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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF A BOYCOTT OF AIRLINES FLYING TO AND FROM SOUTH AFRICA

ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY ARCHIVES
REFERENCE
ORGANISATION DE L'UNITE AFRICAINE

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF A BOYCOTT OF AIRLIFTS MAKING TO AND FROM SOUTH AFRICA

The OAU, from its inception in 1963, has called on Member States to effect a complete boycott of South Africa by forbidding, inter alia, the planes of South Africa to overfly the territories of all African States (CIAS/Plen 2/Res.2). The Council of Ministers in its Second Ordinary Session in June 1964 decided "to take the necessary steps to refuse any aeroplane or ship or any other means of communication going to, or coming from South Africa the right to fly over the territories of Member States or utilize their ports or any other facilities" (CM/Res. 13(II))

Most Member States responded favourably and imposed bans on transit, stop-over and flights over their territory by all aircraft registered in South Africa. However, since the foreign airlines operating in South Africa and, using Independent African airspace and airport facilities entered into a pool with "South African Airways", the Council of Ministers Meeting in Mauritius in June-July 1976 for its twenty-seventh Session adopted Resolution CM/Res. 473(XXVII) which decided "that a conference of aeronautic experts of Independent African states be convened to study the problem and report to the next session of the Council of Ministers". The same resolution requested the General Secretariat "to organize this conference and invite delegates from inter-governmental and non-inter-governmental organizations concerned".

The General Secretariat circulated a Note to all the Member States on 8 September 1976 proposing that the meeting of the aeronautical experts be held in the first half of February 1977, at the OAU Headquarters in Addis Ababa. Since few countries replied to the invitation of the General Secretariat before the appointed dates, the Secretariat had to suggest the new dates of 21 to 24 March 1977. It appealed to Member States at the Lome Session of February 1977 to respond positively to their participation in the meeting of the experts. However, out of the eighteen replies, fifteen States intimated their readiness to participate while three were against the idea of convening such a meeting. Since fifteen States could not constitute a quorum, the meeting had to be postponed.

The Council of Ministers took up the matter again in its thirty-first Ordinary Session; adopted Resolution CM/Res.623(XXI) and again recommended the convocation, as soon as possible, of the meeting of aeronautic experts in conformity with Resolution CM/Res. 473(XXVII).

The General Secretariat sent circular notes to all Member States requesting them to participate in the meeting of the experts, which was scheduled from 12 to 14 March 1979. But, again the response of the Member States was very poor in that only seven countries replied even after the telegraphic reminders were sent. Out of these seven States, two expressed their opposition to the meeting.

In July 1979, the Council of Ministers at its thirty-third Ordinary Session reiterated its call for action by adopting Resolution CM/Res. 774(XXXIII), which calls upon "African countries which continue to have air links with South Africa to study the possibility of cutting such links, refusing to all their aircrafts to and from South Africa to fly over their territories and denying such aircrafts the use of their airports". The Council further reminded the Secretariat to convene the meeting of the experts as directed by the previous resolutions. However, the Secretariat has not been able to convene the meeting. In the light of the negative response from a majority of Member States, the Council may now decide what further steps to take.

The attached document was prepared by a consultant for the special committee against Apartheid and is being circulated for the information of Council on this all-important subject.

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS
Thirty-Fifth Ordinary Session
Freetown, Sierra Leone
1? - 2? June, 1980

CM/1044 (XXXV)
Annex

IMPLICATIONS OF A BOYCOTT OF AIRLINES FLYING TO AND FROM SOUTH AFRICA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ACTION BY AFRICAN STATES*

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* Paper prepared by a consultant for the Special Committee against Apartheid and published on December 6, 1977 by the latter under Ref.A/AC.115/L.481

IMPLICATIONS OF A BOYCOTT OF AIRLINES FLYING TO AND FROM SOUTH AFRICA WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO ACTION BY AFRICAN STATES*

Introduction

1. Since 1962 both the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the General Assembly of the United Nations have adopted resolutions calling on their Member States to deny facilities to flights by all carriers to and from South Africa.

2. These resolutions have been enforced by a number of African countries which have denied transit rights and overflying rights to airlines flying to and from South Africa. No airlines had been transiting through some of these States to and from South Africa; others put a stop to existing flights.

