership and incorporation in the group. What makes enlistment unique is that it is generally voluntary; the individual in question *sought* and chose to be part of the group. The reason for enlistment could differ from one individual to the other. In relation to VEOs, an individual could enlist into a group because of his or her belief in the group's ideology or willingly joined to avenge a grievance – such as the killing of family members or loved one, among others. As a key pathway through which a group can gain membership, the step and actions to connect with the group originated from the individual. In other words, in enlistment the initial move is from the individual to the group.

Recruitment

The term recruitment is a common practice in any organisation or group that seeks to survive beyond the time of its initial formation. There are various definitions of recruitment by various scholars and authors. For example, Mondy defines recruitment as “the process of attracting individuals on a timely basis, in sufficient numbers and with appropriate qualifications, to apply for jobs with an organisation”.¹³ Similarly, Randel views it as “the set of activities and processes used to legally obtain a sufficient number of qualified people at the right place and time so that the people and the organisation can select each other in their own best short and long term interests”.¹⁴ The above definitions emphasised that recruitment is aimed at obtaining the needed number and quality of persons required to achieve the objectives of an organisation. These definitions highlight the importance of selecting from a large pool of available human population to meet the needs of an organisation. They tend to emphasise the element of legality that is pertinent to the activities of lawful organisations, overlooking the purposes and peculiarities of recruitment by unlawful groups such as VEOs.

Recruitment is defined in this context as the process by which an individual is identified, chosen and subsequently integrated into a group to assist the group in carrying out tasks necessary for its survival, operations or accomplishment of some objectives. Unlike in enlistment, the step and actions are taken by a member of the group to lure the targeted individual to identify with the group. Thus, the move for inclusion is from the group's member to the targeted individual and not the other way round. The imperatives of survival and expansion demand that VEOs seek new sympathisers and members. Therefore, they engage in concerted efforts to influence or facilitate others to join or support them. Like lawful organisations, VEOs re-

cruit people of diverse background to perform different tasks. Hence personal engagement in VEOs varies widely among its membership. Some are foot soldiers or bomb makers. Others are strategists, ideologues, or criminals.

Radicalisation

The concept of radicalisation has gained significant currency among government officials, media practitioners, scholars, and security officials in discourses on terrorism and violent extremism, especially since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Those who use the term do not agree on a single definition, as Schmid has rightly noted, but a loose consensus has emerged that radicalisation, whether at the individual or group level, involves a process of rejecting the status quo and often democratic ideals; adopting an extreme political, social, or religious ideology; and condoning violence as a means to achieving ideological goals.¹⁵ Radicalisation is defined here as “the process by which an individual or group transitions from passive reception of revolutionary, militant, or extremist views, ideas, and beliefs to active pursuit of these ideals, especially through promoting, supporting or adopting violence to realise such intentions”.¹⁶

Experts believe that radicalisation is the result of a complex overlap of concurring and mutually reinforcing factors, unique to each context and, to a certain extent, each individual.¹⁷ The process of radicalisation begins with changes in self-identification due to grievances, frequently driven by personal or group concerns regarding local issues as well as international events. A grievance is understood to create the sense of alienation or disenchantment that provides a cognitive opening for radicalisation. A radical ideology – an extreme set of ideas – then provides the individual with a new outlook and explanation for the world in which he finds himself. An individual becomes mobilized as he slowly integrates into a community of other like-minded people. Finally, a tipping point – usually a specific event – can push an individual or group from rhetoric to action. However, it is pertinent to note that becoming radicalised does not *automatically* mean that a person is engaging, or will engage, in violent or dangerous behaviour.¹⁸ However in some cases and context, the drastic change in viewpoints, attitudes and behaviour inherent in radicalisation underlie acts of terrorism and violent extremism.

Violent Extremism

Together with radicalisation is the coming into vogue of the idea of violent extremism. Its usage in academic, policy, media and intelligence circles has increasingly gained traction in recent times. For all the attention that the term has received, there is the absence of clear and universally accepted definition. The *Living Safe Together* project of the Australian government defines violent extremism as the belief and actions of people who support or use ideologically-motivated violence to achieve radical ideological, religious or political views.¹⁹ Similarly, it has also been

seen as “those activities and beliefs which are used to advocate, engage in, prepare, or otherwise support ideologically-motivated violence to further socio-economic and political objectives”.²⁰ It is important to note that such activities or beliefs can also be used in pursuit of religious objectives.

Violent extremism entails the actual manifestation of activities and beliefs of a person or group who not only promotes or justifies the use of ideologically-motivated violence to achieve religious, ideological, political or social change, but also acts accordingly in pursuit of those objectives.²¹ It is therefore the ideology that accepts and justifies the use of violence to reach a particular ideological goal. As noted by Angus, violent extremism is an extension of radicalisation from a relatively benign expression of a viewpoint to the use of violence to achieve a particular objective.²² Thus, violent extremism can be exhibited along a range of issues, including politics, religion, ideology, and gender relations.

LOCAL COMMUNITY AND THE CHALLENGES OF AFFILIATION WITH VIOLENT EXTREMIST ORGANISATIONS

The idea of local community is critical to our understanding of violent extremism given that it offers the platform for extremist recruitment, enlistment and radicalisation. Therefore, the essence of focusing on local communities is to timely and effectively address a basic question: Who would be the first to notice, and able to intervene, with individuals considering acts of violent extremism? Being able to do this will require a good understanding of the complexity and dynamics of such a local community.

There are a number of unique realities that exist in a local community due to its history, natural environment, culture, and other factors that may contribute to violent extremism. People that operate or found in a particular local community may be different in terms of their family, ethnicity, culture, values, and motivations, among others. People therefore often associate and form connections with those who share similar identity, views, values, perspectives, and life circumstances. It is important to recognise that membership in this second type of community does not necessarily correspond to jurisdictions, physical, or geographic spaces previously referred to as communities. This second type of community can sometimes be physically concentrated in small places inside the jurisdiction of a state and in other instances can connect people well beyond the physical boundaries of a specific place to those inside it.²³ The permeability of its social boundaries makes that space susceptible to significant external influences or pressure. However, the specificity of its geographic boundary makes it easy to exactly locate sites of incidents. For instance, a VEOs may choose to recruit new members in a given geographic space. But in doing so, they may leverage ethnic connections and kinships, and later extend recruitment tentacles to others beyond their ethnic group and locality.


Given the variety of community types across a nation, one of the principles an individual or authority working to counter violent extremism should consider is what is the physical and social space to pay closer attention. The purpose is to understand the conditions that facilitate or contribute to the rise of violent extremist tendencies. It is equally vital in understanding individuals that may be at risk or vulnerable to be recruited and radicalise by VEOs. Certain factors in the local community can contribute to the root causes of violent extremism. Often, the socio-economic, cultural, religious, and political environment of a local community provide the broader context of recruitment, enlistment and radicalisation.

To be sure, extremist recruitment and radicalisation are more widespread where conditions of inequality and frustration prevail. Findings of a survey conducted on African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) online platforms (website, Facebook and twitter) corroborate this argument.²⁴ The results demonstrate that majority of the respondents (69%) representing 222 out of a total of 321 participants believed that poverty, marginalization and exclusion are predicative conditions for violent extremism in Africa.

The survey further noted that although political factors such as governance deficit, state failure, lack of trust between government and the citizenry and other grievances play significant role in the escalation and development of violent extremism, social and psychological factors concerning group and individual identity have also emerged as driving factors. It often takes root in people who sympathise with the plight of the oppressed and wish to show their solidarity or those who harbour certain grievances. Radicalised men and women alike often feel despair, humiliation, and outrage over injustice and perceive few options for influencing change.²⁵ Given this situation, people could join VEOs for quite a number of reasons. Some join for socio-economic reasons, while others join due to personal grievances or frustration. Yet other could enlist due to religious beliefs, and others could actually be forced to join. The implication is that for violent extremist movements to develop and fester, and for individuals to join these movements, require an alignment of situational, socio-cultural, and individual factors.

As earlier noted, individuals can join an extremist group either through enlistment or recruitment. The findings of a CLEEN Foundation survey in Nigeria's North Central states of Benue and Kogi corroborates this point. As shown in Figure 2, more than half of the respondents (56%) mentioned that youth usually are thought to voluntarily join (or enlist into) extremist group, indicating that the move to join the group was initiated by the said individual.²⁶ Fewer respondents (44%) reported that "youths are recruited into extremist groups", suggesting that the act of joining the group was initiated by someone else who is most likely the group's member. It equally accommodates the potential for forced conscription.²⁷

Figure 2: Views on how youth join extremist group in Nigeria



Sources²⁸

Individuals who get enlisted into VEOs could be as diverse as the motivational factors or the strategies adopted in the recruitment process. Hence, interventions intended to prevent people from joining extremist groups need to target factors that make such groups attractive as well as the tactics employed by extremist recruiters. The policy implication is that kinetic military response alone is grossly insufficient in addressing violent extremism and terrorism on the continent. Addressing violent extremism involves not just combating it at the point where violent threats become imminent or have manifested, but also preventing it at the earlier point where it takes root – local community. Thus, non-kinetic response in the form of local community engagement is needed to complement military measures.

As important as local community engagement in P/CVE is, its application is fraught with challenges. For instance, identifying those individuals in a community in danger of falling prey to extremist narratives and propaganda sometimes can be as difficult as “finding a needle in a haystack”. Nonetheless, studies have shown that young people (youth and children) are chiefly at risk of being recruited or lured into joining VEOs.²⁹ This is not to say that older people are not members or could not join VEOs.

There are some vulnerabilities or unique traits that extremist groups exploit in recruiting or radicalising young people. In addition, women are also being increasingly targeted in the project of recruitment and radicalisation by VEOs. Some brief remarks about this at-risk groups are apposite at this juncture.

- **Youth** – In terms of youths, the age group of 15-25 is considered as the most targeted cluster for recruitment by VEOs. This category of young people constitutes those mostly frustrated and alienated from society, avid religious seekers, and highly impressionable individuals. Thus, they are susceptible to peer-pressure as they pass through a difficult stage of identity formation.

Furthermore, they are chiefly in search of security, spurred by challenges of poverty, unemployment, social isolation or feelings of rejection by their own faith, family or social circle.

- *Children* – Across the globe, children have become a key target group for recruitment by terrorist groups. Recruiting children not only ensures a next generation of fighters for a terrorist group but it is also easier to indoctrinate and brainwash such young impressionable minds.³⁰ Children are considered as at-risk individuals because savvy recruiters target them to exploit their curiosity and genuine innocence. Children are also known to be easily influenced by peers, parents and outsiders, making them more malleable to manipulations of extremists.
- *Women* – Increasingly, VEOs target women in their recruitment drive. The reason behind increasing recruitment of women and girls is not farfetched. It is easier for women and girls to slip into crowds, since they are not often subjected to very tight scrutiny. Also, they are critical to reproduction of next generation of fighters and provide sexual or domestic services which could be a major incentive for the attraction of male recruits.³¹

Hence VEOs survive and expand through enlistment by those who seek and join such groups out of their own volition or recruitment of new members deliberately facilitated by scouts, members and established networks. In their recruitment drive, VEOs explore both online and offline methods depending on the target and the environment. Therefore, the recruitment of members will involve diverse methods. In the case of the Boko Haram, for example, its offline methods of recruitment include, but not limited to, open preaching, marriage, birth, infection, forced contagion, jail break, abduction, enticement and forced conscription. The modalities of these recruitment methods have been elaborated upon elsewhere, and space precludes such detailed discussion here.³² Suffice it to say that VEOs such as the Boko Haram abhor disengagement of members, whether the individual was recruited by their scouts or enlisted wilfully into the group.³³

Another related challenge in local community is the problem of radicalisation, which could manifest in the form of self-radicalisation or structured radicalisation. Irrespective of the form it takes, it is important to note that how far a person goes on the path to radicalisation depends on a number of factors. Social, cultural, political, religious and psychological factors in a given community can increase a person's vulnerability to radicalisation or even his or her willingness to embrace violent action. The progress and pace of an individual down this path is often very difficult to predict or detect in a community.³⁴ However, evidence abound on how terrorist ideologues influence individuals in moving down this path. In doing this, diverse methods are applied in our contemporary world, which is composed of the real and virtual worlds. However, the border that separates these worlds is permeable; resulting in overlapping, mutually reinforcing and almost indistinguishable spaces.

In the real (physical) world of our local communities, structured and deliberate strategies have been applied by terrorists to radicalise people into committing acts of violence.³⁵ In this regard, indoctrination, brainwashing and hypnosis are some of the principal methods that extremist ideologues have employed in radicalising or intimidating recruits to turn to violent action. In the virtual world, propaganda has been most useful and effective in facilitating radicalisation (see Table 1). An individual can be recruited and subsequently radicalised by extremist ideologue through structured or programmed radicalisation involving one-on-one contact or in training sessions. In doing this, different methods and tools can be used in diverse context. These methods merit brief elaboration.

Table 1: Some Radicalisation Modes used by Violent Extremist Groups in Africa

S/N°	Mode	Location/Platforms	Purveyors	Tools/Materials
1	Indoctrination	Religious Centres	Imams, Indoctrinators	Distorted sermons or teachings, Religious Texts, Exercise books
2	Brainwashing	Camps or Training Facilities	Ideologues	Visual displays, Tapes, Magazines, Spiritual books, etc.
3	Hypnosis	Camps, Training Facilities	Manipulators, Spiritualists	Drugs, Black Magic, Charms, Spiritual books
4	Propaganda	Internet/Media	Propagandists	Publications, Videos, YouTube, Twitter (social media)

*Source*³⁶

Indoctrination. It is one of the subtle methods of radicalisation adopted by VEOs. Indoctrination is the process of inculcating ideas, values, attitudes or beliefs on an individual or group with the intent of making them develop blind and complete agreement with those beliefs.³⁷ It is aimed at influencing people to uncritically embrace newfound ideas, values or beliefs and to back them up with anything but opinion. The process of indoctrination is often conducted in religious centres (mosques) or training camps of extremist or terrorist groups. In relation to religious centres, clerics sympathetic to VEOs engage in hate preaching and distorted teachings to influence their audience. In their training facilities such as those of Al Shabaab's military-style Mtwara and Tanga camps, Boko Haram's Camp Zero and 'Camp Abuja' in Sambisa forest, and Sina Province's Abu Hajr al-Masri Camp, indoctrinators rely on manipulative texts to teach recruits to accept a set of beliefs or values without questioning them.

Brainwashing: This is another method used by extremists and terrorists in their radicalisation drive. Brainwashing refers to the systematic, and often violent, but not always conscious, distortion or conditioning of the mind of another person for selfish or other harmful purposes using operant conditioning.³⁸ Operant conditioning is a blend of fear, shock, punishments and rewards that are timed and intertwined in certain ways to upset, further unground, and alter the mind of the vic-

tim, and at the same time to hide the real process so the victims remains unaware.³⁹ In this method, recruits are brought to training camps, where experienced ideologues then work with them one-on-one to instil a virulent fanaticism and bloodlust toward those described as infidels and apostates. Using videos, sermons and other emotive materials, experienced ideologues then skilfully evoke visions of martyrdom to radicalise recruits into volunteering for extreme act of violence such as suicide bombing. Pain, stress or violent intimidation could be applied mostly on in compliant recruits. In the case of Al-Shabaab, it was reported that:

They brainwash our young boys daily to the extent that they made them a human bomb. They erroneously inform these young men that blowing themselves up for the sake of Islam (which is not true) is one of the surest ways to enter paradise...Al-Shabaab brainwashed our beautiful and innocent young girls to marry older men from either Afghanistan or Arab countries in order to support the “jihad”, as reported repeatedly. In numerous occasions when these courageous young girls refused to marry these ugly and old men, they were raped in order to terrorize other girls.⁴⁰

Evidently, the essence of applying intimidation or pains is to break or reduce the recruit’s adaptive energy or vitality level. Those who are brave enough to refuse such intimidation and other dehumanising treatment such as rape or torture are often subjected to painful death before colleagues to break the resolve of other onlookers.

Hypnosis: Although related to brainwashing, hypnosis is a very deep and subtle alteration or distortion of the brain of a human being so that it responds in certain ways. It is a state of inner absorption, concentration and focused attention.⁴¹ Unlike brainwashing, hypnosis does not need to be coupled with punishments or rewards to be effective or remain viable, and it is usually short in duration.⁴² Terror hypnotists or spiritualists make use of substances like mind-bending drugs and voodoo (black magic) to condition the mind of young recruits into carrying out violent activities such as suicide bombing. In areas where they operate, the Boko Haram has employed hypnosis in radicalising some recruits to carry out violent acts. For instance, one of the two suspected Boko Haram female suicide bombers intercepted in northern Cameroon on 25 March 2016 before she could detonate the explosives was found to be “heavily drugged and therefore not in full control of her senses”.⁴³

Propaganda: Globally, terrorist organisations place a good deal of emphasis on communicating their messages across a diverse audience. The use of propaganda is a key component of this strategic messaging. Social media platforms offer the virtual community for the propagation and sharing of extremist ideology, training materials, explosive making manuals, and sourcing of members. Various tools such as audio and video tapes, leaflets, recorded sermons, publications (e.g ISIS’s dabiq), and posting on websites, among others, are used in this regard to achieve diverse objectives. The objectives include, but not limited to, embarrassing governments, exciting fear

in its opponents, gaining admiration of its supporters, catalysing self-radicalisation of sympathisers, and attracting supporters to their extremist ideology. In particular, the growing propaganda influences and radicalisation that take place online has accentuated concern over how the internet has become a self-imposed and isolated environment or ‘echo chamber,’ where individuals willingly and regularly subject themselves to certain narratives without exposure to counter arguments.⁴⁴

Apart from structured or programmed radicalisation, an individual can be self-radicalised without formal recruitment into any organisation. This has largely occurred due to online influences. For example, a person may become part of an online community of people who share their views and radicalise in a virtual environment.⁴⁵ Exposure to extremist views, sermons, messages, videos, and write-ups by intolerant hate preachers or radical clerics that are accessible online are known sources of self-radicalising influences. The world has witnessed cases where such individuals through self-recorded videos, posting on Facebook accounts or other social media platforms pledged allegiance to terrorist groups like ISIS before carrying out horrific violence. Cases of ‘lone-wolf’ terrorist attacks witnessed in the West attest to this pattern of self-radicalisation.⁴⁶

While incident of self-radicalised individuals carrying out attacks have not been recorded in Nigeria, it is a major pattern in America where the ideology of the late US-born Al-Qaeda cleric, Anwar al-Awlaki, has inspired many individuals into engaging in acts of violent extremism. The list is evidently long and growing, but the one that implicates Nigeria was the case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian born underwear bomber. An example in Africa was the case of ISIS-inspired lone attacker, Saif Al-Deen Al Rezgui, who was involved in the mass shooting of tourists in a resort in Sousse, Tunisia, on 26 June 2015, killing about 38 people and injuring 39 others.

In sum, recruitment and enlistment are the pathways through which VEOs get their members. Enlistment or recruitment could be likened to sourcing and supplying the raw materials while radicalisation is the processing of the raw material to trigger zeal and commitment to promote or indulge in violence. Sometimes it is difficult to separate the stage at which an individual was recruited and the stage he or she was subsequently radicalised. Suffice it to state that radicalisation should, at best, be seen as a process which may compose of phases depending on the individual or context, or both. Where development in phases occur, they may not necessarily be sequential, and they can also overlap, meaning that a person may skip a stage in reaching militant action or alternatively may become disillusioned at any given point and abandon the process altogether.⁴⁷

Thus, recruitment, enlistment and radicalisation are central to the existence of every terrorist group. While recruitment or enlistment is vital to sustenance and expansion of membership, radicalisation is critical to the weaponising or priming of sympathisers or members into vanguards of terror. How then can these processes be dealt with in the context of a local community?

COUNTERING INVOLVEMENT IN VIOLENT EXTREMISM THROUGH COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

Local communities are known for their diversity. Understanding such diversity is crucial in framing programmes or interventions designed to counter extremist recruitment, enlistment, and radicalisation. Efforts in this regard will as a matter of necessity, encompass both prevention and intervention activities at local communities. Prevention activities are both policies and programmes that promote inclusion, engage individuals and communities, diminish exposure to broad risk factors that threaten healthy development, and increase access to resources that promote well-being. Intervention activities are policies and programmes that serve individuals who demonstrate early risk markers of poor judgement, which can include (but are not limited to) mental health problems, alienation, aggression/bullying, and/or delinquency, as well as individuals who may be increasingly drawn to violent extremist ideologies and/or activities.⁴⁸

As President Barack Obama insightfully noted, communities are best placed to recognise and confront the threat posed by VEOs because they are targeting their children, families, and neighbours.⁴⁹ To this end, programmes or interventions at countering extremist recruitment and radicalisation should be particularly prioritised, but not exclusively focused, on targeting *at-risk* individuals or groups. One critical way of targeting at-risk individuals is by strengthening community engagement.

By community engagement, we mean partnership initiatives involving diverse stakeholders such as individuals, government agencies, organised groups, and communitybased or non-governmental organizations, working together to prevent threats to the well-being of a people inhabiting a specific geographical boundary that functions under the jurisdiction of a governance structure. Community engagement has emerged as one of the veritable tools in countering violent extremism at local community levels. It encapsulates a range of partnerships involving law enforcement, intelligence agencies, other statutory organizations, and community-based non-governmental organizations working together to mitigate recruitment, radicalisation and involvement in violent extremism and terrorism.

Robust community engagement is built on the principles of trust, collaboration, respect, inclusiveness, and local ownership. It focuses on building trust with local communities, and state actors engaging with them as partners to develop information-driven community-based solutions to local issues.⁵⁰ As the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) has noted:

such engagement is meant to raise community awareness about the threat of violent extremism, to provide them with the necessary tools, and to empower them to intervene and prevent radicalisation and violence. The more aware communities are of potential threats to their security and wellbeing, the more

empowered they are to be resilient against it and the better prepared they can be to counter the threats themselves.⁵¹

The main objective of community engagement initiatives is to build or “strengthen community resilience, in order to leverage lessons learned in the anticipation of, mitigation of, response to, and recovery from future impacts”.⁵² The importance of cultivating or strengthening resilience is to make local communities to be ‘*violent extremism-proof*’ – the outcome of robust proactive interventions undertaken to inoculate or prevent communities from becoming the breeding grounds for violent extremism and radicalisation. Evidently, exposure to extremist ideas may be through the influence of family members or friends, direct contact with extremist groups and organisations or, increasingly, through the internet.⁵³

Community engagement initiatives therefore are designed to build communities that can better detect, respond and cope with the forces of extremist recruitment, enlistment and radicalisation. To this end, creating or enabling some local community-driven projects in Africa states could help mitigate the forces of extremist recruitment and radicalisation. Such programmes include, among others;

- *Home-based forums* – These are community-based forums that provide space for locales to discuss common issues regarding recruitment, radicalisation and violent extremism with a view to preventing them from taking root in their locality.
- *Skills training interventions* – These are capacity building programmes that offer opportunities for income generation, especially targeting at risk-individuals or groups in a community.
- *Sensitisation programme* – These are orientation and enlightenment campaigns that contribute to challenging extremist ideas to counter their narratives and reduce their appeal to individuals and groups. The use of town hall session or meetings is a common practice in this realm.
- *Community radio stations* – This special radio programmes provide valuable outlets for people to voice concern on issues bordering on their security and wellbeing, often through live call-in radio sessions. In Nigeria, for instance, radio *Dandal Kura* – which means ‘the big public meeting’ in the Kanuri language, is one such recent radio service that emerged to challenge the narrative of the Boko Haram by targeting Kanuri speakers throughout the Lake Chad basin.⁵⁴ It began broadcasting in Kanuri and Hausa language in northern Nigeria on 28 January 2015.
- *Early Warning mechanism* – The development or strengthening of mechanism of timely or early detection of signs of extremism in the local community is vitally important in preventing it from assuming violent dimension. It is equally crucial in helping identify those chiefly at risk of recruitment and

radicalisation for quick response interventions. For instance, early warning mechanism can be deployed in identifying and tracking hate preachers. Tools such as confidential reporting helplines can enable local actors inform security and law enforcement officials of trends inimical for peaceful coexistence in a community with less fear of retribution from extremists.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There is growing understanding globally that the solutions to violent extremism begins in local communities. This is because individuals are first members of a given community before they join VEOs. Such individuals could become self-radicalised or radicalised through one-on-one contact in group sessions, facilitated by experienced extremist ideologues. The very community where the would-be extremist or terrorist lives is therefore a crucial site to target in preventing and mitigating violent extremism. The creation of tailored and effective programmes for preventing or countering violent extremism (P/CVE) will need to focus on bringing together practitioners from across the spectrum and on developing new initiatives or strengthening existing programs where necessary to tackle the root causes of violent extremism in local communities in Africa.

Since local community is the space where individuals are preyed upon by ideologues and terrorist recruiters, they should be the primary site of inoculation programmes against the forces that facilitate enlistment, recruitment and radicalisation into violent extremism. Given the diversity of local community, there is no single solution that will fit in all contexts. To this end, the following broad recommendations are crucial in leveraging local community for P/CVE in Africa.

- **CVE Research Fund** – There is the need to create a long-term funding mechanism to support rigorous academic research that will help build a stronger, multidisciplinary community of scholarship to improve public awareness of the intricacies of extremist recruitment, enlistment and radicalisation. Such unique funding envelope would also support deeper dialogue between researchers, civil society organisations (CSOs), security agents and government officials in generating and implementing effective CVE policies, projects and programmes that suit the peculiarities and specificities of local communities.
- **Countering Violent Extremism Forum (CVEF)** – It is important to create a forum that will offer different stakeholders the opportunity to share ideas and lessons learned on the subject of violent extremism. Such platform is equally important in promoting best practices in CVE for possible adaptation and replication across communities for enhanced peace and security.
- **Community inoculation programmes (CIPs)** – There is need for greater partnership between local communities, donor agencies and governments in implementing community inoculation programmes (CIPs). The CIPs are di-

verse, quick and impactful programmes that provide platforms for awareness creation on the modus operandi of extremists, provide avenue for counselling by elders, and encourage community supports for effective [re]orientation of at-risk individuals. Community based organisation and CSOs are best suited to anchor these programmes. This involves supporting women-led and community-based organisations to identify and properly resource projects that will reduce the appeal of violent extremist ideologies.

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INDIVIDUAL RISK FACTORS FOR ENGAGEMENT IN TERRORISM: CONTRIBUTIONS FROM NEUROCRIMINOLOGY

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ABSTRACT

This article demonstrates how neurocriminology can aid our understanding of individual factors that may be involved in terrorism engagement. There is a problem in explaining how a few individuals decide to join terrorist groups while others don't, even when they live in the same social environment. The field of neurocriminology brings evidence indicating that brain functioning is strongly involved in people's response to environmental stimuli, which can clarify this phenomenon. According to the literature, brain activation patterns generate different levels of sensibility to stimuli, and therefore, different behavioral outcomes. This leads to the conclusion that engagement in terrorism is influenced by structural and physiological aspects of specific brain regions. Therefore, variations in these neural features can make people more or less prone to engage in violent extremism. This premise is supported by research and the findings are discussed in the paper. This article also stresses that biology alone cannot explain violent behavior because it is modulated by environmental variables as well. With that in mind, the discussion uses an interactionist approach to explain how different brain functioning patterns can influence (and be influenced by) the environment and produce risk factors on an individual level.

Keywords

Extremism;
Neurocriminology;
Radicalization;
Terrorism; Violence.

INTRODUCTION

As the name suggests, neurocriminology is an interface between neuroscience and criminology. This field explains how neuroanatomical and neurophysiological variables can influence offending and how these factors interact with environmental stimuli, producing antisocial behavioral outcomes. As stated by Glenn and Raine (2013), “The emerging field of neurocriminology seeks to apply techniques and principles from neuroscience to improve our understanding of crime, to predict crime and ultimately to prevent crime.” Currently, we have solid evidence that criminal behavior and violence have a biological basis. Aspects such as resting heart rate and sub nutrition are factors related to violent crime (Glenn and Raine, 2013). Traumatic brain injury and brain lesions caused by tumors are also events that can stimulate aggressive behavior and therefore have importance for neurocriminological studies. The authors show that neurotransmitters, hormones and birth complications are associated with antisocial traits as well. There is a consistent body of evidence pointing to biological components of violence and scholars found that it can be influenced by variables such as heritability, fetal neural maldevelopment, maternal nicotine and/or alcohol consumption during pregnancy, exposure to lead and low levels of monoamine oxidase A (MAOA) (Glenn and Raine, 2013).

Despite being modulated by biological factors, criminal behavior is a complex phenomenon and occurs through an interaction between these biological aspects and the environment. For example, a decreased expression of the monoamine oxidase (MAOA) gene is related to violent offending (Bogerts, Schöne and Breitschuh, 2017), but primarily if the individual were a victim of maltreatment as a child (Barnes, Raine and Farrington, 2020). This can be described as a genetic risk factor and it also can be found in other contexts, such as psychopathology. Research shows that genetics plays a role in the probability of patients developing depression, for example. This can occur because some people are more vulnerable to certain environmental stressors, consequently having greater chances of developing the disorder (Barnes, Raine and Farrington, 2020). This model of genetic risk factors (or genetic vulnerabilities) illustrates how genetics alone cannot predict with certainty if someone will present antisocial, violent behavior or psychiatric disorders such as depression. What we need is to see how variables (i.e. genetics and social context) interact with each other so we can have a deeper understanding of how they modulate violent behaviors.

It is important to state that this approach does not imply biological determinism. Gene expression does not guarantee behavioral outcomes because this system is strongly modulated by context. Situational factors such as socialization and exposure to violence are examples of variables that serve as modulators of antisocial behavior. They can have a stronger impact on individuals who have genetic risk factors because they are more sensitive to these specific stimuli. This

idea can be used to analyze terrorism as well because we have evidence of a relationship between brain functioning and violent extremism. This evidence will be used to investigate how individual differences can influence the probability of someone to engage in this type of violence. Several people are exposed to what scholars classify as environmental risk factors, such as social exclusion, deprivation, poverty and extremist political views but only a few actually commit acts of terrorism. In addition, people can become radicalized and support violent extremism and don't engage in actual violence. In conclusion, individuals can respond in different ways when exposed to the same environmental stimuli (Barnes, Raine and Farrington, 2020).

Radicalization assessment is a frequently used strategy for terrorism prevention. As reported in this paper, there are several models representing radicalization processes. It also discusses the effectiveness and limitations of such designs, and how they can be useful for counterterrorism (when used with other analytic tools). But at first, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of radicalization, since this term can also have multiple interpretations. In this article, the term refers to “a process by which people develop extremist ideologies and beliefs”, as described by Mohiyeddini *et al.* (2019). In spite of having a vision that deviates from human rights, radicalization does not guarantee that people will become violent (Mohiyeddini *et al.*, 2019), which is a challenge in terrorism prevention. The problem is to identify who will act based on these beliefs. This article considers terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.” (Global Terrorism Database Codebook, 2019).

CONCEPTUAL REVIEW

Currently, we have radicalization models to classify certain behaviors and measure the risk of someone to engage in terrorist acts. This classification also aims to evaluate the individual's degree of commitment to an extremist organization. Such procedures are important to assess the risk of attacks as well because group dynamics is an important component in terrorist behavior (Doosje *et al.*, 2016). One might ask what the best way to conduct this task is, and there is no answer to that. In fact, there are multiple models of radicalization in the scientific literature, each one of them used for risk assessment. Doosje *et al.* (2016) discuss a three-level model that contains the following phases: (1) sensitivity phase, (2) the group membership phase, and (3) the action phase. Likewise, there is a staircase model, which categorizes the radicalization process in six different floors. According to this theory, the escalation starts with a perception of injustice and deprivation, culminating in dehumanizing the enemy on the sixth floor. The order of the floors is fixed and to advance to another level one must pass through the previous ones (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2017).

Those designs have a clear similarity with a sequential model suggested by Becker (2009), which views deviant behavior as an evolution of steps in a linear order. However, those models do not necessarily represent reality in a precise way. According to McCauley and Moskaleiko (2017), such designs can create the illusion of terrorism as being a clear and predictable phenomenon, which is also stated by Khalil, Horgan and Zeuthen (2019). This limitation encouraged the creation of another radicalization design: the two pyramids model. The theory's main concept is the radicalization of attitudes is different from radicalization of actions, which is supported by studies that show how individuals can participate in guerrillas without necessarily having extremist opinions (McCauley and Moskaleiko, 2017; Rousseau, Hassan and Oulhote, 2017). In conclusion, it's reasonable to assume that radicalization is an intricate process and people must be cautious when applying models to explain the phenomenon or to undertake security measures to oppose it. Rousseau, Hassan and Oulhote (2017) show that the detection of behaviors supposedly related to terrorism can be unproductive and even make violence escalate. Besides, it's difficult to identify which of the radical individuals will engage in violence, which is a great obstacle for counterterrorism.

The purpose of this article is to demonstrate how neurocriminology can aid research on how and why people adopt radical attitudes and engage (or not) in terrorism. It also discusses limitations about the idea that radicalization is a prerequisite for engagement in terrorism. In addition, the paper brings an interactionist approach to investigate why when exposed to the same environmental risk factors, some people engage in violent extremism and others do not. This paper is based on the premise that political views and violent extremism are related and both are modulated by brain functioning, which creates variability in individual responses to environmental stimuli. In addition, it shows that the current radicalization models do not consider neural propensities as risk factors, which limits the accuracy of them.

With that in mind, we can analyze evidence of this brain-behavior relationship regarding terrorism. Clifford, Keith and Decety (2020) showed that willingness to fight and die for a group that the individual supports is a phenomenon related to certain brain activity patterns. This disposition to fight is related to increased activation of the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). The dlPFC participates in emotional regulation, being involved in social decision making and impulse control. It is connected to regions in the limbic system, where emotional responses are processed. Through this connection, the dlPFC can intervene in the limbic system activation, allowing emotional regulation. The dlPFC is involved in several cognitive tasks such as working memory, attention and planning of behavior. It takes part in the regulation of emotions and thoughts as well, while having connections with several other areas (i.e. motor and sensory cortices) (Concannon, 2019; Freberg, 2019). In their paper, Clifford, Keith and Decety (2020) also demonstrate a correlation between political views and neu-

ral mechanisms, which illustrates the neurocriminological approach to investigate political violence.

There are other studies showing correlations between violent extremism and brain areas. Husna (2020) describes some individual risk factors that can influence this behavior beyond genetic predispositions: cognitive inflexibility, justice sensitivity and cognitive closure. The author also shows some brain regions that are involved in these risk factors. Regarding cognitive flexibility, there is evidence that this trait is related to the admiration of extremists. But as discussed in this article, we need to investigate the interaction between variables instead of searching for one specific “cause.” In this case, it was found that cognitive inflexibility alone does not guarantee that someone will support extremism, but when this trait is present with a low level of ambiguity tolerance it can behave as a risk factor. In other words, people with these traits may be more inclined to admire extremism.

According to research in neuroscience, cognitive inflexibility is influenced by brain regions such as the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC). When interacting with each other, these areas are related to the ability to substitute beliefs for new ones when we find evidence against them (Husna, 2020). This information overruling process is debilitated in people who have lower activity in both regions, which can be one neural basis for resistant beliefs. About justice sensitivity, some brain regions involved in this cognitive process were identified. Currently, we know that the posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS), dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) take part in the justice/injustice perception of the individual. Also called “moral sensitivity”, justice sensitivity makes people more responsive to perceptions of injustice and they become more prone to support violence to repair it (Husna, 2020).

