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**REPORT OF THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE COMMITTEE
OF TEN ON THE UN REFORMS**

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the current agenda of the 16th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union to be held in Addis Ababa from 30 – 31 January 2011. It should be recalled that at the Fifteenth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union Heads of State and Government held on 27 July 2010, in Kampala, Uganda, the Assembly's decision (Assembly/AU/Dec.309(XV) in reaffirming the African Common Position contained in the Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration on the Reform of the UN Security Council, requested the Committee of Ten Heads of States (C-10) to intensify their efforts in advocating, canvassing and promoting the African Common Position until Africa achieves its objectives. In pursuant thereof, the Committee of Ten on the Reform of the Security Council intensified its engagement in the on-going intergovernmental Negotiations on the Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council and Other Related Matters.

2. The report therefore covers the most recent developments on the reform of the United Nations Security Council since the submission of the last report in July 2010.

II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

A. Informal Plenary Meeting on the inter-governmental Negotiations on Security Council Reform held on October 21, 2010

3. The meeting was convened by the President of the General Assembly H.E. Mr. Joseph Deiss, in accordance with General Assembly Decision 64/568 of September 13 2010; and following appeals by many world leaders during the 2010 General Assembly debate for Member States to decisively move forward the reform process. According to his letter dated 18th October 2010, the meeting was meant to sound the views of Member States pursuant to that mandate. Ambassador Zahir Tanin's role as Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations was renewed by the President of the General Assembly ahead of the informal plenary.

4. Speaking on behalf of the **African Group**, Sierra Leone reiterated Africa's position on Rev.2 of the Negotiation Text as an outcome document of the Fifth Round, emphasising that the principles and terms of the negotiation must be agreed upon first before engaging in the merging of language. By letter dated September 1, 2010 addressed by the Coordinator of the Committee of Ten Permanent Representatives to the Facilitator on behalf of the African Group, it was stressed that it was premature to present the add-ons attached to Rev.2 by the Facilitator as an outcome document of the 5th Round since they cannot genuinely claim to be the product of any compromise-oriented negotiations in strict conformity with Decision 62/557 and 63/565.

5. Other Member States mainly restated their previous positions, with the **United Kingdom** and **France** proposing the **Intermediate Approach**, which provides for expansion in both categories but without the veto to new permanent members until after a period of review, and the **Uniting For Consensus (UFC)** proposing the **Intermediary Approach** although not clear on the variant models of their position.

6. The President of the General Assembly closed the meeting on the note that Rev. 2 of the Negotiation Text would serve as a vehicle to move the process forward and called on the Facilitator to continue working through open and inclusive consultations, which would allow the text to evolve in a balanced and comprehensive way, convinced that the November 11, 2010, Joint Debate in the informal General Assembly on the Annual Report of the Security Council would offer the membership the opportunity to make progress in the Intergovernmental Negotiations. Member States were further reminded that the responsibility to move the process forward rested with them, urging all stakeholders to reflect on their positions and hold consultations with a view to finding the way forward.

B. Meetings and Consultations Held by C-10 in New York with Other Stakeholders

7. In consequence of developments before and during the November 11 Joint Formal Debate held in the General Assembly and considering the urgent need to further advance the African Common Position on the reform process, the C-10 Permanent Representatives in New York held consultations with some of the major interest groups and the Facilitator of the Intergovernmental Negotiations, H.E. Ambassador Zahir Tanin, with a view to sounding opinions on the way forward and garnering more relevant information on the various positions.

Consultations with the Five Permanent Members of the Security Council (P5)

8. **Consultation with the P5** - The C-10 succeeded in engaging four of the five Permanent Members (P5) of the Security Council namely: China, the Russian Federation, the United States of America and France. The *U.K.* was not available owing to its work load in the Security Council, which it was chairing in the month of November. Its position is however believed to be similar to that of France. The views of the rest of the P5 were as follows:

9. **Consultation with China** – China attached great importance to the African Common Position, believing that Africa holds the key to the Security Council reform; but however raised concerns about an apparent split within the African Group on the Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration. They cautioned that any division or split within the African Group could be counterproductive and detrimental to the interest of the region, and emphasized that unity was critical to the interest of Africa for reasons that Africa has more to lose than others. They admonished that the spirit of the negotiations should be one of give and take.