3. The ban, in order to be effective, must be enforced by all African States as it is most unlikely that the Western European States, the United States of America or Israel would enforce the relevant United Nations resolution of their own accord.

4. The present situation is that South African Airways (SAA) is barred from landing in or overflying the great majority of African States and is, therefore, forced to fly round the bulge of Africa to Europe. Foreign airlines from Europe, Australia and Israel continue to fly to South Africa, overflying and landing in African States. This is the major problem which has to be dealt with if an airline ban is to be made effective.

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* Paper prepared by a consultant for the Special Committee against Apartheid and published on 6th December 1977 by the latter under Ref.A/AC.115/L.481.

5. When it is considered that almost all major European airlines and El Al are in pool agreements with SAA it becomes obvious that the situation is most ambiguous. It means that SAA has a 50 per cent interest in all the flights by European carriers which transit in African airports.

6. It can be said that the 1963 OAU ban has been very effectively countered by South Africa. SAA continues to fly to Europe around the bulge of Africa and shares revenue with all the other major airlines which transit in Africa and overfly African territories.

7. To stricke a major blow at apartheid South Africa it is imperative that the following measures be implemented by all OAU Member States, in conformity with the relevant OAU and United Nations General Assembly resolutions:

1. The total interdiction of landing and overflying rights to all aircraft flying to and from South Africa;
2. A further restriction on all foreign airlines flying to or from South Africa by any other route if they wish to operate flights to African Member States of OAU.

8. The first measure should not be difficult to implement, although it may cause some hardship to two countries which cater for the largest number of flights to South Africa, Kenya and Zaïre.

9. The second measure would need very close co-ordination between all African Governments in order to counter any preasures from the airlines affected by such a ban.

10. The object of this paper is to show that both measures are feasible and can be implemented by African States without great loss to themselves, whilst stricking a major blow at South Africa.

OAU ban on South African Aircraft

11. In 1963 OAU imposed a total ban on all South African aircraft from landing in or overflying independent African States. Within a very short time all OAU Member States had fully enforced the OAU decision and all South African registered aircraft were effectively banned from landing in, transiting and overflying the African continent.

12. However, SAA had been prepared for such a contingency and immediately rerouted its flights to Europe via Luanda in Angola (which was still under Portuguese administration) and Ilho do Sal and Las Palmas in the Atlantic. This new route entailed flying around the bulge of Africa - which is a rather costly operation, adding roughly three flying hours to European flights. This new route must have cost SAA an extra £2-3 million in 1963/64 and around £7-8 million at present, as the same route is used now, minus the Luanda stop.

13. The OAU ban was certainly a major blow to South Africa which placed South African Airways in an inferior position in the competition with the European airlines operating to South Africa.

14. At the time the OAU decision was considered by most observers in South Africa as the first step in an OAU campaign to isolate South Africa. All the European airlines expected the OAU decision to be extended to all aircraft flying to and from South Africa. Most of these airlines, i.e. Alitalia, UTA, KLM, Lufthansa, etc. felt that if such a ban was extended to all aircraft flying to South Africa, they would be forced to cancel their South African operations and terminate their flights in African countries to the north. The case of British Airways was different, as it is now, because of the greater number of flights involved and the major importance of British economic interest in South Africa. British Airways is the only airline which might have opted for flights around the bulge of Africa, via Luanda and Salisbury.

15. It may be noted that the major foreign airlines which operate to South Africa operate 38 weekly flights to Johannesburg while these same airlines operate 267 transits and terminal stops in the rest of Africa. The respective figures for 1970 were 19 flights to Johannesburg and 108 to the rest of South Africa.

16. These figures show the relatively weak position of South Africa in comparison with the rest of Africa. It is obvious that if the European airlines are obliged to choose between South Africa and the rest of Africa, they would be forced to abandon apartheid South Africa.

17. At present, the following African States allow SAA to operate in their territories: Botswana, Gabon, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique and Swaziland. There is a weekly flight of SA through Libreville to Europe.

18. Recently the Ivory Coast has granted landing rights to one flight of South African Airways en route from Athens and Rome. At this stage it appears that this is only a technical stop without traffic rights. It, nevertheless, is a departure from the OAU decision which had been enforced by the Ivory Coast until recently.

