



**ORGANIZATION OF
AFRICAN UNITY**

Secretariat
P. O. Box 3243

منظمة الوحدة الافريقية
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**ORGANISATION DE L'UNITE
AFRICAIN**

Secretariat
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REPORT OF THE OAU FACT FINDING MISSION TO
THE SO CALLED FRENCH SOMALILAND (DJIBOUTI)

ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY
CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR THE LIBERATION OF AFRICA
(COMMITTEE OF EIGHTEEN)

REPORT OF THE FACT-FINDING COMMISSION TO THE SO-CALLED
FRENCH SOMALILAND (DJIBOUTI)

PART I

Background information

1. At its 26th Ordinary Session, the Council of Ministers endorsed the recommendation of the 26th Regular Session of the Liberation Committee, to send a Fact-Finding Mission to the so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti). The following Member States were elected to serve on the Mission:

1. Egypt - (Chairman)
2. Guinea
3. Mozambique
4. Liberia
5. Senegal
6. Tanzania
7. Uganda
8. Zaire - (Rapporteur)

Terms of Reference

- The following are the terms of reference:
- (a) To gather information on the prevailing situation in the territory by undertaking contacts, visits to all important places and by inviting views from the present leadership of the territorial government, and LPAI; and from such other organisations and groups, including leaders of communities, as the Mission may consider useful to provide relevant information.
 - (b) To ascertain through close consultations with the leadership of the territorial government, LPAI and such other political groups as may have significant following in their respective positions on the process of independence, and maintenance of French bases in the territory.

- (c) To hold consultations with the two liberation movements recognised by the OAU so as to ascertain their views regarding the future of the Territory and the role they intend to play in the independence process.
- (d) To hold consultations with the Government of Ethiopia and Somalia with a view to finding out from them what measures they can individually and together take in order to enhance the sense of security of the people of the so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti) and respect their territorial integrity and independence.
- (e) To invite the French Government to create the necessary conditions to allow the free expression of views by all groups to the Commission.
- (f) In the light of the information that it may be in a position to acquire to draw up conclusions that will include its views on the attainment of independence and national political unity.

3. After the necessary consultations with the French Government and with the parties concerned, the Mission met in Addis Ababa on 26th April, 1976 to prepare its work. Names of the members of the Mission are attached to this document.

4. The following questionnaire prepared by the Mission formed the basis of the discussion with the parties concerned:

Guidelines to Terms of Reference of OAU
Fact-Finding Mission to so-called
French Somaliland (Djibouti)

a. Interviewees' Credentials

Interviewees will indicate their names, the organizations they represent, the objectives of the organizations/parties and the popular support they enjoy among the territory's population.

b. Independence

- i) What is your position regarding the process of independence as proposed by the French Government?
- ii) Would you be willing to accede to independence in coalition with other political trends?
- iii) What do you think should be the French Government's role in the independence process and after?

b. Referendum

- i) What are your proposals on the holding of a referendum?
- ii) What conditions do you recommend for the holding of a fair referendum in the territory?
- iii) Do you think that there will be a need for external supervision of the referendum e.g. by OAU or UN?

d. Elections

- i) How soon after the independence referendum should the elections be held?
- ii) Would you be prepared to go into coalition with other parties to accelerate accession to independence?

- iii) Do you envisage a need for international supervision of the elections e.g. by OAU or UN?
- iv) What facilities would you like made available to ensure the full participation of the people of the territory in both the referendum and elections?

e. Return and Participation of Refugees in Referendum and Elections

- i) What are your views on the return of refugees to Djibouti and their participation in both the referendum and elections?

f. Guarantees

- i) Do you see any danger or threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of an independent Djibouti?
- ii) If so, what kind of guarantees would you wish to have and from whom?

g. Political Unity

- i) How do you view the question of political unity before and after accession to independence, among the parties/forces fighting for independence?

h. French Military Presence

- i) Is continued French military presence in the territory after independence acceptable to your movement/party/organization or not? Why?

i. Security and Respect for Territorial Integrity and Independence

- i) What measures can your government individually and collectively with the neighbouring state take in order to enhance the sense of security to the people of the so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti) and respect for their territorial integrity and independence?

3. Conditions for Expression of Views before OAU Mission:

- i) What material arrangements has the French Government made to create the necessary conditions to allow the free expression of views by all groups to the Mission?

4k. French Government's Independence Programme

- i) What is the French Government's programme for preparing the people of the territory for their independence?

4a. Population of So-Called French Somaliland (Djibouti)

- i) What, according to you, is the present population of the So-Called French Somaliland (Djibouti)?

5. <u>QUESTION</u>	<u>ADDRESSED TO</u>
1.	Liberation Movements and Parties/Organizations in Djibouti.
2.	Liberation Movements and Parties/Organizations in Djibouti.
3.	Liberation Movements and Parties/Organizations in Djibouti.
4.	Liberation Movements and Parties/Organizations in Djibouti.
5.	Liberation Movements, Parties/Organizations in Djibouti, Ethiopia and Somali Governments.
6.	Liberation Movements and political parties/Organizations in Djibouti.
7.	Liberation Movements and political parties/Organizations in Djibouti.
8.	Liberation Movements and political parties/Organizations in Djibouti.
9.	Ethiopian and Somali Governments.
10.	Liberation Movements, political parties/Organizations in Djibouti and French Government.
11.	French Government.
12.	Liberation Movements, political parties/Organizations in Djibouti and French Government.

6. The Mission's Report which is herewith attached is in three parts, Part I gives an accurate account of the discussions held with all the parties who, in the opinion of the Mission, could provide relevant information regarding the decolonisation process of the so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti). Part II deals with the findings of the Mission and Part III contains the recommendations of the Mission.

7. Although the proposal to send a fact-finding Mission was initiated by the Liberation Committee, the appointment of the Mission and the terms of reference of the Mission was the work of the 26th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers. Consequently, the Mission recommends that the Liberation Committee should only take note of the report and submit it to the 27th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers to be held in Mauritius from 24th-29th June 1976 for consideration.

PART IREPORT OF THE OAU FACT-FINDING MISSION TO
THE SO-CALLED FRENCH SOMALILAND (DJIBOUTI)Meeting with the representative of the M.L.D. - 26th April, 1976

8. The Secretary-General of the MLD, Mr. Ahmed Burhan, read out a prepared text which outlined the objectives and programme of action in the struggle for the independence of the territory. The memorandum was officially submitted to the Mission and hereto attached to the Report. (see Annex I).

9. After the general statement made by the representative of MLD the Mission in accordance with its programme of work invited the representative to give his party's views on the points raised in the Mission Questionnaire.

10. On the question of independence the MLD representative said that his party stands for the total and unconditional liberation of the territory. The MLD is fighting for the establishment of an independent and sovereign nation committed to peace and concord within the framework of the national well being and development of its own culture, the democratisation of national institutions and the promotion of international relations. The MLD, which has fought for the politicisation of the masses, inside and outside the territory has unequivocally spoken against the atrocities of French oppression and in the struggle has solicited and obtained external support. The MLD is favourably disposed to close collaboration with the other parties as it believes that unity of action is vital to avert hatred, civil war and disintegration. The need for a common front is underlined by the fact that no single movement can liberate the territory or for that matter guarantee its independence and security without the support of all the people. In the view of the MLD, France should not be given a free hand in the territory's accession to independence since as a colonising power she would like to see the people divided and MLD has no confidence in France.

11. In regard to the referendum he is agreeable to the holding of a referendum if its specific objective is to prepare the people of the territory for genuine independence with the full participation of the genuine representatives of the people. In this exercise all the national liberation movements and interested parties must be fully consulted and the referendum should be supervised by the OAU and the UN. The MLD has obviously emphasised that any referendum held in the territory must be supervised by the OAU or the UN to ensure that the colonial administration does not manipulate the results.

12. The MLD position on the elections is that they should come immediately after the referendum and before independence. Moreover, the party is ready if the other parties are so disposed to go into coalition to speed accession to independence. As in the case of the referendum the MLD would welcome international supervision of the elections by the OAU and UN because as long as France remains in the territory she will employ every kind of machination to divide the people of the territory. The MLD, among other facilities, would like that their party be allowed to carry on normal political activities to enable them prepare for elections. In this connection the MLD solicited the support, moral and financial assistance from the OAU.

13. On the question of the return and participation of the refugees in the referendum and the elections the MLD stand is that the refugees should be allowed to return and participate fully in the political activities of preparing the country for independence.

14. In respect of guarantees for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of an independent Djibouti the MLD representative said that although Ethiopia and Somalia had at one stage or another laid claim to the territory, an independent Djibouti would like to maintain friendly relations with both neighbours. He also stressed that the OAU should use its good offices to bring pressure to bear upon Ethiopia and Somalia to respect an independent Djibouti, which in any case has traditional, ethnic and economic links with both countries.

15. On the question of continued French military presence in the territory MLD stated that when France leaves she must leave completely. However, MLD would have no objections to maintaining economic and other links with France while completely excluding any military ties. In MLD's opinion the existence of the French military base in the territory will create a dangerous precedent to the territory itself, the Indian Ocean, the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.

16. The MLD estimated the territory's population at 250,000 to 300,000. No exact figures exist because the population fluctuates depending, among other things, on the prevailing economic conditions i.e. whether there is a boom or a depression.

17. In reply to supplementary questions the MLD representative replied as follows: On the question of the number of the refugees and the percentage of the voting population MLD stated that most of the refugees who at one time numbered 30,000 were in Awash, Assab and Dire Dawa. Some of these refugees are already back in Djibouti. The MLD explained to the Mission that it was rather difficult to give a precise figure of the number of refugees from the territory, but undertook to prepare a comprehensive list and make this available to the Mission before the 13th Summit. According to the territory's laws, all above the age of 21 have the right to vote. Nevertheless, this right to vote has never been exercised and since France is the sole administrator of the elections it should be the administering power to give the percentage of the voting population.

18. The MLD informed the Mission that their party has a membership of 80,000 in the territory. The Ethiopian Government has extended facilities for the training of cadres to execute an effective armed struggle in the territory. The Executive Secretary of the Liberation Committee visited one of the training camps on May 22, 1975.

19. With regard to political prisoners held in the colonial prisons, the MLD stated that they have rendered assistance, for instance legal aid, and they would like France to release all of them unconditionally and allow them to participate in both the referendum and the elections.

MEETING WITH THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENTMorning Session

20. The meeting with the Ethiopian Government was held in the Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on April 27, 1976, at 11.45 hours. During the opening session the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia, H.E. Ato Kifle Wodajo welcomed the Mission and expressed his government's wishes to co-operate fully with the work of the Fact-Finding Mission.

21. In reply the Chairman of the Mission expressed his thanks on behalf of the Mission for the welcoming gesture of the Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs. Subsequently, after the Chairman informed the Ethiopian authorities that the object of the Mission's visit to the Ethiopian Government was to receive certain clarifications with regard to the So-Called French Somaliland (Djibouti). Following this the Chairman of the Mission requested the opinion of the Ethiopian Government in particular with regard to:

- (a) the return and participation of refugees in referendum and elections;
- (b) the security and respect for territorial integrity and independence;
- (c) the need for international supervision of the referendum and elections;
- (d) the French military presence in the territory.

22. The Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs while welcoming the above mentioned questions of the Mission requested if he could first give a general remark on the So-Called French Somaliland (Djibouti) and then return to answering the questions.

23. The Ethiopian Minister stated that the territory was an artificial territory and that all the inhabitants were new arrivals. The territory started its origin when the port of Obock was first used as a port of call for ships navigating between Europe and the Far East. As the importance of this port started to grow, people of various tribal factions moved into the area and consequently decided to establish themselves in the territory. In the opinion of the Minister the present population of the territory is approximately 285,000, 30% out of which is composed of expatriate non-residents. The Minister emphasized a fact that there does exist population movements across the borders with Somalia and Ethiopia. This

population movement is further enhanced by the economic ups and downs of the territory. The Minister stated that the population was evenly distributed between the two ethnic groups, namely, the Afars and the Issas, who at the same time have organic links with the people of Ethiopia and Somalia.

24. On the political development, the Minister mentioned the various referenda and elections held in the territory. In the outcome of these referenda and elections the overwhelming majority wished to remain with France. According to the Minister, the people of the territory expressed their wish to stay with France because of the fears that were created among the people on the basis of the claims the two neighbouring states had over the territory. The Minister was of the opinion that the major political factions of the territory are still willing to have some sort of a guarantee from the neighbouring states for the safe-guarding of their sovereignty and territorial integrity.

25. On the policy of the colonial power, the Minister stated that it has of late recognized the right of the people to self-determination. He further stated that the said colonial power had on two occasions (1958 and 1967) given this opportunity to the people. The Minister stated that since there are no political parties in the territory that are created by the history of their own struggle, the colonial power can only resort to referendum and elections for the transfer of power. The existing two major political parties are basically formed on tribal affiliations.