We need to understand the basic involvement of brain regions in specific cognitive tasks but it is necessary to observe how the neural structures interact with each other as well. The cognitive processes and behavioral outcomes are not produced by specific brain regions working independently; they are a result of an intricate interaction of brain structures (Glenn and Raine, 2013). Using the neurocriminological approach we can argue that terrorism might occur not because of socialization or genetic predisposition, but because of the interaction between neural propensities and environmental stimuli that modulates them (which can be both as a risk factor and a protective factor depending on the context) (Barnes, Raine and Farrington, 2020).

It is necessary to develop multilevel and interdisciplinary approaches because radicalization alone cannot explain why violent extremism occurs. For instance, there is evidence indicating that radicalization might not even be a requisite for engagement in terrorism. Rocca (2017) stresses the controversy about the relation between radicalization and violent extremism when stating that, for example, most of ISIS’s recruits have poor knowledge about Islam. This contradicts the idea that

terrorists are mostly radicalized individuals. Decety, Pape and Workman (2017) also bring evidence in this direction, showing that only 25% of jihadi combatants are converted. Besides that, people can sustain radical beliefs without engaging in terrorism (Husna, 2020), which is another evidence that it may not depend necessarily on radicalization to occur. These findings undermine the premise that radicalization is a prerequisite for terrorism.

This is related to the work developed by Decety, Pape and Workman, (2017), where they explain that these beliefs do not necessarily lead to political violence. However, it does not mean that radical beliefs are trivial because there is evidence of their role as well. For instance, Pretus *et al* (2018) found that the left inferior frontal gyrus is a structure involved in the processing of sacred values. Individuals that are vulnerable to extremist propaganda showed a different pattern of activation of this structure, which was assessed via functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). This study is important because it showed empirical evidence of the relationship between neural structures and sacred values while explaining that this relation can increase the subject's willingness to engage in violent extremism (Pretus *et al*, 2018).

Here we can see a controversial topic because despite participating in violent extremism, radicalization may not be essential for it to occur and is absent in some cases (Rocca, 2017). This controversy needs deeper explanations to investigate the role of radicalization in extremism. In order to do that, we can use interdisciplinary explanations that use both biological and environmental views because terrorism is a complex problem that cannot be explained with simplistic answers. Decety, Pape and Workman (2017) recommend the application of areas such as social neuroscience (interface between social sciences and neuroscience) in the scientific investigation of violence. According to the authors, this field supports and uses interdisciplinary views to analyze complex behavioral phenomena. This is important to complement social theories because social, economic and political explanations don't clarify why some individuals respond to environmental stimuli becoming terrorists. According to Husna (2020), these social/political theories fail to demonstrate why (and how) some people become radicalized, so there is a need for the use of multilevel interdisciplinary views to assess this phenomenon.

CONCLUSION

This article was produced to demonstrate how neurocriminology can help us understand why some people engage in terrorism and others don't. There is a need to investigate what individual factors make a person respond to environmental stimuli deciding to join a terrorist organization. As stated early in this article, social/economic/political theories are insufficient to explain micro-level differences and how people can behave in different ways even when they are in the same environment. Neurocriminology can point to some promising directions for further research such as the activation patterns of brain regions and how they can make a person more or less responsive to social stimuli, for example.

This can be useful to develop targeted interventions based on neural functioning to operate at the individual level. There is evidence showing that this approach can be fruitful, as in research conducted by Choy, Focquaert and Raine (2018), where non-invasive brain electrical stimulation was used and resulted in decreases in participant's aggressiveness. Another promising intervention is nutritional supplementation with omega-3, which has a demonstrated influence in brain areas related to violence reduction both in children and adults in multiple countries. In addition, Choy, Focquaert and Raine (2018) explain that pharmacological treatment (i.e. Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors) can reduce violence as well. These are three examples of how neurocriminology can contribute to violence reduction with evidence-based approaches.

Beyond enhancing interventions, neurocriminology can also complement theoretical models of radicalization and risk assessment because it clarifies how some individuals can be more prone to engage in terrorism than others. This could (and should) be taken into account when scholars and policymakers develop counterterrorism and terrorism prevention policies. Evidence shows that these neural-based, non-invasive interventions can reduce violence when used with other psychosocial strategies. Therefore, there is reason to infer that this could be used to aid community policies that seek to undermine engagement in terrorism. But first, we need to develop research on how brain functioning is related to terrorism engagement in Africa because there is a lack of such investigation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- To pay attention to what neurocriminology has to complement in terrorism research;
- To stimulate research and discussions on the neural aspects of terrorism and how they are involved in this type of violence;
- To investigate how these neural propensities for violence manifest in people from African countries;
- To conduct research on how non-invasive biological interventions (i.e. transcranial electrical stimulation, omega-3 supplementation and pharmacological treatment) could be used in African countries and to test if it would bring positive results in reducing violence and engagement in terrorism;
- To create theoretical models of risk factors that consider neural functioning as relevant variables.

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INVESTIGATORS' SKILLS FOR BEST TERRORIST INTERVIEWING OUTCOMES: CAN THEY BE LEARNED?

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ABSTRACT

Terrorism causes significant economic damage and the loss of several lives, leading to considerable impact on countries and continents. In Africa, 2020 has been a year of enormous terrorism activity, where more than 1,300 terrorist attacks occurred in the first eight months, leading to more than 6,000 casualties. Gathering intelligence through investigative interviewing, also referred as interrogation, is one of the available methods to counterterrorism. In the African continent, this is especially true given that over 4,000 terrorists were arrested in 2020 and they may hold valuable information. An investigative interview may find where other terrorists are hiding, which targets they are planning to attack and where they are holding hostages. Therefore, the aim of the present paper was identifying which interviewer skills are necessary to achieve good interview outcomes. Several skills were identified as relevant, however only four were thoroughly discussed due to their importance in evidence-based interviewing methods: Rapport Building, Interpersonal Competence and Versatility, Questioning Style and Effective Use of Evidence. It is explained how each of these skills are relevant to achieve the expected interviewing results, and how they are applied in interviewing methods. A discussion is proposed about the possibility of law enforcement officers learning these skills through training or if they are innate. Finally, a set of recommendations are put forth to ensure that investigative interviewers are developing and using the necessary skills on the field.

Keywords

Interrogation,
Interviewer skills,
Investigative interview,
Terrorism, Training.

INTRODUCTION

Global terrorism impact is high, people's lives can be affected either directly (e.g. injuries, death of relatives, psychological trauma) or indirectly (e.g. unemployment, fear, economic collapse). The Global Terrorism Index, a yearly publication focused on measuring terrorism worldwide, endeavours to identify patterns and trends, while also suggesting countermeasures. Its most recent edition points to a decrease in the number of terrorist attacks, deaths and economic impact. What once had reached a number of casualties as high as 33,555, costing over US\$110billion in 2014, four years after that these numbers dropped to 15,952 casualties and US\$ 33billion in costs (IEP, 2019).

There is also a bulletin, which specifically covers all of terrorism in Africa. However, its results are not as promising, given the frequent rise in terrorist attacks and casualties in 2020 (ACSRT, 2020). Considering all available monthly bulletins from 2020 (January to August), there were 1,341 terrorist attacks in the African Continent. Terrorists mainly used Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs), followed by Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and Kidnapping. These attacks resulted in over 6,000 casualties among civilians, military personnel, and terrorists, while nearly 4,000 terrorists were arrested.

In order to address the issue of terrorism in Africa, government and researchers have proposed and taken several actions. Counterterrorism approaches may focus on recruitment (how terrorist groups are able to engage with the public and draw them to fight for their cause), including the identification of risk factors and the development of strategies to prevent more people from joining terrorist ranks (Darden, 2019). Other approaches focus on how to disrupt their financing, which can occur through robberies, kidnapping, smuggling, drug trafficking, donation from local or foreign supporters (Okereke, 2011). There are also actions aimed at improving legislations to prosecute terrorists more effectively and difficult their financing (Fombo, 2011).

Another possibility in assisting the fight against terrorism, and the focus of the present study, is interviewing suspects to acquire relevant investigative information. Through investigative interviewing (also referred as interrogation), police forces can unearth vital details about terrorists' plans for future attacks, including weapons in their possession and locations under their crosshair. Interviewers can pinpoint gathering places of sympathisers with the terrorist cause and identify recruitment strategies commonly used. Effective interviewing may also find out where other terrorist members and suspects are located, or where they are holding kidnapped victims, an especially important achievement considering that terrorist groups in Africa, between July and August 2020, held over 700 people hostages (ACSRT, 2020). On top of that nearly 4,000 terrorists were arrested in Africa between January and August 2020, effectively interviewing them can lead to significant breakthroughs in counterterrorism (ACSRT, 2020).

Ever since the 9/11 terrorist attack in the USA, a very specific type of terrorist interviewing method became famous: the enhanced interrogation techniques, which essentially made use of torture methods to elicit information (Alison & Alison, 2017). These techniques involved from direct physical damage (e.g. waterboarding), to more subtle and less physically visible forms of torture, also called white torture, such as loud music, sleep deprivation, stress positions, etc. (Human Rights Watch, 2004). Regardless of that, the use of torture in an attempt to gather intelligence is, by no means, new. Rejali (2007) provides a historic report where he points to the use of degrading and dehumanizing methods much further back in history.

It is undeniable that torture carries a heavy emotional load, the fact that one human being is purposefully inflicting extreme pain on another. However, we are still able to find people who defend such acts. Alison and Alison (2017) provide some explanations as to why people accept and convene with torture methods. One of them relates to the idea of a greater good, a perception that torture is acceptable when all other available alternatives turned useless. It resonates with the idea of the just-world, where good actions will be rewarded and evil actions punished, thus, torturing terrorists to acquire information is fair, and even expected, because they are evil. There is also a possibility that hatred and group identification, as important concepts when enemy groups are fighting (e.g. “we must kill them or else they will kill us”), is carried into an interrogation room, which leads to actions of revenge rather than goal-oriented towards information gathering.

The idea behind enhanced interrogation method is clear, by inflicting pain and reducing sense of control and power of detainees; they would give in and truthfully answer all questions because it would lead to the end of torturous acts. However, on top of being a clear violation of human rights, there has also been several questions as to whether it actually works, if prisoners provide more information and if it is reliable.

Amounting evidence points otherwise: torture increases prisoners’ resistance, undermine communication, lead to worse memory recall, and reduces the value and reliability of information gathered (Alison & Alison, 2017). As a result of the lack of effectiveness and the short, medium and long-term health consequences to detainees, other interviewing methods were developed, based on solid theory and scientific rigour.

A wide range of interviewing methods and techniques following these principles are available for use by police and military forces when dealing with crime suspects. For example, the Enhanced Cognitive Interview, considered the gold standard for witness interviewing that has also been adapted and shown to work on suspects, is based on Cognitive Psychology theory, specifically evidence on how human memory operates and how it can be accessed (Hope, Gabbert, Fisher & Jamieson, 2014). Another example is the Observing Rapport-Based Interpersonal Techniques (ORBIT), which is a set of techniques interviewers can use to facilitate communication and increase engagement from suspects and victims (Alison, Alison, Elntib and Christiansen,

2013). Its basis are already established concepts and techniques from counselling, such as Motivational Interviewing and the Interpersonal Circumplex.

In addition to specific methods, there are also some individual techniques and specific knowledge that can be used to facilitate interviews with suspects. Mimicry, for example, has been found to facilitate compliance and increase information shared in an interview (Shaw et al., 2015). The foot-in-the-door persuasion technique has the potential to influence interviewees into complying with costlier requests if it is preceded by requests of less cost (Souchet & Girandola, 2013). Knowledge of cultural differences is also of the highest importance when interviewing suspects from other countries, as evidence shows that cross-culture communication can lead to misunderstanding if interviewers are not aware of such differences in communication, or if they do not use interpreters to bridge the cultural gap (High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group [HIG], 2016).

This interviewing approach based on evidence has already been shown to be an effective method with terrorists. The review of scientific evidence conducted by the HIG (2016) clearly highlights the need to use validated methods and techniques to interview terrorist suspects, as well as how they can be applied in a practical context. On top of that, an earlier issue of the African Journal on Terrorism presents a paper, which shows how counterterrorism efforts in Africa can benefit from information gathering interviews based on evidence, such as the Scharff technique and PEACE method (Melo, 2020). However, a large quantity of interviewing methods and techniques consequently demand several different skills and abilities from interviewers. Which skills and abilities are those? Are they innate or is it possible for interviewers to learn them and become experts in the field? The present paper aims to answer these questions. Firstly, some skills and abilities required in most methods and techniques will be introduced, followed by a discussion as to whether they can be learned, as well as the possibility and effectiveness of interviewer training to build them.

INTERVIEWERS' SKILLS

Rapport building

Rapport is a difficult construct to define, many authors have their own definition. This construct is mainly studied and used in a therapeutic context, where the relationship between therapist and client has significant impact in treatment outcomes (Vallano & Compo, 2015). Authors in the field of psychotherapy define it in a variety of ways, usually describing it in terms of a therapeutic alliance or therapeutic relationship, where therapist and patient work as allies towards the common goal of therapeutic healing (Leach, 2005). To date, there are no clear and widely accepted definition of what rapport actually is. In fact, most who try to define it use vague and broad definitions that including ideas such as a warm relationship, a positive interaction or even harmony between therapist and patient (Vallano & Compo, 2015).

Regardless of the definition used, rapport is understood as a positive and respectful relationship between two people working to achieve a common goal.

Even though the idea of establishing an alliance in a therapeutic context seems reasonable, given the fact that both therapist and patient seek mental health improvement of the latter. The same may not be the case when considering an interrogation context, where interviewers' and detainees' goals usually differ. However, rapport takes a different connotation in a criminal investigation scenario, where rapport is conceptualized as a working or productive relationship (Vallano & Compo, 2015). In these scenarios, the emphasis is on building a respectful and professional atmosphere, rather than a friendly relationship. The goal is creating an accepting and collaborative environment, where both interviewer and detainee share goals of finding the truth, but interviewees are still autonomous and within their rights to choose the extent to which they will cooperate and take part in achieving this goal.

The importance of rapport building in investigative interviewing has become popular since 1993, when McGurk, Carr, and McGurk found that interviewing officers rated this behaviour as the fourth most important skill for an interviewer to have. However, in the same year, Moston and Engelberg (1993) found that rapport was rarely used during actual investigative interviews. This scenario has since changed, as results from research such as the one conducted by Vallano, Evans, Compo and Kieckhafer (2015) with law enforcement interviewers found that all of them identify building rapport as important, while most of them consider it to be essential. These researchers also found that interviewers opt to build rapport in order to obtain more information, and more accurate information from detainees.

This shift is not without substantial evidentiary basis. Several papers have stressed the importance and effectiveness of rapport in an investigative interview. For example, Alison et al. (2013) state that "several historical, biographic, and autobiographic accounts suggest that effective interrogators are interpersonally competent and skilled at "building rapport"" (p.411). Rapport has been shown to significantly increase the amount of information shared by interviewees and facilitate cooperation in investigative settings (HIG, 2016). In another study, analysing real-life police interviews with serious crimes suspects, Leahy-Harland and Bull (2016), found that rapport/empathy was associated with increased probability of suspects confessing. Similarly, Alison et al. (2014) found that rapport-based techniques lead to a reduction in counter-interrogation tactics employed by terrorism suspects. As a result of constant evidence in support of rapport in investigative interviews, police manuals fully endorse its use to achieve better results.

Rapport building is also present in many scientifically validated investigative interviewing methods, such as Enhanced Cognitive Interview (ECI), PEACE method, Scharff Technique and ORBIT. The first procedure an interviewer must do when using ECI is rapport building, as Paulo, Albuquerque and Bull (2014) states, interviewers must first build an adequate and positive relationship with interviewees.

The PEACE method is an acronym for the key stages of an interview as stipulated by UK's Home Office (planning and preparation, engage and explain, account, closure, and evaluate). It posits rapport building as one of the necessary steps to achieve better outcomes (Leahy-Harland & Bull, 2016). Although not clearly stating rapport building, the Scharff Technique include actions that are directly linked to the conceptualization of rapport: be friendly and conversational (HIG, 2016). Finally, a set of techniques built around rapport led to the development of ORBIT, which aims to establish effective ways of building this operational relationship between interviewer and interviewee (Alison et al., 2013). Its developers have found it to be significantly effective in terrorism interviewing cases (Alison et al., 2014).

Building and maintaining rapport requires a set of verbal and non-verbal behaviours. Interviewing manuals, including ECI, PEACE and ORBIT, along with law enforcement interviewers suggest discussing common interests, self-disclosure of personal information, paraphrase interviewee, be direct about the interview, etc (Vallano & Compo, 2015; Vallano et al., 2015; HIG, 2016). Interviewers must also be empathetic, maintain eye contact, genuinely show interest in the interviewee, treat interviewee with respect, offer an item (e.g. coffee, water), assume an open body posture, etc (Vallano & Compo, 2015; Vallano et al., 2015; HIG, 2016).

Interpersonal Competence and Versatility

The already mentioned ORBIT method of interviewing was developed from the analysis of a novel set of data: over 600 hours of field interrogations with 29 convicted UK terrorists (HIG, 2016). In follow-up studies, the designed method has shown to be very effective in reducing counter-interrogation tactics and eliciting information from high-value detainees (Alison et al., 2014). This innovative approach for interviewing, using very specific data with terrorists, puts extra emphasis on two skills interviewers must have: interpersonal competence and interpersonal versatility. Interpersonal Competence is a characteristic of good communicators; it refers to one's ability to avoid maladaptive behaviour in social relations. Interpersonal versatility is the ability to be flexible in one's way to communicate, it is the ability to adapt their own behaviour according to what the context and situation needs (Alison & Alison, 2017).

These skills are directly related to the Interpersonal Circumplex (or Interpersonal Behaviour Circle – IBC) and Motivational Interviewing, ORBIT's main theoretical basis (Alison et al., 2013). IBC suggests that personality should be considered according to how people interact with one another, which could be thought of in terms of a circular configuration composed of two axis: love/hate (horizontal axis) and dominance/submission (vertical axis). These axis in the context of investigative interviewing were confront/cooperate (horizontal axis) and control/capitulate (vertical axis). Using this concept, ORBIT's developers mapped two possible modes of interaction between interviewer and interviewee: adaptive and maladaptive

response (HIG, 2016). Adaptive responses refer to responses that encourage communication and, consequently, lead to a better interview outcome. Whereas maladaptive responses are the ones, which impair communication and lead to poor interview outcomes. In total, there are two interpersonal circles, one adaptive and one maladaptive, each with eight “slices” representing possible behaviours, where each “slice” in the adaptive circle has a maladaptive equivalent. For example, both interviewer and detainee can try to define which topics will be discussed and show authority during the interview in an adaptive (e.g. “in charge, sets the agenda”) or maladaptive (e.g., “demanding, rigid”) way. For a visual representation of both interpersonal circles, please refer to HIG (2016).

ORBIT’s development of adaptive and maladaptive behaviours of the IBC was based on concepts from Motivational Interviewing, which has solid scientific evidence to support its use in therapeutic setting (Alison et al., 2013). Five concepts were used in the development of ORBIT: Acceptance, Empathy, Adaptation, Evocation and Autonomy. Acceptance is the unconditional positive respect for the detainee; it does not mean agreeing or condoning his/her actions or beliefs, but trying to “see the good” despite criminal behaviour. Empathy means trying to understand detainees’ worldview and perspective; interviewers must seek to genuinely grasp interviewees’ motives. Adaptation is an interviewer ability to adapt when there are deviations from the interview plan. Evocation refers to eliciting detainees’ beliefs rather than imposing the interviewers’. Autonomy is about giving detainees a certain degree of control over themselves; they decide whether to cooperate, interviewers do not coerce them, but leave a door open in case interviewees wish to communicate (Alison & Alison, 2017).

Finally, in the context of ORBIT, interpersonal competence is a skill where interviewers use adaptive responses rather than maladaptive ones (Alison et al., 2013). This skill is important because research has found that adaptive behaviour from interviewers lead to adaptive responses from detainees, which lead to more communication, less resistance and more information gathered (Alison et al., 2014). On the other hand, interpersonal versatility refers to an interviewer’s ability to adapt his behaviour through the circle according to the stage of the interview and the behaviours of the interviewee. Research also points that different stages of an interview (beginning, middle or end) require different interpersonal interaction to be most effective (Alison et al., 2014). Therefore, a good interview is when the interviewer is able to be interpersonal versatile to move around the circle when needed, while maintaining interpersonal competence to never use maladaptive behaviours (Alison & Alison, 2017).

Questioning style

The type of questions used in an interview can lead to different outcomes. The amount and reliability of information gathered are directly affected by how inter-

viewers ask questions. Therefore, understanding which ones to use and when to use them is vital. There are two main types of questions: closed-questions, open questions. The first is defined by a set of predetermined possible answers, for example: “did you do it?” or “was the car red?” only elicit a yes or no response from interviewees. Contrarily, open questions allow interviewees to answer more freely and provide information that is not predetermined by the question, for example: “tell me about the car” or “what happened then?”

Closed-questions’ main issue is the lack of recalled information provided, because it provides interviewees with fewer opportunities to talk about other relevant information that may help investigators understand how the crime unfolded (Fisher & Geiselman, 2010). In the specific context of suspect interviewing, if detainees are lying and they provide more information about an event, there are more chances for them to contradict themselves in the same statement or in future interviews, thus improving chances of lie detection. In addition, there is also an increased likelihood of false confessions when using this questioning style in conjunction with accusatorial interviewing methods (Meissner et al., 2012). This is a recurrent problem because closed-questions are inherently more suggestive than open questions. For example, when an interviewer asks whether the colour of the car was red or blue, he is suggesting that the colour is one of the two options. Thus, inducing interviewees to make a decision, when in reality, the car could be a different colour, or the interviewee may not actually remember it, but feels compelled to choose one of the options given. On top of that, interviewers may unconsciously hint which of the options he wishes the interviewee to choose, again suggesting a possible wrong answer based not on the knowledge of the interviewee but on the expectations of the interviewer (Oxburgh, Myklebust & Grant, 2010).

Even though it seems like closed-questions should never be used in an investigative interview, there are some situations when they must be used. For example, when interviewers need to confirm information already mentioned by interviewee, or when the investigative team must gather very specific details that were never mentioned during the interview. However, they should not be used very often, especially during the first stages of the interview, where investigators must first establish rapport and verify what the detainee knows and remembers (Vrij, Hope & Fisher, 2014).

Open questions provide interviewees with the opportunity to elaborate on their answers and provide more details than closed-questions (Fisher & Geiselman, 2010). Due to their “free narrative” concept, where, interviewees are not to be interrupted, memory recall is facilitated, thus increasing the amount and accuracy of information remembered (Vrij, Hope & Fisher, 2014). Open questions also make it more unlikely for suggestions from interviewers to occur, as there are no expectations from interviewees to choose among options, at the same time that interviewers are less likely to give unconscious signals. As a result, these types of questions are highly recommended by different interviewing methods, such as the Enhanced Cognitive Interview, PEACE and Scharff Technique (HIG, 2016).

In general, open questions are superior in their efficacy to gather information without tempering with interviewees memories and facilitating lie detection, which is why they are recommended over closed-questions. However, there are situations where closed-questions are also necessary. Therefore, it is essential that interviewers are aware of the possible uses, advantages and disadvantages of both questions. They also must know how to use closed-questions while reducing their negative possibilities of false memories and interviewer bias (Vrij, Hope & Fisher, 2014).

Effective Use of Evidence

In the context of suspect interviewing, it is vital that interviewers are able to differentiate truthful from deceitful accounts, as it is expected that offenders will try to deceive interviewers and avoid prison (Lobato, Lino & Joaquim, 2019). In the case of terrorism this is especially relevant as the number of potential victims is significantly higher than for other crimes. However, evidence on lie detection is not very positive. First, both lay persons and police investigators are not significantly better than chance in detecting lies (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). Second, police interviewers hold the same inaccurate beliefs about cues to lie detection as lay persons (Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij & Merckelbach, 2016). Third, law enforcement interviewers believe they are better at lie detection than they actually are (Kassin et al., 2007). Even though this evidence is not expected from people who are responsible for lie detection on such crucial tasks, most of the issue comes from focusing on wrong cues of deception. Many law enforcement agencies use non-diagnostic and suboptimal methods for lie detection, usually focusing on non-verbal cues (Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij & Merckelbach, 2016). However, evidence from psychological theory suggest new and more effective ways to detect deceit.

One of these ways is analysing and working on a cognitive level rather than emotional level. More specifically, lying demands a lot in terms of cognitive effort, and liars use known strategies to avoid detection (e.g. avoidance or denial). Interviewers can increase the cognitive load and effectively use available evidence to identify inconsistencies in statements and, consequently, possible lies (Hartwig, Granhag & Luke, 2014). In an investigative interview, it is probable that police will have collected various pieces of evidence, which the general public, including the criminal, is not aware of. If interviewers present all available evidence upfront during an interview with suspects, they will be able to produce a coherent story to justify the evidence without putting themselves at risk of detection. As a matter of fact, the story produced in these situations can be just as similar and convincing as the story presented by truth tellers in the same situation (Hartwig et al., 2006). On the other hand, if interviewers strategically present the evidence against the suspects, they will be able to more accurately identify inconsistencies and possible lies (Hartwig et al., 2014).

In order to do that, interviewers must first gather as much information as possible from suspects, seeking to identify if they are forthcoming about incriminating evidence, or if they choose to avoid ever speaking of it. In this first stage, open questions should be used, as it allows interviewees to speak freely, but also makes it possible for interviewers to identify omissions. After that, interviewers should present evidence, which contradicts their statement, either piece-by-piece, thoroughly discussing each at a time, or present all of them at once. This should be done aiming to verify inconsistencies, for example, if a suspect said he was at the location where the IED was found, but failed to mention reasons to explain why his fingerprints were on it, or actively said he never touched it, interviewers should present this piece of evidence and challenge this contradiction. In these cases, in the latter stages of the interview, closed-questions are recommended, since they are necessary to challenge suspects' statements. This technique became known as Strategic Use of Evidence (SUE), and scientific evidence has shown that it is capable to significantly increase interviewers ability in detecting deception (Hartwig et al., 2014).

There are many other relevant interviewer skills, such as critical thinking, planning, communication skills, emotional intelligence, sensemaking, ethical behaviour, among others (Mount & Mazerolle, 2020). However, the scope of the present paper does not allow for a thorough discussion about each of them and how they are applied in investigative interviews. Therefore, a choice was made to include skills that were most relevant and present through different investigative interviewing manuals. HIG's (2016) literature review provide descriptions of other important interviewing skills in some detail.

CAN TRAINING DEVELOP INTERVIEWERS' SKILLS?

Police forces worldwide invest a lot in terms of money and human resources into training police officers on investigative interviewing with victims, witnesses and suspects (Mount & Mazerolle, 2020). Training usually occur as part of the selection process and before deploying officers on the job. Continued training is also common practice to ensure they do continue to use the best available methods, do not forget learned lessons or master new methods and become interviewing experts. However, there are many different skills necessary for a good interviewer, and there are varied evidence-based methods of interviewing suspects. Is training effective in preparing investigators on so many different skills? Are there interviewers' personality characteristics that can predict better interview outcome?

First, many of the necessary skills to become a good interviewer are not innate, which argues for the need of effective training courses to prepare investigators (Mount & Mazerolle, 2020). Second, understanding what needs to be trained and developed requires an organisational partnership between police forces and researchers, as the first have the necessary data, while the second has the scientific knowledge to analyse it and suggest improvements. This partnership has already

achieved amazing results, for example, McGurk et al. (1993) analysed the effectiveness of a national interviewing training in England and Wales under the PEACE model (already developed according to the best available scientific evidence), which pointed to successful results directly after and six-months after the training took place. More recently, interview methods were developed or improved when researchers could analyse real-life interviews in detail and identify what worked and which interviewer skills still needed improvement.

In general, investigative interviewing training focuses on questioning. First, identifying whether interviewers are using closed-questions or open questions, and second, training them to use more of the latter, as it achieves better results, following by closed-questions only when necessary. This is in mainly due to the PEACE model and ECI, which have defended this use for a longer period of time than other interviewing methods. Non-surprisingly, research about the effectiveness of training police officers on PEACE model, which recommends using open questions, shows significant improvement (Paulo, Albuquerque & Bull, 2013). Nonetheless, there are many limitations and setbacks. Evidence shows that police officers are not commonly using open questions when assessment time was far from when the training occurred, which suggests the need for constant supervision or frequent training programs (Snook et al., 2012). Regardless of that, the use of open questions is one of ECI's components used most frequently by police interviewers (Dando, Wilcock & Milne, 2009).

Similarly, training police officers to strategically use evidence and plan their questions has shown to be very effective in improving their abilities to accurately identify truthful and deceitful accounts. In an attempt to test whether SUE would increase police officer lie detection accuracy, Hartwig et al. (2006) used an experimental approach. Two groups of trainee police officers participated. One of them was trained in SUE and the other was not. Both groups had to interview lying or truth telling mock suspects. Results showed a significant difference between both groups, as the trained one achieved a high deception detection accuracy rate (85.4%), while the untrained group maintained their level just above chance (56.1%). In a recent replication of this study, Luke et al. (2016) found similar but less promising results, as the trained group achieved a higher deception detection accuracy rate (65%) compared to untrained interviewers (43%), but these results are far inferior to Hartwig et al.'s, (2006). Therefore, even though SUE training shows promise, these results should be analysed with caution, and more research should be done to consolidate its training effectiveness.

The other mentioned interviewer abilities (Interpersonal Competence/Versatility and Rapport Building) seems a little trickier to teach police officers, since it is not simply a change of questioning style or when/how to present evidence. In fact, Alison et al. (2014) explicitly state that did not know enough about the possibility of teaching these skills. However, more recent evidence points to its possibility. Brandon et al. (2019) describe a study with 18 interrogators who were assessed in real-

life interviewing scenarios prior and after training on several interviewing methods, including ORBIT and its basis (MI and IBC). Results showed that interrogators used significantly more active listening skills (one of the methods to build rapport) after training. On top of that, they found a significant increase in perceived MI rapport and observed rapport with the suspect. Finally, not only do interviewers show improvement in necessary interpersonal skills but also suspects were more cooperative and disclosed more information in interviews after training. The authors suggest that training improved participants skills in cognitive interviewing, active listening and rapport tactics, which lead to better rapport with the suspect, who became cooperative and disclosed more information. Since it is a fairly recent interviewing method, ORBIT does not have much evidence in terms of training effectiveness yet, but its applicability with high-value detainee is much pronounced.

In regards to specific personality characteristics linked to better interviewer performance, evidence is also scant. Some papers have identified that specific personality traits can lead to better interviewing outcomes, but there are only a few of them. Akca and Eastwood (2019), for example, tried to identify if individual differences according to the Five Factor Model can impact interviewing success. They found that three out of the five personality traits were correlated with success measures used: “Agreeableness with witness perception and appropriate questioning, Extraversion with researcher ratings and inappropriate questioning, and Openness with researcher ratings.” (p.1). However, there are not sufficient evidence to supplement or corroborate with these findings to actively recommend only hiring, training or using police officers with these traits for investigative interviewing. Therefore, in order to have good interviewers in police forces, the focus should remain with training until further evidence is presented.

It should be note, however that it is not simply training that will immediately lead to better interviewing outcomes. As already mentioned, there must be follow-up training courses and supervision to ensure that interviewers continue to apply learned methods. On top of that, training programs can benefit from other factors that have been found to increase transferability to work. First, trainees must be motivated to learn, if they are not, training will have minimum effect. Thus, supervisors and professors must ensure that trainees understand the importance of that training course and its relevance to their practice. Second, trainees must feel prepared to use the interviewing methods by the end of the training, otherwise they will not feel confident in their abilities and avoid using them, for that reason it is important to have practical exercises during the course. The training must also be of high quality, if trainees’ perceptions are negative about it, they will feel less incline to transfer learning to work (Mount & Mazerolle, 2020). Evidence from several HIG training courses also suggest using a combination of scientist and practitioner during exercises, as it increases trainee’s acceptance of the methods taught because there is a highly respected officer who has practical experience, while it also involves the necessary scientific knowledge from his scientist teaching partner (Brandon et al., 2019).

CONCLUSION

There has been a steep change of focus on interrogation best practices with terrorists. Only a few years ago, Enhanced Interrogation Techniques used torture as the main method to gather intelligence and confession out of terrorists, although there were clear violations of human rights, it was considered the best available method. However, recent scientific evidence and cultural changes have shown that there are other, more effective ways, of interviewing high-value detainees and obtaining investigative relevant information. Many different methods have been shown to achieve good outcomes, such as the Enhanced Cognitive Interview, Observing Rapport-Based Interpersonal Techniques and PEACE model. Each of these methods require specific interviewer skills, which they must acquire in hope to produce the expected outcomes. Some of these were presented in this paper, namely Rapport Building, Interpersonal Competence and Interpersonal Versatility, Questioning Style and Effective Use of Evidence. In addition to merely presenting which skills interviewers must have, the present paper also sought to present how they can be acquired through training and whether there are personality traits that facilitate better interviewing outcomes. In general, evidence supports that interviewers can develop the necessary skills through training, which will increase their chances of success in an interview and, consequently, strengthen counterterrorism efforts.

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UNDERSTANDING GENDER PERSPECTIVES TO TERRORISM: ANALYSIS OF WOMEN'S INVOLVEMENT AND COUNTER MEASURE

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ABSTRACT

Understanding what gender perspective to terrorism is not new. However, what is gaining concerns is women's involvement and the available countermeasures to these trends? The 9/11 attacks in New York, regarded as a watershed moment in major international terrorism, led to a widespread military campaign against terror. The adoption of the Plan of Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, which embraces practical measures that substantially address Africa's security challenges. This paper addresses an aspect of terrorism activities in relations to gender-perspectives with women involvement and countermeasures. It considers the gendered rationale for women within the framework of terrorism ideology and culture, arguing for a greater response appreciation on how gender perspectives in terrorist activities can be addressed. The paper draws the conclusion that there should be no limited countermeasures to this phenomenon and understanding.

Keywords

Countermeasure, Gender Perspective, Military Operation, National Security, Terrorism, Women.

INTRODUCTION

The rise in terrorism and terror activities globally has created unimaginable security threats and growing phenomenon of gender sensitive that it attracted in its recruitments dimensions. According to Caron (2017, p. 1) states that women are not frequently involved in the political violence known as terrorism, but they have participated in writing and dissemination of ideological belief, planning attacks since mid-1880s. In recent years, women's support for, and participation in, Islamic State in Libya activities has generated growing attention. Women's radicalization to political violence and terrorism is nothing new per se, but ISIL's success in recruiting

women has been remarkable in several ways, including in terms of the sheer numbers; the geographical diversity of the women; and the new policy challenges that have emerged as a result of this unprecedented level of mobilization (CTED Trend Report 2019, p. 4) Thus we could understand the dynamic entries and recruitment and gender-sensitive, the drivers of radicalization of women and what the impacts of counter-measure terrorism that is needed.