Air transportation to and from South Africa after the OAU ban

19. In order to compensate for the extra costs involved in flying the new routes around the bulge of Africa, SAA had to look for new solutions. It was also necessary for South Africa to strengthen her ties with the European airlines by giving them a greater stake in South Africa in order to have them as allies in a possible confrontation with the OAU Member States.

20. At the time of the OAU ban SAA had a "general pool agreement" with British Airways, while imposing strict passenger quotas on all other European carriers. The South African Government decided to alter this policy and enter into pool agreements with all the European airlines, lifting their traffic quotas to and from Johannesburg.

21. This new policy had two decisive effects:

1. It gave a greater share of the traffic to the European airlines and insured SAA against a drop in its own loads, the foreign airlines having to contribute to SAA a percentage of the extra revenue. According to well informed sources, SAA is the beneficiary in most of these pool agreements;

2. It ensured that the European airlines involved would lobby in Africa to block any further move by the OAU to enforce a total ban on landing and overflying by all aircraft.

22. These airlines would obviously use all the means at their disposal to convince African States that a ban on all flights to South Africa would have serious repercussions for the States involved. The truth is, however, that it is those airlines which would be the losers if they adopted a policy of confrontation with African States.

23. The pool agreements linking SAA and the major European carriers are a real challenge to OAU since almost every foreign aircraft which lands in Africa en route to and from Johannesburg is partly an SAA flight, and since South African citizens are transiting freely in African countries.

24. The pool agreements had the following positive results for South Africa:

1. Financial compensation for the longer route of SAA;

2. Involvement of European airlines in the problems of apartheid South Africa, both political and economic;

3. Using European airlines as a front to continue operations through Africa;

4. Forging closer links with western European Governments involved in this partnership to defy and render meaningless the 1963 OAU ban.

25. SAA also has a very aggressive policy with travel agents in South Africa to ensure that they get a more than fair share of the traffic.

26. The victory of the MPLA in Angola created a new situation as Luanda was immediately closed to all flights of SAA. But, whereas this stop was essential for technical reasons for the Boeing 707s, it is no longer a major problem with the Boeing 747 SP, which can achieve maximum take-off at the high altitude of Johannesburg (1800 meters).

Role of Foreign Airlines in Support of Apartheid South Africa

27. Foreign airlines operating in South Africa play a very important role in support of the apartheid regime of South Africa. They help to create a favourable image of the country to attract tourists and businessmen and encourage the exchange of sports teams as well as musicians and artists.

Airlines as ambassadors

28. Airlines act as informal ambassadors in the countries which they serve and the case of apartheid South Africa is no exception. The foreign airlines help to strengthen the ties between their governments and the regime of Pretoria and also represent South African interests in their respective countries. It is important to them that South Africa should have a respectable image in order to encourage travel to the land of apartheid. Journalists are invited on inaugural flights, groups of travel agents are guided on conducted tours of "sunny South Africa" under the very best of conditions, and even politicians are encouraged to go on tours.

Business traffic

29. To increase the business traffic, both freight and passengers, the foreign airline offices in South Africa act as trade counsellors. Their representatives meet South African businessmen, discuss possible ventures, suggest markets for South African products which they hope to transport, and act as intermediaries between businessmen from their countries and South African businessmen. The airlines organize tours by specialized groups of businessmen, such as motor-car dealers.

Tourism

30. Airlines are the main promotors of tourism in the countries where they operate. Here again apartheid South Africa is no exception. The foreign airlines which operate to South Africa are very active in their promotion of tourism to the land of apartheid. They advertise in the press, on radio and television, holidays and tours to "sunny South Africa". The land of apartheid is pictured as a paradise for holidaymakers, no mention being made of the colour bar imposed on tourism, whilst the Kruger National Park and the all-white beaches, hotels and golf courses are prominently displayed. Film shows of white South Africa are organized for travel agents in Europe and the United States.

31. Thousands of airline offices and travel agents around the globe become active promotors of tourism to white South Africa, which is presented as a holiday paradise with great weather, beautiful girls, prosperity, politically stable and the friendliest people in the world.

