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AND RESEARCH ON TERRORISM**

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African Journal on Terrorism aims to create space for robust, rigorous and innovative research and policy-related papers on terrorism and violent extremism, and encourages fruitful intellectual engagement between policy practitioners and academia. In particular, the Editors are looking for empirical, theoretical and policy-oriented articles that recognize the inherently problematic nature of terrorism on the African continent and employ a critical-normative perspective on the subject.

The scope of subject matter of interest for the journal includes conceptual and field research on terrorism, violent extremism, insurgency and radicalization as well as issues related to Human Security and building community resilience in Africa. African Journal on Terrorism provides a forum for the publication of original theoretical and empirical research articles, disciplinary debates and assessments, editorial commentary, special issues and sections, end of mission reports, research notes, announcements and book reviews.



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African journal on Terrorism is a continental, peer-reviewed, interdisciplinary journal. The journal seeks to publish quality grounded research on all aspects of terrorism, counter-terrorism and violent extremism. The journal seeks to provide a platform that encourages critical analysis and sustained reflection of terrorism and violent extremism on the continent.

Procedures

All submitted manuscripts are subject to an initial blind peer-review by the Editors, and, if found suitable for further consideration, to a second peer-review by at least two independent, anonymous expert referees. The Editor In Chief and Editors review the comments from reviewers, and where appropriate communicate them directly to the author. The Editors will inform the author if the original or revised paper has been accepted for publication in the journal.

Length and Format

Authors submitting papers for the consideration of the journal should limit their works to between 5000 and 6000 words, including references, text, all tables and figures. They are encouraged to support their arguments with relevant statistics, pictures and graphical illustrations. The preferred referencing format of the journal is the electronically generated endnotes. The referencing style however, is the Harvard referencing style. Abstract should not exceed 300 words with at least five keywords.

CONTENTS

- Editorial Comment **vii**
- Critically Examining David Rapoport's Four Waves Theory of Modern Terrorism in the Light of Factual Historical Events – *Michael Aondona Chiangi* **11**
- Stylistic Representations and the Rhetoric of the Image/Text in Select-Nigerian Newspaper Reports on Terrorism – *Blossom Shimayam Ottob-Agede* **31**
- Non-State Actors, Terrorism and Human Security in Nigeria: an Assessment of Boko Haram Insurgency 2009-2019 – *Enun, Nixon Uke* **49**
- Fitting Cattle Rustling in Karamoja Cluster in the Frame of Transnational Organized Crime – *Dr. Francis Okello* **75**
- An Analysis of the Transnational Diffusion of Terrorism in Africa: The Case of Ansar Al-Sunna Armed Group in Northern Mozambique – *Kenneth Kunaka* **91**
- A Feminist-Stylistic Perspective of Select-Nigerian Newspaper: Reports on Boko Haram Terrorist Activities – *Blossom Shimayam Ottob-Agede* **107**

- The Experience of Terrorism in Kenya: What Are the Vulnerabilities and Strengths? – *Felix Shihundu, Israel Nyaburi Nyadera and Billy Agwanda* **127**
- Tracing Classical Muslim Tradition’s Discourse on Terrorism – *Ridwan Rosdiawan and Dwi Surya Atmaja* **145**
- “Women in Terrorism: The Push and Pull Factors” – *Tsepo Cheda* **161**
- Beyond Victimhood: UNSC Resolution 1325, Women and the Fight against Boko Haram in Nigeria – *Prof. Isaac Olawale Albert and Dr. Modupe Oluremi Albert* **181**
- BOOK REVIEW: Munachi Nice Okereke **191**
- ACSRT Terrorism Dossier: Overview of Terrorism and Violent Extremism in Africa (November 2021) **199**

Editorial Comment

The African Journal on Terrorism has continued to attract Africa wide attention given the number of papers that the editorial board receives from time to time. We also get positive feedbacks from policymakers on some of the past issues addressed. Unfortunately, we are not able to publish all papers sent to us because of some editorial and space constraints. Our goal in all cases is to ensure that the papers speak to relevant issues and adopt methodologies that could easily expand frontiers of knowledge. The ten papers in the present edition are on the situations in Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, and Mozambique. They address issues of religion, ethnicity, criminality and gender inequities.

The papers were carefully assembled to respond to two critical questions that students of terrorism in Africa have continued to ask. The first question pertains to why we continue to have more and more cases of terrorism in Africa and the second has to do with how terrorism manifests under different circumstances in the question. Those charged with the responsibility for preventing and managing terrorism must continue to ask and answer these questions. By so doing, they would be engaged in what is technically called “framing”. By this is meant the process of describing and interpreting a complex security situation. It is done by asking a number of “W” questions: what happened, to who and by who, where, in what ways, and with what implications? The questions speak to causative factors and vulnerabilities. The answers to such questions help an intervener to carefully reflect on the situations and then come to informed decisions on what to do.

The core responsibility of the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) to provide guidance for posing and answering all of these questions. Hence, what we have simply done in this edition of our Journal is to let the authors address the issues as best understood by them. We limited our own roles to ensuring that the papers respect the basic canons of academic scholarship. We also ensure that the papers have recommendations that could guide policy makers. Hence, we have ten papers and one book review. A critical look at the contents of the papers suggest to us that at a stage we might have to commission a paper that takes a critical look at the emerging scenarios in Africa in a manner that could more properly guide policy makers on the causes, courses and handling styles of terrorism in Africa. The continent cannot afford to be turned into a safe havens for violent extremists.

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CRITICALLY EXAMINING DAVID RAPOPORT'S FOUR WAVES THEORY OF MODERN TERRORISM IN THE LIGHT OF FACTUAL HISTORICAL EVENTS

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines David Rapoport's Four Waves theory in the light of factual events in the field of terrorism particularly after 9/11. It determines whether unlike Rapoport's projection, the Religious Wave, would transcend its expiration date of 2025. The dateline is gradually approaching yet, the wave keeps waxing stronger. Thus, given its unusual strength, the impact of technology and the internet, the Religious Wave of terrorism may certainly extend beyond the expiration date and possibly become more sophisticated. In fact, with the new features and characteristics that the wave is gradually assuming, it is very unlikely that it would disappear as projected by David Rapoport in 2025.

Keywords

Terrorism,
waves, religion,
conceptualization,
ideology, Rapoport.

1. INTRODUCTION

The attacks of September 11, 2001 opened new frontiers into academic discourses on the complex dynamics of modern terrorism. It was sequel to this historic event that David Rapoport published his 'most influential articles ever written in the field of terrorism studies' (Parker and Sitter, 2016, p.197). His article 'The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism' has provided a theoretical framework for meaningful discussions on the subject. Like Samuel Huntington who argued that democrati-

zation came in waves, (Huntington 1991, p.12), Rapoport also conceptualized the emergence of terrorism in terms of waves. Thus, apart from being one of the most influential theoretical and conceptual frameworks, it has become the most widely debated theories in the field of terrorism studies. Rapoport grouped previously homogenous patterns of political violence into four waves, and each lasted a generation usually drawing their ideological inspiration from anarchism, anti-colonialism, socialism, and religious fundamentalism. The start of each wave is often inspired by a significant catalyst usually in the form of an unanticipated event resulting in a milestone that identifies issues that would galvanize the new movement.

The wave approach attempts to uniquely examine the historical evolution of violent non-state actors and to contextualize their actions by de-emphasizing the conventional approaches which are used in respect of interstate conflicts. Hence, Rapoport's theoretical model is a well-defined and coherent framework that is useful in the simplification of 'the frustratingly complex phenomenon of terrorism' (Walls 2017, p.9). His application of an 'orderly, evidence-based understanding of terrorism, national identity, and political legitimacy may be the most effective weapon we could employ in any "war on terrorism" now or in the future.' (Rosenfeld, 2011, p.9)

This paper is divided into seven parts. The first part is essentially introductory and part two examines briefly the general understandings of terrorism and how it has been viewed in the light of factual events. Part three examines the basic assumptions of the wave theory, an explanation of the various waves and how it has explained historical events. Part four examines the weaknesses of the theory and how difficult it is to apply the theory in explaining certain events. Part five examines the strength of the current religious wave namely the impact of technology and the internet. Part 6 looks at the emergence of fifth wave theories and how they can be used to predict the nature of terrorism in future years. The seventh part concludes the analysis and submits that the dateline of 2025 predicted by Rapoport to be the year when the Fourth Wave would disappear seems to be unrealistic as terrorism in this era is waxing stronger than ever before.

2. TERRORISM AND THE CONTEXT OF THE FOUR WAVES THEORY

It is important to briefly consider the basic assumption of terrorism as understood in the academic literature. Terrorism is so replete with conceptual confusions that providing an all-encompassing or univocally acceptable definition is bound to be epistemically problematic (Faluyi, Khan and Akinola, 2019, p.13). However, in occidental climes, the term is used to describe and condemn 'enemies' of the state as well as brand actions such as bombings, assassinations and kidnappings as terrorist activities (Weinzierl, 2004, p.45).

Nonetheless, without dissipating energy on the epistemic dialectics of terrorism, three consistent and fundamental variables are particularly instructive namely; (a) Terrorism is a manifestation of a person's or group of persons' perception of justice and often involves the use of strategies designed to attract extensive public attention with a view to causing a political change.(b) Terrorists are generally non-state actors although in rare cases, one may find terrorists being supported by governments in form of military, economic or other logistic support from public resources.(c) Terrorist attacks purposefully target the innocent to facilitate the spread of fear and anxiety in the minds of the general public in order to make a political statement (Cronin, 2002, p.32). All these have been replicated in factual events ranging from the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya in 1998, the destruction of the U.S. naval ship called USS Cole in Yemen in 2000, the 9/11 attacks, the executions of US journalists in Syria and the 2014 kidnap of the Chibok school girls in Nigeria to mention but a few, explains the point being canvassed.

In the explanation of terrorism, the most widely used definition is the one adopted by the UN Security Council in its Resolution 1566 of 2004, in which terrorism was described as:

Criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism.

Although a brief reference to the definition of terrorism is desirable, it is not the primary concern of this paper to dwell extensively on the debates that have characterized the meaning of terrorism in the extant academic literature.

Prior to 9/11, the major terrorist organization which had been a thorn in the flesh of the US was the al-Qaeda. But the US response to the group's threats and attacks was in the form of war which was sworn to be fought 'until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated' (Rapoport 2004, p.47). The foregoing commitment reaffirmed a similar declaration of the US government made one hundred years earlier to sanitize the whole world of terrorism. Like 9/11, the US made this declaration following a terrific and tragic event namely, the assassination attempt on the then US president William McKinley in September, 1901 during the Pan American Exposition in Buffalo, New York, by an anarchist called Leon Czolgosz. This incident ignited an aggressive clampdown on political radicals who were suspected of having connections with anarchist movements in the US.

Before then however, the US was not so much engrossed in the war against anarchist terrorism as it was a problem limited to Europe more than a decade and its impact was not felt in the US (Jensen 2001, p.15). It was after president McKinley subsequently died of the injuries sustained and Theodore Roosevelt came on board, that the lackadaisical attitude of the US towards terrorism was changed. The new president called for international collaboration to exterminate anarchist terror anywhere and everywhere it is found in the world (Jensen, 2001, p.18). Anarchist terrorism had earlier gained prominence in Russia and a significant part of Europe due to the inspiration it drew from successful assassinations of high profile political figures and other government representatives so many years before the assassination attempt on President McKinley. The new US President Roosevelt advocated for an international treaty framework to criminalize anarchist terrorism and empowered the U.S. government to treat anarchism ‘as one of the most serious threats against its citizens’ (Jensen, 2001, p.16).

It could be recalled that even before 9/11, the al Qaeda had successfully launched an attack on the World Trade Center in 1993. Thus, the group’s attacks had essentially been directed against the US and its interest overseas as could be seen in the bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, the attack on the USS Cole in 2000 and other threats to the US. But so far, 9/11 is the most horrific terrorist attack in world history and the US particularly. According to Rapoport, 9/11 was ‘the most violent and destructive day in modern history that triggered an aggressive resolve in America and abroad to end international terrorism’ (Rapoport, 2002, p. 14).

As noted earlier, the US commitment to fight international terrorism was made one hundred years earlier precisely in 1901. However, it was largely unsuccessful because the cooperation needed to galvanize counterterrorism efforts was not adequate particularly due to the difficulties associated with having to adopt a unified approach that would suit every nation. Another challenge was that mobilization of international effort for sustained action is pretty difficult. Thus, Rapoport wonders if the US declaration of war on terrorism after 9/11 would be successful having failed in the past. He contends that a proper understanding of counterterrorism can only be possible if a concomitant understanding of the historical features of terrorist acts of non-state actors is examined (Rapoport, 2004, p. 46). This would enhance a deeper understanding of the motivations, strategies and tactics of 9/11 and the impact it has had on the global war against terror.

Rapoport’s theory has focused on the hitherto obscured aspect of terrorism namely the historical development and has now expanded the field of terrorism studies critical for security and diplomatic concerns (Ranstorp 2007, p.10). Meanwhile, history has produced a deeper understanding of the nature of terrorism as well as the examination of both the effective and ineffective strategies of counterterrorism in

order to chart a new course in the renewed global war on terrorism (Thorup, 2010, p.2.). Thus, the focal point of the Waves theory is that an expanded and deeper understanding of the relationship between social economic and psychological motivations for terrorist ideas and actions is absolutely necessary. The theory has inspired discussions on whether a deeper knowledge of the evolutionary trends of terrorism would facilitate the adoption of effective counterterrorism strategies including the prevention of other forms of political violence.

3. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS OF THE FOUR WAVES THEORY

Modern terrorism emerged around near the end of the 18th century following the French Revolution. The first usage of the term terror was in France in 1795; when it was used to refer to a policy systematically used to protect the fledgling French Republic to counter revolutionaries (Cronin, 2002, p.34). It was used to describe the illegitimate use of politically motivated violence by non-state actors, who by definition in a state-centric era, only had illegitimate purposes. Thus, even though the term gained prominence following the French Revolution, terrorism and terrorist activities are traceable to as far back as the first century B.C.

Rapoport explains the emergence of terrorism beginning from the late 19th century, almost a century after the idea of terrorism evolved from the French Revolution. Two critical factors influenced the growth of terrorism during this time namely; (a) the development in communication and transportation patterns opened up and united the world by reducing the time and distance required for people and information to travel (Rapoport, 2001, p. 49), and (b) the invention of the telegraph, daily mass newspapers, and transcontinental railroad transportation, all flourished during the last quarter of the 19th century and were critical to the shaping of the new global dimension of modern terrorism. People were able to travel in more sophisticated ways at a much faster pace. News of events that took place in one country including terrorist attacks could rapidly spread beyond national borders within a day.

The wave conceptualization clearly outlined the chronology of terrorism and suggests that terror objectives are achieved along a continuum, operating in the context of current hegemonic struggles and tensions between groups within nations (Rapoport, 2001, p.35). According to Rapoport (2004: 47), a wave is:

... a cycle of activity in a given time period – a cycle characterized by expansion and contraction phases. A crucial feature is its international character; similar activities occur in several countries, driven by a common predominant energy that shapes participating groups' characteristics and mutual relationships.

Each cycle of the wave is dynamic in the sense that it expands and contracts. A wave has a ‘precipitating event, signature tactics and weapons, and an inevitable gradual decline giving way for the emergence of another wave’ (Kaplan, 2016.p4). Consequently, the demise of one wave inevitably results in the birth of another, providing anchorage for the next wave. According to Rapoport, the four waves are as follows: The Anarchist Wave (1878-1919), the Anti-Colonial Wave (1920s to 1960s), the Marxist or New Left wave (1960s-1979) and the Religious wave (1979-?). It is interesting to note that all these waves share this one common important feature- they all needed a catalyst in the form of a grand event to help galvanize supporters to launch a movement intending to change the political order. It is also imperative to note that this theoretical model has been used to explain the different patterns of emergence of terrorist groups that human history has seen.

a. The Anarchist Wave

As noted above, Rapoport’s first wave of modern terrorism is traceable to the late Nineteenth century with the anarchist movement in Russia during the reign of the Czarist Monarchy. The ideology of ‘Anarchism was later spread to other parts of Europe and into the Balkan states (Walls, 2017, p.26). The early phase of the anarchist wave (1880s to the 1890s) was known as the ‘Golden Age of assassination,’ as it witnessed the frequency of attacks on government representatives, politicians and other highly placed individuals as an expression of rebellion against the political systems. It was in this same era that the US President William McKinley was assassinated by Leon Czolgosz, an unrepentant apologist of the anarchist movement in 1901-the most tragic event in the history of the US.

The anarchist wave began with the Russian populist group called Narodnaya Volya (The Peoples Will) in the 1880s and up to the early decades of the twentieth century (Parker and Sitter, 2016 p. 198). This group is known as the first nationalist rebel group of the Anarchist wave known for using deliberate and coordinated acts of violence against the Russian government and its officials. The anarchists’ objective was to overthrow political systems by coordinating serial attacks on public institutions, with the overall aim of reconstructing Russia by getting rid of conventions socially developed to ‘muffle and diffuse antagonisms’ (Parker and Sitter, 2016, p.50). According to Rapoport (2002: 45), the anarchist ideological conviction was anchored on four significant points namely: (a) Modern society contains huge reservoirs of latent ambivalence and hostility. (b) Society muffles and diffuses them by devising moral conventions to generate guilt and provide channels for settling some grievances and securing personal amenities. (c) However, conventions can be explained historically, and therefore acts we deem immoral, our children will hail as noble efforts to liberate humanity. (d) Terror is the quickest and most effective means to destroy conventions.

The emergence of a wave in Rapoport's model is usually preceded by an international event. But in the case of the Anarchist wave, it was the internal political strains in Russia though they still had significant international impact. For instance, on January 24, 1878 Vera Zasulich, a well-known anarchist shot and wounded a police officer in Petersburg, Russia. Her reason was that the police officer was fond of maltreating political prisoners by constantly beating them. When she was arrested she threw her weapon and declared that she was a 'terrorist not a killer' (Rapoport 2004: 50). During her trial, the conduct of the police officer was put in issue and consequently Zasulich was acquitted. When she came out of the court, she was received by a large crowd with cheers and celebration. The acquittal of Zasulich rekindled the wave of violent anarchism as demonstrators began to perceive the imminence of a revolution in Russia.

In the late 19th Century, Russian intellectuals began to spread their revolutionary propaganda through the publication of pamphlets. The most prominent anarchist writer in this regard was Sergey Nechayev. He produced one of the most radical documents of the time, *Catechism of a Revolutionary* which he wrote in 1869. *Catechism* was his manifesto and a manual which created secret anarchist organizations. The book provided guidance on total devotion to the revolutionary lifestyle by articulating the duties of the revolutionary to himself, his comrades, and society. Nechayev emphasized the need for an extreme commitment to the success of the revolution which to him was the only success in life. One must suppress all other desires and focus on the cause of the revolution which was 'merciless destruction' (Nechayev 1869).

The anarchists essentially financed their revolutions through bank robberies. Their activities and ideologies got extensive publicity following the development in communication and transportation technology. Consequently, information on terrorist attacks were easily circulated to far lands relatively quickly just as it enabled the anarchists to easily travel to other places in order to carry out attacks and to indoctrinate others with their ideology of violent anarchism. Technological advancements also facilitated 'large-scale emigration from various parts of Europe to more democratic political systems, thereby creating sympathetic audiences abroad' (Rasler and Thompson, 2011, p.28).

The anarchists orchestrated the assassination of prominent government representatives which attacks have remained significant in history. For instance, in 1914, the Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated by a Serbian anarchist group called the Black Hand. The aim was to free the Serbian land from the reign of the Austro-Hungarian and the Ottoman Empire. In 1911, the Black Hand also attempted unsuccessfully, to assassinate Franz Joseph I of Austria and Oskar Potiorek, the military Governor of Herzegovina. This attack caused Aus-

tro-Hungarian Empire to declare war on Serbia which precipitated the outbreak of World War I (Jach-Chrzaszcz, 2017, p.98).

Given the disturbing activities of the anarchists in 1904, European nations signed an anti-anarchist protocol. The Protocol called for greater international policing cooperation and exchange of useful information on anarchist activities across Europe. This action exerted considerable pressure on anarchist groups causing a significant decline in the anarchist crusade of violence and a decimation of the anarchist wave.

b. The Anti-Colonial Wave

The Anarchist wave dissipated with the outbreak of the First World War. Shortly after the war which ended with the conclusion of the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919, new states began to spring up. The victors of World War I utilized the principle of self-determination to dismember the Austro-Hungarian empires of the defeated European state, and established new territories for independence (Rapoport 2004: 53). Where independence was not considered to be immediately feasible, such territories were regarded as ‘mandates’ ultimately destined for independence, to be administered directly by the victorious countries until the territories were considered ready to govern themselves (Walls, 2017, p.30). They were not meant to become permanent territories, although they had the effect of maintaining colonial control (Kaplan 2016).

The first national liberation movement was the Irish Republican Army (IRA) which was created in 1916 by a combination of the Irish Volunteers and the Irish Citizen Army (Hearne 1992, p. 1). The main objective of the IRA was to separate Ireland from Great Britain. The group partly achieved this because Northern Ireland was still under a heavy influence from England (Jach-Chrzaszcz, 2017, p.100). The need to unify Ireland became the focal point of IRA agitations that ultimately resulted in a civil war in which the group lost out.

During the Anti-colonial Wave era, terrorism was waged in territories where differences existed among the locals as to their choice of leadership. This made it extremely difficult for the European powers to withdraw in some overseas territories, which option was not as attractive as independence. In some cases, the colonizers believed they could not relinquish control without creating serious problems within the territories. Some examples of these anxieties include the conflicting expectations of the outcome of British rule between the Jews and Arabs in Palestine. Also, in Algeria, the European population was not happy with France abandoning its governance in that territory and in Ireland, majority of citizens in the North were

not ready to liberate themselves from British rule even when the IRA had been fighting fiercely for this cause (Rapoport, 2001, p.54).

The strategy of this wave differed considerably from the previous wave of anarchism. Bank robberies were less common, partly because diaspora sources financed the activities of the groups. In fact, even foreign governments began to offer support. The assassination of leaders was also minimized because doing so had in the past resulted in counterproductive consequences. The modus operandi of this era was the use of guerrilla warfare and the targets were mostly security agents. While honoring the 'revolutionary zeal of the first wave, the second wave idealized national histories and cultures as the second wave turned increasingly inward focusing on local struggles against colonial control' (Kaplan, 2016, p.6).

The anti-colonial causes were legitimate to many more parties than the causes articulated in the first wave and that created a problem of definition. This created a situation whereby one man's terrorist was regarded another man's freedom fighter as the term 'terrorist' became a subject of minimalist and maximalist interpretations. Even when the subject of terrorism first appeared before the United Nations, the question of self-determination frustrated all attempts to define terrorism. The reason for this is not farfetched. Self –determination could not be guaranteed on the platter of gold as most people had to resort to violence in order to secure their independence from the colonial powers. This wave recorded significant success that at the end of the Second World War, the wave had served its purpose and had virtually gone extinct.

c. The New Left Wave

The major catalyst that triggered off the New Left wave was the Vietnam War also known as the Second Indochina War- a military struggle involving the North Vietnamese and the National Liberation Front (NLF) in conflict with United States forces and the South Vietnamese army from 1959 to 1975 (Robert 2009). The role of the US in the war resulted in increased global hatred for the US especially from the developing countries. This was coupled with the fact that the Soviet Union had portrayed the US as a rampant warmonger and the communist world as peaceful. The aftermaths of this agonizing war produced the psychological requisites that gave birth to the New Left wave. A line of distinction was consequently drawn between the East and the West justifying the Soviet support in form of aid, resources, intelligence and other logistics to terrorist organizations in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. The same era witnessed the Cold War- strong ideological conflicts in which state sponsorship of terrorism was quite common.

The victory of the Viet Cong against American troops motivated radical optimism that the oppressive Western system was susceptible to change. It is instructive to note that the Marxist socialist revolution of the 1960s also greatly inspired terrorist organizations of the New Left whose aim was to pull down the oppressive capitalist system which was prominently represented by the US. Terrorist organizations rapidly developed throughout the Western world; the American Weather Underground, the Italian Red Brigades, the West German Red Army Faction, the French Action Directorate, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization are just few among many groups that sprung up after the Vietnam War in 1975 (Rapoport 2001, p.57). These so called freedom fighters claimed to be waging legitimate struggle on behalf of the 'wretched of the earth' against the rich and powerful whose grip of the basic resources has caused untold hardship to the down trodden. This wave greatly flourished in Third World countries where much hostility to the West already existed.

The ideology of the New Left was able to spread rapidly to target destinations because in this era, the mass media and other media of information dissemination as well as advance in technology. It is also important to note, that in the New Left wave, radicalism was combined with nationalism. For example, the Basque Nation and Liberty, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, the Corsican National Liberation Front and the IRA demonstrated radicalism and acts of nationalism (Rapoport, 2001, p.57).

Airplane hijackings and kidnapping were common tactics of the New Left especially in Italy, Spain and the states of Latin America (Kaplan, 2016, p.7). Some New Left organizations attacked their targets in their own countries, usually targets with international significance and affiliations with the US. Other groups launched and coordinated attacks abroad using different nationals. The 1972 attacks during the Olympic Games in Munich and the 1975 abduction of OPEC ministers from Vienna clearly demonstrate the foregoing point. In 1978, the Sadinistas took Nicaragua's congress hostage resulting in an insurrection that brought down the government of Somoza a year later (Rapoport, 2001, p.57).

Some groups abducted and assassinated prominent representatives of government. This was a strategy promoted in the first wave which found its way into the third wave. The most indelible incident of third wave assassination was the abduction of the Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1979 by the Red Brigades who later killed him because the Italian Government declined to negotiate and meet their demands. British Ambassador to Ireland, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, and King Hussein I of Jordan were equally on the target list (Walls 2017, p.33).

The 1980s witnessed the end of the Cold War tensions and concomitantly, a significant dissipation of the third wave. Terrorist groups suffered defeat in many countries

of the world. For instance, the 1982 invasion of Lebanon by Israel led to the extinction of the PLO as international counter-terrorism became increasingly integrative and states' refusal to negotiate with terrorists became more amplified.

d. The Religious Wave

The perpetration of violence in the name of religion is not a new thing (Martinez 2016, p.42). The current global experience of religiously-motivated terrorism clearly explains the powerful impact of religion on human psyche. The fusion of religious beliefs and terrorist ideology has become critical in rationalizing the goals of the new groups. This era has been loosely described as the 'Jihad era' reflecting the propensity of terrorist organizations to identify with the Muslim faith (Ibid: 22). In Islam, Jihad has been interpreted in different ways but ultimately, it refers to a struggle between what is right and wrong. There are two dimensions of jihad namely; the greater jihad which is the struggle within oneself and the lesser jihad which is the duty of Muslims to defend their faith whenever it is under attack (Migaux 2007, p.265). It is under the guise of lesser jihad that the fourth wave terrorists rationalize their acts of terrorism.

It was the 1979 Iranian Revolution that inspired formerly quiescent or isolated Islamist voices to call for a struggle against the Western powers (which then included the Soviet Union) and to have some realistic prospects for success and eventual victory (Kaplan, 2011, p.66). Other factors that precipitated the fourth wave include the beginning of a new Islamic century, and the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. In other words, the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan sent shockwaves through the Muslim world, providing alarming evidence of the threat to Islam from the infidels and therefore a stimulus to defend the faith (Proshyn 2015, p.98). All of these paved the way for religious fundamentalism to gain momentum and engulf secularism and political ideologies that inspired previous waves of terrorism (Gupta, 2011, p.35). The fourth wave is unique from previous waves in the sense that its methods and operations keep changing (Martinez, 2016, p. 22).

The religious wave witnessed the emergence of Al Qaeda and more recently the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Boko Haram in Nigeria, the al-Shabaab in Kenya and Somalia to mention but a few. Thus, one conclusion that can be drawn from the foregoing is that religiously motivated violence and fundamentalism has taken the centre stage in global affairs and could continue to be the prominent feature of contemporary international terrorism for some time.

Following the victory recorded in the Iranian Revolution and the successful removal of Shah from power, a new Islamic government was formed with Ayatollah

Khomeini as the head. Khomeini's regime succeeded in exporting their revolutionary ideologies, and subsequently inspired terrorism in neighbouring Muslim-dominated states of Iraq, Lebanon, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia (Simon, 2011, p.46). According to Rapoport (2004, 62), 1979 till date remains significant to many Muslims as it marked the dawn of a new Islamic century when the redeemer, a tradition that ignited revolts in earlier centuries in Muslim communities finally emerged. The first successful example of state-sponsored terror was the Iran-sponsored suicide bombings which compelled foreign withdrawal from Lebanon.

Soon after Khomeini's assumption of office the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan opening another round of armed conflict in the Middle East. The Muslim forces were mobilized in Afghanistan and neighbouring Arab states and thousands of additional Sunni volunteer fighters coupled with strong financial and logistic support from the US, they successfully evicted the Soviet Union from Afghanistan. This victory is quite significant for two reasons namely; (a) it demystified the concept of Super Power and it brought the aggressor (the Soviet Union) to a calamitous end unleashing a jihadist force that gave birth to the Taliban in 1993 (Kaplan, 2016, p.9). (b) The defeat of the Soviet Union, rekindled confidence in many including Osama Bin Laden who believed that Allah's miracle enabled them to defeat a super power even as lightly armed as they were. According to him, 'the Soviet Union entered Afghanistan in the last week of 1979, and with Allah's help their flag was folded a few years later and thrown in the trash and there was nothing left to call the Soviet Union' (Miller 1999). Therefore, they believed that it is even possible to defeat the Al-Shaitan al-Kabir (Great Satan; the US), a belief that ultimately resulted in the 9/11 attacks orchestrated by the Al Qaeda (Kaplan, 2016, p.9).

There is a significant lesson is to be learnt from the forgoing events. The US heavily supported Afghan fighters or the mujahedeens with finance, weapons and even training to fight the invasion of the Soviet Union. The war was successfully won causing the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan. The same people have now turned against the US (calling her the Great Satan) which they must conquer at all cost.

The same era witnessed the proliferation of other deadly terrorist groups with extremist ideologies. As the wave arose in the 1980s and early 1990s terrorist activities constantly engaged human societies in different parts of the world. In March 1995, a Japanese Buddhist group Aum Shinrikyo released nerve gas in a crowded Tokyo subway station causing the deaths of 12 people and injuring more than 5,000 (Gordon, 2009), the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzak Rabin in 1995 for attempting to broker peace with the Palestinians, the Hebron Mosque massacre of 1994 in which a Jewish settler killed at least 29 Palestinians inside the Muslim mosque built on top of the Cave of the Patriarchs, the Tamil Tiger violence of Sri

Lanka and the assassinations of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 are just a few out of many. In Africa, the same era witnessed the advent of such deadly terrorist groups like Boko Haram in Nigeria, Al Shabaab in Kenya and Somalia, the Lord Resistance Army in Uganda to mention but a few.

There was also a similar dimension of what is loosely termed as ‘Christian Terrorism’ in the US expressed in what Rapoport describes as ‘racist interpretations of the Bible’ (Rapoport, 2001, p.61), a demonstration of white supremacy manifesting in the form of Christian identity movements, whose adherents propagate the message of religious eschatology and apocalyptic doctrines. Timothy McVeigh, the 1995 Oklahoma City bomber is an example of a white supremacist with anti-government sentiments. Although apart from the Oklahoma City bombing, Christian violence has been minimal throughout the fourth wave. Acts of terrorism inspired by other religions, apart from Islamic fundamentalism, have virtually gone extinct since the attacks of 9/11.

Furthermore, the fourth wave of terrorism has been greatly facilitated by globalization. The global community has since witnessed the evolution of computers, mobile phones and the internet, making it easy for terrorist groups to have wider reach and enhanced capabilities for the coordination of their operations, attract sympathizers and recruit new members by easily spreading their ideologies.

It is imperative to note, that the objective of each wave was virtually the same namely, to challenge political ‘legitimacy by calling for a new order of revolution’ (Simon, 2011, p. 46). However, as Rapoport notes, the idea of revolution was understood differently in each wave. In the Anti-Colonial Wave, revolution was understood as national self-determination, while in the Anarchist and New Left Waves it was understood as ‘a radical reconstruction of authority to eliminate all forms of [in]equality’ (Rapoport 2004: 50). Yet, in the Religious Wave, recourse was to religious texts or revelations for the interpretation of revolution (Ibid: 50).

4. WEAKNESSES OF THE WAVE THEORY

David Rapoport’s epistemic model has been widely accepted as the most influential conceptual framework on the analysis of terrorism. In the same vein, the theory has been replete with confusions and inconsistencies. First, Rapoport acknowledged the existence of other violent groups like the Ku Klux Klan between 1865 and 1875 (prior to the starting point of the anarchist wave), yet, he did not find a suitable place for them in his theory. He argues that examples of such other terrorist groups were just ‘statistical outliers’ that had little impact on the development of terrorism (Clutterbuck, 2004, p.154).

Again, a deeper exploration of this theory would disclose much of its intellectual weaknesses. Rapoport argues that each wave has an international character ‘driven by a predominant energy that shapes the participating groups’ characteristics and mutual relationship’ (Rapoport, 2004, 47). He further argues that a wave by definition is a historical event sparked or shaped by international events such as wars or peace agreement. The problem with this view however, lies in the fact that the emergence, activities and lifespan of terrorist groups however powerful their global influences might be, are in the first place determined by local factors namely, socio-political conflicts inherent in particular societies as was the case in the anarchist era, and not by global impulses (Proshyn, 2015, p.92). If Rapoport’s contention therefore, is that global events inspire or trigger the advent of a wave, he has not explained how exactly global events override local socio-political issues to become the main forces behind the creation of new terrorist groups.

Rapoport also argues that ‘when a wave’s energy cannot inspire new organizations, the wave disappears’ (Rapoport, 2001, p.48). As sound as this argument might seem, there is just some insignificant amount of evidence to validate this contention as each type of terrorism has deeper historical roots than his theory seems to suggest (Parker and Sitter, 2016, 198).

Finally, the appearance or disappearance of terrorist groups cannot be rationally tied to specific events. Indeed, it may even disappear through the lifespan of a wave, most evidently, ‘the local socio-political conditions... [which are] nevertheless supposed to be viewed as inspired by external global influences’ (Proshyn, 2011, p.95). Yet, other groups outlive their wave and spill over into another wave justifiably described as changing their nature under the influence of new waves. The details of how and why the transformation occurs are not adequately explained more so, that it is assumed to be transformed by external events as opposed to local socio-political strains which are supposed to precipitate the emergence of a wave.

5. RESURGENCE OF THE FOURTH WAVE

As noted earlier, terrorism in the fourth wave has been greatly facilitated by developments in information and communication technology such as the introduction of mobile phones, computers and the internet. These developments have enhanced the operational capabilities of terrorist organizations and made their activities far-reaching in terms of coverage and efficacy. It has also made it easy for terrorists to finance and coordinate their operations as well as attract sympathy and membership (Pillar, 2001, p.47). They create websites and social media pages to sell their ideologies and weep sentiments to attract financial support from far and near audiences. They upload videos and make podcasts where their leaders re-

mind the foot soldiers of their responsibilities and rewards in the religious combat. They are also able to ‘manipulate the Internet for more clandestine measures including encrypted messaging, hacking, sending death threats, and embedding codes in their messages to conceal their communications and evade detection’ (Cronin, 2002, p.47). The use of ingenious sophistry and emotional appeal with compelling storylines has been the strategy of religious terrorist leaders. Bin Laden used this manipulative and emotive strategy effectively in organizing and executing suicide attacks. The message was always that of extreme paranoia- playing the victim card with messages that elicited strong emotional reaction from Muslims that Islam was under constant attack from the West especially the US and that they are duty-bound to defend Islam from the infidels (Cronin, 2002, p.37).

Furthermore, increased global interconnectedness and the ease of movement of people, goods and money from one part of the world to another has equally enhanced the activities of terrorists as they move freely to execute attacks or evade law enforcement authorities. This makes the apprehension and prosecution of terrorists difficult and complicated (Cronin, 2002, p.49).

The liberalization of trade and elimination of barriers in international financial systems has also made it easy for terrorist organizations in the fourth wave to access funds and support their operations. This is unlike the earlier waves in which terrorist activities were financed by ‘states, individual donors, diaspora communities and through criminal activist such as bank robberies and kidnaps for ransoms’ (Walls, 2017, p.46). Post 9/11 terrorist organizations have funded their operations through proceeds of sophisticated crimes such as trafficking in persons, drugs and weapon smuggling and donations from recognized Islamic charities and other organizations that support Islamic terrorism (Cronin, 2002, p.49). They also use informal methods of payments such as trade in gold and other tangible assets which transactions are difficult to trace. More recently, the advent of crypto currencies has also raised concern on the possibility of terrorist organizations having to use them to transfer funds since such financial flows are not regulated by many governments in the world today.

Therefore, the use of religious sentiment and emotive rhetoric by terrorist leaders along with developments in science and technology has enhanced the durability of the fourth wave which has become increasingly difficult to contain. According to Rapoport (2001, p.66), the frightening aspect of a wave lies in the fact that issues may spring up unexpectedly that would provide inspiration for terrorism, and it may be difficult to predict what they may be. Thus, in the light of the foregoing, Rapoport laments on how difficult it would be to make an accurate prediction as to whether or not the fourth wave would extend beyond 2025. This skepticism was cleared later in 2013 when Rapoport restated his conviction thus: ‘[i]n 2004, we said

that the Fourth Wave would be over by 2025, and we have no reason yet to change our mind' (Rapoport 2013, p.300).

The reason for Rapoport's confidence is not far from the fact that as at 2013 when he wrote, the main international terrorist organization namely, the al Qaeda had suffered terribly due to leadership losses following the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan and the death of its leader Osama Bin Laden. Thus, if Rapoport's conviction is supposedly predicated on the weaknesses of the al Qaeda, he lost sight of the fact that post-9/11 witnessed the proliferation of other jihadist movements like the ISIS, the Daesh, Hamas etc., that have been waxing stronger than even the al Qaeda and wreaking unimaginable havoc particularly after the death of Bin Laden in 2011. Even the Boko Haram and the Al Shabaab terror groups in Africa reached their peak and recorded far more attacks in the post- Bin Laden era than ever before. This suggests that with the strength of this wave, the dateline of 2025 may not be feasible. But as some scholars have speculated, there may be indications that the fifth wave may be on the way and as theoretical predictions have already begun in the academic literature.

6. PROLIFERATION OF FIFTH WAVE THEORIES

According to Rapoport a new wave emerges when a wave's energy can no longer influence the formation of new groups, that is when it will start to disappear. Although a small number of powerful groups can influence a wave's life cycle, the endurance of al Qaeda and other violent jihadist groups in the religious wave has ignited debates over whether the wave will last longer than its predecessors. In this paper the question is answered in the affirmative. However, it is quite difficult to state precisely when a particular wave would end and another would begin. Sometimes it takes so many years for ideologies to crystalize and for group patterns to emerge (Walls, 2017, p.52). From the foregoing, it is possible that the recent developments seem to suggest that the emergence of a Fifth Wave of terrorism is imminent. Yet, the nature and characteristics of the fifth wave exist largely in the realm of imagination and thus beyond our capacity to discern (Weinberg and Eubank 2010, p.601). Since Rapoport's projection that the fourth wave would end sometime between 2020 and 2025, a lot of debates have sprung up as to how the fifth wave would look like particularly "considering the scope, lethality, and longevity of the extremist organizations in the fourth wave with others suggesting that the religious wave will continue indefinitely. In the meantime, some theories have emerged to explain the anticipated fifth wave of modern terrorism. These theories include Jeffrey Kaplan's New Tribalism, Anthony Celso's Jihadist terror groups and Jeffrey Simon's Technological wave. While these theories have made significant contributions to the existing literature on terrorism, they appear to overlap with

the Four Waves theory as most of the terrorist groups and patterns identified by the Fifth wave theories have already been situated within the Rapoport's theoretical framework. Consequently, the scope of this paper would not include the examination of the Fifth Wave theories.

7. CONCLUSION

This generation is no doubt the most dangerous era of terrorism particularly due to the powerful impact of information and communication technology. But that is not to say that terrorism is a new phenomenon as it has been a security challenge from time immemorial. Thus, Professor Rapoport attempted to explain terrorism with his Four Waves theory. The theory translated more than a century of political violence into a coherent wave model to explain the catalysts, groups, goals, and tactics of modern terrorist organizations. Yet, in spite of how much this theory has been celebrated, most of its findings have been proven to be logically and factually incongruous. Consequently, dissident voices like Parker and Sitter prefer to describe the emergence of terrorism in terms of strains rather than waves.