10. Consultation with Russia - Much as they support Africa's right to permanent membership, they were eager to know the form the representation would take; whether national or regional. If national, then there was need for Africa to reveal the names of the two countries that would be representing the Continent before granting them seats; if based on regional representation, then why the demand for two seats instead of one for the region or whether the demand was to accommodate the sub-regional approach in the allocation of seats. Russia also raised concern that the issue of regional representation was one that would clearly require an amendment to the Charter, and could also pose problems for other permanent Members of the Security Council who, by reason of such category of representation, may be required to relinquish their membership on the Council for a future representation of the European Union. They also wanted to know whether there was any provision for rotation in the African Common Position.

11. Consultation with the United States - The US was clearly against the extension of veto rights to new permanent members, including Africa, and did not support its abolition or restriction. They envisioned the creation of new permanent Members without the veto. They also believed representation should be country specific.

12. Consultation with France - It was reaffirmed at the meeting that the President of France was very interested in the Security Council reform and that both France and the UK were sincere and committed to the process. Views were expressed by the Permanent Representative of France that the African position was seen from outside as a blocking position, although he observed that some African countries seemed to be taking a different approach. There was need to know the core of the African position, particularly on the issue of allocating seats; whether on a permanent or rotational basis; that France and the UK shared similar views that Africa should have representation on the permanent membership of the Council but that there was some common wisdom that the veto should not be given to new Permanent Members and that the interest should be, to gain membership first, a view shared by the G4 countries. France was in support of merging of language in the Negotiation Text, believing that, politically, when negotiations start with principles, compromise becomes difficult. Any idea therefore from Africa that would move the process forward would be welcome. There was apprehension that if the process could not move forward by the 66th Session, negotiations may go into oblivion, and that it was possible that at a certain stage, the negotiations may involve the highest political levels at the respective capitals, concluding that more and more countries seemed to be leaning towards the intermediate approach.

Consultation with the Facilitator – H.E. Amb. Zahir Tanin

13. The C-10 Permanent Representatives in New York held consultations with the Facilitator seeking clarification on the process, the options of merging language in the text, the positions on the table and the way forward in the negotiations.

14. The Facilitator in response made the following disclosures:

Firstly, That the process was at a difficult stage because of two issues that are interlinked, the political will and the need to put the various positions on the table in a negotiable format. Those two issues must be addressed together if a viable conclusion was to be attained. Thus the need for urgent decisions by the respective capitals to move the process forward.

Secondly, that the compilation text containing the various positions, irrespective of nuances, should normally be the basis for negotiation; but that many areas of the text overlap and duplicate each other and therefore not good as a negotiating text. There was therefore need for member states to amend the text, though not in substance but language, into a concise negotiating Text to become Rev.3; given that negotiations cannot commence with a non-workable text.

Thirdly, that the text was still open to accommodate a review of any of the positions or even new ones, and that the L.69 Group had submitted a position as appeared in the updated text of September, 2010 (Rev.2).

Finally, that Africa has a big role to play and a big stake in the negotiations as compared to others.

Consultation with the Spokesperson on the L69 Group – The Permanent Representative of Jamaica

15. The meeting which was prompted by Jamaica's statement delivered during the November 11 meeting on behalf of the Group known as L.69, was intended to seek clarification on the position of the L.69 Group and how it related to CARICOM's, having regard to the fact that the African Group had always considered CARICOM as an ally holding similar positions of the Security Council reform. It was also intended to gain better knowledge of the L.69 Group's interest in the negotiation process and its impact on the level of cohesiveness in CARICOM now that the Group seemed to be evolving from coordinating procedural issues to substantive issues. The Group had acquired its name by reference to a draft resolution L.69 of September 2007, which was instrumental in moving the process from the Open-Ended Working Group to the intergovernmental Negotiations process. At that time it comprised countries from Africa, Latin America and Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific; although its actual composition now is not fully known.

16. The Permanent representative of Jamaica reassured that CARICOM's position was similar to the mainstream African Group position on the Veto and on expansion in both the permanent and non permanent categories to a total size of a Council of 26 members with Africa having two Permanent sets. CARICOM proposes 1 rotating seat in the non-permanent category for Africa, Latin America and Caribbean states and Asia and that the use of the veto should however be limited and not to cover war crimes, crimes against humanity and issues of genocide as well as serious violations of human rights. CARICOM, he further revealed, was also advocating for 2 (two) Permanent seats for Africa.

17. On the Composition and position of the L.69. Group, the Jamaican Permanent Representative, as Spokesperson of the Group, made the following disclosures after confirming the historical evolution of the Group, indicating that India was originally nominated to head it: that the Group was adamantly opposed to the Intermediary or any Interim Approach since it was confusing to them, that the Group was silent on the question of the Veto to avoid conflict, and that it supported a regular review of the United Nations to ensure it continued to reflect global realities.