Agathe and Rebecca (2018, p. 3) observed that women play diverse roles in terrorist groups, as perpetrators, recruiters, propagandists, ideologues and supporters. In some situations, women who at first were victims become perpetrators, to improve their situation, through personal relationships, or as a result of indoctrination to radical ideas. Rachel (2018, p.4) argue that it is therefore essential to bear in mind that there is no simple binary between victim and perpetrator and that women engage in extremist violence in complex ways. There is, for example, ample evidence that women play important roles in ISIL's recruitment and propaganda activities. Researchers warn that, even if women do not fight, they can still spread radical ideas and encourage others to commit attacks. According to this have important implications for risk assessments, formulating countermeasures and in prison settings.

We can grasp therefore the clarity of involvement of women in terrorism like their men colleague showcase through, several responsibilities. The ODIHR Report (2015, p.5) noted that as the threat of terrorism has become increasingly global, it becomes increasingly important to look at societies as a whole with all its potential actors in a holistic effort to combat terrorism. In formulating counter-measures it is therefore important to keep in mind where the actors have their foundations, their motivations, including the societal and the political context in which they find their support. The report further to say, understanding the motivational factor behind why actors get involved in violent "extremism" or terrorism, may give us an idea of what challenges a society is facing. Thus, from a gender perspective it may be a vital requirement for integration and comprehensive methods to addressing the factors that cultivate women involvement in terrorism. While there is need for countermeasures through the assessments of these gender perspectives as in women account in terrorism.

According to the ODIHR Report (2015, p. 10) the process of integrating a gender perspective into all the stages of both terrorism prevention and in formulating counter-terrorism measures and strategies ensures that the concerns of men and women are equally considered, to the benefit of society as a whole. In sum, the integration of a gender perspective into counter-terrorism practices could generate more practical, accurate and realistic results on which to base the formulation of strategies. By becoming more comprehensive, the response and strategies could also become more effective, more targeted and more beneficial to societies on the long run. The African Union's (AU) Counter Terrorism Framework together with the United Nations (UN) Global Counter-terrorism Strategy are laudable efforts set

on the part of coordinated and harmonized efforts to counter terrorism and violent extremism among and between states, together with regional, sub-regional, continental and international organizations. However, in spite of these global commitments, the threat is still very much prevalent and beyond the military intervention that has brought its own challenges, in the form of a high number of civilian fatalities and damage to infrastructure. Women are involved worldwide in activities on behalf of terrorist organizations and have been crucial to successes. The case of the Italian jihadist Maria Giulia Sergio, aka Fatima, sets a perfect example of women's active role in terrorist groups. Maria Giulia, from a Christian family, managed to radicalize her family and convinced them to join her in Syria, where she was supporting ISIS. Other women had an active role in spreading extremist messages on social media and in recruiting other women from Western countries. Many of them were converts coming from the UK, France, the US and other Western countries (Anna Zizola, 2019 cited in COE-DAT Report, P.16).

Tiernay (2002, P. 54) opines that men are traditionally seen as having a certain familiarity with violence whether as defenders or aggressors, expected to "know how to fight". Women, by contrast, are associated with nurturing and caring. They are perceived as the protectors and givers of life, rather than the destroyer. In taking up arms they commit a double atrocity: using violence, and in the process destroying perceived safe, innocent and traditional view of women.

The aim of this paper is to understand gender perspectives to terrorism, analysis of women's involvement and counter-measures. It provides literature review from a contextual and perspective angle, a brief overview of the causes, magnitude, the problems it carries, the globally acceptable approaches applicable in counter-measures.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Caron (2017, p. 1) points to the fact that terrorism studies grew as a field in the 1970s in response to the growing threat of sub-state violence in liberal democracies and anti-colonial violence including from groups like the West German Red Army Faction, the Italian Red Brigades, the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN), or the Irish Republican Army. He further alluded to the reality that any analysis of terrorism from a gender perspective is relatively new, with publications that focus specifically on gender, as opposed to women, emerging only as recently as the early to mid-2000s. In his work he identifies scholars from the feminist angle that started with the classic question, "Where are the women?". To this end, works from this angle were seeking to determine where and how women were involved in terrorism. Findings from this studies point out deconstructing gendered discourse, and looking at the agency and of the women and men involved in terrorism, as well as how terrorist organizations are gendered in the international system. Another finding from Caron (2017, p. 1) state that mainstream terrorism studies and critical feminist look

at evidents in the work on suicide terrorism, radicalization and countermeasures. He concludes by saying that, different instantiations of feminist theory continue to drive the scholarship into more critical explorations, including “intimate” terrorism. For the author, women have always been studied in terrorism studies, even if this work is limited in volume and perspective.

For instance, the Office for Democratisation Institutions and Human Rights Report reveals as follows:

That both the logic of terrorism and the strategic elements of terrorism involve a discussion of a logic development in the means and tactics used by terrorist organizations. As such the recruitment of women is

seen as a logical next step in an increasingly tighter security environment Women are seen as effective actors in that with their innocence they will avoid detection in nearly every context. Their perceived non- threatening nature, together with the taboos associated with the woman's body, gives her a special advantage in that she can infiltrate the enemy...

(ODIHR Report, 2015, p. 6)

Sjoberg (2017, pp. 1-6) on his part called for advocates for the incorporation of a gendered perspective that would take women's agency as a starting point and would eschew attempts to instrumentalise their role in terrorism. For him, adoption of a gendered perspective would allow for an engagement on the ways in which gender dynamics operate in defining women's position and status within terrorist groups. Also the USAID Report (2011, p.8) maintain that such a perspective that acknowledges gender-based differences in the treatment and exercise of power between men and women would encourage a mediated understanding of how gender norms construct, shape and influence women's role, participation in violent extremist groups. It would also contribute to a differential understanding of the impact of terrorist on women's lives. However, as noted by Gayatri and Martine (2018, p.7) their work encourages the need for identifying the gender specific nuances in push and pull factors.

D'Estaing (2017, p.106), Katherine Brown cited in Winterbotham and Pearson, (2016, pp.54-65), Quillin also from foundation 2015 cited in D'Estaing (2017, p. 106) in their studies women are largely understood as either 'assets' or 'allies' in countering the threat of violent extremism partly because of the role that they are perceived to have as “inside mediators” in families. As a consequence of their role, women are viewed by policy makers and programmers as having the ability to interrupt or “influence the social mechanisms that guide individuals to violent extremism. O'Rourke (2009, p.681), Harmon and Halmes-Eber, (2014, p.9), Bloom (2011, p. 5-13) in their research studies look into the reasons why women joined terrorist group.

However, Jacques and Taylor (2013, p.9) found out in a study conducted that of the 222 female terrorists identified across various conflict zones, almost a third in the sample had family connections to terrorism, suggesting that activism among kin may play a role in the involvement of some females in terrorism. Ndungu et al, (2017, p. 28) found that relationships may be a key predictor of women's involvement in an extremist group. The study contends that if a woman has a male relative involved in an extremist group then that increases the "likelihood that she will be welcomed into that group further than apart from the role of kinship networks, the economic insecurity of women has also been highlighted as a factor that makes them particularly vulnerable to being recruited by a terrorist group. States further that women's lower economic status in much of the developing and the developed world may make them particularly vulnerable to exploitation by terrorist organizations. Women have been lured into joining terrorist groups with promises of jobs, money and other livelihood.

The ODIHR Report asserts further that:

Terror organizations are aware of the value of female members as a weapon in reaching out to send stronger messages. (ODIHR Report, 2015, p. 6)

Studies by Balasubramanian et al (2015, pp. 197-211) exhibit a plethora of roles for which women play as members of a terrorist group. This logistical and nurturing support, a good wife first to reproduce the next generation and caring for members of the household as well as support to the Caliphate. From the foregoing, women's roles in terrorism stem from multiple causes whose roots are deep. Notwithstanding, the vulnerabilities of women and their roles in a terrorist group go against the popular assumption of women being a care giver and love.

BRIEF OVERVIEW OF CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF WOMEN'S INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM

A global acknowledgement that terrorism is one of the most significant causes of security instability. The increasing of terrorist activities globally and the dimension it has taken in recent times demand an interrogation from a gender perspectives stand. This of the research would look into magnitude and problems associated with women's involvement in terrorism.

The causes: why women

According to Seda 2019 (cited in COE-DAT Report 2019, p.15) causes of terrorism can be subsumed under highlights of three main assumptions which are personal reasons, traditional gender roles, and victims of violence, including terrorism, rather than perpetrators. In fact, women terrorists are a kind of "blind spot" in counterterrorism. According to him, there is a general assumption that most women who become involved with terrorist organizations do so, for personal reasons,

whether a personal relationship with a man or because of a personal tragedy (e.g., death of a family member, rape). Because of traditional gender roles, women are not considered credible or likely perpetrators of terrorist violence. They can easily carry out attacks and assist their organizations. He further that women are able to use their gender to avoid detection on several fronts. First, their “non-threatening” nature at the most basic level results in their being simply not considered important enough to warrant investigation. Second, sensitivities regarding more thorough searches, particularly of women’s bodies, may hamper stricter investigation. Third, a woman’s ability to get pregnant and the attendant changes to her body facilitate concealment of weapon. Lastly is the popular opinion that considers women as victims of violence terrorism, rather than perpetrators”.

The ODIHR Report for instance identified motivations drives of equality in death as the causes of women join terrorist group:

Women show strong motivation for political cause and consciously devote their life to this struggle. (ODIHR Report 2015, p. 4)

For Anna Zizola 2019(cited COE-DAT Report 2019, p.16) states that what lead these women into terrorism is political commitment, alongside a physiological push. According to her research work results, this first stem from the optimal experience of the flow of consciousness, a state in which an individual feels fully alive and entirely absorbed by the excitement. The second cause is the psychological push, which entails some common psychological factors that contributed. For instance this serves as a trigger of episodes of flow of consciousness among Western women terrorist fighters. These are as follows:

- Need for romanticism and adventure / the presence of a mentor
- Need to feel important
- A fragmented conscious and a subconscious search for a more meaningful life
- Subconscious depression that leads to self-destruction
- Desire for adventure often due to a troubled childhood or a trauma (Ann Zizola 2019 cited in COE-DAT Report 2019, p. 16).

Izvestia 2004 (cited in ODIHR 2015, p.6) interviews with women involved in radical organizations, or family members of female activists, point towards an expressed willingness, sympathy and legitimization for female participation, not only as supporters but also as actors in the most violent acts. The young generation of Chechen women for instance shows an increasing acceptance to female suicide bombings. This is contrary to their mothers’ generation. Research shows that even if a women had personal grievances, stories and motivations behind their involvement, the bottom line was their belief in the “cause” they fighting for and a willingness to die so that political attention would be put on their people’s suffering (MacDonald, 1991, p.97). Delaney and Neumann (2004, p. 26) contends that the motivations are mixed position. Women believe themselves to be equal to men, capable of doing the same tasks, and just as committed to the political goal.

Jackson et al (2011, p. 33) reveal that women made the decision to join terrorist groups for much the same as men do. However, the BBC News, (2018) maintain that the origins, manifestation and support of most extremist groups in Africa should not be seen in isolation – they stem from a vast number of factors, intermingled with allegiances and alliances that create a firm connection among them. This can be attributed to a common belief that most extremist groups share. The pursuit of a state that promotes Shari'ah law.

The Nigerian experience with boko haram insurgency

According to Ekereke 2013(cited in Segun and Faith 2016, p. 55-60) in recent times terrorism is assumed to be a phenomenon common to the Middle East. However, the experience of the United States in 2001 and some instances of terror attack on Britain and some African countries authentic the fact that terrorism is spreading faster. Since 2009, terrorist activities by Boko Haram have become a major security threat to Nigeria. The terror group known as jama'atu ahlis sunna lidda awatiwal-jihad (translation: people committed to the propagation of the prophet teaching and jihad) is poised to Islamize.

According to BBC News (2016) the underlying fragility in Nigeria set the stage for Boko Haram, originally operating in the northeastern of Nigeria rapidly transit into a terror lethal fighting force. Sergie and Johnson 2012 (cited in Adefolarin (2014, pp. 361-380) assert that the mutation was a symptom of decades of failed government and elite delinquency finally ripening into social chaos. Boko Haram gained prominence through acts of vicious violence, intimidation, and kidnapping that began to escalate in 2010. Fueled by copious weapons flows released during upheavals in Libya's 2011 revolution, and training from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali, boko haram attacks goes beyond northeastern Nigeria targeting security forces and civilians in other areas of Nigeria and neighboring countries (Sergie and Johnson 2012 cited in Adefolarin 2014, pp. 361-380).

Thus, with intricate crises, the Boko Haram terrorist activities in Nigeria have very complex drivers. The circumstances and motivations leading to women and girls involvement in the Boko Haram terror activities are unwarranted. The version of Sharia law supported by Boko Haram promotes narrow gender roles for women and men. Forced segregation of school-children for public flogging of women for fornication (BBC News, 2014).

Boko haram Experience: women as instrument of terrorism

Human Rights Watch (2014, p. 22) states that women abductees of Boko Haram were subjected to physical and psychological abuse; forced labour; forced participation in military operations, including carrying ammunition or luring men into ambush; forced marriage to their captors; and sexual abuse, including rape. Bloom and Matfess (2016) cited in Gayatri and Martine (2018, p. 7) contends that

the Boko Haram group has been employing women for “operational purposes”, as reproductive agents, frontline suicide operatives, bargaining chips with the Nigerian government, and as tools for terrorizing communities and demonstrating their prowess. This shows the inhuman treatment women suffer from as they are used by terrorist organizations such as Boko Haram.

Magnitude and the problems of women's involvement in insurgency

The magnitude and problems women carry bear a disproportionate burden on women owing to their enervated social status and particularly wide range of profound challenges. Sigsworth (2019) in Carter (2013, p. 31) summarize secondary victimization problems of women through state institutions such as the criminal justice system as follows:

- Serious disruptions on women's social and family, community, and kinship life.
- Considerable variation in circumstances, access to food and drinking water as well as overall living conditions remain problematic for most women involved in terrorism.
- Women and girls' involvement in terrorism face particular sexual exploitation, sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) and transactional sex.
- They may suffer direct loss of property, farm land and others, which then translates into a loss of their livelihoods, assets, rights, and business networks. This may jeopardize women's self-reliance and destabilize their chance of survival.
- Women may face precarious health conditions and may not have access to health services.
- The psychosocial problems of women's involvement in terrorism are significant and largely.
- Fear and emotional distress among such women is aggravated by a sense of loss of dignity as many may feel ashamed and live a life.

Counter-measures

The Security Council has called on Member States to develop a range of gender-sensitive measures. It encourages commitments of States to conduct all counter-terrorism measures in accordance with the rule of law, the United Nations Charter and relevant provisions of international law, international standards of human rights, and where applicable, international humanitarian law are highlighted below:

Tailored Prosecution: This entails the prosecution of women involved in terrorism
Rehabilitation and Reintegration Strategies:

Risk-Assessment Tools: That would focus on genuine appreciation of the entire counter-measures program.

Counter-Narratives: This has to come in the form to de-radicalization women, positive communication and message of hope, trust and openness.

Full Appraisal of the Human Rights Implications of Counter-Terrorism,

Recruiting Good Numbers: Engage a high number woman in operational areas of counter-terrorism such as policing, intelligence and themilitary.

Gender Advisors: Gender Advisor posts in international organizations and operational missions should be a full-time job, not burdened.

CSOs/NGOs: Input from women and women's civil society should be deliberately solicited and incorporated into all counterterrorismFor instance; these programs should be better equipped to handlethe complexity of the threat posed by women terrorists as perpetrators.

The participation of different women actors in the design and implementation of deradicalization and reintegrationprocesses, which should include transparency as well as clear policies, should ensure that specific needs and grievances of women are responded to.

Funding

- Discriminatory counter-terrorist financing rules need to be formulated in order to ensure that civil societyorganizations working in the field of preventing and countering violence extremism (P/CVE) get funding.
- Policies ensuring that civil society organizations with local women, peace and security agendas can get fundingwithout being forced to adopt a preventing and countering violence extremism (P/CVE) agenda need to be enacted(Centre of excellence defence against terrorism report 2019, pp. 48-50;counter-terrorism committee of the united nations security council report 2019, pp. 16-22; office for democratisation institutios and human rights report 2019, pp. 9-10).

CONCLUSION

The causes that engender women involvement in terrorism phenomenon are complex and cannot be simply shrug off without a concrete understanding of it from a gender perspective analysis. This paper addresses an aspect of terrorism activities in relations to gender-perspectives with women involvement and counter-measures. It considers the gendered rationale for women within the framework of terrorism ideology and culture, arguing for a greater response appreciation on how gender perspectives in terrorist activities can be addressed. The paper ana-

lyse the challenges that women involvement in terrorism being used as suicide operative, spy mission and bargaining chips against state authority. In consequence therefore, manitude of problem it carries demand hlobally acceptable approach applicable in counter-measures Moreover, there should be no limited counter-measures to this phenomenon.

RECOMMENDATIONS

There is overwhelming evidence from what have been discussed in this paper that woman at the negative receiving ends as tools in the hands of terrorist group. Therefore, the role of women cannot be discountenanced as just victim and participant in terror activities. There is global acknowledgement of the current role of women in terrorism is gaining unlimited concern in need of counter-measures for peaceful societies. Thus, the following recommendations have been proffered:

- Encouragement of the formation of more women in peace initiatives and gender mainstreaming group. This will lead to effective social network activities among women and girls.
- Women Professional bodies should be encouraged to carry out enlightenment campaigns in schools and communities to emphasize a shift of emphasis from a military and security orientation to human needs countermeasures.
- Education of the women especially the young rural women provision of basic education to the women and girls. This will provide a multiplier effect to the education of women and young girls.
- The Nigeria military should pursue a vigorous enlightenment campaigns with female officers and soldiers in sensitization. This will bring out novel modalities on mainstreaming them for countermeasures in terrorism.
- The state actors in Nigeria owe the responsibility of removing those artificial and institutional barriers of religion, culture or traditional consideration which have incapacitated women and girls.
- There is need to facilitate training and retraining programs on countermeasures for the military for reliable and effective countering operations.
- There is also the need for legislative enactment both at national and state assembly, the judiciary, the police, and other government agencies to help enforcement existing relevant laws which will mitigate women victimization as weapon of terror in Nigeria. This will go a long way to reduce women involvement as trivial issue of serious national security.

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AN EXPOSITION ON JIHAD AND THE STATUS OF NON-COMBATANTS UNDER ISLAMIC INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

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ABSTRACT

The protection of life, as we know, is a fundamental value and objective in Islam. Peace should be the normal state of affairs between people, regardless of differences in religion, philosophy, or anything else. Peace, however, is won at the cost of repelling unjust aggression against innocent people. To this end, Islam and its scholarly tradition have laid down rules regarding warfare, both what justifies a declaration of war (*jus ad bellum*) and how a just war should be conducted after its declaration (*jus in bello*). The Islamic just war tradition, in fact, precedes and foreshadows a number of agreed-upon principles in modern just war theory. This article focuses on the specific rulings that prohibit the act of terrorism and the excessive use of force. These rules safeguard the lives and properties of civilians and the environment, mandate that prisoners of war be treated humanely, and forbid any military tactics involving the use of torture or terrorism.

Keywords

Islamic International Humanitarian Law, Jihad, Non-Combatants, Suicide Bombing, Terrorism

ISLAM ECHOES PEACE FROM INCEPTION

The misunderstanding that Islam promotes war and sets no limit in means and methods of armed combat is illusive. Islam as a religion of peace abhors aggression and made armed combat a legitimate phenomenon only when it becomes necessary.

Even in cases where Islam approves armed combat as a legitimate option and allows Muslims to participate in the hostilities, it has at the same time provided for rules to regulate the conduct of the war.¹

The protection of life, as we know, is a fundamental value and objective in Islam. Peace should be the normal state of affairs between people, regardless of differences in religion, philosophy, or anything else. Peace, however, is won at the cost of repelling unjust aggression against innocent people. To this end, Islam and its scholarly tradition have laid down rules regarding warfare, both what justifies a declaration of war (*jus ad bellum*) and how a just war should be conducted after its declaration (*jus in bello*).²

The principles of *jus ad bellum* and the *jus in bello* were formulated by Muslims at a time when its contemporaries paid no heed to these rules. Islamic law therefore, is the first to have formally established comprehensive rules regarding hostile and peaceful relations between the Muslim and non-Muslim communities.³

The concept and nature of jihad has evolved since the early developments of Islam in the seventh century, often reflecting the prevailing socio-political and economic realities. It has been a subject of discussion among several publicists, particularly after the September 11, 2001 attacks.⁴

A CONCISE CLARITY ON JIHAD

In recent times, the Arabic term *jihad* has been misused due to misunderstanding, manipulation or distortion of its true meaning. Linguistically, the term *jihad* is derived from the Arabic word ‘*Jahd*’, which means fatigue, or from the Arabic word ‘*Juhd*’, which means effort. Thus, the term *jihad* literally means to strive, or to exert one’s efforts, or to earnestly work towards a desired goal or to prevent an undesired one.⁵ In other words, it is an effort (which makes one feel fatigued) that aims at bringing about benefit or preventing harm. This meaning of *jihad* is stated in the Holy Qur’an, Chapter 61 (As-Saff) verses 10-12 as follows:⁶

O you who believe! Shall I lead you to a bargain that will save you from a grievous penalty? That you believe in Allah and His Messenger, and that you strive (your utmost) [do ‘*jihad*’] in the cause of Allah, with your property and your persons: that will be best for you, if you but knew! He will forgive you your sins, and admit you to gardens beneath which rivers flow, and to beautiful mansions in gardens of eternity: that is indeed the supreme achievement.⁷

Thus, in the above context, any striving, any effort, or any work or thing one does in the cause of Allah or to further the cause of Islam, seeking nothing but the pleasure and good will of Allah, is considered to be *jihad* (i.e. striving in the cause of Allah).⁸

Jihad in the sense of striving to achieve a desired goal or to prevent an undesired outcome applies to all aspects of life – civil, political, economic, social, educational, religious and cultural. For example, the term may be used to describe the struggle

against colonialism, neo-colonialism, poverty, illiteracy, disease, discrimination, aggression and other forms of human rights violations. Given the broad nature of the term *jihad*, it can be used to mean several aspects depending on the context in which it is used. According to Ibn al-Qayyim, *jihad* is of four stages:

jihaad al-nafs (striving against the self), *jihaad al-shayaateen* (striving against the accursed Satan or devils), *jihaad al-kuffaar* (striving against the disbelievers) and *jihaad al-munaafiqeen* (striving against the hypocrites [those who undermine Islam from within]).⁹

Therefore, *jihad* is a comprehensive term which is composed of several elements, only one of which involves the use of force or military means. Indeed, references to *jihad* in the Qur'an are found in twenty-four verses, most of which provide for a spiritual and peaceful non-violent understanding of *jihad*, such as being steadfast in the faith, being patient, the peaceful propagation of Islam, and personal and financial sacrifice.¹⁰ Some of these verses, which prove that *jihad* does not always mean war, are stated below:¹¹

Then, verily, your Lord – for those who emigrated after they had been put to trials and thereafter strove hard and fought (for the Cause of Allah) and were patient, verily, your Lord, afterward, is Oft- Forgiving, Most Merciful.¹²

O Prophet (Muhammad, peace be upon him)! Strive hard against the disbelievers and the hypocrites, and be harsh against them, their abode is Hell, - and worst indeed is that destination.¹³

This is consistent with the fact that Islam calls for peace, cooperation, and maintaining justice, and provides for the happiness and welfare of humanity as a whole, regardless of religion. This fact is declared in the Qur'an when it states¹⁴:

Verily, Allah enjoins *Al- 'Adl* (i.e. justice and worshipping none but Allah Alone – Islamic Monotheism) and *Al-Ihsan* [i.e. to be patient in performing your duties to Allah, totally for Allah's sake and in accordance with the *Sunnah* (legal ways) of the Prophet, peace be upon him, in a perfect manner], and giving (help) to kith and kin (i.e. all that Allah has ordered you to give them e.g., wealth, visiting, looking after them, or any other kind of help), and forbids *Al-Fahsha* (i.e. all evil deeds, e.g. illegal sexual acts, disobedience of parents, polytheism, to tell lies, to give false witness, to kill a life without right), and *Al-Munkar* (i.e. all that is prohibited by Islamic law: polytheism of every kind, disbelief and every kind of evil deeds), and *Al-Baghy* (i.e. all kinds of oppression). He admonishes you, that you may take heed.¹⁵

The ethics and main principles of Islam prescribe tolerance, mercy and the granting of amnesty when dealing with harsh situations, and demand that strictness, intransigence or cruelty in excess of the normal limits be avoided, in accordance

with the nature of the Islamic Message as described by Almighty God addressing the Prophet in these words: “We sent thee not, but as a mercy for all creatures.” In other words, human beings, animals, jinn and inanimate beings, and indeed all things, must be treated as thus prescribed. After the conquest of Mecca, the Prophet, peace be upon him, was tolerant towards the *Quraysh*, the former ruling tribe there, who had excessively injured him. He told them: “Today, there is no blame on you, go, you are set free.”¹⁶

Islam lays much emphasis on the personal behaviour of Muslim soldiers. In war, as in peace, the instructions of Islam are to be observed. Worship does not cease in war. Whatever is prohibited during peace is also prohibited during war. The Prophet says:

Beware of the prayer (to God) of the oppressed... for there is no barrier between it and God, even if he (the oppressed) was a nonbeliever.¹⁷

Also, in one of his messages to the leader of his armies, Sa’d Ibn Abi Waqas, Umar Ibn Al-Khattab, said:

I order you and those accompanying you to be most careful about committing offences against your enemies, as the sins of the army are more fearful than their enemy. Muslims win because of their foe’s disobedience to God, had it not been for this, we wouldn’t have power over them, because their numbers surpass ours, they are better equipped than we are. Hence, if we are equal in wrongdoing, they would be superior to us. Unless we prevail because of our values and good deeds, we will never overcome them with our force. Never say: Our enemies are worse than us, thus they will never empower us even if we commit an offence, for many a people have been targeted and subjugated by people worse than they are.¹⁸

STATUS OF NON-COMBATANTS UNDER ISLAMIC INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

Does the concept of jihad provide a religious basis for indiscriminate attacks on civilian populations not taking a direct part in hostilities, or attacks on civilian objects in violation of international humanitarian law and the criminalisation of terrorism? Two principles of international humanitarian law (IHL) should be noted here.¹⁹ First, the principle of distinction requires that attacks be directed against combatants, civilians taking direct part in hostilities, and military objectives.²⁰ Second, the principle of proportionality, prohibits otherwise lawful attacks if the anticipated civilian loss is disproportionate to the anticipated direct military advantage.²¹

From the above principles, two customary rules flow from the choice of weapons to be used in armed conflicts. It is prohibited to employ methods or means of war-

fare that may be expected to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering;²² and it is prohibited to employ methods and means of warfare that are indiscriminate, i.e., cannot be directed against a specific military objective.²³

The Qur'an and *Sunnah* clearly provide stringent protections for noncombatants during warfare. Civilians may in no way be intentionally targeted.²⁴ Muslims engaged in *jihad* must make sure that the civilians of the area where they are waging war are protected in all circumstances. Their lives, property and freedom must be protected. There should be no cases of high-handedness on the part of any Muslim combatant.²⁵ Fighting can only be committed against enemy combatants as provided by the Qur'an: "And fight in the Way of Allah those who fight you..."²⁶ The Qur'an and *Hadiths* prohibit the attack of specific categories of enemy non-combatants who do not share in hostilities and who are unable to do so, including women and children, the aged, the blind, the sick, the incapacitated, the insane, the clergy and *al-asif* (farmers, craftsmen and traders).²⁷ Another protected group are religious persons (the clergy) who live in hermitages or convents. This is based on the Prophet's commands and Abu Bakr's Ten Commandments to his army leader. He reiterated the Prophet's prohibition against targeting hermits, but allowed *al-shammāsah* (the tonsured) to be killed.²⁸ According to some, he permitted this because "whenever a war starts, the tonsured do fight, unlike the hermits".²⁹

Indiscriminate attacks on non-combatants are contrary to several principles derived from the Qu'ran including just and kind treatment,³⁰ proportionality,³¹ humanity,³² fraternity³³ and justice.³⁴ Targeting non-combatants is contrary to the standard of 'just and kind' treatment of non-combatants as stated in the following Qu'ran passage:

Allah does not forbid you to deal justly and kindly with those who fought not against you on account of religion nor drove you out of your homes. Verily, Allah loves those who are just.³⁵

Killing or causing bodily harm to non-combatants or civilian objects cannot meet the test of 'just and kind' treatment. In any case such indiscriminate attacks were prohibited by Prophet Muhammad. During Prophet Muhammad's era, the use of force (*jus ad bellum*) was, as noted above, primarily used in self-defence and indeed subject to several humanitarian rules regulating the conduct of hostilities (*jus in bello*). In particular violence against non-combatants such as members of the following groups was prohibited: women, children, the elderly, the sick and wounded, clerics, and places of worship of Christianity and Judaism.³⁶

It was narrated that the Prophet said to the Muslim army:

Go out in the name of Allah and by the help of Allah, following the way of the Messenger of Allah. Do not kill any old man, infant, child or woman... spread goodness and do good, for Allah loves those who do good.³⁷

In another narration, the Prophet stated “do not mutilate [the dead] bodies; do not kill children.”³⁸ Prophet Muhammad also instructed the Muslim fighters dispatched against the Byzantine army to specifically spare the female sex:

Injure not the infants or those who are ill in bed. Refrain from demolishing the houses of the unresisting inhabitants; destroy not the means of subsistence or their fruit-trees and touch not the palm, and do not mutilate bodies and do not kill children.³⁹

This example was followed by the successors of the Prophet after his death. For example, Abu Bakr al-Siddeeq, Prophet Muhammad’s first successor, instructed the commander of his army:

“I advise you of ten things: do not kill a woman, or a child, or any old person, or cut down any fruit trees”.⁴⁰

Similarly, Umar Ibn al-Khataab, the second successor, warned commanders of the Muslim army as follows:

Do not mutilate when you have the power to do so. Do not commit excess when you triumph. Do not kill an old man or a woman or a minor, but try to avoid them during the encounter of the two armies, and at the time of the heat of victory, and at the time of expected attacks.⁴¹

In addition to the prohibition of fighting civilians, other rules regulating the conduct of hostilities in Islam⁴² include the prohibition of collective punishments,⁴³ protect from retroactive punishment,⁴⁴ the prohibition of mutilation, the prohibition of cutting down trees and demolishing buildings, the prohibition of plundering and pillaging,⁴⁵ as well as respecting agreements concluded on the cessation of hostilities.

SUICIDE BOMBING IN A PROPER LENS

‘Suicide bombing’ is one of the main methods used by some jihadist groups and organizations (e.g., in the Israel-Palestine conflict, and increasingly in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, and the U.S. aggression in Afghanistan and Iraq) to fight those who fight Muslims. While suicide is strictly forbidden in the Qur’an,⁴⁶ some Islamic scholars distinguish between ‘suicide bombing’ and what is described as ‘Martyr operations’ which are considered to be one of the ‘greatest’ forms of jihad. In this regard, Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi has stated as follows:

The martyr operations is [sic] the greatest of all sorts of *Jihad* in the Cause of Allah. A martyr operation is carried out by a person who sacrifices himself, deeming his life less value than striving in the Cause of Allah, in the cause of restoring the land and preserving the dignity. To such a valorous attitude applies the following Qur’anic verse: “And of mankind is he who would sell himself, seeking the pleasure of Allah; and Allah hath com-

passion on (His) bondmen.” But a clear distinction has to be made here between martyrdom and suicide. Suicide is an act or instance of killing oneself intentionally out of despair, and finding no outlet except putting an end to one’s life. On the other hand, martyrdom is a heroic act of choosing to suffer death in the Cause of Allah, and that’s why it’s considered by most Muslim scholars as one of the greatest forms of *jihad*.⁴⁷

According to this view, when ‘suicide bombings’ targeted at those who are actually at war against the believers are carried out, not as a result of despair and discontent or for a material gain, but as sacrificing one’s life for the cause of Allah,⁴⁸ they represent one of the greatest forms of *jihad* rather than being labeled ‘suicide’ or ‘terrorism’. The resolution issued by The Islamic Fiqh Council affiliated to the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) in its fourteenth session in 2003 confirmed this position in the following terms:⁴⁹

- i. Terrorism equals illegal aggression, terror, threatening both in material and abstract forms which is practiced by states, groups or individuals against man, his religion, soul, honor, intellect or his property via all means, among which is the spread of corruption on earth.
- ii. The Islamic Fiqh Council asserts that *jihad* and martyr operations done to defend the Islamic creed, dignity, freedom and the sovereignty of states is not considered terrorism but a basic form of necessary defense for legitimate rights. Thus the oppressed peoples who are subjected to occupation have the right to seek their freedom via all means possible.
- iii. The Islamic Fiqh Council stresses that martyr operations are a form of *jihad*, and carrying out those operations is a legitimate right that has nothing to do with terrorism or suicide. Those operations become obligatory when they become the only way to stop the aggression of the enemy, defeat it, and grievously damage its power.⁵⁰

However, this view is of questionable validity in Islam, particularly given the fact that ‘suicide bombings’ contradict two fundamental principles in Islam: the prohibition against suicide, and the deliberate killing on non-combatants causing indiscriminate and unnecessary suffering to civilians. Even when such operations are carried out, they are often far away from military objectives and cause direct civilian casualties or damage, which is excessive in relation to the intended military advantage which the attack is expected to produce. As Muhammad Munir has observed:

When a suicide bomber targets civilians, he might be committing at least five crimes according to Islamic law, namely killing civilians, mutilating them by blowing them up, violating the trust of the enemy’s soldiers and civilians, committing suicide and, finally, destroying civilian objects or property... A suicide mission is therefore contrary to the norms of Islamic *jus in bello* and has no place in Islamic legal thought.⁵¹

Yet, jihad (and Islam in general) is never a tool of terrorism⁵² or waging war against the civilian population and civilian objects. According to the 1999 OIC Convention on Combating International Terrorism:

“Terrorism” means any act of violence or threat thereof notwithstanding its motives or intentions perpetrated to carry out an individual or collective criminal plan with the aim of terrorizing people or threatening to harm them or imperiling their lives, honor, freedoms, security or rights or exposing the environment or any facility or public or private property to hazards or occupying or seizing them, or endangering a national resource, or international facilities, or threatening the stability, territorial integrity, political unity or sovereignty of independent States.⁵³

Terrorism violates the right to life of innocent individuals which is contrary to the clear text of Qur’an verses such as, “Take not life, which Allah has made sacred, except by way of justice and law, thus does He command you, that you may learn wisdom.”⁵⁴ Furthermore,

... if anyone slew a person - unless it be for murder or for spreading mischief in the land - it would be as if he slew the whole people; and if any one saved a life, it would be as if he saved the life of the whole people.⁵⁵

It can be noted from the foregoing that the Qur’an equates the taking of even one human life unjustly, with killing all of humanity. Therefore, the arbitrary killing of civilians is considered a crime against humanity in the Qu’ran. How, then, can innocent attacks on civilians be justified in the name of jihad? Clearly, the Qur’an prohibits terrorism since its effect is not to save life but to deprive innocent persons of the right to life, contrary to several Qu’ran concepts of morality, love, compassion, mercy, modesty, self-sacrifice, tolerance and peace. Even when one is wronged, the Qu’ran calls for forgiveness.⁵⁶ The Qu’ran declares that, “Allah likes not the *Mufsidun* (those who commit great crimes and sins, oppressors, tyrants, mischief-makers, corrupters).”⁵⁷

Terrorism is one of the most serious crimes and in the Qu’ran context, those who commit terrorist acts would be among the *Mufsidun*. Even beating people or humiliating them was prohibited in the practice of Prophet Muhammad’s companions. For example, Prophet Muhammad’s second successor, Umar Ibn al-Khattab, gave the following instructions, “Don’t beat up people or humiliate them! Since when have you turned men into slaves, whereas they were born free?”⁵⁸

The jihadists, accordingly, were advised to refrain from the shedding of blood or the destruction of property unnecessary for the achievement of their objective.⁵⁹ The statement of Abu Bakr, Prophet Muhammad’s (peace be upon him) closest companion and second-in-command, when he instructed his army as recorded in the earliest manual of Islamic law give credence to this fact:

You will find a people who claim to have totally given themselves to God. Leave them to what they claim to have given themselves. I instruct you in ten matters. Do not kill women or children or an aged, infirm person. Do not cut down fruit-bearing trees. Do not destroy an inhabited place. Do not slaughter sheep or camels except for food. Do not burn bees and do not scatter them. Do not steal from the spoils, and do not be cowardly.⁶⁰

The Prophet (peace be upon him) himself set this precedent in a number of his actions and directives. There are numerous narrations and traditions that emphasize protecting the lives of civilians and noncombatants.⁶¹

Hassan al-Basri, one of the most important and influential of the second generation of Muslims, described the following as violations of the rules of war:

... mutilation (*muthla*), [imposing] thirst (*ghulul*), the killing of women, children, and the old (*shuyukh*) – the ones who have no judgement for themselves (*la ra'y lahum*), and no fighters among them; [the killing of] monks and hermits, the burning of trees, and the killing of animals for other than the welfare [of eating].⁶²

The principles here are clear. The Islamic law of war prohibits naked aggression, the harming of non-combatants, excessive cruelty even in the case of combatants, and even addresses the rights of animals and the natural environment.⁶³ Once an enemy combatant is killed, his dead body should never be mutilated or his head cut off and raised at the point of a lance, rather, his body should be buried.⁶⁴

Therefore, on the battlefield, the old, the weak, women, children, monks, labourers, and other civilians cannot be targeted unless they forfeit that immunity by fighting themselves. Even then, force is authorized only in proportion to the threat, so killing them should be avoided if at all possible.⁶⁵

Other international instruments such as the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam (1990) acknowledge the principle that it is prohibited to attack enemy's civilian buildings and installations by shelling, blasting or any other means.⁶⁶

Although Muslim jurists disagree on the details of application of some rules, according to *Shari'ah* the destruction of property is prohibited, except when it is a military necessity to do so; for example for the army to penetrate barricades, or when that property makes a direct contribution to war, such as castles and fortresses. Plundering is also prohibited.⁶⁷ The Prophet is quoted to have said:

“Do not destroy the villages and towns, do not spoil the cultivated fields and gardens, and do not slaughter the cattle”.⁶⁸

Abu Bakr also provided guidelines to this effect in his ten commandments mentioned previously in this work. Some property enjoys special protection. It is

forbidden to attack any religious sites. However, it is found that wine should be poured away and that any materials denying God should be burnt. Furthermore, it is prohibited to cause damage to horses, cows, bees or any living creature except if there is a military necessity to do so or if they are slaughtered for food. In addition, jurists found that if it is approved by the commander on military necessity, Muslims are allowed to eat and give fodder to their animals from the enemy's territories, but only a necessary amount. Thus, the decision depends on the need and necessity of destruction and whether the destruction can be avoided in anyway.⁶⁹

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The preceding discussion delineates the Islamic law of *siyar* (Islamic International Law) as it pertains to *jihad*, non-combatants as well as the precedents set by Islam in the field of international law. More importantly, it challenges the perception that Islam encourages terrorism and is spread only by force.