An important area of concern in the wave model is that each wave has a projected dateline. While the previous waves have ended within their projected lifespan, the current wave of religious terrorism has proven to be so incredibly powerful that if we are to go by Rapoport's projection, the fourth wave ought to have started diminishing. This does not seem to be the case in reality particularly due to the powerful impact of the internet and technology on terrorist operations. But Rapoport cautions however, that the fifth wave of terrorism may not come as expected. He said that the wave would emerge abruptly and supposedly in reaction to an unforeseen political event which would make it difficult for one to predict accurately the nature of a new wave that would emerge.

Thus, even though some scholars have begun to theorize about the Fifth Wave, such theories remain largely in the realm of imagination. The New Tribalism by Jeffrey Kaplan, the jihadist terror group by Anthony Celso and the Technological Wave by Jeffrey Simon are the commonest attempts to predict the nature and characteristics of the Fifth Wave. Yet as noted earlier, the religious wave of terrorism has certainly been the most lethal and insidious of all the four waves presented in Rapoport's model. Islamic groups constitute the primary actors and have constantly waged war against the West in the last two decades. Their commitment in the fight to establish their global relevance is characteristically unshakable as violent religious groups like al Qaeda and ISIS are not likely to disappear soon. Consequently, it is the submission of this paper that the 2025 dateline projected by Rapoport is too early for the Fourth Wave to disappear.

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STYLISTIC REPRESENTATIONS AND THE RHETORIC OF THE IMAGE/TEXT IN SELECT-NIGERIAN NEWSPAPER REPORTS ON TERRORISM

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ABSTRACT

The visual dimension of terror incidents is represented in the media as photographs, plated to illustrate and tell the stories as they happened. This study examines the stylistic representations as well as the persuasive effects of images of terror scenes from selected Nigerian newspapers. The motivation for the selection of the newspaper images is based on their overall rhetorical signification: meaning operation and visual structure – that which shows action-based images of victimization and attack. Using Halliday’s meta-function of language and Harrison’s Representational Meta-function to analyze texts – images and linguistic signs, this study observes that reporters were moderate in the representation of terror stories told in pictures, as there were minimal obscene scenes; though some images did not adequately capture and/or represent the position of the stories they seemed to represent. Professionalism, ethical caution and/or moderation held sway in some representations; however, some unreadable photos were portrayed as amateurish photo-journalism by the newspaper reporters and their editorial team.

Keywords

Newspaper reports;
Representation;
Rhetoric; Terrorism;
Victimization.

INTRODUCTION

The representation of the photographs of attacks and the victims of terror on Nigerian newspaper pages is a significant aspect for scholarly investigation. The term terrorism seems prevalent nowadays than when it first emerged in Nigeria in the 1970s (Uja, Nafada&Ahimie, 2011). Even though there have been some activi-

ties that relate to acts of terrorism like the hijack of a Nigerian airline in the 1960s, the term terrorism became rampant and known to many in Nigeria in the 70s, as Uja et al have purported. Different studies have examined terrorism in various ways. As a global phenomenon, it is viewed by scholars, organizations, and governments as a menace in society; and therefore, needs a collaborative effort in combating (Norris, Just & Kern, 2003).

Defining terrorism is a challenge to many scholars. This is so because, the term is evasive and can be used to mean many things and different interpretations; including being viewed as any act of a member of the opposition group or left winged extremists who is standing on an opposing view with the power that be, as in the saying “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”. Jenkins (2003) has opined that terrorism is socially constructed and it is usually difficult to define. There are different motivations to the causes of terrorism. One of the driving forces is the ideology the group holds; this usually results in destruction of lives and properties. This is because, for the terrorist organization, attacks must be impactful – the reason suicide bombers or explosives are usually targeted at crowded areas – places where people cluster: market places, places of worship (churches and mosques), schools, motor parks, and any location that attracts a gathering of humans or human activities.

The recent upsurge in terrorist activities has given the media some impetus to engage the public in reporting terror events. Terrorists, on the other hand, in a bid to implement their heinous agenda, leverage on the operations of the media to gain some aggrandisement. Diverse studies from scholars such as Nacos (2002; 2006), Rohner and Frey (2006) and Bilgen (2012) have also revealed the synergy that exists between the media generally and terrorist groups. Nacos (2002), for example, calls this relationship a dangerous symbiosis. For Umuerri and Galadima (2012), since the media wields so much power in society as to determine people’s attitudes and reshaping same, it is thus expected that the media demonstrates some form of fair coverage on national security and terrorism in Nigeria (Ottoh, 2019).

LITERATURE REVIEW

Terrorism

There are a number of definitions to the term, terrorism. Some scholars view it as the mass murder of innocent civilians by highly organized killers for political or social purposes such as in the former Soviet Union where 62million victims were recorded; The People’s Republic of China, 35million victims and the Nazi Germany, 21million victims, all considered as the bloodiest terrorist incidents so far in

human history (Ellis & Walsh, 2000:501; Anderson & Taylor, 2005). Hawthorne (2012) contends that terrorism is a type of war, which he calls a-small-scale-war. With the way “new terrorism” is operated, it is difficult to corroborate Hawthorne’s description of terrorism “as a-small-scale-war”; since the terrorists’ tact and strategies have taken a different turn, in recent times. While some have argued that terrorism is motivated by religion, Duyvesteyn (2004) sees it as a political rhetoric; a label used by the government to forestall attacks on them. It means that terrorism could just be a label by government on left-winged extremists. In addition, terrorism could be a political “game” that the government uses against the governed who will run to them as saviors.

Criminologists like Ellis and Walsh (2000) consider terrorism an act of intimidation of innocents. For Ellis and Walsh (2000), although terrorism has a long history, there was a dramatic upturn in its activities in the 1960s. They also posit that terrorism is as old as the human discovery that people can be influenced by intimidation (p.501); intimidation through the use of language or pictures or other signs that can be interpreted as coercing. The acts of terror and people who perpetrate them seem to have rational motives which Ellis and Walsh (2000), believe are rooted in history and politics. From a historical point of view, Ellis and Walsh (2000, p.502) claim that terrorist activities have been associated with an earliest terrorist group, a Jewish nationalist and/or religious sect called *Sicarii*.

According to Ellis and Walsh (2000), the *Sicarii* group who was called the first century terrorist organization operated against the occupation of Roman forces around 70 A.D., using savage methods that are deadly against Roman and the Jews too. Ellis and Walsh (2000) maintain that the *Sicarii* were extremists among the Zealots who resisted Roman rule and later became terrorists and assassins. The *Sicarii*, in a bid to resist Roman oppression, went about public places with daggers to kill as many people who sympathized with Rome. The *Sicarii* group was seen as the earliest terrorists who heavily opposed the Romans’ occupation of Judea.

In Nigeria, Uja, Nafada and Ahimie (2011 :2) trace the origin of terrorism to the 1970s. Since then, there have been different terrorist attempts by different groups; - but the Boko Haram group seems to stand out in their activities. The history of Boko Haram has diverse assumptions as different scholars have perceived it. One of such speculations in Uja, Nafada and Ahimie, (2011 :2) is that the Boko Haram uprising began in 1995 as *Sahaba* with Mallam Abubakar Lawan. Mallam Abubakar Lawan studied at the University of Medina, Saudi Arabia. However, before 1995, there were some religious unrest in Nigeria beginning with the *Al-Masifu*, loyalists and followers of Alhaji Muhammed Marwa Maitasine who in the 1980s had held Kano and its environs to hostage. This led to the burning of eight Churches in October, 1982 (Ottoh-Agede & Agede, 2016).

Maitasine who took advantage of the economic and political decay in Nigeria then became the leader of the Islamic group, and allegedly combined Islam with sorcery. His ambition to extol and enthrone Islamic laws gave room for more radical Islamists and this appeared to his followers to be a divine legitimacy. For Maitasine, western influences must be rejected by true Muslims. He said that a true leader must be spiritual in the Islamic sense (Ottoh-Agede & Agede, 2016:26-28).

Other terrorist groups have come up after Maitasine; and Sheik Mahmoud Gumi was one of those who in the 1980s agitated and taught the ideology that a Muslim should not accept to have a non-Muslim as a leader. Gumi proposed for Nigeria to be an Islamic state. In his teachings, Gumi said that Muslims are not to have any relationship with non-Muslim, whom he referred to as “infidels”. Another of this kind was the *Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad*, which translates, “people committed to the propagation of Islamic traditions and jihad”, a movement started by Mallam Mohammed Yusuf in Maiduguri, northeast, Nigeria (Uja, Nafada & Ahimie, 2011; Ottoh-Agede & Agede, 2016). From the foregoing caveat, Boko Haram, is an offshoot of these sects as their ideologies point to the same cause. Gumi and Maitasine are both precursor groups to Boko Haram.

ROLAND BARTHES’ RHETORIC OF THE IMAGE

Rhetoric is an art of persuasion used in spoken, written and any other visual discourse to influence audiences’ perception and attitude. As an art of persuasion, rhetoric induces style; and permits a writer or speaker and/or a visual artist and photographer to adopt the style that privileges what s/he is set out to do (Ottoh, 2019). Style is one’s peculiar way of doing things. And, stylistics is the study of style. The study of rhetoric is as important to style as stylistics is to rhetoric.

In “The rhetoric of the image”, Barthes (1964), argues that no picture contains information in itself or that a picture contains so much contradictory information that it takes a verbal message to fix its meaning. Schaeffer (1987), on the other hand, refutes Barthes’ position and avers that neither art photography nor scientific photograph requires linguistic determinism, even though Schaeffer (1987) later agrees that the accompaniment of the linguistic sign can only add to a more “realistic” interpretation of the photograph, he also believes that the photograph alone are meaning-sufficient, that is to say, photographs have significant meanings embedded in them, and that the accompaniment of a linguistic text can only result in tautology. For this reason, Schaeffer claims that most images are meaning entrenched and may not need any addition of the linguistic sign for the reader to derive meaning.

Visuals are important in representing meaning. They are often used by advertisers to bait or entice their audience. Harrison (2003:28) avers that “visuals persuade readers about messages”. This is the reason most product promoters would employ graphic designs of images to sell or promote their brands. Good advertisers or product promoters usually employ catchy images and/or visuals that the reading/viewing audience can interpret and derive meaning from. This can be applied to the way language, whether linguistic or non-linguistic is deployed for the reader. Therefore, a little carelessness in the use of language whether in news reports or for advertorial can wreak a whole nation, and/or misguide a society (Ottoh, 2019).

Visual Rhetoric (VR, hereafter) has now become a subfield in anthropology, literary studies, art theory, psychology, graphic design, communication and media studies, marketing, and culture studies. Scholars in these fields believe that images work less through cognition and more through effect, emotion, and embodiment – that is, images are processed through feeling before they are understood at a cognitive level (Danesi, 2017). VR became influential after the publication of these three works: Barthes’ (1964) “The rhetoric of the image”, Arnheim’s (1969) *Visualthinking*, and Berger’s (1972) *Ways of seeing*. These texts argue in different ways that visual images convey as much information as the verbal texts, if not even more (Ottoh, 2019).

In Barthes’ (1964) article, the context of an image is investigated in two ways: how an image makes meaning and where interpretation stops, and if there is anything beyond the meaning. Barthes categorized the meaning of an image into three: The **linguistic message**, the **coded (connotative) iconic message** and the **non-coded (denotative) iconic message**. The linguistic message is characterized by the linguistic signs encoded as captions and labels that accompany press articles, comic strips, film dialogue, among others. The linguistic message functions either as **anchorage** (that which is prone to multiple meanings; directs the reader to the signified of the image) or **relay** (texts that complement one another; commonly found in press photographs and film).

In the coded iconic message, meaning is basically derived from the image by inferences from the reader’s cultural background knowledge (CBK) of the image. The context is evoked by what is shared between the reader and the image. Here, the image reader has to connect with the image making-allusions to shared background information (SBI) or context. The non-coded iconic message is encapsulated in the scenes and RPs, also, the relationship that exists between the signified and its direct analogical representation. According to Lunsford and Ruszkiewicz (2004:8-9):

Today, images crowd in from all directions, not only from television, video, film and the web, but from traditional print texts as well– from the graphs and charts in a financial report to the daily newspaper to the textbook you

hold in your hand....these images carry part or most of the messages readers are intended to receive. As a result, critical readers pay attention to the visuals in any text they read, understanding that these have a significant impact on how readers interpret and respond to those texts. If a picture is sometimes worth a thousand words, it pays to spend some time thinking about what makes that picture so valuable.

Photos tell stories like every other narrative. Photographic communication has emerged in recent years as an important mode of mass communication and certain scholars such as Nwankpa(2014:22) posit that “picturization of photos on the print pages or any other media makes us eyewitness of the events as they happen and force us to realize with a power never before contemplated the strife and life, the hope and despair, the humanity and inhumanity of the world in which we find ourselves”. It is obvious from everyday practice that “pictures make the abstract concrete and humanize distant events and disaster” (Friend, Challenger and McAdams, 2000:448-9). This study agrees with Harrison’s (2003) position that an image is not the result of a singular, isolated, creative activity, but is itself a social process where its meaning is negotiated between the producer/author and the viewer or the analyst, reflecting their individual socio-cultural and political beliefs, ethos or philosophies and attitudes (p.47).

MEANING AND REPRESENTATION OF TERROR IMAGES IN THE REPORTS

The act of presenting events in a more concrete way makes people say that photo is one way of making people see things the way they happen in spite of the distance or place. In fact, in this study, photos represent acts, such as disasters, whether terrorist or not, that people did not witness first hand. Photographs speak a universal language as most cultures can read similar meanings to them (Pisarek, 1983; Sonesson, 1989; Tuman, 2003).

Photographs have the tendency to attract attention, arouse curiosity in the viewer and manipulate emotions in them (Sturken, 1998). Some of these emotions may be those that represent goodly emotions as laughter, for a photo that caricaturizes, and fear for that which is horrifying, hideous, dreadful, gruesome, and/or shocking. Parsa, in his abstract, posits that many people today “live in a visually intensive society and a world of spectacular and exciting images. They are bombarded with an orderly and continuous stream of visual stimulation from all manner of media every day. They see mediated images more often than they read words”. He concludes by saying “images sell everything”. The next segment looks at the types of rhetoric and their relevance in communication (Ottoh, 2019).

In reading an image, Kress and van Leeuwen (1996) suggest that the analyst should be able to answer these questions: (i) Who are the represented participants (RPs) of the image? and (ii) What is the image about? To answer the above important questions, this study deploys Harrison's (2003) representation category which interrogates the structure and processes of the image alongside Halliday's meta-function of language as captured in Systemic Functional Linguistic (SFL).


THEORETICAL APPROACHES

Halliday's Meta-functions of language and Harrison's Meta-functions of the Image

Representation is a symbolic offer, a clone and/or semblance which can also be seen as a stand-in of something or somebody. The ideational function of language explores how reality is represented, alongside the other functions such as the interpersonal (which shows the relationship that exists between a text and a text reader), and the textual (which deals with the inner workings of the text in terms of coherence, reference to the real world and other rhetorical practices within the text). The focus here is mainly on the ideational function whose emphasis is on the representation of reality in the text – how readers are able to relate or make sense of a text with some form of shared background knowledge (SBK) or shared background information (SBI) as the case may be. These two concepts are sometimes used interchangeably to mean the same thing; where someone is aware or is familiar with events within the text (context) with inferences from other texts (co-text). The represented participants are not strange materials to the reader. Therefore, the study, using Hallidayan ideational function explores the stylistic aspect of representing ideas in image and the linguistic signs that accompany the image in the selected newspaper reports.

To buttress and/or reinforce Halliday's framework, the study added insights from Harrison's (2003) Representational Meta-function which examines structures as narratives – a process where images tell stories by allowing viewers infer or produce meanings about the represented participants (hereafter, RP). RPs tend to be grouped together to present viewers with the “concept” of who or what they represent, while Processes, on the other hand, include, (1) the action that the image takes, (2) the reactional function which is the *semiosis*, that interaction between RPs, (3) classificatory function, where RPs are grouped into kinds and class, for example, advertisements for beauty products often have classificatory images such as group of models, (4) analytical function, where RPs are portrayed in “parts and wholes” structure, the whole becomes the Carrier (vector) on which the parts called Attributes are entrenched or subsumed, (5) symbolic function: symbolism is one of

Pierce’s categorization and some scholars believe that the frameworks: icon, index and symbols are somewhat insufficient or inadequate for analyzing images. See the following schema:



*Fig. 1: Modified Representational Meta-Function Schema
(adopted from Ottoh-Agede, forthcoming)*

For the purpose of this paper, RPs are analyzed for what they “mean”. For instance, the images of terror attacks on newspaper pages are analytical, reactional, symbolic and full of action. Therefore, the following questions are useful in doing a representational meta-function analysis:

- i. Who are the RPs in the image ?
- ii. Are there any vectors in the image that indicate action ? If so, what kind of story does this action tell ?
- iii. If there are no vectors, what is the image trying to tell us in terms of social /cultural concepts ?
- iv. What types of conventional thinking do different objects evoke in viewers ?
- v. Is the image a complex one with more than one process embedded within it ? If so, how do these embedded processes add to viewer’s overall understanding of the image ? (Harrison, 2003 :52 in Ottoh-Agede, forthcoming).

METHODOLOGY

This study is a multimodal endeavor based on stylistics and rhetoric, and therefore views both written and image texts as analyzable. The study analyses texts and discourses from Nigerian newspapers. The choice of these newspapers is informed by their ideology – orientation or postures, accessibility and coverage. The discourse-focus for this paper is Boko Haram terrorist activities and other banditry in the Nigerian context.

SOURCES OF DATA

This article explores data that capture the stylistic representation of terrorist activities in the print media. Data have been selected from *the Daily Trust*, *Weekly Trust* and *Leadership* newspapers based in the north, *The Nation*, *Daily Sun* and *The Guardian*, published in the south. The selection of these six Nigerian newspapers is to interrogate how news producers deploy image and text to stylistically induce and/or appeal to the reader about discourses of Boko Haram attacks. The study, thus, interrogates reporters' ability to objectively and plausibly use language to report a somewhat delicate subject as terrorism, as perpetrated by Boko Haram, without some elements of skew in the reports.

METHOD OF DATA ANALYSIS

Press media texts have been analyzed by using either qualitative or quantitative methods. Previous studies, especially in the United States concentrated on content analyses; focusing on the message with the assumption that its contents can be broken down into units of meaning in an objective and replicable manner. Most of these works examined the content of newspapers on subjects as sports, politics and crime (Mckay, 2006). This study, as a multimodal investigation, examines the linguistic and non-linguistic elements of newspaper reports on Boko Haram terrorist activities. The paper adopts a critical stylistic method to explore data from the perspective of style and rhetoric. The design is qualitative and each report is analyzed by:

- a. Identifying the rhetorical postures and style used by the reporters; focusing specifically on rhetorical representation in the reports.
- b. Describing reporter's attitude in image representation and the interpersonal function of the text.
- c. Analyzing structures of images in context or SBI/K and/or CBK and the portrayal of terror in the print media.

DATA ANALYSIS

Social-construct as Meaning Operation in Terror Image Representation

Terrorism has a social construct as it describes the behaviors of human beings who are part of the society. The image below depicts wreckage caused by terrorists.

Plate 1 : Image of wrecked tricycle affected by bomb



Identifier: *Daily Trust*, Wednesday, December 5, 2012

Without the relay of the linguistic message, one is tempted to say that the image depicts an attack in a car park or motor park as the case maybe. However, the report, using linguistic signs, explains that the images are relics of tricycles (Keke NAPEP) where the attack occurred; not a car park but a bus stop at Baga in Maiduguri. The images of a trailer, a white loaded car and other tricycles at the background of the wrecked ones suggest that the scene is a busy place that attracts human beings or some activities that human beings are involved in; thus, describing it as a bus stop is persuasive enough to tell the attraction of the terrorists towards the scene of incident. The ambiguity of the visual code of the tricycles is narrowed by the relay which tells the story that they are destroyed by terrorists. The relay combined with the nonlinguistic items provides a bimodal dimension of the text which produces the rhetorical structure or the embedded meaning. The image below depicts confusion at the scene of a terror attack:

Plate 2: Image of vestiges after a bomb attack



Identifier: *Daily Trust*, Wednesday, July 8, 2015

The meaning operation and visual structure of the image are depicted in the second-degree victim – represented here as participants in a terror attack; properties such as clothes, shoes, caps (head gears), a building, a satellite dish, and other vectors of motion are shown in Plate 2. The chaotic theme is portrayed in the way vectors are scattered around. The implication is that there has been a violent display which may have resulted in the death of many.

The RPs are people who are gathered around the scene of incident probably trying to rescue victims or checking out things. The level of mayhem is depicted in the relics. For the loss of properties, it is obvious from the image that people's belongings are being destroyed; it is not shown whether there are human deaths recorded. However, the linguistic caption above the image explains that up to dozens of humans are killed and many injured. The elements represented in the image are adequate to persuade the reader/viewer that something is the case and that there has been a violent display at the scene which may have affected many people. The theme of displacement is also depicted in Plate 3 below:

Plate 3: Image showing destroyed homes



Identifier: *The Nation*, Wednesday, March 5, 2014

To further illustrate this, the report in Plate4 uses visuals to represent an occupation of the terrorists, where the map of Nigeria is drawn, significantly foregrounding the places such as BuniYadi in Yobe State and Gwoza in Borno, that are being taken over by the terrorists, while the military stands in the middle retaking Damboa which is a boundary between both states. See the image below:

Plate 4: A map showing places of Boko Haram occupation



Identifier: *Daily Trust*, Thursday, August 21, 2014

Unlike other images discussed in this paper, this image in Plate 4 is a replica of the Nigerian enclave showing the geographical location of the places under attack by Boko Haram. The image is not a direct analogical representation of the scenes of attack but a map which imitates the locations of the attack. The representation of Boko Haram and the military is also imitated with icons similar or approximated to the real objects; using icons of armed men to symbolize both parties. But the difference is shown in the weapons they possess; as the military is made to hold guns while the terrorists are seen holding arrows – a symbolism that depicts the insurgents as possessing sophistication in their tactics while the military is portrayed as susceptible to using outdated weapons of war, symbolized in the arrow which is why they (military) are yet to defeat the terrorists in the areas represented.

In most of the reports, Boko Haram has enjoyed attention on their activities. In Plate 4, a carto-semiotic analysis of the map depicts the idea that the terrorists have occupied the territories – BuniYadi and Gwoza. The use of the map is to create in the reader a picture of the places invaded by the terrorists which adequately persuades and appeals to the reader in different ways. The cartographic implication of the map is in consonance with the headline and the report generally. The reason for employing visuals of the locations where the insurgents have occupied or taken-over is to give the reader an idea of the places of conflict. Again, the headline has aided in the understanding of the news text.

ACTION AND ANALYTICAL ELEMENTS IN THE IMAGES

Some images are full of action vectors which adequately represent the activities in the reports. In the following images in Plates 5,6 and7 discussed as comprising action and analytical elements, there are vectors of outrage showcased in different ways by the Nigeria military, the civilian Joint Task Force (JTF) and the opposing forces, the Boko Haram.

Plate 5: Image showing military's displayed action



Identifier: *Daily Trust*, Friday, March 7, 2014

As part of the war against terrorism, the image in Plate 5 above showcases military prowess. The image does not represent the stated headline: “Boko Haram attacks Mafa again”. In the image, the attack is not portrayed as the caption has stated. The image, therefore, is a form of metaphor which tells the public that something is being done even as Boko Haram attacks Mafa. From the image, one cannot see the troops fighting anyone; however, what is seen is the war equipment which the report claims is undergoing maintenance. The meaning operation and the visual structure of this war equipment on the newspaper page (even as the opponent intensifies the game) is to show the public that government is making effort to win the war against terrorism. The function of this type of war technique is to appeal to and persuade the audience in some way that makes them feel secure. Thus, the image evokes some sense of security on the general public.

Another meaning operation in the visual image one could see as being a motivation to the inclusion of the image on the newspaper stems from the fact that a retired General, Muhammadu Buhari has made a case that the “Federal Government needed to take decisive action [to end the killings], and not keep up the rhetoric” (para.1). Thus, by responding to the General’s statement, the military through the newspaper media showcases their dexterity of telling the public that something is being done or that decisive steps are being taken to end the killings.

This is, therefore, a way of debunking Buhari's claim that the government is only given to falsehood. The visual rhetoric in the image is interpreted as a display of capacity, gallantry, courage and/or heroism which the military should have been known for, while the opponent tries to say otherwise. The visual trope in the image is a reecho and an amplification of the purported war against terror of the Federal Government; as the image bolsters the rhetorical effect of the statement "...Troops clear insurgent's camps" beneath the image. The following image in Plate 6 tells the story of power struggle as Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram, is seen wearing a military uniform. This proves the sect's ideological thinking of seeing themselves as warriors.

Plate 6: Image showing Shekau in military uniform




Identifier: *The Nation*, Friday, October 3, 2014

Shekau's military costume is symbolic of the war context in which the terrorists are engaged in. The appearance symbolizes *wardom* or a warring situation. His aggressive nature is manifested in his comment that showcases boast, "I am not dead". The image shows a hoisted flag which means a conquest or capture of the territory in some ways. The chief Boko Haram ideologue, Shekau, was claimed to have been killed by the military. Through the media, the insurgents got to know the alleged death of Shekau. To correct the impression that he was killed by the military, Shekau comes out in a video boasting: "I am not dead"; a statement that exhibits egoism – deflating the propaganda of the Nigeria military. The RPs of the image are a flag of the "Islamic state", a truck and his militias, with guns, whose faces are not revealed. For not veiling, Shekau connotatively wants to prove the point that he is the one and he is still alive; so that, his accusers will know. Thus, while his followers veiled up, the egoistic and fearless Shekau stands with face uncovered. The implication is to debunk the military's claim and to assure his followers that he is alive. The symbolism derived from this image is that of power relation and struggle, intimidation and conquest.

The RPs in the following image reveal conflict and tension. The people with the weapons backing the reader are not the insurgents, but the locals who are going for a reprisal attack on the perpetrators of terror:

Plate 7: Image showing armed men on reprisal attempt



Identifier: *Daily Sun*, Monday, February 2, 2015

Plate 7 shows members of the community that are affected by insurgency going for a reprisal. The people, whose faces are concealed as they are captured backing the reader, are armed with weapons such as guns, sticks, machetes, motor-cycles among others. It is therefore, unclear as to the particular place the youths are headed. But the report has explained that the represented participants here are not Boko Haram members but youths of the community attempting a reprisal attack on the terrorists.

DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS IN THE STUDY

In the images, there is a creation of a textual universe symbolic of terrorism. Terrorism related themes such as **deceit** (disguise), **insecurity** (victimization, destruction, fear, death, pain, displacement, shock) and **power relations** (aggression, violence, conflict) are depicted in the visual elements used to persuade the reader. Some of the images are represented in oblique angle camera shots. The ideological implication of the use of an oblique angle is to suppress or background the negative graphic incidents reported in the news stories. Oblique angles are less revealing (Ojebuyi & Salawu, 2018), and this implies that by their use, editors have deployed ethical caution or moderation in the representation of the images. Note that, not all the images are less offensive, those that portray pains cannot be said to be less offensive.

The three Hallidayan meta-functions of language featured prominently in the images. At the level of the textual, linguistic items function as a relay to add to the information of the images. The textual configuration of the linguistic items limits ambiguity or reduces pensiveness, where possible. At the interpersonal level, images have a subdued or reduced direct interaction with viewers as most of the offensive graphic portions of the incidents are concealed from the audience. The positioning of the cameras euphemistically represented the images such that the full scene, which may have burnt human victims, are not fully represented. This finding corroborates Ojebuyi and Salawu's (2018) study that states that "news editors demonstrated professionalism and ethical restraint by not using sensational, offensive and graphic images to frame the panic-invoking stories" (p.10). The findings in this study, in line with other studies like Paul and Elder, (2006), Matusitz, (2016), and Ojebuyi and Salawu (2018:11), indicate that news producers, in keeping to their roles as watchdogs and gatekeepers, need to apply some caution and moderation in the use of offensive and sensational images that may cause some moral or emotional panic. Also note that textual configuration or representation of images on newspaper pages influences social reality and audience emotional participation in the visual texts.

CONCLUSION

Visual images, like most non-linguistic texts, are based on individual perception. In reading images, the analyst has the freedom to infer meanings that must be based on and derived from the cultural background the reader shares with the image. The image reader most times draws inferences or allusions from the society or other shared contexts that the image presents, by showing the connection (interpersonal function) between the represented participants and the processes involved in the image composition. The image reader also evaluates the represented participants and the symbolism of the image which may be portrayed in its nature and function. This paper has therefore looked at the various images that terror narrators deploy in the reports. The images used here are delineated under the themes of destruction, confusion, victimization, pain, aggression, intimidation, conflict, anxiety, shock, displacement and death.

Analyzes of the Plates 1-7 reveal a depiction of a war situation; portrayed in the violent scenes, destructions of lives and properties, among others. The scenes of attack are dramatic and spectacular, with elements that are very persuasive; giving the reader a clue to the effect of the attack. The deployment of terror images in the reports helps to tell the stories the way they happen without much of photo editing. The visual structure and meaning operation in all the images stimulate a sensational feeling in the reader as some author has said, images do not tell lies, and a picture speaks for itself. Therefore, for the secondary witnesses, such as consumers of news reports on terror, these images give the inkling to the real terror activities perpetrated by Boko Haram.

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NON-STATE ACTORS, TERRORISM AND HUMAN SECURITY IN NIGERIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF BOKO HARAM INSURGENCY 2009 – 2019

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ABSTRACT

This paper examines the activities of the extremist Boko Haram sect between 2009 – 2019, possible factors facilitating the menace of BH insurgency and its relative impact on human security in Nigeria. This is intended to highlight the social implication of the crisis along with its national security implication and relative threat to human security in Nigeria. Employing the Structural Violence theory, the study highlights the nexus between structural violence such as political marginalization, poverty, unemployment etc. and violent extremism. The paper recommends the complementarities of human security to military operations if the war against violent extremism in Nigeria must become history as military campaigns alone have proven partly successful in stemming the tide of BH insurgency evident from the recurrent attacks on hard and soft targets up until now.

Keywords

Boko Haram, Human Rights, Human Security, Insurgency, Non-State Actors, Terrorism.

INTRODUCTION

There is no gainsaying the fact that Post-return to Democracy in 1999, Nigeria has experienced diverse forms of internal security challenges across the 6 geopolitical zones in the country – South/East, South/South, South/West, North/Central, North/West and North/East – instigating security threats such as recorded in the recent past from or between activities of groups like the Movement for the

Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) in the South/East; Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Niger Delta Avengers (NDA), and other like-minded militant groups in the South/South; kidnapping, hostage taking and herder crisis, a major cause for concern in the South/West necessitating the establishment of ‘*Amotekun*’ – a South/West regional security outfit; farmer-herder crisis in the North/Central; Banditry and kidnapping in the North/West along with Boko Haram insurgency in the North/East region.

From 2009 to 2019, Nigeria has been embattled in a series of national security challenges including those of the Boko Haram insurgency in the North/East; the resurgence of militant activities in the South/South Niger Delta region; the clamour for secession in the South/East by the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and recently, within the South/West, stemming from the incessant kidnapping, hostage taking and herder crisis in the region; the farmer – herder crisis in the North/Central region and the carnage occasioned by banditry in the North/West zone.

Since the emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria, the sect has wreaked havoc across Northern Nigeria including the Federal Capital, Abuja – orchestrating attacks on soft and hard targets including government buildings, security operatives, schools, markets, churches etc. gaining widespread attention in August 2011 after the United Nations compound in Abuja was attacked with explosives leading to the loss of twenty-three lives and many more reported injured (Walker, 2012).

Although Nigeria has since recorded her share of civil unrest and security challenges including direct threats to her sovereignty and territorial integrity, these challenges seem to persist as observed with the trend of BH insurgency in Northeast Nigeria.

Nacos (2016) notes that Boko Haram employs indiscriminate violence in pursuit of its political, religious, and ideological goals. Concurrently, rights activists and organizations like the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (Oxfam) have maintained the narrative that Boko Haram activities have a direct impact on the development of children in Northeast Nigeria (Oxfam, 2015); suggesting the threat of grave humanitarian crisis. According to Abdu and Shehu (2019), the impacts of BH insurgency on women and girls were in the form of abductions, sexual and gender based violence, deplorable living conditions in the IDPs camps, psycho-social problems etc. All these highlight the outcome of insurgency in Nigeria relative to BH.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

Boko Haram rose as a jihadi organization against westernization under the leadership of Muhammed Yusuf with the primary goal of establishing an Islamic state in Nigeria and has infamously propagated violent extremism post-2009. The attacks in 2011 on the police headquarters in Abuja, the United Nations compound in Abuja and the kidnapping of over 200 girls in 2014 from their school in Chibok, Northeast Nigeria eliciting global attention with several campaigns advocating for the release of the girls, whose mass kidnap became the hallmark of Nigeria's brutal conflict against terrorism and violent extremism are one too many cases of BH insurgency in Nigeria as reported by the BBC (June 17, 2011), BBC (August 26, 2011) and the Punch Newspaper (January 15, 2018). This is in addition to a host of security challenges ranging from armed banditry to kidnapping and hostage taking, farmer-herder crisis, militancy, among others within the last decade. Based on data from the European Asylum Support Office (2021) Country of Origin Information Report, over 7000 lives were lost in 2020 alone from Boko Haram attacks, communal clashes, farmer herder crisis and pockets of violence across the nation suggesting a threat to national security posed by non-state actors like Boko Haram in Nigeria. Hence, a direct assault on the economy through reduction in local and foreign direct investments (FDI) along with the attendant cost on human security.

Amalu (2015) observed that as an offshoot of BH insurgency, human security continues to deteriorate as many individuals suffer untold hardship and gross violations much of which has negatively impacted on the fundamental human rights of women and children visible in cases of child and forced marriages, rape, lack of access to adequate health or educational facilities, mass displacements, kidnappings, arson, murder and other despicable acts orchestrated by the sect lending credence to the threat of BH insurgency on human and national security in Nigeria.

According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR, 2021), over 2 million IDPs were registered in North East Nigeria as at December 2020, with 1 683 044 in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States as a result of BH insurgency. This is in addition to conflict-induced food insecurity and severe malnutrition.

Given the infamous record of atrocious misadventures orchestrated by BH post-2009 and despite government's efforts at curbing the menace of insurgency in the country, the insurgents have somewhat resurfaced with their attacks – picking up soft targets in markets, churches, mosques, including industrial and residential areas (Ajibola, 2015). Hence, this paper examines the BH insurgency in Nigeria and its impact on human security between 2009 and 2019.

METHODOLOGY

The methodology adopted for this study is the qualitative method of data analysis. The study depended on empirical data relative to the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Specifically, the content analysis approach was used in the analysis of relevant data presented in the study. Data was mainly drawn from secondary sources viz: international and local media reports, academic journals, newspapers, and books relevant to the subject. These were evaluated to highlight the impact of violent extremism orchestrated by non-state actors such as Boko Haram on Human Security in Nigeria. The literatures reviewed are of high academic research standards and imbued with data relevant to the research variables. The scope of the study encapsulates the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria between 2009 – 2019 and its attendant outcome on human security. Beginning with a complementary abstract, the study kick-starts with a brief introduction, and afterwards a statement of the research problem. The succeeding sections examine the methodology used for the study along with a brief conceptualization of concepts. Furthermore, the theoretical underpinning of the study is presented with an evaluation of the concept of BH and its structural composition following shortly after. More so, the activities of BH insurgency and its impact on Human Security between 2009 – 2019 are reviewed in the succeeding section. Finally, the study draws to a close with a concluding segment and practical recommendations on how to contain insurgent groups like Boko Haram as well as win and maintain the peace in Northeast Nigeria.

CONCEPTUALIZATION

Boko Haram

‘Boko’ according to Liman (1968) is a native Hausa word, originally meaning sham, fraud, inauthenticity, and such which came to represent western education and learning. Hence, ‘Boko’ came to symbolize Western education or Westernization while ‘Haram’, according to the Merriam-Webster dictionary is an Arabic word which means ‘forbidden’, ‘ungodly’ or ‘sinful’. Put together, the term Boko Haram literally translates thus, ‘Westernization is sinful’, ‘Western education is forbidden’ or ‘Western influence is a sin’. Barna (2014) notes that Boko Haram is the name commonly associated with the organization ‘*Jama’atu Ahlis-sunnah Lidda’Awati Wa’l-Jihad*’, or ‘the people committed to the propagation of the prophet’s teachings and Jihad’.

Human Rights

This study will adopt the definition of human rights established by the United Nations (1948), thus, human rights are rights inherent to all human beings, regardless of race, sex, nationality, ethnicity, language, religion, or any other status. Human rights include the right to life and liberty, freedom from slavery and torture, freedom of opinion and expression, the right to work and education, and many more. Everyone is entitled to these rights, without discrimination.

Insurgency – O’Neil (1990) in Amalu, N. S. (2015) defined insurgency as a struggle between a non-ruling group and ruling authorities in which the non-ruling group consciously uses political resources and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of one or more aspects of politics. According to Curtas (2006), the main objective of insurgency is to challenge the existing government for control and requires the active support of some segment of the population as insurgencies do not happen if the population either supports the government or sees nothing to gain from fighting.

Human Security – The 1994 Human Development Report (HDR) of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) defined human security as people’s safety from chronic threats and protection from sudden hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life. Consequently, seven types of security were listed as components of human security: economic security; food security; health security; environmental security; personal (physical) security; community security; and political security.

Terrorism – The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004) defines terrorism as:

criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism (United Nations 2004).

Although this definition incorporates the concept of terrorism; it would suffice to note that terrorism is at variance with such tactics as guerrilla attacks, criminality or robbery, often exploited by extremists in furtherance of their objectives. The UN definition underscores the fundamental characteristics of terrorism such as ideology, political intent, deliberate action, violence, multiple actors/supporters, and an enabling group. Although there are variations in the definition of terrorism as observed

ab initio, these features all lend credence to the fact that the core of terrorism is the inducement of fear. Whereas the concept of terror has long been established to be a piece in the fabric of society, Avi-Yonah (2013) attributes the rise of religious terrorism in Africa to the Libyan state sponsored terrorist bombing of Pan AM Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, on December 21, 1988 leading to the death of 270 passengers; noting the spread of Libyan terrorism to other African states in the wake of Muammar Gaddafi's ouster in 2011.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

For the purpose of this study the theoretical framework is based on '*structural violence theory*' dating back to the 1969 '*Violence, Peace, and Peace Research*' work of Norwegian sociologist Johan Galtung. The phrase '*structural violence*' introduced to peace and conflict studies by Galtung connotes violence experienced by individuals or groups of people as a result of prevailing social, political or economic structures. Thus, distinguished from direct person on person violence where there is an identifiable actor committing a violent act; structural violence is embedded in societal structures where there is no direct individual perpetrator. Although the concept of '*violence*' is often limited in perception to active physical conflict, it is expanded by Galtung (1969) to include structural violence which connotes the harm done to victims manifesting not just in physical attacks but also in unequal access to given resources and opportunities. The relevance of structural violence theory to this paper is better appreciated when viewed against the outcome of Boko Haram insurgency on human security in Nigeria.

CONCEPTION AND STRUCTURE OF BOKO HARAM

As observed by Soyinka (2014) BH has a very long history; whether described as an army of the discontent or as marginalized or feeling marginalized, the movement relies on religion as a fuel for their operation, mobilization, and augmentation of any other legitimate or illegitimate grievance that they might have against society.

Although Boko Haram is often viewed to have emerged in 2002, Onuoha (2014), traces the origin of the sect to the *Ahlul sunna wal' jama'ah hijra* (a Muslim Youth Organization) founded in 1995 by Abubakar Lawan – who eventually departed for further studies at the University of Medina in Saudi Arabia – in Maiduguri; heralding the emergence of an unorganized movement made up of pockets of religiously-inclined individuals at the Mohammed Indimi Mosque in Maiduguri. Onuoha (2014), notes that the Muslim Youth Organization founded by Abubakar Lawan excelled as a non-violent movement until the appointment of

Mohammad Yusuf as its leader in 2002 drawing members from the unemployed and disadvantaged youth population in Yobe and Borno States along with others from neighbouring countries like Chad and Niger at which point the group's name was the *Yusufiyya* movement. Mohammed (2014), recounts the exodus of a group self-identified as the 'Nigerian Taliban' from Maiduguri in 2003 to a rural area called *Kanama* in the Yunusari local government area of Yobe State contiguous with the Nigerian border from where the group launched attacks on police stations and government buildings between December 2003 and January 2004 although these and related activities were eventually contained by the Nigerian Military. More so, Mohammed (2014) reports the reunification of surviving 'Nigerian Taliban' members from the Kanama offensive with Mohammed Yusuf in Maiduguri and its environs – then operating under the cover of the Yusufiyya movement.