32. Airline links have thus done much to create a favourable picture of South Africa and airlines like BOAC, Alitalia, UTA, KLM, Lufthansa and the other European carriers are the most vital propagandists for the South African regime.

Cultural traffic - sports exchanges

33. It is also in the interests of the foreign airlines in South Africa to promote cultural exchanges between their respective countries and South Africa, often in close liaison with their embassies in the case of scholarships, etc.

34. Sports exchanges are actively ecnouraged, often at special reduced fares (either within or outside IATA regulations). Airlines often act as intermediaries in the preparation of such tours. Journalists are invited by the airlines on inaugural flights for special assignments - to cover sports tours or visits by theatrical groups, to write special features in newspapers and magazines etc.

35. Competitions with airline tickets as prizes are organized, the winners being awarded holidays in South Africa. This is usually part of an extensive publicity campaign in the mass media extolling the wonderful aspects of apartheid South Africa.

36. For example, when the French rugby team was touring white South Africa, a press and radio campaign was launched in France by UTA French Airlines calling on the French youth to show support for their team by sending postcards to the airline for onward transmission to the players who were taking part in strictly segregeted sport.

The case for total airline ban

37. A total ban on foreign airlines at present flying through Africa would be a tremendous blow to the apartheid regime of Pretoria. Should such a ban be successful it would have far-reaching effects in trade, tourism and cultural links between South Africa and the rest of the world.

38. Such a ban, which is a necessity in the growing confrontation between Africa and the racist South African regime, does raise a number of problems and would require a more thorough study with the collaboration of African transport ministers and African airline executives.

39. The following aspects are briefly covered here:

(i) Implications for South Africa
(ii) Economic implications for African countries
(iii) Choices facing foreign airlines
(iv) Possible countermeasures by other countries involved
(v) Implications for SAA

Implications for South Africa

40. A ban by African States on all flights to and from South Africa would be the most severe blow so far in the campaign to isolate apartheid South Africa.

41. Such a ban would have the effect of diminishing the links between South Africa and its closest allies in Western Europe.

42. To achieve maximum effect such a ban should be imposed with the minimum of warning which will make it difficult for the European countries involved to apply counter-measures to African airlines.

43. Such a ban will not affect SAA flights which already fly around the bulge of Africa. South Africans would still be able to fly to Europe and foreign visitors and businessmen would be able to fly to South Africa on SAA. However, the foreign airlines which decide to cancel South African operations would close their offices in South Africa and would no longer be interested in promoting business, tourism or cultural ties with South Africa.

44. The impact on white South Africa would be tremendous in the present political climate of South Africa with the victory of the Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe and the imminent victory of SWAPO in Namibia, white South South Africans would see such a ban as a first step in their total isolation.

45. Foreign businessmen who can now visit a number of African States on their way to and from South Africa would have to make separate trips.

46. Tourists would have to choose between South Africa and the rest of Africa. At present a large number of tourists first visit Kenya or Tanzania before going to South Africa. This would no longer be possible and South Africa would be likely to suffer most.

47. Tourism to South Africa would greatly suffer as only SAA would be promoting this tourism, the other foreign airlines would concentrate on other African destinations.

48. The automatic cancellation of pool agreements would also affect the close ties now existing between South Africa and Western European countries.

Economic implications for African countries

49. Fourteen airlines now fly to South Africa and they make 65 stops weekly in African airports on the way to and from Johannesburg (see annex III) as follows:-

Nairobi	35
Kinshasa	20
Libreville	4
Dar es Salaam	2
Mauritius	2
Seychelles	2
Total	65

50. In case of implementation of a total ban on transits to and from South Africa, the African States involved would suffer a certain financial loss through the cancellation or reduction of flights operated by the foreign airlines to their airports. This would be in airport landing fees, catering and other airport revenue.

51. It must, however, be realized that Nairobi for example would not lose all those flights: their numbers would only be reduced. British Airways would most probably only reduce their Nairobi flights by two or three flights weekly and maintain the others by changing their terminal points to Lusaka, Dar es Salaam or Mauritius The other foreign airlines would most probably maintain all their present flights. It is also very likely that Kenya Airways would benefit by carrying a larger share of the traffic from Nairobi.