Consultation with the President of the General Assembly (PGA), H.E. Mr. Joseph Deiss

18. Concerned about the need to take a decisive step forward in the Security Council Reform process, which the General Assembly had been dealing with for the past 18 years, the PGA, on December 6, 2010 called for a one-to one meeting with the Coordinator of the C-10 Permanent Representatives in New York, H.E. the Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone. The discussions centred primarily on the need to give more impetus to the political will necessary to move the reform process forward, emphasising among other things, that in his view, Africa had a big stake in the Security Council Reform process and should be seen to be showing more interest in causing to move the process and should be seen to be showing more interest in causing to move the process forward. He wanted to know where the political will lies for Africa in the Security Council reform process. The up thrust of the meeting was that the PGA later revealed plans to attend the African Union Summit in Addis Ababa scheduled for 30 and 31 January 2011 on the invitation of the Chairperson of the African Union, H.E. Dr. Bingu wa Mutharika, President of the Republic of Malawi, and would appreciate being given the opportunity for a bilateral meeting with the Coordinator of the Committee of Ten African Heads of State on the Security Council Reform, H.E. Dr. Ernest Bai Koroma, President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, in the margins of the Summit in Addis Ababa.

C. The General Assembly Joint Debate on the Annual Report of the Security Council and the Reform of the Security Council and other Related Matters, 11-12 November 2010.

19. The Debate was launched by General Assembly President H.E. Joseph Deiss. He was of the view that consideration of the Annual Report of Security Council in a Joint Debate was important instrument for interaction between the Council and the Assembly, and as such, saw it as another opportunity to reflect on strengthening cooperation between the two bodies with a view to ensuring that they were better able to promote the values of the United Nations. Recent years had seen some movement towards greater transparency in the Council, efforts that should continue. He was of the view that it was essential to build on existing convergences and narrow differences, in order to achieve tangible results and had, to that end, asked the Facilitator to continue work on the text that had emerged from the second revision, by holding open consultations. Member States were reminded that the solution to the reform process was in their hands, and were therefore expected to show flexibility, willingness to compromise and mutual respect in a transparent and inclusive atmosphere.

20. Most of the nearly 50 (fifty) Member States that participated in the debate agreed that the Council should be more democratic and representative of a rapidly globalizing world where the centres of political and economic power had shifted dramatically over the past 25 years. Member States remained divided over the form a reformed Council should take, especially the countries to be included if it were expanded.

21. United Kingdom, which held the Presidency of the Security Council for the month of November, introduced the report contained in document A/65/2, revealing that over the past year, the Council had worked to address some of the requests and concerns of the international community, in particular, with regard to improving its transparency and enhancing its working methods. Frequent meetings between the General Assembly and the Security Council, and regular briefings by the Council throughout the year, had also increased transparency. The Council took into account many views of the Member States on its working methods.

22. Sierra Leone on behalf of the **African Group**, once again reiterated Africa's demand for expansion in both the Permanent and Non-permanent categories with Africa allocated at least two permanent seats together with all the prerogatives and privileges, including the veto if it continued to exist, and a total of five non-permanent seats, as contained in the Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration with the African Union being charged with the responsibility of selecting its candidates. The African Group further stressed the imperative of reforming the Security Council in a comprehensive manner that will enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the United Nations' primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security and called for the need to identify and agree on the structure and approach of continuing the Intergovernmental negotiations.

23. The **Russian Federation** called for increasing the Council's effectiveness by making it more representative, adding that such efforts should not have a negative impact on the body's work. Reiterating its support for an intermediate solution, **France** was aware of all positions supported by Member States, and that alternatives in the area of reform were clear; either urgent progress was to be made, or if the debate continued to linger, reform of the Council would "die a slow death" at the expense of all parties involved. Furthermore, France like many other Member States emphasised the need for a shorter, more operational negotiating text and that commitment to reform was required before the end of 2010. **The United States** maintained that modest expansion must take place in both categories but it must be country-specific and the veto should not be extended to the new Permanent Members. **The United Kingdom**, like **France**, supported the inclusion of representation for Africa, and the G4 into the Permanent category of the Security Council but without veto.