According to Aliyu, Moorthy and Idris (2015), whereas the eventually unified sect, under the leadership of Muhammad Yusuf initiated the process of raising its permanent Mosque named *Taimiyyah Masjid* on a land donated by Yusuf's father in-law, Baba Fugu Mohammed, the group courted high powered patronage from prominent members of society. Aliyu, Moorthy and Idris (2015) report that in the years between 2000–2003, the sect supported the gubernatorial candidature and actively contributed to the electoral victory of Senator Ali Modu Sheriff owing to the erst while government's seeming resistance under the leadership of Mala Kachalla towards total implementation of Sharia in the State.

Walker (2012) notes this point as the watershed in the sect's existence, morphing into a State within a State. Hence, Pham (2013) highlights the defiance of the group towards the Nigerian State and its seemingly emboldened nature during the government of Governor Sheriff in Borno State. Thus, their ideology spread across the Northeastern States of Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, Gombe and other States in Northern Nigeria viz Niger, Kano, and Kaduna.

Nwolise (2017) succinctly categorized BH campaign in Nigeria into six phases, viz:

- **2003–2009:** Sporadic attacks on Police stations and against Borno State government.
- **2009–2010:** Temporary withdrawal, Underground recruitment of students from North-East Nigeria and Military training in Libya, Mali, etc.
- **2010–2013:** Resurfacing, experimental coordinated attacks on the Nigerian state via guerrilla tactics, massacres and attacks on Churches etc.

- **2013–2015:** Full scale war using conventional tactics, occupation of territories, hoisting of flag and establishing caliphate system in occupied areas.
- **2015–2016:** Demystification of BH, capture of BH Headquarters (camp zero) at the Sambisa forest and dispersal of BH leadership cum fighters to different towns.
- **2016–Present:** Return of BH to traditional terrorists' tactics of attacks on soft targets, Intelligence gathering and mop up operations by the Nigerian military.

According to Mohammed (2014), the 2009 violence in Maiduguri and Bauchi which launched Boko Haram into limelight rose out of a squabble with the Salafist Izala group concerning the use of a mosque in Maiduguri, the subsequent arrest of 67 Boko Haram members, including Abubakar Shekau; harassment of the sect's members upon return from '*dawah*' (an invitation, summon or call in Arabic representing the preaching of Islam/exhortation to submit to Allah) and the attempted enforcement of the bike-helmet law in Maiduguri; a development ultimately perceived as premeditated against the group. However, Mohammed(2014) reported the immediate cause of the 2009 uprising as the direct shelling of members of the sect – returning from a cemetery after a burial in Maiduguri – by security forces and the subsequent refusal to grant access to healthcare facilities for all who sustained varying degrees of gunshot injury leading to the attack on Dutsen Tanshi police station in Bauchi State and eventually escalating to four States within the span of 4 days. As noted by Maiangwa (2012), members of the sect in Bauchi and Maiduguri were mobilized for reprisals against security forces; building up to the 2009 violence – involving Yusuf's capture and extrajudicial killing by the police – leaving around 800 people dead including Buji Foi, a former commissioner in the Borno State government and sponsor of the sect.

More so, Mohammed (2014) reports the evolution of BH from non-violence to radicalization and extremism in three phases viz:

- Kanama Hijra (exodus of the acclaimed Nigerian Taliban from Maiduguri to Kanama Village, Yobe State – Northeast Nigeria) between 2003 – 2005 where the radicals aspired to establish an Islamic puritan community away from the seeming corruption of mainstream society.
- Heated confrontation over fishing rights at a local pond in Kanama Village and eventual escalation of violence against the Nigerian Police Force although contained by the Nigerian Army. Thus, the retreat of surviving Nigerian Taliban members to Maiduguri, building further momentum through extensive *dawah*

(preaching), debates with opposing Ulama (clerics), mass recruitment of new members, intensive proselytizing and radicalization of members.

- Extra judicial killing of BH leader, Mohammed Yusuf by the Nigerian Police in 2009. Thus, the eventual retreat and re-emergence of the sect in 2010 under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau to avenge the death of Mohammed Yusuf and other members of the sect.

According to Onuoha (2014), after the death of Mohammed Yusuf, BH regrouped, mobilized, recruited, radicalized its members and advanced in sophistication of attacks, deploying tactics including hit-and-run assaults, targeted assassinations, drive-by shootings, use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDS), suicide bombings, attacks on security formations and civilian targets, kidnappings (such as the infamous 276 Chibok girls kidnap), gruesome executions etc. Peters (2017) noted the introduction of the Ansaru faction of BH which broke away over discontent with the brutal style of Abubakar Shekau and operating mainly between 2012 and 2013. According to Peters (2017), Ansaru debuted under the leadership of Khalid al-Barnawi and also included the hitherto third in command to Shekau, Mamman Nur. However, in spite of portraying a strategy influenced by al-Qaeda and courting the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in Mali, the faction became moribund towards the end of 2013.

According to Jacob and Akpan (2015), Mohammed Yusuf set up Islamic schools (*madrassah*) and organizations that offered many a disadvantaged Muslim youths a sense of belonging-although, affluent and gainfully employed members of society reportedly identify as members of the sect. Hence, it is pertinent to note that while the devastating impact of poverty may influence mobilization of the teeming youths, poverty is not a lone factor of motivation for allegiance to terrorist organizations. According to ICC (2015), Boko Haram's strategy of offering financial assistance to low income, artisans and needy individuals earned the sect a considerable level of support in the Northeast and encouraged the youth's involvement in terrorist activities. The sect reportedly induced families with cash to release their wards – minors – who are deployed as soft tools for intelligence on the activities of military personnel; making an effective strategy as children are assumed benign; thus, pose no security risk.

Furthermore, the northern Almajiri system has proven to be a catalyst for the activities of BH, producing a great population of BH foot soldiers. According to Zenn (2013), given the teeming population of young boys introduced into a largely unregulated system of education where the Arabic language Qur'anic recitation from Islamic scholars form the overall basis of education, there may be propagation of religious sentiments culminating in radicalization as these minors are vulnerable to violent and extremist interpretations of the Qur'an. Danjibo (2009) contends that

the preference for Qur'anic education over Western education increases the Almajiri's susceptibility to the manipulations of extremist ideologies by dishonest clerics and other such authority figures.

BOKO HARAM, TERRORISM AND HUMAN SECURITY IN NIGERIA (2009 – 2019)

Globally, there has been a surge in the activities of extremist groups and irregular combatants – with examples from the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and United States pentagon (Bonilla, 2020), Al Shabaab's deadly attack in 2013 on Nairobi's Westgate shopping mall which reportedly killed 67 people according to the BBC (September 20, 2014), and those of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) which launched more than 100 attacks in August, 2020 in Iraq (McKay, 2020) to name a few – often accompanied with severe implications as they seek to pursue their objectives which include but not limited to the establishment of an Islamic State ruled by Sharia (in the case of Boko Haram) in Nigeria; expansion and capture of territory in the Muslim world for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) sect; rebellion against regimes considered infidels – particularly America and her allies – albeit established with intent to provide combatant support and funding to the resistance against soviet forces in Afghanistan in the case of Al-Qaeda (Byman, 2015) and rebellion against the Western-backed Federal Parliament including acts of brutality against “enemies of Islam” among the Horn of Africa's Christian and Sufi Muslim population in the case of Al-Shabab, a fundamentalist sect which began as the militant arm of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) – an alliance of hard-line Sharia courts in southern Somalia – with a goal to administer Somalia in accordance with strict Sharia principles (Sommerlad, 2019).

Paul, Clarke & Grill (2011) submit that insurgency has assumed the foremost expression of global conflict culminating in loss of lives and property in addition to instigating fear and trauma to peoples and communities Post-WWII. Hence, deducing from Paul, Clarke & Grill (2011), all insurgent groups including the Zealots of Antiquity, Assassins of the 11th through 13th Centuries, Hukbalahap of the Philippines, Ku Klux Klan (KKK) of the United States, Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) of Peru, the Italian Red Brigades, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), Al-Qaeda, the Japanese Red Army, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Hezbollah of Lebanon, Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) of Canada, Movimiento de Liberación Nacional - Tupamaros (MLN-T) of Uruguay, to nascent terror groups such as Boko Haram, assume a measure of uniqueness in their modus operandi. Thus, carnage, fear and trauma evident through BH activities.

Beyond ideology, the root causes of terrorism according to Abi-Hashmen (2004) and Franks (2006) include poverty, economic exploitation, poor healthcare and educational infrastructure as well as the influence of foreign culture. Debunking the position that low socio-economic status sanctions the vulnerability of the poor to terrorism, O'Brien (2010), argues that some terrorists–cum–Jihadists have relatively comfortable backgrounds and high social capital – a case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a 25 year old ex-engineering student at the University College London who attempted to blow up a commercial plane as a planned suicide mission for al-Qaeda in 2009 (BBC, 2012) – often espousing a misconception of Westernization or focus on negative aspects of Western values, assumed antithetical to Islamic doctrines. In the same vein, Crenshaw (1981) notes that terrorism is not necessarily due to inequality or poverty; hence, it is not always a tool of the oppressed but of the advantaged as economic conditions do not necessarily explain membership of a terrorist group.

Boko Haram like other extremist groups have launched irregular warfare on the Nigerian State and her neighbours in the Lake Chad Basin resulting in countless loss of lives, property and displacements in addition to a heated polity raising safety concerns for Nigeria and her neighbours. Amalu (2015) examined the threats of Boko Haram insurgency on human security in Nigeria revealing that insurgency has claimed a lot of lives and property; compounded the food and nutrition insecurity situation in the country; aided the spread of infectious diseases; denied millions of children and youths access to education; increased the number of internally displaced persons with dire need of shelter and has caused people to live in constant fear and anxiety.

Amalu (2015) concludes that Boko Haram Insurgency has negative impact on human security; noting that, counter-insurgency can only be effective when issues of poverty, corruption and bad governance are effectively addressed. Concurrently, Mohammed, NT (2020) argues that BH terrorist attacks evidenced by abduction and killing of people; destruction of homes, classrooms, health centres, churches, mosques, and farms has plunged the nation into a persistent state of insecurity. The thesis submits that BH insurgency has threatened the basics of food, safety, shelter, education and defence which primarily constitute security for the human person; thus, constituting a threat to human security. The study reveals that BH insurgency has culminated in a horrible humanitarian situation evident from human deaths, human rights abuses, population displacement, economic crisis, and general insecurity. Furthermore, the study argues that BH insurgency has claimed many lives and property; exacerbated the country's food and nutrition insecurity situation; helped spread infectious diseases; denied access to education to millions of children and young people; increased the number of internally displaced persons in desperate need of shelter, and more importantly forced people to live in constant terror and uncertainty.

Alhaji, Zakuan, and Ahmad (2018) found that BH insurgency has amplified the number of IDPs in the country, making it one of the highest IDP populations in Africa. They noted that several women and children have been psychologically traumatized by the activities of Boko Haram along with the abuse of power by the military, police, and civilian Joint Task Force (JTF). As corroborated by other scholars noted in this study, these negative experiences such as gruesomely losing a parent, child or relative paves the way for a myriad of real life challenges including child abuse, rape, trauma, etc. among others which take a huge toll on the individuals affected, particularly women and children. The case of trauma as a result of stigmatization is noted by Bloom and Hilary (2016) where women and girls hitherto in the captivity of Boko Haram escape and successfully make it home, only to be greeted with stigmatization and considered unworthy of marriage as families and communities prove unwilling to receive them. Hence, providing fodder for the BH sect in terms of ready lieutenants to perpetrate violent crimes in Nigeria. Thus, those adversely affected by BH insurgency may engage in social vices to fill the vacuum occasioned by the insurgency leading to the grooming of irresponsible members of society who will in turn pose an existential threat to their immediate environment and the larger society if left unchecked.

Williams and Istifanus (2017) revealed that access and inclusion in education in the Northeast of Nigeria has been threatened by BH insurgency citing barriers such as damage to school facilities, emotional disorders, fear and insecurity, stigmatization, poverty, unwanted pregnancy, forced marriage and lack of teachers as stumbling blocks to the education of the girl child in the region. This is in consonance with Ajibola (2015) who asserts that the BH insurgency has had physical, social, psychological and economic impact on women and children in Northeast Nigeria including physical attacks, abductions, bomb blasts, kidnappings, destruction of property, attacks and destruction of schools etc. killing thousands of students and their teachers; adversely affecting school enrolment and attendance as parents restrict their wards from school for fear of terror attacks.

Ajibola (2015) noted the social and psychological implication of BH insurgency on women and children in the Northeast to include sexual abuse, trauma, displacements, hunger, starvation, forced marriages to their captors, forced religious conversion, trafficking, drug abuse etc. with some like the chibok girls subjected to rape (unprotected, endless and unwanted sex) by their captors, becoming pregnant in the process and giving birth to children who according to Ariyo (2013) cited in Ajibola (2015) are groomed to become child soldiers and effect the wishes of the insurgents; suggesting an imminent threat to the security of society at large. The study further argues that children who have been rendered homeless and separated from their families due to the insurgency have resorted to begging, stealing and prostitution in order to survive; further straining the moral fabric of society. In terms of health, the study notes that women and children in the Northeast have

been deprived of basic medical facilities as some children have not been immunised against basic infant diseases, while some have become vulnerable to fleas and scabies as well as air-borne diseases and some others exposed to risky sexual behaviour leading to the transmission of HIV and STIs.

Bala and Tar (2019) documented several violations of human rights by the sect using special case boxes. In box 1, Sesay, Duthiers, and Carter (2014) noted that BH insurgents attacked a busy outdoor market in Gamboru Ngala, Borno State; opening fire on the market, launching grenades/improvised explosive devices and burning unfortunate victims alive in shops where they had sought refuge from the attacks. In box 3, Sanghani (2014) documented the experience of women forced to cook, clean, wash the bloodied clothes of insurgents killed in violence, transport pillage from villages along with providing military assistance via transporting ammunition and forceful engagement in murder. Peter, E. (2018) documented the ordeals of two teenage girls forcefully abducted from their home by the insurgents after killing their parents; eventually taking them to camps inside Nigeria's dense sambisa forest where they were forcefully married to insurgents and raped repeatedly by their new husbands and other men in the camps. In the same vein, Searcey (2016) highlighted the experience of a BH victim abducted by the insurgents along with her 4-year-old baby after their village was sacked and her husband killed. The victim was subjected to forced marriage to which she expressed displeasure although eventually complying with the terrorists' demands; violated and raped by the insurgents.

According to the Human Rights Watch (2014), while BH has arbitrarily captured victims, it seems to target students and Christians in particular; threatening them with whipping, beating or death unless they convert to Islam, quit school and wear the veil or hijab. As reported by HRW (2014) in Bala and Tar (2019), a 19-year-old female secondary school student along with five others were captured on their way home from school by BH insurgents and held captive within the 518-square-kilometer sambisa forest for two days and only released after pretending to be Muslims in addition to renouncing western education via a pledge never to return to school. This is without tell of other victims abducted from their homes and villages, while working on their farms or selling items on the street.

Zakari (2019) noted that the violence unleashed by BH on communities in Borno State instigated a mass exodus of people from their original places of habitation in different parts of Borno State to Maiduguri town unannounced for safety of their lives and properties making them not only internally displaced persons but also destitute; consequently mounting additional pressure on already stretched social infrastructures such as hospitals, schools, electricity and shelter in the town. This development is noted to have necessitated the establishment of resettlement camps across Maiduguri metropolis to cater for the displaced persons not only in terms

of protection from the BH insurgents but also to provide shelter and other social amenities resulting in the presence of sixteen (16) official and unofficial internally displaced persons (IDPs) camps in Maiduguri metropolis at the end of 2017 housing over 40,000 IDPs, grouped into over 6,000 households.

Ogbonna and Ruiz Jiménez (2017) observed that the activities of BH insurgency in Nigeria has been unravelled in food shortages and hunger, forced migration and displacement of people as well as dwindling local and foreign investment in the affected regions of BH attacks. According to a report by the International Organization for Migration (IOM, 2015) cited in Ogbonna and Ruiz Jiménez (2017) 91.98% of forced migration and internal displacement from the Northeast region are caused by Boko Haram activities. They further observed the disproportionate attention on and increased security vote by the Nigerian government in lieu of allocating resources to developmental projects, resulting in economic instability, leakages and the attendant problem of infrastructural decay; a claim substantiated with the case of Colonel Sambo Dasuki (rtd.), National Security Adviser (NSA) to former president Goodluck Jonathan investigated by the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) over the diversion of US\$2 billion allotted for the purchase of 12 helicopters, four fighter jets and other ammunition meant for the Nigerian military campaign against BH insurgency (Ogbonna and Ruiz Jiménez, 2017). Thus, they submit that as many more Nigerians benefited from the infamous arms deal, BH activities appear to be strengthening corruption among Nigerian political elites.

Awojobi (2014) cited in Ebonyi (2019) argued that the socioeconomic and psychological costs of BH insurgency were evident in the reduction of commercial activities in the Northeast particularly the areas of finance noting that the incessant attacks had drained human capital and investment which have hindered economic development in the region. For example the thesis observed that the Maiduguri Monday Market adjudged the biggest in the city had reportedly lost its bubble as hundreds of shop owners halted their businesses for fear of insecurity. Concurrently, Ovaga (2012) observed that the incessant attacks by BH insurgents severely impacted the economic lives of individuals in the affected areas citing the forced review of operational hours by commercial banks from 9.00am to 12.00 noon as against the regular banking hours of 8.00am to 4.00pm in a bid to safeguard their business premises. Thus, creating untold hardship for traders and other intending customers who would usually turn in their proceeds for safe keeping; leading to a spike in shop burglaries and the attendant loss of resources as traders were forced to deposit monies in their shops.

Whereas violent non-state actors such as Boko Haram have unleashed extreme brutality on untold numbers of Nigerians and foreigners alike, the Nigerian Security forces have largely received accolades via stemming the tide of insurgency parti-

cularly in the Northeast region. This is the hallmark of a July 2021 assessment tour by Security Watch Africa (2021), highlighting the prevalent trend of security in the hitherto ravaged BH stronghold of Maiduguri, the capital and largest city of Borno State. The tour to evaluate the level of security and rate of return to normalcy included a visit to the popular post office intersection and busy Maiduguri GSM market along Damaturu road where some traders and passers-by made up of indigenes and residents of the State were surveyed. All 7 respondents interviewed by Security Watch Africa (2021) including an ex-Youth Corps member from the South-eastern part of the country turned resident and business operator reported an impressive level of improvement in security and sense of normalcy in the Capital, Maiduguri, hitherto a hotbed of extremist activities. More so, the theatre commander of the Nigerian Army troops (Operation Hadin Kai) stationed in Maiduguri, Maj. Gen. Christopher Musa revealed the budding synergy between security forces and the State government geared towards resettlement of displaced communities to Security Watch Africa (2021). These suggest an upward improvement on human security in Maiduguri, an indicator of relative peace and security. Furthermore, Security Watch Africa (2021) notes a surge in infrastructural development within Maiduguri amidst the realities of containing insecurity in the Northeast region.

To further explore the measure of extremism orchestrated by BH, Appendix I of this study highlights violent acts perpetuated by the insurgents in Nigeria between 2009 and 2020.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The ideological position of the structural violence theory corroborates the spate of terrorism ravaging Northeast Nigeria as the Boko Haram insurgency may be adjudged an outcome of socioeconomic and political marginalization, deprivation, and unequal access to opportunities. This premise is fairly consistent with the status quo in the Northeast where the population is reported as largely illiterate and in extreme poverty according to the Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (2020) survey report on the standard of living in the country. Using the structural violence theory as a tool of analysis, it can be argued thus; Boko Haram insurgency stems from such factors as neglect of the masses, the accumulation, diversion and misappropriation of the commonwealth by the political class culminating in widespread inequality which may degenerate into untold hardships and sporadic attacks on several targets. Hence, BH insurgency in Nigeria corroborates the alternate hypothesis of this paper which submits that there is significant relationship between BH insurgency and human security in Nigeria. To effectively address the BH insurgency in Nigeria, the following recommendations are advised:

- i. Introduction of socio-economic empowerment initiatives for the idle youths to address the alarming rate of poverty and unemployment which often provide fodder for extremist groups like BH as a ready pool for recruitment.
- ii. Introduction of rigorous educational reforms to tackle the high rate of illiteracy which places the uneducated at a disadvantage, thus, vulnerable to extreme ideologies.
- iii. Government must establish a strong presence in the affected areas to give the people a sense of belonging. This can be achieved by intensifying effort toward infrastructural projects, healthcare as well as provision of basic amenities like safe and running water, electricity, affordable housing etc.

APPENDIX I: SELECTED BOKO HARAM ATTACKS IN NIGERIA BETWEEN 2009 AND 2020

North East

- July 27, 2009 Yobe State: Attack on Postiskum, Yobe State Divisional Police Headquarters. Three Policemen and one fire service officer died.
- September 8, 2010 Bauchi State: Bauchi Central Prison set ablaze and over 700 members of the sect freed. Killed 5 people.
- May 30th, 2011 Borno State: Bomb exploded early morning in Maiduguri, Borno State. Killed 13 and injured 40.
- September 13th, 2011 Borno State: Attacked soldiers shortly after the arrest of 15 sect members during military raids on Boko Haram hideout. Injured 4 soldiers.
- November 4th, 2011 Yobe State: Attacked Damaturu the state capital. About 15 people killed.
- January 22nd, 2012 Bauchi State: Attacks at two churches and the headquarters of Tafawa Balewa LGA in Bauchi State. Killed about 10 people.
- January 30th, 2012 Borno State: attack in Maiduguri the state capital. Killed 6 including 2 air force officers.
- April 30th, 2012 Jalingo: Bomb explosion in Jalingo. Killing 11 and several others injured.

- 3rd October, 2012 Adamawa State: Massacred people in the town of Mubi. Killed about 25 – 46 people.
- June 9th, 2013 Yobe State: Attacked students and teachers in Damaturu. Killed 13 people.
- July 6th, 2013 Yobe State: Book Haram gun men attacked a school. Killed more than 42 people.
- September 12th, 2013 Borno State: Ambush of soldiers by Boko Haram. Killed 40 soldiers.
- September 29th, 2013 Yobe State: A massacre in Gujba College. Killed more than 50 students.
- February 16th, 2014 Borno State: Massacre in Izghe village. Killed 105 people.
- February 24th, 2014 Yobe State: Mass murder of college students. Killed 43 people.
- March 2nd, 2014 Borno State: Bomb blast in Maiduguri. Killed 300 and left 250 people injured.
- April 15th, 2014 Borno State: Abduction of 276 Chibok school girls.
- May 5th, 2014 Borno state: Attacked Gamboru and Ngala towns. Killed 300 people.
- May 27th, 2014 Yobe State: Buni Yadi attack. Killed 49 security personnel and 9 civilians.
- June 1st, 2014 Adamawa State: Bomb blast at Mubi. Killed at least 40 people.
- June 2nd, 2014 Borno State: Gwoza massacre killing mostly Christians. Killed 200.
- July 18th, 2014 Adamawa State: Book Haram attack in Damboa. Killed 18.
- September 19th, 2014 Borno State: Attack at a busy market in Mainok. Killed about 30 people.
- October 31st, 2014 Gombe State: Explosion at a bus station. Killed at least 4 people and left 32 injured.

- November 10th, 2014 Yobe State: Twin suicide bombing. Killed 61 people.
- November 25th, 2014 Borno State: Suicide bomb blast in Maiduguri. Killed over 45 people.
- December 11th, 2014 Borno State: Massacre and destruction of houses in Gajiganna. Killed 30.
- December 13th, 2014 Borno State: Abduction of people in Gumsuri. Killed about 35 people.
- December 22nd, 2014 Gombe State: Bus station bomb blast. Killed at least 27 people.
- January 10th, 2015 Borno State: Female suicide bomb blast at a market in Maiduguri. The suicide bomber and 19 others killed.
- January 24th, 2015 Borno State: Boko Haram gunmen attempt to burn down the village of Kambari near Maiduguri. Killed 15 people.
- February 2nd, 2015 Gombe State: Suicide bomb blast after the President of Nigeria leaves an election rally in the city of Gombe. Killed 1 and left 18 injured.
- February 15th, 2015 Yobe State: Suicide bomb blast in Damaturu. 16 Killed and 30 left injured.
- February 24th, 2015 Yobe State: Suicide bomb blast at bus station in Potiskum. At least 27 Killed.
- February 28th, 2015 Yobe State: Suicide bomb blast near Damaturu. Killed 4 civilians.
- July 1, 2015 Borno State: Boko Haram militants raid three villages in the North/Eastern state of Borno. At least 145 people killed, according to witnesses.
- February 19, 2018 Yobe State: A faction of Boko Haram raids the Government Girls Science and Technical College in the northeast Nigerian town of Dapchi, kidnapping 110 students of the college.
- March 1, 2018 Borno State: Boko Haram militants attack a displacement camp in Rann, Borno State, killing at least three Nigerian aid workers and injuring three others. Three International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) aid wor-

kers were abducted in the attack. On September 17, 2018 the ICRC reports on the killing of the abducted aid worker Saifura Hussaini Ahmed Khorsa and abducted midwife Hauwa Mohammed Liman, executed after a deadline for negotiations expires.

- June 9, 2020 Borno State: At least 81 people are killed in an attack on a village by suspected Boko Haram militants in northeast Nigeria, where seven people, including the village head, children and women, are abducted.
- November 22, 2020 Borno State: Boko haram attack Governor Zulum's convoy. Kills Seven Soldiers, two others.
- November 28, 2020 Borno State: United Nations report the killing of at least 110 farmers by Boko Haram in Zabarmari village.


North Central

- October 1, 2010 Abuja: Explosion near Eagle Square, Abuja. Claimed 12 lives, leaving many injured.
- December 24, 2010 Plateau State: A bomb attack, in Barkin Ladin, Jos, Plateau State. Killing 8 people.
- December 31, 2010 Abuja: Explosion at Mogadishu Mammy Market, Abuja. Killed 10 people.
- April 8, 2011 Niger State: Bomb at INEC office in Suleja, Niger. Killed eight corps members and the suicide bomber.
- July 9th, 2011 Niger State: A bomb targeted at a church in Suleja, Niger State. Killed 4 and injured many others.
- August 26th, 2011 Abuja: A suicide bomber drove into the United Nations building in Abuja. Killed 25 and injured 60.
- December 25th, 2011 Niger State: Christmas Day bomb blast in Madalla, Niger State. Killed about 40 people and wounded over 5 dozens more.
- March 11th, 2012 Plateau State: Bomb blast at St. Finberr's Catholic Church, Rayfield, Jos. Killed 11 people and several others injured.

- April 14th, 2014 Abuja: Twin bomb blast attack. Killed over 88 people.
- May 1st, 2014 Abuja: A car bomb blast. Killed 19 people.
- May 20th, 2014 Plateau State: Twin Car bomb blast in Jos. Killed 118 and injured many others.

North West

- March, 2011. Kaduna State: Attack on the residence of Divisional Police Officer at Rigasa area of Kaduna State. Killed two policemen.
- June 20th, 2011 Kastina State: Attacked Kankara police station in Kastina State. Killed seven policemen and two security men.
- March 18th, 2013 Kano State: Bus bomb blast. Killed about 65 people.
- November 28th, 2014 Kano State: Bomb blast. Killed at least 120 Muslims.



Source: Culled from Danjibo (2009), Nwolise (2017), Nigerian Dailies, Local and International media reports on the activities of BH in Nigeria from 2009 through 2020.

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FITTING CATTLE RUSTLING IN KARAMOJA CLUSTER IN THE FRAME OF TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

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ABSTRACT

This article aims to fit cattle rustling in Karamoja cluster in the frame of transnational organized crime (TOC) and proposes its inclusion in the typology of TOC. Data was collected through qualitative means; content review, observation and interview. The key informants included elders, former cattle rustlers, local council leaders, security personnel and business people. Sampling was purposive. The article found that cattle rustling have similar features that fit into the frame (understanding) of transnational organized crime. The article concludes that cattle rustling is a transnational organized crime and should be included in the typology of TOC. The article begins with an introduction and definitions of cattle rustling, Karamoja cluster, OC/TOC, modus operandi of OC/TOC and analysis of cattle rustling as a TOC. It then draws conclusion with recommendations.

Keywords

Fitting, Cattle rustling, Karamoja cluster, frame, transnational organized crime.

INTRODUCTION

Cattle rustling in Africa is growing both in scale, violence and increasingly linked to organized criminal and terrorist groups as a source of income. In West Africa, it is reported in Nigeria, Niger and Cameroon. North-eastern Nigeria's experience with cattle rustling is extending throughout the Lake Chad Basin, involving Boko Haram (Ciara et al 2017).¹ The extremist group relies on the activity as

a major source of financing. Militants frequently raid cattle in northern Cameroon and transport them via middle men to markets in northern Nigeria. In 2016 Borno State estimated that 200,000 head of cattle were rustled. Overall estimates of Boko Haram's accumulation vary from some million dollars to US\$20 million.² The group's activities had a drastic impact such that major cattle markets in Borno state were shut down to ensure that Boko Haram don't exploit the livestock trade. Zamfara State in the north-west region of Nigeria remains a major hotspot for cattle rustling, despite the amnesty programme granted by the state governor in 2017 for cattle rustlers to lay down their weapons.

Madagascar presents another example of cattle rustling in African. Banditry linked to the raids of zebu cattle became increasingly problematic as the island suffered political instability and economic decline after President Ravalomanana was ousted in 2009. The rise of cattle rustling and casualties was magnified by the introduction of modern weaponry and criminal groups that became increasingly professional. In 2016, the Madagascan army announced that 161 people were killed in clashes between the army and cattle rustlers.³

As for Karamoja cluster in East Africa, there has been a long history of cattle rustling. The act evolved over time from being an accepted traditional practice sanctioned by the village elders into a commercialized and criminal venture (Titus, 2013).⁴ Some of the causal factors that contributed to cattle-rustling in the Karamoja cluster were the creation of administration units during colonialism which impeded the pastoral way of life of the people in the region. The colonial administration imposed permanent tribal boundaries with ramifications on the pastoral communities as these boundaries were set up without due regard to the seasonal variations and demands of the nomadic lifestyles of the pastoralists (Osamba, 2006).⁵ Environmental factors also contributed largely to the practice of cattle-rustling. This led to the pastoralists crossing borders and trespassing to other communities' territories in search of pasture and water. Consequently, the pastoralists engage in inter-ethnic conflict because of the effects of drought and famine leading to the death of hundreds of stock. The pastoralists engaged in rustling to restock and compensate for lost cattle. Some of the pastoralists engaged in rustling as conduits for unscrupulous businessmen to make quick money from the miseries and hardships of the pastoralist.

However since the 1990s, there has been a surge in cattle rustling in Karamoja cluster, the actors and weaponry becoming increasingly sophisticated because of the proliferation of small arms in the cluster. Recent statistics and reports show that cattle rustling has evolved in both method and extent (Ciara et al 2017). It is now practiced for commercial reasons through criminal networks cross-communal and international borders, rendering the practice a transnational criminal act. Previously

practiced as a cultural heritage, it is now undertaken for economic benefits. Livestock is seen as a valuable commodity that has attracted business people from within and outside the cluster region.

Data for the article was sourced qualitatively using interview, document review and observation as methods of data collection. The key informants included elders, former cattle rustlers, local council leaders, security personnel and business people. Sampling was purposive because former cattle rustlers rustled the animals, local council leaders are politicians who know the affairs of their localities, security personnel are involved in curbing rustling and some of the business people deal in rustled animals. Therefore, they were best placed to give the required data since they were participating in various activities involving animals. Photographs of elders examining the intestines of animal for information, and youth normally mobilized to rustle animals were taken.

DEFINING CATTLE RUSTLING

Several authors have fronted a number of definitions of cattle rustling. According to Ciara et al (2017) cattle rustling occurs when a group of individuals plan, organize and steal livestock forcefully from another person or from the grazing field or kraal for the purpose of commercial gain. Similarly, journalists, academics and practitioners increasingly refer to it as a form of violent organized crime with a transnational dimension.

According to Okoli et al (2014)⁶ cattle rustling is a criminal activity which is driven by the criminal intent on the expropriation of stolen cattle for meat or for sale, the act of stealing a herd of cattle from grazing land. To them, the phenomenon has evolved into a more standardized term to mean the act of stealing herd of cattle from any place notwithstanding the motivations.

Greiner (2013)⁷ notes that cattle rustling is a collective term that entails brutal and reckless murder, ethnic cleansing, criminal marketing chains, highway banditry and petty theft across rural border areas that has degenerated into serious violent conflict.

Deo et al (2019)⁸ also refer to cattle rustling, as conceived by the Turkana elders in the traditional setting, as theft of livestock, usually a herd belonging to one community, by a group of armed warriors from another rival community. It entails the use of illicit small arms and light weapons (weapons designed for personal use and use by people serving as crews).

The Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (EAPCCO)⁹ report (2006), Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC) (2010)¹⁰ and Titus (2013) offer similar definitions of cattle rustling. All the definitions mention stealing, planning, organizing, attempting, aiding or abetting the stealing of livestock by any person from one community or country to another, where the theft is accompanied by dangerous weapons and violence. The EAPCCO definition recognizes that modern weapons (guns) are used which have replaced the less lethal weapons like spears, bows and arrows which were historically used before. The KHRC (2010) and Titus (2013) agree that cattle rustling has degenerated into a commercialized criminal venture and a predatory form of crime, hence passing for a typical example of organized crime involving discernible hierarchical social, economic, criminal networking and syndication.

Cattle rustling is also defined by Bunei et al (2016)¹¹ as an activity carried out by a group of individuals, often not from the same community, who plan, organize and forcefully steal livestock from another person, community or from the grazing field or kraal for the purpose of social, political or economic gain.

Cheserek et al (2012) further conceive cattle rustling as the act of forceful raiding of livestock from one community by another using guns and leaving behind destruction of property and loss of lives. According to Maganda (2013),¹² the practice along the Kenya-Uganda border has transformed over time with the increased proliferation of sophisticated firearms. The arms trade routes in the region, which traverse national borders and explores the factors that influence cattle rustling, including commercialization, political incitement, unresolved recurrent conflicts, historical marginalization and poor state strategies for curbing raids and related conflicts, has exacerbated the practice.

KARAMOJA CLUSTER

This is a semi-arid cross-border region comprising the pastoralist communities living in the borderlands between Uganda, Kenya, Sudan and Ethiopia. Most of the pastoralist communities classified under the cluster share the same ethnic roots and the Ateker language. The pastoral communities belonging to the cluster includes the Turkana, Pokot and Samburu of Kenya, the Dodoth, Jie, Matheniko, Pian, Tepes, Bokora, Eethur and Pokot of Uganda, the Toposa, Didinga and Nyangatom of Sudan and the Merille of Ethiopia. Competition for scarce resources, particularly water and pasture, and the cultural value placed on cattle has produced a tradition of cattle rustling in the region (Ken et al, 2010).¹³

Fig.1. Map of Karamoja cluster.



Source: [Karamoja harmonization report, 1999](#).

In 2004, violent pastoral conflict in the Karamoja Cluster resulted in more than 600 human deaths and loss of over 40,000 heads of livestock (primarily cattle and goats) in a year (Osamba, 2006). The origin of the present increased militarization of cattle-rustling and the change from a traditional practice to the current sophistication, dates back to 1904, and sanctioned by elders through a system known as gerontocracy. Available literature indicates that guns were rarely used in conducting cattle rustling, but on the contrary crude weapons such as sticks, spears, bows, arrows and clubs were the preferred weapons (Mazrui, 1977).¹⁴ The raids were practiced as a means of reciprocity, for poor families to acquire livestock and restock, particularly after droughts or epidemics, a form of redistribution and balancing of wealth. In the cluster, cattle rustling was traditionally a cultural activity where young men would steal livestock as a means of acquiring more stocks for various purposes such as payment of dowry, show of heroism, worthiness, courage and social status, rite of passage from youth to adult or wealth enhancement (Cheserek et al 2012).¹⁵

This cultural practice has been transformed, with elders having no control over the youth and, with guns as major tools of trade. Prior to 1990, cattle raids meant stealing livestock by scaring away owners but in contemporary times, it involves forceful stealing and destruction of property (Cheserek et al, 2012).¹⁶ The modern form of cattle rustling is no longer the case with the traditional one. The motive has changed from stealing to fulfill cultural traditions to a highly complex, commercial and criminal act. The act has become an organized commercial enterprise along the

boundaries of pastoral communities as stolen cattle is never recovered. According to Greiner (2013), cattle rustling is a major problem in Kenya which has been used as a political tool to coerce and create voting blocs by criminals preferring to resort to violence if confronted. The commercialization, militarization and politicization of cattle rustling has significantly altered the traditional parameters of political engagements. Cattle from rural areas are cheap, organically good and “sweet” for human consumption (Greiner, 2013). This has created demand and business opportunity for rogue business individuals to reap huge profits as cattle is bought at a cheap price. Trading of livestock and livestock products has become a lucrative business, attracting a lot of people seeking to gain from the upsurge and demand. Organized criminal ventures are involved throughout the value chain in livestock production i. e. herdsman to rustlers, distributors and consumer markets. As a result cattle rustling has become a highly commercialized activity.

ORGANIZATION OF CATTLE RUSTLING

In the Karamoja cluster, cattle rustling comprises of three steps with planning as the initial step. A key informant, a former cattle rustler narrates the steps:

Cattle rustling expedition begins with planning. A youthful warrior consults an elder who is a foreteller/dreamer to explore the chances of success. The elder probes questions such as; Is the way safe? Will the expedition be successful and animals brought? What will be the magnitude of death on either side. The elder asks for a goat of a particular colour according to his dream, which is killed and he examines the intestines to discern the answers to the questions under probe.

Fig.2. Karimojong elder examining the intestines of the goat for information.



Source: Field data (2020).

Depending on the findings of the intestinal examination, the youth are advised to continue with the planning of the expedition. If the information discerned indicates that “own” warriors will be killed in large numbers and few or no animals brought, another goat with a particular colour prescribed by the foreteller is killed to erase the previous negative information. Once positive examination is ascertained, the youth are flagged off to begin mobilizing the rustling force. Alternatively, *emuron* (diviner) is consulted, who investigates the success of the expedition by casting skin sandles. Casting skin sandals is done by knowledgeable and expert community elders who can foretell the success of the rustling expedition. Casting the sandle involves gently throwing the skin sandles in the air and noting their positions after landing on the ground. Their positions on the ground after landing contain messages which are then interpreted by the elder. This is done repeatedly as observations and interpretations of the different positions are made, until a favourable landing position is attained by the sandles showing that the expedition is fruitful.

After proof of success, a second step of mobilization of the youth (*ngikaracunas*) begins. This is the fighting force to execute the rustling plan.

The mobilizers are usually previous or current cattle rustlers who are brave in the field, have amassed animals through the act such that when they talk to the youth, they are respected and words believed. For their bravery, they are respected and given praise names such as *Amunya ngimoe* (finished/killed all the enemies), *Abwanga ngimoe* (chased/defeated all the enemies), *ayiwu ngikiliok* (saved fellow warriors in a battle) or *Thopuriethe* (smouldering fire). Such mobilizers mobilize up to about 50 youth; 30 armed with AK 47 assault rifles and 20 unarmed, but with sticks. The 20 unarmed warriors are to drive the animals very fast, while the armed group engage the pursuing party in a battle of gun fire.

Fig. 3. Chief mobilizer posing with his gun, frenzied warroirs showing their prowess in rustling and the category of youth mobilized.



Source: Field data (2020).

In one successful cattle rustling act in Turkana land, Kenya, the informant further narrates:

In this particular episode, the mobilizer was a Jie warrior of Karamoja cluster of Uganda, but with very close ties in Turkana, a cluster community in Kenya as he is married to a Turkana woman. He coordinates the cattle rustling inside Kenya with other accomplice rogue police and military personnel, paramilitary, local politicians and local traders in Kenya and Uganda. He acts as if passing intelligence to the rustlers to take a route that would not make them be intercepted by security, while at the same time, informing security to block the very route so that the rustlers are intercepted. He also prepares the business people to buy the animals once the mission succeeds. The rogue security personnel intercept the animals, impound them and sell to the business people. The mobilizer later gets his share of the deal.

