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**ASSEMBLY OF THE UNION**  
**Twenty-Third Ordinary Session**  
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**Assembly/AU/10(XXIII)**

**REPORT OF H.E. DR. ERNEST BAI KOROMA, PRESIDENT OF  
THE REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE AND CHAIRPERSON OF  
THE COMMITTEE OF TEN ON THE UN REFORMS**

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**I. INTRODUCTION**

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the current agenda of the 23<sup>rd</sup> Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union to be held in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea from 26<sup>th</sup> – 27<sup>th</sup> June, 2014.

2. It builds on the previous report of the African Union Committee of Ten Heads of State and Government on United Nations reforms entitled: “The Thirteenth report of His Excellency Dr. Ernest Bai Koroma, President of the Republic of Sierra Leone and Coordinator of the Committee of Ten on UN reforms,” adopted during the Twenty Second Ordinary Session of the Assembly held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 29 to 30 January 2014.

3. The report covers the period 1<sup>st</sup> February to 18<sup>th</sup> June 2014.

4. In pursuant of its mandate to promote and canvass the Common African Position enunciated in the Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration and distilled into the African Group position submitted by the C-10 to the Chair in 2009, the C-10 of the African group continues to engage with all interest groups with a view to achieving Africa’s demands.

5. In that context, the African Group supports a comprehensive reform of the Security Council and opposes a piecemeal approach. It demands two permanent seats and additional two non-permanent seats to correct the historical injustice done to the continent, being unrepresented in the permanent category and under-represented in the non-permanent category. Africa therefore supports expansion in both categories; advocates that the veto be abolished, but if it continues to exist, it should be accorded to new permanent members. Africa further advocates for expansion of the Security Council from the current 15 to not less than 26 members, and improvement in working methods. In this context, Africa supports regional representation on which the Common African Position is anchored. On the process of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, Africa advocates the need to firstly agree on the principles and criteria of the negotiations vis-à-vis the five negotiable clusters as contained in decision 62/557 as a pathway to achieving a concise agreed text needed to move the IGN process to the stage of real negotiations.

6. Following our out-reach efforts, the L-69 a cross regional grouping comprising of about 42 developing countries including India and Brazil, had inter alia submitted a

Memorandum of Understanding to the C-10 to which we responded with a Non-paper to form the basis of our engagement. The L-69 responded to the Non-paper with a draft resolution for joint consideration. A joint meeting of experts from both sides was held with the view to address procedural and substantive questions.

7. As a result of this engagement, the L-69 changed its previous position on the Veto to be compliant with that of the Common African Position. However, concerns have been made about the composition of the L-69. In particular, the continued membership of both Brazil and India of the G-4 is viewed by many with suspicion that they are more committed to the G-4 agenda which was the initial position of the L-69. Greater attention needs to be paid to addressing the issue of African countries that are within the ranks of the L-69. Their continued membership of the L-69 is considered by key partners and delegations as lack of cohesiveness of the African Group.

8. Whilst the C-10's engagement with the L-69 is on-going, concrete steps have been taken to enhance engagement and collaboration with the CARICOM with the view to move the reform process forward to the point of real negotiations and meaningful reform. To that end, an Expert-level meeting was held on 13 June 2014 in New York, and an agreed summary of that meeting will be considered at the Ambassadorial level of the C-10 and CARICOM.

9. Areas of convergence in the on-going Intergovernmental Negotiations have been identified with groups like the G-4 on expansion in both categories, the L-69 and CARICOM including some other delegations on expansion in both categories and the question of the veto, and some members of the P-5, some Eastern European and Asian countries on the issue of expansion in both categories as well as support for Africa's inclusion in the permanent category.

10. At the just concluded tenth round of the Intergovernmental Negotiations devoted to the clusters, it was obvious that broad support for Africa seems to be gaining momentum with calls from across all regions of the UN membership to address the historical injustice the continent continues to suffer.

## **II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS**

### **The Tenth Round of the Intergovernmental Negotiations**

11. The first meeting of the second exchange of the tenth round of the Intergovernmental Negotiations in the informal plenary of the General Assembly on the *Question of Equitable Geographical Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other related Matters* was held on 13 March 2014.