52. In the case of Kinshasa, the six airlines involved would most probably maintain their flights for purely commercial, as well as diplomatic, reasons. In most other cases, the flights would probably be maintained by the airlines, which would terminate their flights in Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, Kinshasa, Lusaka or Blantyre.

53. One positive aspect for Africa is that most of the airlines involved would look for other traffic points in Africa to make up for the lost South African traffic. They may operate more flights across Africa from West to East and vice-versa, which would serve a real need.

54. Any financial loss suffered by the African countries would not be a very high price to pay for the most important concerted action which has even been taken against the racist Government of South Africa.

Choices facing foreign airlines

55. Should a decision to ban all transits to and from South Africa be taken by OAU members, the airlines involved would be faced with the following alternatives:

(a) The cancellation of their South African operations, terminating their flights in other African countries; this would probably entail a reduction in the overall number of flights in order to allow for the lost South African traffic.

(b) The re-routing of their flights along the route presently used by SAA around the western bulge of Africa; this would entail far fewer flights than at present as they would not pick up any passengers en route. This could be countered by the African countries imposing a ban on any airline which continued its operations to South Africa via any other routes.

56. These possibilities would have to be studied carefully but at first sight it seems obvious that when airlines are faced with the choice of South Africa or the rest of Africa, they would have to choose Africa for purely economic reasons.

57. The figures in Annex IV show that the only foreign airline that would face a difficult choice is British Airways because of large passenger traffic to and from South Africa. However, there is no doubt that the over-all British Airways traffic from other African countries far exceeds that figure. British Airways has agreements, both commercial and technical, with a number of African airlines; Kenya Airways, Ghana Airways and Nigerian Airways. These agreements are more important to British Airways than their weekly flights to South Africa.

58. In the case of UTA the South African traffic is a very small proportion of its over-all traffic in Africa. Furthermore UTA has a partnership agreement with Air Afrique which is the backbone of UTA's operations in the African continent. The South African operation is a mere extension of one of the fingers of one hand as far as this airline is concerned.

59. The next largest operators are Alitalia, Lufthansa, Sabena and Swissair, with approximately 10,000 passengers. They are likely to choose Africa and adjust their programmes accordingly.

60. The traffic of the remaining airlines is not important enough to influence their decision in favour of South Africa.

61. The figures in Annex V show that Africa as a whole is far more important to foreign airlines than South Africa. The foreign airlines which operate to South Africa have 267 transit or terminal flights in African States and only 38 terminal flights to South Africa.

62. It can be estimated that 35 per cent of the passenger revenue on the 38 flights to South Africa is supplied by the South African stop and 65 per cent by the other African stops en route. This varies according to the airline but can be considered a fair estimate.

63. This, in effect, means that these airlines would have to reduce the number of their flights to maintain the profitability of their operations but as Africa is an area of great expansion for air traffic it is likely that the reduction in flights would not be large or permanent. As mentioned earlier, these airlines would also look for additional stops in Africa to make up the loss and this could be a positive factor for Africa.

Possible countermeasures by other countries involved

64. There are numerous precedents for restrictions being imposed on international flights in recent years:

(a) Flights to Arab countries are not permitted to transit in Israel en route;

(b) Flights to Israel cannot transit in Arab countries;

(c) Flights to Cuba cannot transit in the United States of America.

65. In Africa there is the precedent of Southern Rhodesia. After UDI, flights to Salisbury were barred from Nairobi and Lusaka. All flights to Johannesburg via Lusaka in Zambia have also been terminated.

66. There is no reason why similar restrictions should not be imposed by African States on transit flights to apartheid South Africa, but one must still consider the possibility of counter-action by the European countries involved.

67. Traffic rights negotiations between European countries and African States are linked with offers of aid from the Western countries and such a ban as the one under discussion may have repercussions on some of these agreements.

68. However, if a ban is imposed simultaneously by all African countries, and backed by a resolution proposed by African States at the General Assembly of the United Nations, it would be much more difficult for countermeasures to be applied against African States. Countermeasures are also unlikely since the airlines concerned would still be maintaining their operations to African airports but with restrictions on transits to and from South Africa.