The third step is spying and moving to the location of the animals for a final assault:

The mobilized group set out and gathers at some location as reconnaissance is made. Spies are sent out to spy on the enemies i.e. what is the strength of the enemies, how many animals are there. The spies also steal some goats/sheep for subsistence in the bush as the reconnaissance continues. The reconnaissance continues until they are satisfied that the animals are many enough, and no remarkable resistance is expected from the enemies. The attack ensues with ferocious gun fire and the animals are driven away very fast. The armed group engages the enemies as the unarmed ones escape with the animals. After a while, the engaging armed group disengages and run very fast after the group driving the animals. They again stop and engage the enemies as the animals are driven faster and farther. Another tactic is to divide the animals so that the enemy trackers get confused, divide themselves and become weak in confrontation. The warriors then meet at an agreed place to divide the animals among themselves. Meanwhile, the rogue security personnel are planning to intercept them and impound the animals. Once it is done, it is sold off to the traders.

In some cases, it is also coordinated by insiders of the victim communities, the Local Defense Units (LDU) personnel and the local politicians. The LDU personnel, who work together with the formal law enforcement agencies, have been implicated in collaborative activities with the rustlers. The police, army and local traders have equally been implicated as the informant continues the narrative:

The LDU personnel spy and pass intelligence to the rustlers for payment after a successful mission. They are paid in form of animals and immediately sell to the local traders. The local council officials, who are supposed to mobilize people against cattle rustling, instead mobilize the youth to rustle for payment. They also do it to secure their positions from rivals local politicians. In the 2021 general elections, one of the parliamentary candidates had the slogan *Nyawereth*, meaning “cow dung”, signifying that he stands for animals, and that he defends the interest of his community as far as animals are concerned. And he was elected on this slogan. This kind of politicians simply increases the network of rustlers. Also, when the army and police pursue the rustled animals and recover, they are supposed to return to the victims, but there is talk that they load animals on trucks and sell to urban centers where meat has higher prices. In urban centers, the traders are set waiting to receive the animals immediately and slaughter for cash. In one public security meeting addressed jointly by all Karamojong Members of Parliaments (MPs), one member of the public challenged the MPs to investigate the real people behind cattle rustling in Karamoja. Whenever the animals are rustled and recovered, the rightful owners don’t get the animals back. Where do the animals end up? It appears there is a racket behind rustling which benefits from the act. Rustling has also taken a different turn with the use of modern technology, mobile phones. Warriors herding animals along the road between Kotido and Moroto in Uganda are usually seen holding mobile phones and small portable solar panels for charging. It is the local traders who operate butchereries who provide the phones and solar panels to the warriors. The phones are used to coordinate rustling. For instance when animals are rustled from Kenya and the Kenyan authorities communicate to the Ugandan authorities to intercept the animals, they collect information on the movement of law enforcement (police/soldiers) on the Ugandan side and communicate to the rustlers driving the animals to change direction. Sometimes the warriors pretend to be assisting law enforcement, but assisting the rustlers instead. In this way, cattle rustling is now a livelihood to everybody in the chain, and unlikely that it will end soon.

ORGANIZED CRIME

The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC) Article 2 defines “organized criminal group” as: a group having at least three members, taking some action in concert (i.e., together or in some co-ordinated manner) for the purpose of committing a ‘serious crime’ and for the purpose of obtaining a financial or other benefits (UNTOC, 2004). The Convention adds that the group must have some internal organization or structure, and exist for some period of time before or after the actual commission of the offence(s)

involved. The implied definition of “transnational organized crime” encompasses virtually all profit-motivated criminal activities.

Several scholars have defined Organized Crime (OC) too. Federico Varese conducted a content analysis of 115 definitions of OC from 1915 to 2009¹⁷ and found that OC involves the pursuit of profit through illegal means by an organized hierarchy that shows continuity over time, where the use of violence and corruption are the most recurrent. He stresses that OC has its own language, history, tradition and customs, method and techniques, highly specialized machinery for attacks upon persons and property, and modes of defense. A commission is paid for overseeing, planning and coordinating the activities of all subgroups across different individuals or entities involved in it.

Haller (1990)¹⁸ finds the existence of business partnerships and cooperation among organized criminal illegal entrepreneurs, who operate under conditions of illegality often aided by corrupt law enforcement officers who remain independent illegal operators, rather than joining a single structured organization. He further advances criminal network perspective’ for the understanding of organized crime, and summarizes the characteristics of OC according to structure, activities and means. According to the structure, he stresses organization, continuity, networking, planning, coordination and entrepreneurship as the main features of organized crime. To him, organized criminal groups use violence and corruption across national and international borders to execute their missions.

TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME (TOC)

The term “transnational crime” was first used at the Fifth United Nations (UN) Congress on Crime Prevention and the Treatment of Offenders in 1975 by the UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch in order to identify certain criminal phenomena transcending international borders, transgressing the laws of several states or having an impact on another country (UNODC, 2017).¹⁹ Although the concepts “transnational crime” and “organized crime” overlap, and transnational crimes are often perpetrated by organized criminal groups (Tonou, 2011),²⁰ many commentators take the two terminologies to be synonymous. The eleventh UN Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems in 2008 defined transnational crimes as offences whose inception, perpetration and direct or indirect effects involved more than one country (UN Survey report, 2007-2008).²¹ This tendency towards a broad definition is also reflected in article 3(2) of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. It states that an offence is “transnational” if it satisfies one of a number of these alternative conditions:

- a.** It is committed in more than one State;
- b.** It is committed in one State but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction, or control takes place in another State;
- c.** It is committed in one State but involves an organized criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more than one State; or
- d.** It is committed in one State but has substantial effects in another State.

It therefore implies that organized crime becomes transnational when it meets the requirements of article 3(2) of the 2004 UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Virtually, TOC encompasses all serious profit-motivated criminal actions of an international nature where more than one country is involved.

TYPOLOGY OF TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

The UN has identified several different categories of transnational crime: drug trafficking, trafficking in persons, child trafficking, migrant smuggling, organ trafficking, trafficking in cultural property, counterfeiting, money laundering, terrorism, cybercrime, theft of intellectual property, illicit traffic in arms, aircraft hijacking, sea piracy, wild life trafficking, trafficking counterfeit pharmaceuticals, trafficking minerals, oil bunkering, pornography, prostitution and waste dumping (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2014).²² Although this typology is not exhaustive, cattle rustling is not included in the list.

MODUS OPERANDI OF TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

The most typical characteristics like the use of violence, corruption and money laundering shape the modus operandi of transnational organized crime. The use of violence and intimidation against victims, against members of groups inside the same organization or against members of other organizations, has been defined as an ingredient of the crime, bringing what has been termed “the law of silence” (Arben, 2015).²³ Arben adds that the use of corruption to influence politicians, public administrators, criminal justice system officials is regarded as a tool of the organized crime (groups) that facilitate their operation. Political corruption ensures that the votes are kept intact. Judicial corruption buys administrative and judicial decisions. Criminal groups corrupt the judiciary by accessing magistrates via social, political, professional and family networks. Professional networks also facilitate such contacts, where defense lawyers, who are former prosecutors, intermediate between organized crime and the judiciary. Police corruption is used to

influence the police personnel. Police have the most direct exposure and frequent contacts with organized crime as such, organized crime most often targets them. Organized crime uses corruption to obtain information on investigations, operations and protection for continued illegal activities. Occasionally, corrupt officers become directly engaged in criminal activities.

Further, referring to definitions of Organized Crime provided by 17 different scholars, Albanese found that 12 included “the use of force or threat” in the definition (Albanese, 1988).²⁴ Abadinsky (1981)²⁵ points to the “willingness to use violence” as a fundamental trait of organized crime and adds that violence is a “readily available and routinely accepted resource” for criminal organizations.

FITTING CATTLE RUSTLING IN TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME

In doing this, the article analyses the features of cattle rustling that fit the definition/characteristics of OC/TOC for comparison. As noted by Tonou (2011), that many commentators take the two terminologies to be synonymous, and for purposes of comparison of the features, the article takes the two terminologies to be synonymous too. From the definition of cattle rustling, a number of authors cite planning, organizing and the use of force/violence in obtaining cattle in the process of rustling (Ciara et al 2017; Titus, 2013; Bunei et al 2016, Cheserek et al 2012 & Kenya Human Rights Commission, 2010). This is executed by a group of rustlers crossing from one community to another across international borders. In the process, killings, maiming and destruction of properties occur. These atrocities can be considered as heinous or serious. Similarly, in the organization of rustling, the informant’s testimony includes planning in which the youthful warriors consult an elder who is a foreteller/dreamer to probe some pertinent questions about the impending rustling expedition. The use of AK 47, a symbol of violence is equally identified. These definitional views resonate with the definition of organized crime as presented by Article 3(2) of the UNCTOC 2004; “a group having at least three members, taking some action in concert (together or in some co-ordinated manner) for the purpose of committing a ‘serious crime...’”. The cattle rustling is executed by a group of rustlers in a planned way similar to the consideration of “... a group having at least three members” and “... coordinated manner” mentioned in the UNCTOC definition. The organization of rustling is synonymous with the definition of TOC under the UNCTOC article 3(2) (b) “... its preparation, planning, direction...” takes place in another State. Clearly, cattle rustling is planned in another state, for instance Uganda and executed in another state, e. g. Kenya. These similarities are supported by Ciara et al (2017) who cite cattle rustling as organized and marked by high levels of violence and that in Baringo County, Kenya, the area has witnessed thousands of livestock stolen and dozens of people shot or killed. Federico Vare-

se also notes that OC occurs “... where the use of violence is the most recurrent”. Similarly Albanese (1988) found 12 out of 17 definitions of OC included “the use of force or threat” as an important aspect of the definition as Abadinsky (1981) lists the “willingness to use violence” as a fundamental trait of organized criminal organizations. The use of violence in OC connects correspondingly with violence in cattle rustling.

In analyzing the financial gain, the same authors mention it as one of the motivations for cattle rustling. For instance, Titus (2013), Bunei et al (2016) and KHRC (2010) share this idea of economic gain as one of the reasons for rustling. Ciara et al (2017) and Maganda (2013) also cite commercial benefits while Greiger (2013) and Okoli et al (2014) cite criminal marketing and meat for sale, arguing that rural meat is considered cheap and sweet by the urbanites. Equally, Titus (2013) adds “... cattle rustling is a highly complex, commercial and criminal act, organized as a commercial enterprise along the boundaries of pastoral communities as stolen cattle are never recovered”. On Boko Haram, Ciara et al (2017) further note that the group’s activities have had a drastic impact, such that major cattle markets in Borno state have been temporarily shut down to ensure that Boko Haram does not exploit the livestock trade. This consideration of financial gain by these authors is also shared in the definition by Article 3(2) of the UN definition of UNCTOC “... for ... the purpose of obtaining financial or other benefits” and Federico Varese who notes ... OC involves the pursuit of profit through illegal activities. Besides Haller (1990), views it ... enterprise involving illegal activities of providing illegal goods in public demand. The testimony of the key informant also gives cattle rustling a commercial perspective. “... load it on trucks and sell to urban centers where meat has higher prices. ... the traders are set waiting to receive the animals immediately and slaughter them for cash”. These views place cattle rustling in the realm of TOC whose motive is material benefit.

Analysis of the transnationality of cattle rustling is discernible from the testimony of the key informant; ... the chief mobilizer is a Jie warrior of the Karamoja cluster of Uganda, but with very close contacts in Turkana, a cluster community in Kenya, as he is married to a Turkana woman. He coordinates the cattle rustling inside Kenya with other accomplices in Kenya and Uganda”. This picture of cattle rustling as a transnational organized crime ties with the EAPCCO’s conceptualization of cattle rustling “... from one country or community to another” and Maganda’s (2013) part of definition “... a practice along Uganda/Kenya border”, according a transnational character to cattle rustling. Additionally, Titus (2013) observes “... the crime is also transnational in that cattle is moved across borders”. This transnational character also mirrors Ciara et al (2017) view that “... North-eastern Nigeria’s experiences with cattle rustling now extends throughout the Lake Chad Basin with Boko Haram militants frequently rustling cattle ... transporting them via middle men

to markets in northern Nigeria. With the involvement of actors such as Boko Haram and the movement of cattle across national boundaries, cattle rustling becomes a form of transnational organized crime". Further, Ken et al (2010) assert that "competition for scarce resources, particularly water and pasture, and the cultural value placed on cattle has produced a tradition of cattle rustling in the region", implies that the act has become transnational in the region. Cattle rustling also mirror all the sub sections of the definition of TOC in article 3(2) of the UN Convention against TOC which states that an offence is "transnational" if it satisfies one of a number of these alternative conditions;

(a) It is committed in more than one State. In respect to this sub section, cattle rustling is carried out in the four countries of Karamoja cluster. As contained in the testimony of the informant, the act is therefore committed in more than one state.

(b) It is committed in one State but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction, or control takes place in another State. Viewed from the testimony of the informant, the act can be committed in one state, but prepared and planned in another state. For instance in the testimony, mobilization and preparation took place in Jie, Uganda, but the act was to be committed in Turkana, Kenya.

(c) It is committed in one State but involves an organized criminal group that engages in criminal activities in more than one State. Again considering the testimony of the informant ... rustlers coalesce around prominent/brave warriors with praise names such as *Rithamoe* ... such worriers can sway cattle rustling to any country they choose and the youth follow them because of the respect they are accorded. In this way, a group from Uganda cluster can rustle in Kenya and South Sudan clusters at any time as the mobilizers wish.

(d) It is committed in one State but has substantial effects in another State. Regarding this sub section, the rustlers are not always lucky to come back without any casualties from the rustling expedition. For instance in one rustling expedition to Turkana, Kenya by the Jie of Uganda, the Jie were killed that only five rustlers came back and without animals. Nearly every family in the county was mourning the death of a family member as a result of that expedition. Two widows committed suicide because of the loss of their partners. Consequently, the county became a perennial victim of cattle rustling as there were very few worriers left to fight off rustlers from other communities in the cluster. Clearly, this was a case of an act being committed in one state, but with substantial effect in another state.

Considering corruption, it has been cited in cattle rustling too. From the definition of Titus (2013), "... stolen cattle are never recovered" imputing that the animals disappear in an act of corruption. The key informant also cites corruption "... challenged

the MPs to investigate and find out the real people behind cattle rustling in Karamoja. Whenever animals are rustled and recovered, the rightful owners don't get them back. Where do they end up? It appears there is a racket behind rustling which benefits from the act". Also Bunei et al (2016) note "... in reality such crime cannot occur without the collusion of the criminal network of cattle rustling involving a group of local rural residents who work in cohort with urban-based businessmen in large scale corruption.

CONCLUSION

From the analysis of the two phenomena, this article has found that cattle rustling has many features that fit into the frame of TOC. The article therefore, concludes that cattle rustling is a transnational organized crime and should be included in the typology of TOC.

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AN ANALYSIS OF THE TRANSNATIONAL DIFFUSION OF TERRORISM IN AFRICA: THE CASE OF ANSAR AL-SUNNA ARMED GROUP IN NORTHERN MOZAMBIQUE

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ABSTRACT

Terrorism has been used over the years as a strategy or means to express political, religious or social grievances by aggrieved groups. This study analyses the concept of diffusion or contagion as a major driver of the transnational spread of terrorism. The study analyses the case of Ansar al-Sunna, operating in Cabo Delgado Province of Northern Mozambique, with a view to establishing the potential for the diffusion of the terrorist insurgency beyond Cabo Delgado. The study reviews similar terrorist insurgencies elsewhere in Africa which subsequently spread or were replicated beyond the borders of countries of origin through diffusion or contagion. Such cases include Boko Haram in West Africa, Al Shabaab in East and Horn of Africa, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Allied Democratic Forces in the Great Lakes region. The study concludes that the potential for diffusion of the group's operations beyond the Cabo Delgado Province remains omnipresent. This is given impetus by the group's alleged alliance with foreign fighters and affiliation to ISIS, which aims to establish an Islamic caliphate in southern Africa. The study established that since the first attack on Mocimboa da Praia District in October 2017, the activities of Ansar al-Sunna have rapidly spread to other districts of Cabo Delgado Province and even beyond the border across the Rovuma River into Tanzanian territory. This paper is based on a review of literature from terrorism and counter-terrorism studies, insurgency studies, globalisation studies and relevant mass media and Internet reports relating to the terrorist insurgency in northern Mozambique.

Keywords

Cabo Delgado, Diffusion and Contagion, Insurgency, Terrorism, Transnational.

INTRODUCTION

With the end of the Cold War era in the early 1990s, the world is becoming more interdependent, with conflict, crime and violence also becoming more international in their scope, causes and impact (World Bank Group Policy Research Report, 2020: 7). This is reflected in the unfolding global conflicts such as those in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, the Philippines, Nigeria, Somalia and the Republic of Yemen which accounted for 56 percent of all terrorist attacks in the world and 74 percent of terrorism fatalities in 2017 (Ibid: 20). While civil wars, including terrorism, are by definition mostly armed conflicts within a nation state, the conflicts are rarely, if ever, confined within the boundaries of a single nation state (Forsberg, 2016:1; Li, 2015:1). Hence, with regards to their causes, conflicts generally tend to be geographically clustered, with rebel groups moving back and forth across porous borders, with cross-national networks of states and non-state actors being engaged in trading arms for natural resources, and the effects of civil war being felt far beyond the country in which it is fought.

Some of the spillover effects of transnational conflict include refugee inflows and economic decline in neighbouring states and the attendant spread or contagion extension of the actual conflict into neighbouring states. Graeme & Slobodien (2016:1) expand the discourse on regional conflict diffusion to include five broad drivers, namely: weak states; anticipated power shifts, both regional and domestic; porous borders; large refugee flows; and the religiously-based non-state militant campaign against the state as an organising principle of world politics.

Relatedly, Forsberg (2016) attributes the diffusion of conflict to three dimensions. Firstly, that the causes of intra-state conflict are clustered; secondly, that an ongoing civil war spurs additional conflict in a proximate location due to contagion; and thirdly, that conflicts are connected within a region in terms of linkages between issues, actors, and motives. All these criteria are generally partially or wholly applicable to the contemporary terrorist insurgencies in the world, and the terrorist insurgency raging in Northern Mozambique since 2017 is not an exception.

The prevalence of some or all of the afore-mentioned drivers in the continental and regional context will therefore likely aid the diffusion or spread of conflict from one country to another. In the case of the Middle East, these drivers have contributed to the rise of the Islamic State (IS), which has dominated the current terrorist insurgency in both Iraq and Syria (Graeme & Slobodien (2016:7). The Syrian conflict has ignited a massive exodus of Syrian, Libyan and Afghan refugee flows into Europe, while in the Middle East, refugees have been a vehicle for diffusing conflict and challenging state resources (Ibid).

The current insurgency in Mozambique's Northern region has similarly attracted a plethora of international actors, transcending national borders from as far afield as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kenya and Tanzania, among others. The ripple negative effects of the conflict are vivid in Mozambique, such as the mounting influx of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) overwhelming Pemba, the capital city of Cabo Delgado Province, and the attendant humanitarian challenges of lack of food, shelter and clothing.

While the initial attacks were confined to villages and districts within Cabo Delgado, the escalation of the terrorist insurgency in 2019 saw the group attacking the village of Kitaya in the Matwara region of the Republic of Tanzania, just across the Rovuma River bordering Mozambique and Tanzania. This attack culminated in the deployment of Tanzanian troops to the region to protect the country's border with Mozambique from insurgent attacks. This paper explores how the theory of diffusion or contagion explains the potential for the internal and transnational spread of the terrorist insurgency in northern Mozambique and makes recommendations on possible mitigatory measures.

TERRORISM VERSUS INSURGENCY

The two terms 'insurgency' and 'terrorism' have sometimes been used interchangeably. While these terms are generally contested in the sense that there is no agreed definition, there is however, a clear distinction between them, particularly with regards to the mode of operation or tactics, the objectives or motives of either terrorists or insurgents, as well as their strategic or political intents (Jackson, 2011:19).

Various definitions have been proffered by different individuals, scholars and organisations as they perceive terrorism (Young & Dugan, 2014). Terrorists generally promote illegal acts of violence to harm or endanger the general population through instilling fear. The Organisation of African Union (OAU), later to become the African Union (AU) in 2002, defined terrorism as "any act which is a violation of the criminal laws of a state party and which may endanger the life, physical integrity or freedom of, or cause serious injury or death to, any person, any number or group of persons or causes or may cause damage to public or private property, natural resources, environmental or cultural heritage" (AU Report, 2016:13). In its Counter Terrorism Strategy (2015), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) also adopted the AU definition of terrorism, with minor additions. One distinct characteristic of terrorism is the indiscriminate use of violence against the civilian population with the objective of causing fear and terror (Iyi, 2018:3).

Other scholars, such as Frisch (2011:2) and Yurtbay (2018:24) consider terrorism as a strategy or tactic of insurgency rather than a separate organisational entity, defined by its strategic choices, such as the targets attacked and the weapons and tactics used. Yet another definition by Szayna et al (2017:36) delineates terrorism as an intentional act of violence or threat of violence by a non-state actor. In their attempt to coerce the state through violence against civilians, terrorists usually indirectly target state institutions (McConaghy, 2017:2). In synthesising the above definitions this paper will consider terrorism as the deliberate use of violence by an individual or group against civilians to achieve a political objective. This definition also takes cognisance of McConaghy's assertion that a state party can also be both a perpetrator as well as a target of terrorism.

An insurgency is considered to be such when a group of actors uses violence to contest the sovereignty of an established regime, with the aim of effecting political change (Lammers 2017:1-2). It has also been defined as the organised use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify or challenge political control of a region (Bunker, 2016:3). The above definitions resonate well with the one by Frisch (2011:2) which states that 'an insurgency relates to a non-governmental organisation working to effect social and/or political change through violent means against existing power structures and in a way that deliberately challenges the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of violence'.

An insurgency is essentially characterised by two aspects: firstly that it is primarily conducted within the borders of the insurgents' country and, secondly, an insurgency develops when a certain part of society feels aggrieved towards the government, a foreign power or another select part of society (Frisch, 2011:2). For the purpose of this essay, insurgency shall be defined as the use of violence and subversion by a non-state actor within a defined geographical space to effect political change.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Diffusion and Contagion

The concept of diffusion in general emphasises that actors in one national context may be influenced by actors in another state or states through the process of interdependence (Gilardi, 2012). While the terms 'diffusion' and 'contagion' can be, and have been, used interchangeably, Gilardi (2012) defines diffusion as a consequence of interdependence. He adds that, 'diffusion does not only occur at the international level, but can also take place within countries, among a wide range of public and private actors and leads to the spread of all kinds of things, from

specific instruments, standards and institutions... to broad policy models, ideational frameworks and institutional settings' (Gilardi, 2012: 2-3).

Contagion, on the other hand, has been defined as a process whereby internal conflict in one location influences the probability of another internal conflict erupting in a different place at a later point in time (Forsberg 2016:5). Ertan and Bayar (2018) define contagion as the process by which one group's actions provide inspiration and guidance, both strategic and tactical, for groups elsewhere. Diffusion or contagion can be defined as the direct spillover of conflict from one region to another, either within or across international boundaries (Bara, 2018; LaFree & Xie, 2017; Fisunoglu, 2020). In the context of terrorism, Neumayer and Plumper (2019:1) posit that, 'if terror attacks from groups of one country are followed by similar attacks on the same target from groups of other similar countries, then this could be the consequence of contagion'. To support this assertion, Horowitz (2010) argues that the external linkages and organisational capabilities facilitate a terrorist organisation's ability to imitate or copy the innovation of others. These linkages and capabilities, in the case of established terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and IS, manifest in their ability to reach global audiences through modern communication networks, such as the Internet, as well as use of global money transfer systems. These means and resources enable the groups to recruit potential terrorists globally as well as to sponsor terrorist acts without necessarily setting foot in the targeted countries (Findley et al, 2015). Through the process of diffusion, Crenshaw (2010) submits that terrorist groups develop and interact with each other and may share strategies and tactics of violence.

In exploring the transnational diffusion of conflict, the paper will be guided by the three conceptual dimensions proffered by (Forsberg 2016), namely; clustering, contagion and connectedness. The first dimension is that civil wars are clustered in space due to shared regional characteristics that make conflict more or less probable depending on geographical location. The current insurgency in Cabo Delgado, while having underlying socio-political underpinnings, is also religious-inspired, pitting Sufi against Salafi Islamic ideologies (Bukarti & Munasinghe, 2020). This makes it attractive for other like-minded groups from within and outside Mozambique to join in support of the Ansar al-Sunna group. This could explain the presence of some members of the group, especially in leadership positions, coming from as far as Uganda and Tanzania, with support for the group also coming from other Islamic-linked groups like IS, Al-Shabaab and ADF.

The second dimension is that the occurrence of civil war in one state may increase the risk of civil war in neighbouring nations through the effects of contagion. In her analysis of the spread of conflict, Forsberg (2016) affirms that such contagion may take place through direct spillover of refugees and arms transfer or through more

indirect processes of strategic learning and inspiration. In the last dimension, civil wars in different countries may be connected by shared grievances, collaboration between rebel groups, and emerging war economies, resulting in intractable regional security complexes (Forsberg, 2016:1).

DIFFUSION OF TERRORISM IN THE WORLD AND IN AFRICA

Since the reign of terror in France between the period 1793 and 1794 during the French Revolution when a series of massacres and numerous public executions took place, terrorism has evolved over the years through four distinct phases or waves (Rapaport, 2004). These waves are the Anarchist Wave during the 1800s; the Anti-Colonial Wave, during the 1920s; the New Left Wave, during the 1960s which was founded on radicalism and nationalism; and the Religious Wave of modern terrorism, which is considered to be currently underway and estimated to continue for the next twenty five years (AU Report, 2015:14). This current wave is premised upon the world as living in the age of terror founded on religious fundamentalism. The emergence of international terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and the Islamic State Group during this wave and their subsequent drive for the establishment of Islamic caliphates in some regions of the world gives credence to the designation of this wave as the religious wave. It is important to note that the current wave is characterised by terrorist groups fighting for the establishment not only of Islamic law in most areas of dominance, but also of Christian law, as in the case of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), which sought to rule Uganda according to the ten commandments of the Bible.

While terrorism has been in existence for a long time, the 2001 attacks on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in the USA proved to the world that terrorism had morphed into a ubiquitous global security threat. Globalisation and its attendant technological developments have played into the hands of terrorist groups and facilitated the transnational propagation of terrorist activities across nations, as geographical distances and sovereign state borders are no longer obstacles. With regards to the global proliferation of terrorist groups, Haynes (2012:2, in AU Report, 2016) asserts that globalisation 'increases their ability to spread their message and to link up with like-minded groups across international borders' and that, 'the overall result is that cross-border links between various religious actors have recently multiplied, and, in many cases, so have their international and transnational concerns'. Consequently, the contemporary global arena is proliferated by transnational terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, ISIS, the LRA, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), Al-Murabitun, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), among others (AU, 2016).

The global diffusion of terrorism can be traced to the events that unfolded after the invasion of Afghanistan in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, when the US placed a number of states, including those not related to Afghanistan or the 9/11 attacks, on an “axis of evil” (Li, 2015:2). These states were deemed by then US President George W. Bush as foreign governments that allegedly sponsored terrorism and sought weapons of mass destruction. The states included Iran, Iraq and North Korea. Iraq was subsequently invaded by the United States of America in 2003 on the alleged basis of sponsoring terrorism and possessing weapons of mass destruction.

As pointed out by Haberson (2013:3), the continued turmoil in Afghanistan has already contributed to the civil war in Tajikistan, to authoritarianism in Uzbekistan, to growing Russian aggressiveness prompted by fear of Islam along Russia’s southern frontier, and to the dissemination of military skills for radical Islamists in South Asia and the Arab world. Some groups like Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, Al Shabab in Somalia, Boko Haram and Al Nusra all started off as domestic terrorist groups with local grievances and largely limiting their operations to their host-states bases. As the groups grew bigger and gained more confidence in their operations, they subsequently linked up with more established and better resourced groups like Al Qaeda and IS with global expansionist agendas and thereupon began to project regional expansionist tendencies. Similarly, the Ansar al-Sunna group in northern Mozambique has already given an indication of its strategic intent by linking up with ISIS.

The threats and risks of intrastate violence and instability, particularly driven by terrorism and violent extremism, and their subsequent propagation or diffusion across national borders are a major global security concern, more so in Africa where there are a lot of ungoverned spaces, porous borders and failed or failing states, which are fertile grounds for the breeding and diffusion of terrorism. The environment offered by the Sambisa forest of Nigeria, with its proximity to the border with Cameroon has facilitated the activities of Boko Haram to quickly assume a transnational character as the group launched attacks into neighbouring Cameroon, Chad and Niger. Furthermore, the transnational activities of Boko Haram have implications for the regional security and stability of the Lake Chad Basin States as the conflict has displaced millions of people within the affected countries and also resulted in a high influx of refugees in the Lake Chad Basin countries (Iyi and Strydom, 2018). Elsewhere there have been attacks on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania as well as repeated attacks on civilians in both Kenya and Somalia attributed to Al Shabaab.

Iyi (2018:4) brings an interesting dimension to the discourse on the diffusion of terrorism with the concept of ‘franchising’, in which internationally-established terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and IS are using their brand names to expand their global reach and spheres of influence as a strategy to attract more followers and

establish recruitment hubs through affiliating emerging terrorist groups. By merely pledging allegiance to the bigger group, the smaller groups are guaranteed of both funding and recognition. The acknowledgement by IS for responsibility for some of the attacks in Mozambique gives a strong indication that Ansar al-Sunna is now affiliated to the broader IS Group (2019; Bukarti & Munasinghe, 2020).

DIFFUSION OF TERRORISM IN MOZAMBIQUE

The potential for the local and transnational diffusion of the prevailing terrorist insurgency in Mozambique can best be understood through an analysis of the background to the current conflict, the major group involved in the group as well as its links with other established external extremist groups.

Background to the Situation in Northern Mozambique

Since attaining independence from colonialism in 1975, Mozambique has been embroiled in a series of internal civil conflicts (Astill-Brown & Weimer, 2010), the latest being the terrorist insurgency in the Northern province of Cabo Delgado. Pitting Islamic militants trying to create an Islamic state/caliphate in the region and Mozambican Security Forces backed by foreign private security contractors, the current conflict has been ongoing for almost three years since 2017 (Matsinhe & Valoi, 2019). In the early stages of the insurgency, civilians were the key targets of attacks by the Islamic and ISIS-affiliated extremist militant group Ansar al-Sunna, a local jihadist group which has spearheaded the insurgency in Cabo Delgado Province. In highlighting the underlying causes of the current conflict in Northern Mozambique, Bonate (2018:1) attributes it to the following grievances:

The discontentment of the Muslim youth is one of the main causes of the phenomenon. Lack of employment, the ‘squeezing out’ of the local population from their ancestral lands by big international conglomerates, and feelings of marginalization, social exclusion, and hopelessness are all real problems that could have prompted the violence. Other possible causes include the loss of revenues from the artisanal mining and illegal trade in timber due to the tighter control by the state and private businesses. Disproportionate use of force by the police and private security against young people involved in these activities, along with other abuses, might have contributed as well.

Ansar al-Sunna follows a radical interpretation of Islamic fundamentalism (Habibe et al, 2018). It was allegedly founded by followers of the Kenyan radical

Islamic cleric and Al-Shabaab sympathizer, Aboud Rogo Mohammed, who is believed to have been the brains behind the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam bombings of the US Embassy in 1998 (Financial Times, 2018). Following the death of Aboud Rogo Mohammed in 2012, some of his followers moved south to Tanzania's Kibiti District in 2015 and established networks for drug smuggling to support fighters and acquire weapons for terror operations (Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2016). They switched operations from Kibiti in Tanzania to Cabo Delgado in Northern Mozambique, where the group is reported to have linked up with the local insurgent groups.

Ansar Al-Sunna: The Face of Terrorism in Cabo Delgado

The history of Ansar Al-Sunna can be traced to 2015 when the group started as a religious organisation in Mocimboa da Praia, one of the districts of Cabo Delgado Province (Agencia de Informacao de Mocambique, 2018; Bukarti & Munasinghe, 2020). The group was founded by a group of young men, some of whom had studied abroad at Islamic schools in Somalia or were connected to Salafi groups in Tanzania and Kenya. The original name of the group was Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jamaa (ASWJ), meaning 'Adherents to the Tradition of Prophet Mohammad and the Community' and the group preached a puritanical version of Islam (Bukarti & Munasinghe, 2020). The group introduced new teachings which were contrary to the traditional Sufi teachings, which the majority of the Mozambican Muslims follow. The group's criticism of Sufis led to serious Sufi-Salafi tensions in Cabo Delgado, with each side trying to justify and present its version of Islam as the correct interpretation of Islam (Ibid).

The escalation of sectarian tensions resulted in ASWJ falling into dispute with the government over its radical interpretation of Islam and characterisation of Sunni Muslims, and more so when the group incorporated followers of Aboud Rogo Mohammed, the leader of al-Hijira, a Kenyan group affiliated to al-Shabaab in Somalia (Bukarti & Munasinghe, 2020; West, 2018, p. 5). Rogo Mohammed, who was killed in an assassination in 2012, had been put on the UN and US sanctions list for his links with al-Shabaab as well as for fundraising and recruitment of Swahili-speaking fighters (Bukarti & Munasinghe, 2020).

After Rogo's death the resultant clashes between his followers and Kenyan authorities led to some of his supporters joining Al-Shabaab while others moved south into Tanzania and subsequently reached Cabo Delgado to join ASWJ in 2016. With the continued fight against Mozambican authorities and Sufi Muslims, the amalgamated group transformed itself into Ansar al-Sunna, called for a declaration of Sharia law in the province and refused to recognise Mozambican law on the grounds that it was un-Islamic (Bukarti & Munasinghe, 2020). Similar to Boko

Haram in Nigeria, the group has rejected state institutions such as schools and hospitals, and has also refused to pay taxes as well as voting in elections or sending children to state-run schools. The group has also declared its intention to overthrow the Mozambican Government and replace it with a society that adheres to Sharia law (Opperman, 2018).

Diffusion of Terrorism through Foreign Connections

Pirio et al (2018) postulate that Northern Mozambique's new militant Islamic group raises concerns about the impact of radical jihadist ideology, social and economic marginalization of local Muslim communities and a heavy handedness in security response. They claim that the leadership of the group seems to be motivated by foreign Jihadism, holding common goals and priorities, such as creating an Islamic state after Sharia and shunning the secular education system of government (Ali-Koor, 2016).

The link between Ansar al-Sunna and ISIS can be traced to April 2018 when 90 Al-Shabaab members defected to ISIS and infiltrated Mozambique through the Islands of Zanzibar and Tanzania (Bukarti & Munasinghe, 2020:7). Two months later ISIS claimed responsibility for an attack in Mozambique and several more subsequent attacks. This connection with ISIS has been evident through the growth of Ansar al-Sunna's continued improvement in strength, weaponry, violence and propaganda since the first attack in October 2017. The acknowledgement by the IS Group of its involvement in the conflict in Cabo Delgado (Long Wall Journal, 2019; Weiss, 2019) bears testimony to the potential for diffusion of the operations of Ansar al-Sunna beyond Cabo Delgado Province.

The traditional media for the propagation of terrorism by terrorist groups has been through the use of newspapers, pamphlets, books and manifestos, however, the mass media and Internet have gained traction as vessels for the spread of terrorism internationally (Chicoine, 2019; White, 2020). Chicoine (2019:1) confirms the ISIS's use of Internet platforms such as Twitter and YouTube to reach a wider global audience and its ability to attract foreign recruits and inspire domestic acts of terrorism. While there has been no evidence directly linking IS and Ansar al-Sunna, the rapid spread of the group's operations in most districts of Cabo Delgado since the first attack in October 2017 in Mocimboa da Praia District, coupled with the increased sophistication in weaponry and the boldness of the group to face the Mozambican Security Forces head-on in some operations, and the willingness of the local youths to join the group point to the group's possible support from IS. Affiliation to ISIS allows Ansar al-Sunna to be recognised both regionally and internationally as a viable Islamic actor, and guarantees the group of a constant

supply of funding to recruit and sustain their operations (Bukarti & Munasinghe, 2020). Notwithstanding the IS link however, the Jihadist group could also be engaged in some other subtle forms of propaganda or mobilisation for support, which is a subject for further study.

The insurgency in Cabo Delgado is concentrated in districts bordering Tanzania, and KiSwahili is one of the ‘lingua franca’ of the Jihadists, connecting them up the East African coast and into Eastern DRC (Vines, 2020). This linkage has facilitated the rampant movement of the insurgents across national borders, some of which are themselves porous in some places. This in turn may facilitate the diffusion of the insurgency. The openness of the Indian Ocean waters and the coastline of Cabo Delgado also provide ease of movement between Mozambique and the border areas of Tanzania, which can facilitate the diffusion of terrorist insurgency between the two countries.

MITIGATORY MEASURES

The Government of Mozambique has been making efforts to contain the spread of the terrorist insurgency in Cabo Delgado since its genesis in October 2017, albeit without success. In June 2019, the Government of Mozambique also declared an alliance with the Islamic Council of Mozambique (CISLAMO) in order to resolve the conflict in Cabo Delgado by countering the recruitment efforts of the violent extremists (Bonate, 2019). In her analysis of the situation in Cabo Delgado, Bonate points out that CISLAMO has always been an interested party to the ongoing conflict, and is one of the institutions which the insurgents are fighting against. Hence the chances for this effort to succeed are slim.

In 2018 the Government of Mozambique enacted a new law, the “Legal Regime for Repression and Combating of Terrorism”, which provides for the punishment of anyone found committing, planning or participating in terrorist acts, as well as for those who provide or receive training for terrorist purposes. It also provides for the punishment of those who travel or attempt to travel to join a terrorist organisation, as well as those who assist in such travel (Bukarti & Munasinghe, 2020).

The country has incorporated the services of private security entities and also entered into a number of bilateral and multilateral arrangements with state and non-state parties to increase surveillance of its borders as well as assisting its Defence and Security Forces to deal with the terrorist insurgency. Specifically Rwanda and SADC have deployed troops to counter the terrorist insurgency, while the UN, AU, EU, USA, UK and Portugal have pledged logistical support to Mozambique for the counter terrorism effort.

FINDINGS

The article came up with the following findings:

- The terrorist insurgency in Mozambique is a result of some underlying socio-political grievances which the Government needs to understand and address so that they do not impede international investment and development of the region.
- While the origin of the terrorist insurgency is internal in nature, it has been influenced by external extremist elements (Bonate, 2018), most notably ISIS, whose involvement in Mozambique has contributed to the escalation of the situation since its onset in 2017.
- The Mozambique Defence and Security Forces did not timeously call for regional and international support as the initial attacks were considered criminal offences rather than terrorist insurgency. Hence they were unable to effectively deal with the insurgency before it could spread to most districts of Cabo Delgado Province.
- The international community, particularly the UN, AU, SADC, the EU, USA, and Rwanda, among others, have committed resources, both human and material, to support Mozambique in dealing with the terrorist insurgency.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In order to curtail the potential escalation of the terrorist insurgency in northern Mozambique and beyond borders, it is recommended that:

- The ongoing offensive operations by the Rwandan, SADC and Mozambican forces should be well coordinated so that the activities of the terrorist insurgents are neutralised in a holistic manner.
- With the pledged support from the international community, the Government of Mozambique should capacitate its Defence and Security Forces so that they can be able to relocate the internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, as well as protect the liberated zones after the withdrawal of the intervention forces.
- The Government of Mozambique should make a deliberate effort to address the underlying grievances of the people of Cabo Delgado, particularly to do with alleged issues of marginalisation, underdevelopment and religious differences.

- The SADC region should fully implement the Regional Counter Terrorism Strategy of 2015 at regional and national levels to deal decisively with the emerging threat of terrorism. In this regard the SADC Standby Force should be fully capacitated and deployable at short notice for counter terrorism and stabilisation operations in SADC Member States, in coordination with other international partners.