This is a brief sketch of those rights which fourteen hundred years ago Islam gave to man, to those who were at war with each other and to the citizens of its state, which every believer regards as sacred as law.

It is the writer's staunch recommendation that the war against terrorism should be a multilateral or collective one instead of adopting a unilateral approach since there is just one common enemy. The involvement of the Muslim world directly will contribute immensely and effectively to the combat against terrorism. Meanwhile, this will also aid in nipping this upheaval at the bud since the root causes of terrorism will be addressed. Also, countries should work together by enriching, strengthening and developing the

conventional international law and Islamic international law norms and principles to combat terrorism and engage the Muslim world with the force of the Islamic law which will record progress in the war against terrorism.

Furthermore, it is recommended that Muslim scholars should produce more books and publication purely addressing this issue from a comparative perspective to educate Muslims and non-Muslims alike, especially the youth. Such an effort shall serve two crucial purposes: while creating further enlightenment on the *shari'ah* in connection to the common law, it shall also remarkably broaden the scope of Islamic war literatures.

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WHAT COMES AFTER THE TERRORIST ATTACK? REDUCING DAMAGE THROUGH TRAINING AND PREPARATION

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ABSTRACT

Although global statistics point to a decrease in terrorism related attacks, Africa does not fall within this trend, as terrorist attacks and casualties are on the rise. These attacks have the potential to cause massive damage, resulting in hundreds or thousands of casualties. Consequently, they are classified as major incidents, which require extraordinary resources and actions from emergency responder agencies. Many efforts are being taken to prevent terrorist attacks, such as training police officers and investigators on how to identify and interview terrorists, targeting terrorism financing, etc. However, these actions are not enough as attacks continue to happen. Therefore, we must be prepared to deal with the aftermath, the consequences of a terrorist attack, with a focus on reducing damage and casualties. Scientific evidence suggest that training emergency responders significantly improve their abilities on major incident management, which has been linked to a reduction in mortality and morbidity in real life scenarios. Consonant to that, the present article aims to present possible training exercises in major incident management and the potential benefits already detected, both academically and practically. There are five different types of exercises. Two of them are discussion-based (orientation and tabletop exercises), which are the least expensive and complex. The other three are operation-based (drill, functional, and full-scale exercises), which has a focus on learning by doing, but are more costly and complex to organise. Regardless of the type of exercise, evidence reveal significant improvement in participants' perceptions, knowledge and skills. The present paper discusses three of them in detail: triage, interoperability and organisational improvement. Finally, recommendations are provided to assist in the implementation of a major incident management training culture.

Keywords

Interoperability, Major incident management, Terrorist attacks, Training, Triage.

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism is a topic that has been on the rise for the past two decades, especially since 2001, when the 9/11 terrorist attack in the United States of America took the lives of approximately 3000 people, leaving thousands of others injured (CNN, 2018). Ever since then, various high-profile cases have made international headlines. There were the London bombings in 2005 (more than 50 people died and hundreds were injured), the terrorist attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015 (more than 100 people died and hundreds were injured), and the Manchester Arena bombing in 2017 (23 people died and more than 800 were injured). Attacks such as these have prompted both government and researchers to understand, prepare and prevent new terrorist attacks from ever occurring again.

The most recent Global Terrorism Index (IEP, 2019) specify that 2014 was the year when terrorist attacks caused more deaths and more economic damage. However, there has been significant decrease since this peak. After four consecutive years of decrease, in 2018, total number of deaths from terrorist attacks fell by more than half. There is an even more significant decline when assessing economic impact. Estimations indicate that terrorism caused an economic damage of over US\$ 100 billion in 2014, whereas in 2018 this number is just above US\$ 30 billion. This serves to show that trend in terrorism worldwide has changed, it increased constantly from 2000 until 2014, but now it is less frequent and less damaging.

Even though this is definitely true when we analyse global trends in terrorism, it is not the case when we consider only the African continent. The African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) report a persistent monthly increase since the beginning of 2020 (ACSRT, 2020a). It is either an increase in both the number of attacks and deaths, or an increase in either number of attacks or number of deaths. There is one exception though, which is April, when both terrorist attacks and related casualties showed a significant decrease. Nevertheless, the African trend for terrorism is clear, and it is going upwards, July recorded 38% more terrorist attacks and 12% more related casualties when compared to June, which was the month with the highest number of both terrorist attacks and casualties in 2020. The most recent monthly report indicates a significant decrease from July to August; however, we still need to wait for more information from the following months to verify if the second semester is going to see a change in trend, or if August is just one more exception (ACSRT, 2020b).

It should be noted that terrorism has several definitions that vary depending on scholars, organisations and political stance, leading to a lack of consensus on what should be considered a terrorist act. However, similarly to the ACSRT, this paper uses the definition put forth by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1999 at the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. Article 1 of this convention states that a terrorist act means:

- “(a) any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a State Party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage and is calculated or intended to:
- (i) intimidate, put in fear, force, coerce or induce any government, body, institution, the general public or any segment thereof, to do or abstain from doing any act, or to adopt or abandon a particular standpoint, or to act according to certain principles; or
 - (ii) disrupt any public service, the delivery of any essential service to the public or to create a public emergency; or
 - (iii) create general insurrection in a State.
- (b) any promotion, sponsoring, contribution to, command, aid, incitement, encouragement, attempt, threat, conspiracy, organizing, or procurement of any person, with the intent to commit any act referred to in paragraph (a) (i) to (iii).”

Article 3 from the same convention adds to the definition of a terrorist act:

1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1, the struggle waged by peoples in accordance with the principles of international law for their liberation or self-determination, including armed struggle against colonialism, occupation, aggression and domination by foreign forces shall not be considered as terrorist acts.
2. Political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other motives shall not be a justifiable defence against a terrorist act.

Terrorist attacks, due to their catastrophic and massive impact, also fall within the category of major incidents. A major incident is any event that require extraordinary resources because of the location, severity, type or number of casualties (Mbanjumucyoet al., 2018). The Joint Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP, 2016) defines it as “an event or situation with a range of serious consequences which requires special arrangements to be implemented by one or more emergency responder agency” (p.8). These events often require more resources than what is available on a regular basis, making it necessary for emergency responders to make adequate use of them to save as much lives as possible. Major incidents can be the result of natural disasters, such as floods, earthquakes or epidemic diseases, but they can also be man-made, such as traffic accidents, stampede and terrorist attacks (World Health Organization [WHO], 2013).

Several researchers and institutions have taken action trying to understand terrorists, focusing on how and why they attack in order to prevent such major incidents from ever happening. For example, there are many papers and books on how

terrorist groups recruit people for their cause, and how governments and organisations can act to prevent it (Jones, 2017; Melo, 2020). There are also many studies on how to best interview terrorists and gather intelligence to prevent new attacks (Alison et al., 2013). As a matter of fact, Fombo (2011) states that “Antiterrorism endeavours can be typified into military-cum-intelligence efforts, legislation aimed at improving legal provisions for prosecuting terrorists, and measures targeting sources of funding to terrorist networks.” (p.61).

Although it is highly important to work towards preventing a terrorist attack from ever happening, it is clear that those strategies are not infallible. Terrorism is still a threat worldwide, especially in Africa, where we see a rise in terrorist attacks and casualties, with over a thousand deaths recorded only in July 2020 (ACSRT, 2020a). Therefore, it is also important to prepare for when they do happen. Emergency responder agencies such as Hospitals, Police, Ambulance and Fire Service must be prepared on what they must do in case of a terrorist attack. Emergency preparedness has been linked to reduced mortality and morbidity in major incidents, including terrorist attacks (Nilsson et al., 2015; Mbanjumucyo et al., 2018). Consequently, we must strive to prepare emergency responders in major incident management.

Considering that in order to develop emergency preparedness one must practice, it is inappropriate to expect first responders to practice on actual major incidents. It is inadequate to hope that these responders gain the necessary skills to manage a major incident when lives are at stake. Just as a surgeon does not learn how to perform a surgery on actual living patients, emergency responders should not need to learn how to manage a terrorist attack when lives of innocent people are on the line. Therefore, it is of the utmost importance that these practitioners go through training to learn how to manage a major incident in a safe environment, where their mistakes will not lead to the death of hundreds of people.

The importance and benefits of training to prepare first responders on major incident management has been comprehensively shown. Skryabina et al. (2017) assessed its effect through a scoping review and found that, regardless of the type of exercise implemented, healthcare participants’ knowledge, confidence and overall competence significantly increased, it also helped to identify gaps and limitations in their organisations’ emergency plans, among other things. The value of training for major incidents was also identified in a very practical way through a report on the Manchester Arena bombing, where it informs that “things worked well”, partially due to the exercise run less than a month prior to the terrorist attack (Kerslake, et al., 2018, p.89).

HOW TO TRAIN FOR MAJOR INCIDENTS AND TERRORIST ATTACKS

There are many ways and types of exercises to train emergency responders on major incident management, each of them with their specific advantages and disadvantages (European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control [ECDC], 2014). The choice over which of these exercises are better suited will depend on the aims

and objectives of the organisation, as well as the available resources and budget. Another factor that must be taken into consideration in choosing the type of exercise is experience. If facilitators are not used to planning and facilitating a major incident exercises, they must start small, with simpler and more controlled exercises. Similarly, if organisations and participants are not familiar with major incident management, it is recommended to start with simpler exercises (e.g. tabletop), before moving on to more complex ones (e.g. full-scale exercises).

Major incident management exercises can be divided into two main groups: Discussion-based exercises and Operation-based exercises (Skryabina et al., 2017). The first, as the name suggests, is mostly focused on learning through debate, discussion or lectures, it is closer to an experience of learning in a classroom as there is no emphasis on hands-on experience. This type of exercise is simpler and costs fewer resources, both in terms of time and money (ECDC, 2014). Operation-based exercises, on the other hand, typically involve scenarios that are more realistic. In these exercises, participants must take action, learn by doing and acquire hands-on experience with managing casualties and security threats, using organisations' tools, following a specific procedure, among other possibilities. Since it has a practical nature, operation-based exercises often require much more resources than the first type, however, they also allow for training under conditions that most closely resemble an actual major incident (ECDC, 2014). Discussion-based exercises encompass two different types: Orientation exercise and Tabletop exercise. Operation-based exercises can also be split into three specific exercises: Drill Exercise, Functional exercise and Full-scale exercise.

Discussion-based exercises

1. Orientation exercises

Informal discussions in the format of a seminar or workshop. These exercises are akin to a classroom, where facilitators aim to build knowledge in collaboration with participants. The idea is for participants and organisations to learn through thinking and discussing. Their goals are usually to familiarise participants with their roles, the organisation's emergency plans, policies and procedures. Seminars and workshops are also commonly chosen when organisations want to review and assess their emergency plans, providing a space where employees can participate and comment on the need for improvements. As a result of their simplicity, orientation exercises are the easiest to run. They require only minimal use of resources since it only requires a classroom, a conference room or even an online meeting. In addition, facilitators do not need a huge amount of time, money or human resources to prepare.

2. Tabletop exercises (TTX)

Informal simulations of major incidents without time constraints or a real-life, physical, scenario. These exercises aim to test emergency plans in a relaxed environ-

ment, where participants are encouraged to discuss and solve problems based on the emergency plans and procedures already in place. As the ECDC (2014) highlights: “the emphasis is on problem-solving rather than spontaneous decision-making” (p.11). Depending on the needs, TTX can be as simple as orientation exercises, generating an informal discussion and assessment of emergency plans on a simulated scenario. It can also be very complex, similar to a functional exercise, but without the time pressure. TTX is also flexible in terms of time, it can last from a couple of hours to several days, according to the aims of the exercise and resources available.

There are three main advantages of TTX: low cost, since they are significantly less expensive and require fewer resources when compared to operation-based exercises; the fact that all participants can actively work in their roles; and the malleability, given that it can easily be adapted to meet different demands and objectives, from developing teamwork to testing emergency plans (Lennquist & Montán, 2012). On the other hand, its main disadvantage is the lack of realism, because there are no time constraints and it is not run as a real-life scenario, preventing participants from experiencing the true pressure of a major incident. However, Dausey, Buehler and Lurie (2007) support that TTX can be just as effective as an operation-based exercise if run correctly. On top of that, since they require minimal resources, it is much more likely to run TTX on a regular basis when compared to more costly operation-based exercises.

Operation-based exercises

1. Drill exercises

While orientation exercises and TTX are informal and address broad issues, drill exercises focus on training a very specific task, function or process. Their aim is to test and prepare participants’ abilities and skills to perform the task under assessment. For example, a drill exercise may focus on testing and improving fire fighters’ abilities to evacuate a building, or it may concentrate efforts on assessing if healthcare practitioners are correctly using a triage tool. Considering that drill exercises are operation-based, participants will learn by doing, the focus is not to discuss if the triage tool is the best available or if it fits the needs, but to actually test and prepare participants on how to use it. Drill is a recommended type of exercise if facilitators or organisations identify a gap that needs addressing. For example, if a major incident (or a simulation) exposes the lack of expertise of emergency responders in correctly using a tool, drill would help prevent it from happening again and costing lives or money.

2. Functional exercises

These exercises put participants in a situation as close as possible to a real major incident without actually deploying resources on the ground. They are run at a venue designated for use by strategic and tactical command in cases of major inci-

dents. In order to create the sense of realism a series of steps are commonly taken: adding time pressure (e.g. there is a limited time period to evacuate everyone from a building about to collapse); constraining resources (e.g. participants only have a limited number of ambulances, fire trucks or police cars available); using real-life factors (e.g. the number of available hospital beds during the exercise is the same as the one available in real life), among other possibilities.

The fact that none of these resources is actually used in real-life makes it a less costly exercise. In practice, participants will be moving around representations of resources. Therefore, if the exercise is designed so that participants must triage and care for 200 injured people from a terrorist attack, using 20 ambulances, while moving them to three different hospitals. They will not actually move around ambulances in real-life, or interview actors playing casualties to triage. Participants will move cards on a table, magnets on a board or any other possibility (according to the exercise method used) that represent casualties and ambulances.

In addition, functional exercises focus “on testing coordination, command, and control between multi-agency coordination centres” (Skryabina et al., 2020, p.2). Consequently, participants from different agencies are invited to assess and practice multi-agency response to a major incident. As a result, functional exercises help prepare emergency responders from various organisations, while also promoting a good working relation between them.

3. Full-scale exercises

Out of every type of major incident management exercise, full-scale is the closest to reality. Extra steps are taken in order to immerse participants in a replica of a major incident. In full-scale exercises resources are actually deployed, similar to how it would occur if the incident had taken place in real life. Firstly, the environment is created to reproduce a major incident, if the exercise is focused on a derailed train, there will be a derailed train that participants must enter, assess structure, extract victims, etc. If the exercise is a response to a live terrorist attack in a school, participants would be physically deployed to the school, police officers would have to enter the building, paramedics would have to calm and triage the victims, etc. Secondly, there will be physical victims and perpetrators, played by actors or volunteers, that participants must deal with. For example, in a live terrorist attack exercise, police officers must deal with the terrorist threat (neutralize volunteers acting as terrorists), while paramedics must triage and treat patients (volunteers with realistic makeup to fake wounds).

Full-scale exercises are praised in the literature due to their realism, which is linked to a response from practitioners that is closer to reality and, therefore, learning is also more likely to be transferable to real life major incidents (Lennquist & Montán, 2012). However, proportionate to the extent facilitators must go in order to closely replicate a major incident is both the amount of resources needed and the

difficulty in creating such an exercise. Full-scale exercises are the costliest type of exercise, it requires enormous amount of time, money and human resources to plan it. It also demands hugely from facilitators to make it realistic and work effectively to simulate an actual major incident. There is also a need to invite multiple participants, from different agencies in order to assess multi-agency response, but without disrupting their activities due to the exercise and putting the general public at risk (ECDC, 2014). For example, in a terrorist attack exercise, it is imperative that police officers attend; however, there should still be enough police officers on duty to deal with everyday incidents.

BENEFITS OF TRAINING FOR MAJOR INCIDENTS

Scientific literature has found that training leads to improvement in various areas relevant to an effective major incident management. Skryabina et al.'s (2017) scoping review found over 20 factors that improved due to training, which encompass improvement of both participants (e.g. knowledge and confidence) and organisations (e.g. assessment and refinement of emergency plans). Even very specific and highly complicated factors that compromise an ideal major incident management can benefit from training. Waring et al. (2018), for example, found that information sharing across a multi-agency response team to a simulated major incident was delayed due to the lack of common understanding in terms of terminology and shared situational awareness. The authors suggest that future training could facilitate information sharing by promoting “communication behaviours that facilitate common frames for interpreting messages and understanding information needs” (Waring et al., 2018, p.24). In addition, Skryabina et al. (2020) measured the importance of emergency preparedness training with practitioners that responded to mass casualty terrorist attacks, mostly emergency responders from the Manchester Arena Bombing. Results showed that participating in training exercises improved coordination, confidence, real-time modification to response, and support provided to those who did not participate in training exercises.

There are many factors, which will determine a successful major incident management. Considering that it is impossible to discuss all of them in a single paper, some of them will be addressed in this study in hope to provide an initial understanding of the potential improvements that can be achieved through training exercises. Three factors were chosen based on available information about their development in Africa and their potential for positively affecting the aftermath of a major incident and reducing the number of casualties and morbidity: Triage, Interoperability, and Organisational Improvement.

Triage

Major incidents usually have more casualties than the resources available to care for all of them. A single terrorist attack can cause hundreds of deaths and many more injured, while the number of hospital beds and health emergency responders are un-

deniable inferior. Even considering a country that is well prepared to manage several casualties such as the Netherlands, they may not be able to tend to all casualties from a major incident. The Netherlands has a Major Incident Hospital (MIH), “a unique facility functioning as an insurance policy for the healthcare system” (Haverkort, 2016, p.20), which has the potential to be deployed within 30 minutes and can receive up to 200 patients. However, history shows us that terrorist attacks can have much higher number of casualties. Therefore, identifying which persons should be given priority treatment on site, sent to specialized hospitals or offered specific healthcare attention is going to be essential in making sure that hospitals are not overwhelmed, casualties receive appropriate treatment and the number of deaths reduced. This specific process of identifying patients’ medical needs and making sure they are sent to the right hospital at the right time is called triage.

Triage’s goal is to determine the type and severity of casualties. Understanding the casualty scenario enables an overview of how many people were directly affected by the major incident and how much resource will be necessary to treat all of them. Many different algorithms and systems have been created in order to effectively triage casualties, such as Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment (START), Modified Physiological Triage Tool (MPTT) or Triage Sieve (Alenyo et al., 2018). The idea behind these algorithms is to increase accuracy and reliability in the assessment of treatment priorities based on a pre-determined set of criteria, generally including a person’s ability to walk, respiratory rate and heart rate. Overall, they divide casualties into four groups: Deceased, Red (Priority 1 or Immediate Priority), Yellow (Priority 2 or Urgent Priority) and Green (Priority 3 or Delayed Priority).

In practice, however, healthcare practitioners end up performing a subjective assessment of casualties, which may lead to inappropriate allocation of resources and suboptimal use of emergency healthcare (Alenyo et al., 2018). There are two main triage errors: under-triage and over-triage (Frykberg, 2005). The first occurs when victims of high priority are classified as low (delayed) priority, thus losing precious treatment time for more urgent medical needs. Over-triage is the opposite, when victims have non-critical injuries but are classified as high priority, which can put extra burden on hospitals already overwhelmed and may prevent patients that actually have critical injuries from getting the necessary treatment.

Adherence to and accurate use of triage tools can improve after training. Alenyo et al. (2018) found some important pieces of evidence on this matter. First, South African prehospital emergency care providers showed low correct triage scores (63%) despite going through a major incident management training. However, there was a 10% increase in correct triaging between before and after taking part in the exercise, thus showing training’s positive effect in this regard. Furthermore, participants that had already taken part in a major incident training in the past, performed statistically significantly better than those who were trained for the first time. Therefore, this evidence corroborates with what has been repeatedly found: frequent training has a highly positive effect in preparing emergency personnel on major incident management.

This information also serves to explain why Mbanjumucyo et al.'s (2018) research found that participants, even after training, were still relying on visual assessment to triage patients. As the authors themselves inform, "there has been no published description of such exercises in Rwanda before" (p.77), thus, it is possible that practitioners were not receiving frequent training to prepare themselves on using triage tools. On top of that, they recommend that exercises "should be run regularly to be better prepared" (p.77), a suggestion that add to the growing evidence supporting regular training for major incidents.

Interoperability

In the event of a major incident, the work of multiple organisations is necessary. In case of a bombing, it is vital that police are there to help neutralize the terrorist threat, apprehend suspects and direct crowd; fire fighters are needed to extract victims from rubble and control fire, while workers from emergency medical services are required to treat and transport the injured. Given the multi-agency nature of such events, it is vital that they are able to communicate effectively among themselves, because the work of one agency will directly affect others. For example, before paramedics move into a building that has been bombed by terrorists, they must know from fire fighters if it is safe for them to do so, or how much time they would have before it collapses. Similarly, they would need help from police officers to control crowd and clear routes if they expect to quickly move victims to hospitals. The ability of sharing information and using it to assist decision-making is called interoperability, and it is key for the successful coordination of a major incident (House, Power & Alison, 2014).

Two key aspects of effective interoperability are role knowledge and information sharing. Role knowledge describe practitioners from different agencies understanding what their role is and, on top of that, knowing the roles of other agencies. Therefore, it does not suffice to have an entire healthcare team aware of their roles, duties and responsibilities in case of a major incident, if they are ignorant to the role of their partner agencies. Role knowledge helps with understanding boundaries, identifying when you need assistance from colleagues of different organisations and who to ask when such help is in need (Andersson & Lindström, 2017). This builds collaboration and facilitates information sharing among agencies.

Information sharing refers to agencies' abilities to share relevant information among themselves and, because of that, create a shared understanding of the major incident scenario (Waring et al., 2018). In order to effectively share information, agencies must first understand what pieces of information are relevant to partner organisations. One must know what information to share and with whom, as not all information is relevant for everyone. There is evidence to show that excessive information sharing is just as damaging as sharing few information (Waring et al., 2020). On top of that, information sharing must be timely, as evidence shows that

delayed information sharing leads to a delay in decision making, creating plans and putting them in practice, thus increasing the possibility of a major incident causing larger negative consequences (Waring et al., 2020).

In summary, role knowledge builds the foundation for effective information sharing, which in turn leads to a better understanding of the major incident. Consequently, decision makers are able to better allocate their resources and achieve optimal outcomes on major incident management. Training is central to achieve the expected level of cooperation and interoperability, several papers have reported how exercises improved participants' knowledge of their own roles and the roles of partner agencies, as well as how training improved interagency communication and information sharing (House et al., 2014; Skryabina et al., 2017; Waring et al., 2020). However, in order for that to occur, exercises must include participants from multiple organisation to build a true multi-agency environment.

Organisational Improvement

Organisations should have plans ready to be put in practice in case of major incidents. The South African Disaster Management Act from 2002 (South Africa, 2002), for example, clearly states the need to have disaster management plans and strategies. Therefore, police forces, fire fighters and hospitals should have specific plans for situations that require an extraordinary use of available resources. However, such plans are not perfect, they are designed based on an idea of a real-life event, but they are rarely tested unless during a live major incident. As a result, practitioners do not have an opportunity to test these plans and get hands-on experience in using them prior to a life-threatening scenario. On top of that, if there is no testing of plans before a major incident happens, it is simply a hypothesis whether or not these plans are actually effective.

These issues can be addressed through training, as evidence shows that exercises are effective means of testing emergency plans (Skryabina et al., 2017). Confronting participants with a situation where they must implement disaster plan in a simulated scenario of a major incident, provides them with an opportunity to test whether or not said plan is feasible. Exercises have the potential to identify a plan's strengths as well as its gaps and shortcomings, opening an avenue for improvement. For example, a simulation exercise can verify if the number of resources available (e.g. number of beds, staff available, number of ambulances, etc.) described in an emergency plan are sufficient. In case these resources are insufficient, organisations would now have this information and the opportunity to fix it.

On top of that, if practitioners have the opportunity to practice using these plans, they will feel more confident in using it in the future. This has been found, for example, with healthcare staff who responded to the Manchester Arena bombing and had previously taken part in a simulation exercise (Skryabina et al., 2020). There is also evidence from different exercises, with different participants showing that practicing

major incident management in a safe learning environment, where mistakes will not cause the death or injury of others, leads to subsequent increase in confidence and knowledge on what to do in case of a major incident (Skryabina et al., 2017).

CONCLUSION

Looking at a global scale, terrorist attacks have been decreasing significantly over the past years, consequently reducing economic damage as well as loss of lives and healthcare costs. However, Africa's situation does not follow the global trend. In fact, terrorism in African countries is on the rise, causing increasing levels of damage every month. Counterterrorism actions aimed at preventing terrorist attacks from ever happening and disrupting terrorist cells are abundant; police officers train on how to identify potential terrorists and interview them, government tighten border control and specialists analyse bank accounts potentially funding terrorism. Although these efforts must be praised and continue to exist in order to suppress more terrorist attacks, they are not perfect, terrorist attacks continue to happen and cause significant damage.

In light of this, the present paper proposes another look at how to reduce terrorist attacks' damage by preparing for when they eventually happen. There is plenty of evidence to suggest that training first responders, such as emergency healthcare staff, police officers and fire fighters on major incident management significantly increases the chances of reducing mortality and morbidity. Therefore, different types of training exercises are presented in order to inform how we can prepare emergency responders, varying from low-complexity and low-cost exercises (orientation exercises, tabletop exercises, drill exercises) to high-complexity and high-cost exercises (functional exercises and full-scale exercises). On top of that, there is plenty of evidence to support that such exercises, if run correctly, can develop participants' skills and effectively prepare them for a major incident. These exercises can teach and condition participants to use triage tools, they can facilitate communication between agencies and test emergency plans.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. African countries must implement a culture of training emergency responders in major incident management. There is evidence to show that even a single exercise can improve participants' skills, which may be vital in case of a terrorist attack.
2. Training should start small, with low-cost and low-complexity exercises, such as seminars and workshops to elaborate or discuss emergency plans, before moving to more complex and costly exercises such as full-scale exercises.
3. Training must be as frequent as possible. Amounting evidence points to significant improvement in major incident management when exercises are run on a regular basis and participants are able to keep practising learnt skills.

4. Whenever possible, major incident management exercises should involve multiple organisations to build trust among agencies, increase collaboration and develop interoperability.
5. Government must collaborate with academics and researchers to organise exercises, identify shortcomings, verify if the exercises are actually producing expected results and develop strategies to further enhance participants learning.

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MEDIA, JOURNALISTS AND REPORTING POST-INSURGENCY ISSUES IN NORTHEASTERN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

Media and journalists are fundamental pillars in reporting terrorism and insurgency, such as Boko Haram insurgency that has devastated northeast Nigeria for more than a decade. The situation in the region is entering into post insurgency era and the media and journalists should be further guided on issues to be reported in the period. Therefore, this paper theoretically examines the connection between media, journalists, and reporting post- insurgency in northeastern Nigeria. The objective of the paper is to identify key issues that media and journalists should concentrate in reporting during post-insurgency period in Nigeria and indeed other African countries that are facing similar challenge. The study adopted document analysis and interview methods. The paper argues that post insurgency issues to be reported should be related to reconciliation, reintegration and resettlement, and pattern of reporting the issues requires unique techniques and sources. The paper also identifies and explains challenges of reporting post insurgency, such as threat to journalists and lack of funding to support the reporting process. The study discovers that northeastern Nigeria has not fully recovered from the insurgency; journalists do not report issues constructively; and there is no adequate funding to support journalists to report the post insurgency professionally among others. The study, therefore, recommends that media organisations and government should provide all safety measures to minimize risks and danger; journalists should report issues constructively to raise hope for the people affected by the insurgency; and local media should give adequate funding to strengthen journalists' capacity to report post-insurgency issues among others.

Keywords

post-insurgency,
northeastern Nigeria,
insurgency, journalism,
reporting.

INTRODUCTION

Reporting issues such as conflict, insurgency, terrorism and war as well as their aftermath especially insurgency is a lifeblood of journalism profession, not only in Nigeria but globally. Insurgency, which is a component of the 21st Century challenges that have been affecting societies, has suffocated northeast Nigeria and the country in general since 2009. Prior to *Boko Haram* insurgency, northeastern region was one of the most diverse, and peaceful geopolitical zones in Nigeria that had little religious violent conflict or insurgency.

Northeast is one of the six geopolitical regions in Nigeria that were politically created. Other regions were North West, North Central, South West, South East and South South. The North East initially was a single state in 1967 but it was further divided at different point in history into Adamawa, Borno, Bauchi, Gombe, Taraba and Yobe States. These states are poor in nearly all indices of development, which perhaps make them, particularly Borno and Yobe, as hub of *Boko Haram* insurgency (UNDP, 2017; National Bureau of Statistics, 2010). According to Jibril and Abubakar (2017), the region is populated by nearly more than 200 minority ethnic groups that largely practice Islam and Christianity with Kanuri, Hausa and Fulani as dominant groups. The 2006 Census conducted by the Nigeria's National Population Commission (NPC) indicated that the region had approximately 19 million people, out of which Adamawa had 3,178,950; Bauchi had 4,653,066; Borno had 4,171,104; Gombe had 2,365,040; Taraba had 2,294,800, and Yobe had 2,321,339. The population figure of the northeast approximately stands at 26.2 million out of an estimated 200 million population of Nigeria (Olukoya, 2016: National Bureau of Statistics, 2018).

The figure is equally swelling significantly despite the *Boko Haram* insurgency that claimed thousands of life. The insurgency however concentrates in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states respectively with Borno as the most hit (Mohammed, 2015). Thus, the people of the region and indeed Nigeria and its neighboring countries have grievously suffered from the *Boko Haram* insurgency. Thousands of people have either been killed or displaced. Properties worth billions of Naira were also destroyed and damaged. For instance, according to statistics released by the Borno State, which is the epicenter of *Boko Haram* insurgency, indicated that over one hundred thousand people (100,000+) have lost their lives. Over two million, one hundred and fourteen thousand (2,114,000+) people are internally displaced in various official camps in Maiduguri, Bama, Gwoza, Ngala, Monguno, Pulka, Banki and Sabon Gari, and many people are living in host communities with relatives and friends (Tukur, 2017). According to the Internally Displaced Monitoring Centre's estimation, Nigeria houses a total of 3.3 million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), which is the highest in Africa (Aliyu, 2017). The *Boko Haram* insurgency has also forced over one hundred and forty-six thousand (146,000+) people to be refugees in Niger, Cameroon and Chad Republics. There are also

over fifty four thousand (54,000+) women as widows and over fifty two thousand (52,000+) children as orphans. It is against this backdrop that the National Population Commission further estimated that 80% of the displaced persons were women and children (Ibrahim, 2017).

There is effort from government to reconstruct destroyed communities and resettle people that were displaced as a result of the insurgency. This ushers the region into post insurgency period, thus there should be a change on the issues to be reported by the media. Hence, some of the displaced persons and refugees are being resettled in the communities that have been recaptured from insurgents and reconstructed as part of the post insurgency activities. The media and journalists have reported many dimensions of the insurgency and how people are displaced and resettled based on the conventional journalistic guidelines. This assisted the kind of supports and interventions people received from government and non-governmental agencies. However, issues related to Boko Haram post insurgency and how the issues should be reported by media as well as challenges to be encountered by journalists have not been widely examined.