**12.** It should be recalled that prior to the commencement of the tenth round, the President of the 68<sup>th</sup> Session of the General Assembly, H.E. John Ashe, appointed an Advisory Group with the mandate to “produce a basis for the start of the intergovernmental negotiations that reflects the ideas put forward in the negotiations so far”, and to also identify available options.

**13.** Consequently, the Advisory Group produced a non-paper and included a sixth item on cross-cutting issues.

**14.** Due to the misgivings that some delegations and interest groups had about the composition of the Advisory Group, and the lack of consensus for the Chair or any group to embark upon drafting a concise text, the non-paper was dismissed by some delegations as not being the product of a membership driven process.

**15.** The Chair’s programme of work for the tenth round was devoted to in-depth discussion of Member States’ positions on the Five Key negotiable clusters agreed upon in General Assembly decision 62/557. The major interest groups, namely: The African Group, the Group of 4 (G-4), the L-69 Group, CARICOM, Uniting for Consensus (UfC), and the P-5 actively participated alongside forty-five delegations.

**16.** The exchange of views was lively and interactive. It further demonstrated the continued existence of divergence between the UfC and the rest of the membership on the question of expansion in both categories, permanent and non-permanent. The major divergence is the continued stance of the UfC to expand the Security Council in the non-permanent category only.

**17.** Another area of divergence was on the question of extending the veto to new permanent members in a reformed Security Council.

**18.** The G-4, UK, France, some Western European countries and some small states supported the idea of putting a moratorium on the discussion of the veto for new permanent members until after a period of 15 years after the reform would have come into force.

**19.** Some Member States were of the view that the veto should be abolished, and if that seems to be difficult, then, as a matter of common justice, it should be extended to new permanent members. This is because the veto is considered to be an inherent attribute of the permanent category of the Security Council as presently constituted.

**20.** The role and authority of the Chair was also a subject of debate. The UfC and some Member States including some P-5 Members were of the view that the Chair does not have any mandate or authority to make an assessment of the process nor to produce a summary or embark on any attempt to produce a concise text. The reason advanced was that such an exercise may have the tendency to tamper with substantive positions and in the process dilute their value. There is also the fundamental question of the understanding and interpretation of General Assembly decision 62/557, the guiding resolution of the IGN process.

**21.** The tenth round also revealed increasing convergence on the five key negotiable clusters as well as the legitimacy of the Common African Position on United Nations Security Council reform. This was exemplified by expressed support for Africa's continued marginalization in terms of its representation in the Security Council. Among interest groups and delegations that continued to express support for Africa were CARICOM Member States, some Eastern European States, the L-69, some members of the P-5, the G-4, some Small Island Developing States, Belgium and the Netherlands and the UfC.

**22.** This growing support was sustained and built upon throughout the tenth round of the Intergovernmental Negotiations.

**23.** Some Member States were of the view that the breakthrough in finding a solution to the differences existing among member states would have to come from beyond the negotiation text and called for greater political flexibility to achieve consensus.

### **The Five Key Negotiable Clusters**

**24.** As mentioned earlier, the tenth round of Intergovernmental Negotiations was devoted to discussing the five negotiable clusters which as defined by General Assembly decision 62/557 provides the framework of the Intergovernmental Negotiations. The interconnectedness of the five clusters was further reiterated by many delegations and thus recognizing the implications of their interdependence.

#### **i) Categories of Membership**

**25.** The African Group represented by the C-10 Permanent Representatives reiterated the Common African Position on this cluster as contained in Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration, demanding an increase in the two categories with two permanent seats and additional two non-permanent seats for Africa.

**26.** All Member States agreed on the need for meaningful reform of the Security Council. The majority underscored that any reform measure should include expansion in both categories of membership – permanent and non-permanent. It was reiterated by majority of delegations that the present composition of the Security Council negates the spirit of the UN Charter on the principle of equitable geographical representation (article 23.1) which should be redressed.