Position of SAA

69. As mentioned earlier, SAA would benefit directly from the ban on foreign airlines. However, it would take some time for it to acquire the extra aircraft necessary for increased frequencies which would be required to transport all the traffic from South Africa.

70. Measures would need to be taken to ensure that the foreign airlines involved do not enter into secret agreements, supplying the necessary aircraft under SAA colours. This aspect would have to be covered in any OAU resolution to be enforced by its Member States.

71. The psychological impact on South Africa, as well as the loss of international airline operations, would far outweigh the benefits which would accrue to SAA.

COUNTRIES SERVED BY SAA OUTSIDE AFRICA

Europe		No. of flights weekly
United Kingdom	London	7
France	Paris	2
Germany, Federal Republic of	Frankfurt	4
Italy	Rome	2
Greece	Athens	2
Netherlands	Amsterdam	2
Spain	Madrid	2
Portugal	Lisbon	3
Switzerland	Zurich	2
Latin America		
Argentina	Buenos Aires	1
Brazil	Rio de Janeiro	2
Far East - Oceania		
Australia		1

FOREIGN AIRLINES SERVING SOUTH AFRICA

European carriers		No. of weekly flights 1970	1977
Alitalia	(Italy)	3	3
British Airways	(United Kingdom)	7	7
Iberia	(Spain)	-	1
KLM	(Netherlands)	2	2
Lufthansa	(Germany, Federal Republic of)		
Olympic	(Greece)	-	2
Sabena	(Belgium)	2	3
SAS	(Sweden)	1	1
Swissair	(Switzerland)	-	3
TAP	(Portugal)	-	2
UTA	(France)	3	3
		19	30
North America			
Pan American	(United States of America)	1	2
South America			
Varig	(Brazil)	-	1
Australia			
Qantas	(Australia)	1	1
Africa			
Air Mauritius		-	1
Air Malawi		-	4
Air Botswana		-	4
DETA	(Mozambique)	3	3
		3	12

		No. of weekly flights 1970	1971
Other			
Middle East			
El Al	(Israel)	1	3
	Total	28	49

Notes

1. All the European airlines overfly and land in African States to and from South Africa.

2. Pan American and Varig fly via Rio de Janeiro across the Atlantic.

3. El Al lands in Nairobi only on return flights from Johannesburg.

4. Qantas lands in Mauritius en route to and from South Africa.

5. Air Mauritius lands in Madagascar en route to Durban but the latest information is that Madagascar has not interdicted this stop to Air Mauritius.

AFRICAN STATES BEING USED BY FOREIGN AIRLINES FOR TRANSIT STOPS EN ROUTE TO AND FROM SOUTH AFRICA

	Southbound	Northbound	Total
Kenya			
British Airways	7	7	14
Lufthansa	3	3	6
Olympic Airways	2	2	4
KLM	2	2	4
El Al	2	2	4
SAS	1	1	2
Swissair	1	1	2
	16	19	35
Zaire			
Sabena	2	2	4
Alitalia	2	2	4
Swissair	2	2	4
Iberia	1	1	2
UTA	1	1	2
TAP	2	2	4
	10	10	20
Gabon			
UTA	2	2	4
United Republic of Tanzania			
Swissair	1	1	2
Mauritius			
Qantas	1	1	2
Seychelles			
British Airways	1	1	2
Total			65

Notes

1. It is estimated that only 35 per cent of seats are actually offered for sale by these foreign airlines in South Africa, 65 per cent being reserved for the traffic from their transit

stops in African States. Of this allotment, it is estimated that these airlines achieve a 60 per cent load factor.

2. SAA has 15 long distance flights to European destinations, all seats being offered for sale in Johannesburg, i.e. 195,000 seats. Load factor 60 per cent = 117 000.