OVERVIEW OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY AND MEDIA REPORTING

Boko Haram insurgency started in the northeast Nigeria by a small group of Islamic religious extremists. The group has now grown to the level of being one of the most deadly international terrorist groups and has become a threat not only to the Nigeria's security and development, but a great peril to many other nation-states particularly Chad, Cameroon and Niger republics (Omilusi, 2016). The group's official name is "*Jama'atul Alhul Sunnah Lidda'wati wal Jihad*," which means "people committed to the propagation of the Prophet's teachings and jihad". It is also referred to *Yusufiyya*, an appellation attributed to its founder Muhammed Yusuf who was extra-judicially killed in 2009 by the Nigerian security agents (Ibrahim and Hamman-Obels, 2017). But the group is popularly called *Boko Haram*, a media crafted label based on the issues preached by the group's late leader Yusuf (Cook, 2011; Ajayi 2012). The group has committed a lot of human rights abuses and in-human acts from 2009 to date, particularly in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa States. However, the military has now significantly subdued and neutralised the insurgents to the extent that they have left most of the local communities they controlled in 2012, 2013 and 2014 (Monguno and Bagu, 2017). This paves way for governments, humanitarian agencies and professionals such as journalists to intervene and prepare for the issues that may arise in the post-insurgency period.

The gory picture of humanitarian crisis generated by *Boko Haram* in the northeastern Nigerian gives the United Nations agencies, international and domestic Non-Governmental Organisations, donor agencies and charity organisations, an opportunity to intervene by partnering with governments and local organisations

in order to provide different kinds of supports to people who have been either displaced, wounded, raped, radicalised, de-radicalised, resettled or reintegrated. These kind of organisations are over one hundred and twenty-six (126+) operating in the region particularly in Borno State (Sawab, 2017).

On the other hand, international media organisations such as British Broadcasting Corporation, (BBC), Radio France International (RFI) and Aljazeera TV have sent several teams of reporters and senior editors to examine and report the humanitarian crisis in the region and, of course, offer analysis of post-insurgency issues. This is in addition to what the existing locally based broadcast and print media organisations and journalists in Nigeria have reported.

Thus, the media landscape in the region is dominated by public broadcasters that are expected to provide favourable information from/to governments, especially governments' efforts and Non-Governmental Organisations towards ending *Boko Haram* insurgency and building prosperous post-insurgency communities (Abubakar, Dauda and Abubakar, 2017). Hence, out of more than thirty-one broadcast media organisations in Nigeria, there are only a few private broadcast media such as *Gotel TV* and *Radio Ray Power*, *Dandal Kura* and *Radio Ndaraso* that provide more critical reports on the insurgency and the need for peace (Abubakar, Dauda and Abubakar, 2017). On the side of print, reporters from all major national newspapers have reporters and correspondents in the region that covered the insurgency from beginning to the present period which we termed as pre-post-insurgency era. Some media houses and journalists have also paid heavily in the course of discharging their constitutional responsibilities covering the insurgency (Pate and Hamza, 2017).

For media and journalists to provide more accurate reporting on post insurgency issues, there is a need for guide that will help either in lessening or totally eradicating challenges journalists and media organisations would likely face while reporting post-insurgency issues. Hence, the main thrust of this paper is to identify post-insurgency issues that should be part of the priorities of media and journalists that cover the region; provide tips for reporting post- insurgency issues in the northeastern Nigeria; pinpoint major sources of information for journalists who will be covering post-insurgency issues; and identify challenges and measures of addressing them when they occur in the process of reporting post-insurgency issues in the northeastern Nigeria.

REPORTING AND POST-INSURGENCY CONCEPTUALISED

Reporting ordinarily suggests activities engaged by someone in telling, informing and narrating something that occurred to people. But in journalism, reporting is defined as a process of information gathering that involves actions of generating

materials for news and writing the news (Olawunmi, 2014). The term reporting is used interchangeably with coverage, which refers to an act of gathering factual, accurate information about what has transpired in a particular environment; processing the information; and writing it in order to meet information needs of different people. Reporting should meet journalistic, professional requirements of generating and writing facts in general and specific needs of newspaper, magazine, radio, television and online news media. Hence, reporting is the ability of journalists to identify issues, treat them factually and professionally and disseminate them to audience through different media platforms. This is generally a process of finding factual information about countless issues, tracing sources of information and interviewing reliable people, processing the information and filing the finished product to news media (Chris, 2002).

On the other hand, post-insurgency connotes a situation whereby society is recovering from severe destruction of physical infrastructure orchestrated by insurgents. The recovery includes repairing and rebuilding hospitals, roads, schools, places of worship and entire community or village, as well as reconciliation, reintegrating, resettling and providing psychosocial and mental trauma supports to people who have been affected by an insurgency (Ibrahim and Hamman-Obels, 2017). The concept of 'post-insurgency' can be used interchangeably with 'post-conflict' but the two terms have similar surface meaning and deeper differences. Post-conflict could be wider in meaning and application because of the term 'conflict' that encompasses insurgency, war, disagreement and competition. Post-conflict involves post-insurgency and it is a period of restoration of people's opportunity, dignity and hope in a society that underwent excessive violence and it is about creation of employment and improving the capacity of people to be self-reliant (United Nations, 2009). Furthermore, Anderlini and EL-Bushra (2004) argued that post-conflict is a transitional situation from war to peace that usually occurs between the time when violent conflicts immediately disappear to the time when normalcy is returned. This period involves transition from conflict when legitimate local capacities emerge and it is supported to restore livelihood and reconstruction; and to the fostering sustainability when recovery efforts are consolidated with measures that assisted in preventing the reoccurrence and resurgence of another conflict. They stressed that it is the time when "peace agreements hold and military violence subsides, the focus of aid shifts from emergency relief to long-term social and economic development" (Anderlini and El-Bushra, 2004:51).

In essence, there are two definitions of post-conflict, that is international post-conflict and intrastate post-conflict. The international post-conflict deals with big international wars "when formal surrender, negotiated cessation of hostilities, and/or peace talks followed by a peace treaty mark a possible end to conflicts" (Brown, Langer and Stewart, 2011). On the other hand, Brown, Langer and Stewart (2011) argued that intrastate post-conflict is more complex because hostilities hardly end immediately and conflicts linger for a very long time before peace is achieved and

“fighting often continues at a low level or sporadically, and frequently resumes after a short period”. For this reason, Brown, Langer and Stewart (2011 :04) further stated that the milestones that can help in defining and determining post-conflict period are “cessation of hostilities and violence; signing of political/peace agreements; demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration; refugee repatriation [or internally displaced person resettled]; establishing a functioning state; achieving reconciliation and societal integration; and economic recovery”. It is also visible from the foregoing that intrastate conflict is more associated to insurgency and therefore post-insurgency is more linked to intrastate post conflict situation.

Therefore based on the above conceptualization two divergent arguments surface on whether the northeastern Nigeria is in the period of the post-insurgency or not. The first argument is that the region is still in the insurgency period because there are pockets of attacks on military formations, communities and civilians by insurgents. The attacks lead to loss of lives and destruction of properties. The insurgents’ activities usually occur in the rural communities to the extent that some people have relocated to internally displaced camps in the relatively safe environment (Ibrahim and Hamman-Obels, 2017). The second argument, which is more supported by the conceptualization of intrastate post-conflict, is that many major cities and some communities in the northeast region of Nigeria are much secured than at the time when insurgency was at its peak. Thus, many captured or destroyed communities and cities have been rebuilt and their resistance and resilient capacities have been enhanced to protect and prevent reoccurrence and resurgence of insurgency. This effort has not yet qualified northeastern Nigeria to be in a complete post-insurgency period. The situation in the region can best be described as pre post-insurgency or pseudo post-insurgency because *Boko Haram* insurgents carry out attacks that claim lives and render some people homeless (Eide, 2016). But with the sustained military efforts to eliminate insurgency and government activities to resettle displaced communities, it is good for journalists to have clear guide and tips on the issues to report when the region eventually finds itself in the complete stage of post-insurgency.

Post-insurgency reporting is a specialised form of journalistic reporting where journalists shall gather factual, accurate, evidence-based information on how the fundamental rights of people that have been violated by insurgents are being legally restored by governments, international community, non-governmental organisations, charity groups and other stakeholders. This kind of reporting is presented either in form of news, documentary, feature, magazine or news analysis that deals with post conflict issues in order to ensure restoration of peace, order, nonviolent coexistence, harmony and security of life and food through post conflict processes and building (Orgeret and Tayeebwa, 2016).

POST-INSURGENCY REPORTING AS PEACE BUILDING CONDIMENT

One of the significant aspects of post-insurgency period is peace building. This is largely required in Africa countries such as Nigeria (House of Common Report, 2006). The peace building effort involves range of political, religious, security and social issues. According to Mua'zu and Ibrahim (2016:03) "peace building is a process that occurs after the intensity of conflict has ebbed, ended or agreement has been secured to end the conflict". This is contrary to peacekeeping which is militaristic involvement of third party based on invitation to separate conflicting parties or peacemaking, which is a diplomatic approach to mediate the warring parties through their officials in order to create ground for agreement. Thus, peace building is connected to efforts and activities that strategically targeted at prevention of violent conflict on one hand and "reconciliation, transitional justice, education for peace, communication for peace" (Mua'zu and Ibrahim, 2016:03). This involves promotion of condition of no violence, human rights, justice, building and sustaining truth and encouraging collective activities to achieve development.

Last (2020) believed that post-insurgency in northeastern Nigeria requires rebuilding and resettlement but the most important thing is to create and sustain a culture of coping in which people will feel at home after the insurgency. This culture ensures that people build mental mechanism to recover from insurgency beyond physical structures. Therefore, it is part of the responsibility of journalists to report culture of coping as practiced in the region. The coping mechanism includes how people cope with distress and conflict at house and communal level especially the mechanism used in the pre-colonial history and late 20th Century. Thus, identifying old coping strategies used in the past is a form of journalism, which Last (2020) called 'careful journalism'.

It is based on this, Lambourne (2004:03) argued that post-insurgency peace building is strategically "designed to promote a secure and stable lasting peace in which the basic human needs of the population are met and violent conflicts do not recur". This should also address significant root causes of an insurgency, proliferation of arms and ammunition, military culture of treating with civilians as well as disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration to create lasting peace in the post-insurgency period (Nyaruai, 2015; Lambourne, 2004). This, however, is compounded with problem of information dissemination among the resettled people, government and development agencies. Hence, Mua'zu and Ibrahim (2016) argued that the media and by extension journalists could be used to address such challenges that occur not only during peace building in insurgency but even in the post-insurgency epoch. They argued that insurgencies provide media organisations with array of issues to be covered and discussed while journalists will be busy trying to interpret the issues to provide solutions and complicate the situation in some incidences.

Akpan, Ering and Olofu-Adeoye (2013: 2286) also emphasized that generally, media has four important roles to play in peace building process. Firstly media contribute towards defining the socio-economic and political atmosphere under which the peace process takes place. Secondly, media or rather journalists influence the actions and inactions of stakeholders in the process. Thirdly, media contribute immensely and as well influence the nature of debate about peace process especially the case of *Boko Haram* that always brings about issue of whether federal government should dialogue with the insurgents or not. The debate has been on different media platforms and is largely influenced by the way journalists handle the discourse. Fourthly, the media can help in securing and facilitating public approval of the peace process. Legatis (2015) also noted that media and journalists play significant role in conflict transformation. According to the author, media have the potential to do this through constructive reporting as against offering narrower or complex possibilities for interpreting and understanding events as they unfold during such conflict situations. In view of this, media can influence the perception of the audience through their work and “help to whether, and to what extent, conflict actors are cognizant of the multiplicity of constructive solutions that could potentially be applied to the conflicting sets of interests” (Legatis, 2015:04).

Journalists and media organisations are also in danger as a result of how they treat issues during insurgency and of course in the post-insurgency. In other words, media and journalists are central and more relevant in the post-insurgency period because it is an epoch when relatively achieved peace can be sustained through reconciliation and resettlement activities. Therefore reporting the activities of peace building initiative, its processes and activities during post insurgency era is part of social issues that should be taken into consideration by journalists and media organisation. Wilson and Wilson (2009:05) further stated that peace building requires information, education, action and advocacy as well as spirited governance that occur “through open discussion on issue of interest to the people which strengthens their engagements with justice and peace”.

It should be noted from the above that media and journalists as important pillars in a democratic society like Nigeria, should be able to discharge their constitutional responsibilities which include education and advocacy. They should educate citizens especially those who have survived *Boko Haram* insurgency and are struggling to recover, reconstruct and rebuild trust. This activity will take place together with some repentant, rehabilitated, resuscitated and reintegrated insurgents. Therefore, this period is dotted with so many interesting and non- interesting issues that would attract the attention of journalists and media organisations as well as scholars and development partners. The issues, sources and challenges related to reporting post insurgency would be identified through the following methods:

METHODS OF THE STUDY

This paper deployed document analysis and in-depth interview methods as qualitative approaches to social research. The document analysis was used to generate data from policy briefs, code of conduct and reports of the Borno State Ministry of Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Resettlement, Nigeria Union of Journalists Code of Conduct as well as international development organisations such as Carnegie Endowment for International Peace that produced report on stabilizing the region after Boko Haram insurgency. We searched the documents and interpreted them in order to identify issues that should be of concern to the media and journalists as well as challenges. We also interviewed one each of communication and journalism expert and professional journalist to generate additional data on the subject matter. The methods were normally deployed to retrieve information from documents and oral statements that could be hard or soft in order to make meaning out of the texts (Bowen, 2009). The essence of these methods was to identify, interpret and explicate issues to be reported by media, journalists and as well sources where information should be derived. Also, the methods identified challenges that may likely occur in the process of information gathering and reporting related to post-insurgency in the northeast Nigeria.

ISSUES IN POST-INSURGENCY REPORTING

Based on the examination of the post-insurgency situation and its related documents in the northeast, we argue that journalists should bother on and beam their journalism searchlights on issues related to fundamental human rights that involve life, social, economic, agricultural, health, educational and religious rights. Distinctively, it is argued that the coverage of post-insurgency should be centered on reconciliation, reintegration and resettlement themes.

Reconciliation issue is one of the fundamental issues that journalists and media houses should concentrate on. Journalistic piece such as news reports, feature articles and media programmes should contain accurate information that will help in reconciling parties involved in the insurgency particularly between victims of insurgency and repentant insurgents. The journalists should dish out messages on forgiveness and tolerance in order to heal the wound of insurgency and restore friendly relationship between insurgency victims and repentant, de-radicalised insurgents who have been reintegrated into the society.

Psychosocial support issue is part of emergency responses that can help people to heal themselves from psychological wounds. Therefore, news media reports should contain messages that will aid people to recover from trauma in a nonthematic way.

Reconstruction issue deals with the rebuilding structures that were destroyed in the insurgency by the insurgents or state actors. The journalists should report

issues on reconstruction processes of destroyed and damaged infrastructures such as schools, houses, hospitals and roads. The reports should be able to identify how resilient and concrete the infrastructures in line with Goal 9 of the Sustainable Development Goals and the African Union (AU) Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development Framework that was adopted in 2015 and 2006 respectively (Orgeret, 2016; United Nations, 2014). The SDGs' demands for building resilient infrastructures that can withstand the present usage and that of the future. These conventions have empowered journalists and news media to positively influence reconciliation in the aftermath of violent conflicts such as insurgency in the North East Nigeria.

Relocation and resettlement of displaced persons: Post-insurgency journalists and reporters in particular should concentrate on the process and manner of relocating the affected people either from the villages and communities invaded by insurgents or from the camps where Internally Displaced Persons, especially women and children, would be resettled. The issue of resettlement also requires journalists to examine and evaluate the safety and habitability of the places. For example, presently there are over nine thousand (9000+) people who have been relocated from Borno State alone (Tukur, 2017). Therefore, journalists should write reports on how these relocated people survived in the areas.

Another issue is the reintegration of insurgency victims and repentant insurgents that are to be reintegrated into a wider society. This issue includes, for instance, women and children who were kidnapped and possibly raped and indoctrinated by insurgents but eventually rescued or ran from the *Boko Haram* hideout should be reunited with other members of the society who are expected to mix freely without discrimination and rejection. This requires journalists to report on how such victims to be accommodated without prejudices. On the integration, media reports should also contain messages that will help in preparing society to embrace those who perpetrated an act of insurgency but they are eventually and successfully de-radicalised in prison or any detention centre.

The governments' actions that deal with political, financial and security commitments of federal, affected states and local governments toward securing and providing basic needs to the people who have been relocated, resettled or de-radicalised should be part of the issues to report by journalists. This includes issues of provision of food, shelter and other social amenities.

The activity of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in the region is a fundamental issue that journalists should consider vital in the post-insurgency period in northeastern Nigeria. The NGOs are organisations that engage in offering humanitarian services to the victims of insurgency who live in camps or being relocated, resettled and reintegrated to the mainstream social structure. There is public outcry in the region that some of the NGOs have ulterior motives. Therefore, the journalists should try to objectively and factually scrutinize their activities in order to ensure that they operate within their mandates and national interest.

Human rights violation is an issue that is more pronounced during insurgency, but it is an issue even in peace and post-insurgency situations. The journalists should look at how security agencies, Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) and even other members of the society may violate the fundamental rights of both insurgency victims and alleged insurgency perpetrators.

Management of humanitarian aids that deals with how governments and their agencies manage humanitarian assistances that come from various international and national donor organisations, especially during post-insurgency. Journalists reporting post-insurgency should evaluate and report issues of mismanagement of resources meant for displaced persons particularly women and children. In fact, mismanagement of resources is seen as part of the causes of insurgency and can occur in the post insurgency period (Fukuda-Parr, Ashwill, Chiappa and Messineo, 2011). Therefore, journalists should investigate how government' agencies such as State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) and National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) collect and distribute funds and goods and services to the concern persons.

Generally, the key role of journalists in post-insurgency period are to deal with issues on people's rights; to discover illegal actions against victims of insurgency; and report issues on corruption in the management of resources meant for IDPs through watchdog function as a two- way channel between those who govern post-insurgency and the governed (Orgeret, 2016). Reporting these issues by journalists and media organisations should be done in a balanced, unbiased and gender sensitive manner unlike in Nepali where journalism was not very "successful in making post-conflict reporting balanced and gender sensitised" (Koirala, 2016:20). The Nepali experience, which was about reporting post-Maoists conflict, showed that the environment was not secured for women journalists to report. It should be noted however that this was not only restricted to women because during the conflict, journalists irrespective of gender were threaten and abused by government security agents and Maoists army. However, in the post conflict period, women journalists experienced "verbal abuse and attacks more than men" (Koirala, 2016:124), discrimination in terms of news assignments, promotions and salary. The issues reported on the post conflict also did not largely cover issues related to the plight of women and children who largely suffered the conflict as a result of atrocities committed by government and insurgents' armies. Furthermore Koirala (2016) argued that war literature had suggested that there were differences in terms of issues reported by women and men journalists.

Women journalists concentrate more on human sufferings than macho conflict reporting on issues related to number of people murdered, body injured as well as weapons and armies. The post insurgency reporting, on the other hand, should deal with both issues reported during insurgency and still occur in the post insurgency period.

SOURCES OF INFORMATION IN POST-INSURGENCY REPORTING

The fundamental arsenals journalists have in the business of reporting not only post- insurgency situation are sources of information that are expected to be accessible and credible. This is more requested in the conflict and post-insurgency circumstances in which information is needed most to reintegrate and settle the conflicting and affected parties. Therefore, we argue that journalists, who should be reporting post-insurgency issues should take, understand, deal and establish beneficial relationship with sources such as executive officers of agencies, victims of insurgency, security officers, civil society organisations and consultants.

The executive officers refer to the elected officials, right from the governor of a state to the local government counselor of the areas affected by insurgency in the northeastern Nigeria. It also includes ministers, commissioners and politically appointed people such as the members of north east development initiative who are saddled with specific responsibilities of handing issues that will make affected people to return peaceful coexistence in the region. This includes staff and officials of the National Emergency Management Agency and States' Emergency Management Agencies.

Insurgency victims, especially those that have been relocated to their various communities are believed to constitute part of the credible source of information for journalists. This source will enable post-insurgency journalists to find out how the government officials and indeed the NGOs have been providing supports as requested in the mandate of their operations. This includes Internally Displaced Persons who are individuals that are yet to be resettled, in the liberated and re-constructed villages. They are people who still stay in over 30 major and satellite camps in Maiduguri, Yola, Abuja, Yobe and other local governments (United Nations Humanitarian and Refugee Commission, UNHCR, 2017). The commission stated that there were approximately two million displaced persons in Nigeria and they will provide volume of credible information on how they are assisted and of course how their fundamental rights might be violated either in the camps or in the process of resettlement.

It was also found that state-security agency and their civilian counterparts such as Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) and hunters could serve as vital sources of information. These people provide physical protection to both insurgency victims and humanitarian workers. The state security agency includes the police, military, customs, immigration and civil defence corps. On the other hand, the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) and hunters are non-state security actors that are stationed in various camps and in liberated and resettled villages. They have vital information that will help in accurate reporting of post-insurgency issues. Hunters are substantially engaged by governments to fight insurgents and they participate in ensuring that post-insurgency effort becomes reliable. Therefore, they can provide

valuable information not only to journalists but the state security agents, and they can guide journalists on how to escape in a situation whereby they are trapped in the course of their duty.

There are numerous local and international non-governmental organisations and consultants that provide shelter, protection, psychosocial and humanitarian assistance in the insurgency and post-insurgency period. According to Sawab (2017) there were hundreds of such organisations officially registered in the region and they could make life easy and sometime difficult in the post-insurgency period. The organisations serve as sources of information because they have data on all or most of the issues related to the insurgency and post-insurgency in the northeastern Nigeria. These organisations include international and local organisations that render humanitarian assistance to the victims of insurgency in the post-insurgency period. On the other hand, consultants who provide technical supports to UN agencies and NGOs can serve as great sources of credible information to journalists related to post-insurgency issues. However, the information given should always be treated with utmost care because some consultants could probably misguide journalists in order to protect part of their means of livelihood.

It is pertinent for us to emphasis here that the listed sources in this paper are general in nature. Journalists can get valuable, factual information from individual members who are not authorized to speak. These kinds of individual might be working in various governmental and non-governmental agencies.

CHALLENGES AND MECHANISMS IN POST-INSURGENCY REPORTING

We have identified lots of challenges, journalists who shall cover post insurgency issues in the northeast, are likely to experience. It should be understood, however, that the challenges that will be faced in post insurgency reporting are not much different from those encountered during time of insurgency. The challenges are situated within professionalism and risk management in the reporting of terror groups and violent extremism in north east Nigeria. The challenges journalists could encounter involve killings, attacks on media houses and journalists, threats through text messages, detention and imprisonment, confiscation of working equipment such as professional computer, midget and camera, legal suite against media organisations and journalists as well as deliberate denial of information, especially among some Non-governmental organisations and government officials. The identified challenges are also found during insurgency as Pate and Hamza (2017) suggested in their study. However, journalists can scale through these challenges by deploying professional approaches that are used by experienced journalists and even security agents who tried to get information.

Journalists should properly and officially be introduced to the news sources. This applies to resident journalists in the northeastern who always cover the region in the conflict and non- conflict periods. The introduction should be done by either news medium or the Nigeria Union of Journalists (NUJ) or both to government institutions, security agents, UN agencies and NGOs. Journalists reporting post-insurgency can cover their identity where necessary so that they will not be hunted, injured, arrested, detained or killed by security operatives or insurgents or even both. Post-insurgency journalists should try to get clearance from security officers where necessary. The security agents shall inform and certify that roads to the liberated and resettled communities as safe for journalists visit, assessment and reporting. Journalists can also disguise in a situation where their lives are at risk while covering post-insurgency issues. Resident journalists in the northeast can also relocate from known abode to avoid attack and arrest while covering post-insurgency issues. In order to get cover and protection, journalists who report post- insurgency should nurture and maintain cordial and close relationship with the Nigerian Union of Journalists and Nigerian Guild of Editors. These professional bodies will use their organisational structures and influence to rescue and defend a journalist who is either being tortured, arrested, detained or even kidnapped by any of the sources of information in the process of reporting post- insurgency issues. Journalists should also equip themselves with the provisions of international conventions and agreements that provide UN and NGOs frameworks to operate insurgency affected areas like northeastern Nigeria. This knowledge will empower journalists with mechanism to overcome the challenges of non-disclosure of information in the areas of resource management and misappropriation of interventions. Journalists should work as teams of colleagues that are pursuing common goal. This will enable them to strengthen, protect and help each other.

JOURNALISTIC TOOLS AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE POST-INSURGENCY REPORTING

Apart from the journalistic skills acquired by journalists to enable them report post- insurgency issues, other requirements and tools certainly become necessary to enhance their job as information providers. Journalism is a profession that highly recognizes the ability to utilize certain tools for effective reporting. The era of using pen and paper alone to record happenings and events is gradually becoming old fashion because of the advent of new information and communication technologies. The availability of the communication technologies and the journalists' ability to harness these gadgets will certainly impact positively on the quality of information being disseminated to the members of the audience. Computer and multi-media skills enable information to be presented in different formats showing different angles to a story. Reports on post-insurgency activities in the northeast if professionally and constructively treated will provide audience with certain desired elements such as visuals, audio, text or graphics for effective information consumption.

Social media is regarded in journalism both as a tool and source of information that enrich journalistic practice in various ways. Omosotomhe and Olley (2018) note that journalists use social media more often than not in their daily work of gathering and disseminating information in order to extend their reach and coverage. Hence, the need for journalists irrespective of their medium to be skillful and materially equipped with gadgets such as, computer, smart phones and internet facility is essential. However, the staff could be supported by their organizations through provision of the necessary tools and facilities.

Also, in addition to identifying the issues, sources of information and the likely challenges in reporting post insurgency, journalists need high level of awareness and knowledge of security engagement and policy frameworks to guide their efforts towards repositioning the situation in the north east. This becomes important for media organizations and the journalists to see the need to interact more frequently with stakeholders at meetings, workshops and other functions where issues concerning policies and security engagements are being discussed. Having this opportunity will increase their knowledge and understanding of the issues to be constructively reported about, and also guide them in selecting news items.

CONCLUSION

The situation in northeastern Nigeria is gradually moving to the post-insurgency era that requires adequate plan and preparation from journalists in order to fulfill their constitutional and professional responsibilities. This includes understanding the fundamental issues that should be reported and sources available in the area which might be different when compared to the insurgency period. Issues of reconciliation, reintegration, resettlement, resource management and meeting the basic needs of the people, particularly Internally Displaced Persons in the post- insurgency northeastern Nigeria should be part of the central focus of journalists and media organisations. International non-governmental organisations, security operatives and government emergency agencies are essential sources of information to the post-insurgency journalist in north east Nigeria. Hence, if the tips, guides, challenges and other issues discussed here are taken into cognizance, the journalists' effort towards providing constructive reports in the post- insurgency era is certainly going to be successful and will lead to a positive transformation of the insurgency affected communities in the northeast Nigeria.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Media and Journalists have been observed to have played significant role during the peak of the insurgency in northeastern Nigeria and are still contributing significantly towards restoring peace and building the region. This study has reviewed relevant literature on the issues around reporting insurgency and post-insurgency activities and further recommends the following in achieving objective, accurate and comprehensive post-insurgency reporting:

1. The northeast has not fully recovered from the insurgency as such media organisations and government should provide all safety measures to minimize risks and danger that can affect journalists covering issues relating to the insurgency and post-insurgency.
2. Journalists should report issues constructively by providing information that will raise hope for the people affected by the insurgency and minimize publishing sensational stories.
3. Local media should be given adequate funding to strengthen their capacity to report happenings in their locality to gain the confidence of the audience who perhaps prefer foreign media to local media reporting on insurgency or post-insurgency matters.
4. Media organisations should regularly provide capacity building trainings to enable journalists identify relevant sources of information; overcome challenges and also acquire emerging skills.
5. Digital media platforms owned by mainstream media should be strengthened to counter fake news on issues relating to insurgency as being peddled on social media.
6. Governments need to recognize and consider the media and journalists as stakeholders in formulating and implementing policies relating to post-insurgency activities.
7. Further research on media and journalists engagement during insurgency and post- insurgency should be carried out on a large scale to generate more empirical data and this should include ethical issues in reporting insurgency and post insurgency.

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EXAMINING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE USE OF PROSCRIPTION ORDERS IN COMBATING TERRORISM IN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

The crime of terrorism has attracted various responses by many countries of the world. In Nigeria, proscription orders and other mechanisms have been used in combating terrorism. Accordingly, Boko Haram, Indigenous Peoples of Biafra and Islamic Movement of Nigeria have been proscribed. This work examines the effectiveness of the use of proscription orders in combating terrorism in Nigeria. Using doctrinal methodology, the work found that the use of proscription orders in combating terrorism in Nigeria is effective to the extent that it has relatively prevented an emergence of new violent organisations, comparatively curtailed an upsurge of increasing violent activities of some of the proscribed organisations, strained their relationships with some sponsors, crippled an overt supply of resources to the organisations and helped in securing necessary conditions for support by other countries of the world in combating terrorism. The work recommends an unbiased and timely use of proscription orders; increased further collaborations with other countries of the world; demonstration of strong political will against terrorism by the Nigerian State and; amendment as well as increased enforcement of terrorism laws in order to strengthen the effectiveness of the use of proscription orders in combating terrorism in Nigeria.

Keywords

Effectiveness, Designation, Listing, Proscription, Proscription Orders, Terrorism, Terrorist Organisations.

1. INTRODUCTION

Terrorism in any part of the world is usually associated with vicious destruction of lives and property, together with other consequences. No part of the world seems safe as the world continues to witness recurring cases of terrorism identified with different terrorist organisations or groups (Fahmy, 2006, p. 2). In Nigeria, the government continue to hold that insurgent sects perpetrating terrorism have been technically defeated. Contrary to the assertion, terrorism has continued to seriously threaten security of lives and property; shaken national unity, cripple economic development and invade human rights of millions of people in Nigeria (Hanson, 2019, p. 204). The Boko Haram, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB), Fulani Herdsmen and Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) are some of the violent organisations identified with acts of terrorism in Nigeria. However, Boko Haram has particularly been associated with widespread acts of terrorism involving hijackings, kidnaping, hostage taking mass killings, arsons, bombings and assassinations, which it usually voluntarily claims responsibilities (York, 2011). In its response to terrorist acts perpetrated by these groups, the Nigerian State has adopted and used many mechanisms, including proscription orders. Accordingly, Boko Haram, IPOB and IMN have been proscribed by the Nigerian State.

Notably, the use of proscription orders in combating terrorism is a response mechanism practised by many countries of the world mainly as a strategy for suppression of terrorism (Lynch, McGarrity and Williams, 2019, p. 2). The fundamental rationale is to delegitimise the concerned groups and cut off external support by criminalising interactions with these groups (Lynch, McGarrity and Williams, 2019, p. 2). Proscriptions often provide the government with a multifaceted arsenal of administrative, legal, and political means of combating terrorism (Gross, 2011, p. 46). In Australia, the three principal rationales of proscription in the prevention of terrorism include: ease of proof; provision of a basis for the criminalisation of fundraising for the groups and other activities; and presentation of a clear symbol of public revulsion and reassurance that severe measures are being taken against the groups (Lynch, McGarrity and Williams, 2019, p. 2). These justifications form the bases for the use of proscription order in combating terrorism in many countries of the world.

This work is divided into four parts. Part one, the introduction, provides the background of the work. Part two, provides a brief understanding of proscription, examines the law on proscription in Nigeria and makes comparisons with United States of America (US) and United Kingdom (UK). In part three, the work examines the consequences of the use of proscription orders in combating terrorism. Part four discusses the effectiveness of the use of proscription orders in combating terrorism in Nigeria. Part five makes the recommendations while six is the conclusion.

2. PROSCRIPTION OF TERRORIST ORGANISATION AND THE LAW

Proscription of terrorist group is the act of listing an armed group as a designated terrorist organisation (Haspeslagh, 2013, p. 189). It involves the identification of an organisation, which is involved in or associated with terrorism and the labeling or designation or listing of such organisation as a terrorist organisation with attendant consequences. Once such organisation is designated, it is prohibited from operating for the purpose with which it has been associated. Accordingly, all rights and benefits hitherto accruable to it become barred from the time of the proscription. It has been maintained that since September 11, 2001 terrorist attack in the US (9/11) and the emergence of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), the proscription of militants, rebel movements and non-state armed groups have become a prominent policy tool in dealing with terrorism (Haspeslagh, 2013, p. 189). Accordingly, International Organisations and individual states have been identified to have developed lists of proscribed organisations that are designated as “Foreign Terrorist Organisations” (FTOs) (Haspeslagh, 2013, p. 189). It is believed that using proscription orders against violent organisations, largely helped further contain their security threats. Consequently, the logic of proscription remains that by blocking material support and raising the costs of pursuing terrorist activities will force individuals and these organisations to abandon their act of terrorism (Haspeslagh, 2013, p. 189; Udofa and Hanson, 2020, p. 43).

Without doubt, the 9/11 terrorist attacks resulted in immediate response to terrorism, including pronounced transformation in the status of proscription of terrorist organisations and individuals globally (Lynch, McGarrity and Williams, 2019, p. 2). The United Nation (UN), through Security Council Resolution 1373 of 2001 enjoined member states to institute mechanisms to deal with terrorism and terrorists financing (S/RES/1373(2001)). Countries which had not hitherto ratified and domesticated relevant conventions on terrorism were obliged to do so and, those ones without national counterterrorism legislations were required to enact them for use in combating terrorism. The legislative responses to these demands by member states were fast. As such, the Australian government, in 2001, passed the Charter of the United Nations (Anti-Terrorism Measures) Regulations 2001 and in 2002, the Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 was passed (Jarvis and Legrand, 2018, p. 204). The US, which has been at the forefront of the war against terrorism enacted the Patriot Act 2001, and began to engineer the globalisation of anti-terrorism legislations around the world (Sampson, 2010, p. 42). Canada responded with the enactment of Anti-Terrorism Act 2001 (Jarvis and Legrand, 2018, p. 204). The United Kingdom, which had reviewed and merged its counterterrorism powers under the considerable Terrorism Act 2000, went further to fortify its existing powers with the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (Jarvis and Legrand, 2018, p. 204).

In the US, some of the legislations which deal with the proscription of terrorist organisations include Immigration and Nationality Act 1965 (INA), Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), US Patriot Act of 2001 and Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), among others. All these legislations accommodate the proscription of Foreign Terrorist Organisations" (FTO) and other matters ancillary to terrorist organisations in the US. The AEDPA, in its section 302, amends chapter 2 of title II of INA (8 U.S.C. 1181 et seq.) by adding at the end, section 219, which provides for Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. If an organisation is deemed to fall within the provisions of the INA, the Bureau of Counterterrorism prepares an administrative record, typically including both classified and open sources of information which is submitted to the Secretary of State. Under section 219(1) of the INA, the Secretary of State is authorised to designate an organisation as a foreign terrorist organisation if he finds that:

- (a) the organisation is a foreign organisation;
- (b) the organisation engages in terrorist activity; and
- (c) the terrorist activity of the organisation threatens the security of US nationals or the national security of the US.