CONCLUSION

The terrorist insurgency in Northern Mozambique has been ongoing since October 2017. While the conflict is essentially an internal matter for Mozambique with regards to its origin and underlying causes, a number of external players and influences have made the situation more complex. The situation has since assumed extreme and transnational proportions, with ISIS openly acknowledging its support for the local Islamist group, Ansar al-Sunna. With the Defence and Security Forces of Mozambique evidently overwhelmed by the situation, which has now spread to almost the entire province of Cabo Delgado, the intervention by forces from Rwandan and SADC forces could not have come at a better time. The involvement of ISIS and other external players complicates an already volatile situation characterised by socio-political, economic and religious underpinnings. It should also be noted that ISIS could be pursuing a strategic agenda to establish a safe haven or caliphate in Southern Africa after its recent setbacks in Syria, and such an agenda could be embedded in its sponsorship of Ansar al-Sunna. Hence the SADC community of States, in collaboration with cooperating international partners, should unite to counter the emerging threat of terrorism while it is still at its infancy and before it diffuses to the entire region.

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A FEMINIST-STYLISTIC PERSPECTIVE OF SELECT-NIGERIAN NEWSPAPER: REPORTS ON BOKO HARAM TERRORIST ACTIVITIES

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ABSTRACT

The archetypal deviance-marked representations of suicide bombers who are females on the news, generally suggests and magnifies already existing gender inequalities in a patriarchal society like Nigeria. Previous studies have examined the framing of female actors of terrorism in the media by using different data and theoretical sets. This study, through a radical feminist framework, examines the representation of suicide bombers who are females in news reports of select-Nigerian newspapers. The focus of this study is on the biased framing of female terror participants as terrorists. This makes the study significant. The study is qualitative and derived data from seven randomly selected Nigerian national newspapers: *The Nation*, *Daily Trust*, *Daily Sun*, *Weekly Trust*, *This Day*, *Vanguard*, and *The Guardian*; marked as Appendices 1, 2, 3, 4, 5(a & b) and 6 respectively. These newspapers are among the top ranked in Nigeria, and are hereby presented as a case study. The study reveals that newspaper-frames of the female suicide bomber tend to be gender biased; such that the newspapers, in an attempt to be sensational, specify gender in the reports when it is a female perpetrator. This kind of representation of the female actor is a rhetorical approach to *member* her in a negative active space; and this debunks society's ascription of her ideals. The study also shows that her involvement in terrorism may not have been deliberate, as in the cases of the Chibok and Dapchi school girls-abductees who are used by their abductors to perpetrate terror. The study concludes that the inclusion of the female on the news reports assigns her a bad image; as opposed the idyllic labels: simple, calm and beautiful. Whatever the motive for the habitual mention of the female actors of terrorism on the pages of the newspapers sampled, this study recommends that female suicide bombers should not be regarded as terrorists, misfits or viewed as out-of-touch-with-reality humans. This is because the more the media discriminates against the female as a suicide bomber, the more leveraged she becomes to terrorists as they deploy her services to the detriment of the society she should nurture.

INTRODUCTION

Feminist stylistics is a sub-branch of applied linguistics that accounts for ways in which gender issues are linguistically encoded in texts (Mills, 1996, 2006 and Montoro, 2014). A feminist stylistic study, like this present study, is concerned not only to describe discourses that depict some form of gender-typing and/or sexism, but also explains how readers of a text process meaning vis-à-vis the role linguistic choices play in the creation of gendered meanings in a text (Montoro, 2014). It is by this definition that this study takes this position in the analysis of newspaper reports that represent female terror actors as deviants.

The representation of the female actors of terrorism by the media has taken the same frame as women in politics (Nacos, 2005), women drivers, women mechanics, among others. Modern terrorism, unlike the hegemonic tendencies of patriarchy, has exploited the female by engaging her as an active participant in the perpetration of terror. Before now, in Nigeria, checking for IEDs (improvised explosive devices) was done only for males, especially men before they are granted entrance into the Churches, Mosques, motor parks, market places, banks and so on. This was based on the long-timed myth that women are a weaker sex, caring, non-destructive, kind and should be adorned for beauty. On this, the Nigerian Boko Haram terrorist group has leveraged, using female abductees as scapegoats for operations. The abduction of the girls in north-Nigeria attests to the fact that modern terrorism recognizes the place of the female in terror perpetration. So, even the male terrorists, now, disguise themselves as women to carry out some odious acts of bombing, abduction, shooting and maiming of innocents. As in Appendix 5 below:

Troops nab terrorist disguised as woman (This Day,
Tuesday, 24 February, 2015).

The attention of gender scholars, particularly feminist scholars, have been drawn towards this angle of scholarship where the media becomes specific in mentioning the female gender when it is a female perpetrator. The implication of the emphasis on female terror actors may be based on the media's prejudices that see her as an interloper in a man's space; or it is to debunk the weaker-sex-myth which usually grants the female access into public events without adequate checks. Today,

the story is changing, as more media reports have shown acts of suicide bombers who are females. Thus, as a means of shaping attitudes, media reporters are twisting the perception of media consumers to view suicide bombers who are females as FEMALE terrorists. This is the reason for the consistent addition of the ascription FEMALE as opposed the labelling of MALE to the phrase suicide bomber. This describes her as a “terrorist”. However, it is pertinent to note that, not all female perpetrators, especially the girls, are terrorists. This is because some of their involvements are not deliberate, and their actions are sometimes involuntary. This places them at a disadvantaged position as victims of terrorism, as in the case of using abductee school girls of Chibok and Dapchi as scapegoats. From this labelling, FEMALE SUICIDE BOMBER, the society, gradually views the females from a different lens: as agent of destruction, as she has been incorporated in life-taking activities the males were originally known for.

On the other hand, this study presents two perspectives to the argument: the academic (scholarship) and social viewpoints, respectively. The academic standpoint adds to the growing literature on the feminist debates on equality among the genders, supporting that women like men can be anything; hence the society should not double-victimize her womanbeingness and femaleness, and personhood: as a female and as a terrorist, since this is not the case with their male counterparts. The social perspective presents a perception that argues that female participation in terrorism may not be as a result of leveling up with their male counterparts, that is the equality principle, but may be involuntary, forceful and could be as a result of ignorance. This point is important to note so that girls can be reoriented on the ills of running errands for people they barely know.

THE FEMALE TERROR ACTOR-FRAMES

Gender debates have been over-flogged in recent scholarships. Different perspectives, on the study and development in the fields that relate to gender, have emerged. Some scholars argue on the marginalization of the female while others debunk the notion of marginalization and rather view the place of the female gender as the center. Today, there are also debates on the female’s engagement in terror acts, and the conversation on their depiction by the media is also on-going.

Nacos (2005) posits that the media’s portrayal of the female terrorist has taken the same gender frames as women in politics. She believes that although women have been among the leaders and followers of terrorist groups throughout the history of modern terrorism, the mass media typically depict(s) the woman-terrorist as an intruder (interlopers) in a male dominated sphere.

Nacos also asserts that the frames given to the female terrorists by the media are those that describe them as being out-of-touch-with-reality, aberrant, deviant, anomalous and so on. She adds that most women engage in terrorism out of boredom (p.130). While this may be Nacos' position on women's engagement, this paper tends to take a divergent stance, as the paper contends that female suicide bombers in the Nigerian context are usually either forced into the acts, or coerced into believing there is a reward for their action. Therefore, Nacos' contestation may not be absolute in the Nigerian context.

Auer, Sutcliffe and Lee (2018) examine the white widow frames; using intersectionality as the approach to uncover complex representations of female terrorists in the news media. They assert that what the news media considered particularly captivating in the aftermath of the 21 September, 2013 Westgate Mall massacre in Nairobi, Kenya, was not the devastation of the attack, but the suspected involvement of Samantha Lewthwaite in the attack. The news media created a position for Samantha Lewthwaite at the center of media discourse in Britain for a long time and dubbed her the "White Widow". Auer, Sutcliffe and Lee (2018) argue that the news media both malign and normalize Lewthwaite, representing her participation in terrorism through complex constellations of identity.

La and Pickett (2019), following the same line of argument as Nacos (2005) and Auer, Sutcliffe and Lee (2018), show the different media frames of the female terrorists as they claim that due to their sensational nature, suicide bombings attract attention and are often covered with different lenses. In their study, La and Pickett identified two frames: the liable agent frame – which is the frame given to the female terrorists by the local media, and the vulnerable and helpless girls frame – which is a portrayal or representation of the female terrorist by the international media. These scholars hold similar opinions that the female terrorists have not been well positioned or represented in the media.

Thus, this study corroborates most of the positions held by these scholars, especially La and Pickett's (2019) position, and adds that female gender frames on the media are acts of gender inequality; as these representations depict the female terrorists as intruders in terrorism. La and Pickett's classifications: the liable agent and the vulnerable and helpless girls' frames capture the attention of this study. As earlier argued, female terror actors in the Nigerian context, have these frames; where the immediate society views them as collaborators and deliberate participants, others may consider their involvement as involuntary, as in the vulnerable and helpless girls' frame – the Chibok and Dapchi girls, for instance. La and Pickett's gender framing of the female suicide bombers in the media is one of the catalysts to this present study.

THE MEDIA IN SYNERGY WITH TERRORISTS

The recent upsurge in terrorist activities in Nigeria has given the media some impetus to engage and inundate the public space with reports of terror incidents. Terrorists, in a bid to implement their agenda, utilize media's operations for aggrandizement and propaganda. Some debates among media and terrorism experts hold that media items on terror re-enact terrorism. Palmerton (1985), Milburn, Bowley, Fay-Dumaine and Kennedy (1987) and Dowling (1988), for example, believe that terrorist organizations and the media are "partners in crime". By this, they argue, the media, like the terrorists, are actors of terrorism. This means that the kind of reportage deployed by news reporters serve to magnify the activities of terrorists; and this suits news operators' record sales. For these scholars, this makes the media collaborators of terrorism.

Again, scholars: Nacos (2002; 2006), Rohner and Frey (2006) and Bilgen (2012) have also revealed the synergy that exists between the media generally and terrorist groups. Nacos (2002), for example, calls this relationship a dangerous symbiosis. Bilgen (2012) and Idiong (2012) in their studies on the role of the media for [in] terrorist activities, hypothesize that, the media generally plays a significant role in the publicity of terrorist activities. Specifically, Bilgen (2012, p.1) interrogates the synergy between terrorist groups and the media, and claims that "the architects of terrorism take advantage of the media for the benefit of their operational efficiency". He also corroborates Nacos' position that the relationship between the media and terrorist groups is a dangerous one.

For Umuerrri and Galadima (2012, p.3), as powerful tools for creating awareness, "the media are capable of setting the agenda on issues, thus raising them to the plane of national discourse". From the arguments above, what is seen as one of the aims of the media today is more or less that of "selling gossips"; what the society wants to hear, read and buy. It is no longer the "truthfulness" or credibility of news stories but the rush for gossip in the media market that guides news writing.

Contrary to most opinions, Mbazie and Nnah (2012, p.26) posit that, "the effectiveness of reports on terrorist activities by the media provides the general public with the right to know what is of threat to them...". It is obvious, from this caveat, that with the passing of the right of information bill in Nigeria (RIB, 2014), the public has the right to know events and happenings in the society. However, what Mbazie and Nnah (2012) forget to note is that reporting terrorism is not the matter for debate, and is not outrightly out of place to do so, but the manner in which the media reports terrorism is the argument for scholars. It is against this backdrop that this paper lends a voice to the on-going conversation and asserts that terrorism reportage can be as dangerous as the act itself; as it does not just end at the public

knowing about these terror acts, but also the psychological implications these news reports may have on the news consumers. This is the reason, sometimes, that security agents will want to protect the public from the psychological racket by not allowing reports on terror on the news media.

For Umuerrri and Galadima (2012), since the media wields so much power in society as to determining people's attitudes and reshaping same, it is thus expected that the media demonstrates some form of fair coverage on national security and terrorism in Nigeria. A fair coverage for this study may be understood to mean, reports with a balanced gender tone, reports that do not point accusing fingers to unwilling victims such as the suicide bombers who are females in the Nigerian context. Those females who are not deliberate actors in the act; especially as we can easily allude to the girl-child, as in the cases of the Chibok and Dapchi school-girls-abductees.

THEORETICAL ORIENTATION

Radical feminism is a branch of feminist philosophy, founded on Marxist principles. Radical feminist thoughts oppose oppression of any kind. So that, everything that oppresses femaleness is contestable. The contestations within the feminist ideological underpinnings move towards equalizing the position of the female-beingness to male-beingness. Most patriarchal societies withhold some female rights to existence. They usually define her roles; limiting her capabilities to just a few roles and functions in society. Patriarchy never bends to female aspirations. Thus, feminist radicalisms hold a different view from the patriarchists, and by no means identify the female as inferior to the man, as such must be treated equally. It is appropriate for this study because it best analyzes texts on power play and relations between the genders; and shows how the female gender wants to be addressed and understood.

Vukoičić (2013) opines that radical feminist postulations are based on the notion that most societies are patriarchal; and tend to marginalize and discriminate against the woman. It is a conflict theory that views the society as consisting of opposed fractions between the genders in relation to male's hegemony. The fact that the Nigerian society privileges the male over the female is the cause for this conflict, and this study lends a voice in that regard to say, female suicide bombers in Nigeria are not terrorists, on the one hand, and on the other, they should not be marginalized and unjustly treated and viewed with gender lenses that place them at a tripartite victimhood: as females, as threat to society and as outcasts, even in death.

As a call for the elimination of male supremacy in socio-political and economic contexts, radical feminism considers patriarchy as what bedevils the society and what encourages inequalities and differences in society. Male's continuous oppression of

the female brings about the constant challenge and contestation from the feminist to abolish existing social norms and institutions that oppose female's liberation such as cultural gender clichés, sexual objectification, rape, gender ascriptions and roles, representation of genital differences, violence against women, female gender inclusion on news reports, among others.

The second wave feminist ideologues in the 1960s examined patriarchy as a transhistorical phenomenon that is more daunting than other sources of oppression: racism, political, class, religious, and so on. Radical feminists, Atkinson (1969/2000), Willis (1984) among others have posited that the tendency of upholding patriarchy in a society is meant to view the male as the norm and the female as the other. In our gathering of data for this study, it is observed that, male suicide bombers are regarded as the norm, as the reports do not identify with the gender type of the bomber but do so with the female suicide bomber. It is against this background that this study adopts for a framework for analyzing texts, this theory of conflict, with a view to determining reports that tilt and relegate the females who are involved in suicide bombings vis-à-vis those reports that foreground their negatives in seven Nigerian newspapers.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The purposively sampled data, derived from seven randomly selected Nigerian national newspaper reports of The Nation, Daily Trust, Daily Sun, Weekly Trust, This Day, Vanguard and The Guardian are examined and analyzed, based on a feminist-stylistic standpoint. This study adopts a qualitative and not quantitative method; and the sampling technique is realized by the selection of news-texts that incorporate gender discourse patterns. Even though the newspapers selected are top ranked Nigerian national dailies, data selected do not cover a large corpus that should represent the view of all newspapers in Nigeria. However, this study can be viewed as a reference point for analyzing other newspaper texts that may appear to portray such proclivities in their reportage. Seven Nigerian newspapers are not quite adequate to categorize all newspapers in Nigeria as doing gender in their news report on terrorism. Although, since these seven newspapers are top ranked, and have a wide range of readership in Nigeria, it is, thus, appropriate to hold that “most” Nigerian newspaper reporters mark gender in reports on terrorism with evidence from the reports sampled and analyzed in this paper.

DATA ANALYSIS

Discursivity and contextualities of gender in newspaper reports

The mass media’s portrayal of the females as interlopers, misfits or deviants in the acts of terrorism is obvious in the newspaper reports examined in this paper. This can be seen as a motivation from some cultural gender clichés and labels about the female who is usually described as a weaker sex, second fiddle or sidekick; perpetually at a disadvantage in society. These kinds of ascriptions have further underestimated the levels at which terror can be perpetrated in Nigeria.


Age long societal gender stereotypes have undermined the power of the female for which modern terrorist ideologues have leveraged. Cultural gender representations have their implication on the way the media, the newspapers in this case, handle information on female suicide bombers. Some authors of American news magazine have associated acts of terrorism with male hormones, thus, any female who happens to play the part of a terrorist is classified as a

deviant (Ottoh, 2019). Most times, when a female perpetrates the act of bombing as a suicide bomber, reporters specify by adding the gender type as in the examples in Appendices 1 and 2 below:

Woman suicide bomber kills 30 in Bauchi town strike.
(Appendix 1: *The Nation*, Monday, November 17, 2014).

The portrayal of the female terror actor in the newspaper media depicted in the example in Appendix 1 here reveals some inequality indices as reflected in the inclusion of the gender type, woman.

Analysis of Appendix 1 on the chart shows the act of gendering, thus:



The reporter’s use of the modifiers woman suicide to describe the bomber in Appendix 1 shows or creates a different rhetorical version about what the society

thinks of the woman. The Theme woman suicide bomber is conflated into all three roles of the Subject: psychological, grammatical and logical. This makes the phrase important in the headline-sentence structure. The Rheme, in the chart above, has the Predicator (kill), the Complement (30) and an Adjunct, a prepositional headed adverbial (in Bauchi town strike). The predicator is a Goal-directed material Process, which represents the outer manifestations of the inner workings of the perpetrator (woman); it shows the acting out of processes of consciousness and psychological state of the Actor (woman) who performs the action, kills. See also the following example in

Appendix 2:

Female suicide bomber kills 13 in Damaturu.

(Appendix 2: *Daily Trust*, Monday, February 16, 2015).

The reports above are discussed under the heading, *doing gender* in terrorism discourse since the reports are gender inclined. The inclusion of a specific gender-type, on the leads of the reports vis-à-vis the headlines, shows an act of doing gender. The implication is that of gender inequality. For instance, in comparing our data to other reports on suicide bombing where the perpetrators are males (Appendices 3 and 4) which read: *Suicide bomber kills 47 in boys' school massacre* (*The Nation*, Tuesday, November 11, 2014); *Suicide bomber kills 15, injures 47 in Yobe* (*Daily Trust*, Monday, July 27, 2015), there is no mention or specifying of the gender type, it is just stated: suicide bomber, without gender details, hence, the macro-rule of deletion on the headline. Going by the inductive reasoning, if A then B, one would say the deletion implies that the suicide bomber is a male (the norm); otherwise it should have been specific on the gender type, if female (the other – who is viewed as the deviant).

Contrary to Appendices 3 and 4, Appendices 1 and 2 above, and 5a&b, 6 and 7 below indicate a specific gender type *woman suicide bomber*; *female suicide bomber*, respectively. The news stories in this study specify the gender type when it is female who perpetrates the act. This is assumed to be that since the act is non-feminine, female who are involved in terrorism and suicide bombing are seen as callous or inhumane, hence deviants. In most societies, especially, traditional societies like Nigeria, femininity is often associated with feminine attributes such as being motherly, comely, compassionate, merciful, life-giving and caring; howbeit, the gender specificity on the reports. Another assumption could be that it is a way the media ensnares the readers' emotional appeal to questioning the reason women/girls are involved in the acts of terrorism which are supposedly masculine and alien to the African society. Again, it could be a way that the media wants to expose the fact that females are now participants of terror. See examples in Appendices 5a&b, 6 and 7 below:

There was pandemonium in Gombe and Rivers States yesterday when both states were hit by a series of bomb blasts, one of which was masterminded by a **female suicide bomber** that led to the death of at least two persons...

Spokesperson for the Gombe State Police Command, Fwaje Atajiri confirmed this to reporters shortly after the incident.

He said two persons lost their lives, including the **female suicide bomber**, while 18 others were injured. “Two people lost their lives: the **female suicide bomber** and one other woman, 18 others sustained injuries and are being treated at the Gombe Specialists’ Hospital”, he said (Appendix 5: *This Day*, Tuesday, 3 February, 2015). All bold fonts are researcher’s emphasis.

The repeated use of female specifics on the news reports above accentuates oppressive gender norms and presents terrorism as symbolic of masculinity. From the reports, two bombs were detonated by two different suicide bombers in two different states, but one gender, the female who is portrayed as the deviant, catches the glare of the newspapers for specificity. The report in Appendix 6 below also illustrates this:

7-yr-old female suicide bomber kills 5, injures 19 in Yobe (headline)

Abuja – A **seven-year-old girl**, yesterday, killed herself and five others in a suicide bombing in Potiskum, Yobe State (Appendix 6: **Vanguard**, Monday February 23, 2015).

This report corroborates the earlier claim that these female suicide bombers are not deliberate participants, as it is made obvious in the age of the suicide bomber in Appendix 6. In contrast to this report in Appendix 6, a similar report on *This Day* (Monday, February 23, 2015) avoided to identify the gender of the suicide bomber on the headline but did not fail to indicate it in-text as in:

Suicide bomber hits Potiskum market, kills 5, injures 46 (headline)

Suicide Bomber Strikes Potiskum Market (sub-headline)

But despite the valiance of the Nigerian troops, the terrorists are yet striking, this time resorting to more of suicide bombings as Potiskum, for the second time in a month, witnessed another suicide bombing when a **female suicide bomber** attacked the Global System Communication (GSM) (sic) market in the State’s biggest commercial town.

In Potiskum and the state capital Damaturu, suicide bombers especially **females**, have continued to hit motor parks, GSM market, restaurants and several public places in recent times leaving several lives lost, many persons injured and property also destroyed.

A major phone accessories seller at the market, Yusuf Jubril told ThisDay on phone that a **female suicide bomber** hit the entrance of the GSM market located in the heart of Potiskum town around 1:15pm.

He said. “We saw the **girl** and we became suspicious of her movement and when one of us tried to confront her, the bomb on her went off, killing both of them and three others, while several others sustained injuries and have been taken to the General Hospital in Potiskum” (Appendix 5b: *This Day*, Monday February 23, 2015).

In both reports in Appendices 6 and 5b (as in the ordering above), there is an age factor; indicating that these bombers are children, and this makes our assumption of the girls’ unintentional participation in terror acts accurate. The reports analyzed represent the female suicide bombers as terror actors which makes some readers react in some ways either in fear or shock. These children who may not have known the implications of their actions are dubbed terrorists by members of the society (local media framing); thereby victimizing them in three ways: as females, terrorists (outcasts), and dead.

The consistency in the mention of the female suicide bombers on the news becomes persuasive to label these girls as terrorists. This kind of labelling is consistent in the media and demonstrates societal gender stereotypes. Gender clichés influence the way the mass media constructs news and represents the participants of the news event. The archetypal representation of the female suicide bombers by reporters as deviants or aberrant also suggests that media reports on terrorism magnify already existing gender inequalities such as female subordination and marginalization in the Nigerian patriarchal society. This is also a rhetorical strategy to show the inclusion of the female in a negative active space. Thus, debunking the idea that females are not naturally destructive – a gender label that helps incorporate her in an inactive space. Gender activities and attitudes of this kind usually emerge from membership in a sex category.

Gender typing has both psychological and behavioral tendencies. Gender-display on news reports is a product of social doings and the analysis of the representation of terror on media discourses in this study suggests that terrorism is already gender marked, such that special modifiers as “*female suicide bomber*”, “*woman suicide bomber*” are added to show exceptions to the norm. The news media sees the female

terrorist through prism gender stereotypes. Thus, the conceptualization of gender as a role on reports on terror, displays male hegemonic tendencies with these social practices: power, intimidation, dominance/prominence and inequality in the Nigerian patriarchal context. The report in *The Guardian* below corroborates this view:

28 fear killed in Kano, Yobe blasts (headline)

... In Yobe State, a suspected **female terrorist** with an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) hidden yet in her flowing veil detonated the substance yesterday, killing 16 people at the crowded motor park in Yobe State.

The incident occurred barely 48 hours after a **female suicide bomber** killed herself and five other people with Improvised Explosive Device hidden in her veil at the Potiskum Global System of Mobil Communication (GSM) market in the same state (Appendix 7: *The Guardian*, Wednesday, February 25, 2015).

From the reports in Appendix 7, the newspaper engages in some form of stereotyping, framing the female terrorist as an intruder in a man's space and a liable agent of destruction. This is the reason for identifying the terrorist as a **female** in the report.

On the other hand, Nacos (2005) claims that the woman engages in acts of terrorism because she is bored; "sometimes a woman turns to terrorism out of boredom..., what does a middle-class woman do who doesn't happen to be interested in a career or college?" (p. 130). This assertion can only be true in other contexts but the Nigerian, of which female's engagement tends to differ.

(forced or coerced). So, this study does not substantiate Nacos' position as this may not be obtainable in the Nigerian situation of the abduction of girls and women. Therefore, the inclusion of the adjective, female to the bomber is persuasive and tends to reinforce that females are liable or vulnerable agents of modern terrorism.

THE FEMINIST SUICIDE BOMBERS AS THE OTHER

Gender stereotypes have continued to blossom in the mass media. Since terrorism reemerged in Nigeria in 2009. The entrenched gender clichés of the media have endured in the portrayal of the female terrorist. Nacos (2005) asserts that although the female has featured prominently in the history of terrorism, the female terrorist continues to be perceived as a deviation from already stated norms or status quo. Some news media in Nigeria have joined their counter-parts world over to frame their

reports based on the lines of traditional stereotypes that describe the female suicide bomber as a paradoxical human being. See the example from the news text:

Azare, Bauchi State's second largest town, was bombed again yesterday by *a woman* suspected to be Boko Haram agent.

Sources said no fewer than 30 people were killed in the explosion which took place at about 5:20pm at Kasuwar Jagwal, a popular area in the town... The **female suicide bomber** blew herself, witness said... Sources said the dismembered body of the terrorist believed to have detonated the bomb was picked up at the explosion site. (all italics, researcher's emphasis) (Appendix 1: *The Nation*, Monday, November 17, 2014).

From the excerpt above, the reporter portrays the woman as the other. The reason for the addition of the gender-type is to foreground the deviation from the stated norms in society. While societal clichés about woman limit and confine her to a passive world, the terrorists have deployed the female to avoid being detected on different occasions. This is based on the belief that the feminine nature of the woman poses a non-threat to the society. This becomes the reason readers of reports that are centered on the female terror perpetrators, express some form of shock and disappointment. Already envisaging the reaction of their reading audiences, the newspapers deem it fit to spell out the terror perpetrator when they are female agents. This article, thus, suggests that if women are less or not discriminated against based on their gender, the deception of female terror actors would be revealed; especially when everyone is perceived and seen as human beings who are capable of any evil.

THE FEMININE PARADOX: LANGUAGE AND MYTH IN THE REPORTS

The paradox in the representation of the female in the reports is that women are generally known for their caring disposition. The female nature is believed to be harmless, and this connotes that they are life givers, nurturers, and are usually non-destructive and fragile. However, the deception of the terrorists heightens when the female is co-opted into acts of terrorism as recourse for dealing mercilessly with the opponent (those on the other side). It also heightens the social drama on the terror scene as this lift of material from society contradicts the 'general' belief (myth) of the people. See the following headline report from Appendix 2:

Female suicide bomber kills 13 in Damaturu
(*Daily Trust*; Monday February 16, 2015).

Analysis of Appendix 2 shows this act of *gendering* as the report could have read: suicide bomber kills 13 in Damaturu, but to point to the contradiction of the

female self in acts of terrorism, there is an inclusion of the type of gender. See the excerpt from Appendix 3, where there are mixed genders as terror actors. The reporters say:

Two suicide bombers yesterday hit the gates of the Borno State General Hospital, Molai, Maiduguri, killing themselves and injuring two people (para.1).

One of them, a **female bomber** was said to have blown herself up at the first gate of the hospital at about 11:30am while the second *suspected to be a male bomber* on a bicycle ran into the hospital's second gate, where a bomb explosion had killed five and injured 16 people last Saturday, witnesses said (para.2). Italics, researcher's emphasis.

(Appendix 3: *Daily Sun*; Thursday, July 2, 2015).

The line of argument here is that these two bombers; whether identified as females or males is inconsequential as both are terror perpetrators. That is, whether:

A <or> B = terror perpetrators

The first paragraph in the excerpt from Appendix 3 above, introduces the two terror events at the hospital by suicide bombers without gender inclusion: "Two suicide bombers yesterday hit the gates...". There is no sign of gender here. But paragraph 2 distinguishes between the gender types through the results achieved. There are two different fallacies playing out here: hasty generalization and genetic fallacy. The reason given for the first bomber being a female or the other *suspected* to be a male is insufficient as depicted in the provided pieces of linguistic evidence in: "One of them, a female bomber was said to have blown herself up...", "while the second *suspected* to be a male bomber on a bicycle ran into the hospital's second gate, where a bomb explosion had killed five and injured 16 people...". The term that shows uncertainty here is *suspected*. So, what are those pointers or markers that the reporter/eyewitnesses use(s) to buttress their suspicion?


To answer this, in comparing the levels of damage, the first suicide bomber did not achieve much as it is said "she blew herself up". There are no other innocent victims recorded except for the suicide bomber "herself". But in the second act, the witnesses say, they *suspect*, not that they are certain, that the second bomber was a male. How did they arrive at this conclusion?

- a. From the premise that "he" was riding a bicycle, and
- b. The result of the act which is 21 victims (5 killed and 16 injured).

If the enthymematic reasoning or deductions are based on the premises in (a) and (b) above, then the argument is fallacious; as the witnesses to the report have committed a *hasty generalization* with the assumption that “the suspect was riding a bicycle” hence, a male, and that the suspect recorded a higher level of damage, hence a male; and a *genetic fallacy* that draws the conclusion from the premises that if the suspect were a woman she may not have been seen riding a bicycle or the level of damage may not have been this high. These premises may be derived from the assumptions based on the origins of the woman and the cultural theories that describe her as weak and fragile.

Another implication of the gender inclusion could be based on the media’s objectives about the female terrorist. Identifying the gender type, in this study, may also be to debunk what the society thinks of the woman, more so, to expose the deception of the terrorists in the exploitation of the female by *membering* her into terror spaces. See another excerpt that does not specify gender:

Suicide bomber kills 47 in school boys’ massacre:



(Appendix 4: *Weekly Trust*, Saturday, January 10, 2015).

The above chart is an example of a male terror actor, as the gender is not mentioned. From the caveat, this study posits that mentioning gender on news text is an act of showing inequality and the examples examined have shed light on this position.

CONCLUSION

The reports sampled for analysis in this study show some penchant for the sensational – “what bleeds lead”. The ideological struggle for what is selling on the newspapers has paved the way for the sensationalism of news items. Every media outfit is at the frontline of breaking news to their consumers. The inclusion of the female gender-type on terrorism news reports depict a certain sign of gender inequalities. This is part of sensationalism; as gender is appealed to in the reports in some special ways. In conclusion, all the news sources discussed in this study have the proclivity to represent the female terrorist with an out-of-touch-with-reality frame.

RECOMMENDATIONS

From the analyses of newspaper reports, it is revealed that female's participation in acts of terrorism may not be deliberate and voluntary. Thus, as part of the recommendations of this study, the female irrespective of the roles she plays should be viewed first from the perspective of a human being with rights, and second from the position that she is liable and vulnerable to becoming anything. Hence, she should be identified as a human and not excluded from certain roles that define her as a female; by having her gender-type specified on the reports on terror acts. This paper, therefore, further recommends that as much lies within the production power of the newspapers, gender marking on headlines should be avoided and/or reduced as much as possible, as this may signify some acts of discrimination against the female. Even so, the female involvement in these acts may as well not be a deliberate attempt as most of them are abductees of the terrorists like in the case of the Chibok and Dapchi girls. Identifying her on the headlines may also be an act of doubly-victimizing her. Although, this study is not an advocacy for female participation in terrorism, it recommends that there is need for the newspapers to regulate their reports on female involvement; more so, to prevent their representation as martyrs of a terrorism.

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APPENDICES

- Appendix 1: *The Nation*, Monday, November 17, 2014
- Appendix 2: *Daily Trust*, Monday, February 16, 2015
- Appendix 3: *Daily Sun*; Thursday, July 2, 2015
- Appendix 4: *Weekly Trust*, Saturday, January 10, 2015
- Appendix 5a: *This Day*, Tuesday, 24 February, 2015
- Appendix 5b: *This Day*, Monday February 23, 2015
- Appendix 6: *Vanguard*, Monday February 23, 2015
- Appendix 7: *The Guardian*, Wednesday, February 25, 2015.

THE EXPERIENCE OF TERRORISM IN KENYA: WHAT ARE THE VULNERABILITIES AND STRENGTHS?

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ABSTRACT

The 8 August 1998 attack on US embassy in Nairobi opened a new chapter in Kenya's national security concerns. Henceforth, the country has endured the burden of terror attacks from domestic, regional, and international groups than any other country in the region. This paper seeks to examine why Kenya has been a target of attacks and why some of these attacks have succeeded. It adopts the SWOT analysis (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats) framework to identify the internal strengths and weaknesses as well as external opportunities and threats. The authors argue that among other things, Kenya's perceived association with western powers, instability in Somalia, domestic group-grievances, and corruption within its security apparatus makes the country vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Similarly, the study identifies improving counterterrorism strategies, support from international actors, domestic socio-economic and political reforms as well as growing stability in the region as some of the strengths and opportunities available for Kenya in its war on terror.

Keywords

Terrorism, SWOT, Horn of Africa, Kenya, Counterterrorism.

INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, concerns over national, regional and international security have transformed. Increasingly, attention has been on how non-state actors and ‘new wars’ continue to shape security. Coined by British academic Mary Kaldor (2013), new wars are reflected in the proliferating post-Cold War era asymmetrical violent conflicts between state and non-state networks. In several cases, these violent conflicts are attached to the weakening of the state as a legitimate source of norms. Terrorism has stood out as one of the main threats states have to contend with in an increasingly intertwined and complex international system. Globally, the number of terrorist groups and attacks have increased in scale and intensity (Shinn, 2003) and the events of 9/11 and subsequent attacks in many European capitals including London, Ankara, and Paris have shown that no country is immune to terrorism. Even more concerning is the challenge of trying to eliminate terrorist groups using current strategies (interventions, targeted killings, and extrajudicial processes) which have proved counterproductive. For over two decades of trying to get rid of Taliban in Afghanistan, to Nigeria’s efforts to eliminate Boko Haram, the Houthis in Yemen, and Al-Shabaab in Somalia, represent some examples of failed counterterrorism efforts (Jackson, 2017).

Africa like other regions in the world is dotted with territories under the control of terrorist groups with local and international affiliations. In the Horn of Africa, a combination of political instabilities, ungoverned spaces, fragile states, corruption, hard and soft social bond networks have made the region vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Economic constraints, marginalisation, religious extremism, and radicalisation especially of the youths have given terrorist groups a fertile ground to recruit, train, and launch attacks. Equally, strong ethnic and clan bonds have made it difficult for governments to collect intelligence needed to overcome terrorist groups. Instead, local communities choose not to cooperate with government agencies in reporting terrorists and their sympathizers out of perceived loyalty to blood groups or due to fear that government will not provide protection especially in ungoverned localities.

The consequence of not effectively dealing with terrorism in the Horn of Africa has had severe impacts in the region and this study focuses on the experience of Kenya. It acknowledges that the attacks in Kenya have been a result of regional and national constraints and therefore adopts a SWOT analysis to explore the weaknesses and threats that have made attacks in the country possible as well as the opportunities and strengths the country can rely on to overcome any future threats from terrorism. Combating terrorism is not only a matter of national security but also a matter of economic security as the country strongly relies on tourism and persistent cases of insecurity tend to scare potential visitors to the country.

TRENDS OF TERRORIST ATTACKS IN KENYA

According to the United States (US) reports on Terrorism 2019, the attack on Dusit D2 hotel complex in Nairobi by Al-Shabaab was the worst since 2015 after significant improvements in operations and coordination were achieved within the Kenyan security sector. Al-Shabaab attacks in Nairobi and other urban places mostly targeted civilians with notable use of suicide vests and the other attacks in remote areas of the country bordering Somalia that targeted security officials significantly relied on the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) (United States Department of State, 2019).

Kenya has experienced quite a number of terror attacks chronologically over the years (see Table 1 below). According to official government statistics released by the Ministry of Interior contained in the Note Verbale forwarded by the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kenya in Geneva to the Secretariat of the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee, the country recorded 12 major terror attacks in the period 1980 to the year 2015 (Ministry of Interior and Coordination of National Government, 2017) and several other attacks since then.

Table 1: Chronology of major terrorist attacks in Kenya (1976-2020)

<i>When</i>	<i>Where</i>	<i>What</i>	<i>Why</i>	<i>How</i>	<i>Who</i>
28 Jan 1976	Nairobi	Plan to shoot down an EL AL passenger plane thwarted	Islamic fundamentalism and the struggle against Zionism and US interests	Plotters arrested	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine & Baader-Meinhof
31 Dec 1980	Norfolk Hotel	20 people killed more than 100 injured	Revenge for Kenya's assistance to Israel's rescue operation to free hostages in Kampala	Bombing	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP)
7 Aug 1998	US Embassy	250 killed & 5000 injured; nearby buildings destroyed.	Attack on US Interests	Truck Bomb	al-Qaeda
28 Nov 2002	Paradise hotel & Israel Passenger plane, Mombasa	13 people killed 80 injured; Attack on plane missed	Attack on Israel interests	2 Missiles targeted the plane	al-Qaeda affiliated; 'the Army of Palestine'
Sept 2011	Kiwaiyu Safari Village	Attack on British Couple killing man, abducting woman	Targeted foreigners for ransom	Guns	Armed Somali Men
Oct 2011	Manda Island	French Woman Kidnapped and crossed to Somalia	Targeted foreigners for ransom	Guns	Armed Gang
24 Oct 2011	Mwauras Night Club Nairobi	14 people injured	Deployment of Kenyan forces in Somalia	Hand grenade	Al-Shaabab
27 Oct 2011	Mandera	Ministry of Education Officials attacked 4 died	Deployment of Kenyan forces in Somalia	Guns and explosives	Al-Shaabab

5 Nov 2011	Pentecostal Church Garissa	2 people killed	Deployment of Kenyan forces in Somalia	Grenade attack	Al-Shaabab
21 Sept 2013	Westgate Mall Nairobi	67 people killed 175 injured	AMISOM Retaliation	Guns and grenades	Al-Shaabab
15 – 16 June 2014	Mpeketoni	At least 65 people in multiple attacks	Alleged execution of Muslim clerics	Explosives, machetes, guns	Al-Shaabab
22 Nov 2014	Mandera	Nairobi bound bus attacked 28 people killed	Religious Intolerance	Guns and Explosives	Al-Shaabab
2 Dec 2014	Mandera	36 Quarry workers killed	Retaliation for Kenya Military in Somalia		Al-Shaabab
2 Apr 2015	Garissa University College	148 killed 79 injured	Revenge attack against Kenya	Guns and Explosives	Al-Shaabab
15-16 Jan 2019	Dusit D2 Hotel, Nairobi	21 killed & 28 injured	Retaliation against KDF in Somalia	Operatives storm hotel complex with guns, suicide vests & grenades	Al-Shabaab
16 Feb 2019	Primary school Wajir	3 Christian teachers killed	Religious Fundamentalism	Gun Attacks	Al-Shaabab
15 Apr 2019	Mandera town	1 police officer killed & 2 Cuban doctors abducted	Scuttle government operations	Ambush with firearms	Al-Shabaab
15 Jun 2019	Wajir County	11 police officers killed; 1 injured & 3 Police Reservists abducted	Undercut security operations	IED	Al-Shabaab
26 Oct 2019	Garissa County	11 General Service Unit (GSU) officers killed	Hamper security operations in the region	IED	Al-Shabaab
6 Dec 2019	Wajir County	6 police officers and 4 civilians killed	Instil civilian fear	Gun attack on public transport bus	Al-Shabaab
5 Jan 2020	Manda Bay	3 Americans killed; 2 contractors injured	Response to US moving embassy in Israel to Jerusalem	Indirect and small-arms fire	Al-Shaabab
7 Jan 2020	Saretho village in Garissa	4 children killed; 3 wounded	Target telecommunication infrastructure	Firearm attack/light bombs	Al-Shaabab

Source: Author Compilation

From the Table 1, the main terrorist organization that attacks Kenya is the Somali based Al Shabaab terror group whose impact has necessitated critical (re) thinking and deep reflection on Kenya's security. Cannon and Pkalya (2019: 12) provided a strong argument to the critical question of why Al-Shabaab targets Kenya when they noted that:

“Al-Shabaab targets Kenya more than other frontline states because of the opportunity spaces linked to Kenya's international status and visibility, its relatively free and independent media that widely publicizes terrorist at-

tacks, a highly developed and lucrative tourist sector that provides soft targets, the comparatively high number of Kenyan foreign fighters within the group's ranks, the presence of terror cells in Kenya, expanding democratic space, and high levels of corruption.”