**27.** Most delegations echoed support for Africa's demand to address the historical injustice emanating from the continent's non-representation in the permanent category and its under-representation in the non-permanent category.

**28.** A number of delegations cautioned that the inextricable inter-related nature of the clusters should be borne in mind and therefore cannot be treated independently.

**29.** The P-5 who are major stakeholders, support expansion in both categories but continue to oppose either abolishing the veto or extending it to new permanent members.

**30.** A few Member States particularly the UfC, comprising of about 12 to 15 countries are completely opposed to the idea of including new permanent members. Thus, the UfC support expansion in the non-permanent category only which in their view should be along the lines of creating longer term seats. This was considered by them to be an ideal solution to making the Security Council more broadly representative, legitimate and transparent.

**31.** Many delegations while supporting the G-4 position on expansion in both categories continue to disagree with the efficacy of creating a "new class" of Council membership under an intermediate arrangement proposed by the G-4, the United Kingdom and France.

ii) **The Question of the Veto**

**32.** In accordance with the Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration, Africa demands that the veto be abolished but so long as it exists, it should be extended to new permanent members as a matter of common justice and in the interest of promoting democracy. Of the more than ninety delegations that participated in the debate, more than two-thirds including the CARICOM and L-69 supported this stance.

**33.** Many delegations including the African Group, the UfC, CARICOM and the L-69 condemned the existence of the veto which they considered to be anachronistic, exclusive, unrepresentative, and undemocratic. Another shortcoming of the veto that

was highlighted was its abuse by the wielding powers. Some of the examples stated revealed instances of the use of the veto to further national, group or allied interests.

**34.** The G-4 (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan) are of the view that discussion of the veto should be deferred to a period of 15 years after the reform comes into effect. In other words, the veto should not be used by the new permanent members nor discussed until a review of the reform. This position is informed by due consideration of their perceived difficulty that the P-5 and some other delegations are opposed to extending the veto to new permanent members.

**35.** All P-5 members (China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, and United States of America) seem to be opposed to either abolishing the veto or extending it to new permanent members.

**36.** The UfC and several other delegations also opposed the extension of the veto to new permanent members. They believe that any addition to the category of permanent members with right to veto would further complicate the reform process. Their preference is a reformed Security Council without permanent members. However, the UN Charter does not make provision for the current permanent members to opt out of that category. The UfC reaffirm the need for the Security Council to be more representative not only of today's realities but of the future as well. In that context, they maintained that the difficulty was how to adapt the Security Council in the next 15 years to come were new permanent members to be included on the Council.

**37.** France proposed a code of conduct which was to be understood as a gentleman's agreement among the P-5 that could restrain them from using the veto in circumstances of genocide, gross violations of human rights and threat to international peace and security. The exception to this was that it would not be applicable should the national interest of any of the P-5 members was at stake.

**38.** Given the close link between the veto and working methods, the following proposals were made:

- a) establish rules or appropriate measures to exercise the right of veto;
- b) extend veto to new permanent members but its use to be deferred until after a review of the reform;
- c) that a negative vote cast by a permanent member must be explained to the general membership and that at least a double veto will be required before any decision in the Security Council is influenced;

- d) provision be made for the General Assembly to overturn the use of veto with a two-thirds majority vote which will generally restrict the use of the veto;
- e) the non-use of veto particularly in instances of genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity are imminent;
- f) exclude the election of the Secretary General from sanctions of the veto;
- g) restricting the use of the veto to Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

iii) **Regional Representation**

**39.** The Common African Position as enunciated in the Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration speaks of the African Union “selecting representatives on the Security Council’s permanent category to act in its name and speak on its behalf.” This may cover the option of regional seats allocated to regional institutions or even national seats but responsive to the interest of the region. This may require further clarity. The high ground for Africa’s demand within the context of equitable geographical representation in both categories in accordance with Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration is the historical injustice arising from the under-representation and no representation in the non-permanent and permanent categories respectively.