These are the requirements set out by the Act to qualify an organisation for proscription. Section 219 (2) of the Act provides for the procedure to designate a terrorist organisation. According to this section, if the Secretary of State believes an organisation satisfies the criteria as set out, he must consult with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney- General before the designation is finally made. Once an organisation is determined to warrant designation, the Secretary of State must notify Congress of the intention of his findings that the organisation satisfies the requirement of the law for proscription and the factual basis of his findings. If after the expiration of the seven days of such notification and the Congress does not review and disapprove of same, the Secretary is to publish the designation in the Federal Register and the organisation stands proscribed. However, by section 219(2) (b)(ii), any such designation shall cease to have effect upon an Act of Congress disapproving such designation. However, the designated organisations have right to seek judicial review of the designation.

In UK, proscription of terrorist organisations is provided under Part 2 of Terrorism Act 2000. Here, it is the Home Secretary that makes the initial decision of selecting the organisations to be proscribed. In doing so, he has to take into account factors including: the nature and scale of an organisation"s activities; the specific threat that it poses to the UK; the specific threat that it poses to British nationals overseas; the extent of the organisation"s presence in the UK; and the need to support other members of the international community in the global fight against terrorism (UK Terrorism Act 2000 Pt. II S. 3(4)). The organisations are thus selected by

Home Secretary on the basis of information including classified materials from UK and foreign intelligence services, along with police, security and legal advice. A working group, within the government service representing all the interested parties then meets and scrutinises proscriptions. The UK Parliament is then consulted. The Home Secretary then places an Order before parliament listing all the proscribed groups (UK Terrorism Act 2000 Pt. II S. 3(4)). The list is debated and the order approved or rejected wholly by parliament as the case may be.

3. TERRORISM PROSCRIPTION IN NIGERIAN

The response by the Nigerian State to the UN demands witnessed the enactment of legislations including the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment, etc.) Act, 2002, now the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act 2004, Cap E1 LFN 2004 (EFCCA); Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps Act 2007, Cap N146 LFN 2004 (NSCDCA); Terrorism Prevention Act, 2011 as amended in 2013 (TPA 2011 as amended); and Money Laundering Act 2012 (MLA). However, the TPA 2011 as amended is the primary legislation on terrorism in Nigeria. It has twelve UN treaties on terrorism incorporated into it in section 40 of the Act. Section 2 of this legislation provides for the proscription of terrorist organisations and the procedure for such proscription thus;

- (1) Where two or more persons associate for the purpose of or where an organisation engages in -
 - (a) participating or collaborating in an act of terrorism;
 - (b) promoting, encouraging or exhorting others to commit an act of terrorism: or
 - (c) setting up or pursuing acts of terrorism,

the judge in Chambers may on an application made by the Attorney General, National Security Adviser or Inspector General of Police on the approval of the President declare any entity to be a proscribed organisation and the notice should be published in official gazette.

- (2) An order made under subsection (1) of this section shall be published in the official gazette, in two national newspapers and at such other places as the judge in Chambers may determine.

A combined reading of sections 2(1) and (2) of the Act, shows that the procedure for obtaining a declaration proscribing a group as a terrorist organisation requires that: the President, by way of proclamation, gives approval to the Attorney-General of the Federation or National Security Adviser or Inspector-General of Police to apply to the Judge in Chambers by way of ex-parte application for issuance of an order of Court declaring a specified entity a proscribed organisation

(Adangor, 2018, p. 148). Upon presentation of this application, the Court may grant the order declaring the specified entity a proscribed organisation. This Order is, under section 2(1) (c) of the Act, required to be published in the Official Gazette of the Federal Government and in two; national newspapers and at such other places as the court may determine. Once this is done, the organisation remains proscribed with attendance consequences. This was the case with the proscription of Boko Haram terrorist group in 2013 and published in the Official Gazette of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Terrorism (Prevention) (Proscription (Order) Notice, 2013 in No. 34, volume 100); IPOB in 2017 (Terrorism (Prevention) (Proscription Order) Notice, 2017 in volume 104); and IMN in 2019 (Terrorism (Prevention) Proscription Order Notice, 2019).

In Nigeria therefore, by virtue of section 2(1) of the TPA 2011 as amended, the consideration to determine the group to be proscribed, is exclusively that of the executive. Such issue is resolved by the President through the Attorney-General of the Federation or National Security Adviser or Inspector-General of Police, before it is presented to the Court for issuance of proscription order. Since the application for proscription order is heard and granted ex-parte, the affected organisation cannot oppose such application. Accordingly, the group goes to court, on the return date, only to show why the proscription order should be withdrawn, but not why it should not be made, same having already been made (Adangor, 2018, p. 148).

Notably too, the legislature is excluded from being involved in the proscription procedure. The decision to proceed to Court against any group for proscription by the President is not subject to legislative considerations. Hence, what informs the President's decision is entirely within the prejudices of the President (Adangor, 2018, p. 152). It has been argued that it is not unlikely for the President to be influenced by extraneous considerations such as ethnic, regional, religious, or political affiliations in coming to the conclusion that an order proscribing an organisation should be granted under the Act (Adangor, 2018, p. 152). This at times exposes the President to accusations bothering on ethnic chauvinism as exemplified in his failure to proscribe armed Fulani herdsmen in spite of their involvement in acts of terrorism in Nigeria and several demands in that regard (Mamah and Agbo, 2018). The haste in the proscription of IPOB was also a subject of criticism, particularly in the light of the fact that IPOB was considered by many to be largely a non-violence organisation before proscription. This provides the tendency of subjecting such decisions to wider political criticisms resulting in rejection by other countries who disagree with the decision as in the case of IPOB. It is such decision that has seen Namdi Kano, leader of IPOB, walking the streets of other countries of the world freely. This could be avoided. Proscription in Nigeria should therefore follow an established procedure according to law, which must reflect basic democratic principles and international norms without political, religious, social, ethnic or regional prejudices. Where the contrary is the case, collaborations with other countries of the world to combat terrorism would likely fail to yield desired result, leading to

a situation where the organisation is proscribed by the target state yet allowed to operate by other states of the world, as in the case of IPOB.

Comparatively therefore, it is crystal that firstly, there exist a higher degree in the decision-making procedure in the US and UK than in Nigeria concerning the proscription of terrorist organisations. Thus in US and UK, the executive, the legislature and the judiciary are all involved in the proscription procedure, with wider areas of consideration. However, in Nigeria, it is only the executive and the judiciary, with limited areas of consideration. Secondly, there is presence of a degree of democratic oversight involved in the proscription of terrorist organisations in US and UK, which is absent in Nigeria. In US and UK, the consideration of proscription of terrorist organisation must be laid before US Congress and UK Parliament respectively, who are to deliberate on it and reject the proscription or approve same as the case may be. Also in US, by section 219(2)(B)(ii) of ATEDPA 1996, if within seven days of proscription, Congress disapproves of same, a proscribed organisation ceases to be proscribed.

In Nigeria, there are no such oversight functions for the existing Federal Houses of Legislatures. This is more so as the proscription order in Nigeria is made by the court, which judicial functions are subject to review by it alone and legislative functions are separated from it. Although the TPA 2011, as amended, leaves proscription decision in the executive, the pronouncement is made by the Court. The National Assembly has no part in proscription of organisations in Nigeria. Apart from this, there is also absence of fair hearing because no organisation that is proceeded against for proscription is provided an opportunity to be heard before being proscribed. They are also not seen to be treated fairly as no application for withdrawal of proscription order has ever succeeded. These absences leave much to be desired, hence the need for further amendment of the amended TPA 2011 to reflect these inadequacies.

4. CONSEQUENCES OF THE USE OF PROSCRIPTIONS ORDERS

Proscription constitutes a significant aspect of counterterrorism frameworks in many countries of the world and its use plays a critical role in the global fight against terrorism. There are usually many intended consequences of the use of proscription orders in combating terrorism. Primarily, proscription constitutes an effective means of inhibiting support for terrorist activities and pressuring organisations to end terrorism. Formal proscription is a typical pre-requisite for the seizure or freezing of the organisation's assets; prevention of its members from soliciting for and obtaining support or sponsorship; banning of the organisation from taking parts in political activities; and prevention of other states from dealing with the organisation (Jarvis & Legrand, 2018, p. 206.) Others include prevention of its members from travelling across national and international borders; and exposure of members to extradition or prosecution (UN Security Council Resolution 1373 of 2001, S/

RES/1373(2001; INA, s. 219(2)(C)). Proscription is also crucial to lack of significant domestic political denigration that trails potentially controversial counterterrorism actions such as extra-judicial killings (Jarvis and Legrand, 2018, p. 201).

Furthermore, proscription constitutes a representation of a fulcrum of states' counterterrorism capabilities, ambitions and political will in combating terrorism. It remains a means to signal organisation's illegitimacy and creates a hostile operating environment for the organisation, particularly in soliciting support and raising funds (Legrand, 2014, p. 6; Jarvis and Legrand, 2018, p. 206). It places financial and criminal sanctions on the proscribed organisation, which significantly reduces the organisation's capacity to commit terrorist acts (Jarvis and Legrand, 2018, p. 206). It stigmatises and isolates designated organisations internationally and deters donations or contributions or economic transactions with them (Jarvis and Legrand, 2018, p. 206). It is used to: communicate government's political stance on a conflict involving a non-state actor; strengthen global efforts to annihilate common threats presented by the concerned organisation; activate policing powers targeting the specific proscribed organisation, active sympathisers, sponsors and supporters; and to augment government's diplomatic relationship with other states of the world (Jarvis & Legrand, 2018; Haspeslagh, 2013, p. 192).

In Nigeria, proscription makes it a criminal offence for anybody to amongst others: belong, or profess to belong, to the proscribed organisation with a penalty of 20 years imprisonment; solicit, invite or render support for such proscribed organisation; harbour or hinder the arrest of members of a terrorist organisation; provide training or instruction to terrorist organisation; conceal information about acts of terrorism of a terrorist organisation; incite or promote membership in a terrorist organisation or solicits property for the benefit of a terrorist organisation; express an opinion or belief that is supportive of such proscribed organisation or recklessly as to whether a person to whom the expression is directed will be encouraged to support such proscribed organisation; provide devices to terrorist organisation; recruit persons to be members of terrorist organisations or take part in terrorist activities; finance a terrorist organisation; deal in the property of a terrorist organisation; and to arrange, manage or assist in arranging or managing a meeting in the knowledge that the meeting is to support or further the activities of such proscribed organisation, or is to be addressed by a person who belongs or professes to belong to such proscribed organisation. These are provided for in sections 2 to 16 of the TPA 2011 as amended and are equally within the prohibited sphere of the legislations on terrorism of other countries of the world, like Britain. (Britain Terrorism Act 2000, sections 11, 12 and 13).

Apart from the intended consequences of proscription, significant unintended consequences also exist. One of such unintended consequences includes the fact that proscription may stimulate targeted organisations to transform their structures or the organisations rather than disbanding them (Dongen, 2011, p. 366). It may

also operate to promote and potentially emboldens targeted organisations (Legrand, 2014, p. 17). Designation could also further radicalise terrorist organisation and push it to strengthen international linkages with other terrorist groups (Legrand, 2014, p. 18). Finally, proscription regimes can aggravate attempts at peace and reconciliation as well as codify antagonistic relations between states and sections of their societies (Jarvis and Legrand, 2018, p. 206).

5. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE USE OF PROSCRIPTION ORDERS

Notwithstanding existing unintended consequences of proscription, the use of proscription orders in combating terrorism in Nigeria is effective to a significant extent. Firstly, it has relatively prevented the emergence of new violent organisations in Nigeria and kept those ones which were timeously proscribed in check. This is evidenced in the emergence of IPOB and IMN and commencement of violent acts of terrorism in 2015 and 2018 and timeous proscription in 2017 and 2019 respectively (Ekpo and Agorye, 2018, p. 37). The timeous proscription, without doubt, kept them in checks and prevented them from firmly establishing their presence in Nigeria. Many individuals and organisations that would have overtly made provisions and support for the group could not do so. Accordingly, they received less support from some sponsors and were rejected, monitored, arrested and prosecuted by the Nigerian State. However, where there is inordinate delay in proscription of violent organisation, such organisation usually gained grounds, wins part of the populace support, sponsorship and secures operational base before proscription. This is what contributed to the reduction of Boko Haram activities, which came into existence in 2002, commenced deadly terrorist attacks in Nigeria in 2009 and continued till 2013 before it was proscribed (Hanson, 2019, p. 206). The delay in the proscription of Boko Haram was caused by many indices including lack of strong political will by the then Goodluck Jonathan administration, politicization of security issues and ethnic chauvinism. Thus proscription decision should be made timely to nip in the bud the violent activities of organisations before escalating to an uncontrollable degree. This was the omission made by the Nigerian State when it failed to proscribed Boko Haram early in time at the beginning of hostilities in 2009 before escalation of hostilities followed then by the late proscription in 2013.

Secondly, it has curtailed rapid growth of proscribed organisations and their violent activities, particularly, in the primary stages of their operations. Proscription orders effectively sends clear messages to people that involvement with such organisations in Nigeria or overseas, is prohibited (Jarvis and Legrand, 2018, p. 206). Consequently, many members of the proscribed organisations are usually accosted, arrested and prosecuted. In Nigeria, although the proscription of IPOB has been widely criticised, albeit rejected on grounds that the group is relatively a non-violent organisation, its proscription has relatively kept the Organisation in check in Nigeria. Similarly, when some members of the IMN went on mass protest, in the early period of its proscription, demanding for the release of their leader, Ibra-

him Zakzaki, many were arrested and their activities aborted by the Nigerian State (Enumah, 2018). The approach makes the prosecution of members of proscribed organisations easily conducted and convictions secured.

Thirdly, it has successfully communicated to international community and independent states that Nigeria rejects claims to legitimacy by proscribed organisations. This communication aims at securing needed conditions for support from international community and independent states in dealing with the groups as terrorist organisations (Jarvis and Legrand, 2018, p. 206). This is so since the commission of any offence by proscribed organisation in Nigeria has an extra-territorial jurisdiction with regard to prosecution (TPA 2011 as amended). Accordingly, where any member of a proscribed organisation is arrested outside Nigeria and the arresting state is unwilling to prosecute; such state is obliged under UN instruments on terrorism to extradite the person to Nigeria for prosecution. This is in line with the supports provided for target States by UN member states through UN instruments on terrorism, particularly, UN Resolution 1368 of 2001 (S/RES/1368(2001) and UN Resolution 1373 of 2001 (S/RES/1373(2001)). However, where the proscription of an organisation falls short of democratic principles and international norms and is widely criticised and rejected, particularly by other states of the world, its members may be allowed to move freely in those countries of the world without being arrested or extradited. This is the case with Nandi Kano, leader of IPOB who has been touring many countries of the world without being arrested and extradited.

Fourthly, it has effectively heightened public awareness and knowledge of the proscribed organisations, strained their relations with sponsors and greatly crippled their supply of resources (Jarvis and Legrand, 2018, 206). The effect of proscription has a direct impact on how states and other parties engage with those organisations. The awareness and knowledge that an organisation is proscribed usually creates a gap between the organisation and sponsors or would be sponsors and supporters (Jarvis and Legrand, 2018, 206). It similarly encourages zero-tolerance counterterrorism approaches by setting disincentives to negotiated solutions and non-violent engagement at the beginning. It has been maintained that the main aim of proscription is to delegitimize the groups and cut off external support by criminalising interactions with these actors (Ben and Sullivan, 2010, p. 6). Thus in Sri Lanka, for instance, post-9/11 activities affected the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in terms of raising funds, legitimacy, and access to weapons because many countries had listed the group as a terrorist organisation, therefore cutting off funds for the group (Haspeslagh, 2013, p. 197).

In Nigeria, the proscription of terrorist organisations has largely impacted on their support and supply sources. Initially, support and sources of supply for Boko Haram, for instance, came from organisations and influential individuals in Nigeria. In January 2012, former President Jonathan acknowledged that Boko Haram sympathisers were in the executive, legislative and judicial arm of his government

including the security agencies (Guitta and Simcox, 2014, p. 8). Accordingly, certain persons identified to be sponsors of Boko Haram including Senator, Ali Ndume of Borno State, was arrested and prosecuted for sponsoring Boko Haram and other related offences. Although the charge against him was dismissed in 2011, this sent strong deterring signal against sponsorships of terrorism in Nigeria. Also, the arrest, detention and trial of El Zazaki, leader of the IMN and that of Namdi Kanu, leader of IPOB, have impacted on the support and supply sources of these terror groups in Nigeria as their activities are greatly reduced in Nigeria. This has, to a greater extent, prevented the organisation from enjoying easy supply of funds and other materials from donations and gifts overtly as it were in earlier times before proscription with IMN and IPOB.

6. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Terrorism has been shown to be perpetrated by both individuals and violent organisations. These perpetrators of terrorism have been proceeded against in variety of ways by target states and other states of the world. In doing this, many response mechanisms have been adopted by these states, one of which is the use of proscription orders. This strategy gets violent organisations listed as terrorist organisations and accordingly prohibited from operations with penal sanctions together with other consequential effects.

In Nigeria, this response mechanism is accommodated in the TPA 2011 as amended and has been used against Boko Haram, IPOB and IMN. Undoubtedly, this response mechanism has been shown to be generally effective particularly when used timeously. According to McLellan, as stated by Legrand, States should be able to disable organisations before they are able to put hijackers on planes or threaten the sense of security of the states and mechanisms should be put in place to go after terrorist organizations and put them out of business (2014, p. 5).

This work recommends the following;

- (i) An unbiased and timely use of proscription orders in combating terrorism in Nigeria. The proscription decision and the process of identification of terrorist groups should be timeous and laced with fair hearing without prejudice. Thus, the Nigerian State need not wait for terrorist organisations to writ large with uncontrollable act of terrorist violence before contending them. They should be nipped in the bud as quickly as possible and in the beginning of hostilities through the use of proscription orders.
- (ii) Proscription of terrorist organisations in Nigeria should be consistent with constitutional morality and international protocol in order to further strengthen collaborations with other countries against the organisation. This is so because once an organisation is proscribed, collaboration with other countries becomes necessary in combating their violent activities. Where the

proscription fails to be consistent with constitutional morality and international protocol, such collaborations would fail. This would operate to prevent cases where an organisation is proscribed in Nigeria, yet members of such organisation are allowed to operate freely in other countries of the world.

- (iii) The Nigerian State should demonstrate a much stronger political will in dealing with terrorism. This is so because despite the huge political, diplomatic, legislative and military investments in counterterrorism, the commitment of the Nigerian Government to combat terrorism is seriously undermined by its reluctance to effectively halt terrorist acts perpetrated by armed Fulani herdsman and their various support organisations. Thus violence organisations should not be allowed to operate without proscription at all, as in the case of the armed Fulani Herdsmen. The de-radicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration of terrorists into the society under Operation Safe Corridor which appears similar to amnesty should not be made to precede the end of hostilities by the terror organisations (Dataphyte, 2020). A proposal for the establishment of an agency for the education, rehabilitation, de-radicalisation and integration of repentant insurgents in Nigeria, which precedes the end of hostilities of Boko Haram, as was done in Nigeria appears to undermine such stronger will.
- (iv) Amendment of the law on terrorism is also recommended in order to make the use of proscription orders more effective in combating terrorism in Nigeria. Members of the National Assembly should not shy away from amending terrorism laws in Nigeria to accommodate current realities, democratic principles particularly, fair hearing without fear that it could be used against political opponents. The amendment should make the Legislature, Executive and Judiciary part of proscription decisions in Nigeria. The executive should not solely be vested with powers to determine the organisation to be proscribed and the reasons for doing so. Particularly, the National Assembly should be made to debate, within a specified time frame, whether or not a particular group should be proscribed. This would strengthen the democratic oversight mechanisms of proscription frameworks to reduce executive discretion in the proscription of terrorist organisations. Notably, the amendment relating to proscription must be significantly followed with vigorous enforcement in order to yield the required result.

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THE MILITARY, BOKO HARAM, AND THE DIALECTICS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

This paper interrogates the ongoing counterinsurgency operations by the Nigerian military against Boko Haram insurgents. This is against the backdrop of the intractability of the jihadist insurgency whose asymmetrical dynamics tend to have posed a daunting challenge to the conventional might and strategy of the Nigerian military. By way of a desk research that draws substantively on scholarly and policy literature, the paper posits that the counterinsurgency operations have been protracted and precarious owing largely to the asymmetrical pragmatism of the insurgents' strategy, which tend to have afforded them significant measure of tactical advantage over the government forces. The paper makes a case for the adoption of a hybrid strategy as a way out of the seeming viscid manacle of current counterinsurgency endeavour in Nigeria.

Keywords

Asymmetric violence, Boko Haram, counterinsurgency operations, military, strategic interaction.

INTRODUCTION

Insurgency is a typical instance of an asymmetric warfare. Asymmetric warfare has to do with “military tactic that exploits the opponent’s weaknesses and vulnerabilities and emphasizes differences in forces, technologies, weapons and rules of engagement” (Steponova, 2008, p.15). It has been, arguably, regarded as a tactic of ‘the weak’ against ‘the strong’ in the context of unconventional violent conflict (Steponova, 2008). An asymmetrical conflict is often characterized by gross disparities in terms of actors’ military, economic and technological combat-capabilities. Such power imbalances are widened by both strategic and structural asymmetries,

especially the status-imbalance between a non-/ sub-state actor and a state (Gallo & Marzano, 2009). Hence, asymmetrical violence is often resorted to by “the side that is not only physically and technically weaker but also has a lower formal status in an asymmetrical confrontation” (Steponova, 2008, p.14).

Quite like insurgency, counterinsurgency highlights a veritable dynamic of asymmetric military confrontation. In this respect, a state actor is engaged in a non-regular warfare where might is right, and the ethos of warfare hardly apply. In that regard, a state-actor wages a war of attrition on the insurgent’s forces whilst the insurgents struggle for survival through sundry subversive defensive strategies, including terrorism (Okoli&Iortyer, 2014; Amnesty International, 2015; UNDP, 2018). In that context, the belligerents are involved in a non-regular armed contest in which their conventional military superiorities and vulnerabilities are mediated by their comparative power, strategy and/ or status/ structure asymmetries. By the dynamics of these asymmetrical relations, none of the parties reserves any exclusive winning advantage beyond what its tactics and fighting will could afford it. Expectedly, while the state actor(s) seek(s) to capitalize on military assaults based on the imperative of civilian defence, the insurgents’ forces would be inclined to maximizing their military defence and civilian attacks. And whereas the state actor(s) may be constrained and restrained by moral cum humanitarian concerns of warfare, the insurgents would tend to operate with reckless tactical leverage, opportunism, and unrestrained brutality, thereby enjoying some measure of strategic advantage in that context.

Associated with the above strategic scenario is a dilemma whereby the insurgent and counter-insurgent forces are plunged in an intractable violence whose dynamics defy the conventional notion of military defeat or triumph. Such is the asymmetric logic of the contemporary counterinsurgency conundrum. In December 2015, the Nigerian President, Mohammadu Buhari declared that Nigeria’s jihadi insurgents, Boko Haram, has been ‘technically defeated’ (Olaniyan, 2018). This declaration curiously implies that the Nigerian government was winning both the battle and the war against the insurgents, arguably based on the strategic breakthroughs on the fields of counter-insurgency operations. Nonetheless, more than four years after this declaration, Boko Haram insurgents have been evolving, both in terms of tactical resilience and operational adaptability.

Significantly, the insurgents have moved their operational bases from urban cells to enclaves in the forested landscapes of the hinterlands, with their strongholds in Sambisa forest in North East Nigeria. From such vintage terrains, they have masterminded several hard-target attacks (see Table 3) in recent years, leading to mortal consequences in most instances. A good number of the attacks have been targeted on critical assets and structures of the Nigerian military. In the light of this development, how could one comprehend the continued operational dynamism as well as tactical resilience of Boko Haram insurgents despite the acclaimed ‘technical defeat’? This pertinent question, among others, forms the crux of the present discourse.

The paper is significant because of the need to update the emerging knowledge on the subject matter of symmetrical complications of counter-insurgency in Nigeria. Extant studies in that regard (USG, 2012; Onuoha, 2013; Park, 2014; Doukhan, 2015; Weber, 2015; Folade, 2016; Matfess, 2016; Okoli, 2017; IPSS, 2018, Onuoha, Nwangwu & Ugwueze, 2020) have focused variously on salient aspects of the ongoing counter-insurgency efforts in Nigeria without amply highlighting how its asymmetrical complications tend to protract the process. The present discourse, therefore, takes its point of departure from these existing works and seeks to interrogate the counter-insurgency process in order to explain its asymmetrical dialectics and how that is affecting the outcomes and prospects thus far. The remainder of the paper is organized in three broad sections. Coming next is the background where relevant conceptual, theoretical and contextual issues are presented. That is followed by a consideration of the focal issue: asymmetric violence, insurgency and counter-insurgency. The last section appraises the on-going counter-insurgency campaign, considers some policy implications and recommendations, and draws up a conclusion.

CONCEPTUAL FRAME OF REFERENCE

Four key terms form the conceptual thrust of this paper, namely: asymmetric violence, Boko Haram, counter-insurgency, insurgency, and military. These terms are considered in turn forthwith in order to situate their operational meanings in the context of the present discourse. As applied herewith, Boko Haram, which translates to “Western education is forbidden”, is the main actor in the Islamist insurgency conflict that first appeared in northern Nigeria in 2002. The group’s official name is ‘*Jama’atuAhlis Sunna Lidda’awatiwal-Jihad*’, which translates to ‘people committed to the propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad’ (IPSS, 2018, p.5).

Asymmetric violence refers to a violent conflict in which extreme imbalance of military, economic and technological power is supplemented and aggravated by status inequality; specifically, the inequality between a non- or sub-state actor and a state (Stepanova, 2008, p.19). An example of asymmetric violence is insurgency. Insurgency is a protracted political-military struggle directed toward subverting or displacing the legitimacy of a constituted government or occupying power and completely or partially controlling the resources of a territory through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations (USG, 2012, p.1). Similarly, counterinsurgency – frequently referred to by the acronym COIN – is the combination of measures undertaken by a government to defeat an insurgency. Effective counterinsurgency integrates and synchronizes political, security, legal, economic, development, and psychological activities to create a holistic approach aimed at weakening the insurgents while bolstering the government’s legitimacy in the eyes of the population (USG, 2012, p.1).

ASYMMETRIC VIOLENCE IN RELATION TO INSURGENCY AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY

Insurgency is understood in the existing literature a veritable pattern of asymmetric violence (Okoli&Iortyer, 2014; Onuoha, 2016; Falode, 2019). Essentially, the asymmetrical essence of insurgency/counter-insurgency lies in its normless dynamics and irregularity (Okli & Azom, 2019). Asymmetric violence highlights a combat-military tactic in which one or all the belligerents seek(s) to exploit opportunistically the opponent's structural and operational weaknesses/ vulnerabilities. Such pattern of violence often exploits structural and operational disparities in terms of forces, technologies, weapons and rules of engagement towards gaining irregular advantage (Stepanova, 2008).

Three types of asymmetry are evident in contemporary unconventional warfare. These are power, strategic, and structural asymmetries (Gallo & Marzano, 2009). Power asymmetry refers to extreme disparities in military might and capabilities between or among fighting forces. On the other hand, strategic asymmetry has to do with a strong imbalance in terms of the application of tactics or strategy while structural asymmetry arises from significant differences in terms of the status of the parties (Gallo & Marzano, 2008). Structural asymmetry is also known as status asymmetry in the extant scholarship and praxis.

The asymmetries of insurgency / counter-insurgency are not a linear process. Rather, they are a dialectical process whose dynamics may work for or against any fighting party. In this regard, Stepanova (2008, p.20) aptly avers:

Asymmetry in conflict is not just, and not even mainly, about the stronger side making use of its advantages. The asymmetry does not work in just one direction. If that were the case, then the stronger side could easily use its superior military force, technology and economic potential to decisively crush its weaker opponent. However, alongside its multiple superiorities, a conventionally stronger side has its own inherent, organic, generic vulnerabilities...

In line with the foregoing strategic thinking, analysts have sought to explain the circumstances under weak actors could 'win' asymmetric conflict. For Mack (1975, p.181), this could be understood with reference to three cardinal postulates, to wit:

- relative power explains relative interests;
- relative interests explain relative political vulnerability; and
- relative vulnerability explains why strong actors lose.

Implicit in the above postulation is that strong actors often have a lower interest in winning in view of the fact that their survival does not necessarily rest with winning. Conversely, weak actors tend to have a high interest in winning simply for the fact that it is by so doing that they can ensure their survival. The quest for survival for a weaker side in a typical asymmetric conflict is, therefore, a compelling exis-

tential imperative that often drives opportunistic violence, such as suicide terrorism and genocide. The phenomenon of suicide terrorism has been central to Nigeria's current counter-insurgency debacle.

Another relevant factor which may explain a strong actor's defeat in an asymmetrical conflict is related to the issue of operational vulnerability. This condition is determined by military and political vulnerabilities of each fighting side. Generally, the state forces enjoy low military vulnerability but suffer high political vulnerability in a common asymmetric conflict. Non-state actors, such as insurgents, on the other hand, wield high military vulnerability and low political vulnerability (Arreguin-Toft, 2008). High political vulnerability for the state forces may derive from constraints arising from tactical adherence to the conventional rules of warfare, pressures from local and international public opinions, and the vested interests of the dominant elites or extant regime. For the insurgents, the low political vulnerability is a function of their tactical leverage and opportunism as dictated by the asymmetric imperatives of violence. On balance, therefore, the high military vulnerability of the insurgents is compensated for by their low political vulnerability. Such an outcome has afforded insurgents a sort of tactical advantage in relation to the government side in counterinsurgency situation, as the Nigerian experience tends to have evinced.

The point of emphasis in the foregoing is to the effect that parties in a typical counterinsurgency situation interact within a peculiar strategic circumstance in which conventional military strength or weakness may not necessarily determine their prospect of victory or defeat. What is crucial in this regard is the circumstantial asymmetries of violence, as determined by the tactical dynamism as well as pragmatism of the actors. More also would depend on how the actors tactically negotiate the inevitable strategic dilemmas arising from the legitimate use of force amidst the conventional and unconventional threats of violence. While the state-actor is ideally constrained by the concerns of political legitimacy and legal propriety of a tactic, such concerns hardly matter for the insurgents anyway. For obvious reasons pertaining to etiquettes of warfare, the government forces may strive to eschew maximum violence that may result in collateral civilian casualties, at least for the sake of regard for 'rules of engagement'. Whilst they rationalize through this strategic dilemma, the insurgents strike with the utmost degree of lethal brutality at the slightest given opportunity. Any corresponding retort by the government forces may be antagonized as an infraction of orthodoxy by the comity of nations (cf. Amnesty International, 2015).

To be sure, the winning prospects in a typical counterinsurgency operation is dependent upon the asymmetrical dynamics between the strategies and counter-strategies applied by parties. In effect,

Same-approach interactions (direct-direct or indirect-indirect) imply defeat for weak actors because there is nothing to mediate or deflect a strong actor's power advantage. These interactions will, therefore, be resolved quickly. By contrast, opposite-approach interactions (direct-indirect or indirect-direct) imply victo-

ry for weak actors because the strong actor’s power advantage is deflected or dodged. These, therefore, tend to be protracted, with time favouring the weak (Arreguin-Toft, 2008, p.105).

Nigeria’s counterinsurgency experience has been both arduous and protracted. Oftentimes, the direct assaults of the government forces have often been counterpoised by the indirect defensive-offensives of the insurgents. The insurgents are winning their battle by resorting to sundry surprise attacks on certain strategic assets of the government forces: police stations, prisons, command structures and camps, bridges and communications infrastructures. They have also relied on systematic use of landmines, human shields as well as suicide terrorism to subvert the military capabilities of the government forces. Furthermore, the insurgents have equally resorted to the strategy of holding territory as well as that of maintaining physical fortresses (especially in forests, jungles, borderlines, etc.) in order to gain some measure of power balance or advantage vis-a-vis the adversary (Okoli, 2019). The purpose of adopting these measures is to gain a strategic advantage while negating the government forces’ capacity to fight.

THEORETICAL PREMISE : STRATEGIC INTERACTION THESIS

This study appropriates of the Strategic Interaction Thesis (SIT) as its analytical framework. Pioneered by Arreguin-Toft (2001), SIT is aimed at proffering “a general explanation of asymmetric conflict outcomes” (p.99) with a view to coming to terms with the conditions under which weaker actors may gain a strategic advantage over the strong ones in conflict situations that goes beyond the remit of conventional violence. The theory presupposes that asymmetric conflict is an occasion whereby the state (strong) actor(s) would interact with the non/ sub-state (weak) actors (s) in pursuit of a strategic value essentialized by relative ‘battle winning’. In such a strategic interaction, the strong actor(s) is/are expectedly inclined to the attack while the weak actor(s) is/are, more or less, on the defence, applying a variety of strategies (see Table 1).

Table 1: Strategies of Asymmetric Conflict

Strategy	Remark(s)
1. Direct attack	Application of military arsenals to capture or neutralize an adversary’s armed forces
2. Barbarism	Conducting depredations against non-combatants with a view to weakening the fighting morale of the opponent
1. Direct defence	Deployment of armed forces to subvert an opponent’s combat capabilities and tactics
2. Guerrilla warfare	Thwarting the will of the attacker through indirect systematic attack such as infiltration, sabotage, armed vandalism, ambush, territorial occupation, etc.

Source : Adapted from Arreguin-Toft (2001, p.100-103).

With reference to direct attack and barbarism (considered in this context as direct strategy), the end of the attack is to neutralize an enemy by destroying his capacity to sustain a fight. But in the case of defence and guerrilla warfare (here, indirect strategy), the goal is to destroy the adversary's spirit and resilience by way of indiscriminate non-combatant assaults capable of causing anti-war backlashes. In the views of Arreguin-Toft (2001, p.108), "when strong actors attack with direct strategy and weak actors defend using an indirect strategy, all things being equal, the weak actors should win". To win in this regard does not necessarily translate to annihilation of an adversary, or elimination of hostilities. Instead, it means wielding a strategic advantage over an opponent. Thus, when a weak actor 'wins' the battle in a typical asymmetric conflict, the consequence is prolonged hostility that may be intractable (cf. Park, 2014).

The trajectory of insurgency and counterinsurgency in Nigeria's North East over the years have demonstrated salient dialectics of 'victory', nay 'defeat', in an asymmetric violence. While the war is far from being won, isolated battles have been won by belligerents on different fronts. Boko Haram insurgents are surviving and sustaining the violence in spite of their seeming disadvantages vis-à-vis the capabilities of the government forces. This is an indication of the asymmetrical dialectics of counterinsurgency. In effect, despite the acclaimed 'tactical defeat' of Boko Haram by the government forces (Olaniyan, 2018), the insurgents have shown proven resilience, capitalizing on indirect strategies to maintain some level of asymmetrical advantage in the process. Among others, this situation explains the apparent intractability and precarity of counterinsurgency operations in that context.

BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS IN NIGERIA

Boko Haram was formerly known as **Jamā'atAhl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wahwa'l-Jihād**. This literally translates to "Group of the People of Sunnah for Preaching and Jihad". It is an extremist jihadist sect that mainly operates in northeastern Nigeria; although it is also active in parts of Chad, Niger Republic and northern Cameroon (Onuoha, 2014; Onuoha&Oyewole, 2018). The sect was founded in Maiduguri, the capital of Borno State, by Mohammed Yusuf in 2002. Following the killing of the founder by Nigerian security operatives in 2009 (FRANCE 24, 2009; Barkindo, 2017), Abubakar Shekau became the leader and supreme commander of the sect, and he has been in that position till date. In the years of its nascence, Boko Haram was more or less a nonviolent radical Islamic movement dedicated to *purifying Islam in northern Nigeria* (Okoli & Iortyer, 2014). However, the killing of its founder in 2009 led to the sudden transformation of the sect into a violent jihadi organization with terrorist tendencies.

Over the years, Boko Haram has been involved in violent campaign against the Nigerian state and people of faith in the country. It has engaged in mass killings, largely through the deployment of human and vehicle borne Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) as well as gun violence at both soft and hard targets. Some of its prominent attacks include the Bauchi Jail break of 2009, the United Nations building bombing as well as that of the Police Headquarters in Abuja in 2011 (Okoli, 2017). In 2014, the group expanded its operations in North East Nigeria, occupying swathes of territories in the states of Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe. In March 2015, the group declared allegiance with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, thereby rebranding itself to *The Islamic State in West Africa or the Islamic State's West Africa Province* [abbreviated ISWA or ISWAP] (Withnall, 2015). Since its inception, Boko Haram has killed not less than 20,000 people and displaced 2.1 million (Amnesty International 2020, Omenma, Onyisi, & Okolie, 2020). Consequently, it was ranked the world's deadliest terror group according to the Global Terrorism Index in 2015 (Akinola, 2015; Onuoha, 2016).

The group have carried out mass abductions, including the kidnapping of 276 schoolgirls from Chibok in April 2014. This incident led to international outrage as well as global reckoning of the activities of Boko Haram. Since then, the group has masterminded series of solo and mass abductions, kidnapping for ransom, acts of banditry, cattle rustling, and the like in various parts of northern Nigeria and Lake Chad region (Akinola, 2015; Okoli, 2019). In September 2015, Nigeria's Director of Information at the Defence Headquarters of Nigeria announced that all Boko Haram's strongholds and camps had been destroyed. Nonetheless, violence by the group has continued unabated. Similarly, in December 2019, president of Nigeria, Muhammadu Buhari proclaimed that Boko Haram was "technically defeated" (Olaniyan, 2018). Curiously, in spite of this presidential declaration, attacks by Boko Haram have escalated, leading to high rates of fatalities and complex emergencies.

In the course of its systemic evolution, Boko Haram has been characterized by an amorphous structure and command, owing to its organizational splintering (Onuoha, 2016). Within the ranks of the sect today, succession-related wrangling and concerns about whether Muslim civilians can be attacked in their operations generated rift and contributed to the split of the Boko Haram into two: include *Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati* [JAS] and *Islamic State-West Africa* [ISIS-WA] (Mahmood & Ani, 2018). The IS Caliph has since recognized Abu Musab al-Barnawi as the group's new leader in Nigeria to replace embattled Abubakar Shekau. From its obscure inception to infamous ascendancy, Boko Haram sect has witnessed an evolutionary transformation that could be accounted for in four broad phases. Table 2 provides such an account based on the insights from Col-Ravnkilde and Plambech (2015). Although the pattern espoused in respect of these phases cannot be said to be historically sacrosanct, it offers valuable initial account, nonetheless.

Table 2: Transformational Phases of Boko Haram (2003-Date)

Phase	Event(s)
2003-2009 Militant Mobilization Phase	The sect, under the charismatic leadership of Mohammed Yussuf, canvassed and mobilized for the implementation of Sharia law in some of the northern states.
2009-2013 Clandestine Period / Islamic Insurgency	Following the killing of Mohammed Yusuf, the sect went underground and re-emerged under the new leadership of Abukar Shekau, who transformed the group into a vanguard of asymmetrical warfare.
2013-2015 Full-Scale War	Sporadic and episodic attacks on soft and hard targets, especially in the northeastern region, leading to the 2013 declaration of a state of emergency in three northern states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe by President Goodluck Jonathan.
2015-date Regionalisation / Internationalisation	<p>Sporadic guerrilla warfare in mass gatherings as well as an increasing number of attacks in the neighbouring countries, including Niger, Cameroon and in the capital of Chad.</p> <p>Authorisation of a Multinational Joint Task Force to combat Boko Haram by African Union in January 2015.</p> <p>In March 2015, Boko Haram's Pledging of allegiance to Islamic State in March, 2015, and the subsequent acceptance of the loyalty by the group's leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.</p>

Source: Cold-Ravnkilde and Plambech (2015, pp. 20-22).

The need to counter the activities of Boko Haram insurgents has led to a number of strategic responses from the Nigerian government. The responses could as well be chronicled under different operational phases that spanned between 2007 and 2015-date. Table 3 is instructive in that respect. It is important to note that the information shared in Table 3 are by no means absolutely exhaustive. Nevertheless, they amply capture in graphic manner the various dispensations in Nigeria's tortuous fight against Boko Haram insurgency.

Table 3: Phases in Counterinsurgency Operations in Nigeria

Period	Major Trend	Addendum
2007	The Joint Task Force (JTF), comprising military and police operatives, came into existence.	The intervention was code-named 'Operation Flush'.
2011	The Special Military Task Force (SMTF) was instituted.	This comprised the military, paramilitary, as well as intelligence and security agencies.

2013	The Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) came into existence. Also, 2013 saw the emergence of Nigeria's Anti-Terrorism Act.	The troops were volunteers from local and neighborhood vigilantes who fought with rudimentary weapons.
2014	The National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) was enacted.	This was the foremost counter-terrorism policy in Nigeria; it was revised in 2016.
2015	The advent of Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF). Also in 2015, Nigeria employed foreign mercenaries from South Africa to help in its fight against Boko Haram.	Niger, Nigeria, Chad and Cameroon contributed troops to constitute MNJTF.

Source: Falode (2019, pp.18-19), with authors' modifications.

THE DIALECTICS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY IN NIGERIA

Armed conflict is essentially a power struggle and a veritable pattern of power relations. Disputants in an armed conflict are involved in an exercise whereby power is used to achieve some strategic ends that are also defined in terms of power. Although the processes of armed conflicts are characteristically dynamic and uncertain, asymmetric warfare is much more complex and unpredictable. In situations of asymmetric conflict, belligerents are poised to seek victory or avoid defeat through sundry dimensions of irregular and opportunistic tactics. In the views of Maxell Air (2013, p.2):

War is complex and chaotic because of its unpredictability. However, irregular wars pose a greater challenge in that the enemy is often a smaller force that is difficult to identify or predict. This is usually the case when fighting guerrillas.

Given its observable trajectory thus far, Boko Haram insurgency as well as the government's endeavours at stemming it have aptly instantiated the asymmetrical dialectics of contemporary irregular warfare (Fourcher, 2016; Ewa, 2018). Through its dialectical historical course over the years, parties to the conflict have relentlessly invented, reinvented, improvised, and adapted new approaches to survival and sustenance, based on the situational imperatives and dynamics of the battlefield. Underscoring this trend is an opportunistically amenable tactical pragmatism and dynamism, which tends to have made the conflict rather complicated, protracted and intractable (Allen, Lewis, & Matfess, 2016).

In the years of its nascence, Boko Haram operated in Maiduguri as a local neo-Salafist movement seeking to purify what was perceived as an apostate Islam as well as propagate a genre of radical Islamism based on puritanical application of *Sharia* (loosely, Islamic law). Sequel to its initial confrontation with the Nigerian security operatives in July 2009 wherein its leader, Mohammed Yusuf, was

murdered, the sect incidentally transformed from a local sectarian movement into a radical jihadi organization with extremist espousals (Cold-Ravnkilde & Plambech, 2015). Expanding sporadically into the northeastern states of Borno, Adamawa, Bauchi, Gombe and Yobe in the following decade, the sect, *ab initio*, engaged in direct military attacks on Nigerian internal security structures: police stations, prisons (correctional facilities), government security posts/ checkpoints, and so on.

By 2014, the violent campaigns of the sect had spread to nearly all the States in northern Nigeria, including the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja. During this period, the sect's operations were marked by indiscriminate attacks on both hard and soft targets, especially with the aid of locally fabricated Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). This period witnessed selective onslaughts on Christians and non-Muslims as evidenced by the prevalent bombing of churches and/ or communal congregations. Encouraged by its apparent asymmetric advantage over Nigeria's internal security forces, the sect resorted to territorial occupation in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States. Consequently, the sect overran and occupied swathes of rural communities in parts of Adamawa and Borno, imposing a sort of caliphate rule in the affected areas (Okoli, 2017).

The repositioning of counterinsurgency by the Federal Government of Nigeria in 2015 brought about an auspicious moment for the ongoing counterinsurgency operations. A consolidated military force, reinforced by the sub-regional MJTF, as complemented by foreign mercenary fighters from South Africa, combined forces to oust the jihadists from the occupied territories, forcing them to retreat to the fringes of the Lake Chad's forested frontiers (Okoli, 2019). Far from being defeated, the insurgents have, nevertheless, sustained much of its operational cum organizational resilience (Warner & Matfess, 2017). They have succeeded in carrying out both offensive and defensive attacks from their embattled strongholds in the Sambisa and Lake Chad sanctuaries (see Table 4).

Over the years, Boko Haram insurgents have expanded their terrorist activities from Nigeria to northern Cameroon, Niger Republic and Chad. It has engaged in the abduction and killing of foreign aid workers and nationals. In effect, the group is has been recognized as one of the deadliest terror groups in the world (International Crisis Group, 2017). Essentially, it has so far withstood, if not negated, the regular and irregular firepower of the Nigerian and allied military forces through its highly adaptive, opportunistic, and tactically pragmatic asymmetric violence (Walker & Weber, 2012; Park, 2014; Weber, 2015), the contours of which can be outlined thus:

- i maintenance of some organizational and operational synergy with international jihadi networks (Al Qaeda, ISIS, etc.)
- ii sustained funding of its activities through aspects of rural and urban criminality: cattle rustling, kidnapping for ransom, rural banditry, bank and market raids, etc.
- iii strategic deployment of irregular tactics, such as suicide bombing, guerrilla warfare, ambush operations, hostage-taking, and so on.

The above conditions, coupled with the organizational and operational weaknesses of the Nigerian military, have impeded the promise of a successful counterinsurgency in Nigeria (Bappah, 2016). Expectedly, the counterinsurgency campaigns in the country have been mired in what Onuoha, Nwangwu and Ugwueze (2020, p.1) aptly characterized as a “viscid manacle” – a precarious endeavour without a foreseeable prospect of victory. There is certainly no gainsaying the fact that no significant military gains have been recorded on the side of the Nigerian forces. Nonetheless, an adroit balancing of the military and non-military imperatives of the counterinsurgency agenda remains a desideratum. In this regard, the submission by (Buchana-Clarke & Knoope, 2017, p.12) is germane:

While military gains have certainly been made against Boko Haram..., it is important to note that the root causes of the conflict have not been addressed. ... The Problem with military gains is that they tend to create the appearance of peace while the social and political issues that give rise to the conflict remain unaddressed (Buchana-Clarke & Knoope, 2017, p.12).

NIGERIA’S COUNTER-INSURGENCY DEBACLE: SOME POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND IMPERATIVES

The Nigerians experience of counterinsurgency operations has been hallowing. It could be rightly described as precarious at best. Much of it has been based on reactive hard-target military offensives aimed at degrading the insurgents in their fortified enclaves as well as operational domains. While the government forces dissipate their military capabilities on sundry militarized operations, such as mounting of road blocks and checkpoints, motorized patrol, virtual surveillance and reconnaissance, and combat-based offensives, the insurgents have mainly resorted to indirect defence tactics: suicide terrorism, guerrilla warfare, tactical infiltration and subversion, and armed vandalism (Okoli, 2017; Okoli & Azom, 2019).

With isolated exceptions, the insurgents have mainly avoided confronting the government forces in a regularized battle where their conventional military superiorities or vulnerabilities would be the ultimate determinant of combat-outcome. Instead, they have largely resorted to asymmetric confrontations, based on irregular combatant strategies, among which is the tactic of taking the battle to difficult terrains that afford them some strategic combat-advantage. Examples of such terrains are remote forests and borderlines where the prospect of asymmetric manoeuvrability is highly assured for the insurgents. Relying on the resultant strategic payoff, the insurgents have undertaken a relentless war of attrition that has often put the government forces on the defensive.

The asymmetries of such a scenario are such that the military might of the government forces is counteracted and even negated by the perilous indirect defence tactics of the insurgents. The systematic deployment of suicide bombers, land-

mines, human shields, as well as the exploitation of human and natural resources of the occupied landscapes, have enabled the insurgents to enjoy some measure of tactical balance with the government forces (Okoli, 2019; Okoli & Azom, 2019). The asymmetric dynamics of the battlefield has compensated for the insurgents' conventional military weaknesses, and has helped in pushing the government forces towards the thresholds of dire embattlement.

Thus, considering the asymmetries of the ongoing counter-insurgency as they are perceived, it is arguably evident that the jihadists are 'leading', if not 'winning', the battle. Although 'leading' in this regard does not literarily presuppose 'winning', it is rationale to posit that the insurgents are wielding their turf based on the asymmetric advantage garnered through indirect defence. This is against the tactically embattled direct attacks of the government forces, which has so far proven rather precarious. Here too, the seminal postulate of Arreguin-Toft becomes apposite: 'when strong actors attack with a direct strategy and the weak actors defend using an indirect strategy, all things being equal, the weak actors should win' (2001, p.108).

It may sound uncharitable to posit that the insurgents are leading the battle in the on-going counterinsurgency campaign. It may also amount to fatal pessimism to concede that they are winning. However, indications are rife to the effect that the jihadists are making sustained headway. This is evidenced in the prevalence of hard-target attacks, often targeted at military personnel and structures, in the recent times (see Table 4). Reversing this trend would require a rejigged counterinsurgency approach that recognizes the exigency of maximizing indirect attacks in order to degrade the fundamentals of the insurgents' operational strength and resilience. To say the least, a hybrid counterinsurgency strategy that prioritized the military and non-military, as well as regular and non-regular, imperatives of an asymmetric violence is a desideratum. This would entail, among others, moving from the current militarized combat-operations to soft-target priorities thus:

- i countering insurgents' extremist narratives through the propagation of secular ideology that eschews extremism.
- ii identifying and plugging local and international sources of logistical and ideological patronage of insurgency.
- iii ascertaining and addressing the fundamental socio-economic, political and socio-cultural interests as well as grievances that drive the insurgency.
- iv identifying and mitigating the critical socio-contextual faultlines that complicate insurgency.
- v degrading the combat-defence capabilities of the insurgents through a pragmatic military approach that embodies strategic intelligence and technologically driven combat-offensives.

Table 4: Timelines of Selected Boko Haram's Attacks in 2020

Date	Attack(s)
6 January	• Not less than 32 persons were killed and over 35 sustained injuries when an IED exploded on a crowded bridge in Gamboru, Borno State, Nigeria.
7 January	• 20 soldiers were killed and more than 1,000 people displaced when a town in Borno State, Nigeria, was attacked by ISWAP militants.
19 January	• A suspected female Boko Haram suicide bomber detonated her IED in Kaiga-Kindjiria, western Chad, killing 9 civilians.
7 February	• Boko Haram fighters killed 6 civilians in Bosso District, Diffa Region, Niger.
9 February	• About 30 civilians were killed and many more abducted by militants in Auno, Borno State, Nigeria.
4 March	• 4 police officers and 2 vigilantes were killed by Boko Haram militants during a raid on an army base in Damboa, Borno State, Nigeria.
23 March	• Some 50 Nigerian soldiers were killed by Boko Haram fighters in an ambush near a village in Yobe State, Nigeria.
24 March	• At least 92 Chadian soldiers were killed and 24 army vehicles were destroyed by Boko Haram assailants during a several hour attack in the Boma peninsula in the Lake Chad region of Chad.
5 April	• 2 Boko Haram suicide bombers killed seven civilians and themselves in Amchide, Far North Region, Cameroon.
3 May	• Militants attacked a military camp outside Niger's Diffa city, killing two soldiers and wounding 3 more.
18 May	• 12 soldiers were killed and at least ten more wounded after Boko Haram militants attacked their outpost northeast of Diffa, Niger.
9 June	• An attack by ISWAP on the herding village of Gubio in Borno State, Nigeria, left at least 81 people dead, seven people and over 1,200 cattle abducted, and the village destroyed.
13 June	• ISWAP staged two attacks in the Monguno and Nganzai areas of Nigeria's Borno State, killing at least 20 soldiers in the first location and at least 40 civilians in the second location.
27 June	• 9 soldiers and 2 vigilantes members were killed in a Boko Haram ambush.
28 June	• 6 Nigerian soldiers were shot dead in an attack on their duty posts by Boko Haram, who stole weapons in the attack
2 July	• 2 civilians were killed and an aid helicopter damaged after militants raided Damasak, Borno State, Nigeria.

7 July	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An ambush carried out by ISWAP on a Nigerian military convoy at Bulabulin village, Borno State, Nigeria, resulted in the death of at least 35 soldiers and left more than 18 injured and 30 missing.
10 July	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Boko Haram attacked Baga killing about 20 soldiers stationed there, and then attacked a military convoy near GadaBlu, killing 15 soldiers.
13 July	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Militants killed 8 soldiers as they attacked a military convoy near Kumulla, Borno State, Nigeria, and then killed another two soldiers during a firefight near Kolore village.
18 July	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gunmen attacked several villages near Chibok, Borno State, Nigeria, killing 3 farmers.
22 July	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5 aid workers were executed by armed men who had kidnapped them last month in Borno State, Nigeria.
2 August	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Boko Haram militants attacked an IDP camp in Far North, Cameroon, killing 16 people and wounding at least seven more.
9 August	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • ISWAP killed 6 French aid workers and two Nigerien civilians in Kouré, Tillabéri Region, Niger.
1 September	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At least 7 people were killed and more than 14 were wounded when a suicide bomber exploded at an IDP camp in Goldavi, Far North region, Cameroon.
25 September	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At least 30 people, including civilians and security personnel, were killed when militants attacked the convoy of a region governor near Baga, Borno State, Nigeria.
30 September	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 10 Nigerian soldiers were murdered and 8 more were injured when militants laid siege on their logistics convoy near Marte, Borno State, Nigeria.
28 November	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • About 110 civilians, mostly rice-farm workers, were massacred by Boko Haram in Koshebe, Borno.
11 December	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More than 500 students were abducted by Boko Haram insurgents from Government Science School Kankara in Katsina State.
13 December	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 28 people were murdered and 100 wounded in the town of Toumour in Niger, following which Boko Haram set ablaze between 800-1,000 homes and the central market, in the town.

Source(s): Compiled by authors from sundry media reports and personal communications.

CONCLUSION

Boko Haram insurgency has presented a veritable instance of asymmetric violence. Over the years, the endeavours of the Nigerian forces to counter the violence has met with both prospects and challenges. The insurgents have been able to sustain their violent campaign mostly by way of tactical opportunism, especially through the of guerrilla warfare and suicide terrorism, the government forces have been locked in protracted counter-insurgency operations where their conventional military capabilities have often suffered serious setbacks in the face of the asymmetric onslaughts of the insurgents. The outcome has been a precarious counter-insurgency experience in which the asymmetries of violence tend to have placed the government forces always on the defensive, whilst the insurgents aggrandize in asymmetrical offensives. The way out of this apparent viscid manacle is the adoption of a hybrid counterinsurgency operations that deploys both regular and non-regular, as well as hard and soft, strategies towards degrading the enabling assets and values the insurgents' violence. To this end, the focus of such operations should go beyond a preoccupation with conventional military campaign and seek to equally address the gamut of ideological and developmental issues that drive extremism in the focal area. In this regard.

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ADOPTING ECOWAS CONFLICT EARLY WARNING TO COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES IN WEST AFRICA

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ABSTRACT

Terrorism has persisted over the last three decades with a high human and material cost. But more so, it remains a strategic threat to the State system, undermining the gains of development and freedom. Scholars and researchers alike have engaged deeply with the concept and reality of terrorism; its meaning, causes, implications and solutions. The same can be said of conflict early warning. However, there is an academic hiatus in assessing the relationship between conflict early warning and counterterrorism. This is particularly so in the context of ECOWAS Conflict Early Warning and ECOWAS member states. The theory of conflict prevention was employed in this research. A descriptive survey research design was adopted. Data was gathered from primary and secondary sources. Key Informants Interviews and Focused Group Discussions were conducted. Secondary data was sourced from books, journal articles, and online materials. Data collected was interpreted using conceptual and relational content analysis. The research showed that there is a significant relationship between Conflict Early Warning and Counterterrorism. Furthermore, ECOWAS periodically generates warning in the form of Human security reports that can help achieve the dual goal of preventing and/or mitigating the threat of terrorism, under a counterterrorism framework. However, there exists a fundamental challenge between alert and response. Alert does not necessarily translate to response. There is need to increase funding, reduce bureaucracy, synergize both open and close sources of information to authenticate warning and to expand and empower response stakeholders to complement the States.

Keywords

Conflict Early
Warning, Violent Extremism,
Counter-Terrorism Strategies,
ECOWAS, Terrorism.

INTRODUCTION

The world is faced with complex and interconnected security challenges and risks. These range from issues of climate change and environmental degradation, Transnational Organized Crime (TOC), Maritime Piracy, arms proliferation including Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD), migration problems, protracted civil wars, political instability, pandemics and terrorism. Among the plethora of security challenges in the world, terrorism has assumed a prominent source of insecurity over the last three decades. According to Barak Mendelsohn, the particular characteristic of terrorism which concerns States and the State-based international community is the fact that terrorism attempts to replace the current global order with a Shari'a-based Caliphate.¹

One cannot easily forget the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack in the United States of America. This event marked a watershed in the history of terrorism in the world.² Elsewhere, the Bali bombing, Indonesia October 12, 2002, the Madrid train bombings, March 11, 2004, the Chibok girls kidnap, 14 April 2014, and the Sinai attack October 31, 2015, etc. These events have come with high human and material costs. Although there is a sustained decline in the incidence of deaths arising from terrorism between 2015-2019. According to the institute for economics and peace, 2014 marked the highest recorded cases of terrorism related deaths with 32,658. In 2015, there were 29,376 deaths, in 2016, 25,673, in 2017, 18,814, in 2018, 15,952, and in 2019, 13,826 deaths. Yet, terrorism has continued to spread. Seventy-one (71) countries have now witnessed at least one or more terrorism deaths globally. According to the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) Report, 2019, the death toll from terrorism was marked at 15,952 and the direct economic cost was marked at \$33 billion.³

In West Africa, there has been consistent evidence of the markers of terrorism perpetrated by groups in the sub-region. The persistent attack on civilians, public infrastructure and government personnel have been identified by scholars as a common identifier of terrorist attack.⁴ Groups such as Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wahwa'l-Jihād (Boko Haram), Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP), Ansar Eddine, Movement for oneness and jihad (MUJAO), al-Mourabitoun and front de Liberation du Macina (FLM) and Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) are prominent in carrying out such attacks. These groups have carried out premeditated violence such as kidnapping, suicide bombing, hostage-taking, mass murder, the wanton killing of civilians, government officials and security personnel, and destruction of national infrastructure.⁵ Consequently, several programmes, regulations, protocols, and declarations have been initiated by the sub-regional body, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to help member states counter terrorism. Among them are the ECOWAS Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and the Convention on Extradition, Political Declaration and Common Position against Terrorism, and the ECOWAS Counter-terrorism Strategy and its Implementation Plan.⁶

Scholars have described the current counterterrorism strategies in West Africa as reactive and overly dependent on kinetic use of force. Consequently, the results have been counter-productive. Hence, the need for alternative approaches.⁷ It is within the remit of this work to interrogate the counterterrorism strategies in the sub-region. However, it is not to go through the entire community's counterterrorism effort with a fine-tooth comb but rather to investigate the ability of member states to adopt ECOWAS Early Warning to its counterterrorism strategies as an alternative to its current efforts. It is important to note that ECOWAS develops and circulates alert to member States in form of daily, weekly and monthly reports. It is thus expected that member States respond to such alert to prevent/mitigate violent conflicts and in this case terrorism.

This research paper intends to unravel the relevance of Early Warning to Counterterrorism Strategies. The study seeks to highlight ECOWAS policy framework that underpins the utility of Early Warning to counterterrorism strategies. Furthermore, it is within the purview of this research work to describe the components and focus of ECOWAS Conflict Early Warning as well as the challenges of adopting ECOWAS Conflict Early Warning to counter terrorism strategies in West Africa.

The research is divided into four broad sections. In the first section, the work will be introduced. This will be followed by conceptual clarification and theoretical framework as well as review of literature. The third section will be dedicated to interrogate the utility of ECOWAS Early Warning by member States. Consequently, efforts will be made to describe ECOWAS Early Warning mechanism. The last section will be the conclusion and recommendations.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

To fully understand the research paper, it is imperative to describe key concepts. Hence, in this section efforts will be made to explain these concepts. These include, Conflict Early Warning, Terrorism and counterterrorism.

CONFLICT EARLY WARNING

In his seminal work, Alexander Austin in the Berghof Handbook on Conflict Transformation defines early warning as; 'any initiative that focuses on systematic data collection, analysis and/or formulation of recommendations, including risk assessment and information sharing, regardless of topic, whether they are quantitative, qualitative or a blend of both'.⁸ From his point of view, great emphasis is placed on the methodology of data collection, and analysis in the process of warning. Consequently, the integrity, legitimacy, and credibility are vital ingredients if the warning is to be effective and not cause harm.

In sharp contrast, other definitions have focused on the target of generated warnings. David Nyeihn's definition neatly fits this category. He thus defines Early

Warning as; ‘a process that alerts decision-makers to the potential outbreak, escalation, resurgence of violent conflicts and promotes an understanding among decision-makers of the nature of the violent conflicts’⁹. The sentiment of this definition is the relevance of decision-makers in any early warning. In this sense, the imperative of Early Warning is dependent on how successful it is in alerting and by extension eliciting appropriate responses from relevant decision-makers.

Some definitions have also drawn cognizance of the two important elements of previous definitions (methodology and decision-makers) and thus develop such a hybrid category. Thus, the need for data collection and analysis, crafting and eliciting of responses have been captured. The Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER’s) defines Early Warning as;

‘the systematic collection and analysis of information coming from areas of crises for (i) anticipating the escalation of violent conflicts, (ii) development of strategic response to these crises, and (iii) the presentation of options to critical actors (national, regional and international) to inform decision making and preventive action’.¹⁰

The purpose is to elicit Early Responses that happen at the latent stages of a predictable violent conflict, to avert, lessen, resolve, or changing circumstances that may increase the likelihood of violent conflict breaking out. Some of the most crucial activities in the course of Early Warning consist of information gathering and verification, analysis, mapping and monitoring, and estimation of risks, informing, advocacy, monitoring, and evaluation.¹¹

TERRORISM

Nicholas Perry notes that a universally satisfactory definition of terrorism can be likened to the search of a ‘Holy Grail’. This implies that there are as many definitions as there are scholars, experts, government and international organization.¹² Bruce Hoffmann also shares this sentiment, when he observed that terrorism has oscillated in meaning, context, time and space where applicable. He further observed that there has been a sharp change in the understanding of terrorism which formerly implied State use of violence to control the populace by instilling fear and terror in the minds of its citizens, to the viewership of terrorism in the opposite sense of citizens employing ‘acts of terror’ towards the State.¹³ According to Miller, terrorism is described as ‘violent actions inflicted upon secondary targets that may be conducted by clandestine or semi-clandestine individual, group or government with the wider purpose of attracting attention, gaining support or forcing concession from the primary target on personnel or political issues’. For terrorists, the direct targets of violence are not the main target, the immediate human victims of terror violence are generally chosen randomly or selected from a target population to serve as a message generator. The victims are used to manipulate the main target, to force it to accede to the demand of the primary target. These tactics include; kidnapping and


hostage-taking, bombing, hijacking, killing, destruction of personal properties and national infrastructure.¹⁴ This definition captures both state and non-state actors as possible perpetrators of terrorism.

In another vein, Crenshaw defined terrorism as ‘a deliberate and systematic violence performed by a small number of people, purposely to intimidate watching popular audience by harming only a few, being pre-eminently political and symbolic, and clandestinely resisting authority’. Such acts of terrorism expect to trigger a response from the primary target (the state) which will, in turn, draw public attention and support to its grievances or issues¹⁵. This definition is opposed to state terrorism, where a state supports or condones acts of terrorism. Crenshaw’s definition is adopted. This is because it captures the typology of actors of interest in this work. Specifically, non-state actors. These non-state actors associated with terrorist assaults in West Africa include Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Islamic State West African Province etc.

COUNTER-TERRORISM

According to the Marrien Webster Dictionary, counterterrorism is seen as measures designed to combat or prevent terrorism¹⁶. Counterterrorism is understood as the police, military, judicial and extrajudicial responses aimed at eliminating or reducing terrorist violence in any given context¹⁷. This definition focuses on the kinetic use of force and legal framework in addressing terrorism. It reflects the post 9/11 counterterrorism approach with a high-level military offensive. With the complexities of terrorism which sometimes takes the form of right-wing, left-wing Ethno-nationalist, jihadist motives coupled with the economic and identity dimension of terrorism, there was a need to develop a complementary approach. Furthermore, the need to include other sectors such as non-state actors including religious, cultural, communities, and development agencies, NGOs in dealing with terrorist threats. Hence, addressing the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism has come to be associated with soft counterterrorism approach. According to Hamed Al-said, counterterrorism is the activities of building community resilience using religious, cultural, and development means to counter the appeal of terrorism.¹⁸ It includes the work of both government and non-governmental organizations. The distinguishing factor between the two, being the inclusion of non-state actors in the counter terrorism process.¹⁹

Figure 1.1.
A conceptual Model showing the relationship between the two variables



THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Conflict Prevention

This study adopted conflict prevention theory. This is due to its relevance to the subject under study. This theory asserts that conflict does not just happen, that it goes through a sequence of phases. This tradition supposes that preventing the manifestation of violence is possible depending on three core assumptions: timely response to manifestations of danger; an all-inclusive, coordinated approach to mitigate the threats to violence; and a comprehensive attempt to transform the root causes of violence.²⁰

According to the Innovation for Conflict Prevention, conflict prevention is the combined set of tools, actions and approaches designed to prevent the onset of armed conflict, and/or its recurrence by tackling the root causes of conflict and its immediate triggers, both endemic and external to that setting. In this context, conflict prevention has three pillars: operational, structural, and transnational.²¹ It can be observed that there is an emphasis on armed conflict which is indicative of manifest violence. Conflict prevention is not essentially aimed at preventing conflict, but to prevent the violent expression of conflicts.²²

Indeed, there seems to be a consensus among conflict resolution and transformation scholars that conflict in itself is a necessary condition for change in any social structure and therefore, crucially, for any kind of progress.²³ Thus conflict prevention is often understood as occurring when “violence is still not the dominant expression of the problem”.²⁴ It aims to “reduce the potential for violence, make it an unreasonable option, and create conditions that encourage the peaceful resolution of political differences (e.g., deal with underlying injustices and inequalities that make people resort to violence”.²⁵

Conflict prevention requires the identification of both structural and proximate causes of conflict, as well as efforts to avert causes before the outbreak of violence. The advocacy for conflict prevention does not imply that conflict is undesirable. It just simply means that trying to resolve a conflict after it has happened complicates its resolution and it is costly.

The application of conflict prevention theory in this research is based on the logic that this study wishes to affirm that overt conflicts are preventable at the latent stage if appropriate systems are put in place and appropriate preventive measures taken at the right time. This theory connects rightly to the subject matter under investigation in that if early warning is identified in good time and with goodwill from stakeholders, appropriate preventive initiatives can be taken, conflict prevention is likely to succeed. This study proposes a change from a culture of reacting to proactive conflict prevention. This can be achieved by institutionalizing a solid contextualized framework for monitoring conflict trends through early warning and early response systems.

Literature Review

ECOWAS was established on 28 May 1975 in the treaty of Lagos. The organization was established principally to promote regional integration and economic development of the West African region. It is made up of 15 countries including Nigeria, Niger, Benin Republic, Cote d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, Cape Verde, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Ghana, Togo, Guinea, and Guinea Bissau. However, following the eruption of violent conflicts and its negative ramifications on developmental goals for the region, there was the need to review and adapt its mandate to address security challenges in the region.²⁶ And although these conflicts were intra-state in nature and scope, it soon had a ripple effect across borders. The regionalization of these conflicts thus required the regionalization of security systems in West Africa.²⁷


For Roisin Hinds, terrorism in West Africa can be traced to the expansion of al-Qaeda network from Algeria.²⁸ Today the case is quite disturbing. West Africa, particularly Nigeria and Mali are homes to some of the world's most notorious terrorist groups including Jamā'at Ahl as-Sunnah lid-Da'wahwa'l-Jihād (Boko Haram), Islamic State West African Province (ISWAP), Ansar Eddine, Movement for oneness and jihad (MUJAO), al-Mourabitoun and front de Liberation du Macina (FLM) and Al-Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). These groups have carried out deadly attacks on citizens, government personnel, private and public infrastructures, disrupting the peace and stunting the development of the region. They have engaged in killing, maiming, kidnapping, and rape, causing large scale displacements within States and beyond.²⁹ These groups have metamorphosed from local aggrieved elements to operate regionally and in synergy with global terrorist groups combining both religious ideation and criminality to survive.³⁰

Governments, regional organizations and the international community have been active in countering the threat posed by terrorism. However, Emeka Okereke notes that a major challenge is government's overdependence on 'Kinetic' use of force and military might. He further argues that although this will eventually push terrorist elements out, it is not sustainable as the underlying causes persist. Hence, the need for an alternative approach.³¹ Furthermore, with the multiplicity of military/defense cooperation, including the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) between Nigeria, Niger, Benin, Cameroon, and Chad, in the Lake Chad Basin (LCB); the G-5 Sahel, comprising of Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Chad, in the Sahel region; The UN Multinational Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA); the French-led operations Barkhane and Serval in Northern Mali; and several other bilateral security arrangements, terrorism still persist. What Jennifer Cook describes as "security traffic jam" in West Africa.³²

Okey Uzoechin in his work *"Connected Security: The Missing Link in the evolving Regional Approach to Countering Violent extremism in West Africa"* observes that terrorism is only a symptom of a society-wide dysfunction which

manifests violently. He further illustrates the relationship between radicalization, violent extremism and terrorism. In this regards radicalization and violent extremism form the base on which terrorism is expressed. Hence, to effectively address the threat of terrorism, it is germane to first of all address conditions conducive for radicalization and violent extremism. The role of Early Warning, therefore, is key. Furthermore, He observes that early warning attempts to create a catalogue of root and proximate causes or factors which if attended to will effectively address the threat of terrorism.³³

Figure 2.1. Graphic representations of early warning, radicalization, violent extremism, and Terrorism



Source : Author.

The figure above demonstrates the relationship between early warning and terrorism. Radicalization and violent extremism as seen at the bottom of the pyramid represents a non-violent expression of conflict (latent Stage). Terrorism on the other hand is seen at the top representing a violent expression of conflict. Thus, preventive actions (generated by early warning reports) would be effective at a latent stage of the conflict unlike in the latter stages of manifest terrorism which is at the top.