A SWOT ANALYSIS

Kenya's strengths against Terrorism

Kenya is an active member of several international organizations within the United Nations (UN) framework and other global coalitions whose mandates are to eliminate the effects of terrorism, thus, a key actor in coordinating counterterrorism initiatives in the region (Kagwanja, 2006). The country has been able to enhance terror investigations, prosecutions, and incident response measures which have disrupted terrorist activities such as planning of terror, recruitment, and movement of jihadists as part of the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) with the United States. The first of its kind to be located outside the United States, the multi-agency counterterrorism investigative force seeks to share experiences and sensitive intelligence to facilitate counterterror investigations in accordance with international law and treaties and respect for human rights which is anchored in the constitution of Kenya (FBI National Press Office, 2020).

International collaboration is also a source of finance to support critical counterterrorism strategy. In 2016-17, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) reported £1.6 billion was issued in bilateral aid programming to priority countries which included Kenya and Nigeria (Great Britain et al., 2018: 56). The country has also benefited from the US State Department Bureau of Counterterrorism Fund which was launched in Nairobi in 2017 to develop a Public Prosecutor Training Institute (PTI) (Lawyers Without Borders (LWOB), n.d.). Apart from financial support of these partnerships, Kenya collaborates to deny terror organizations the resources to organize violence through its membership in the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group where it is represented by a permanent Director General from the Financial Reporting Center (FRC) established in 2012 (Financial Reporting Centre (FRC), 2017).

Kenya's hosting of the United Nations (UN) Office in Nairobi equally provides an important centre for international and regional coordination of efforts against terrorism. The Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) participation in the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) serves as an important platform to share information and further incapacitate the terror networks together with the regional allies. Leveraging on the country's elaborate multilateral framework to combat terrorism,

Kenya has for instance, co-sponsored UN Security Council resolution 2396 on returning and relocating foreign terrorist fighters in December 2017 (United Nations Digital Library, 2017). The country has thus become a major hub for disrupting the activities of terror organizations such as Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda that threaten international peace and security.

Over the last decade, the country has taken measures to address institutional weaknesses by overhauling police training curriculum and pursuing recruitment of high calibre graduates into the security institutions. Police equipping has also improved and there is better access to quality body armours, specialized firearms, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles and Armoured Personnel Carriers among others. Key legal reform frameworks within the Kenya Police include the National Police Service Commission Act 2011, the National Police Service Act 2011, and the Independent Policing Oversight Authority Act 2011. Collectively, they seek to ensure transparency, effectiveness, and efficiency within the Kenya Police and facilitate better scrutiny by the public, civil society organizations, constitutional oversight bodies and international organizations (National Police Service Kenya, 2019). The recognition that fighting terrorism requires whole of Government institutional approach has also necessitated similar reforms in the justice system with the training of judges and prosecutors on how to handle terror related charges.

Kenya's weaknesses against Terrorism

Kenya security sector has been accused by human rights groups for violation of basic rights of terror suspects during counterterrorism operations. Such allegations against security officials include extra-judicial killings, disappearances, and torture of suspects especially in the coastal and North-eastern regions of the country (Ombur, 2016). Protection of human rights in responding to terror threats remains a steep learning curve for the security sector. The domestic and international legal challenges have raised doubts of a fair trial with terror related cases delaying significantly in the judicial processes (Khamala, 2019). Specifically, legislation of anti-terrorism laws has remained a challenge for the country and has often elicited strong resistance in parliament and outside especially from the civil society. Nonetheless, different groups of Kenyan citizens perceive the process of legislating tough terror laws as the “government’s submissive response to pressures by the US and Britain” the de-facto global leaders of the war on terror. The citizens therefore are conditioned to resist the pressures of both the US and Britain on Kenya. Similarly, it is also plausible that public debate is distorted by elements of the terror groups in the general population.

However, these legislative challenges are not only unique to Kenya because most democracies face difficulties explaining to the citizens the essence of restric-

tive individual and public freedoms that is often associated with most anti-terror laws. Democracies face moral and legal dilemmas in the face of protecting civil liberties, human rights and the rule of law while fighting terrorism at the same time (Gross, 2015). Democracy puts pressure on leaders making it difficult for newly elected democratic governments to publicly cooperate in the fight against terrorism (Whitaker, 2008). The suppression of Terrorism Bill introduced to parliament by the Grand Coalition Government in 2003 to give government more powers to fight extremist groups faced a lot of resistance. Similarly, there was chaos and physical fights in parliament in 2014 when Security Laws Amendment Bill was passed into law amid widespread resistance from a section of legislators because of its “draconian” nature (BBC News, 2014).

The perception of Kenyan public towards terrorism has been a source of weakness. The Kenyan public has been on slow learning curve as some of its sections perceive threats from local armed groups such as Mungiki and threats like HIV/AIDS to be more serious compared to the threat of terrorism (Krause and Otenyo, 2005). The security agencies have taken time off operations to interact with members of the public to discourage them from aiding terror suspects because of social ties especially in the North-eastern regions where Al-Shaabab militants are a menace. According to Amnesty International, police reforms in Kenya remain inclusive because of other contextual and structural barriers. Contextual barriers include corruption and the deliberate disrespect of the law by the members of the police service despite the reforms largely taking a legalistic approach. The strong legalistic approach has also hampered the opportunity to achieve holistic reforms within the police service because of the limited attention to the social and policy development. Structural limitations on the other hand, are mainly within the service itself with resistance towards public vetting and to some extent unnecessary duplications that impact on delivery (Amnesty International, 2013).

The country’s justice system has increasingly become a victim of manipulation by terror suspects who end up spending years abusing the justice system while continuing with the terror activities. The case in point is that of the Akasha brothers who were immediately convicted by the US court for terror links including terror financing, weapons and drug trafficking (US Department of Justice, 2019). They had successfully devised mechanisms of evading the long hand of the law while in Kenya up until when the country decided to extradite them to the United States. It seems the decisions by the country’s bureaucrats to deport terror suspects to other jurisdictions emanates partly from the fears of the weak justice system in the country. However, the deportation, extradition and rendition of alleged terrorists has not gone without challenges with the courts often ruling against the decision to deport terror suspects to other jurisdictions (Horowitz, 2013).

The war against terrorism in Kenya has also suffered from declining public trust, perception, and confidence especially from the minority ethnic communities that largely occupy North-eastern Kenya. Whereas the large part of the Kenyan community perceive the actions of the police as consistent in the fight against terror, the Somalis hold an exception, often accusing the security forces of targeting and harassing them deliberately. Some believe that they are subjected to unnecessary intrusive surveillance, extortions, disappearances, and killings among other human rights abuses (Muibu&Cubukcu, 2021). The anti-terror operation ‘*RudishaUsalama*’ which translates to “restore peace” of April 2014 amplified the cries from the urban based Somali communities that were rounded up and taken to Kasarani stadium for a security screening procedure aimed at weeding out terrorist cells (Amnesty International, 2014). Some scholars have even argued that Kenya’s domestic counterterrorism infrastructure is unevenly built skewing towards a few minorities. Allegations of Kenyan Muslims of Arabdescent becoming main suspects in terror investigations after US Embassy bombing have been advanced in a non-native alienation history notion (Prestholt, 2011). The securitization of Somali refugees “Somalinization” in counterterrorism operations is a derogatory from the doctrine of non-refoulement which is protected by both domestic and international law (Mwangi, 2019).

The AMISOM operation despite registering successes also created a dilemma for Kenya. AMISOM operations are usually inhibited by budget shortages making it ineffective and inefficient. There are critical calls to restructure the force and streamline funding to respond to emerging needs of the liberated areas to avoid recapture by Al-Shabaab. According to the Chief of Defence Force of Kenya, the country has had to unilaterally shoulder many security operations inside Somalia due to the inefficiencies of the AMISOM force, budget and logistical constraints. It is also highly likely that in the event the AMISOM winds up, Kenya security forces will have to devise mechanisms of filling up the gap that is likely to witness a resurgent of the Al-Shabaab. It is from this recognition that the country is only committed to leaving Somalia only when the Al-Shabaab threat is eliminated and stability established (Daghar et al., 2020).

The question of whether the Kenya Defence Forces should have deployed inside Somalia in the first place or just within the Kenyan borders remains an elusive one. It has elicited a huge public debate in the past with some holding that the Kenyan troops should be withdrawn from Somalia and be deployed within the country’s borders. The main proponents of this argument cite international law as having established limits of acting in another jurisdiction. Despite defeating Al-Shabaab from the source being the most critical aspect in securing Kenya and the region, some scholars hold contrary arguments and cite the increased random small scale retaliatory Al-Shabaab attacks in Kenya as the main reason to pull Kenyan troops from Somalia. They label the Kenya

Defence Forces capture and liberation of the port city of Kismayu from Al-Shabaab as merely a suspension of hostilities (Odhiambo et al., 2014).

Questions continue to be raised about the efficacy of border walls in the fight against terrorism with one study claiming that the Kenya-Somalia border wall is simply going to ignite border disputes in addition to separating communities that are bound together by blood (Cannon, 2016). These doubts combined with institutional challenges such as corruption, limited expertise and funds make the Kenya – Somalia wall less likely to achieve the intended objectives. The recommendation is for the country to shelve the desperate counter-measure to other effective interventions that will demoralize the terror groups from targeting interests in Kenya. Addressing the root causes of insecurity and violent extremism in the Northern corridor can be effective and may even achieve the unity and trust among the communities living across the borders making it easier to share useful security information.

Opportunities for Kenya against Terrorism

The spread of social media provides an opportunity for both the security actors, all emergency responders as well as the general public to leverage in defeating the efforts of terrorists. According to a study that analysed the use of twitter during the Westgate Mall attack, the use of social media enabled “bi-directional flow of information” cutting across geographies, cultures, languages and organizations (Simon et al., 2014). With the proper integration and synchronization of information the power of the social media is immense during emergencies such as terror attacks, and hostage takings.

Secondly, Kenya enjoys wide political and diplomatic coverage across the world compared her counterparts in the region. The country has been able to attract allies both in the East and the West thereby creating an opportunity for cooperation in counterterrorism which continues to be highly regarded as very important by policymakers particularly in the context of accessing intelligence and special equipment needed for counterterrorism operations. Through the United States Security Governance Initiative (SGI) where Kenya is one of six countries participating, the country has been able to access US Government assistance to both the military and police (Chalfin and Thomas-Greenfield, 2017). Equally, the United Kingdom, has been assisting in training and modernization of security personnel and infrastructure. Israel has also been among the first responders working side by side with Kenyan authorities to technically support counterterrorism operations.

Thirdly, Kenya should strive to resolve the question of “ambiguous citizen”. According to Scharrer (2018), many Somalis do not question their Kenyan cit-

izenship but rather their “belongingness” to Kenya given that their reference to Somalia, Somaliland, or Puntland in the last decade as their focal identity has been waning. However, their existence withing a grey space within the society that makes them neither fully integrated nor eliminated in the economic and political realms of the society have become a source of frustration especially amongst the vulnerable youths. According to Abdullahi (2014), *“Kenyan Somalis at times naively buy into this national delusion until they are violently awakened to the reality by events like the current exercise (operation usalama watch), and then put in their rightful place. Fifty years of abuse and neglect is too long to endure. But it is not that Kenyan Somalis don’t want to be part of Kenya. It is Kenya that does not want Somalis in Kenya”* As such, the government can seize this opportunity and counter these sort of sentiments by developing mechanisms that enhance the involvement of marginalised groups in mainstream economic and political activities such as participation in electoral processes or observation, better representation in political parties and the civil service, and reform exclusionary public institutions, processes, and laws.

However, perhaps the most important opportunity for Kenya is the cooperation with Somalia. The two neighbouring countries working together to deal with cross border threats and other issues of governance that will result in a relatively stable Somalia will go a long way in addressing the threats for Kenya. Cooperation enabled voluntary return of some of the refugees from the refugee camps in Kenya to areas liberated by the Kenya security forces inside Somalia. These group of refugees are now able to continue with their normal lives in their homes (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2021). Kenya and Somalia have no better option than cooperating on regional issues that affect the stability of both the two countries.

Threatsfacing Kenya against Terrorism

The presence of Dadaab and Kakuma refugee camps on Kenyan soil continues to pose a major security challenge and threat to the country. The government has tried to close the camp on several occasions without success and the Ministry of Interior has continued to engage various stakeholders including the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to close the two camps in manner consistent with the international law and norms. The two refugee camps which collectively hosts more than four hundred thousand refugees mainly of the Somali origin has also faced legal setbacks with the Judiciary ruling against some pronouncements of the Interior Ministry. However, the threats that emanate from the camps cannot be ignored because the two recent largest attacks on Kenyan soil are believed to be organized or aided by individuals inside the camps (Gettle-

man, 2017). Academic opinion is also divided on Kenya's decision to close the two camps with some observers arguing that the decision taken by the country is just but a reflection of the deep embedded structural flaws in the international refugee regime (Cannon and Fujibayashi, 2018).

The issue of foreign fighters continue to pose another dilemma as some Kenyan citizens have been recruited by terrorist groups while al Qaeda and ISIS have also sent foreign terrorists to the country. Despite rolling out domestic counter-extremism programs targeting vulnerable youths, the challenge is yet to be fully addressed (US Department of Justice, 2020). The US Justice Department referred to the case of a Kenyan national who was arrested in the Philippines and indicted on six grounds of terrorism including conspiring to hijack aircraft in order to conduct a 9/11-style attack. Moreover, it's a paradox that Kenyans form a significant number of Al-Shabaab foreign fighters if not the majority which complicates the response from the security in Kenya when confronted with groups that want to return home. The re-integration program faces challenges with some of the Al-Shabaab returnees disappearing without trace a few days later mainly in the Coastal counties of Kilifi, Kwale, Lamu, and Mombasa (Wasike, 2021).

Al-Shabaab rise in Somalia is often directly related to increased radicalization and recruitment of Kenyan nationals to its ranks. The main victims in the past have been the Kenyan Muslim community or recent converts. Al-Shabaab exploits the perceived social and economic exclusion of the Kenyan Muslim community to lure them to its ranks (Anderson and McKnight, 2015). The group has in the past targeted school going children for radicalization thus hampering to a greater extent the delivery of learning programs in the country. It is from this understanding that the government decided to send troops across the border to counter the insurgents in Somalia. Al-Shabaab recruiters with links to Kenya are a challenge for security forces as they are able to easily integrate within the society because of linguistic and cultural connections. The extent of the radicalization is feared to have spread far and wide including potentially reaching youths and other groups that are considered non-Muslim, non-marginalized, non-Somali and educated (Speckhard and Shajkovic, 2019). Al-Shabaab radicalization and recruitment is an issue that goes beyond the obvious Somali and Kenyan-Somali nationals. It brings on board individual elements of socialization in the society. In addition, the ability of Al-Shabaab to camouflage and forge alliances with different terror networks such as ISIS and al Qaeda proves that the group presents a global threat and not just a threat to Kenya (United Nations, 2021).

Youth unemployment rate in Kenya is also a huge challenge making it almost impossible to counter both domestic and international radicalization (Hellsten, 2016). The country ranked 139 out of 181 countries on the 2020 Global Youth De-

velopment Index (Wanzala, 2021). The shrinking opportunities calls for combined efforts in dealing with the issue of youth unemployment. According to Rosenau, (2005) unemployment in Kenya provides a fertile ground for recruitment and radicalization of youths because of high rates of poverty, weak policing, porous borders, and corruption. Although opinions remain divided, several scholars hold that terrorism in Kenya is partly as a result of disillusionment with the internal socio-economic and political marginalization especially of the Muslim minority communities.

The widespread public opinion that Kenya's counterterrorism strategy is imposed by the outside Western powers also weakens the fight against terrorism. Kenya needs to prove that the actions against terrorism are independent and based on existential threats on her interests. It is for these fears that attempts to pass anti-terrorism legal frameworks have faced strong resistance from the civil society and different sections of the Kenyan community who quickly dismiss such efforts as serving the interests of Western powers and not priorities of millions of Kenyans. Newly established security institutions such as the Anti-Terror Police and the National Counter Terrorism Centre are struggling to gain for legitimacy amid claims of being established and run by foreign security agencies with Kenya having little to do with the operations of the institutions (Kamau, 2021). Scholars have even doubted the entire framework of Kenya's counterterrorism arguing that it is a representation of the colonial continuities in the country due to its perceived neglect of critical national peculiarities. Local actors had no place at all in coming up with the counter-terror interventions and strategies leading to possible lack of ownership. There is a need to come up with an "indigenous African counterterrorism" approach within the global counterterrorism framework and for this case an indigenous counter-terrorism framework for Kenya (Oando and Achieng', 2021).

Kenya has to find a strategic balance on the role played by foreign aid and diplomatic pressure on the country's counter-terror operations which is impacting the relationship between the society and the state with unbearable long-term consequences (Lind & Howell, 2010). Studies have shown that foreign donor funding and projects aimed at addressing the root local issues such as conflict prevention and resolution and violent extremism with the view of achieving peace and security through the investments rarely achieve intended purposes with the donors continuing to apply conditions or ignore human rights concerns at the recipient destinations (Bachmann and Hönke, 2010).

The approach taken in the fight against terrorism is also as important as the outcomes of such an effort. The Government of Kenya has been found wanting in its war on terror with claims of targeting some sections of the society like the country's Muslim population in the North-eastern and along the Coastal strip. Some scholars have even argued that Kenya's counter-terror efforts have contrib-

uted to the institutionalization of radicalization and its link to Islam. The country's social construction of radicalisation and violent extremism mainly based on theology and social networks relegates other relevant understandings such as economic and political marginalisation (Breidlid, 2021). Kenya's security responses to the al-Shaabab threats such as the increased policing of Somali/Muslim communities, extra-judicial killings and crackdown on refugees have likely led to the Al-Shaabab problem becoming an inborn problem in the country (Lind et al., 2017).

CONCLUSION

The threat of terrorism in Kenya has long term implications on human security, economic and national security. The dilemma facing the government of Kenya and its partners in dealing with the crisis is that the resilience of groups such as Al-Shabaab have been boosted by the very efforts that are meant to defeat such groups. Indeed, while the efforts stop terrorist groups from operating in the country have sometimes reduced their momentum, in some cases, actions by the government have been interpreted to mean further marginalisation and oppression thus terrorist groups have used these as evidence radicalise even more people. But amid the uncertainty of where the future of terrorism in Kenya is heading to, there are glimmers of hope. For example, the global war against terrorism has seen a sharp decline in the activities of larger terrorist groups such as ISIS and Al Qaeda.

Domestic reforms, including but not limited to introduction of devolved system of government have paved the way for the integration of previously marginalised groups into the country's development agenda thus reducing the communities' grievances. The Kenyan military has good international networks which combined with the country's diplomatic advantages can help strengthen its response to domestic and regional terrorist activities. Other political, economic and security reforms that have been experienced since the promulgation of the 2010 constitution will go a long way in addressing the some of the deep rooted causes of radicalisation in the country. These strengths and opportunities should be further explored and combined with new sustainable strategies of dealing with the problem of terrorism in Kenya.

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TRACING CLASSICAL MUSLIM TRADITION'S DISCOURSE ON TERRORISM

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ABSTRACT

The 2001 USA-led War against Terror targeted groups and individuals in countries predominantly inhabited by Muslims. This tendency produced the allegation that “terrorism” is designed to address Islam and Muslims as perpetrators of the violence. How do Muslims actually perceive themselves in relation to terrorism? While the discourse on terrorism remains infrequent among Muslims, identical concepts on dealing with violent actions consisting of terrors in fact can be found across classical Muslim traditions.

Keywords

Bughat, Fiqh,
Hirabah,
Terrorism

INTRODUCTION

In contemporary Arabic terminology, terrorism is referred to as “*irhab*”, derived from the verb “*arhaba-yurhibu*”. Etymologically, this word means “to frighten, to terrify, to cause an atmosphere of terror, or to strike with fear.”¹ The widespread usage of this term in the Arab world cannot be separated from the effects of terrorism discourse in Western languages, particularly in English and French (Izwaini, 2015: 73-75).² Since the beginning of the 80s, the term *irhab* can often be found underlining the political rhetoric in the Middle East, aimed as a condemnation to Israel’s military actions in Palestine (Holtmann, 2014: 141). The Egyptian government also often used this term to describe the violent actions of anti-government Islamic movements.³

After the September 2001 incident in the United States, the global communities tend to stigmatize *irhab* as a product of Islamic teachings (Ogan, 2014: 27-46, see also Fair and Savla, 2019: 105). Obviously, the Muslim community automatically responds in various forms, from apologetic clarifications, reformulation of ideological concepts, even up to public admissions. This accusation of terrorism leveled at the majority of Muslims is a serious phenomenon, because it also invites public attention to review Islamic ideology, which are often said to be a strong inspiration of those actions.

However, due to the universality of the concepts of Islamic teachings⁴ which manages to last for more than 14 centuries and professed by more than 1.3 billion of Earth's inhabitants, anyone would obviously find it very hard – if not impossible – to find a complete dogmatic textual foundation to the claim that Islam legalizes violence and terror. The widespread hypotheses of this accusation are more often based on extremely biased partial interpretations. They are deployed to justify the idea that the violent terror actions stealing the global public's attention are committed by Muslims (Terrorism Research Initiatives, 2019: 158-185). In this context, the counter-propaganda done by some Muslim elements then are also stuck in the field of conceptual interpretations, reexamining the ideological texts accused to be inspirations for the terror actions through the approach of socio-political and socio-historical analyses.

The idea of correlating terrorism with Islamic elements can be said to be a new phenomenon. Previously, typically violent actions with political aims are viewed as an act of rebellion against the status quo. In fact, these kinds of actions often would be recorded in future history as a fight for liberty, particularly in the period where the global political landscape was dominated by the restructuring and creation of nation-states, from 1920s to 1960s.⁵ Nationalism and religion became the 2 most prominent ideologies serving as the “spirit” fueling these movements (Liow and Arosoaie, 2019: 86-113).

Later on, after the forms of nation-states in various parts of the world have crystallized, a shift in political rhetoric in labeling these mass movement actions occurred. Any action opposing the government that involves violence is then labeled as a “disturbance of security” and “terror action”. At the same time, nationalism is sidelined by religion as the central factor mobilizing these actions. Some of the “successes” achieved by these kinds of movements, such as the Iranian Revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini, assassination of President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, and Hezbollah's militant opposition in Lebanon solidify the assumption that religious inspiration in violent political opposition is a real, important thing. Ultimately, the world's attention is directed at the violent political situation of the Middle East, and the religious beliefs of most of its populace.⁶ It was at this point that a special public attention to Islamic terrorism was formulated.

However, if one observes the ideas that develop internally, the discourse of terrorism among Muslims – especially in the scope of Islamic tradition – is very ‘quiet’ (Fine, 2010: 271-288). The contemporary obsession concerning the issue of terrorism is completely unseen in the tradition of Islamic scientific discourse along its history. In the Qur’an, the term “*irhab*” is never mentioned. The closest we have in the Qur’an is its derivation in the verb form, which appears once, in al-Anfal (8) verse 60 (Holtmann, 2014: 141-142).⁷ Interestingly, the word “*yurhibunahum*” in this verse actually has a positive connotation and intended as an advice. Obviously, it would be extremely naive to interpret that verse as a suggestion to perform terrorism, despite the fact that there are some elements of Muslim community that use it as a justification for legalizing violent actions.⁸

If terrorism is taken to mean, “The use of violence to create an atmosphere of terror among the public for political goals”, Islamic history records the existence of this group action from a faction of the Ismailiyyah sect, famously known as the “Assassins”.⁹ This group, based in mountain fortresses in most of Persia during 11th - 13th century AH was a political organization that splintered from the Ismailiyyah sect that formed a secret society, characterized by an oath of absolute obedience to their masters’ orders and adopting the dogma of murdering every enemy that got in their way. During the leadership of Abu Mansur al-Idjli and Mughirahibn Said, this group even declared that the murder of public leaders was the manifesto of their political goals. Among the famous victims of this group are leaders of Abbasid Dynasty, such as Nizam al-Mulk (485H-1092M) and Sultan Malik Shah not long after.¹⁰

Even though explicitly, the term terrorism was rarely discussed in the traditional Islamic scientific tradition, it doesn’t mean that there is absolutely no related concept in this tradition. A further observation of the Islamic legal tradition, particularly related to concepts concerning the benefits and sanctions of public order (*mu’amalahwa al-jinayah*), yields several terminologies that are almost parallel to terrorism. Concepts such as *hirabah*, *qath’ al-thariq*, and *ahkam al-bughah* are some of the examples of that. An important thing to note is the fact that the discourse of these topics tend to be free from political undertones, due to the fact that historically, the development of these concepts came from individuals independent from the state’s influence, but whose authority are acknowledged by the people.¹¹ Thus, their discussion of these concepts focused more on public order or the social harmony dimension, rather than the perspective of retaining power. This is the factor differentiating the classical and contemporary discussions of terrorism.

TRACING THE DISCOURSE OF TERRORISM IN THE CLASSICAL ISLAMIC SCIENTIFIC TRADITION

Tracing the roots of modern discourse among the Muslims is usually done through analogy with similar issues that had been discussed by the previous generation of thinkers. The field of *Fiqh* (legal tradition) is usually used as the main subject of reference. Every Muslim of every generation believe that all aspects of their life has to always be based on Allah's commandments in Al-Qur'an and the guidance of His Messenger through Sunnah. The tradition of *Fiqh* study operates in this domain, because it discusses the various prescriptions about what should and should not be done by each Muslim, both individually and collectively in performing the entirety of their daily life so that they are always guided by the divine revelations.

True, terrorism is a new phenomenon. However, if we inspect its characteristics and criteria in detail, it would be revealed as a new form of an old phenomenon, repeated in history. Basing the definition of terrorism on US's Federal Bureau of Investigation's version, the criteria of terrorism are: *First*, the illegal usage of power in violent actions. *Second*, causing casualties and losses, along with both individual and property damages. *Third*, causing an atmosphere of terror that disrupts the running of government and public order. *Fourth*, has a political aim, in the sense that the actual targets reach much wider than the victims of the real actions.¹² From these 4 elements, the third point is the most basic element. The rise of an atmosphere of terror is the dominant factor in terrorism.

Violent actions that create an atmosphere of terror or gripping fear among the people had attracted special attention in classical Islamic legal studies, and its legal construction can be found in the discussion about the concept of *Hirabah*. Ibn 'Abd al-Barr (d.463/1070), a Spaniard *Fiqh* expert of the Maliki school, defined *Hirabah* as an action of blockading public roads that causes that road to be unsafe for travel and spread terror by robbing, murdering, and other actions forbidden by God, whether done by a Muslim or not, a free man or slave, and aware of their intentions or not in robbing and killing.¹³ Al-Kasani (d.587/1191) from the Hanafi school equated *Hirabah* with *Qath'al-Thariq* and defined them as an act of assault to the users of a road in order to seize their belongings by force, spreading fear and making people unable to pass the road freely.¹⁴ A *Fiqh* expert of the Syafi'i school, Imam al-Nawawi (d.676/1277) stated that anyone who raises their weapons and spread terror on the road, either in the city or out of it, has to be dealt with by the rulers, because if they are ignored, their power would increase and the crimes of robbery, murder, and general atmosphere of terror would spread further.¹⁵ Meanwhile, Ibn Qudamah of the Hanbali school defined *Hirabah* as an action of openly

armed blockade of the streets for travelers in a desert area far from settlements with the intention to rob the travelers.¹⁶ He stated that his fellow Hanbali scholars actually take a step further and categorize as *Hirabah* every action of street blockade everywhere, and that those performed in intra-city streets are actually more frightening and impactful.¹⁷

From these definition samples stated by experts representing the four main schools of Islamic Fiqh, it can be concluded that the main characteristics of *Hirabah* are the spreading of fear (*ikhfafah*), powerlessness (*'adam al-ghauts*), and the lack of effective security measures to stop it (*ta'adzzur al-ihtiraz*). Concerning these characteristics, al-Nawawi noted that the previous generation of scholars, such as Imam Malik and Abu Hanifah, limit *Hirabah* to incidences happening in isolated and uninhabited areas, with the reasoning that it is in these areas where travelers feel afraid and powerless, while those happening in inhabited areas cannot be classed as *Hirabah*, because the would-be victims can easily ask for help.¹⁸ The same reasoning was also used by Ibn Qudamah when limiting *Hirabah* to incidences happening in the middle of the desert routes.¹⁹ The element of spreading fear and powerlessness as the main excess can also be seen in the rationalization of the majority of Syafi'i-school scholars that exclude actions of robbery and murder inside the city that was caught by the public. Public knowledge of the details of the crime prevents the element of terror and powerlessness from arising, thus disqualifying the action from being considered as *Hirabah*.²⁰

The centrality of the spread of fear and powerlessness as the main factor of *Hirabah* is also stressed by other Fiqh experts, even though by using opposite case examples. Ibn Taymiyah (d.728/1328) stated that a landlord, doctor, or artisan who lured people to come to their business office, to then murder them secretly in order to gain their wealth can also be categorized as *Hirabah*. This secret act of crime, according to Ibn Taymiyah, is no different from crimes that pay no attention to who noticed it, as both create an atmosphere of terror and there are no effective security measures to combat them.²¹ Another example was put forward by al-Kasani. He stated that the majority of Hanafi-school scholars, including Imam Abu Hanifah himself exclude actions performed by women. The common assumption that women tend to not do actions that can cause terror and powerlessness cause similar actions done by women to be not categorized as *Hirabah*.²²

The fatality of its effect makes *Hirabah* different from regular murders, usually referred to as *Qishash*. In the regular *Qishash* law adopted by most schools except Hanafi, a murder done by a Muslim of a non-Muslim would only be punished by payment of blood fine, not a death penalty to the culprit. However, in *Hirabah*, all culprits are treated the same, no matter their beliefs. This difference is because *Hirabah* is no mere interpersonal crime, so the personal beliefs of the victims have no

relation to the punishment given to the culprits. Even figures such as Ibn Taymiyah, who tend to be antagonistic towards non-Muslim, preached a harsh punishment for Muslim *Hirabah* culprits who victimized non-Muslims. According to him, the punishment is not in the name of the victims' families, but must be in the name of the state's authority, because *Hirabah* is a crime towards the common good of the public.²³ Similar opinions were also voiced by scholars of the Maliki school. al-Dardir (d.1201/1786) and al-Sawi (d.1241/1825) implied that if a Muslim breaks into the house of a non-Muslim forcefully, and then the non-Muslim managed to kill the Muslim robber in order to defend their family and wealth, then the murder must be categorized as self-defense.²⁴

Hirabah is also different from crimes involving illegal control of wealth, referred to in Fiqh as *hadd* or *Hudud*. Even though the examples elaborated above depict the element of illegal seizure or control of wealth dominantly, it doesn't mean that *Hirabah* can be equated with other crimes such as armed robbery, kidnapping, or banditry. The motive of wealth-seeking might be a reason why someone commits *Hirabah*, but that's not the main reason why it is categorized as *Hirabah*. The factor of spreading gripping fear and powerlessness is the main differentiating point between *Hirabah* and illegal control of wealth, often referred to as *ghasb*.

In his book, *al-Syarh al-Shagir*, Ahmad al-Dardir cited a definition given by Ibn al-Hajib (d.646/1248) which stated that *Ghasb* is the action of taking someone else's wealth illegally and by force, but not through *Hirabah*.²⁵ Al-Dardir underlined this definition as an 'inadequate' definition, since it requires prior understanding of the concept of *Hirabah*. He stated that this weakness can be covered if the words, "not through *Hirabah*" (*bi la hirabah*) are replaced with the words, "not cause a fear of being murdered" (*bi la khawfi qatlin*)²⁶. From this explanation, it can be concluded that the thing that separates *Hirabah* from *Ghasb* is not in the element of seizing wealth, but in the element of spreading fear. This spreading of fear is obviously not just limited to the victim in the moment of the crime, where they have to surrender their wealth. However, the big effect of *Hirabah* is that it will also spread terror to other people, hampering public order and activity due to the threat to their lives.

Based on this understanding, al-Dardir and Maliki-school scholars after him step even further in their legal thinking concerning *Hirabah*. They also applied the core characteristic of *Hirabah*, the spreading of fear and powerlessness, to other crimes, even when the motive of wealth seizure is totally absent from them. Explicitly, al-Dardir defined *Hirabah* as the action of blockading streets (*qath' al-thariq*), spreading terror there by depriving the people of their rights to cross the road freely, even without the intent to seize the wealth of those passing the road.²⁷ A commentator of al-Dardir, Ahmad al-Sawi made the last part of al-Dardir's definition clearer by stressing that even if the culprits' intentions is merely obstructing people from

freely passing the road, it still counts as *Hirabah*.²⁸ Another al-Dardir commentator, Syams al-Din al-Dasuqi (d.1230/1815) was even more explicit in his explanation. He stated that *Hirabah* is an action performed by someone to spread terror in the streets with the intention to prevent people from crossing the road freely. Even if the culprit has no intention to seize the wealth of those passing the road, as long as they are spreading terror and making other people unable to make use of the road, they still can be punished for *Hirabah*.²⁹ Al-Dasuqi and also other figures mentioned before also focused on the factor of spreading fear and powerlessness in order to label other crimes, such as poisoning and usage of deadly drugs as also *Hirabah*. In fact, both al-Dardir, al-Sawi and al-Dasuqi even seems to acknowledge the existence of *state-terrorism*, when they explicitly count as *Hirabah* the tyrannical actions of the then current governor of Egypt who seized his citizens' wealth, withheld their salaries and attacked their settlements, when nobody can stop those crimes.³⁰

From the above explanation, it can be concluded that *Hirabah* is an extraordinary crime. Its definition is always developed by Fiqh experts to cover criminal acts which tension exceeds normal regular crimes such as theft, robbery, or murder. *Hirabah* has a wider scope due to its excesses giving rise to an atmosphere of terror and powerlessness among the people. This condition is almost identical to the concept inherent in terrorism, an extraordinary crime beyond the boundaries of regular criminal acts.

Consequently, the punishment meted out to culprits of *Hirabah* is also very severe. The rationalization of this severity, according to Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Qurthubi, a Fiqh expert of the Maliki School, is that *Hirabah* is an extremely destructive action then disturbs common life and livelihood. Trade is the largest source of livelihood for the common people, and they need security and liberty of access to participate in it. However, when those 2 factors are disturbed by terror, people would cease their activities and forced to stay at home, stalling trade and disturbing their livelihood. Thus, according to al-Qurthubi, God sets the most severe punishment for *Hirabah*, in order to shame and discouraged would-be criminals, and maintains people's livelihood from ceasing.³¹

The most severe form of punishment referred to by al-Qurthubi is written clearly in a verse of al-Qur'an, which is the epicenter of the entire study about *Hirabah*. The verse is as follows:

The punishment for those who fight God and His Messenger, and strive to spread corruption on earth, is that they be killed, or crucified, or have their hands and feet cut off on opposite sides, or be banished from the land. That is to disgrace them in this life; and in the Hereafter they will have a terrible punishment. Except for those who repent before you apprehend them. So know that God is Forgiving and Merciful. (Q.S. Al-Maidah/5: 33-34)

This text about the punishment for *Hirabah* is extremely clear, and Fiqh scholars agreed on the literal interpretation of this verse. A difference in opinion only occurs concerning at least three matters. *First*, in interpreting the meaning of the connecting word “*aw*” which means “or” that separates each of the four punishments mentioned in the verse. The majority of scholars from the Hanafi, Syafi’i and Hanbali schools interpret it as indicating a sequential order (*tartib*) in punishment. If the culprit of *Hirabah* commits murder without seizing wealth, their punishment is murder too. If they *do* commit murder accompanied by seizure of wealth, their punishment is to be killed and crucified. If they only seize wealth without any murder, then their hand and foot are chopped crosswise, and if they do not commit either murder or seizure of wealth at all in the course of *Hirabah*, then their punishment is merely to be exiled.³² Meanwhile, according to the Maliki School, the word “*aw*” in the verse implied a meaning of choice (*takhyir*) in punishment, which is left to the judge’s discretion. In this school’s view, a culprit of *Hirabah* can be sentenced to death and crucifixion, even if they did no murder or seizure of wealth, because their actions cause the spread of fear and powerlessness, as well as triggering other severe crimes to occur. Imam Malik himself even once stated that someone who only commits *Hirabah* without any murder would spread fear wider and deeper among the people, compared to someone who commits regular murder.³³

The *second* point of difference is the minimum amount of wealth seized, before a culprit of *Hirabah* can be sentenced to crosswise hand-and-foot chopping. For regular thefts, someone is only sentenced to hand-chopping if the wealth they stole exceeds the limit (*nisab*) of a quarter Dinar. Does the same limit also apply to the amount of wealth seized in *Hirabah*? Syafi’iyah,³⁴ Hanbaliyah³⁵ and the majority of Hanafiyah³⁶ scholars, with several qualifications, set the same limit as regular thefts. Meanwhile Malikiyah scholars consider that there is no special limit, because in their opinion any culprit of *Hirabah* deserves to be sentenced to amputation, no matter how much wealth they have seized.

The *third* difference is the question, “must supporters of the *Hirabah* action who do not directly participate in the act of murder and/or wealth seizure be punished equal to those who are directly involved?” The school of Syafi’i states that only those who are directly involved can be sentenced for *Hirabah*.³⁷ Meanwhile, the schools of Hanbali, Hanafi and Maliki states that anyone involved in *Hirabah* will be sentenced to the same punishment, no matter whether they are directly involved or not.³⁸

In the case of someone repenting from *Hirabah* there is almost no difference in opinion. All schools agree in interpreting the verse, which implies that if a culprit of *Hirabah* repented before being captured, and shows sincere regret and serious dedication to change, then the mandatory punishments of death, crucifixion, amputation, and exile will be postponed and left to the domain of “God’s Right” (*haqq*

Allah) to forgive. However, this does not mean that the civil rights (*haqqadamy*) of the victims are ignored. The victims ('s family) can still demand execution and compensation of their rights.³⁹

From all these lengthy discussion, it is clearly illustrated that the connection between the concept of *Hirabah* in classical Islamic legal discourse and terrorism in modern discourse lies in their main element, of spreading fear, atmosphere of terror, and powerlessness among the populace. Then, what about the element of political goals, which is also a main element of terrorism? Does *Hirabah* also involve intrinsic political motives as one of its main elements?

During the era of Umayyad reign and early Abbasid reign, every violent opposition towards the government is usually suppressed using these harsh punishments of *Hirabah*.⁴⁰ Some Fiqh experts in the early centuries of Islam also applied the label of *Hirabah* to armed groups conspiring to commit violence in order to overthrow the government and the Islamic governance system.⁴¹ However, the sentencing of *Hirabah* sanctions for political rebellions is often based on the motive of revenge and eradication. Thus, later on Fiqh experts formulated a new legal concept that separated the acts of political rebellions from *Hirabah*. This new legal concept would later be known as *Ahkam al-Bughat*.

The basis of the legal formulation of *Bughat* is the approach taken by Caliph Ali ibn Abi Thalib against his detractors⁴² as well as based on al-Qur'an 49: 9-10.⁴³ Based on this legal formulation, rebellions only need to be suppressed, and the captured rebels cannot be killed and/or tortured; and after their rebellion ended and they repented, then they must be released with no punishment. They are not held responsible for any murder and/or property destruction committed during the rebellion. They can only be punished for crimes committed outside the aims of the rebellion, such as rape.⁴⁴

At the very least, there are 2 main factors that differentiate an act of rebellion (*Baghy*) completely from an act of *Hirabah*, in the eyes of Islamic law. *First*, an act of rebellion in Islam is usually based on a difference in *ta'wil* or interpretation that is acceptable, at least among the rebels themselves. If the rebels' *Ta'wilis* that their actions are based on the spirit of *amr bi al-ma'ruf wa nahy 'an al-munkar* and fulfilling their duties as a Muslim, then their rebellion cannot be classed as *Hirabah*.⁴⁵ *Second*, the act of rebellion must fulfill the factor of power and preparation, which is indicated by having enough troops and arsenal. Fiqh experts disagree on this limit. Al-Qarafi implies that the minimum amount of troops involved is 10 personnel. However, he stressed that the main consideration is not the raw number of people, but the level of support. The more support a rebellion garnered, the more accepted the basis *ta'wil* of the movement. Thus, the rebellion cannot be categorized as *Hirabah*. Meanwhile,

the fewer the number of personnel/support of the rebellion, the less legitimate it is, and the closer it is to *Hirabah*.⁴⁶

The rise of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS/ISIL) in 2014 has torched the light on the revival of this traditional Fiqh discourse. The group's ability to attract Muslims around the globe using its version of Islamic laws has forced leading Muslim scholars and Islamic authoritative institution to issue counter-interpretation. Using this traditional Fiqh approach, Grand Sheikh of Al-Azhar Ahmed al-Tayeb, for instance, denounced the group's brutality by saying that ISIS had committed appalling acts against humanity and crimes against Muslims and non-Muslims alike and that it had to be fought with force and determination (Maged, 2015). Al-Tayeb based his view on the verse of *Hirabah* which states: "*The punishment for those who wage war against God and his Prophet and who strive to sow corruption on earth is death, crucifixion, the severing of hands and feet on opposite sides or banishment from the land. This is the disgrace for them in this world and in the hereafter they will receive grievous torment.*"⁴⁷ In his denunciation of ISIS, Ahmed al-Tayeb, along with The Mufti of Nigeria Sheikh Ibrahim Saleh Al-Hussaini, rejected the labeling of the group's member as apostates (Asharq Al-Awsat, 2014).