26. The Minister stated that the future status of the territory was linked very much with the peace in the region. He further stated that Ethiopia did not have any claims to the territory but that it will not remain passive if forces inimical to her interests are established in the territory. The Minister emphasised that Ethiopia had made it clear in Kampala at the 12th Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the OAU and in so many other places that she had no territorial claims.

27. The Minister stated that there was a lot of inter-dependence between Ethiopia and the territory and that 60% of Ethiopia's external trade was passing through Djibouti. He further stated that these

interests of Ethiopia were growing just as much as the interests of the people of the So-called French Somaliland(Djibouti) in Ethiopia. According to the Minister the independence of the territory has to be compatible with the vital interests of Ethiopia.

28. The Minister requested that the Mission while it is examining the problem of independence, should as well see into the future of the territory. While commenting on Somalia's position, the Minister stated that even though on many occasions the Somali Government has affirmed that it had no annexationist intention, there were still provisions in her constitution for the annexation of the territory.

29. On the question of security and respect for territorial integrity and independence of the territory the Minister stated that it was the Ethiopian Government that raised for the first time the question of guarantees. In the opinion of the Ethiopian Government, membership of the territory to the OAU will be a guarantee by-itself. The Minister stated that the OAU can provide tangible and specific guarantees though these may not be military guarantees. The Ethiopian Minister then proposed the following four points to serve as a basis of tangible guarantees for the independence and territorial integrity of the territory:- (a) the OAU to request Ethiopia and Somalia to enter into an agreement under its auspices in which both governments will undertake as a matter of legal obligation to withdraw all their claims and to refrain from all acts of violence which may hamper the smooth transition to independence, (b) the OAU to request and obtain specific undertakings from Somalia and Ethiopia to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the territory and refrain from altering the independence and the demographic set up of the territory; (c) the OAU and UN must in addition to this secure the necessary guarantees from all states with respect to the independence and territorial integrity of the territory; (d) the international community to consider the territory as a special case in regard to its economic development since the only means of economic viability are the port with its traditional traffic towards and outside Ethiopia, the railway and the French military establishments. Unlike other African states the So-called French Somaliland(Djibouti) has no viable economic resources.

30. On the supervision of the referendum and elections by international organisations the Ethiopian Minister stated his desire that the OAU be associated with the colonial power in the organization and conduct of the referendum. On the inclusion of the Arab League the Minister stated that the question of the territory being essentially an African question the OAU must have a primary role in the decolonization process. However, the Minister expressed that members of the Arab League could on individual basis be associated. In the view of the Minister, to include the Arab League as an institution will be admitting the existence of interests of other countries in African questions. Concluding his remarks on this question, the Minister stated that however much desirable is the inclusion of the OAU in the supervision of the referendum and elections for the acceptability of their outcomes by a larger group of the population, such an association of the OAU should not be a sine-qua-non to the holding of the referendum and elections.

31. On the question of the French military presence, the Minister stated that the government of Ethiopia has publicly stated that it does not favour the presence of the French military base in the territory. However, he stated that the presence of such a military base should not be a condition for independence. According to the Minister the presence of the military base is to some people in the territory a kind of guarantee after independence and whereas the Ethiopian Government understands this concern it does not think the existence of this military base is a necessity. The Minister stated that such fears must be supplanted by tangible OAU guarantees. The Minister added that it was the hope of the Ethiopian Government that after independence the authorities of the territory will not depart from the principle of Non-Alignment and invite foreign powers.

32. Before the morning session was adjourned, the Ethiopian Minister of Foreign Affairs gave the Mission copies of the document stating the position of Ethiopia (see Annex II).

Evening Session

33. The evening session was resumed at Africa Unity House at 18.30 hours.

The leader of the Ethiopian delegation, H.E. Ato Kifle Wodajo, Minister of Foreign Affairs, informed the Mission that he wanted to make additional statements on the following points:

- (a) on Somalia's policy of introducing violence for the disruption of the smooth transition to independence;
- (b) on the continued territorial assertion by Somalia; and
- (c) on the recent discussion Ethiopia had with the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of France.

The Ethiopian Minister requested if he could answer the two questions raised in connection with the discussions held during the morning session and proceed thereafter to give the additional statements as indicated above. This was agreed.

34. On the question of the French military presence in the territory the Ethiopian Minister stated that the French military presence was never justified. According to him, the presence of a big power in the area will only invite any other big power. He further stated that his objection to the French military presence in the territory applied to the period before and after independence. He stated that when Ethiopia asks for immediate independence it means that the French military presence in the territory must end.

35. On the possibility of the formation of a coalition and participation of all parties in the political process, he stated that he strongly supports the resolving of the differences between the various parties and the creation of a united front.

36. Clarifying the previous claims of Ethiopia over the territory he stated that there has never been a legal or constitutional provision laying claim over the territory and that the new Ethiopian Government had made it clear that whatever claim it might have had was withdrawn.

37. As to further information on the Somali claims based on a constitutional provision, he referred to Article 6 of the old Somali constitution whose objectives, according to the Ethiopian Government, were the unification of all the territories inhabited by Somalis.

The Minister stated that upon the abrogation of the first constitution the objectives of the unification of the Somali territory remained in the first Charter of the Revolution. He further made reference to an official Somali publication (Our Foreign Relations) and quoted passages from pages 63 and 39. To substantiate matters the Minister produced maps printed in Somalia and quoted statements made by President Siad Barre on October 21st 1975 (Revolution Day).

38. The Ethiopian Minister referred to the recent violence and incidents in the territory and commented on the kidnapping of children and the two recent attacks on the life of the territory's Chief Minister, Mr. Ali Aref Bourhan. The Minister also made reference to the hostile broadcasts from Somalia. The Minister informed the Mission that it should ask questions as to why there were so many incidents and violence recently, by whom they were generated and staged and for what purpose. Referring to the Lusaka Manifesto, the Accra Declaration and the Dar-es-Salaam strategy and the dictates of these documents for resorting to armed struggle the Minister stated that the recent developments in the territory were rather inconsistent.

39. On the discussion the Ethiopian Government had with the French Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. PONCET, the Minister informed the Mission that France was to convene all political factions of the territory for the appreciation of their views. He further stated that France had confirmed that in its opinion military presence in the territory should not be a pre-condition for independence. The Minister further stated that France was willing to invite observers from the OAU and the Arab League for the forthcoming referendum and elections. France had as well informed the Ethiopian Government that she was intending to hold elections immediately after the referendum. Further, the Minister stated that France was intending to convene a constitutional conference for the preparation of the new constitution.

40. On the number of refugees residing in Ethiopia, the Minister stated that it was difficult to give the precise number, though the number of the refugees at the moment is estimated at 5,000 to 7,000

The Minister stated that the Government of Ethiopia would be glad to take the Mission to the places where the refugees are located.

41. On the question of the refugees and ways of solving the problem the Minister stated that there should first be a realistic definition of a refugee. Referring to the OAU Convention on Refugees the Minister quoted Article 1 of the said Convention and stated that before determining a person, a refugee, from Djibouti it must be ascertained that Djibouti is the natural habitual residence of such a person. At the end of his intervention on this question the Minister renewed the Ethiopian Government's invitation to the Mission to visit the areas in Ethiopia where refugees from Djibouti were temporarily residing.

42. Accepting the invitation, the Mission subsequently visited two refugee camps in Assieta and Dubti in Wollo province. In Assieta, the Mission saw about 4,000 refugees. Only a small number of them had French identity cards or work permits. Asked to explain this, the Administrator of the region said that those people were Afar nomads who had their homes in Djibouti but who had also relatives in Ethiopia. These nomads do not usually bother to carry identity papers because of their frequent movement to and from Djibouti and also for fear of being refused employment in Ethiopia. The refugees carried placards some of which read "we want to return to our homeland - Djibouti," "we are against the annexation of our territory by Somalia." At Dubti, the Mission saw about 2,000 refugees, mostly Afar nomads. As in Assieta, only a handful had French identity papers. They carried similar placards.

43. After discussions with LMD and the Ethiopian Government in Addis Ababa, the OAU Fact-Finding Mission left for Mogadiscio on 28th April, 1976 where it held discussions first with the FLCS on the same day and on the following day with the Government delegation led by the Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Somali Democratic Republic Dr. Abdurahman J. Barre.

Meeting with FLCS

44. After the Chairman of the Mission had outlined the terms of reference of the Mission to the FLCS, the memorandum outlining the position of the movements was read out and presented to the Mission by the leader of the movement. The memorandum in brief rejected the proposal of the French Government as declared in the statement of 31st December, 1975 in which France expressed readiness to lead the So-called French Somaliland (Djibouti) towards independence. FLCS rejection of the proposals were made on two main grounds:

- (a) FLCS insist on necessity of negotiations concerning the process of decolonization between the colonial power France, and the legitimate representatives of the people as opposed to the leadership of the Local Government.
- (b) That the legislative elections were based on colonial system disregarding the political realities, humane problems and demographic character of the country. Full text of the memorandum is attached to the Report (Annex III).

45. The Mission then questioned the leadership of FLCS on various aspects of the process of accession to independence of the territory as contained in the Mission's questionnaire. On the question of process of independence, FLCS leadership reiterated their position as contained in their memorandum. It was emphasized that the declaration of France was against the interest of the people of Djibouti. On whether FLCS would be willing to accede to independence in coalition with other political trends, the leadership said that the movement was prepared to go into coalition with authentic representatives of the people and not with representatives of the colonial government and by that they meant FLCS would be ready to go into coalition with LPAI. The FLCS further stated that the movement would be prepared to work with all parties fighting for genuine independence and liberty and would at the same time fight the French Government and her boot-lickers. They stressed that the movement could not work with allies

of France; it would only work with LPAI. As regards the role France could play in the process of independence and after, FLCS had the following comments:-

- (a) France should recognize the legitimate rights of the people to accede to independence.
- (b) France should create the necessary conditions for the people to participate in the political evolution of their country.

46. On the question of referendum and the conditions of holding it, and whether international supervision by OAU or UN would be needed, FLCS categorically stated that referendum should be preceded by a constitutional conference which should lay down all the necessary rules and regulations which will guide the holding of such referendum. Conditions should make it possible for all adult men and women to participate in the referendum. Refugees should be allowed to return and participate in the referendum and elections. If necessary international organizations such the OAU and UN should take part in the preparation of the electoral roll.

47. On whether FLCS sees any danger or threat to the sovereignty of the territory and whether it needed any guarantees, the movement thought there was no danger. If there was any danger that would be the same as could be applicable to any country. "We cannot imagine any specific danger, we have the Charters of the OAU, and UN and those are our guarantees. There would be no threats from our people, any threat would have to come from outside and hence we may ask for guarantees. International law, Charters of the OAU, UN and Arab League are the best guarantees. No foreign presence would be tolerated in Djibouti. Djibouti would need no guarantee from anybody. Guarantees provided in the OAU and UN Charters are enough", they said. They added that should aggression take place against Djibouti the people of the country would defend themselves. And if need be they will ask assistance from whomever they wish.

48. On the question of unity, FLCS said there were only two movements fighting for the true independence of the So-called French Somaliland (Djibouti). The Movements are FLCS and LPAI. As to the French military presence, FLCS objected to this very strongly.

49. FLCS estimated the population of the territory to be 500,000 broken down as follows: 450,000 living in the territory, 30,000 refugees in Somalia and Ethiopia and 20,000 nomads. There were differences of opinion among the leadership of FLCS on the number of refugees. This necessitated the setting up of criteria of determining citizens of Djibouti when the need for drawing up the electoral roll for referendum and elections arose. The FLCS leadership could not give the approximate strength of their Movement but said that they had great following and unfortunately did not have a membership register. The leadership, however, claimed that the 30,000 refugees from Djibouti living in Somalia were members of FLCS whereas they had earlier stated that there were 30,000 refugees living in both Somalia and Ethiopia. They further stated that there was an agreement between FLCS and LPAI to negotiate for independence together. They further said that armed struggle had started in Djibouti under the leadership of FLCS.

Meeting with the Somali Government:

50. On 29th April, 1976 the Mission held discussions with the Somali Government officials. Both the welcoming address and the memorandum of the Democratic Republic of Somalia stressed the stand of the Government on the question of accession to independence of the So-called French Somaliland (Djibouti). It also touched on the consultations carried out by the French Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs with Somali Government. The memorandum covered questions of the French Military base, the role of France in the process to independence, referendum, elections and constitutional conference. It also mentioned the return of refugees and demolition of the barbed wire fence. The memorandum rejected the idea of international supervision of the proposed referendum by the OAU, United Nations or Arab League saying that such supervision would only serve to further France's diabolical plans

calculated to deprive the people of their God-given rights to independence. Both the address of welcome and the memorandum are attached to this Report. (see Annex IV).