24. Jamaica, openly speaking on behalf of the **L.69** Group, for the very first time, indicated that efforts of the Security Council to improve its working methods and enhance transparency were important, but could not substitute for the comprehensive change required in the composition of the membership of the Council to render it more reflective of contemporary global realities. It expressed the hope that through further discussions and negotiations, the negotiation text could be condensed and made more

manageable. The Group supported expansion in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of membership. New Group supported expansion in both the permanent and non-permanent categories of membership. New Permanent Members should be selected based on criteria established in the United Nations Charter, and the L.69 Group supported an increase in membership to the mid-twenties. The Group was of the view that the UN reform should be an ongoing process and supports a comprehensive review of the Organ after a period of 15 years.

25. Many delegations did not agree with the efficacy of creating a “new class” of Council membership under an intermediate arrangement proposed by the **United Kingdom** and **France**. Some Member States were of the opinion that the breakthrough in finding a solution to the differences existing among Member States would have to come from beyond the negotiating text and called for greater political flexibility to achieve common consensus.

26. The **UFC** led by **Italy, Spain, Argentina, Republic of Korea** and **Colombia**, reiterated the **Intermediary Approach**. This proposal which centred on the enlargement of the non-permanent category only, was first put on the table in 2005 and had since come up with variant models on the size, duration and basis of representation.

D. First Exchange of the Sixth Round of the Intergovernmental Negotiation on the Reform of the Security Council held on 14th and 17th December 2010.

27. Several delegations settled for the option to streamline Rev.2 of the Negotiating Text, with a view to making it shorter and devoid of repetitions as well as overlaps in order to produce a leaner and negotiable document as contained in the Facilitator’s letter of 24th November, 2010 others called for merger of the Text for negotiations as another option.

28. **Sierra Leone**, on behalf of the **African Group**, in addition to reiterating the common African Position as contained in the Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration, made it clear that Africa’s Position in the Text was well edited, very concise and free from overlaps and repetitions and therefore bore no culpability for overloading the Text or making it unworkable. It further expressed apprehension that organizing the Text identify similarities, convergence and divergence did not appear to be the only reason for the proposal to merge language in the Text since the Facilitator was further encouraging member States to come up with concrete language to blend existing bullet points on the add-ons or even suggest new bullet points, irrespective of nuances in the various positions and the interconnectivity of the negotiable clusters, and when such add-ons were neither product of consultations or negotiations, nor the outcome of any agreement in the 5th Round. Consequently, Africa maintained its reservation on any merging or streamlining exercise at the stage and preferred, as stated in previous interventions that principles and substance of the five negotiable be agreed upon as a first step towards consensus building, and that its position as reflected in the Negotiation Text should remain intact for the meantime.

29. Jamaica, speaking on behalf of the L.69 Group, supported expansion in both the Permanent and non-permanent categories of the Security Council from the present 15 to 25 or 26, with the new Permanent Members from the present 5 to 11, having all the prerogatives and privileges including the veto, which should include the allocation of two new permanent seats to Africa, two to Asia, one to the Latin America and Caribbean region and one to the Western European and other groups (WEOG). It also supported expansion in the non-Permanent category from 10 to 14 or 15 with addition of one new non-Permanent seat in Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin America and Caribbean Group (GRULAC), including Small Island Developing States for which participation shall be on the basis of rotation, and two non-Permanent seats for Africa. The Group also called for a leaner text of not more than two pages and entrusted the Facilitator with the task of producing such a text by January, 2011.

30. China supported expansion in both categories of the Council and proposed an overview of the various positions and in that regard called on countries that had remained silent to air out their views in order to narrow down options with a timetable in place for the negotiations. **France**, on the other hand, supported the inclusion of the G-4, Representation for Africa and the Arab countries into the Permanent category of the Council and called for a shorter Text amenable to negotiation. The **United States of America** was of the view that the Council should be reformed to reflect the geopolitical realities of the 21st Century but supported a moderate expansion in both Permanent and non-Permanent categories with the caveat that new Permanent Members must be country specific and have the ability and willingness to contribute to international peace and security and should not have poor human rights record. The **Russian Federation** stated that it was looking forward to reaching a solution by the end of 2011 and that **member state** should agree on the formula for the expansion of the Council. The **United Kingdom**, on its part concurred the call for a shorter Text but cautioned against tampering with the substance, and that such amendment must have the consent and support of member states, with concentration on areas of convergence and divergence .