Peterlinus Odote shares a similar view with Uzoechina. He opines that terrorism can best be framed within the prism of conflict and thus like conflict, grows in stages from a latent stage to manifest violently. He submits that for prevention to be effective, there must be early warning mechanism which will detect nascent conflict situation such as underlying socio-economic, political and religious factors that feed extremist views. In his work, *‘Role of Early Warning Systems in Conflict*

Prevention in Africa: A Case of the Ilemi Triangle, he illustrates the effectiveness of Early Warning in preventing violent conflict including terrorism.³⁴

DB Subedi in his work *Early Warning and Response for Preventing Radicalization and Violent Extremism* observes that there are two broad approaches to countering radicalization, violent extremism, and terrorism. These include hard and soft approaches. Accordingly, he notes that the bandwagon of the State's apparatus is often geared towards hard measures which include the use of force, policing, surveillance, etc. to counter terrorism. However, such over-reliance on hard measures only addresses the symptoms and not the underlying causative conditions. He, therefore, advocates for the complementarity of soft approach which attempts to address the underlying conditions of terrorism. In doing so Subedi notes that the impact of early warning is enormous and critical for such to be achieved. He argues that Early Warning promises to pick up and process socio-psychological and structural factors that drive terrorism. This is to guide policy-makers towards comprehensive counter-terrorism.³⁵

The Legal Framework/Mandate of the ECOWAS Early Warning System


ECOWAS was established primarily for economic development and regional integration. However, following the destructive conflicts that ensued, it was realized that there was a need to develop security and/or conflict resolution frameworks. The 1991 Declaration of the ECOWAS Political Principle underpins this very position. The ECOWAS Early Warning System represents one of such frameworks. Early Warning was first cited in the ECOWAS Revised Treaty of 1993. Specifically, Article 25 in Chapter 4 of the revised treaty sanctions the establishment of an early warning system.³⁶ Similarly, the Chapter 4 of the 1999 Protocol relating to the mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-keeping and Security (also known as the Mechanism) provides for the establishment of a sub-regional Early Warning System. The system, by generating authoritative reports on the security of the sub-region will strategically enhance the capacity of the community's preventive actions.

The protocol on democracy and good governance further emphasizes the need for human security approach to conflict prevention and management. That is, the human security factor in conflict prevention is essential.³⁷

The 2003 Declaration of Regional approach to Peace and Security further supports the argument for a synergy of coordination between the different agencies of ECOWAS precisely in preventing the occurrence of violent conflict in the sub-region.³⁸ The ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs), their Ammunition and other related materials established in 2006 calls for the institutionalization of preventive mechanism against the proliferation of SALWs. This convention further highlights the need for an Early Warning System for preventive actions.³⁹

The ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (ECPF), a mishmash of the mechanism (1999) and the protocol on democracy and good governance (2001), further calls for the establishment of a Conflict Early Warning System that would monitor the security situation in the sub-region among other focal points for conflict prevention and resolution. It is important to highlight the fact that the core of the framework is to identify opportunities and structures to address operational and structural causes of conflict in the sub-region.⁴⁰

Figure 3.1. ECOWAS Early Warning Legal Framework



Source: ECOWAS Early Warning Directorate, 2020.

ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Early Warning

ECOWAS Counter-Terrorism strategy is a policy framework to guide the community on a common strategy to address the threat of terrorism in the sub-region. It was proposed in 2013 as part of the policy framework adopted by the Heads of States and Governments known as ECOWAS 'Political Declaration and Common Position against Terrorism'. The strategy is divided into three; prevent, pursue and reconstruct. The ECOWAS counter-terrorism strategy in its first pillar of prevention, advocates for the institutionalization of Early Warning for effective and timely response by relevant stakeholders. Hence, States within the community are expected to adopt Early Warning to their counter-terrorism strategies. The second pillar emphasizes response after the overt manifestation of terrorism. It makes for coordination and cooperation in the military and judiciary. The third pillar makes a case for peacebuilding efforts including reconciliation, and reintegration. In the framework, precisely the implementation plan, it mandates the Early Warning Unit (ECOWARN) to expand its current sets of indicators to include terrorism. This is with the view of informing member States to counter terrorism more effectively, timely and appropriately.⁴¹ It is important to note that the first pillar makes the bulk of

this research work. This is because it lays credence to the instrumentality of Early Warning in preventing the manifestation of terrorism in the sub-region.

The Components of ECOWAS Conflict Early Warning Mechanism

The ECOWAS Early Warning System was operationally established in 2004. It is designed to capture data collected from the field and other open sources. Currently, the Early Warning Unit is headed by a Director with five (5) Analysts in the ECOWAS Commission and Seventy-seven (77) field monitors; Five (5) each in its fifteen (15) member states except Nigeria which has seven ((7). These field monitors are selected on the distinct peculiarities of member States. For instance, in Nigeria, six (6) monitors out of seven (7) come from the six (6) geo-political zones of the country. Four (4) of the five (5) field monitors are sourced from academia and one from the Civil Society.⁴²

The Early Warning Unit is made of two divisions; the system division and the analysis division. The former is made up of Information Technology (IT) experts, technicians who manage the platform including the Geographic Information System (GIS) Laboratory, the platform and the 77 field monitors spread across the sub-region. The latter is made up of 5 analysts who produce thematic reports on five (5) areas including; Crime, Security, Governance, Health and Environment. The GIS Laboratory is meant to transcribe bogus incidents and security reports into info-graphics on maps of member States indicating the area of needed action.⁴³

The Focus of ECOWAS Conflict Early Warning


The ECOWAS Early Warning System generates forty-five thousand (45,000) incident reports and thirty-thousand (30,000) security situation reports daily. The incidents reports are used to study trends and patterns of conflicts and security. The focus of the ECOWAS Early Warning can be derived from the five (5) thematic areas. These include Crime, Security, Governance, Health and Environment. The ECOWAS Early Warning can be fundamentally linked to human security issues in the sub-region. As earlier mentioned, these reports resonate with underlying human needs essential for positive peace. These conditions, if addressed would reduce security risk in the community. The higher the prevalence of human insecurity, the higher the risk level of State insecurity. Where the prevailing socio-economic, and political conditions are not supportive of an individual's growth and development, community progress and sense of equality and belonging, the risk of insecurity increases. Hence, the core of the ECOWAS Early Warning is to provide comprehensive security to citizens of the Community as a prerequisite to State and sub-regional peace and security. Nantene Coulibaly succinctly puts it by saying "If people can't have peace, States can't have peace".⁴⁴

Figure: 4.1. ECOWAS Early Warning Reports



Source: ECOWAS Early Warning Directorate, 2020.

Figure: 5.1. ECOWAS Early Warning Modules



Source: ECOWAS Early Warning Directorate, 2020.


Adopting ECOWAS Conflict Early Warning to Counterterrorism Strategies in West Africa

The 1999 protocol (the Mechanism) clearly notes that the products of the Early Warning Directorate is solely for the use of the President of the ECOWAS Commission. This consequently excludes member States from directly accessing its reports. However, there are channels through which ECOWAS shares its Early Warning products with member States. In the first channel, ECOWAS Vice-President with the authorization of the President of the Commission, shares Early Warning products with Council of Ministers of ECOWAS, and the Mediation and Security Council (MSC). This is then communicated to the Presidents and Heads of States. It is imperative to highlight here that Early Warning products that go through this medium is classified. In the second channel, ECOWAS shares its Early Warning products with Ambassadors of member States in Abuja, the Headquarters of the Commission. Also, early warning products of these kinds are of less confidentiality. In the third channel, ECOWAS shares its Early Warning products with National

Early Warning Centres in the 15 member States. Currently, 5 members States (Mali, Burkina Faso, Cote D’Ivoire, Liberia, and Guinea Bissau) have operational Early Warning Centres. In the fourth category, ECOWAS shares its products with partners including development agencies, conflict prevention and resolution bodies, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), and prominent Citizens/Leaders.⁴⁵


Over the years, there have been challenges facing the adoption of ECOWAS Early Warning to counterterrorism. This is primarily centred on the alert-response gap. In an attempt to address the underlying gap, the recipients of the Early Warning reports have been expanded to include NGOs, and development agencies etc. It will be noted that the 1999 protocol delimits the use of the early warning products to the President of the Commission. However, there are fundamental challenges still facing the incipient process and structure. The future trajectory of the Early Warning and response is drawn towards establishing national early warning centres that will communicate directly to different tiers and structures of government, CSOs and communities directly affected for prompt response. As at the time of writing, national early warning centres have been established to further enhance early warning and response capacities of member States. These include Mali, Burkina Faso, Liberia, Guinea Bissau, and Cote D’Ivoire.

Figure 6.1. The Structure of the new ECOWAS Early Warning System



Source: The ECOWAS Early Warning Directorate 2020

Figure 7.1. The Structure of the National Early Warning and Response System



Source: *The ECOWAS Early Warning Directorate, 2020*

THE CHALLENGES OF ADOPTING ECOWAS CONFLICT EARLY WARNING IN COUNTERING TERRORISM IN WEST AFRICA

Alert-Response Gap

As much as there is a sizeable measure of faith in the efficacy of ECOWAS Early warning mechanism to counterterrorism, there are a plethora of challenges inhibiting its optimal utility in the sub-region. According to Nantene Coulibaly, there is a fundamental problematic between alert and response. This is commonly known as alert-response gap. This peculiar challenge informed the replacement of the de-centralized Early Warning System with a centralized system; the former known as Bureau de Zones. To further reduce the gap between ECOWAS alert and member States' response towards conflicts and terrorism, efforts are being made to establish National Early Warning centres across the community. Currently, 5 States including Mali, Burkina Faso, Liberia, Guinea Bissau, and Cote D'Ivoire have operational National Early Warning Systems.⁴⁶

Lack of Access to Information

According to Abdoulaye Maiga, the field monitors are not enough to pick up sufficient data especially considering the physical size and population of the States. For instance, Nigeria with an estimated Two hundred million people being monitored by a meagre of 7 field monitors. A large area of the country may not be cove-

red. This is more so with the difficult terrain of the rural areas with little government presence. Also, there is a lack of access to intelligence. This is a special type of information that reduces uncertainty. With a synthesis of open-source data and intelligence report, Early Warning will be more authentic and authoritative. This will invariably prompt actions from Governments in the sub-region.⁴⁷

Lack of Funding

The challenge of funding in ECOWAS can be ascribed to nearly all aspects of its programming and Early Warning mechanism is not different. Each of the field monitors is paid one hundred US dollars (\$100) per month. This makes about Seventy thousand, Seven-hundred US dollars (\$7,700) per month for the 77 field monitors. This is estimated at about Ninety-two Thousand Four-hundred US dollars (\$92,400) annually. These field monitors are also trained annually by the commission. The limited financial constraints of ECOWAS have made it difficult to expand this number to make for sufficient coverage of the region.⁴⁸

Bureaucracy

Often, the bureaucratic backlog within ECOWAS and member States have posed significant challenges to counterterrorism. Policy implementations are sometimes delayed as a result. For instance, the millions of homeless children living on the streets of West African countries have been cited as major source of recruitment for terrorist organization.⁴⁹ Yet, there is little result on efforts to reduce the number of children on the streets by member States.

Late and Inappropriate Response

Late response to alert implies delays and untimely response to counterterrorism. As earlier indicated above, the lack of funding and bureaucratic backlog can result in late response to counterterrorism. Inappropriate response, on the other hand, implies Early Response, however inefficiently done. For instance, the establishment of national early warning and response centre in the 15 member states have not been achieved. Only 5 States have achieved the feat. These centres hope to expand the response stakeholders to non-governmental organization.⁵⁰

Government Inertia for Human Security Approach and over-dependence on Military Approach

Wolfgang Banadek cited the imperative of government adopting human security approach to its counterterrorism efforts.⁵¹ The sentiment is that when citizens of ECOWAS community witness little or no fear to life and want, they will have little sympathy for terrorism. When government concerns itself primarily to the plights of its citizens by providing essential social amenities such as access to healthcare, education, employment etc., terrorism will be addressed more effectively.

Governments in the sub-region have continued to invest heavily in military efforts to counterterrorism with little attention paid to the socio-economic status of its citizens. To illustrate, Nigeria have budgeted \$9.81b from 2014 to 2018.⁵² In comparison to education, the Nigerian government has budgeted a paltry sum of ₦55.19t from 2009 to 2018. In fact, only ₦3.90t was allocated for education in that period.⁵³

FG Budgetary allocation to education (2009 - 2018)			
Year	Budget	Educ Allocation	% of budget
2009	3,049 trn	N221,19 bn	7,25
2010	5,160 trn	N249,09 bn	4,83
2011	4,972 trn	N306,0 bn	6,16
2012	4,877 trn	N400,15 bn	8,20
2013	4,987 trn	N426,53 bn	8,55
2014	4,962 trn	N493 bn	9,94
2015	5,068 trn	N392,2 bn	7,74
2016	6,061 trn	N369,6 bn	6,10
2017	7,444 trn	N550 bn	7,38
2018	8,612 trn	N605,8 bn	7,03
Total	55,19 trn	N3,90	7,07

Source: Vanguard Newspaper, 2018

Government have failed to tackle the socio-economic challenges of its citizens in the sub-region. Poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, children on the street syndrome, are common indices in the West African sub-region.⁵⁴ These remain the focal point of ECOWAS early warning to member States.

CONCLUSION

ECOWAS has committed resources and effort to prevent terrorism on the one hand, and mitigate the impact of terrorism in the sub-region. Its Early Warning Directorate has consistently served this purpose by generating alerts such as daily, weekly and monthly reports to member States. These reports are then communicated to members States for preventive actions. However, there are fundamental challenges in adopting alert to effective counterterrorism strategies. Recipient member States have failed to utilize alerts generated by ECOWAS for its counterterrorism efforts.

As a panacea to the aforementioned, it was recommended that National Early Warning Centres be established in the 15 member States to allow for improve anticipation and response to violent conflicts and indeed terrorism at the local levels.

Also proposed, is the establishment of peace constituencies to close the gap by governments in the efforts to prevent terrorist acts. Peace constituencies here refers to individuals and groups that value peace and work towards non-violence in resolving conflicts within communities. The study showed that ECOWAS member States have shown little interest in adopting ECOWAS early warning to its counter-terrorism strategies. It is imperative to mentioned that ECOWAS early warning is human security focused. It lays less emphasis on kinetic use of force but on improving the socio-economic livelihood of citizens of the sub-region.

RECOMMENDATIONS

From the foregoing, the following recommendations are hereby made;

There is need for the ECOWAS body to reinforce the prevention narrative within the sub-region. The current reactive approach is not effective.

- a. There is also the need for the sub-regional body to increase funding for Conflict Early Warning. This is because the current structures for field monitors are inadequate to garner the fullest perspective of human security challenges within the sub-region that informs terrorism.
- b. There is also the need for the ECOWAS Early Warning Unit to synergize open and close source data. This is because both sources will authenticate and legitimate warnings and thus have a greater chance of eliciting prompt and appropriate responses.
- c. There is need for the ECOWAS body to expand its current stakeholders to include more non-governmental organizations such as communities, civil society groups and private institutions in the response mechanism. This is to help complement the role of governments.

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IMPACTS OF TERRORISM AND BUSINESS CLIMATE ON ENTREPRENEURSHIP DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

Purpose – The purpose of this contribution is to review the theoretical and empirical literature on terrorism and business climate on entrepreneurship development in Nigeria.

Methodology / approach – Review of the relevant academic literature and regression analysis was employed.

Findings – This contribution shows that there is a theoretical foundation to the popular hypothesis that terrorism and business climate directly impact entrepreneurship development. A review of the empirical evidence on the impact of terrorism and business climate, however, yields an inconclusive result. Some studies find that terrorism and business climate conditions (directly and indirectly) matter to entrepreneurship development, whereas a plurality of studies suggests mixed results.

Research limitations / implications – The findings of the survey indicate that terrorism and business climate alone does not directly impact entrepreneurship development. However, the interactive form of terrorism and business climate does present the opposite.

Originality / value of paper – The contribution offers a comprehensive impact of the terrorism and business climate on entrepreneurship development in Nigeria by employing an interactive form of terrorism and business climate on entrepreneurship development in Nigeria and hints at promising areas of future research.

Keywords


Business climate,
Entrepreneurship,
Nigeria, Regression
analysis, Terrorism

1. INTRODUCTION

Terrorism has multiple roots and multiple effects. Economic considerations come into play at both ends, but it has been difficult for scholars and policy makers to reach a consensus on what role economics plays in causing terrorism, and how economic considerations might be useful in understanding terrorism and in devising strategies and specific policies to counter terrorism. Much of the discussion about the links between economics and terrorism has revolved around how poverty, inequality, and limits on opportunity shape terrorist responses, and on how the alleviation of these conditions might reduce the incidence of terror. In addition, policy responses have increasingly emphasized such tools as economic sanctions on states that are supporters of terrorism and efforts to disrupt the financing channels of terrorist organizations.

Nigeria has been ravaged by terrorist activities which have made the country unsafe for Nigerians and foreign investors. For instance, there have been on the upswing in attacks from suicide bombers. According to *Global Terrorism Database (2019)*, the *GTD*, as introduced by LaFree and Dugan in 2007 affirms that there have been a rise in number of terrorist incidents in Nigeria has illustrated in figure 1. This therefore suggests a noticeable increase in nation-wide terrorist incidents as well as terrorism fatalities during the periods of 2000 to 2019.

Figure 1- Terrorism activities in Nigeria from 2000 to 2019



Source : *Global Terrorism Database (2019)*

According to Adeyemi (2012), assert that terrorism in Nigeria is a latent function of prolonged failure of the Nigerian State to deliver purposeful good governance. When the Federal, state and Local Governments steal all the money allocated for building schools, hospitals, industries, etc., the greater percentage of the citizenry especially the youths are denied good education, employment and good health. These youths are therefore affected socially, psychologically and economically. Frustrations, dejection and hopelessness remain a day to day occurrence in their lives (Adeyemi, 2012). They can easily be brainwashed and indoctrinated with false doctrines and co-opted into illegal societies.

In conclusion, the thrust of this research was to investigate if terrorism and prevailing business climate does have any impact on entrepreneurship development in Nigeria or not over the period of 2000 to 2019.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF TERRORISM AND ITS IMPACT ON ENTREPRENEURSHIP

Terrorism literature is wide and crosses academic disciplines. Terrorism is caused by a combination of political, economic and institutional factors (Sonubi, 1973; Otobo, 1983; Owoye, 1991). Explanations range from individual psychological processes to rational decision models to systemic interactions. The theoretical framework of this research is based on Rational choice theory.

2.1 RATIONAL-CHOICE THEORY

Rational-choice theory can be used to provide a theoretical framework that mirrors the popular wisdom on the terrorism-economy relationship. Rational-choice models are the theoretical workhorse of most economic analyses of terrorist behavior (e.g., Sandler and Enders, 2004 ; Caplan, 2006). Analogous to the economic analysis of crime⁵, rationalchoice models of terrorism assume terrorists to be rational actors—behaving more or less like *hominis economici* who try to maximize their utility, given the benefits, (opportunity) costs and economic constraints linked to these actions. In fact, while public perception tends to view terrorist behavior as “irrational”, psychological studies of individuals participating in terrorist groups – reviewed by Victoroff (2005) – do not suggest that terrorists routinely suffer from mental incapacities. Consequently, Caplan (2006), who provides an extensive analysis of terrorist irrationality, comes to the conclusion that the sympathizers of terrorism and most active terrorists act more or less rational.

2.2. EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK OF IMPACT OF TERRORISM AND BUSINESS CLIMATE ON ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN NIGERIA

Odeselu in Shadare (2011) added that insecurity in Nigeria has affected all aspect of businesses negatively and that it scars away entrepreneurs as it drains

the resources that could have been used to improve the economy. These resources according to him include finance and time.

Tagba in Gbenga and Augoye (2011) argued that an insecure environment impinges directly on development; it disenfranchises communities, contributes to poverty, distorts economies, creates instability and stunts political development. As opined by Sonubi (1973), Otobo (1983) and Owoye (1991), terrorism is often caused by a combination of political, economic and institutional factors such as bad leadership, unemployment and corruption. The volume of corruption in Nigeria triggered the poverty profile of Nigeria to 69 % (National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)). The NBS report further reveals that 112.47 million Nigerians live below US\$1.00 per day and as a result could barely afford the minimal standards of food, clothing, health care and shelter. According to Patrick et al. (2012), it reduces the chances of Foreign Direct Investment and hinders greater productivity.

Management experts say the terror unleashed by the militant sect, Boko Haram, has adversely affected businesses nationwide and that businesses and foreign investment activities inflow into Nigeria are being negatively affected by the activities of this sect in the northern parts of the country (Awoyemi, 2012). According to Adebakin and Raimi (2003), it is appropriate to note that three explanatory variables, viz: security, education, agriculture are positively significant in economic development. This implies that these three variables have considerable impact on the gross domestic product of any nation. This work therefore, seeks to identify the impact of terrorism and violence on entrepreneurship in Nigeria.

In conclusion, Festus (2018) affirmed that terrorism has not got a direct implication on FDI and GDP but on internal entrepreneurial activities which may on the long run affect the national GDP. It was concluded that terrorism has got great impact on entrepreneurs' activities in Nigeria.

3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY OF IMPACT OF TERRORISM AND BUSINESS CLIMATE ON ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN NIGERIA

This section describes the data used in this study, the data source, and the estimation methodology. It describes the econometric model employed and their estimation technique.

3.1 DATA DESCRIPTION

This study is performed in the framework of Nigeria, for the period of 2000 to 2019. Data sources are from the World Development Indicators database (WDI) of the World Bank (2019) and Global Terrorism Database (2019) in annual basis. In this study, entrepreneurship development is the dependent variable denoted by LENTDEV while terrorism is denoted by the number of terrorist incidents (LTERIND) and business climate is measured by ease of doing business (LBIZCLI)

and the interactive form of number of terrorist incidents (LTERIND) and business climate is measured by ease of doing business (LBIZCLI). All variables are at their natural logarithms and EVIEWS 9.0 is the software package used for calculation of the results.

3.2. MODEL SPECIFICATION

The model will borrow from the neoclassical growth models that show a relationship between growth, capital formation and labour

$$Y = f(k,L) \dots\dots\dots (1)$$

Where : *Y* is economic growth, *k* is capital and *L* is labour.

The model can be rewritten as follows to incorporate the impact of terrorism and business climate on entrepreneurship development

$$LENTDEV = LTERIND + BIZCLI + LTERIND*BIZCLI + \varepsilon_t \dots\dots\dots (2)$$

Where :

S\N	Abbreviation of variables	Full name of variables
1	<i>LENTDEV</i>	Entrepreneurship Development (proxy by number of new business registered)
2	<i>LTERIND</i>	Number of terrorist incidents (GDT, 2019) (incidents)
3	<i>BIZCLI</i>	Business climate proxy by Easy of doing Business
4	<i>LTERIND*BIZCLI</i>	Interactive form of Number of terrorist incidents and Business climate proxy by Easy of doing Business

Table 1: *Apriori Expectation from variables*

S\N	Abbreviation of variables	Expected Apriori sign from variables sign
1	<i>LTERIND</i>	Inverse
2	<i>BIZCLI</i>	Positive
3	<i>LTERIND*BIZCLI</i>	Positive/Negative

4. RESULT OF IMPACT OF TERRORISM AND BUSINESS CLIMATE ON ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN NIGERIA

This section presents the time data analysis result of impacts of terrorism and business climate on entrepreneurship development for Nigeria.

4.1. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF IMPACT OF TERRORISM AND BUSINESS CLIMATE ON ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN NIGERIA

Table 1 below presents the summary statistics of the variables engaged in this study. The mean distribution of all the variables was presented in the second row of the table. Mean is unarguably one important tool for measuring central tendencies. The third row presents the maximum, while the fourth row shows the minimum value for all the variables. Row five presents the standard deviation result. The *LENTDEV* which is the dependent variable has a maximum of only 11.271, and the minimum is as low as 11.162 with a mean of 11.221 which is relatively closer to the maximum than the minimum. This result strongly lays credence to the extant a priori expectations that in external debt (LED) is relatively high in Nigeria. The implication here is that, during the period under review, entrepreneurship development in Nigeria relatively high.

Moreover, the results for all the independent variables, namely, *LBIZCLI*, *LTERBIZCLI*, and *LTERIND* follow similar maximum and minimum trends with the entrepreneurship development (*LENTDEV*). For instance, *LTERBIZCLI* shows 10.33731 for the maximum, whereas the minimum is as low as 10.13385 and its mean value of 10.21024 which is closer to the minimum than the maximum. We can, therefore, infer that *LTERBIZCLI* has been very erratic and unprecedented, looking at the gap between the minimum and the maximum.

**Table 1: Descriptive statistics of impact of terrorism
and business climate on entrepreneurship in Nigeria**

	<i>LENTDEV</i>	<i>LBIZCLI</i>	<i>LTERBIZCLI</i>	<i>LTERIND</i>
Mean	11.22140	49.62539	10.21024	6.306315
Median	11.23030	48.47451	10.15956	6.278521
Maximum	11.27136	52.02699	10.33731	6.458338
Minimum	11.16253	48.37466	10.13385	6.182085

Source: Author (2019)

This means that the level of entrepreneurship development in Nigeria reported between the period between 2000 and 2019 is assumed to depend on the corresponding measures of terrorism and business climate. The dataset is constructed based on the period of 2000-2019 (the so-called terrorism years). First we regressed the average yearly new business registered (as a proxy of entrepreneurship development in Nigeria) against two main business environment indicators number of terrorism incidences (as a proxy of terrorism) and easy of doing of business index (as a proxy of business climate) using the least squares method. The result is presented below:

**Table 2: Result of OLS Multiple Regression (model 1) of impact of terrorism
and business climate on entrepreneurship in Nigeria**

Dependent Variable : ENTDEV	
Result of OLS Multiple Regression (model 1) Variables	
Constant	0.000819 (21.0856)*
TERIND	0.000397 (5.293)*
BIZ_CLI	3.80 E-05 (2.092107)*
TERBIZCLI	– 0.000159 (– 0.4057)*
N	19
R-Squared	0.67536
Adjusted R-Squared	0.675192
F-Statistic	1.336

** Significant at the 95% and 99% confidence level.*

The result displayed in table 2 above shows that terrorism, business climate and interactive form of terrorism and business climate are significant at the 5% level. However, the terrorism variable contradicts our a priori expectation, while the business climate variable gave us our expected sign. In particular, the interactive form of terrorism and business climate is inversely related to the entrepreneurship development indicator, implying that combined interactive form of terrorism and business climate is harmful to the entrepreneurship development.

On the other hand, the terrorism variable (TERIND) entered with very low positive sign against our a priori expectation. In particular, we computed the elasticity of terrorism, business climate and the interactive form of terrorism and business climate with respect to the log of the dependent variable at their sample means.

The result shows that a percentage rise in terrorism will lead to a 0.027% decline in average entrepreneurship development. For business climate, a percentage increase of 1% increases entrepreneurship development marginally (approximately 0.00000013%) while the result shows that a percentage rise in interactive form of terrorism and business climate will lead to a 0.0159% decline in average entrepreneurship development in Nigeria.

The adjusted R-squared shows that the explanatory variables account for approximately 68% of changes in the dependent variable. This result is reinforced by the F-test, which is highly significant. The Durbin-Watson statistic of approximately 2 (1.88) indicates the absence of autocorrelation in the model. The overall effect indicates that the positive effect of entrepreneurship development through improved business climate is overwhelmed by the negative effect of number of terrorist incidents; hence, we can conclude that business environment is detrimental to growth and further impoverishes the entrepreneurs in Nigeria.

5. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have attempted to empirically examine the extent to which terrorism and business climate retards the entrepreneurship development. On the basis of empirical evidence, based on multiple and log linear regressions linking various measures of terrorism and business climate to entrepreneurship, we have found that terrorism and business climate alone does not directly retards entrepreneurship development. However, the interactive form of terrorism and business climate has a significant adverse effect on entrepreneurship development. However, the positive effect from business climate is not sufficiently strong to offset the negative effect of terrorism. The assumption underlying the promotion of entrepreneurship development is that an improved business climate (i.e. easy of doing of business) alone when unrestricted and unregulated, brings benefits to developing countries, however, having an improved business climate alone is not sufficient for entrepreneurship development rather the issues on terrorism is vital, hence to ensure entrepreneurship development there is need for the policymakers to ensure a secured business climate be advantageous for the economy in the long run.

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ACSRT TERRORISM DOSSIER

ADDRESSING GENDER IN PREVENTING VIOLENT EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM IN AFRICA: INTEGRATING WOMEN'S DIVERSE ROLES AND VOICES

*Statement delivered by: Mr. Idriss Mounir Lallali – Acting Director,
African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT)
Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CCPCJ) Side event on
Wednesday 19th May 2021
13:10 to 14:00 (Vienna time)*

- **Distinguished Representative of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime;**
- **Excellencies;**
- **Distinguished Participants;**
- **Ladies and Gentlemen;**

1. Often, and to some extent subconsciously, gender is mistakenly used interchangeably with women, probably because they, as compared to men, are a vulnerable gender, hence the degree of emphasis therefore is bestowed to them. Women constitute the majority of the world's refugee population and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), they are more affected by crimes of war than their male counterparts. It is unfortunate that the most prevalent form of gender-based violence is against women and girls.
2. Terrorism and violent extremism has disproportionately affected women and girls. From being at the forefront of the displacement crisis to constituting the majority of victims of sexual exploitation and abuse, to suffering stigmatization from association with different groups, women and girls are faced with different challenges than men and boys.

3. Thousands of women and girls have been abducted, raped or forced into marriage and continue to be used as suicide bombers against their will or as a result of religious conviction and radicalization. Upon their return into communities, they continue to live in trauma and stigma undermining their social and economic reintegration. In addition, due to hardship, women and girls are forced into survival sex and other negative coping strategies including early marriage.
4. On the other hand, with the emergence of the so-called Islamic State we have witnessed a clear shift of women, from being victims of terrorism to increasingly taking multiple active roles in terror activities, inter alia, active combat, recruitment, planning, training, sponsoring and propaganda campaigns, even as operational leaders. We all remember the White Widow the Nairobi's Westgate Mall terror attack masterminded.
5. Motivational factors for women engagement in terror activities do not inevitably differ from those inspiring men to terrorism. The main driving factors are often specified as need to support family members, monetary issues, failing victims of religious extremism and martyrdom. Forceful recruitment and abduction targeting young women has been the trademark tactic of such terror groups as the Lord's Resistance Army and Boko Haram.
6. Women and girls, men and boys, have all experienced the conflict differently, as both victims and actors, and are differently impacted by the development deficit that persists. Attention must be paid to these different experiences and impacts, if individual needs are to be addressed, so as to build resilience to radicalisation and recruitment, and to establish pathways to decent and productive lives.
7. Counter Violent Extremism programs, therefore, necessitate wide ranging engagement with various stakeholders and most importantly it also requires addressing socio-economic problems to reduce vulnerability to extremist ideology, so as to ensure effective implementation and sustainability of related measures.
8. A gender-sensitive approach must therefore be mainstreamed into our responses, in particular targeting young women who are increasingly making

voluntary choices to join terrorist groups, and present themselves as Jihadi brides.

9. The mainstreaming of gender issues must be accompanied by specific and urgent action to increase protection for women and girls, and to ensure that women are empowered to participate fully in planning and decision-making processes, in all actions for conflict resolution, early recovery and development, as well as all mechanisms for evaluation and enhanced accountability.
10. It is therefore necessary to undertake gender-specific research, and to design and implement initiatives that empower women and youth, supports their participation in all processes for stabilization, early recovery and development, and establishes mechanisms for improved gender sensitive monitoring, reporting, analysis and advocacy.
11. Research needs to be accompanied by mechanisms and methodology for improved monitoring, reporting, analysis and advocacy to ensure that a gender sensitive approach is truly mainstreamed, and that the process leverages effectively upon the capacities of each demographic appropriately and to the full. These efforts will ensure that the development aspirations of all groups are not just taken into account but are actually realized for inclusive and cross-cutting development progress for men and women, boys and girls.
12. In many parts of sub-Saharan Africa women have been at the forefront of efforts to counter the political, social and cultural factors that enable violent extremism. Women are among the most powerful voices of prevention – in their homes, schools and communities - and women's organizations and movements have played a significant role in advocating for inclusion and tolerance.
13. Women's organizations also provide alternative social, educational and economic activities for at-risk young women and men. Hence, they can uniquely help build the social cohesion needed to resist the appeal of a violent extremist group. However, most of the current counter-violent extremist programs however focus only on men. Women are absent from the decision-making processes on how to address violent extremism. A closer

understanding of the roles women play, is critical to the development of tailored strategies to strengthen resilience against violent extremism and to support victims and survivors.

14. Women and girls must also be especially supported and promoted in empowerment initiatives that span a broad segment of interventions and sectors. This focus area will aim to address the structural barriers that women and girls face and establish an enabling environment for this demographic group to thrive.
15. Investing in women's economic autonomy is also critical in preventing violent extremism as women's economic status builds their own resilience, as well as that of their families, against joining extremist groups." This should include, but not be limited to, increasing their access to capital and other facilitative resources (such as legal and financial advice) to promote entrepreneurship.
16. The current situation also calls for specific protection measures for women and girls to be designed and implemented. These Protection mechanisms must include support to the monitoring, reporting and holding to account those individuals and systems that oppress women and girls and undermine their effective engagement in the stabilization process.
17. Efforts should include promoting girls' and women's' education, ensuring their reproductive rights is upheld and safeguarding women's' health across the entire sub-region.
18. Finally, interventions must also address the legal obstacles that exist, for example in inheritance law and land ownership, to enable women to engage constructively in the economy.
19. These efforts will be facilitated and supported by the integration, domestication and operationalization of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 and pillar 2 of the AU Strategy for Gender Equality and Women Empowerment under the Aspiration 6 of the Agenda 2063 and SDG 5 on gender equality and Security Council resolutions relevant to the Women, Peace and Security agenda, including resolution 2242 (2015).

Ladies and Gentlemen,

- 20.** All voices should be heard in public dialogue. Critical reflection and thinking should be promoted, and majority public opinion should be relied upon to frame the issue correctly and establish the societal discourse to isolate and refute violent extremist logics. Mechanisms should be established, and capacities strengthened, to ensure that all community stakeholders including women and youth in particular are able to participate in all forms and at all levels of the public debate. Women-only discussion platforms can stimulate interest in the gender-specific dimensions of the phenomenon of violent extremism.

Distinguished delegates,

- 21.** As human values are put to test by disheartening incidents perpetrated by immoral people who are intentionally haunting global peace and security, it is our duty to develop effective counter narratives by using every means available to us to create synergies that proactively confront these phenomena of violent extremism and radicalization. Surely, no single entity or individual can harness all the effort needed.
- 22.** Africa and its people have for long experienced various forms of radicalization, intolerance, violent extremism, and terrorism extremism, in which Africans have paid and are still paying a heavy price, in terms of lives, stability and development. Overcoming Terrorist will only be achieved if we collectively work together in the fight against all forms of the threat.

Thank you for your attention.

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ISSN 0261-7846



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