Similarly, 126 Islamic law scholars from across the continents has issued an open letter⁴⁸ to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, criticizing his self-appointment as a caliph and the group's claim of Islamic authenticity and behavior. The 17-page letter is point per point discussion meticulously specifying ISIS' misconceptions of shari'a by referring to scriptures and lying on religious legal precedent as did the traditional Fiqh discourses. The Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) employed parallel method by creating an online messaging center designed to counter extremist propaganda and deconstruct violent ideologies, which was called the Voice of Wisdom: Center for Dialogue, Peace and Understanding (Ansari, 2017). This tendency, then, become a model for countering terrorism in Muslim communities and has been adopted by countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia.

CONCLUSION

Over its 15 centuries of existence, Islam has gathered a rich perspective on responding to societal problems. Thus, as one of the many phenomenons in societal life, terrorism, or a very similar concept, is surely also covered in traditional Muslim wisdom. Traditional *fiqh* discourse is the most comprehensive discourse in dealing with actual societal problems along the course of time. In the case of modern terrorism, an almost identical concept can be found in *fiqh* discourses concerning *hirabah*, *qath'u Thoriq* and *Bughat*. However, in order to determine which of these concepts is the most applicable to modern terrorism, further research is needed.

Some of research findings on global Muslim opinion suggest that majority of Muslim communities favor larger role of religion in their public and political life (Esposito & Mogahed, 2008; PEW Research Center, 2012). This sign of Muslim inclination can be a departing point for governments of Muslim countries to implement Fiqh discourse in resolving societal and political problems such as terrorism and other forms of social conflict.

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ENDNOTES

- 1 Munir Ba'albaki, *al-Mawrid*, (Rembang: Halim Jaya, 2006), page 424. See also Mahmud Yunus, *Kamus Arab-Indonesia*, (Jakarta: Hida Karya Agung, 1990), 6th edition, page 148. Besides those general meanings, the derivations of *arhaba* also have other meanings, such as priesthood, the part of a camel's hump where saddle is placed, a shirt's sleeves, etc. See Louis Ma'louf, *al-Munjid fi al-Lughah wa al-A'lam*, (Beirut: Dar al-Masyriq, 1986), 17th edition, page 282. A more detailed explanation of the alternative meanings of *arhaba* can also be seen in Ibn Manzhur Jamaluddin Muhammad ibn Mukarram al-Anshari, *Lisan al-'Arab*, (Kairo: Dar al-Mishriyyah, 1968), vol. II, page 420-423.
- 2 See "Terrorism" in Richard C. Martin, (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World*, (New York: Thomson and Gale, 2004), vol. II, page 691-693.
- 3 Richard C. Martin, (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World*.
- 4 See reference about Islam's universalism in M. Quraish Shihab, *Membumikan al-Qur'an*,
- 5 See "Terrorism" in John L. Esposito, *Ensiklopedi Oxford: Dunia Islam Modern*, (Bandung: Mizan, 2002), Volume VI, 2nd edition, pages 33-37.
- 6 Richard C. Martin, (eds.), *Encyclopedia of Islam and the Muslim World*, and John L. Esposito, *Ensiklopedi Oxford: Dunia Islam Modern*.
- 7 The verse's text is as follows:

وَأَعِدُّوا لَهُمْ مَا اسْتَطَعْتُمْ مِنْ قُوَّةٍ وَمِنْ رِبَاطِ الْخَيْلِ تُرْهِبُونَ بِهِ عَدُوَّ اللَّهِ وَعَدُوَّكُمْ وَآخَرِينَ مِنْ دُونِهِمْ لَا تَعْلَمُونَهُمُ اللَّهُ يَعْلَمُهُمْ ۚ وَمَا تُنْفِقُوا مِنْ شَيْءٍ فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ يُوَفَّ إِلَيْكُمْ وَأَنْتُمْ لَا تُظْلَمُونَ ﴿٦٠﴾

Departemen Agama RI, *Al-Qur'an dan Terjemahannya*, (Jakarta: Depag RI, 1990), hal.

- 8 There are several scientists that argue that this verse is an argument for the legality of terrorism. This view is also adopted by hardliner Islamic movements, such as the group mobilized by Imam Samudera and other convicts of Bali bombings. Further discussion about this can be found in other parts of this writing.

- 9 This term appears in European history literatures about the Crusades. "Assassins" is a term coined by French historians for this group, which refers to their habit of consuming *Hashish* (a kind of African marijuana) as a medium for ascetic rituals. Ibn Khaldun refers to this group as the "*Fidawiya*". See H. A. R. Gibb & J. H. Kramers, *Concise Encyclopedia of Islam*, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 2001), page 48.
- 10 H. A. R. Gibb & J. H. Kramers, *Concise Encyclopedia of Islam*, pages 48-49.
- 11 Sherman A. Jackson, "*Domestic Terrorism in the Islamic Legal Tradition*", in *The Muslim World*, Fall 2001: 91, 3/4, page 294.
- 12 B. L. Smith, *Terrorism in America*.
- 13 Ibn 'Abd al-Barr, *al-Kafi fi Fiqh Ahl al-Madinah al-Maliki*, (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyah, 1997), pages 582-583.
- 14 Ala' al-Din Abu Bakr ibn Mas'ud al-Kasani, *Bada' I al-Shana' I fi Tartib al-Syara' i*, (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyah, 1997), Volume 9, page 360.
- 15 Al-Nawawi, *Kitab al-Majmu'*, (Kairo: Dar Ihya al-Turats al-'Arabi, 1995), Volume 22, page 227.
- 16 Ibn Qudamah, *al-Mughni*, (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyah, t. t), Volume 10, page 315.
- 17 Ibn Qudamah, *al-Mughni*, Volume 10, page 303.
- 18 Al-Nawawi, *Kitab al-Majmu'*, Volume 22, page 232.
- 19 Ibn Qudamah, *al-Mughni*.
- 20 Al-Nawawi, *Kitab al-Majmu'*, Volume 22, page 233.
- 21 Ibn Taymiyah, *Majmu' Fatawa Ibn Taymiyah*, Volume 28, page 316.
- 22 Ala' al-Din Abu Bakr ibn Mas'ud al-Kasani, *Bada' I'*, Volume 9, page 361.
- 23 Ibn Taymiyah, *Majmu' Fatawa Ibn Taymiyah*, Volume 28, page 311. Some Maliki scholars stated that the punishment for *Hirabah* is "God's Right", in contrast to *Qishash's*, which is "Adam's Right"; see al-Qadhi 'Abd al-Wahhab, *al-Ma'unah 'ala Madzhab 'Alim al-Madinah*, (Mekkah: Nizar M. al-Baz, 1995), jilid 2, hal. 1366.
- 24 Ahmad Al-Dardir, *Al-Syarh al-Shagir*; 2:404, dan Ahmad al-Sawi, *Bulghat al-Salik li Aqrab al-Masalik ila Madzhab al-Imam Malik*, (Cairo: al-Maktabah al-Tijariyah al-Kubra, t. t), Volume 2, page. 404.
- 25 Ahmad Al-Dardir, *Al-Syarh al-Shagir*.
- 26 Ahmad Al-Dardir, *Al-Syarh al-Shagir*.
- 27 Ahmad Al-Dardir, *Al-Syarh al-Shagir*.
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- 29 Syams al-Din al-Dasuqi, *Hasyiyat al-Dasuqi 'ala al-Syarh al-Kabir*, (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr, t. t), Volume 4, page 348.
- 30 Syams al-Din al-Dasuqi, *Hasyiyat al-Dasuqi*, dan Ahmad al-Sawi, *Bulghat al-Salik*, page 404.
- 31 Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Qurthubi, *al-Jami' li Ahkam al-Qur'an*, (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1999), Volume 3, page 88.
- 32 Ala' al-Din Abu Bakr ibn Mas'ud al-Kasani, *Bada'I'*, Volume 9, pages 370-371.
- 33 Malik ibn Anas, *al-Mudawwanah al-Kubra*, (Beirut: Dar al-Fikr, 1986), volume 4, page 428.
- 34 Al-Nawawi, *Kitab al-Majmu'*, Volume 22, page 233.
- 35 Ibn Qudamah, *al-Mughni*, Volume 10, pages 312-313.
- 36 Ala' al-Din Abu Bakr ibn Mas'ud al-Kasani, *Bada'I'*, Volume 9, page 363.
- 37 Al-Nawawi, *Kitab al-Majmu'*, lihat juga Abu al-Hasan 'Ali ibn Muhammad ibn Habib al-Mawardi, *al-Hawi al-Kabir fi Fiqh Imam al-Syafi'I*, (Beirut: dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyah, 1994), Volume 13, page 363.
- 38 Al-Mawardi, *al-Hawi*, Ibn Qudamah, *al-Mughni*, Volume 10, page 308, Malik ibn Anas, *al-Mudawwanah*, page. 430.
- 39 Al-Nawawi, *Kitab al-Majmu'*, Volume 22, pages 242-243, Ala' al-Din Abu Bakr ibn Mas'ud al-Kasani, *Bada'I'*, Volume 9, pages 373-374, Ibn Qudamah, *al-Mughni*, Volume 10, pages 314-315, and Ahmad Al-Dardir, *Al-Syarh al-Shaghir*, 2:404-405.
- 40 Sherman A. Jackson, "Domestic Terrorism in the Islamic Legal Tradition", page 302.
- 41 See al-Jashshash, *Ahkam al-Qur'an*, (Beirut: Dar al-Kutub al-Ilmiyah, 1994), volume 1, pages 508-510.
- 42 Caliph Ali ibn Abi Thalib did not give punishments to the Companions who opposed his government. The Camel War, sparked by Thalbah, Zubair, and 'Aisyah was suppressed, and Ali did not punish 'Aisyah. The same treatment was given towards the rebellion of Syria's governor, Muawiyah Ibn Abu Sufyan, or the Khawarij. See Sherman A. Jackson, "Domestic Terrorism in the Islamic Legal Tradition".
- 43 Ayat tersebut berbunyi:

وَإِنْ طَائِفَتَانِ مِنَ الْمُؤْمِنِينَ اقْتَتَلُوا فَأَصْلَحُوا بَيْنَهُمَا فَإِنْ بَغَتْ إِحْدَاهُمَا عَلَى الْأُخْرَىٰ فَقَاتِلُوا الَّتِي تَبْغِي حَتَّىٰ تَفِيءَ إِلَىٰ أَمْرِ اللَّهِ فَإِنْ فَاءَتْ فَأَصْلَحُوا بَيْنَهُمَا بِالْعَدْلِ وَأَقْسِطُوا إِنَّ اللَّهَ يُحِبُّ الْمُقْسِطِينَ - 9:49.

إِنَّمَا الْمُؤْمِنُونَ إِخْوَةٌ فَأَصْلَحُوا بَيْنَ أَخَوَيْكُمْ وَاتَّقُوا اللَّهَ لَعَلَّكُمْ تُرْحَمُونَ - 10:49.

- 44 Khaled Abou El Fadl, “*Ahkam al-Bughat: Irregular Warfare and the Law of Rebellion in Islam*”, in J. T. Johnson and John Kelsay (eds.), *Cross, Crescent and Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War in Western and Islamic Traditions*, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), pages 153, 160.
- 45 Khaled Abou El Fadl, “*Ahkam al-Bughat: ...*”, pages 157-158.
- 46 Khaled Abou El Fadl, “*Ahkam al-Bughat: ...*”, page 160. See also Syihab al-Din al-Qarafi, *al-Dzakirah*, (Dar al-Gharb al-Islami, 1994), jilid 12, hal. 6.
- 47 The verse is on Qur’anic chapter al-Ma’idah Q5:33.
- 48 Available at <http://www.lettertobaghdadi.com/> accessed on September 9, 2021.

“WOMEN IN TERRORISM: THE PUSH AND PULL FACTORS”

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ABSTRACT

The purpose of the study is to establish the reasons behind terrorist groups' recruitment and use women in their operations, something that was not very common in the past. Desk research was conducted to gather information for the study and it was established that terrorist groups recruit and use women because they are not usually subjected to thorough searches at check points due to some social norms. Women and children frequent crowded places such as markets and places of worship which they can attack and achieve a high kill rate. Terrorist groups usually want publicity and media attention and using women in their missions can help achieve this, female suicide attacks generate eight times more media attention as compared to similar attacks by men. Women can also be used to gather intelligence by dressing as maids and nurses to infiltrate the enemy camp or to seduce military personnel. Finally, the study recommends strategies that can be used to curb the recruitment of women and children into terrorism. It is recommended that more research be done on female terrorism so as to understand it better. Other issues such as education and rehabilitation of former female terrorists have to be considered as well.

Keywords

terrorism, suicide bombings, media attention, infiltration.

INTRODUCTION

According to Carr (2003), Laqueur (2011) and Zalman (2008), terrorism dates back to the biblical times when the Romans were both perpetrators and victims of such activities. It was during these times that other Jewish groups such as the Zealots of Judea and the Sicarri used terror tactics against those they considered enemies, mainly the Romans and Greeks (Merriam-Webster, 1984). Zalman (2008)

goes on to describe terrorism as being as old as humanity's willingness to engage in violence for political reasons. Terrorism continued into the modern times especially during the great war of 1618-48 and the Napoleonic Wars of 1799-1815. During the 21st century groups such as Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Boko Haram in Nigeria, Anti Balaka in Central African Republic and Lord Resistance Army in Uganda began using their religious beliefs to engage in acts of terrorism (Bob Christian, The Seattle Times, 1 April 1996).

Of late terrorist organisations have recruited and used women in their operations something that was not very common sometime back. Terrorist groups have identified advantages of recruiting women into their ranks chief among them being their ability to access the target without much scrutiny and desire to get media attention. It is recommended that the security sector be capacitated to deal with the female terrorists by having more female officers to conduct body searches. Research should also be conducted on the level of female involvement in recruiting other women. It should also be determined if women join terrorism voluntarily and address the reasons behind this. The research seeks to find out the reason why women join terrorist groups and their role in these groups. The researcher found it necessary to do a desk research on female terrorism because no significant research has been done to date and there is also limited information regarding what motivates their involvement (Bloom 2011). This lack of information about the role of women significantly limits the resources and approaches that analysts are able to employ when looking at terrorist events and the threat that each organization will pose (Bizovi 2014). Findings from the study will add value to the already existing knowledge and assist intelligence analysts in counter terrorism.

MAIN BODY

The Push Factors

According to Raghavan and Balasubramanian (2014), women join terrorist groups either voluntarily or through cohesion. Women that join voluntarily do so for political/ideological, economic and personal reasons (Raghavan and Balasubramanian, 2014). Political/ideological reasons include desire for regime change or fear of religious persecution while socio-economic factors range from financial to material benefits. Personal reasons for joining terrorist organisations are the desire to revenge and adventure. Other women are forced or blacked mailed into terrorism as discussed below.

Political/ Religious Factors

According to the Carter Centre Report (2017), women in Muslim communities flee to join the Caliphate so as to escape from Islamophobia, which is an attack against Islam. These women regard the proposed banning of burqa and the physical attacks on them for wearing head scarfs, as a threat to the Muslim community. Such threats make them feel vulnerable and obliged to turn to the Caliphate which they regard as a safe place to practice their religion (de Leede 2018).

Captured would-be Arab women suicide bombers claimed that they joined terrorist groups because they wanted to get rid of Israel in its occupied territory and advance a nationalist cause (Schweitzer, 2006b: 39). For women in Islamic groups that participate in Jihad, fighting against the enemy is similar to protecting their homes and families (Dearing, 2009: 66). Women also join radical organisations such as the Maoist in India for ideological reasons aimed for political and leadership change (Khan, 2006).

Economic Factors

Women can be attracted to terrorist groups if they see that they are likely to gain materially. If women find themselves in a situation where they do not have basics such as food and water and can only get this support from terrorist groups they accept it and get drawn into the group (Dudman, 2018). In Colombia, some women join terrorist organisations after having been promised safety, and education opportunities as was the case with Anne Phillips who had been in the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People's Army (FARC) for most of her life (Brittian, 2008). Anne came from a poor rural community and frequently suffered abuse by a family member. She eventually ran away from home and ended up joining FARC where she was promised safety, and education opportunities. She was trained by this group and was later to recruit other women. She eventually escaped from the organisation after she fell pregnant and was forced to abort her baby. For Anne and other women seeking material benefits from extremist groups such as FARC become an escape route from a patriarch society. Women who join FARC are also assured of financial stability as they are paid a salary of US \$350, US \$ 100 more than the US \$250 which is paid by the Colombian army (S. V. Raghavan and V. Balasubramaniyan, Jul-2014).

Personal Factors

Personal reasons for joining terrorist groups include the desire for revenge after death of a loved one, sexual abuse, escape from stigmatisation as well as adventure.

Desire to Revenge

Terrorist groups recruit aggrieved women who have suffered segregation, sexual abuse and those who lost their loved ones to the enemy. Such women are easy to recruit and can do a good job because of their desire to revenge or get recognition (Bloom 2011). This was the case with the Chechen black widows, the Tamil girls and the victims of gender apartheid in the Gulf States among others. According to Bloom (2011), Iraq has more than 100,000 widows who are victims of war and sectarian violence. Terrorists groups will therefore recruit these women because of their desperation, anger and quest to avenge against the forces that they regard as responsible for the death of their husbands. Studies have established that eighty eight percent of Chechen's black widows lost their husbands during the Russian-Chechen War (Speckhard and Akhmedova 2006, Bloom 2011). Women who have been sexually abused by government soldiers also join terrorist groups to seek revenge (Bloom, 2011). Some of the Chechen women who have been raped by Russian soldiers at checkpoints and Tamil women who have been sexually abused by the Sir Lankan government Sinhalese troops have also been recruited by the different terrorist groups (Speckhard and Akhmedova 2006).

Escape from Stigmatisation

According to Buchanan (2014), some women are attracted towards terrorist groups so as to escape from stigmatisation, social rejection and ostracization associated with sexual abuse. They therefore want to prove to the rest of the world that they are useful to other people, in this case the terrorist groups. According to Lantos (2002) women can join terrorist groups so as to escape from gender apartheid in Gulf States, Algeria, Yemen, and Sudan. These women are discriminated against and face gender discrimination in public institutions such as marriages and child custody. In some of these countries women are not allowed to drive, cannot travel alone and are also forbidden from receiving medical attention in hospitals without the consent of their husbands or male relatives. The system of gender apartheid exposes women to indoctrination and manipulation by terrorists who promise them a better life (Lantos 2002).

At times terrorists target those women who even when they are not discriminated against still feel that they lack a sense of belonging. This, according to Hearne(2009), is the case with regards to the women in Kyrgyzstan. A recent International Crisis Group report indicates that women in this country are recruited to a terrorist group Hizb-utTabhir (HT). The report finds that although the women enjoy relative equality in the newly independent country, there is lack of a coherent national identity which is found in an Islamic HT group. The HT emphasises on 'Islamic sisterhood' and also has gender-segregated HT meetings which enable wom-

en to interact with other women and share ideas. The case of Anne Phillips above is another example of a woman joining a terrorist group for economic reasons as well as sense of belonging.

According to Reyes (2016) women are regarded as dependents and this makes them feel marginalised. A case in point is that of Colleen LaRose also known as Jihad Jane who lived an obscure life committing minor crimes and was regarded as an eccentric alcoholic. She eventually joined an online community that supported Jihad terrorism where she felt welcome and appreciated. Her feelings of marginalisation and access to online community of radical Islamists gave her a sense belonging which she lacked from her community.

Adventure

Some women join terrorist groups for the purposes of adventure, they find the idea of travelling to a different land very attractive (de Leede 2018). This was one of the reasons why some women decided to move to Syria and Iraq were some media houses portray male fighters in a positive light, describing them as heroes who were prepared to sacrifice their lives for a good cause. Some women therefore find it appealing to be associated with such men (de Leede 2018). Other women also want to live with and take care of their fighter husbands in these countries under Islam religion (Navest, De Koning and Moors, 2016).

Coercion

At times women are forced to join terrorism through emotional blackmail or forced recruitment. Recruiters can blackmail females and later force them to join terrorist groups (Israeli Ministry of Foreign affairs, 2002a). In some cases, the recruiters would seduce the young women from conservative society and later blackmail them (Raghavan and Balasubramaniyan 2014).

THE PULL FACTORS

This part of the paper looks at the reasons why terrorist groups prefer to recruit women into their camps. Issues such as their inability to raise suspicion, easy access and invisibility, publicity as well as their ability to raise funds are some of the reasons why terrorist groups are recruiting them. The researcher gives examples of instances where terrorist groups have used women to their advantage.

According to Buchanan (2014), women are generally regarded as peaceful and subordinate to men in their lives and are not usually treated with suspicion. Women are regarded as not being capable of causing harm and they therefore raise less suspicion where ever they go (Schweitzer 2006). Even today women are still trusted and regarded as unlikely candidates for suicide bombings despite the fact that they were responsible for 16% of suicide bombings between 1985 and 2006 (Schweitzer, 2006).

In a study carried out by a Russian magazine a female journalist was made to walk down the streets in Moscow with a satchel clutched around her body and acting in a suspicious manner. She was dressed like a traditional Moslem woman with a scarf and a black gown but she was never intercepted by the Russian police, instead no one appeared to notice her despite the fact that Chechen men were routinely stopped and interrogated by Russian security personnel (Buchanan 2014). In most Muslim societies, conducting thorough searches on women is considered inappropriate and may result in condemnation by women's groups and the conservative populations (Bloom M 2014). Most women therefore find it easy to access their target since most security check points are controlled by men.

Attractive women tend to destruct the attention of the male security personnel thus enabling them to go through check points with little scrutiny (Bloom 2014). According to Harmon and Holmes-Eber, (n.d) terrorist groups take advantage of this loop hole and used women to carry out suicide bombings as was the case with the 1987 bombing of the South Korean Airline. The bombing was carried out by Kim Hyun Hee, a young model and former North Korean propaganda films actor. She played the role of a granddaughter to an older male North Korean spy and the pair struck very little attention. She was able to bypass security checks because of her confidence, beauty and youthfulness (Harmon and Holmes-Eber, n.d).

In another incident in Kenya, three young women dressed in veils walked into a police camp to report a stolen phone, and were not subject to thorough searching (Koigi 2016, 28 October). Once inside the police camp they opened fire and threw grenades and petrol bombs setting the police station alight. These women were young, aged between 19 and 25, and according to the Kenyan government, terrorist groups target these age groups because they are easy to indoctrinate and also regard terrorism as a noble cause (Koigi 2016, 28 October).

In some cases even men dress as women so as to avoid thorough scrutiny. A case in point was the situation Somali in December 2009 where a suicide bomber dressed as a woman complete with lady's shoes and veil managed to detonate an explosive in a crowded Mogadishu hotel killing three Somali ministers (Hearne 2009). Some

women can gain easy access to their target because the security personnel do not have the capacity to interrogate or conduct thorough searches on them (Hearne 2009).

In a related incident in Sri Lanka, a female suicide bomber disguised as pregnant entered a Sri Lanka army hospital and blew herself up successfully killing and injuring a lot of people including the Commander of the Sri Lanka Army (BBC News, 25 April 2006). The woman used a fake identification document and informed the security personnel that she had an ante-natal appointment at the army hospital inside the complex, and was allowed through.

Studies have shown that female suicide attacks have a higher kill rate as compared to those carried out by men because women visit more crowded places such as markets and churches as compared to men. According to a study of five different terrorist groups, attacks carried out by women had an average of 8.4 victims while attacks by men had a kill rate of 5.3 victims (Bloom 2011).

Expendable

Besides their ability to avoid detection and access the enemy camp, Speckhard(2008),says that terrorist groups prefer to use women in suicide bombings as they are expendable. Most women do not have senior leadership positions and special skills within the organisations so losing them will not have a major effect. Matfess (2017) interviewed an anonymous defected Boko Haram insurgent who confirmed this and went on to note that women were cheap and using them would serve the group's male fighters (Warner and Matfess 2017).

Couriers

Terrorist groups have also been used by terrorist groups as couriers. Terrorist groups have developed a Stealth Bra which they use for smuggling small weapons and arms. The bra is made up of material that leaves the detection screen blank, absorbs radar and x-ray making it impossible to detect any weapons. A woman was caught trying to smuggle weapons in a similar bra filled with small weapons in France (Clayton, 13 July 2002).

Besides the smuggling of weapons, Muslim dresses can also be used to smuggle medicine, food and military items. According to Holmes in the Reuters Report, young women in Syria would pretend to be conservative Muslims, dress in long dresses and scarfs which they then use to hide food and other non-food items which they bring out of Damascus to Homs city (Holmes, 25 April 2012).

Publicity

Schweitzer (August 2006), states that the use of women in terrorist attacks especially suicide bombings attracts a lot of media attention which in turn helps publicise the activities of their organisations. Bloom (2005) agrees and goes on to state that the 1991 attack on Rajiv Gandhi, the former India Prime Minister, generated a lot of attention and publicity and also boasted revenue from the diaspora donations. Because of their ability to infiltrate public places and enemy territory with easiness, women have a very high kill rate, more than four times that of men. (Bloom, 2011).

In Pakistan female suicide bombers receive a lot of attention and are regarded as heroines, their funerals are usually attended by a lot of people. They are also idolised and have their posters plastered in public places with some teenagers even placing their pictures alongside those of international celebrities (Bloom 2011). Terror attacks by females are usually reported in more detail as compared to those committed by their male counterparts. The reports usually provide more information on the possible motive of the attacker while those committed by men are associated with the group's motive. Such attacks also increase the chances of the problems experienced by the groups being highlighted in the media. It is often after such attacks that problems such as discrimination and poverty are featured in the media thus encouraging other organisations to also use women (Shedd 2006).

The high jacking of a passenger flight in 1969 received a lot of media attention in a way very appealing to terrorist recruiters (Hearne 2009). The plane was high-jacked by Leila Khaled, a 21 year old female Palestinian terrorist with the Popular Front. The media placed a lot of emphasis on her gender and went on to describe her as the pin-up of the armed struggle, and likened her to Che Guevara.

The publicity associated with an attack by women brings sympathy to the cause of the group. Such attacks are also used by the terrorist groups to manipulate the general population's sense of outrage in the event of the death of the attacker. The general population tends to blame the targeted regime for the death of the attacker (Brown 2005).

Propaganda

Terrorist groups use women for propaganda purposes to attract more recruits, spruce up the group's image and also shame the enemy.

To recruit others

Terrorist organisations such as ISIS use women to recruit others since they have the ability to penetrate the grassroots networks and screen potential recruits (Badurdeen 2018). The recruiters meet their victims through family and social networks where they socialise and build trust with them, promote sisterhood and create a sense of belonging (Saltman and Smith, 2015).

Female recruiters are preferred by the terrorist groups because they are viewed as having motherly love and are therefore able to influence family members for recruitment (Cragin and Daly 2009). They are also able to lure potential male recruits with false promises such as the possibility of finding a bride (Ndungu and Salifu, 2017).

According to Bloom (2018), female recruiters are able to lower the potential recruit's guard and allay their suspicion. This was the case with Susan who was recruited by an AlShabaab female recruiter after responding to a job advert. The recruiter was friendly, created a rapport and built trust making her very comfortable (Badurdeen 2018). The recruiter later drugged her and handed her over to a terrorist group.

Nora el-Bathy, a 15-year-old French schoolgirl, was also lured into joining a terrorist group by other women through Facebook. She befriended "sisters" who helped her escape to Turkey after she was promised a job helping children and the wounded in Syria (Nailiet al, 2014).

Improve the group's image

Terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda have an online women magazine run by women and it portrays life in Al Qaeda camps as nice and comfortable. The magazine shows women in these camps dressed nicely, eating good food as well as drinking expensive cocktails (de Leede 2018). The impression given by the magazine is contrary to the real situation on the ground (Huckerby 2015). Some of these women even give live testimonies on social media portraying their organisations in a positive light. Through these tactics, terrorist groups are in a position to recruit even more members into their groups. The FARC group of Colombia uses women to mediate in conflict and to also look after orphans in areas under their control among other duties. This gives a positive image of the group portraying it as pro peace, less threatening and more approachable (Buchanan 2014).

Intimidation

Use of women in terrorism serves the psychological effect of intimidating the enemy. The enemy feels vulnerable that no one is safe as even the women who were supposed to be gentle were now part of the attack. Such an attack also sends a message to the entire world that the situation is very dire, it emphasises on the seriousness of the situation at hand.

When an enemy comes across a female terrorist, they become irritable as losing against a woman would be considered disgraceful. In societies where men are regarded as the protectors of the family, the use of women in terrorism has a shaming effect on the men thus compelling them to also join the terrorist groups (Bloom 2011). The men will be asking themselves questions like;

“If a woman can do it, why can’t I?”.

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, the deceased leader of AQI once remarked on his website posting;

“... are there no men, so that we have to recruit women?”.

In religious traditional groups like the Muslims organisations, men are expected to play an active and leading role of protecting the family, these organisations believe in a strong male gendered lead. Terrorists however use the women who are regarded as the weaker sex to shame the male headed households (Bloom 2007; Brunner 2005 cited in Suttan, 2009; Galvin, 2013).

Human Shield

The ISS in Syria used their wives and children as human shields to defend Baghouz village, their last piece of territory just before they finally succumbed to the US backed Syrian Defence Force. According to The Associated Press (AP) and ITV the ISS fighters were said to have placed thousands of women and children on the battle’s front lines to slow offensive advances against them. They deliberately put the women and children on harm’s ways so as to save themselves and the caliphate (Ma, Mar 25, 2019).

In the Philippines, the Maute fighters and other bandits in Marawi City also used women and children as human shield to prevent the government forces from accessing the city which was under their control. The use of human shields forced the government forces to revisit their counter terrorism strategy in a bid to protect

non-combatants. This United Nations General Assembly has since voted against the use of the women and children as a counter terrorism strategy (Ma, Mar 25, 2019).

Gather Intelligence

The fact that women are attractive and create less attention or suspicion makes them useful in gathering intelligence for the terrorist groups. Buchanan says that women can dress up as maids, prostitutes, nurses, teachers and other professionals so as to infiltrate and seduce the enemy to gather intelligence (Buchanan, 2015). According to Cragin and Daly (2009), organisations such as the Irish Republican Army, IRA, also used women to lure soldiers to a remote location in order to kill them. The IRA had a para-military base called Cumann na Bann in Ireland where its female members would seduce the soldiers before they were assassinated by IRA snipers (Cragin and Daly, 2009).

Fund Raising

Terrorist groups such as Boko Haram in Nigeria use women to raise and transfer funds through charitable organisations, sex slave trade and kidnapping (ISS Report, October 2018). The money raised through these activities is then used for other terrorist activities such as the purchase of weapons, medical supplies and food (Ksowski, 19 January 2018). In 2014, women sympathetic to the terrorist cause transferred thousands of dollars to the al-Shabaab militants in Somalia using small transactions and coded language to avoid detection. A total of fifteen women were later arrested across the United States of America over these transactions (Alexander, Nov 2016). Meanwhile in countries such as Palestine, several women including the wives of Pakistani Jemaah Islamiyah leaders have also been arrested for running charity organisations which fundraise for the Palestine Islamic Jihad group (Katharina Von Knop 2007).

Kidnapping for ransom (KFR) is another source of funding for terrorist organisations. According to the Global Counter Terrorism Forum, the use of kidnapping and ransom in some regions of the world has become a threat to peace, security and regional stability. Nasser Al-Wuhayshi, former leader of Yemen-based Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, described kidnapping as profitable and lucrative (Rhode, 2014) while Oumar Ould Hamaha, commander of the Mali-based Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, AQIM, noted that kidnapping was the Jihadist's source of funding in the Western countries (Nossiter 2012).

There is also speculation that the Nigeria government paid ransom to the terrorists to facilitate the release of the Chibouk girls who were kidnapped by the Boko

Haram in Nigeria, in 2014 (ISS October 2018 report). Since women are regarded as gentle and innocent it is easy for the terrorists to demand and receive ransom from sympathisers. Boko Haram also used the kidnapped women to negotiate for the release of their jailed counterparts (Abatan 2018).

The sale of women as sex slaves is very common among the IS fighters. According to Catherine Powell, IS fighters were even captured on video battering for kidnapped Yazidi women at slave market to generate revenue. The Islamic State has also established bureaucracy for sex slavery, including sales contract with potential buyers. The female slaves are used to lure men from Muslim society where dating and casual sex is forbidden.

In some cases terrorist groups have brothels where they keep and use the kidnapped women as prostitutes (Attwood, 25 May 2017).

Child bearers

Some terrorist groups believe that the success and continuation of their cause depends on the ability of women to give birth and raise children who would be tomorrow's fighters. Osama Bin Laden used to praise the women for bringing up children who later became Al Qaeda fighters. He said that women were responsible for raising the fighters who committed the 9/11 attack and those that fought in Palestine, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Chechnya (Lahoud 2002). Umayma al-Zawahiri, the wife of Ayman al-Zawahiri, also encouraged other Muslim women to raise their children to love and defend Muslim territories and properties.

In Nigeria, Boko Haram would impregnate captured women so that they give birth to future soldiers (Powell, 2015). These children are then indoctrinated from birth, so that they grow up being loyal to the organisation. The Islamic state, IS, refers to these children as Cubs of the Caliphate. Women in the Islamic State have given birth and raised more than seven hundred children as a way of expanding the growth of the caliphate (Darden 2019).

WAY FORWARD

The Global Counter Terrorism Unit, OSCE, the United Nations and other counterterrorism scholars have made the following recommendations to prevent women's involvement in terrorism.

Research

Analyse the factors that put the women at the risk of recruitment and design policies that can address these factors (Raghavan and Balasubramaniyan 2014). There are push factors that drive women to recruitment and pull factors that violent extremists use to target and recruit these young women and girls. However, there is limited information on these factors and it is important therefore to gather more information on girl's involvement in violent extremist so as to design effective interventions. Researchers, practitioners and policy-makers across disciplines need to work together to get such information which will then add value to the already existing but limited knowledge on the problem.

Advocacy

Female teachers, community elders, religious leaders, and former female violent extremists can be involved in educating women on the dangers of joining terrorist groups. The education and counselling should address the needs of the women and girls at risk of being recruited. Testimonies of attacks, abuses, and restrictions experienced by credible former female terrorists will be of great assistance in the education. Social media can be a very powerful vehicle of communicating these messages especially to the young urban women while outreach programme would be suitable for the rural population with no access to social media. Since terrorist groups use the internet as one of their recruitment vehicles, potential female recruits should be guided on appropriate response to terrorism messaging-activism on social media.

Rehabilitation

Rehabilitation and re-integration centres for former terrorists should be established and in cases where they are already in existence, they should be gender sensitive and address experiences and specific obstacles and challenges that women and girls may face. The rehabilitation centres should be able to deal with problems such as trauma from assault and caring for children whose fathers are often dead or not present (Cronin, July 08, 2019). These centres should also consider the ways women and girls in particular can exit these groups and develop reintegration options that take into account their specific needs and experiences.

Education

Education can be used to reduce recruitment and radicalization to violent extremism and terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. Education can either be formal or informal and should focus on community engagement, human rights, tolerance, peace and reconciliation. Educating girls and young women reduces their chances of being recruited into violent extremist groups that exploit religion and misinterpret political and historical facts. With an education the potential recruits will be in a position to analyse and challenge these narratives.

Security

There is need to close the security gap of searching women and children during raids and at roadblocks and check points, so as to prevent them from smuggling weapons and suicide bombs which they eventually use to blow themselves up. Afghanistan has started addressing this issue by recruiting and training more female police officers to be used at checkpoints. This will also provide independence, a staple job and useful skills for the women (Cronin, Jul 08, 2019).

Sanctions

Women and men involved in terrorism should receive equal treatment from investigation to prosecution. Women have been receiving lenient sentences based on the belief that they were either duped or forced into engaging in terrorism. The UN therefore calls on its member states to analyse the causes of female terrorism and create more effective counterterrorism strategies. Policy makers should therefore dismiss the gender stereotype and recognise the plurality of women's experiences in terrorism especially in ISIS (Jones, April 9, 2019).

Human Rights

Basic human rights such as right to life and physical integrity, right to liberty and security, freedom of expression, freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief, right to protection, among others should be respected as failure to do so can result in alienation and resentment. Terrorist groups can use these violations to “establish a victimization discourse, justify their acts and recruit new members, including women” (OSCE Secretariat, 12 and 13 March 2011).

CONCLUSION

It is very important for counter terrorism activities to include women as full partners in developing and planning counter-terrorism efforts. In instances where the terrorist groups are promising to give women a voice to their communities and opportunities, it is important to equally empower women in voicing against terrorism. Women can therefore be provided with platforms to counter terrorist recruitment propaganda (The Word Press, 21 May 2019).

The rehabilitation and reintegration of former female terrorist back to society must also include other women. In Afghanistan for instance, Women without Borders, a Non-Governmental Organisation, has an initiative called Sisters Against Violent Extremism, which is currently educating women living along the Afghan border on how to prevent the radicalization of their children, and reintegrate former extremist group members back to their family and society (The Word Press, 21 May 2019).

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BEYOND VICTIMHOOD: UNSC RESOLUTION 1325, WOMEN AND THE FIGHT AGAINST BOKO HARAM IN NIGERIA

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ABSTRACT

There is a plethora of literature on the Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria. Where gender is ever mainstreamed into the analyses, the focus is exclusively on what women and girls suffer in the hands of the insurgents and how they have been passive recipients of humanitarian assistance. Atomized in these existing works is what women contribute to managing the crisis. This age-long academic tradition explains why women are hardly mentioned in extant literature on how wars were fought and won globally. Our paper attempts to reverse some aspects of this problem in the study of the ongoing Boko Haram crisis in Nigeria from the prism of the “participation” pillar of the UNSCR 1325. The first leg of our study relates to how some girls abducted in 2014 by Boko Haram in Chibok organized their escape: first while being taken away by their abductors and later when their hope of being rescued by the government waned. By this act, the Nigerian state had less girls to rescue from Boko Haram through the costly negotiation it engaged in. The second focus is on how a brave woman leads a band of hunters on search missions for Boko Haram members and abductees in Sambisa forest. The third issue is the controversial role played by “Mama Boko Haram” as a go-between the Nigerian state and some Boko Haram members she had a “motherly” relationship with before the commencement of the crisis in 2009. The three issues underscore how women and girls could help themselves to attain some objectives of the UNSCR 1325 rather than waiting “endlessly” for the prescribed state interventions that may not come.

INTRODUCTION

There are three major stakeholders in situations of violent extremism and terrorism: the perpetrators (namely the violent extremists and terrorists), the victims (those who get killed, maimed and displaced in the conflict process and their relations), and the interveners (those helping to manage the crisis). Existing literature on the experiences of women and girls in violent conflict situations are largely framed in victimhood terms. Our position in the present paper is to move the study of Boko Haram in Nigeria beyond the victimhood prism and show that women and girls too contribute to the counter insurgency, no matter how little. The value added by this kind of academic position is that when the history of the crisis is written in the future it would be shown that men did not do everything; women too contributed their own quota to the counter insurgency processes.

The theoretical, policy and global frameworks for our kind of analysis is the UNSCR 1325 passed in 2000 preventing and redressing the problems faced by women, most especially in conflict situations. It has four pillars: (i) participation, (ii) prevention, (iii) protection, and (iv) resolution and recovery. The participation pillar which is particularly emphasized in the present study makes a global call for the participation of women in decision making processes at national, regional and international levels. The pillar particularly ‘encourages’ states and other relevant institutions to ensure that women are included in political decisions concerning peacebuilding, conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction processes. Not many countries fulfil this obligation of enabling the participation of women in managing conflict situations. What then should women and girls do at helping themselves in the context of the latitude provided by the UNSCR 1325? Our paper attempts to answer this question; it has more to do with how Nigerian women and girls got and get themselves included in the management of the Boko Haram crisis even when not officially invited. They are motivated into action largely by their commitment to the responsibility to protect.