31. India and **Brazil** aligned with the statement of the L.69 Group and expressed support for expansion in both the Permanent and non-Permanent categories with the new Permanent members having the same rights and obligations as the current ones. Additionally, they requested the Facilitator to produce a shorter Text by mid January 2011, stressing that the Text should capture the prevailing and unchallenged sense of the UN Member States. Like the L.69 Group, **India** also proposed two new Permanent seats for Africa, two for Asia, one for the Latin America and Caribbean region and one for WEOG. **Germany** also emphasised the need for an urgent and early reform, proposing streamlining of the Text to 2-3 pages, taking due regard to all the positions in the Text and to submit the summarized Text by the end of December 2010. **Japan** maintained its positions as contained in the G-4 proposal and joined the other three G-4 members in supporting the production of a shorter Text by the Facilitator of not more than 3 pages by January 2011.

32. Members of the Uniting For Consensus (UFC) led by **Italy, Spain, and Pakistan** maintained that the UFC as a Group had shown compromise and flexibility both in terms of principles and also with reference to the Text, having moved beyond the Group's

position of 2005. In the context of the draft Text, Pakistan indicated that they had, along with Mexico and Canada merge their respective paragraphs as reflected in paragraph 5.4 of the Negotiation Text. On the substance, Pakistan underscored the need for the Security Reform process to address the historical injustice to Africa, indicating that the Common African Position was a result of regional consensus, taken on behalf of the region and should not be confused for the quest for Permanent Membership by individual States. They stressed that the European Union after the Lisbon Treaty on Common Foreign and Security Policy was a reality of the 21st Century and that therefore the presence of the EU in the Security Council should be compatible with this reality and reviewed in its right perspective. On the process Pakistan admitted redundancies and overlaps in the text, but admonished that the unpleasant vehicle with redundant ingredients would not improve by “mere cosmetics or semantics of editorial changes”. Member States should strive to reach broader political understanding on the cardinal principles for reform before focusing too obsessively with the Text.

33. Belgium and The Netherlands, by way of shortening the Text, introduced for consideration and not as a proposal, a sample Text as an example of what would look like a next step in the direction of a consolidated negotiation Text based on chapter four of the Text dealing with size of an enlarged Council and its Working methods compressed into 12 pages. Chapter four of the Text was less contentious but contained several technical and textual challenges. The exercise was done in a neutral capacity and the outcome did not in any way reflect their national positions. They maintained that the editing process took on the Add-ons to Rev 2 as a starting point, without deleting any proposal of any delegations except the duplications and overlaps. According to them, the thrust of the exercise was to cluster the different topics and in doing so, identified both principles and more concrete proposals.

34. Summing up, the **Facilitator** stressed the need for a workable negotiation Text with assurance of taking into consideration the positions of all member states in assuming his responsibility as Chair, following the concrete proposals by member states towards the production of a Rev. 3 Text by mid February, **2011**. He further underscored his impartiality to positions but partiality to progress, adding that there was need for States to be more proactive so as to reach a solution that could garner the widest support.

III. OBSERVATIONS

35. The Committee of Ten Permanent Representatives in New York has been receiving enormous support from the African Group of the Whole. The Group has been reluctant to engage in any merging exercise if some basic principles and parameters were not defined and agreed upon on each of the clusters. The rationale being that delegations and interest groups held diverse positions on the five clusters as spelt out in their respective proposals in the Negotiating Text. In the case of Africa, the only cogent approach was to first reach an agreement on the principles and parameters before any merging of positions and proposals could be achieved in an effective and efficient manner. For example, the African group does not see wisdom in merging language on

the veto, size as well as on an expansion in the two categories of the Security Council given the divergences of views on the issue.

36. The statement delivered by Jamaica on behalf of the L69, though similar to the African position, suffers divergence on the question of the Veto, which they propose should be extended to new Permanent Members but with restriction placed on its use. Another area where the African Group differs largely is the process of the negotiation. While the African group proposes agreeing first on principles, the L69 Group supports streamlining of the Text. Similar situation exists between the present proposal by India, Brazil and Japan on both the question of the Veto and the Process. The proposal by the L.69 Group, some members of the G-4 and few others to shorten the text by 2 to 3 pages and entrust the Facilitator with that responsibility may compromise ownership of the process by member states. It is also difficult to produce a shorter Text of not more than 3 pages that can faithfully reflect the convergence on all the five clusters of the Negotiation Text without compromising some of the positions. One such cluster that is likely to be adversely affected is the Veto, which is key to the African Common Position. The majority of members of the African Group in New York share this view.

37. While there is agreement on addressing the historical injustice suffered by the African continent as well as agreement among a majority of the membership of the United Nations on the need to expand the Council in both the Permanent and non-Permanent categories, there has not been any substantial shift in positions. Clearly, there is a general agreement in favour of enlargement of the size of Council and for its Working Methods to be improved. However, the opposition to the extension of the Veto on the part of the P5 is very much potent. The clusters dealing with Categories of Membership and Regional Representation essentially remain contentious. Mustering the necessary political will to move the process forward is indispensable for future progress in the negotiations.