51. The Mission then posed a number of questions to the Somalia authorities beginning with the question of continued French Military presence after independence to which the Somali authorities said that, such presence after independence would only be considered as continued dependence. Independence should be unconditional.

52. On the question of security and territorial integrity of the so-called French Somaliland after independence, the Somali authorities said, if France were to put into operation the proposals of Somalia as contained in the memorandum, the country would be given genuine independence and there would be no need for guarantees. But if the demographic composition of the people of the so-called French Somaliland was interfered with, there will certainly be no security. Left to themselves, the people of the territory would be responsible for guaranteeing and maintaining their independence. Threats of dangers which were being used as an excuse for seeking guarantees is dependent on the internal situation. The people of the territory are capable of self-defence once granted genuine independence.

53. On refugees, the Somali authorities said from 1966 there have been continued outflow of refugees to Somalia and the number from the first referendum of 1958 is estimated to be close to 100,000. The Somali authorities estimated the population of the territory to be 600,000 of whom 250,000 live in the city of Djibouti alone. It was further emphasised that the population figure was a mere estimate and that there has never been a census in the territory and France is not expected to undertake such an exercise. The question was asked on the difference of refugee figures between those given by FLCS - 30,000 - and those given by Somali authorities - 100,000. The Mission wanted to know which was correct. The Somali spokesman said that the figures were just estimates and the Mission could make its own estimates.

54. As to which forces within the territory and outside the territory Somalia considered to be the rightful participants to the Constitutional conference, Somalia replied that these were the progressive organisations within the territory such as students, labour organisations, youth organisations, LPAI and FLCS. Asked why only progressive forces and not other trends of opinion should participate in the constitutional conference, Somalia said it was a fact that the Local Government did not enjoy the support of the people. Members of the Local Government should not participate in their official capacity. Somalia was not against their participation as leaders of a movement. As to how they viewed the participation of LMD, Somalia said no useful purpose could be served by the participation of that movement. It could attend as an observer.

55. Since France was no longer a stubborn colonial force, the Mission asked whether armed struggle was not now negative. Somalia thought that the declared intention of France was welcome. What mattered was the sort of independence to be given to the territory. Short of fair facilities for genuine independence, armed struggle should continue. A change of attitude on the part of France and her positive response would render armed struggle unnecessary.

56. The Mission wanted to know of the presence of foreigners and the ethnic groups of the territory. Somalia said foreigners are composed of French troops and in April, 1976, 2,500 Ethiopians had been transported into the territory to a town called Galafi.

57. The Mission raised the question of territorial claims which are said to be found in the constitution of the Democratic Republic of Somalia and showed a map which outlines Somali ethnic limits, international boundaries and provisional boundaries, and asked whether these did not constitute a threat to the territorial integrity of the territory and hence justified the need for guarantees.

58. In answering this, Somalia said it was a common international practice for any country to guarantee its territorial integrity and security and that there had^{not} been any country whose accession to independence had to be guaranteed by other countries. Somalia wanted to know who wanted the guarantee. Was it another interested party or the colonial power? Somalia reiterated its position since her independence 1960 that it had always called for an immediate and unconditional independence of the so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti).

59. The Somali authorities informed the Mission that the provision in the constitution on union of all Somalis had been abolished in 1970. Referring to the map, they said that it was only meant to show the habitation areas of the Somali people. They went on to say that there were no provisional boundaries between Somalia and the so-called French Somaliland.

60. Then the Mission wanted to know what would be the most effective way of determining refugees since both Somalia and Ethiopia claimed to have almost all refugees in their territory and none in the other. Somalia said, the deportation from the so-called French Somaliland had been a continuing process since 1958 and the refugees had been pushed into Somalia. Somalia added that, that week alone, (week ending on 29 April 1976), nearly 100 people had been deported to Somalia. They went on to emphasise that Somalia had never been aware of refugees from Djibouti being deported to Ethiopia. But it had been an exclusive practice towards Somalia. As to movements of nomads, Somalia said it had not found it necessary to increase hardship on them by opening a register for their registration.

61. Lastly, the Mission wanted to know the attitude of the Somali Government towards the OAU Convention on refugees as a guide to determining refugees from the so-called French Somaliland. The reply was that the Somali Government was still studying the Convention.

62. The Mission was granted audience by His Excellency the President of the Somali Democratic Republic, and Chairman of the Supreme Revolutionary Council, Major-General Mohamed Siad Barre at his residence on 29th April, 1976, before leaving for Hargeisa.

63. The President welcomed the Mission to the Republic of Somalia and opened his remarks by saying that the Mission had a mandate which was both delicate and historic. He said the decolonization process in the African Continent has been long, and now there remained a few countries under foreign domination in Southern Africa (Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa) and the So-called French Somaliland (Djibouti).

64. The President said the fact that the Mission was being welcomed by France to Djibouti was a unique development. But nonetheless Somalia did not believe that the declaration of France to grant independence to the territory was genuine. There were signs, he said, which showed that France wanted to involve the OAU so as to give credibility to her manoeuvres. But the people of the territory are mature enough and can fight for their own freedom. He told the Mission that it would be able to get more truth of the situation from first-hand information on the spot.

65. The President asked the Mission to go deep into the problem. "I urge you to go deep in your enquiry", he emphasised. The President advised the Mission not to accept French manoeuvres and not to look at the French moves superficially. He further told the Mission that Somalia was not against France, and that she would work to see that Ethiopian economic interests were safe-guarded. Somalia, he said, would not promote economic strangulation of other African countries. Somalia believes in African Unity and cannot go against that line.

66. The Mission left Mogadishu late in the afternoon for Hargesia where it spent the night. In the following morning, Friday 30th April, 1976, the Mission visited three townships where there were concentrations of refugees from the So-called French Somaliland (Djibouti) by helicopters provided by the Somali Government. These were ARABSIYO, BORAMA and LOYADA, a village situated on the border with the territory only 16 Km. from the City of Djibouti.

ARABSIYO

67. The Mission found a large gathering of people; men, women and children, carrying placards some reading "We have the right to be taken back to our native home in Djibouti" and many others. The number of refugees at this town was estimated at 5,250. Many of the refugees had with them Work Permits, Vaccination Certificates

Marriage Certificates, Birth Certificates and a few had real identity cards with pictures on them, all issued by the French Government in the So-called French Somaliland (Djibouti),

BORAMA

68. The Mission was received by an enthusiastic crowd of refugees demanding to return to their home - Djibouti. The crowd was estimated at 1,200. Besides the documents seen at Arabsiyo the Mission saw also two old soldiers who had fought on the French side in Djibouti during the last World War who had been deported very recently.

LOYADA

69. This is a small control border post where a few hundred people live. The Mission again saw a demonstration of the people demanding their return to their homes in the So-called French Somaliland (Djibouti).

70. It will be remembered that Loyada was the scene of the kidnap drama of a bus full of French school children last February. The bus still stands on the border and signs of the skirmish that took place are to this day vivid.

Visit to the So-called French Somaliland (Djibouti)

71. The Mission crossed into the So-called French Somaliland (Djibouti) in the afternoon of 30th April, 1976, where it was welcomed by the permanent Secretary to the French High Commissioner, Mr. Rene Murgot. From Loyada the Mission was flown by helicopters to Djibouti airport where the French High Commissioner, Mr. Camille d'Ornano, Mr. Ali Aref Bourhan, Mr. Hassan Gouled (LPAI) and their aides were waiting to receive them.

72. From the airport the Mission was driven to the hotel through thick crowds of Djibouti residents lining on either side of the road. The people were organised in political groups. The first group from the airport was LPAI members wearing specially made dresses/...

for the occasion as well as carrying placards denouncing French manoeuvres and calling for immediate unconditional independence. This was the biggest single group and could be said to have covered almost two thirds of the whole route from the airport to the Hotel. One could sense the strong desire and emotions for freedom in the faces of the people.

73. Then came members of UNI with placards calling for independence and denouncing any manoeuvres to annex the territory to any neighbouring country and pleading for total support to Mr. Ali Aref Bourhan and his Government. This group could be said to cover two thirds of the remaining one third of the route.

74. The last group, covering the remaining bit of the route was that of members of MPL - a young political party with membership comprising mainly students and youths. They also carried placards calling for unconditional independence and denouncing the Local Government of Mr. Ali Aref Bourhan.

75. The whole show throughout the route had only one significant message, and this was that the people of the so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti) were fed-up with colonial domination and as a whole wanted independence.

76. The Mission had been expected in Djibouti by 11.00 that morning, and the programme had been planned to start late in the afternoon. But due to delay in arrival the programme had to be changed and at 17.00 the Chairman accompanied by the Assistant Secretary-General (OAU) and Executive Secretary (AFLICO) paid a courtesy call on the High Commissioner at his residence.

Meeting with LPAI

77. From 18.00 to 21.00 on the 30th April, 1976, the Mission held discussion with the leadership of LPAI at their offices. The spokesman of LPAI to the Mission was Mr. Ahmed Dini, Secretary General of the Movement. He told the Mission that since the declaration of France and the invitation to go to Paris for discussions on the future of the territory, the Movement had already handed over its proposals to the French Government. He said France had proposed a meeting in the second half of May but LPAI did not know the outcome of their proposals, whether they had been accepted, changed or new items had been introduced by France.

78. He called the Mission's attention to the fact that there were youngmen and women who had become aliens because they were born before 1943 while their brothers and sisters had French nationality since they were born after that date. He told the Mission to take note of the fact that the Party's statistics showed 45% of the population could not be considered citizens; everything depended on the question of nationality as in South Africa where passes were required to move freely within the country. Job opportunities also depended on one's nationality and if one did not have papers one could not vote. The same applied to school children: the possibility of going to school was subject to the possession of French nationality. The Secretary General wondered who could vote for the population. He further revealed to the Mission that very frequently nationality was withdrawn from those who had it and in such cases one became an alien in one's own country. When a son became an alien, he could no longer live with his family and nobody could give him shelter; therefore, a father could be imprisoned for housing his son. In short, the nationality law could make an individual become of an undetermined nationality. For this reason, LPAI has proposed the presence of all political trends at the conference which should be chaired by a neutral and competent person from within the territory. The mandate of the conference should be to look into:-

- (a) Nationality - (Citizenship) question.
- (b) Preparation of a new electoral roll.

79. It also proposed that the conference should be the only body to organize elections with the assistance of international observers and France only to ensure equitable application of all the elections regulations.

80. Asked to clarify the question of a neutral chairman for the conference, he replied that he should be an indigenous person not belonging to any political party but highly interested in the decolonization of the territory. If one cannot be found locally, then LPAI would request for one from the OAU or UN.

81. Continuing, he said that the LPAI has also asked for the abolition of all repressive laws so as to allow the people of the

territory living outside as refugees to return and those in the country to be given legal documents to participate in the elections. LPAI would like to see these procedures solved before acceding to independence. The question of removal of barbed wire was also raised by LPAI. He called for the removal of the barrier to enable free movement of the population before deciding on their future. He further called for amnesty for all political prisoners who had been convicted because they did not have identity cards.

82. As to whether the French troops had the right to vote, LPAI replied in the affirmative and added that according to the existing electoral practice they actually can vote wherever they may be. The present Speaker of the Territorial Assembly, they said is a French General who was responsible for the killings of 1966-67 following the referendum. Hence their objection to France organizing the elections or referendum. "We want to establish a state and not a French state," they said.

83. To clarify further the issue of conference, LPAI feels that the conference should be institutional i.e. Administrative, to prepare for the elections. They categorically stated that they had no confidence in the Territorial Government. LPAI had no room for tribalism.

84. When asked whether his movement would be willing to accede to independence in coalition with others, the Secretary General replied in the affirmative but not with present Local Government. He said they could have a coalition with all the fronts outside and with the Opposition Party in Parliament. He added that ties already exist between the LPAI and FLCS, and the two movements agreed on the objective but their methods differed. LPAI preferred political means while the FLCS advocated armed struggle.

85. As to whether there would be need for international supervision of the referendum and elections, LPAI accepted this in principle but only when the people of the territory were in charge of the organisation of the said referendum and elections. They would demand the supervision by the OAU, UN or Arab League in the preparations of the said referendum and elections.

86. Asked how soon after referendum should the elections take place, he said as a matter of fact they wanted independence before any referendum. For elections, they would be ready as soon as the physical difficulties have been solved, e.g., the question of nationality, release of political prisoners, return of refugees and the establishment of an up-to-date electoral roll.

87. He stated that he did not foresee any threat to the sovereignty of the country after independence and went on to say that the territory's membership to the OAU, the UN, the Arab League and the Non-Aligned Movement would be the necessary guarantee his party wanted.