SEAT CAPACITY AND ESTIMATED PASSENGER TRAFFIC ON FLIGHTS FROM JOHANNESBURG TO EUROPE

	No. flights Weekly	Seat Capacity Weekly	Annual Capacity	Estimated seat allotment for sale in South Africa
British Airways	7	2,500	130,000	60,000
UTA	3	1,100	57,200	19,000
Lufthansa	3	1,100	57,200	19,000
Alitalia	3	1,100	57,200	19,000
Sabena	3	1,100	57,200	19,000
Swissair	3	1,100	57,200	19,000
TAP	2	700	36,400	12,000
KLM	2	700	36,200	12,000
Olympic	3	600	31,200	11,000
Iberia	1	350	18,200	6,500
SAS	1	350	18,200	6,500
	31	10,700	556,400	203,000
			Load factor 60% =	121,800

Notes

1. It is estimated that only 35 per cent of seats are actually offered for sale by these foreign airlines in South Africa, 65 per cent being reserved for the traffic from their transit stops in African States. Of this allotment it is estimated that these airlines achieve a 60 per cent load factor.

2. SAA has 15 long distance flights to European destinations, all seats being offered for sale in Johannesburg, i.e. 195,000 seats. Load factor 60 per cent = 117,000.

AFRICAN SERVICES OF 14 FOREIGN AIRLINES FLYING TO SOUTH AFRICA

	British Airways	UTA	Sabena	PAA	Swiss Air	Alitalia	Lufthansa	Iberia Air,	SAS	KLM	TAP	El Al	Varig	Qantas
North America														
Cairo	5								4	4				
Tunis			1		1	1								
Algiers			1		2	1	1	1						
Oran					1									
Casablanca			3		1		3	2						
Tangier			1					1						
Tripoli						3				1				
Benghazi						1								
WEST AFRICA														
Dakar			1	3	5		3	2						
Monrovia		1	2	2	3			1						
Abidjan		8	1	2	2	1		1						
Accra		1		1	3	2	1			2				
Cotonou		1		1										
Lagos		3	2	3	3	2	3	2	1	2				
Douala		3	1	1	1	1								
Libreville		5	1	1	1	1		1						
Malabo								1						
Ndjamena		2												
Bangui		2												
Kano			1							2				
Nouadhibou		1						1						
Bamako		2												
Freetown		2												
Conakry		1												
Niamey		1												
Ougadougou		2												
Lome		1												
El Aaaium								2						
Bissau											2			

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	British Airways	UTA	Sabena	PAA	Swiss Air	Alitalia	Lufthansa	Iberia Air	SAS	KLM	TAP	El Al	Varig	Qantas	Olympic
EAST AFRICA															
Sudan	4				1	1	2								
Addis Ababa	6					1	1								
Djibouti	2														
Entebbe	3		2												
Nairobi	12		3	3	1	4	3		2	3		1			2
Mombasa	3														
Dar es Salaam	3			1	1	1	1		1	1					
Mogadishu															
CENTRAL AFRICA															
Kinshasa	3	3	4	2	2	2	1	1							
Bujumbura			2												
Kigali			3												
Brazzaville		3													
Luanda		1				1					2				
Lusaka		1				2									
Tannanarive						1									
Salisbury												1			
Mauritius						1	1							1	
Saudi Arabia	2														
TOTAL	43	44	29	20	28	27	22	16	8	15	4	2		1	4
SOUTH AFRICA	7	3	3	2	3	3	3	1	1	2	3	3	1	1	2

TOTAL AFRICA 267

TOTAL SOUTH AFRICA 38

AFRICAN SERVICES OF 14 FOREIGN AIRLINES FLYING TO SOUTH AFRICA

	British Airways	UTA	Sabena	PAA	Swiss Air	Alitalia	Lufthansa	Iberia Air,	SAS	KLM	TAP	El Al	Varig	Qantas	Olympic
North America															
Cairo	5								4	4					
Tunis			1		1	1									2
Algiers			1		2	1	1	1							
Oran					1										
Casablanca			3		1		3	2							
Tangier			1					1							
Tripoli						3				1					
Benghazi						1									
WEST AFRICA															
Dakar			1	3	5		3	2							
Monrovia		1	2	2	3			1							
Abidjan		8	1	2	2	1		1							
cra		1		1	3	2	1			2					
tonou		1		1											
gos		3	2	3	3	2	3	2	1	2					
uala		3	1	1	1	1									
breville		5	1	1	1	1		1							
labo								1							
jamena		2													
ngui		2													
o			1							2					
adhibou		1						1							
ako		2													
etown		2													
akry		1													
mey		1													
adougou		2													
e		1													
Aaaium								2							
sau											2				

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