**40.** Proponents of the Charter provision for national seats are of the firm belief that membership to the Security Council should be country specific and a matter of national responsibility. They supported this point by citing Chapter 23.1 of the Charter as spelling out the criteria for non-permanent membership as well as the specific mention of the P-5 members by their names as justification for their claims.

**41.** The issues that remained unanswered during the debate include among others, the notion of enlargement based on existing regional frameworks; and whether a mechanism should be devised by which seats can be allocated to Member States on the basis of certain geo-political and economic configurations. Many delegations also queried whether membership to the Security Council should be based entirely on national rather than regional considerations or vice-versa.

**42.** The UfC whose membership continues to be against any expansion in the permanent category, advocates for allocation of seats to regions on a rotational basis rather than to individual Member States. Its membership believe this will promote the principle of accountability and transparency.

43. On the contrary, proponents of Security Council membership on the basis of national seats have out-rightly dismissed the regional accountability on the grounds that in practice, Member States largely responded to instructions from their capitals instead of the broader regional concerns. They further argued that membership to the elected seats is subject to accountability to the wider membership of the United Nations rather than regions.

44. The question of regional representation therefore presented different concerns to different delegations.

iv) **Size of an Enlarged Security Council and Working Methods**

45. Many delegations recognized that despite the exponential increase in members of the United Nations, the size of the Security Council, a principal organ of the United Nations is inversely proportional to that of the General Assembly. The need to democratize the Security Council and thus making it more representative, transparent, and legitimate was key to the reasons advanced for an expanded Security Council.

46. Many delegations expressed support for Africa's claims which they considered as legitimate and therefore bear merit for consideration. Calls for the size of an expanded Security Council ranged from 21 to 31. While Africa advocates for not less than 26, the G-4 and UfC call for 25. CARICOM and L-69 advocate for expansion of the Security to 27. They emphasized the need to have a rotating non-permanent seat dedicated to the Small Island Developing States (SIDS). The Arab Group called for the allocation of a permanent seat to its membership.

47. Some P-5 Members advocated for a modest expansion preferably in the low twenties.

48. *On Working Methods*, many delegations including the African Group made concrete suggestions on how to improve the transparency and access to the Security Council, including through improving and adopting its rules of procedure, which are still provisional.

49. The membership called for the convening of more frequent formal meetings as well as greater involvement of interested parties in the Security Council's consultations prior to the adoption of decisions to allow for wider participation.

50. However, all P-5 members continue to see themselves as masters of their own procedure with prerogatives over their rules of procedure, which are still "provisional"

and accordingly, are opposed to member states imposing on them views on improvement of Council's working methods.

v) **Relationship between the General Assembly and the Security Council**

51. On relationship between the General Assembly and the Security Council, the following proposals were made by many delegations:

- a) the need to maintain a positive balance among the principal organs of the United Nations, especially between the Security Council and the General Assembly. This would strengthen the confidence of its members and enhance the legitimacy of the Security Council's actions;
- b) the need to improve on the balance of competence between the General Assembly and the Security Council, which has often tended to lead to clashes in competence between them;
- c) the need to examine the respective functions of the General Assembly and the Security Council with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security in order to enhance the effectiveness of the General Assembly's role, given that the Security Council's primary responsibility in this domain is not exclusive;
- d) the need to strengthen the leadership of the General Assembly with a view to enable it to play its proper role as the most representative, democratic, chief deliberative body of the United Nations in accordance with relevant provisions of the UN Charter;
- e) the need to submit to the General Assembly comprehensive and analytical reports containing assessment of the Security Council's work and views expressed by its members on pertinent issues as these reports have generally been narratives of events and lacking analytical depth;
- f) the need to allow for the effective and timely flow and exchange of information between the two organ, particularly through frequent and regular consultations between the Presidents of the General Assembly and the Security Council to review work plans and consult on specific issues of mutual concern with a view to enhancing more direct and dynamic exchanges between the two organs to work in a more inclusive, collaborative and transparent manner.