88. On the French military presence, he said that OAU Resolution CM/Res.431 adopted in Kampala in July called for an end to French military presence and this had been reiterated at the Standing Committee meetings in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. He said that if the country became a member of the Non-aligned movement it did not intend to align itself with any Western or Eastern military power and the country could not claim to be independent while keeping a foreign army which had been there for more than 114 years.

89. The Mission wanted to know whether the French Government had made necessary material arrangements to create conditions for free expression of views for all political groups during its visit to the territory. LPAI replied that it was happy with attitude displayed by the French Government for allowing demonstrations as witnessed by the Mission on arrival and outside LPAI offices. Ban on public meetings had been lifted and two members of the movement had been temporarily released from prison although seventeen others were still in jail.

90. On population of the territory, he said the last census was held in 1945 and the present estimates put the population at between 200,000 and 300,000. But LPAI believes that the population is now approximately 500,000 with 230,000 living in Djibouti itself. They further consider refugee population to number between 30,000 and 40,000. These refugees they said are only in the Somali Democratic Republic, since Ethiopia had all along refused to receive refugees from the Territory.

91. The LPAI raised alarm against Ethiopia for sending in people in the territory to pose as citizens. They stressed that refugees had

always been moving to Somalia and not to Ethiopia. LPAI also promised to give a copy of letter of protest addressed to the Ethiopian Government for transporting Ethiopians to the territory - to a town called GALAFI - in collaboration with Ali Aref and the French Government. (protest letter attached, Annex XII).

92. Asked what LPAI would do if France refused to respond to their proposals and whether LPAI would contemplate any legal measures, LPAI said that the movement had no legal proposals and if the situation turned out that way, they would resort to resistance even to the extent of launching an armed struggle.

Meeting with National Union for Independence (UNI)

93. On Saturday May 1, 1976, the Mission had almost four hours discussion with the leaders of UNI. In a short address of welcome, the President of the Movement told the Mission that his party hoped to negotiate for independence with France by constitutional means bearing in mind the fact that most African countries acceded to independence in the 1960's through peaceful negotiations. The movement has chosen the same approach for the territory that being the surest and less dangerous course after the declared intention of France to grant independence to the territory. Following the independence programme given by France, UNI has called for consultation with other political organizations inside the country. The movement, he said, strongly resents external interference in the internal affairs of the territory and was opposed to its annexation by either Somalia or Ethiopia. He therefore asked the Mission to obtain guarantees for them from their two neighbours - Somalia and Ethiopia.

94. He then asked one of his colleagues - Mr. Haji Kamil, to give a short history of the territory. Mr. Kamil informed the Mission that from about 1860 French merchant ships used to call for coal near Djibouti and in 1862 the territory came under French colonial rule. He narrated several historical events including agreements reached between the French colonialists and some local sultanates. On the current political developments he said that there were no historical links of ownership of the territory with either Somalia or Ethiopia, although both countries have laid claims over the territory. He stressed that the people of the territory do not want

to be absorbed by their neighbours and called on Somalia and Ethiopia to have respect for the OAU Charter. He accused Somalia of wanting to conquer Djibouti by talking of a Liberation Movement (FLCS) which does not exist. He ended by saying that what they wanted for their country was peace and independence.

95. The Mission then put questions to the leaders of the party, starting with the position of the party on the process to independence as proposed by France. UNI stated that the party had demanded independence and this was not the proposition of France. Although in the past the party had voted in favour of continued French rule, it now demands independence.

96. In answering a question on whether UNI would be willing to go into coalition with other political trends, the Mission was told that the party was composed of all sections of the population and had no objections to a coalition with the other parties provided that that did not affect the territory's territorial integrity. It was further said that the question had been put to the LPAI in writing but there had been no reply. The members of the party were ready to unite with all the political parties to form a common front before independence. The French High Commissioner had tried to bring all the parties together and the LPAI had also been invited to take part, with the UNI, in the talks to find a common solution prior to the constitutional conference. A date had been also fixed for that meeting and it should have been respected by all the parties concerned but the LPAI had refused to co-operate. A second opportunity had been offered to the parties recently when France invited all political trends to Paris during the second half of May to hold a round table discussion; unfortunately LPAI had already stated that it would not take part in any round table talks with others but preferred to discuss alone with France.

97. On the role of France, the party felt that France as an administering power should participate in the organization of the referendum. France should also ensure border security and be ready to defend the territorial integrity of the country. As to the future

relations between the territory and France it was said that the Government established after the departure of French authority would have the right to conclude agreements, in particular, military agreements, in view of the territory's delicate situation. The party wanted the French army to remain after independence but that did not mean that the territory wanted to keep the colonialist troops by all means. If the OAU wished to assist the territory the party would dispense with French aid.

98. It also said that the question of referendum and conditions for holding it was dependent on the determination of nationality. The party felt that nationality question should be settled before any referendum. After independence the Chamber of Deputies would hold new elections for a Constituent Chamber which will draft the Constitution. UNI had no objection to OAU or UN supervision of both referendum and elections, but did not see what role the UN would play. The problem of Djibouti, it was felt, was an African problem and OAU supervision would be enough.

99. On the return of refugees and their participation in the referendum and elections, UNI said that there were no refugees. It was a fact that people had left the territory to seek their own interests however, there was nothing to prevent those who had left the territory from returning if they had the nationality of the territory.

100. The Mission wanted to know from UNI - it being the party in power, the population figure of the territory. Varying figures were given ranging from 200,000 to 500,000. Of these between 100,000 and 130,000 were said to be resident in Djibouti city alone, 250,000 being inhabitants of the remaining part of the territory and about 100,000 foreigners.

101. The UNI denied any knowledge of existence of political prisoners in the territory. They however, admitted that there were common law prisoners in the country.

102. On the question of nationality, UNI held the view that the people who were born in the territory were French citizens but this

was not the case of those who had come to work. The latter were asked their nationality before being employed. However, in the country, there were Guineans, Sudanese, Senegalese and Egyptians who had lived in the territory for a long time and could be regarded as nationals. Ethiopians and Somalis had the same characteristics as the people of the territory but they could not be considered nationals because they had their own nationality and were nationals of their respective countries.

(The statement of UNI position is contained in Annex VIII)

Meeting with the Parliamentary Opposition

103. The Fact-Finding Mission met with members of the Parliamentary Opposition on 1st May, 1976. Their spokesman, Mr. Barakat Gourat Hamadou in stating their position said that the territory had smarted under the yoke of colonialism for 120 years and that the time had come for the territory to be liberated. In fact, he did not want independence to be imposed by the French. He discarded the idea of the referendum because, in his view, the referendum could not take place before the people were provided with all the necessary papers enabling them to vote. The party wanted the question of nationality to be settled first and then the question of the referendum could be taken up later. The French Government had proposed a referendum for December 1976 but the party did not agree with the French Government which wanted to impose on the territory a referendum for the purpose of preparing the elections of a Constituent Assembly which would satisfy the desires of Mr. Ali Aref.

104. He submitted a memorandum (see Annex XI) which contained the position of the Parliamentary Opposition. In answer to a question regarding the return of refugees put to him by the Commission, he said that the Parliamentary Opposition was in favour of the return of the refugees because they have the same rights as the citizens of the territory. He suggested that a committee should be set up to identify all the refugees.

105. Asked if he thought there would be any threats to the country's territorial integrity after independence, he replied that he did not see any threat but added that if there were any it would come from Ethiopia or Somalia. In the light of this, the party would require guarantees from the OAU and the Arab League against any possible invasion from Somalia or Ethiopia.

106. On the question of French continued military presence after independence, he condemned the idea of a foreign military base in the country after independence but his party would like the French army to remain to guard the borders until the territory was in a position to ensure its defence by its own troops.

107. As regards the population of the territory, he estimated the population of the whole territory as between 300,000 and 350,000. Mr. Hamadou said that since four months the government party no longer held a majority in the Assembly. It was necessary therefore that LMD and FLCS should come back to Djibouti to form a coalition government with other parties in the territory. Since the government party had lost its majority, the Opposition group had been to Paris and had urged the French Government to dissolve the Chamber so as to avoid the mistakes of faked elections.

Meeting with Mr. Ali Aref - President of the Council of Government

108. The meeting of the Commission with Mr. Ali Aref and members of his government was held on 1st May 1976 at the State House. Mr. Ali Aref welcomed the members of the Mission and promised that he would do his utmost to facilitate the Mission's work. He then made a statement on the general situation of the country and expressed the hope that the Commission would find an adequate solution to the problem between the territory and its two neighbours, Somalia and Ethiopia.

109. The Mission told Mr. Ali Aref that it had earlier held discussions with UNI (Mr. Ali Aref's party) and wanted to know the views of his government on a number of points.

110. Asked for his opinion on the process of independence as proposed by the French Government, Mr. Ali Aref said that the process provided that all the African and Arab countries should be consulted by the French Government to help find a solution; it further provided for consultations with all the parties in the territory with a view to establishing a common front for the future Constituent Assembly. After a general agreement was reached there would be a referendum before a Constituent Assembly was elected.

111. He explained that the legal process would be long because of the preparation of the electoral list. However, he thought that everything would be settled in November 1976 and that was why people were being asked to fulfill the necessary requirements before that date. If the referendum was ratified in January 1976, the Assembly would be dissolved but that could be done after the adoption of the Constitution in about the first half of 1977. On the elections, he said that everything would be done by France to facilitate it and this will be discussed among other things including the nationality question at a meeting to be held in Paris during the middle of May, 1976.

112. Asked if he saw any threat to the territorial integrity of the territory and if so what sort of guarantees would he want, Mr. Ali Aref said he wanted political and moral guarantees from the OAU such as non-interference in the territory by Somalia and Ethiopia. Everyone was aware of the fact that the OAU did not have an army but its assistance was indispensable to the territory. The country would certainly need French military assistance after independence but he was opposed to the installation of a foreign military base in the territory.

113. In answer to the question whether there was any problem which should be solved before independence, Mr. Ali Aref replied that the political parties should take the initiative to hold talks leading to the creation of a common front for independence instead of leaving this to the Administering Power. The other problem in his view, were the Liberation Movements based in Mogadishu and Dire Dawa (Ethiopia). He felt that it was time these movements

laid down their arms to take part in a round table discussion.

Since the colonial power was now ready to grant independence to the territory, these movements should join forces with the other parties in the territory in forming a coalition.

114. On the question of what should be the role of the French Government in the process of independence and after independence, Mr. Ali Aref replied that the role of the French Government should be the observance of strict neutrality and the granting of all the necessary nationality papers. The Government should not be influenced by the political parties he said, and its role should be confined to technical assistance, cultural aid and co-operation after independence.

115. Regarding external supervision of the referendum, Mr. Ali Aref said that he would support supervision by the OAU and not by the UN as his country should first become a member of the UN before it can play this kind of role in the territory. The referendum, he said, would be global and different from that of the Comoros because the Afars and Issas were two peoples who could not do without each other and they constituted an indivisible nation.

116. The Missioner then asked for Mr. Ali Aref's views on the question of the return of refugees to the territory and their participation in the referendum and the elections. Mr. Ali Aref said that there were no refugees anywhere either in Ethiopia or Somalia. He said that persons from the neighbouring countries who travel to and from the territory could not be considered as refugees. On the other hand there were nomads with French nationality who travel outside the territory seeking pastures for their cattle. Nothing prevents such people from returning. However, he said that there were refugees who had fled Somalia to settle in the territory. In his opinion, the question of refugees was being fabricated to justify annexation of the territory to Somalia so as to enable that country to proceed with a second referendum. He remarked that members of the Commission may have seen people in Somalia carrying French papers. This was so because there were many persons in the territory who had families in Somalia and because of the fact that they had a common border. He added that he knew all those areas well and that his grandmother lived in one of them.

117. He also said that there were Ethiopian refugees in the territory who had come mainly from Eritrea but the French Government had restricted their activities because France had agreements with Ethiopia, especially the agreement on the Franco-Ethiopian railway.

118. On the question of political prisoners, Mr. Ali Aref said there were no political prisoners in Djibouti and the three prisons inside the territory contained only common law prisoners. He further said that he was the only person who could authorise imprisonment but he had not done so for he believed in democracy.

119. Explaining the current French military presence in Djibouti, he said that there were about 250 gendarmes posted in Djibouti and that there had been reinforcement of 500 because there had been attacks and riots in the country. In 1958 the city of Djibouti had 40,000 inhabitants and now the number has risen to 130,000. That could explain the reinforcement of the gendarmes.