38. While there is an overwhelming support and a general agreement amongst the UN Member States that Africa deserves a Permanent Representation in the Security Council, this appears to be shrouded with ambiguous interpretations about the nature of Africa's representation, whether it is nation state or regional representation. Some Member States are inclined to suggest that, Africa's inflexibility on its position is holding back or slowing down the UN Security Council Reform process.

39. The P5 believes the Council should be reformed to represent the present global political realities and that Africa has a genuine case and therefore a big stakeholder in the process; but has been quick to identify seeming cracks within the African Group. Secondly, they believe it is useful to know the countries that Africa intends to allocate the two Permanent seats to if granted, and whether the selected countries would represent the interest of the African Region or their own national interests. Insistence on regional representation is regarded by some of them as a threat to their own national interests and that if the permanent seats Africa is demanding is on regional basis, then why two seats, and not one. While two of them, United Kingdom and France, propose the Intermediate Approach with a review after a period of fifteen years to decide whether to extend the Veto or not, the continuous insistence by the U.S. that the Veto should not

be extended to the new Permanent Members has the potential of stalling the reform process.

40. Considering that article 23 of the United Nations Charter dealing with the composition of the Security Council provides for only two categories of members, Permanent and **non-Permanent** members, the French and British position for an increase in **Permanent category without veto**, as stated in the Intermediate approach, may result in the creation of a third category of membership in the Council: **Permanent Member without veto**.

41. From their pronouncements, it is very likely that the Russian Federation and China are opposed to any attempt to force through a solution or set an artificial time table for the reform of the Security Council. They prefer to allocate all the time needed in order to achieve this reform.

42. Recent pronouncements by the President of the United States outside Capital, in support of some candidates for permanent membership on the Council, namely India and Japan, are yet to begin to have any material impact and influence in the on-going Intergovernmental negotiations, in terms of any noticeable shifts in momentum and positions by the United States and the P5s, other than precipitating adverse critical comments from regional rivals in reaction to such pronouncements.

43. The PGA has not singled out the African Union Summit to propagate and promote his desire to achieve some decisive step forward in the Intergovernmental negotiations on the Security Council reform during his Presidency. He had also attended other relevant fora like the G20, apparently in pursuance of the same objectives, and all indications are that he intends to continue such crusades. Galvanizing the necessary political will is very important, particularly as some member states like some P5s prefer the existing status quo of the Council and are either not excited about the reform or are not genuinely committed to the process; whilst some other members for reasons of regional rivalries are resisting any admission of new members to the permanent category. Therefore, peddling Africa's insistence on the Veto, if it continues to exist, as a stalling factor in the negotiations is accordingly mere camouflage used by some members to disguise the real nature of their covert positions or negative attitude towards a comprehensive reform of the Council. The PGA's slated meeting with African leaders and the Coordinator of the C-10 Heads of State and Government on Security Council reform at the Summit may not be unrelated to such allegations, which, should they arise, must be stoutly refused as unjustified and meretricious having regard to all the circumstances.

44. As mentioned earlier, the main feature of the First exchange of the Sixth Round was the call by some Member States for the Facilitator to shorten the Text and produce a much leaner one of about 2-3 pages before January, 2011 to facilitate the text-based negotiations.

45. The launching of the Sixth Round of the negotiations marked by several calls to shorten the text has in diverse ways heightened the concerns of Member States on the

Security Council reform. For Africa, the concern is based on real apprehensions that the African Common Position may adversely suffer under the guise of merging language, a possibility which may come to light only when it is already too late to rectify.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

46. Africa's demand is attracting more and more support. This should be built upon through constructive engagement with all other stakeholders with a view to taking advantage of the existing commonalities and finding ways of narrowing down areas of divergence.

47. The African Group should remain cohesive on all aspects of the reform process. It is therefore advisable, at this stage, that Africa maintains its position on agreeing on principles first before engaging in any streamlining or merging exercise.

48. The African Common Position should continue to reject any Intermediate, Transitional or Intermediary Approach in the negotiation on the grounds that they outrightly contradict the Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration in their key requirements.

49. As decided at the Summit held in Kampala in July, 2010, African Heads of State and Government should continue to intensify efforts to garner the political will and support for the African Common Position from other Heads of State and Government.

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