**The Summit of the African Union Committee of Ten on United Nations Security Council Reform held in Oyo, Republic of Congo 15 – 16 May, 2014**

**52.** In furtherance of its mandate and pursuant to decision reached at the 20<sup>th</sup> Ordinary session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at the African Union Headquarters in Addis Ababa from 27 – 28 January 2013, the Coordinator of the Committee of Ten Heads of State and Government, His Excellency Dr. Ernest Bai Koroma, President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, in consultation with his peers of the C-10 convened, a Summit of the Committee held in Oyo, Republic of Congo from 15 to 16 May 2014.

**53.** The Summit, which was preceded by meetings of the Committee of Ten Foreign Ministers and Permanent Representatives of New York and Addis Ababa in Freetown and Oyo, had the following objectives:

- a) examine the evolution of the Security Council Reform process so far, including the work of the Inter-Governmental Negotiations;
- b) map out strategies to further expand and intensify outreach;
- c) seek to identify convergences and nuances for effective and meaningful coalition building.

**54.** Further, the Summit of the Heads of State and Government reiterated the inevitability of the reform to reflect the realities of our current geopolitical and economic environment and emphasized that:

- i) the United Nations Security Council reform is an integral component of the international push for adherence to the democratic principles, equity and fair play at all levels especially at global levels which has continued to fall below expectations;
- ii) Africa's under-representation and non-representation in the non-permanent and permanent categories of the Security Council respectively are inconsistent with the demand for the inclusiveness, transparency, accountability and legitimacy of the international system;
- iii) despite being the continent to which a substantial proportion of the matters considered on the agenda of the United Nations Security Council apply, and cognizant also of its contribution to peacekeeping and peace-making as well as to humanitarian support, Africa has limited representation and voice in

the highest decision making processes of the United Nations. Africa also makes substantial contributions to the work of the Security Council through its participation in funds, programmes and activities of the United Nations;

- iv) even as the on-going Intergovernmental Negotiations on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Related Matters have entered into the tenth round, the debate still remains within the realm of restatements of known positions;
- v) the African Common Position, as contained in the Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration, should continue to serve as the most viable option that reflects Africa's legitimate right and aspiration to rectify, inter alia, the historical injustice endured by the Continent;
- vi) it is time for the repeated proclamations and statements in support of Africa to be translated into concrete actions for the achievement of the African Common Position within the framework of the wider United Nations reform process and other interest groups.

**55.** At the end of the deliberations, the following key recommendations were made:

- a) the C-10 will continue to guarantee, in its engagements and negotiation activities, that the reform process is approached in a comprehensive manner; making sure that Africa remains cohesive and continues to speak with one voice for the attainment of the African common position;
- b) the C-10 will undertake intensive outreach initiatives at all levels, bilaterally and multilaterally and, in particular, at the highest political levels, focusing principally on the five Permanent Members of the Security Council, making sure that the C-10 members are specifically assigned to each of the P-5 members;
- c) in this regard, the C-10's advocacy for the African common position will be taken to the capitals of the P-5 countries to canvass and garner support for its content. The Chair of the C-10 will coordinate the outreach program in consultation with his peers by drawing up a schedule for intensive engagement with the Permanent Members (P-5) at the highest level to ascertain the extent of their support for the African Common Position beyond the pronouncements already made;

- d) that the C-10 will make every effort to ensure that alliances by any Member States to reform proposals other than the Africa Common Position should not compromise the interests of the continent and its common position. Africa must remain fully united for and committed to the Common Position without exception. Noting however the likely risks membership of African Member States to other interest groups may pose to the cohesiveness of the continent and full commitment to its Common Position, the C-10, **decides to seek** clarity on the matter at the 23<sup>rd</sup> Ordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government of the African Union in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea in June 2014;
- e) the C-10 **directs** its Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives in New York to redouble their engagements with other interest groups in order to build mutually beneficial alliances;
- f) the C-10 will ensure that such engagements and alliances should meaningfully enhance the spirit of the Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration;
- g) taking into account the importance of strategic partnerships, the C-10 must seek to promote the Common Africa Position on the reform of the UN Security Council at all fora;
- h) the C-10 requests that before the next budget year of 2015, the African Union Commission should work with the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) to find ways of funding the activities of the C-10 from the General Fund;
- i) the C-10 Heads of State resolved that the Committee should continue to engage and consult outside the margins of the Summits on rotational basis following consultations by the Coordinator.
- j) it was decided that the next high level meetings of the Committee will be held in Kenya and Zambia respectively.
- k) the report of the Oyo Summit is attached to this report as an annexure.