120. On the size of the population of Djibouti and the number of those qualified to vote in the elections and referendum, Mr. Ali Aref said that the official figure given by the French High Commissioner had put the population as between 270,000 and 300,000 made up of nationals and non-nationals such as Greeks, Senegalese and Sudanese. He reckoned that about 60,000 would be eligible to vote but he was not sure about the accuracy of the figure since as in all Moslem countries women were not compelled to vote.

121. Finally, Mr. Ali Aref was asked whether he was prepared to accept that his country accedes to independence in coalition with the other political parties. He replied that the independence of a country should not involve only one party but should be the concern of all parties. He added that he was prepared to take part in the independence of the country as a simple citizen. Explaining this, he said that he was not the leader of a party but head of a government and therefore of an equal footing with everybody. In his official capacity he had done his best to bring all political parties together with little result; however he was not dissouraged.

Meeting with representatives of the Chamber of Commerce - 1st May 1976

122. The Mission welcomed the delegation of the Chamber of Commerce and asked their spokesman to give his views on the process of independence. The spokesman of the Chamber of Commerce said that his delegation had no observations to make on political questions but would state only the economic realities of the territory. As far as the Chamber of Commerce was concerned, the following three economic factors which should be taken note of in the territory:

- (1) the country has no mineral resources and its economy was based mostly on French aid;
- (2) there was transit trade due to the port which had been equipped by the French Government;
- (3) the monetary situation which, thanks to the currency now in use, had made Djibouti a privileged trading centre.

He told the Mission that he could not give exact figures to support his argument but he would supply them if the Mission so desired in due course.

123. Explaining on the economic realities of the territory, the spokesman said that military assistance constituted 70% of the territory's revenue; social services were financed from deductions from salaries; a substantial part of the territory's revenues were derived from transit trade. The state and other bodies provided social security. Although he did not wish to speak of the political situation of the territory, he said that one should envisage substitution from other quarters for the aid given to the country by France and above all the subsidizing of social welfare when the territory becomes independent. The monetary status of the territory was guaranteed by a currency based on the dollar, which enjoyed the support of the French Franc. That was what had attracted substantial financiers to Djibouti. As regards independence, the territory would certainly be ruined after independence for it now depended on French assistance for the following:-

1. the financing of military and civil services
2. the port of Djibouti where goods transited from neighbouring governments
3. the Franco-Ethiopian railway.

124. The Mission thanked the spokesman for his statement and confirmed that one could not speak of independence without mentioning the economy.

Meeting with M. P. L. - 1st May, 1976

125. The spokesman of MPL started with the information that in Tadjoura where the MPL had come to welcome the OAU Mission, one person was killed and fourteen were wounded by the police who opened fire on MPL supporters. He alleged that this was done with the complicity of Mr. Ali Aref who was in Tadjoura at that time. He invited Members of the Mission to the funeral of the nationalist who was killed. The Chairman expressed the condolence of the Mission to the party and regretted that owing to the Mission's heavy schedule, it would not be possible to attend the funeral.

126. After this expression of condolence, the Mission asked the MPL a number of questions. The first question concerned the possibility of the MPL forming a common front with other parties and movements. The MPL spokesman replied that a coalition could be envisaged with LPAI but not with what he called the colonialists forces such as UNI and stooges like Mr. Ali Aref who represented white colonialists. As for the two liberation movements, LMD and FLCS, he said these two movements had been established to satisfy Ethiopia and Somali propaganda purposes and did not represent the reality of the territory.

127. Asked about the MPL's views regarding the referendum and elections, the spokesman of MPL said that his party was against the referendum because the electoral registers were faked and as long as the necessary conditions for a fair and just referendum were not met, one could not speak of a referendum. He asked for OAU intervention to ensure the validity of the referendum because France wanted to hand over the country to a stooge like Mr. Ali Aref. If the necessary conditions were satisfied through the intervention of the OAU or UN, one would be able to say that the referendum had not been faked. Regarding the holding of subsequent elections, he also said that this should be organized and not merely supervised by international organizations to avoid foul play.

128. On the question of guarantees after independence, the MPL said that in consideration of the claim which Somalia and Ethiopia have made to the territory, it will be necessary to provide guarantees for the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of Djibouti. He noted that the Somali Radio often spoke of the annexation of their territory. The people of Djibouti wanted complete independence and do not wish to be annexed by Ethiopia or Somalia. He called on both neighbouring States to recognize and guarantee the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Djibouti.

129. In response to a question on the ideology of his party and its strength, he referred the Mission to the Party's Manifesto (Annex IX). He added that the party had offices in Dikhil, Djibouti, As-Ela, Tadjoura and Harida and was about to open one in Obock. The militants of the party number about 9,900. He claimed that there was no discrimination in membership of the party as the party's aim was to bring all the people together regardless of ethnic origin. Although the Afars were in the majority, there were also Somali militants in the party and the party was not chauvinistic.

130. Asked about the refugees, he commented that he was not sure about the figures given by Ethiopia and Somalia.

Meeting with the French High Commissioner - 1st May 1976

131. The High Commissioner began by expressing his regrets about the incident which had occurred the day the Mission visited inland towns of Tadjoura and Obock which he said had somewhat marred the image he would have liked to give of the territory. The people had been given a great deal of freedom and all arrangements had been made for them to receive the Mission calmly. What had occurred could have taken place even if there had been few people.

132. Three months ago, he said, the two principles which were to lead the country to independence had been defined. He summarised these principles and specified that the two conditions were internal peace and external security to ensure genuine independence. At the domestic level, France would endeavour to achieve consensus, in other words it would try to create conditions enabling the entire population to choose their future and their institutions. This has been done in other countries and there was no reason why it should not be feasible in the territory. As for the process leading to independence, the High Commissioner told the Mission that the word process should be interpreted to mean what the authority intended to do to have the independence accepted. In the second half of May a meeting of all the major political groups would be convened in Paris where everyone would be able to state his problems freely under

the auspices of France, which was responsible for the territory, in order to establish a programme for independence. He assured the Mission that this would not delay but accelerate independence because, at any rate, independence would be obtained.

133. As regards the external security of the country he stressed that a country could only be truly independent if it could avoid foreign intervention and guarantee the security of its borders. He felt that the OAU which represented the whole of Africa should not fail to assist in this connexion. The High Commissioner reminded the Mission that at the dinner with them he had expressed the hope that the country would become independent and a full member of the OAU. That was why the members of the Mission were today the guests of France who was depending on them. France would like the inhabitants of the territory to live in peace and within in the African community.

134. He further pointed out that by virtue of his responsibilities in the territory he considered himself a simple citizen temporarily residing in the country because France should always live up to its world image. It did not have the right to abandon the territory without making certain that the people would be able to live in dignity and full sovereignty. To conclude, he said that that was how he envisaged the process leading to national independence.

135. The Mission thanked the High Commissioner for his long statement and called for his views on the question of nationality and the right to vote.

136. The High Commissioner observed that he had expected the question especially the part on nationality. It was in fact quite strange to note that it was on the eve of independence that people were referring more and more to the question of French nationality. It was very strange but normal since nationality conditioned the electorate and the right to vote. According to French Law, one had to be French to be eligible to vote, but a native of the territory of course. He had considered the problem but it would be studied in depth in Paris in a few days time. It was obvious that the Mission would not be aware of what would happen in Paris but a solution would be found. That was France's duty.

137. The Mission reminded the High Commissioner that he had said that all political trends would be invited to Paris. Did that include the movements outside the territory?

138. The High Commissioner replied that the only manifestations he had observed from outside the territory were those of terrorism. He felt that France had never underrated any of her interlocutors because France was the country of dialogue. France would not reject dialogue, but in such a case it was normal to discuss with the leaders in the country, people who were well-known, as it was difficult to hold talks with persons one did not know; however, the door was always open. In any case, he added, what he had just said was his personal view and not that of his Government. That would depend on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in particular on Mr. Francois Poncet. Explaining further, the High Commissioner said that France had not rejected dialogue with MLD and FLCS but it first wanted to reach an agreement with the major political groups of the country. The LPAI had objected to a round table with the other movements and had decided to negotiate alone with the French Government; there were other movements other than the LPAI which would be contacted. He added that the FLCS had not made any requests and that he did not know about the existence of the movement, hence he did not see how France could invite a group whose representative it did not know.

139. The Mission informed the High Commissioner that there were movements recognised by the OAU and it had learned that those movements would also be invited.

140. The High Commissioner said that if they were invited, they would take part in the Paris talks; he felt that all interlocutors were valid even if there were divergencies he was ready to deal with external and internal matters.

141. The Mission referring to the problem of the domestic situation, asked the High Commissioner to give an idea of the various political parties in the country and their popularity. The High Commissioner replied that the question was a trap and specified that the Mission knew as much as he did about the matter.

142. Pressed for a reply, the High Commissioner said he would try to be fair but refused to speak to the Mission about the political forces in the territory because he did not want to offend anyone.

There was UNI, the Parliamentary Opposition and the LPAI, hence three political parties which would have to evolve but that would depend on the electorate. In any case he did not wish to speak for political parties because he had already become the enemy of MPL.

143. The High Commissioner went on to talk about ethnic problems in the territory. As for the ethnic problems, he informed the Mission that ethnic peculiarities and hostilities did not exist only in Africa but in the whole world. For example there was Belgium with two ethnic groups: the Wallon and Flemish. These two groups formed a single nation. France had never claimed the French-speaking part of Belgium. He said that this should remain a secret as he did not wish to offend Belgium. France already had many domestic problems and did not wish to create any difficulties by annexing a friendly country. There were many ethnic groups in the territory but there was no reason why the people should not live together.

144. Asked if the referendum and the elections would be conducted globally to avoid what had happened in the Comoro Islands, the High Commissioner dismissed the example of the Comoro Islands and said the elections would be global.

145. The Mission remarked to the French High Commissioner that it had received reports that since France took the decision to grant independence to the territory, acts of violence had increased but the Mission had not noticed any such acts. The High Commissioner was asked if these acts of violence were being committed outside or inside the territory.

146. The High Commissioner replied that the Mission had been to the border at Loyada where acts of violence had been committed. There was nothing more to point out. He drew the Commission's attention to the fact that everyone moved about freely in the city but he regretted what had occurred to the children at the border.

147. The Mission informed the High Commissioner that during the meeting with Mr. Ali Aref, the latter had said that there had been an assault with machine guns and that there were rumours of annexation

by the neighbouring countries after the territory's independence. The Mission wanted to know if the French Government had taken all the necessary measures.

148. The High Commissioner replied that the territory should receive guarantees from the OAU; that was why the Mission had come to apprise the true situation of the country. Djibouti was at the horn of Africa and was of interest to the countries opposite it, around it, as well as to those to the north and south. It was in the interest of the whole of Africa to make sure that Djibouti did not fall prey to anyone.

149. The Mission then asked whether the French Government was prepared to grant independence to the territory because many problems remained to be settled.

150. The High Commissioner stated that the French Government had requested that the popular vote should take place in November-December 1976 and the elections after; however, the LPAI had objected to the fixing of a date before the Paris meeting when the question of the referendum and the nationality law would be discussed. He was not saying that France was in a hurry but France would want everything done quickly and well. As regards the population, he pointed out that there were 225,000 inhabitants including a total of 15,000 Europeans and 210,000 indigenous persons. He added that despite the barbed wire, the population had doubled hence the fence was of no importance.

151. Asked about his opinion concerning the supervision of the elections by an international organization, the High Commissioner said that he would still be High Commissioner during the elections and promised that they would be held strictly according to the rules and this will be so even if he was no longer High Commissioner.

152. The Mission then mentioned the request of refugees to whom reference had already been made in OAU and UN resolutions. The Commission said that in Somalia it had seen persons with identity cards issued by the French authorities; they had said they had been expelled by the French authorities and wanted to return to their country. He asked the High Commissioner what could be done to have them return to take part in the elections.

153. The High Commissioner replied that if there were people with French identity cards they could report to the border and return freely to the country. He told the Commission it was the first time he had heard there were refugees with French identity cards. All such persons could return provided their cards were not faked.

154. The Mission then emphasised that it had seen people in Somalia with identity cards, marriage certificates, work permits and birth certificates issued by the French authorities.

155. The High Commissioner pointed out that there were people from the surrounding areas who came to Djibouti. He said that often these people left desert areas to come to Djibouti because they could find no food in the desert. Others came by train to settle illegally in Djibouti. Many of them had been arrested in Djibouti but he had ordered their release, including women and children who did not want to leave the territory.

156. Since the problem of nationality was very important as it would facilitate the referendum and elections and as according to information, cards were already being distributed to those who had none and this was being done before the review of the nationality law, the Mission asked if this measure would be extended to the refugees because there was also a question of blood ties, in other words, refugees who had relatives, forebears or brothers and sisters in the country and were not in possession of identity cards. The High Commissioner felt that the identity cards ought to be distributed first to persons in the country.