BOKO HARAM AND NIGERIA’S UNSCR 1325

Boko Haram is a radical Islamist movement whose origin can be dated back to 2002. Its founder, Muhammed Yusuf, who had been having running battles with the security system in Nigeria for a long time was killed extrajudicially by the Nigerian police in 2009. To avenge his death, the movement now led by Abubakar Shekau, resorted to terror attacks on the Nigerian state. It took the combined efforts of the Nigerian military and the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) to disgorge the group out from Maiduguri to Sambisa forest from where they launch their guerrilla attacks on soft and hard targets across northern Nigeria until recently when it restricted its activities to the border communities of Cameroun, Chad, and Niger. The group is

notorious for kidnapping women and girls which are used as sex slaves, domestic servants, suicide bombers and bargaining chips with the Nigerian state.

The UNSCR 1325 was framed to address the kind of human security crises created by Boko Haram in Nigeria and the Lake Chad Basin countries. That the insurgents still keep some of the girls and women taken from Chibok and Dapchi and have hundreds of others in their custody suggests that more is needed for meeting the expectations of the UNSCR 1325 in the region. How can girls and women complement the efforts of the government in this respect? This is where the “participation” pillar of the UNSCR 1325 becomes very important. It speaks amongst several other things to how girls and women could participate in solving the problems that confront them rather than being perpetually seen as passive victims of violent extremism and endless recipients of humanitarian support in Nigeria. For illustrating this, the following sub-sections of this paper focus on three important considerations: (i) how some abducted Chibok girls bravely escaped from their Boko Haram (ii) how Aisha the brave huntress and other women participate in the search for abductees in Sambisa forest, and (iii) the exploits of “Mama Boko Haram” as a go-between Boko Haram and Nigeria. The call of the paper is for community participation in peace operations.

BRAVE CHIBOK GIRLS

The abduction of Chibok and Dapchi girls by Boko Haram in 2014 and 2018 respectively brought the sect out as a group opposed to women’s rights and the education of the girl child. The rescue of the girls remains a global question today. It has been impossible for the military – whether operating alone or in concert with the international community – to free the girls. Those of them that survived the Boko Haram abduction returned home as a result of the condescending negotiations Nigeria had with the insurgents. As the world remembers the agonies of the girls there is the need to also salute the courage of the Chibok girls that organized their own escape from their abductors. They attained what neither the military might nor negotiation skills of Nigeria could achieve. For this reason, the girls are branded in this paper as “brave victims”. The world needs more of such girls in situations of violent extremism and terrorism. Though what the girls did is very risky this response option helps to further reason around the “participation” pillar of the UNSCR 1325: the need for abductees to participate in facilitating their rescue. Rescue options may not have to be left to the third party responders alone; the abductees have a role to play in helping the process.

The Chibok girls abducted on 14 April, 2014 had no chances of escape from the school where taken. They were captured by Boko Haram members who claimed to be officers of the Nigerian army sent to protect them. They were subsequently load-

ed into trucks. It took them time to realise they had been abducted. Under different circumstance 53 of the over 270 girls later escaped; leaving behind more than 200 others¹. In other words, about 20 per cent of the girls escaped.

How did the girls escape? Some jumped out of the truck taking them to the forest², some ran into the bush at Sambisa while the insurgents were either sleeping or not observing. They trekked for days in the bush before finding help. Some of the girls who stayed with the insurgents long enough to get pregnant delivered while escaping but lost and buried the babies on their journeys³. They all took great risks but what happened to their peers left behind were more harrowing. They were subjected to a life of misery and starvation; converted to Islam and forced to recite verses of the Quran⁴. They were subjected to multiple sexual harassment, forced to carry out manual duties and suicide attacks; sold off as sex slaves to as far as Central African Republic, and even killed for disobeying orders. Some died of snake bites, some fell sick and died, and a few died as a result of friendly fire from those seeking to rescue them from their abductors.

THE BOKO HARAM HUNTRESS

Following the abduction of Chibok girls in April 2014 some hunters constituted search parties for the abductees in Sambisa forest. Incidentally, one of their leaders is a woman named Aisha Bakari Gombi. Her gallantry earned her the nickname, the ‘queen hunter’ in local communities and in the Nigerian media. She grew up at Gombi, a village in the vicinity of Sambisa forest. Before the Boko Haram crisis, she hunted antelopes, baboons, and guinea fowl with her grandfather in the forest and therefore has an excellent knowledge of the terrain where the military now fight Boko Haram. The woman is also believed to have the sorcery powers for freely navigating such a dangerous environment.

Aisha’s passion is for freeing abducted women and girls and liberating her community from the clutches of Boko Haram. Her first rescue mission for the Chibok girls, organized from Daggu, near Chibok was not a total success. The hunters, male and handful of female she worked with, went as far as the spot where the abducted girls were being held. However, they could not launch any meaningful attack because of the limited weapons at their disposal compared to what the Boko Haram members were having. Whereas Boko Haram is powerfully armed, has sophisticated drones and the capacity to down military aircrafts, Aisha only goes on her missions with a double-barrel shotgun. As she said, “We could free them if the military would give us better weapons.”⁵. Her group work more on helping to rescue abducted girls and women and bringing to justice those harbouring them in the forest rather than being involved in full blast military operations.

So notable is Aisha's contributions to the counterinsurgency in the North East that Al Jazeera television had to do a 25-minute documentary on her titled *Aisha: Boko Haram Huntress*⁶. The filmmaker, Rosie Collyer, who spent a year in the North East region following Aisha and the Nigerian army on a number of missions, focused the production on Aisha's incredible bravery and championship⁷. In the film, she complained about her team's consistent inability to procure enough weapons for carrying out their missions. This problem happens probably because though the woman has a good relationship with the military they were opposed to her involvement in any unauthorized operations. What is considered authorized in this respect is when she is formally invited by the military to join rescue missions for abducted women and girls and not when she launches her independent operation. Even then, the woman does not get sufficient credit or reward for her exploits. Calling attention to this problem Al Jazeera observed that "Government troops are quick to call on Aisha for her skills but slow to reward her efforts financially... While she is unable to liberate many more captives held by Boko Haram due to a lack of resources, she will never stop trying"⁸.

Calling attention to the kind of collaborative work Aisha does, Rosie Collyer made reference to an occasion when she was invited by a familiar military officer to join the search for some seven women and four children abducted by Boko Haram from Daggu and taken deeper into Sambisa forest in February 2017⁹. Her team responds timeously to such regular invitations and in the process is known to have facilitated the rescue of hundreds of people, most especially women and children. Their operations also lead to the arrest of several Boko Haram members.



Source:

<https://www.okayafrica.com/aisha-boko-haram-huntress-is-the-story-of-a-fearless-female-warrior-or-fighting-extremism-in-northern-nigeria/>

The documentary provides detailed information on why and how Aisha got into counterinsurgency operations. She was motivated into action by the kind of devastations she saw Boko Haram cause in the communities around her in the North East. She is joined to hunt for the insurgents because of her experience as a professional hunter. She learnt the trade from childhood from her father and grandfather. One of the women in her team, Hamsat Hassan, claimed to have equally joined the band of hunters to avenge the abduction of her sister in 2015. That was the last she saw of the woman. As she said, "I couldn't fire a gun when I asked to join the Hunters' Association in a town also called Gombi, but all I knew was that I wanted to avenge the people who abducted my sister,"¹⁰.

Though a Muslim, Aisha believes in traditional spirit worship. Hence, her team members do not go out on any mission without carrying out appropriate protection rituals. In the forest, they communicate with one another using sign, animal and bird languages. While in the forest Aisha multitasks by teaching the other hunters how to identify medicinal plants and prepare secret potions that protect them from bullets and help to repress hunger and thirst for staying longer in the mission¹¹. She acquired the skills from her grandfather and has continued to use them for the good of her immediate community.

MAMA BOKO HARAM

The third and last case considered in this paper is Aisha Wakil popularly known in Nigeria as “Mama Boko Haram”. She is one of the biggest confidants of Boko Harm in Nigeria; the sect has a lot of respect for her. She helped to circumcise some of the sect members in their infancy and decided to stay close to them since then. Explaining the situation she said: “When I came here in 1989, some of the boys had reached circumcision age. I helped in circumcising them... the tradition here is that after circumcision, you’re expected to kill a chicken for them then use fire or hot water on their ‘something’. So I did all that for them”. She became a “mother” to several of the youths long before the founder of Boko Haram, Muhammed Yusuf, arrived Maiduguri to start indoctrinating them. She visited, cooked for and played with several of the militants when they were growing. The last to join Aisha’s social network was Yusuf, the founder of the Boko Haram. Commenting on this the woman said: “So when Mohammed Yusuf came, my relationship extended to him and his father-in-law. Like it is my tradition, every evening, I cook for people within and outside my home. So every evening, they all troop in here do come to eat”¹². Included in the list of those that benefited from Aisha’s pots were some almajirai (Islamic school children) under Alhaji Fugu, Yusuf’s father in law¹³. In other words, food contributed significantly to building the relationship between Aisha and some of the Boko Haram militants. Commenting on this, she said:

... because I am from the southern part of the country, I normally prepared southern dishes, which Yusuf had always come to eat. In fact, he liked my egusi soup very much, and we became very close when his father-in-law told him that I was the one who cooked the food. So anytime we met, he expressed delight and prayed that Almighty Allah would reward me, for he was eating from my pot and that was how I established a strong relationship with him,”¹⁴

The foregoing notwithstanding, Aisha's main focus was on her "children". She started to notice some negative changes in them when they started to return home late around 11 or 12 midnight from attending Muhammad Yusuf's lectures and preaching. According to her, "Soon, the children began to be conscious of themselves. It was then that the rumour started that they were planning a war. When I heard of it, I went straight to Muhammad Yusuf ... When I realized that Muhammad Yusuf was frequently being arrested, detained and released, I went to Baba Fugu¹⁵ and asked him why his son-in-law was always being detained? But I learnt he was always preaching things the government didn't like and insulting them." She staged a number of protests towards halting the radicalization process; she counsel the youths around her on the need for peace. She continued to counsel the Boko Haram members after they resorted to revolutionary violence. She was quoted during one of the outings to have said: "My sons, I have been begging you since in silence to come out and state your grievances and stop destroying your homeland. Please come out and state your grievances and stop these killings"¹⁶.

Beyond the food she provided them before the escalation of the Boko Haram crisis Aisha is respected for several other reasons. The woman came from the Christian dominated Enugu State in South eastern Nigeria but converted to the religion of Islam when she got married to Wakil Gana a judicial officer in Borno State in appreciation of the man's excellent character. She studied Law at the University of Maiduguri and soon became respected by the society as a human rights activist working with the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) in Borno State as a specialist in Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)¹⁷.



Though opposed to western education, the youth in the Boko Haram movement must have been in love with how Aisha used her legal training probably to help secure the release of some of them detained at the early stage of the crisis. Unlike her kind of educated persons in Northern Nigeria, Aisha was never seen in the public without being fully veiled from the crown of her head to the sole of her feet. So much is the respect they have for her that she helped to secure the release of several persons abducted by Boko Haram simply by placing a call to them. Commenting on this she said: "I have released so many people that were kidnapped. I will just call them and say 'you took my house girl or sister or best friend' meanwhile I do not

know these people and they would be released”¹⁸. It was through her that Nigerians and the international community got to learn that the girls abducted in Dapchi in 2018 were actually taken by Boko Haram and not any other terrorist group.

She tried severally to make the federal government negotiate with the insurgents through her but the efforts were rebuffed. However, she was appointed a member of the Committee set up by the administration of President Goodluck Jonathan in 2013 to negotiate with Boko Haram. The Committee could not meet because of the disagreement between the government and the insurgents about representation and the agenda for the dialogue process. Unable to properly place the woman’s stand in the fight against Boko Haram, the government had to declare Aisha wanted in August 2016 alongside a journalist, Ahmad Salkida, to whom Boko Haram members were always sending their breaking news. Also declared wanted at the time was Ahmed Bolori, alias “Peace Ambassador”. They were accused of being accomplices of the Boko Haram sect. This happened shortly after Boko Haram released a video showing some of the abducted Chibok schoolgirls were still alive. Aisha was believed to have helped to procure the video. The woman and the others were later released.

Barrister Denise Ritchie, a New Zealand-based barrister and founder of Stop Demand Foundation, regarded the declaration of Aisha as being wanted to be ill-advised. Rather than declare her wanted she expected the government to have seen the relationship between the woman and Boko Haram as an evidence that the latter is approachable and would have respected her as a mediator in ending the Boko Haram crisis quickly. She observed that “Boko Haram spokesmen have previously said that they would be willing to talk with the government through Ms Wakil, also known as ‘Mama Boko Haram... So it is unfathomable that to date no one from the Buhari-led government has approached Aisha Wakil to explore facilitating such a meeting. More so, given that in March this year I attended with Ms Wakil, two meetings with Boko Haram representatives in Maiduguri... How is that a New Zealand woman visiting Maiduguri can attend with the woman dubbed ‘Mama Boko Haram’, two meetings with key Boko Haram representatives while the government has made no attempt to arrange even one such meeting through her?... Aisha Wakil is highly respected by many. She is highly regarded by many within Boko Haram”¹⁹. Denise argued that the environment of the meeting that she attended with the representatives of Boko Haram in Maiduguri, including two commanders of the sect, suggested to her that the Islamists are ‘approachable and respectful’ as several issues including the Chibok girls were discussed with them. It was at that meeting that Aisha got the video evidence that the Chibok girls were still alive.

CONCLUSION

The position of this paper is that there is more to the experiences of women and girls in Nigeria's Boko Haram crisis than that of victimhood; they also participate as interveners. The three cases above graphically illustrate how courageous some women could be in situations of armed conflict. The Chibok girls that escaped from Boko Haram could have been killed while escaping but they took the risk. Aisha the huntress took a great risk going after the well-armed Boko Haram members with her double barrel gun. Her case reminds us of the need for governments to get more women recruited into security services. Mama Boko Haram too has what it takes to facilitate a peace meeting between the Nigerian state and Boko Haram but she has not been given the needed safe space. Her case reminds us of the need for government to accommodate more women mediators in their processes. What all of these issues have shown is that given the right support, Nigerian women and girls have a lot to contribute to the management of violent extremism in Nigeria most especially in the contexts of the UNSCR 1325. The Nigerian situation provides some cursory international lessons.

ENDNOTES

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BOOK REVIEW

*Munachi Nice Okereke**

Title of Book: **Terrorism Deradicalisation in Global Contexts: Success, Failure and Continuity**

Name of Author: **Rohan Gunaratna and Sabariah Hussin**

Number of Papers: **221**

Publication Details: **(London and New York, Routledge, 2020)**

Name of Reviewer: **Munachi Nice Okereke**

INTRODUCTION

The book focuses on the various deradicalisation programmes adopted by different countries across the world. Deradicalisation refers to the process of encouraging a person with extreme political, social and religious views to adopt more moderate positions on the issues. The book contains 15 different chapters dealing with the deradicalisation of extremists in different countries drawn from Africa, Asia, Europe and the Middle East. Various contributors highlighted the challenges encountered in the processes and useful lessons to be learnt from the country-specific case studies reviewed.

In Chapter 1, Rohan Gunaratna and S. Hussin provides a background to the book noting that counter terrorism policies have been shaped due to the occurrence of various pivotal events such as the 9/11 attacks, the US intervention on Afghanistan and Iraq, the Arab springs in 2011 and much more. The authors further observed that the use of force on these terrorists can breed suspicion and anger thus the need for the introduction of soft approach to preventing and countering violent extremism. The authors identified the various stages associated with effective rehabilitation programmes to include but not restricted to social, psychological, religious, educational, vocational, creative arts therapy and sports and motivational rehabilitation. Authors also drew attention was also drawn to the role of

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the cyberspace on these terrorist attacks and how the government should help and combat these terrorists and their online supporters. He also mentioned the need to rehabilitate not just the man (terrorist) but his family to avoid recidivism. Finally, the authors outlined four possible challenges the government needs to address to ensure a successful deradicalisation program; first innovative leadership, second, dedicated resources, third, infrastructure and fourth, legal frameworks.

In Chapter 2, Ahmed Nazwan focuses on the United Kingdom's effort to rehabilitate extremists, the author stated that due to the complex and evolving nature of terrorism in the environment, there was a need to make a counter-terrorism effort in the country which brought about the four major components of deradicalisation program; the pre-criminal deradicalisation programme, the mandatory programme, the pre-prison program and the post-criminal space program. The author identified the main strengths of the system as the community-based approach being used while the main weakness is that they are founded on assumptions that radicalisation is mainly due to individuals being exploited by an extreme ideology but often ignoring the fact that it is also about how people see the world in specific contexts.

In the third chapter, Sagit Yehoshua relates to us the different radicalisation and deradicalisation in Israeli and Palestinian prisons. He says that the case is quite unique in Israeli prison in the sense that the government does not initiate any programmes of rehabilitation or deradicalisation to the Palestinian prisoners. He also highlights the various variables relevant to the Palestinian prisoner which includes acquiring education, exposure to the others, et al. Their major weakness was the lack of clear ideologies, there is no explicit leadership or rabbi that makes the decisions. In an interview with some of the prisoners, it was discovered that most of them had a rethink of their actions because of the harsh interrogations and incarcerations they were given in prisons. However, it is difficult for one to determine whether or not there was an actual deradicalisation process because some of them still believe in the ideologies and still feel the need to act upon it. The author suggests that the process of being brought out of their comfort zone and interviewed changes their perception and leads them to rehabilitation and self-development.

In Chapter 4, Tara Kartha focused on extremist violence that erupted in India in the 1980's following tension were created between the powers in New Delhi and Pakistan. Rehabilitation processes were however enacted whenever the opportunities presented itself. The first rehabilitation exercise in the state was said

to be limited because it was for a short time. The militants were asked to surrender as soon as they got to India. The second surrender programme was broader because it allowed the surrender to an army or paramilitary unit anywhere in the state and it also offered long term rehabilitation including incentives and vocation courses to those who wanted it. The third surrender was also announced and it specifically targeted Kashmiris who had gone to Pakistan for training between 1989-2009. The returning militants were asked to stay in counselling centres for three months during which they would be interviewed and debriefed. They also complained about harassments and injustice which brought about new sets of societal problems. The author however argued that replacing the term, “surrender” with ‘re-integration’ would go a long way to help the system. Programmes where the young militants would meet and compete and interact with each other were also made available.

The focus of Jamilya Nurkanova in Chapter 5 was the deradicalisation of women in Kazakhstan because women were steadily becoming members of the ISIS terrorist group and every year the number increases. This caused the national authority to recognize the need to develop a variety of preventive and rehabilitation practices to bring the women back to the approved version of Islam. The author noted that the women in the centres are treated as humans and not criminals. Although it was argued by some experts that deradicalisation of women would be more successful if the rehabilitation centres rely on working with other members of the female djamaats. Other experts argued that in-group, deradicalisation is successful when an individual is influenced and inspired by the group leader. The author recognizes the non-inclusion of gender specifics or the language which the deradicalisation process would be taking place could lead to the failure of the deradicalisation process. The author identified the challenges encountered to include unstable funding from the government and reliance on over simplified approach to measuring the success of deradicalisation. The author concludes this chapter by saying that the deradicalisation of women isn’t considered an impossible task but the state needs to implement a systematic financial assistance for this to happen.

The contributions of Mohd Norzikri Kamaruddin, Noor Nirwandy Mat Noordin and Abd Rasid Abd Rahman as contained in Chapter 6 adds to the existing literature on Malaysia’s approach to deradicalisation and its effects on terrorism. The author considers Malaysian government’s deradicalisation programme for terrorists as successful. A research was carried out to confirm this purpose in which interviews with senior policy makers, counter terrorism specialists and

those involved in the process of deradicalisation was conducted. All participants agreed that Malaysia practiced a good form of deradicalisation and they also mentioned the importance of law enforcements in preventing former militants from recidivism. They also agreed that adequate funding was needed for the effective deradicalisation process in order to be able to provide good after-care programmes that will deter individuals from getting into recidivism. They identified some strengths of the system as using a soft approach in winning the hearts and minds of detainees, the involvement of one's family in the process, use of former militant detainees as role models. In addition, they identified the gaps in the process to include the absence of specific place for terrorist detainees, limited counsellors, no structured trainings for them and paucity of funds. Some of the solutions they proffered were the cooperation between agencies and the roles of family and community as a possible improvement strategy.

In Chapter 7, Amresh Gunasingham focused on the violent extremist Buddhists in Sri Lanka. The author notes that religious actors in Sri Lanka are important in countering violent extremism due to their positions of authority and credibility as well as ties to the community. In Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese are about 74% which is the majority while the Muslim community comprises 10%, yet the Sinhalese live in fear of being outnumbered. Also Amresh Gunasingham points out that Sri Lanka has witnessed three major episodic violence following the end of colonial rule which are the JVP (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna) movement, the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) and the Bodu Bala Sena. Muslims were presented as the terrorist group and thus are a threat to the Sinhalese. The Buddhists had religious as well as economic justification for the violence they incited. A Ministry for National Integration was established for the reconciliation action plan which had the following features; integration friendly school program, integration friendly media program and district reconciliation committees. They faced challenges like lack of rule of law, Buddhist shrines being set up in Muslim dominated areas. The author recommended education reforms and utility of religious leadership as policy reform strategies.

In Chapter 8, Syed Huzaifah Bin Othman Alkaff began by stating how terrorist attacks started escalated in Yemen. It was said that militancy and jihadism in Yemen grew out of Saleh governments policies in their attempts to stay in power. The author emphasises the need for the adoption of the CVE (Countering Violent Extremism) and PVE (Preventing Violent Extremism) programme which are divided into two; the prison based and non-prison-based programmes. Emphasis was also placed on the continuous use of ideological aspect of deradicalisation

despite the fact that its effectiveness is yet to be seen. The major challenge of the programme identified is that terrorists keep restructuring their strategies and winning the hearts of many while subtly influencing a radical version of Islam and insinuating political violence on them.

C. Nna-Emeka Okereke and Chinyere Ibehexamines Nigeria's Operation Safe Corridor as a counter-terrorism implementation strategy in Chapter 9. The authors identified the main objective of operation safe corridor as facilitating the easy access and passage of terrorists to security forces for proper deradicalisation. The programme is a 16-week programme divided into three phases; reception & documentation phase, deradicalisation & rehabilitation phase and the reintegration phase. The programme has recorded a number of achievements such as ensuring that the ex-terrorists are familiar and compliant with the objectives of Op SC, provision of drug therapists for the programme, socio-psychological and spiritual transformation, arranging for the ex-militants to link up with their families among others. The authors noted that despite aforementioned achievements, the operation Safe Corridor programme still encounters challenges such as the lack of a robust framework, members of the community still perceive the ex-combatants as killers and the refusal of vulnerable states to accept the ex-combatants as part of the reintegration process. There have however been few cases of recidivism amongst ex combatants discharged from the Op SC programme.

The thrust of Chapter 10 as captured by Any Rufaedah, FajarErikha and Nida Tsaura Sjariati focuses on Indonesia's experience in terms of re-educating terrorists. Indonesia has a body that specialises in handling terrorism issues known as Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT). They set up a deradicalisation centre for convicts who are willing to participate in deradicalisation activities. There however exists other Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) that conduct their own deradicalisation programme in several prisons where topics concerning the state and religion are discussed. Two studies were conducted based on deradicalisation and their results were grouped into the categories of justice, application of Islamic laws in Indonesia, Kafir & Takfir and tolerance of others. In conclusion, the entrepreneurship module received a positive response from detainees. There was also provision of counselling room for those in need. The use of audio-visual media which contained oral messages were seen to have a positive impact on the detainees though the briefness of the meetings were seen as part of the challenges of the programme.

In Chapter 11, Ruetaip Tungkasamitra Chansrakaco examines Thailand's offender rehabilitation programme and qualifies it as a vital aspect of the country's criminal justice targeted at reducing recidivism. Its processes include prisoners' orientation, prisoners' classification, prisoners' rehabilitation, pre-release, probation & reintegration respectively. The treatment system for prisoners in Thailand was divided into four stages; submission, treatment, pre-release and post-release. Based on the offender's classification, the programme was further divided into two levels; basic programmes which are conducted in key areas of rehabilitation such as education, skills, work, religion and morality and the specific rehabilitation programmes which are based on knowledge, skills and attitudes approach. The nation's efforts to rehabilitate ex-terrorist is for the purpose of reducing recidivism through both institutional and community approaches to rehabilitation. The Thai Government also recognized the importance of inclusiveness involving cooperation of the larger society in supporting the rehabilitation programmes.

In Chapter 12, Ahmed El-Muhammady interrogates the dynamics of radicalisation using the experience of militants' extremists in Malaysia. The chapter is also written based on the author's experiences in analysing the evidences and interviewing ex-militants detained in the country. The author conceptualised radicalisation as "the process of adopting extremist ideology and translating it into violent actions or committing the acts of terrorism as defined by the Malaysian laws". He insists that radicalisation shouldn't be viewed as a one-dimensional concept but as a complex and overlapping process between cognitive process, emotion belief system and action. For him, conceiving radicalisation as a monolithic concept is seriously misleading. He stresses the need to identify and distinguish the difference between ideological offences and criminal offences and insists that concerted efforts be made to treat both differently. In the case of the ideological offence, he posits that the individual is yet to commit the crime, though he might have thoughts or behaviours that are extreme. For instance, when an individual is in possession of a book that condones extremism. The Malaysian rehabilitation programme is not a 'fit-for-all' programme and thus is considered one of the most successful programmes in the world with a 93% success rate.

Remy Mahzam focuses on deradicalisation efforts in Philippines in Chapter 13 and notes that it is the only southeast Asian country ranked among the top 10 impacted by terrorism in the 2018 Global Terrorism Index. He posits that the issue of violent extremism in Southeast Asia has to be addressed from a holistic approach by identifying and examining the root causes of the conflict and what makes terrorism thrive in those regions. The author posits that it is important the

Government of Philippines anti-terrorism policy examines and benefits from the existing Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism (P-CVE) initiatives adopted by other neighbouring countries like Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. In addition, he recommends that while considering its own counter-terrorism policy, the Government of Philippines should strike a balance between these 3 approaches; preventive, reactive and corrective. The author also advised that terrorist ideologies online should be tackled through counter-terrorism, empowering religious experts and promoting digital literacy and public awareness campaigns.

In Chapter 14, Sabariah Hussin and Syed Huzaifah Bin Othman Alkaff focuses on the LA model of CVE as that which developed strong partnership and community trust built through robust engagements at grass root level. The model also profits from strong support from local, state and federal law enforcement and government agencies in the in the region. Their framework for CVE was built as a prevention, intervention and interaction in moderating different risks factors while meeting the community needs to achieve social harmony & cohesion. Individuals that are believed to be committing a crime are then referred to the RENEW programme. PATHE(Providing Alternatives to Hinder Extremism) evolved from the RENEW(Recognizing Extremist Network Early Warnings) programme though it isn't a criminal prosecution programme but rather a programme devised to provide alternatives to individuals who may have shown extremist behaviours.

In Chapter 15, the Iftekharul Bashar and Alberto Ballesteros de Santos addresses the deradicalisation programmes taking place in the prisons in Spain which addresses the ideologies and behaviours of inmates convicted for terrorism and those who have shown extremist behaviours. The programme is completely voluntary and as such the prisoner must express his willingness to join the Spanish deradicalisation programme aimed at disintegrating the prisoner from the organisation and building a mainstream behaviour that actually counters the ideas that led them to terrorism in the past. The prison deradicalisation programme has 3 components; psychological, religious and educational which are carried out respectively. The author identified the challenge confronting the programme as low voluntary enrolment and the fact that not all prisons in Spain has a deradicalisation programme. The author recommended that Spain should consider diversifying its modes of deradicalisation by introducing sports, creative arts and continued education for the inmates.

CONCLUSION

The book, *Terrorist deradicalisation in global contexts; success, failure and continuity*, is a thought-provoking literature that addresses deradicalisation and rehabilitation programmes for terrorists. It gives an in-depth study of what deradicalisation is and why it should be incorporated in all prisons and correctional facilities around the world. The various authors tend to point out challenges and recommend possible solutions to the various deradicalisation programmes mentioned in the book which can be a starting point for other countries seeking to start their own deradicalisation policy. They can learn from the mistakes and successes of others. The book further provides readers with different views and theories of deradicalisation as given by different authors based on their experiences and research.

In addition, the book's peculiar uniqueness lies in the currency and widespread case studies showing various deradicalisation programmes and processes across the world, their mode of operation, strengths and weakness and also recommendations gotten from series of research conducted on that subject. It is therefore a must read for all scholars, policy makers and every individual in general especially those studying the intricacies of terrorism.

In terms of weakness, while the book sought to present a global perspective to deradicalisation, the bulk of its case studies were drawn from Asia. With the exception of the focus on Nigeria, the efforts of various African countries such as Algeria, Kenya and Sudan among others were largely ignored. In addition, only the Spanish programme was examined in Europe. Yet, the authors failed to establish guidelines from the respective cases studies that could help ascertain whether a terrorist has truly changed on the long run even after the series of programmes.

OVERVIEW OF TERRORISM AND VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN AFRICA

November 2021

INTRODUCTION

- Terrorism and VE have emerged as a major security challenge in Africa posing fundamental threats to political leaderships as well as economic and social fabrics in the continent.
- The wave of terrorist attacks across the continent have been experienced in almost all the five regions of Africa with attendance consequences such as the loss of lives and property and the accompanying atmosphere of fears and insecurity upon which the terrorism thrive.
- At the beginning of the 21st Century, there were no known international/transnational terrorist organizations operating on the African continent.
- However at the end of 2015, there were as many as 25 terrorist groups operating across borders on the Continent.

A PERSPECTIVE: VIOLENT EXTREMISM

- **Contending Views:** Scholars, Politicians and Practitioners.
- **Extremism:** Rejection of generally accepted societal beliefs, norms, way of life and/or legal framework in preference to an alternative.
- **Response to society could be either violent or non-violent.**
- **Violent Extremism:** Justification, Support and use of violence to achieve normally Political, Social, Religious or Ideological goals. Response to society is by Violent/Terrorist acts.

- **Philosophy:** “Good” Ends justify any Means to achieve Goals. VE unwilling to accept criticism - Intimidate & threaten Dissenters/Critics with harm/death.
- **Tools:** Fear, Intimidation, Violence, Terrorist Acts and Death rather than Peaceful means to seek change.

SOME ACTIVE TERRORIST GROUPS IN AFRICA

N°	TERRORIST GROUP	CURRENT LEADER	COUNTRY (IES) OF OPERATION
1	Al-Shabaab	Ahmed Umar Abu Ubaidah	Somalia, Kenya
2	Boko Haram	Bakura Modu	Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon
3	Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP)	Sani Shuwaram (Unconfirmed)	Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Cameroon
4	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)	Abu Ubaida Yussef Al-An-nabi	Mali
5	Macina Liberation Front (MLF)	Amadou Kouffa	Mali
6	Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM)-Coalition of AQIM, Ansar Eddine, MLF, Al Mourabitoun	Iyad Ag Ghali (JNIM)	Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger
7	Islamic State in Greater Sahel (ISGS)	Abu Walid al-Sahrawi (Presumed killed)	Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso
8	Ansarul Islam	Jafar Dicko (brother of Ibrahim Mallam Dicko)	Burkina Faso
9	Islamic State Central African Province (ISCAP)-Formerly Allied Democratic Forces	Seka Musa Baluku	Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
10	Ansar Al-Sunna Wa Jama'a (al-Shabaab of Mozambique)	Abu Yasir Hassan	Mozambique
11	Islamic State in Somalia (ISS)	Abdul Qadir Mumin	Somalia


CURRENT SITUATION- CONTINENTAL REVIEW

- A review of mid-year data of violent episodes involving African militant Islamist groups and their evolution over the past decade underscores the growing threat posed by these actors.
- The threat, however, is characterized by considerable variance in levels and types of violence.
- This relative leveling off in militant Islamist group activity in Africa belies stark differences in trajectories between and within the respective theaters.
- Nearly all the major violent activities are concentrated in three of the five main regions of violent extremist activity in Africa: DRC, the Sahel and Somalia.
- Violent activity in these areas, in turn, is closely tied to the Mai-Mai and ADF/ISCAP, JNIM in the Sahel and al Shabaab in Somalia.

OPERATIONAL THEATRE

Militant Islamist group violence continues to be primarily concentrated in five main theaters:

- DRC,
 - the Sahel,
 - the Lake Chad Basin,
 - northern Mozambique,
 - Somalia;
- Based on data gathered at the end of the first half of the year, there were 950 terrorist attacks that led to 3883 number of deaths across the continent.
 - This represents a 10% increase in attacks and 15% decrease in deaths recorded compared to the same period in 2020 when the continent recorded 867 attacks and 4558 deaths.
 - This therefore reflects a complex phenomenon where in spite of spike in attacks, casualties declined.



REGIONAL THREAT SITUATION

West Africa (The Sahel and Lake Chad Basin)

The security situation in the Sahel continues to deteriorate with terrorist groups expanding their presence southward, and increasingly threatening coastal West African states namely:

- Cote d'Ivoire,
- Benin,
- Senegal and,
- Ghana.


The following recent happenings paints a gloomy picture:

- The attempted murder of Mali's interim President Col. Assimi Goita,
- The death of Boko Haram leader Abubakar and the integration of some of former Boko Haram commanders and fighters into the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP),
- The political and security fractures witnessed in Chad following the death of President Idriss Déby.

The attempted assassination of Col. Goita exposes the fragility of the security situation in the Mali, whose stability is crucial for the stability of the entire region.

- In the midst of the political turmoil in the Sahel, terrorist violence continues even if slowed.
- On the night of 4-5 June, assailants killed at least 132 civilians when they attacked the town of Solhan in the Sahel region of Burkina Faso.
- It was the deadliest attack in Burkina Faso the country first experienced its first terrorist attack in 2016.
- Again, in August 2021, 80 people, including 65 civilians and 15 gendarmes were killed by jihadist attack on a military convoy escorting civilians in northern Burkina Faso.

- On 25 June, six Malian soldiers were killed in a raid on a military outpost in the village of Boni in the centre of the country,
- More than 51 people were killed on 7 August in northern Mali,
- An attack in Western Tahoua region, Niger on 21st March led to the deaths of at least 137 civilians,
- Despite the insecurity, Niger conducted its first peaceful transfer of power,
- Days before Bazoum's swearing-in ceremony, presidential guards thwarted an attempted coup when a military unit assaulted the presidential palace on the night of 30-31 March.



- Within the Sahel, there is growing rivalry and tensions between the two main terrorist groups operating in the region the Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) over control of territory and claims of legitimacy.
- Although tensions began to grow between the two organizations in 2019, it was not until early 2020 that the tensions spilled over into a full-blown conflict.
- This conflict led to the deaths of several JNIM and ISGS fighters particularly in the Lipta Gourma region bordering Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.
- However, during the first four months of 2021, there has been a decrease in the number of confrontations between JNIM and ISGS.
- The seeming lull in the ensuing conflict between the two terrorist groups in early 2021 has coincided with a sharp rise in terrorist activities in Burkina Faso in particular and in Mali to a lesser degree.
- This goes to validate the argument that when the terrorist and violent extremist groups are not fighting among themselves, it frees their hands to launch attacks against civilians and security forces.
- The consolidation of the purported alliance between the ISGS in the Sahel and ISWAP in the LCB after Abubakari Shekau's death.





- Although IS Central had in 2019 revealed that the ISGS was now part of ISWAP, there isn't up to date, any significant movement to demonstrate a clear.
- Announcement of the re-merger of some Boko Haram fighters with ISWAP.
- With a strong force of combined ISWAP/Boko Haram fighters and cooperation between ISGS/ISWAP/Boko Haram will lead to further expansion of violence.
- Within the Lake Chad Basin, the merger of Boko Haram and ISWAP following the deaths of their respective leaders will pose a renewed challenge but also opportunity for the security forces in the region.
- In terms of modus operandi of an allied ISGS/ISWAP group in West Africa, there is likely going to be some disagreement between the two organizations.
- ISWAP is against indiscriminate use of violence against civilians including moslems as well as the use of women and girls as suicide bombers.
- This position is directly at variance with the tactics of the ISGS in the Sahel where its attacks, particularly, against civilian populations, be they moslem or otherwise, are indiscriminate.
- In terms of opportunities, the death of the two leaders within the short span of time should enable security forces to capitalize on situation to further weaken the groups.
- Since Setember, over 1800 Boko Haram fighters have surrendered to the Nigerian security forces while 2260 women and 3752 children who were in captivity

rescued. This indicates that the death of Shekau has had an effect on the group's cohesion.

- The reported killing of one Mallan Bako, an alleged successor to Al Barnawi before the recent announcement of the appointment of yet another successor, Sani Shuwaram indicates the group may also be under pressure and its fighters could be coaxed to surrender as well.

East Africa

- The terrorism landscape in East Africa continues to be dominated by incidents in Somali, making it the epicentre of extremist activities in the region.
- Somalia is on track for a 16-percent rise in militant Islamist events and fatalities in 2021.
- Al Shabaab remains the most active group in the country and the region and is on pace for over 2,000 violent events in 2021.
- This violent activity has picked up around the Somali parliamentary and presidential elections, which al Shabaab has vowed to disrupt.
- The increase in al Shabaab violence is also associated with a rise in battles with security forces, which is currently on pace to increase by 28 percent in 2021.

Southern Africa

- Mozambique remains the only country in Southern Africa that has greatly suffered from the scourge of terrorism.
- Although Ahlu Sunnah wa Jama'a (ASWJ), the main terrorism group operating in the country has been intensifying attacks since 2017, the number of terrorist attacks is on track for a decline in annual activity, despite the high-profile attack in Palma in March 2021.
- Overall, ASWJ is on pace for a third fewer violent events and fatalities compared to 2020.
- The deployment of SADC and Rwanda troops is expected to further tame the activities of the group going into 2022.

Central Africa

- In the Central African region, terrorism & VE landscape is characterized mostly by the security situation in the DRC, considering that Cameroon and Chad are largely considered within the Lake Chad Basin area.
- The situation in the DRC is continuing to deteriorate with multiple terrorist and violent extremist groups operating particularly in the three neighbouring provinces of Eastern DRC: Ituri, North-Kivu and South-Kivu.
- Allied Democratic Forces/Madina at Tawheed wal Mujahideen (ADF/MTM) also referred to as the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) noticeably increased its operations around Ituri and North Kivu provinces during the year.
- ISCAP is reportedly collaborating with ASWJ group operating in northern Mozambique, even though the extent of their cooperation is not very clear. The growing violence perpetrated by Mai-Mai groups in the DRC make the situation even more complex.
- The groups have been committing atrocities against civilians, the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) and United Nations Organization Mission in Democratic Republic of the Congo (MINUSCO), with civilians bearing the brunt of the violence.
- In February, 14 February, militiamen attacked FARDC positions in Kampemba commune, Katanga province, killing 14 people including three FARDC soldiers, one civilian and 10 militiamen. A Police officer and five civilians were wounded and seven militiamen captured. Four PKM weapons, one 40mm rocket launcher, eight AK47 weapons, one RPG7 weapon, one Camera, one city map and four telephones were recovered.
- Also, in the Ndalya locality in Ituri province. ISCAP terrorists attacked the locality killing 26 including three FARDC and 23 civilians. The looted three pharmacies and burned down a church. The continuous violence undermines the efforts of the ongoing counter-insurgency operations by FARDC that launched military operations in 2020 targeting the multiple smallarmed groups operating throughout Ituri, North Kivu, and South Kivu provinces.
- The persistent violent activities have made it exceedingly difficult for MINUSCO to carry out its mandate in protection of civilians and helping the Government in its stabilization and peace consolidation efforts.

North Africa

- North Africa continued to see a decline in militant Islamist group activity, a trend since 2015.
- Virtually all 134 violent events observed in North Africa in the first half of 2021 were reported in Egypt and linked to an affiliate of the Islamic State (ISIS), the Islamic State in the Sinai Province.
- CT operations in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt have resulted in significant reduction of terrorist attacks.

CONCLUSION

- The resurgence of TVE incidents on the continent indicates that the threat nonetheless remains formidable as the terrorist groups have proven resilient and are fast adapting to changing circumstances in order to remain relevant in their cause.
- As has been proven, no country is immune from the threats of terrorism and violent extremism, we must not spur any effort to cooperate fully to defeat this menace.
- We must cooperate to share real and actionable intelligence on the movement, financing and recruitment of terrorists.
- Intensify joint monitoring of our borders.
- Conduct periodic joint training for our intelligence agencies with particular focus on those charged with dealing with the scourge of terrorism and violent extremism.

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