### III. OBSERVATIONS

56. Member States continue to consider the Intergovernmental Negotiations process as the appropriate forum to discuss Security Council reform. Notwithstanding this, there

is need to step up efforts in garnering the necessary political will that could lead to decisive progress.

**57.** The trajectory of the on-going Intergovernmental Negotiation has created a better understanding of the various positions of Member States in terms of areas of convergence and divergence.

**58.** The tenth round has shown that member states positions are not as entrenched as they may seem. However, progress will not be possible without taking steps that can further build on the gains made so far.

**59.** The tenth round recorded progress on areas of convergence with many delegations expressing support for expansion in both categories with a size in the mid-twenties and working methods, regional representation, relationship between the General Assembly and the Security Council. The veto continues to be a contentious issue, with some calling for its abolition, if not ideal, as a matter of common justice, considered it fair that it is extended to new permanent members. Others called for limitation of its use.

**60.** The UfC, with Italy as focal point, reiterated the Intermediary Approach. This proposal which centred on the enlargement of the non- permanent category only, was first put on the table in 2005, and had since come up with variant models on the size, duration and basis of representation.

**61.** Considering that article 23 of the United Nations Charter dealing with the composition of the Security Council provides for only two categories of members, Permanent and non-Permanent members, the G-4, French and British position for an increase in Permanent category without veto, as stated in the Intermediate approach, may result in the creation of a third category of membership in the Council: Permanent Member without veto.

**62.** The CARICOM and L-69 continue to call for the allocation of a rotating non-permanent seat to Small Island developing States. This addition by the L-69 and CARICOM increases the size to 27. Therefore, the difference between the Common African Position and that of the L-69 and CARICOM is on size, effected through the latter's call for one rotating non-permanent seat for Small Island Developing states. Another area of divergence is on process. Both the CARICOM and L-69 seemingly support the G-4 position on producing a concise text without due reference to agreeing first on the principles and criteria of the five negotiable outlined in General Assembly decision 62/557.

**63.** All P-5 members see themselves as masters of their own procedure with prerogatives over their rules of procedure, which are still "provisional" and accordingly, they are opposed to member states imposing on them views on improvement of their working methods. Notwithstanding, they all express commitment to the reform of the Security Council, but have so far not come up with a united and comprehensive position on all the five key negotiable clusters. Furthermore, some of the P-5 members continue to emphasize on increasing the size of the Council to the low twenties.

**64.** The greatest challenge that the IGN process on UN Security Council reform faces is bridging the divergent positions, especially on the issue of the veto, and coming up with a text that could garner support by the required two-thirds majority. This will require securing the votes of 129 out of 193 member states for it to stand a chance of being adopted. Furthermore, under Article 108 of the UN Charter, amendments to the Charter can only come into force when ratified by two-thirds of member states including all the permanent members of the Security Council.

**65.** The Common African Position continues to enjoy broad support, sympathy and traction due to the legitimacy of its demands and therefore remains a viable option with encouraging space to build alliances with like-minded interest groups.

**66.** The idea of negotiating and eventual tabling of a draft resolution remains an option but should in the meantime not be the main focus until we are sure of the progress made with delegations and interest groups.

#### **IV. CONCLUSION**

**67.** Africa's demand is attracting more and more support. This should be built upon through constructive engagement with all other stakeholders with a view to taking advantage of the existing commonalities and finding ways of narrowing down areas of divergence.

**68.** The African Group should remain cohesive on all aspects of the reform process. It is therefore advisable, at this stage, that Africa maintains its position on agreeing on principles first before engaging in any streamlining or merging exercise.