157. The Mission thanked the High Commissioner for his answers and especially for the release of the children and prisoners among whom were women who did not have papers. Nevertheless, the city was surrounded by barbed wire; apparently to limit the population growth of the city. The Mission raised the subject of military presence in the territory and wondered if France intended to cut down its troops gradually and also to remove the barbed wire.

158. The High Commissioner promised that the barbed wire would be removed when the country became independent but as for the French troops, he said, neighbouring countries had troops too. Troops, planes and cannons were not the Police Force and were to be found in all countries; France also had some. The Police Force was not the gendarmerie which the Mission had already seen. It was the territorial guard that did not depend on the High Commissioner. This was under the control of the territorial government.

159. Asked further what were the instructions given to troops guarding the barbed wire fence because people often tried to get through it, the High Commissioner said that tear gas had never been used against people who had tried to get through the fence. He admitted the presence of the gendarmarie in the territory and told the Mission that the country could not be guarded with a bouquet of flowers.

160. The Mission told the High Commissioner that it felt that internal security after independence depended to a large extent on the security that would be established in Djibouti before independence. This would include, in particular, consideration of the proposals of the political parties, amendment of the nationality law, the census and consequently the revision of the electoral list involving both those who were inside and outside the territory. To conclude the Mission said it had noticed that as far as the political parties were concerned, there exist certain apprehensions at the level of the leadership.

161. The High Commissioner felt that the problem should be broached in that way and promised that in Paris he would put forward the matter as stated by the Mission.

162. The Mission then asked the High Commissioner whether if all the conditions were not fulfilled would France delay independence as a result. The High Commissioner replied that France wanted independence to be granted quickly and under the best conditions.

163. Asked if France would withdraw support from Djibouti when the country received guarantees from the OAU, the High Commissioner said it would be up to the new state to decide and added that reference

was being made to a French base in Djibouti but there was no such base. He added that France would welcome OAU economic assistance to the territory after independence. Apart from French assistance, France envisages economic assistance from international organizations such as the European Development Fund.

General Remarks

164. During the visit of the Fact-Finding Mission to the So-called French Somaliland (Djibouti), the Mission was struck by the presence of very large number of French troops in the city of Djibouti who were there ostensibly to ensure security but inspite of the turn out of hundreds of demonstrators who had gathered to receive the Mission at different times, no incident was reported in Djibouti.

165. However, in Tadjourah the Police opened fire on some peaceful demonstrators who had come to welcome members of the OAU Fact-Finding Mission. One person was reported killed and fourteen were injured. Some Members of the Mission visited the wounded in the hospital. The Mission was later informed that the killed and wounded were members of the MPL and the Police did not take orders from the French High Commissioner but from the territorial government.

166. At Obock, the Mission could not see supporters of the various parties; for a few minutes after arrival the members of the Mission, could see from a distance the Police opening fire at some demonstrators carrying placards. No satisfactory explanation was given by the authorities as to why this was done.

167. In Djibouti Members of the Mission visited the barbed wire fence surrounding the city.

168. The French authorities in the territory made all arrangements to facilitate the work of the Mission and the Mission was able to carry out its work without any hindrance. The Mission registers its appreciation also for the excellent facilities which both the Ethiopian and Somali Governments made available to it thus enabling it to carry out the work assigned to it.

169. Finally the Mission wishes to record the request by all the political parties in Djibouti to be present in Mauritius when the report is being discussed by the Council of Ministers.

MEMBERS OF THE OAU FACT-FINDING MISSION TO
THE SO-CALLED FRENCH SOMALILAND - (DJIBOUTI)

170.

- EGYPT: 1. H. E. Ambassador Mohammed Fouad EL-BEDEWY (Chairman)
2. Mr. Hussien MESHARRAFA
- GUINEA: 3. H. E. M. Djebel COUMBASSA
- LIBERIA: 4. Mr. C. Ansumana COOPER
- MOZAMBIQUE: 5. Mr. Luis B. HONWANA
6. Mr. Alberto SITHOLE
- SENEGAL: 7. H. E. M. Latyr KAMARA
8. Mr. Saliou CISSE
- TANZANIA: 9. H. E. Mr. Paul RUPLA
10. Mr. J. Msolomi
- UGANDA: 11. H. E. Mr. J. W. KALISA
12. Major Bashir JUMA
13. Mr. C. KATSIGAZI
- ZAIRE: 14. Mr. Kalonji CHIKALA (Rapporteur)
15. Mr. Mindia Monga NDUMBU
- SECRETARIAT: 16. Dr. Peter U. Onu (Assistant Secretary-General for
Political Affairs)
17. Col. H. I. Mbita (Executive Secretary, Liberation
Committee.)
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PART IIFINDINGS OF THE FACT-FINDING MISSION TO THE
SO-CALLED FRENCH SOMALILAND (DJIBOUTI)

1. All parties concerned stated categorically that they want independence for the so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti). They agreed that independence should be attained through constitutional means. However, the LMD and FLCS in making reservations concerning independence within the framework of the present conditions said that such independence would be a continuation of the colonial regime under other forms.
2. All the concerned parties both in the territory and outside had misgivings regarding the forthcoming referendum and elections proposed by France. They were ready to accept a referendum and subsequent elections after certain conditions have been fulfilled (e.g. the nationality question, revised electoral roll, participation by all political parties, liberation movements, release of all political prisoners and supervision by OAU).
3. All political parties in the territory and the liberation movements were ready to consider some kind of coalition. The LPAI accepts coalition with FLCS, LMD, the Parliamentary Opposition and with UNI on condition that Mr. Ali Aref does not participate in any official capacity; FLCS accepts coalition only with LPAI; UNI favours coalition with LPAI, FLCS, LMD and the Parliamentary Opposition. LMD favours coalition with all political parties and liberation movements; MPL accepts coalition with all the nationalist and anti-colonialist forces but never with UNI with or without Mr. Ali Aref; the Parliamentary Opposition accepts coalition with all local forces namely: LPAI, MPL, and even UNI but without Mr. Ali Aref. The Mission is convinced that some kind of coalition is possible for the reasons of ethnic differences or rivalry, which some people think could bedevil this co-operation appears to be exaggerated. It was evident that membership of all the political parties cuts across all the ethnic groups in the territory.

4. Regarding the supervision of the referendum and elections, all parties were unanimous on the need for OAU participation. Some of the political parties and national liberation movements agreed to the participation of the League of Arab States in the supervision of the said referendum and elections while only one country opposed such supervision by the League of Arab States. The UNI on its part does not see what useful purpose will be served by UN supervision since the problem is one that should be the sole concern of Africa. However, the MPL stated that the supervision of the preparations for the referendum and the elections was more important than the supervision of referendum and elections.

5. Regarding special measures or facilities taken by the French Government for the forthcoming referendum and elections the French High Commissioner said that the details relating to these would be considered by the parties in a conference to be held in Paris. But he also informed the Mission that the Administration was in the process of distributing identity cards to certain people and has released those he called political prisoners. Even though the Mission established that there was as yet no blue print for the referendum and elections, the French Government hopes to discuss and formulate modalities for the projected referendum and subsequent elections during the second half of May 1976 in Paris with the concerned parties.

6. All the political parties and liberation movements were agreeable to the participation of all genuine citizens of the so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti) in the referendum and elections. The territorial government and UNI were of the opinion that there were no refugees; however UNI stated that if there are any they agree to accept the return of these refugees once their nationality has been ascertained by given criteria to be decided by the political parties. Following this the OAU could assist in their repatriation. The FLCS and LND urged the return of the refugees but indicated different criteria.

7. The Mission established that the question of nationality is one of the most important issues. All concerned parties including France were unanimous on the fact that the question of nationality must be solved before the referendum and elections.
8. There were definite differences over the question of guarantees after the territory attains independence. Some parties considered that the membership of OAU and UN would be sufficient guarantee for their independence. Others demanded the solemn guarantees of Ethiopia and Somalia under the auspices of the OAU. They added that the two neighbouring states should renounce any claims to the territory. Some other parties considered that besides the solemn guarantees from the two neighbouring states they deem it necessary to have French military presence for the purpose of assisting them to build their national army and if necessary to defend their borders.
9. All concerned parties were opposed to the presence of all foreign military bases in the territory.
10. The Mission was not able to establish the exact figure of the population either in Djibouti city or in the whole territory. The figure given to the Mission varied from 250,000 to 500,000 for the entire territory.

PART IIIRECOMMENDATIONS1. Refugees

The Mission recommends that in order to solve the problem of refugees, an Ad Hoc Committee comprising the French authorities, two representatives each from the three political parties namely LPAI, UNI and MPL, the Parliamentary Opposition and the National Liberation Movements FLCS and LMD, should be set up with a view to determining who the refugees are and for organising the process of their return using the OAU Convention on Refugees as a guide. The OAU Bureau of Refugees (B.P.E.A.R.) and the U.N.H.C.R. could assist the Ad Hoc Committee in this exercise. Once the nationality question is settled, the Ad Hoc Committee should see to it that these refugees are accorded full citizenship rights.

2. Guarantees

Though there was no unanimity among the parties concerned on the question of guarantees it is an acceptable principle in the view of the Mission that guarantees should not be regarded as a sine qua non condition for the independence of any territory.

Notwithstanding the above, the Mission, having taken note of the strong views expressed by some concerned parties strongly recommends that the next Summit Meeting of the OAU to be held at Mauritius in July 1976 should reaffirm Resolution CM/Res.431/Rev.1 (XXV) and the Summit should call upon all member states and particularly the two neighbouring states, Ethiopia and Somalia, to respect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the new state.

3. Referendum and elections

Since all the political parties, the national liberation movements and the French Government agree that the holding of a referendum and subsequent elections should be preceded by the settlement of the nationality question and the revision of the electoral roll which should be based on universal adult suffrage and as all the concerned parties agree to OAU's supervision of the

referendum and elections, the Mission recommends that the OAU should participate in this exercise and should be involved in all the steps leading to it.

4. Creating the necessary atmosphere for peaceful accession to independence

Since it is not proper in the opinion of the Mission for the President of the territorial government, who is also a leading member of one of the political parties in the territory to have control over the police force at the present transitional stage of the territory to independence, the Mission recommends that in order to create the necessary conditions for peaceful accession to independence, all the law enforcement agencies should be the sole responsibility of the French administration in the territory.

5. Common Political Platform for the Political Parties and Liberation Movements

The Mission recommends that all the political and the national liberation movements should meet as soon as possible in a neutral ground under the auspices of the OAU in order to form a common platform in the process leading to independence.

6. Assistance to the territory by OAU

As it is obvious that the so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti) will be faced with enormous economic problems after independence, the OAU should include the independent territory of Djibouti in its assistance programme for all the newly-independent states. The Mission also recommends that member states of the OAU should give the independent state of Djibouti assistance on a bilateral basis.

COMMENTS OF THE OAU LIBERATION COMMITTEE ON THE
REPORT OF THE FACT-FINDING MISSION TO THE SO-CALLED
FRENCH SOMALILAND (DJIBOUTI)

1. The report was introduced by the Rapporteur of the Mission, the Representative of Zaire.
2. In his introduction, the Representative explained the terms of reference of the Mission, the mode of organising its work, the views of interested parties, remarks and recommendations of the Fact-Finding Mission.
3. After the introduction and extensive discussions, it was decided that:
 - (a) the Committee should take note of the Report after general observations had been made on it. These observations should be submitted alongside the Report of the Mission;
 - (b) the Report be distributed to all Observer Member States and Liberation Movements and that they be allowed to participate in the discussions;
 - (c) the Report should also be distributed to all other parties concerned.
4. On the general observations on the Report, the following ideas emerged:
 - (i) There was a general agreement on the involvement of the OAU in the exercise to determine "who the refugees are and for organising the process of their return, using the OAU Convention on Refugees as a guide.
 - (ii) On the question of guarantee for the independence and integrity of the territory of the So-called French Somaliland (Djibouti), the Minister of Ethiopia observed its importance, stating that this question should have received greater consideration of the Fact-Finding Mission of the OAU.

Some delegations of Member States also expressed their views that this question is a delicate or an important one which has of late engaged the attention of the OAU.

The Minister of Somalia also stated that this question has received sufficient consideration of the Fact-Finding Mission of the OAU.

To the Chairman of the Commission
of the Organization of African Unity.

Mr. Chairman,

We the Members of the Executive Committee of the Liberation Movement of Djibouti, taking advantage of this occasion, have the honour to present, on behalf of the fighters and militants of our movement, the position of the MLD on the future status.