**69.** The involvement of some African Member States in new initiatives on the sideline of the Common African Position like the Accountability-Coherence-Transparency group "ACT", the L-69 and UfC should be addressed without delay to stall the further peeling off of our membership which presently puts our cohesiveness and unity into question. This was also among the observations and recommendations of the Oyo Conclusions of the C-10 Summit. In this regard, there is need for Africa to be cautious and guarded

against being enjoined in initiatives that may create the impression of division within the African Group.

**70.** African Member States should continue to reject any piece-meal approach as well as reform models such as Intermediate, Transitional or Intermediary Approaches on the grounds that they out-rightly contradict the Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration. They also undermine the spirit of meaningful reform that can ensure the legitimacy of the Security Council.

**71.** As decided at previous African Union Summits, African Heads of State and Government should continue to intensify efforts to garner the political will and support for the Common African Position from other Heads of State and Government.

**72.** Essentially as already outlined in the Oyo Conclusions, the Committee of Ten, may at the highest level, continue to intensify efforts in promoting the Common African Position and canvassing support for it through an outreach programme with the P-5, the UfC, CARICOM, the G-4 and other groups/delegations with the view to further build on existing convergence and to narrow down areas of divergence.

**73.** As a next logical step, the Permanent Representatives in New York should continue building on their engagement with all interest groups and to continue to explore means of securing a broad and strategic majority that will inject the required dynamism to achieve progress

**74.** There is also need to have a budget that can support and facilitate the work of the C-10 at both the technical and political levels. Such a budget can enhance outreach in New York and Addis, and in other capitals as well as participation in the on-going IGN process and member states initiatives.

**MATRIX OF THE POST OYO SUMMIT ACTIVITY PLAN OF THE COMMITTEE OF TEN HEADS OF STATE  
AND GOVERNMENT ON THE REFORM OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL  
JUNE 2014 -JANUARY 2015**

No	Activity	Expected Outcome	Responsible Partner (s)	Time Frame of Implementation			Remarks
				Jun	Jul - Sept	Oct - Jan	
1	<b>Presentation of the 14<sup>th</sup> Report of the Committee including the Outcome of the Oyo Summit and its Activity Plan at the 23<sup>rd</sup> Ordinary Session of the Summit of Heads of State and Government</b>	<b>Adoption of Report as well as the Activity Plan and schedule of Implementation</b>	<b>The Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union at Malabo</b>	X			
2	Engagement of the Africa Union Commission (AUC) to fully assume its supporting role Commencement of the outreach (visits) to the capitals of P5 at the highest level by C-10 Heads of State and Government	The level of commitment and preparedness of the P-5 members to support the Common African Position in real terms ascertained	C-10 Heads of State and Government and counterparts of the P-5	X	X	X	
3	Follow up actions at all levels, including the Ministerial, Permanent Representative and	To sensitize other member states on, and disseminate the justification of	C=10 Heads of State and Government, Foreign Ministers including other government officials	X	X	X	

	expert	Africa's demand for membership of the permanent category	engaging at various fora				
4	Meeting of the Committee in Nairobi, Kenya	To review updates on outreach activities vis-à-vis the promotion and acceptance of the Common Position on Security Council reform	C-10 Ministers and Permanent Representatives		X		
5	Engaging actively in the Intergovernmental Negotiations on the reform of the Security Council in New York	The Common African Position advanced	The C-10 Permanent Representatives in New York supported by their designated experts	X	X	X	

**SCHEDULE OF OUTREACH TO THE P-5 MEMBER STATES**

	<b>PERMANENT MEMBER STATES</b>	<b>RESPONSIBLE MEMBER STATES OF THE COMMITTEE OF TEN</b>	<b>REMARKS</b>
1	France	Republic of Congo and Algeria	
2	People's Republic of China	Uganda and Zambia	
3	Russian Federation	Equatorial Guinea and Kenya	
4	United Kingdom	Sierra Leone and Namibia	
5	United States of America	Senegal and Libya	



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2014-06-27

# Report of H.E. DR. Ernest Bai Koroma, President of the Republic of Sierra Leone and Chairperson of the Committee of ten on the UN Reforms

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DCMP

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