1. The Liberation Movement of Djibouti has been set up in 1964 by nationals of the so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti) who have come to seek refuge in Ethiopia having been expelled from their motherland by the repressive machinery of French Colonialism.
2. The aims of our Movement are and continue to be the following:
 - (a) The total liberation of our country from the yoke of French colonialism.
 - (b) The establishment of an independent sovereign nation wherein all citizens shall live in freedom and equality, in understanding and peace, and work in democratic institutions for their economic well-being and cultural development.
 - (c) The struggle against colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism, the struggle for democratization of international relations, the promotion of mutual respect, friendship and brotherhood among

all peoples as well as the development of co-operation, on equal basis, amongst all countries in the horn of Africa.

3. The Liberation Movement of Djibouti has been recognized in 1965 by the Organization of African Unity and has since benefited from the generous assistance and active solidarity of free Africa, and from progressive, anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist forces of the entire world.
4. Thanks to this support and solidarity, the Movement of the Liberation of Djibouti in the course of the pasted ten years has been giving political education to the people inside and outside the Territory, and drawing the attention of international public opinion to the perpetual crime committed against our people by French colonialism. In this connection, our movement has also been fighting to assert the legitimate rights of our people to freedom, independence and dignity.
5. The struggle that we had thus carried out has also strengthened the efforts of our brothers and sisters who are fighting be it inside or outside of the Territory. The political and diplomatic support that our cause received from free Africa and progressive forces of the entire world have cornered French colonialists and has obliged them to recognize the right of our people to independence.
6. There we are, thanks to the courage and sacrifice of our people, thanks also to our African brothers, we are on the threshold of independence.

7. At this stage of the situation, we cease the opportunity to inform you of our apprehensions and anxieties.
8. The Unity of action of all political parties and movements is an absolute necessity for our true national independence..
9. This unity of action is of paramount and absolute necessity, not only for the liberation of our people but also for ascertaining the building up of a nation which is politically stable and economically prosperous.
10. Without this unity of action, we cannot expect anything else but the unleashing of hatred, confrontation of different groups, fratricidal war, the destruction of the nation, the rise of new colonialism and finally the disappearance of our country from the world maps.
11. We have to avoid such a disaster, Africa must help us to confront it, and your mission must have this factor as a starting point.
12. The Liberation Movement of Djibouti is convinced that no political party, nor a group of personalities could pretend to liberate by itself the territory of Djibouti. One group alone is even less able to maintain its political stability. Thus LMD had always called for consultations and negotiations with the view to setting up a common front by gathering all political tendencies around a common programme of action.

13. Having the same historical background and sharing the same destiny, our people in spite of ethnic and linguistic diversity is bound by a strong sentiment of national community.
14. This feeling of national community is the main guarantee for our independence and the territorial integrity of our country.
15. This being the case and because of the expansionist aims of one of our neighbours we are confident that the OAU will examine the complexities of the problem prevailing in our region and take appropriate measures that will ensure the independence and the territorial integrity of our country. Peace and security of this part of our continent require this price.

CM/759 (XXVII)

Annex II

VIEWS OF THE PROVISIONAL MILITARY GOVERNMENT
OF ETHIOPIA ON THE INDEPENDENCE AND FUTURE
OF THE TERRITORY OF DJIBOUTI

1. Purpose of the Present Statement

1.1 The present policy statement does not intend to assert on behalf of the people of Djibouti their right to self-determination and independence. Indeed it would be inappropriate to do so, because no one should attempt to appropriate the right to speak on behalf of the people when they themselves are articulating their desire and when they themselves are organizing for independence.

This policy statement only sets out:

- The position of Ethiopia, a neighbouring state, which shares with the Territory of Djibouti over 400 miles of a common frontier and whose two peoples are closely bound by blood and history, and who enjoy today as they always have in the past a high degree of economic, cultural and security inter-dependence.

- An African position, which does not intend to supplant itself for the desire of the people, but one that aims to respond to the needs of the people for safeguarding their independence and territorial integrity after accession to independence.

2. The Right of the People of Djibouti to Independence

2.1 The people of Djibouti have a fundamental and inalienable right to an independent national existence. This is a right which is universally recognized by the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Charters of the OAU and other international and regional organizations as well as by the constitutions of most states.

Like all peoples who had been and who still are under colonial rule, the people of Djibouti have the right to enjoy their independence through the exercise of free choice. There cannot be any other route to independence from colonial rule except through self-determination.

2.2 The right of peoples under colonial rule to self-determination and immediate independence is particularly enshrined in the United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV), 14 Dec. 1960.

Under this historically important document, the right to independence of colonial peoples is declared to be absolute and unconditional, and one that cannot be pre-empted by any other right, nor restricted by economic and other considerations. To this end the Declaration states, inter-alia,

"that all peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory..."

that

"Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence."

In countless resolutions the United Nations has asserted the rights enunciated in this Declaration with respect to every and all peoples under colonial rule.

2.3 The Charter of the OAU lays down as one of the purposes of the Organization of African Unity the complete eradication of colonialism from the face of Africa. Thus the right of African peoples under colonial rule to self-determination and independence is not only enunciated as a fundamental and inalienable right, but also as an objective for the achievement of which all independent African States, members of the OAU, have an obligation to work.

2.4 The link between the enjoyment of the right to independence and international peace and security has increasingly come to be recognized. So much so that today the international community as a whole, and the United Nations in particular,

and such regional organizations as the OAU, the League of Arab States etc., have assumed special responsibility to assist peoples under colonial rule who are waging a struggle for their independence.

2.5 Thus the people of Djibouti have a fundamental right to self-determination and immediate independence.

This right is absolute and unconditional, and cannot be circumscribed by any claim to their territory, asserted on the basis of ethnic affiliation, economic or security interdependence.

This right to independence also includes the right of the people to freely determine without any interference the conditions of their independence. No one can arrogate to himself this right which belongs to the people of Djibouti.

The OAU, the United Nations, and the international community at large, has the duty and the responsibility to assist the people in their struggle for independence. But it should be clear, however, that this assistance cannot be at the expense of the right of the people to a free and unimpeded choice.

3. Ethiopia's policy for the Independence of Djibouti

3.1 The policy of the PMG for the genuine independence of the people of Djibouti can be described as one of unconditional and full support.

This policy has been articulated on several occasions by no less an authoritative spokesman for the PMG than the Chairman of the PMAC and the Council of Ministers, His Excellency Brigadier General Teferi Bante. Suffice it to quote here important statements that he made on two occasions.

First, on the occasion of Africa Liberation Day on 25 May, 1975, in a nation-wide address to the people of Ethiopia, he said:

"We now wish to address ourselves to the problem of Djibouti, which is located in

in our region. The people of Djibouti have close historic, geographic, religious, demographic and economic ties with the people of Ethiopia. For these reasons, it is obvious that the general well-being and security of our two peoples are interdependent. The Provisional Military Government of Ethiopia, therefore, warmly supports the right of the people of Djibouti to determine their own future without external interference."

Second, in another important address to a meeting of African Heads of State and Governments in Kampala on 29 July 1975, he reaffirmed the policy of the PMG as follows:

"The only French possession in Africa that has not gained its independence is the Territory of the Afars and Issas, popularly known as Djibouti. Ethiopia believes that the future destiny of this territory should be based on the free choice of the people. If independence is their choice, Ethiopia will accept that, and will be happy to live with an independent neighbour whose sovereignty will be assured by its membership in the Organization of African Unity. Since history, geography and continuous historical interaction have created a mutuality of interest between this territory and Ethiopia, the preservation of which will no doubt redound in increasing measures to the benefit of both, Ethiopia has every confidence that an independent state in this important part of the Horn of Africa will recognize her vital interests.

"The Provisional Military Government does not believe that Ethiopia's policy poses any difficulty to the independence of the Territory of the Afars and Issas. Whatever historical rights Ethiopia might have had in this area she recognizes that these are overridden by the right of the people to independence. If there is any difficulty to its independence it should be looked elsewhere.

I would like to make it clear that Ethiopia does not have any legal act or legislation on its books asserting any claim to the territory".

The same policy has been stated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia in an address on October 3, 1975 to the 30th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and to the Council of Ministers and the Liberation Committee of the OAU. Further statements by spokesmen of the PMG, defining Ethiopia's policy, have been widely disseminated and commented upon by the Ethiopian press and media as well as by the international press. The records are ample and can be referred to.

While Ethiopia has such a forthright and positive policy which does not lead itself to any ambiguity or misinterpretation, the PMG believes that the African community of independent states, and the two neighbouring states to the Territory of Djibouti in particular, should assist the people so as to enable them to receive their independence in unity.

The PMG opposes any and all attempts aimed at subverting the self-determination process by setting one ethnic or political group against another, or by introducing violence in order to influence the outcome of the political process, or by attempting to alter the demographic composition of the Territory.

The IMG cannot, in particular, countenance a deliberate attempt from the outside directed at realizing any claim to the Territory of Djibouti.

3.2 Each colonial situation has its own characteristics, offering particular challenges and opportunities. In this regard, Djibouti is no exception. The decolonization process of the Territory presents certain challenges which call for constructive diplomacy on the part of the African community of nations.

4. Characteristics of the Political Situation in Djibouti

4.1 Unlike most African territories which became independent in the post-war years, the situation of Djibouti poses a special decolonization problem. The Territory of Djibouti is 8,996 square miles with an estimated population of over 285,000 persons. A good part of this population is concentrated in the administrative capital city of Djibouti. The population is divided between the two principal ethnic groups, the Afars and the Issas.

Moreover, residing mostly in Djibouti, there is a disproportionately large group of expatriate residents who come from the neighbouring countries as well as a sizable European population. According to the latest United Nations estimate, this group accounts for 30.4% of the entire population.

With the tradition of constant movement of people in the area, the size of this expatriate group has ebbed and flowed according to the ups and downs of economic activities in the Territory. This in turn has created a problem as to who can legitimately be considered a bona fide resident of the Territory, with full rights to participate in the Territory's political process. On the other hand, it has also opened a potential avenue of interference from without in the affairs of the Territory. Attempts had been made in the past to alter the demographic composition from the outside with the hope of influencing the outcome of elections in the Territory.

As of now, no visible resources which could sustain the expansion of its economy have been identified in the Territory. Furthermore, as the Territory does not dispose of any agricultural hinterland, most of its economic activities are based on the transit trade of Ethiopia, especially on the railway traffic between the city of Djibouti and Addis Ababa.

The Administration Budget of the Territorial Government of 2.5 Billion Djibouti Francs (U.S.\$11 million) is almost dependent on French Government subsidy. It is obvious, therefore, that an independent Djibouti, more than any of the least-developed of the developing countries, will require the most generous international assistance for the development of its economy as well as close economic cooperation with its neighbours.

4.2 Apart from the above limitations another important factor which has acted as a constraint on progress towards independence has been the concern that the people as a whole had and continue to have with actual or potential claim to their territory by neighbouring states.

One of the neighbouring states has never hidden its designs to absorb Djibouti into its national territory. This claim is asserted on ethnic affiliation, and constitutes a part of its larger claims on territories of other neighbouring sovereign states.

Unlike Ethiopia, which has made clear its complete and unconditional support for the genuine independence of Djibouti as well as its withdrawal of any and all claims it may have had to the Territory, the other neighbouring state has persisted only in reiterating its support for self-determination and in promising not to annex the Territory. It is obvious, however, that renunciation of the concept of annexation which denotes aggressive military action, does not cover the deliberate subversion by a state of the political process of another territory which could have similar results.

Even after the Kampala meeting of African Heads of State and Government, as well as the Lima Conference of Foreign Ministers'

of Non-Aligned Countries called upon the neighbouring states to renounce their claims to Djibouti, one of the neighbouring countries continues to be ambivalent.

Moreover, during the 30th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, the world body, at the insistence of Ethiopia, passed a resolution calling "upon all states to renounce forthwith any and all claims to the Territory and to declare null and void any and all acts asserting such claims "(Res.3480/LXX). Had this call been accepted by all the neighbouring states, it would have obviated the fear the Territory's people have of potential infringement of their sovereignty and territorial integrity after independence. Unfortunately, however, the representative of one neighbouring state chose to express his Government's reservation on the particular paragraph of the resolution (operative paragraph 6) which called for renunciation of claims by the neighbouring countries, thus intensifying the fear of the people of Djibouti.

In explaining his Government's reservation, the representative of the neighbouring country declared that the call for renunciation did not apply to his country ⁽¹⁾. The implication of this declaration was obvious: since his government considered Djibouti as part of its own national territory which is under "foreign occupation", it was only logical for him to believe that the call for withdrawing claims did not refer to his Government's continuing policy.

4.3 Looking at the brighter side of the political situation in the Territory of Djibouti, one finds a number of encouraging and positive developments.

(1) General Assembly, Thirtieth Session, A/PV.2437

Until quite recently the only groups which demanded independence for the Territory were the two liberation movements, Mouvement de Liberation de Djibouti and Front de Liberation de Cote de Somalie. All political parties and political groups, on the other hand, were in favour of remaining under French rule with some autonomy for local government.

Today all this has changed. The Territorial Council and Government have expressed their desire for total and immediate independence. They have taken substantial steps towards this end. The Government of France has agreed to this demand and is in the process of formalizing the Territory's accession to independence.

True, there are differences among the politicians of the Territory regarding the procedures to be employed for the self-determination process, but these are more apparent than real. These differences have their basis mainly in personal rivalries and are amenable to political solution once external interference ceases. It can be said therefore that the people of Djibouti almost have their independence in their hands. If there is any single obstacle in the way of the independence of the Territory, it is the uncertainty which hangs over its security and territorial integrity after independence. This is the most central and crucial issue to which solution must be found immediately.

4.4 Given the above-enumerated positive developments in the politics of the territory, the increasing introduction of violence into it from the outside has been a matter of surprise and concern not only to Ethiopia but to other African States who have closely followed the Territory's progress towards independence. Surprise because violence, both intercommunal and one directed at the personnel of the colonial administration, is a relatively new phenomenon; and concern because at this stage of the liberation struggle there are sufficient indications that violence is being introduced to advance an objective other than the Territory's independence.

It is incumbent upon the African community of nations, to ask certain pertinent questions at this juncture. Why has there

been increasing violence in the Territory at this particular time? Who are the perpetrators of this violence, and for what objectives, and in whose service is violence being employed?

FLCS, the Mogadiscio based liberation movement, has claimed responsibility for some of the violence, including the latest mass kidnapping of school children. The PMG believes that given the positive trends in the political situation of the Territory, the increasing introduction of violence at this stage of the independence struggle cannot be justified on rational grounds.

Furthermore, the PMG is convinced that such violence at this time will not serve any purpose except to subvert the self-determination process of the Territory, polarize the people and possibly kindle an inter-communal war along ethnic lines. This is the more so, as the group does not have any following within the Territory.

5. Interdependence between Ethiopia and the Territory of Djibouti

5.1 First, the Territory of Djibouti is inhabited by two principal ethnic groups. The majorities of these two groups - i.e. the parent groups - live in Ethiopia.

Numerically, the total number of the entire Afar group on the Horn of Africa is approximately 630,000. Of this number, 130,000 live in the Territory of Djibouti, whereas the rest (500,000) live in Ethiopia.

Similarly, the total number of the Issas ethnic groups are Ethiopians and have always lived in Ethiopia.

This ethnic affiliation has always manifested itself in abiding mutuality of interest. An external situation which would affect the well being of either people is thus bound to have consequences on the other.

5.2 Secondly, throughout history Djibouti has been a natural outlet to the sea for Ethiopia's hinterland. The construction of the port of Djibouti and its subsequent linking by a railway with the interior of Ethiopia around the turn of the century has led to the development of a highly interdependent economic relationship in the area. At present the port of Djibouti handles over 60% of Ethiopia's external trade and it is bound to become even more important as an outlet when the vast region of Ethiopia south of the Rift Valley is fully developed.

The people of the Territory are almost wholly dependent on Ethiopia for their subsistence. Not only transit trade to and from Ethiopia constitutes the mainstay of the territory's economic activity, Ethiopia is also the principal supplier to the Territory of all types of foodstuffs from vegetables to poultry and meat, as well as potable water.

5.3 Finally, the significance of the Territory of Djibouti to Ethiopia's security interests cannot be over-emphasized. Strategically situated as the Territory is at the cross road of the continents of Africa, Asia and Europe, any situation that would disturb the existing inter-dependence and mutuality of interests between Ethiopia and the Territory would seriously endanger the well being and the security of both countries.

Because of this complex web of interdependence and mutuality of interests, Ethiopia believes that the Territory's independence to be compatible with her interests and supports the genuine independence, unity, territorial integrity and the continued existence of Djibouti as a sovereign state.

6. The Problem and the Solution

6.1 Like all problems of decolonization, the case of Djibouti involves the transfer of the powers of government to the genuine representatives of the people. In colonial territories, where there have been single well organized liberation movement which have established their legitimacy through ardent

struggle, the colonial powers did not have any option but to transfer the powers of government directly to them. In situations where there have been more than one liberation movements, however, the colonial powers have always fallen into the temptation of playing one against the other in order to slow down the process of independence or to create conditions that would favour the movement they considered to be amenable to preserving their interest after independence. Too often also, when the prospects of independence are in sight, rivalries for power and office intensify among the political leaders.

Now that Djibouti is on the threshold of independence, it manifests many of those familiar characteristics described above. As there are more than one acceptable competing groups, rivalries among the leaders have intensified. Since no one political group has developed an incontestable legitimacy by a long history of struggle, it has been convenient for each to claim that it has done more than the other for the independence of the Territory.

As has been done in similar situations, the only way to resolve such differences is by persuading those factional groups to see the advent of independence as an opportunity to work together rather than regard it as a bone of contention, and where circumstances permit, to help organize free and democratic elections which would make it possible for all political groups to face their people through their political programmes.

If those leaders were so far unwilling to ask for independence, it was because they had genuine fear that their territorial integrity and sovereignty would be jeopardized by claims laid to their country by the neighbouring states. This fear is based on the recognition of the fact that their territory is not endowed with sufficient resources and could not therefore enable them to assure respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Djibouti.

Now that Ethiopia for her part has made an unequivocal statement renouncing any and all grounds for potential claims to Djibouti, an opportunity has, for the first time, emerged to allow

the people of the territory to consider independence as a viable proposition for the future of Djibouti. Even though the apprehension of the people of the Territory was thus partially allayed, unfortunately it still remains a matter of great anxiety for the people that the other neighbour continues to be committed to a policy of expansionism by maintaining constitutional provisions which seek the realization of the annexation of the Territory, as well as by public declarations to the same effect by high officials of that neighbouring state.

From the OAU point of view, the problem should be looked at as having two phases, one pertaining to the stage before independence and the other after independence. Having regard to the considerations set forth above, if the OAU is to assist the people to accede to and enjoy their independence, it cannot apriori say that it can only be concerned with the process before independence. As the history of the Territory of the last ten years has amply demonstrated, the two phases cannot be separated. The prospect after independence, particularly the fear the people continue to have that others may not respect their territorial integrity has played a part in delaying their demand for independence. In as much as the OAU should address itself to the question of transferring the powers of government to the authentic representatives of the people, it should therefore consider the challenge of providing tangible guarantees to the effect that the sovereignty and the independent status of the Territory will be respected by all.

True, the membership of an independent Djibouti in the OAU and in the United Nations might provide some guarantee. In the view of the Provisional Military Government of Ethiopia, however, in the absence of any modicum of defence capability on the part of the Territory, such guarantees could not be sufficient by themselves, especially against subversion or against attempts to abolish the independent status of the Territory by altering the demographic composition of its population.

Given also the importance of the Territory for the security and economic well being of all the neighbouring states, any attempt by any country in the region to alter the independent status of the

Territory in pursuance of any policy under whatever guise or seemingly lofty ideals, could not be accepted by the other. As far as Ethiopia is concerned it would consider such a policy as a potential source of conflict endangering the peace and security of the area.

Despite the fact that the OAU may not be in a position to provide military guarantees for ensuring the territorial integrity of an independent Djibouti, the PMG believes that the OAU can offer certain tangible guarantees if this challenge is faced realistically and resourcefully.

The PMG would like therefore to make the following proposals which it hopes would meet the requirements of the situation both before independence and after independence.

1. Process Before Independence

The task facing the OAU at this stage is to enable the different political groups to receive independence in unity so that whatever differences there may be among them will not be exploited with a view to delaying independence, or to making sure that those who will be receiving independence on behalf of their people will be those who would be amenable to the objectives of outside interests. With this in view,

- (a) The OAU has to work for the creation of a united front of all political factions in and outside the Territory who are for immediate independence.
- (b) To discourage all political groups and factions from arming clandestinely their followers as it is now clear that such arms are intended for use against each other and not against the departing colonial power.

- (c) To encourage all political groups to promote conditions conducive to the free expression of views and, to this end, to eschew appeals to tribal loyalties and instead to formulate national political programmes which they can submit to their people.

2. Post-independence Guarantees

In an agreement to be signed under its auspices, the OAU should request and obtain from Ethiopia and Somalia, the two neighbouring states to the Territory of Djibouti:

- (a) A specific undertaking of renunciation of any and all claims to the Territory of Djibouti, in compliance with the provisions of the OAU Resolution No.431/Rev.1(XXV) (Kampala 12th Summit) and the UN Resolution 3480 (XXX) which called upon all states to renounce forthwith any and all claims to the Territory and to declare null and void any and all acts asserting such claims.
- (b) Such other undertakings as may be required to respect the independence and the integrity of the territory, to refrain from any and all acts designed to alter the independent statehood of the Territory, and to cease and desist from interfering in the internal affairs of the Territory, and particularly to abandon all attempts to change the demographic composition of the Territory.
- (c) In addition to such undertakings that the neighbouring states may be called upon to give, the OAU and the UN should also provide other tangible guarantees as may be necessary and appropriate for ensuring the territorial integrity and independent statehood of the Territory, with a view to enhancing the sense of security of the people of Djibouti.

- (d) Considering the lack of visible natural resources for the development of the economy of the Territory, the international community should consider Djibouti as a special case requiring co-ordinated assistance for its development.

The Provisional Military Government of Ethiopia would like to make it absolutely clear that it is prepared to provide any guarantees that may be required of it by the OAU along the lines indicated above. The PMG also welcomes such additional guarantees that the OAU and the UN may wish to provide in keeping with their paramount responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security in our region. The PMG believes that, if the OAU were to take into account the characteristics of the Territory's problems, which are more than the usual problems posed by the process of decolonization, it would have made a constructive contribution to their solution. If, on the other hand, the OAU were to ignore some aspects of the problem and if it were to let developments take their own course, it would not have lived up in full measure to its responsibility to the people of Djibouti and it would have left a time-bomb ticking away on the Horn of Africa.

Addis Ababa,

26 April 1976.

FROM: FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION,
THE SOMALI COAST,
MOGADISCIO,
SOMALI DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC.

27th April, 1976.

To: OAU Fact Finding Mission to the Somali Coast,
Mogadiscio.

It is a great pleasure for us to welcome your Fact Finding Mission, appointed to assess the real political situation of the Somali Coast.

Your visit comes at a crucial moment for the future of our people and country. It is not ~~superfluous~~ to say that your historical Mission is of a great importance for our cause, because, the result of your work will contribute to the process of decolonization of our country. We call on the attention of the Honourable Members of the Committee to the fact that the powerful colonial apparatus has been activated to deform the political realities of our country, it is therefore your responsibility to obtain the maximum information which will help you assess accurately the prevailing political situation in the country by meeting with the masses and their true representatives, only in this way you could arrive at an objective conclusion.

As from the 31st December, 1975, the Colonial Government of France has expressed its readiness to lead our country towards independence and defined the So-called process of decolonization as follows:--

1. To hold a constitutional Conference in which all political parties would participate,

2. To hold a legislative election in which the future government of the country will be elected.

The FLCS has already expressed its opinion by rejecting the French colonial government proposal for the following reasons:-

1. FLCS insists that the negotiations concerning the process of decolonization must be discussed between the colonial power and the legitimate representatives of the people instead of being between the Puppet of France and the legitimate representatives as suggested by France.
2. The legislative elections are based on the colonial legislation and could not therefore take into account the political realities, human problems and demographic realities of our nation. The possession of French identification documents are a condition to the right to vote, such documents are issued solely by the colonial Administration under arbitrary conditions and are manipulated to suit the colonial policies and political conviniences. In this manner all those considered nationalists by the colonial regime are either barred or even made to lose these documents at the same time all the female population are placed out the right to vote, in this way 90% of our people cannot exercise their political rights.

For instance an order-in-council dated 18th July, 1963 barres the somali population of the Somali Coast from the right of citizenship, even those who are born in the territory are effected by the law in question. Another law of 7th May, 1946 excludes the sons of the former French subject the right to claim their father's nationality. This is why two (2) members of the same family born and bread in the Somali Coast are compelled to hold different nationalities, one considered French and the other a foreigner without the basic civil rights.

It is therefore incumbent upon us to express the fronts' view point with regards to this important Mission, The French Government has since the last year expressed its opinion about the independence of our country in a manner that could seem to the world opinion an honest intention to prepare the country for independence. We have however proven beyond doubt that the French Government's actions are completely contrary to the opinion so far expressed.

What strenghthens our doubts are the measures taken by France to further re-enforce its position in the territory.

The Civilian population is subjected to the most inhuman acts of oppression. The last of such actions being the summary execution and wounding of political prisoners in mid April this year and transfer of the rest to unknown destination.

France's present policy towards our country could be only described as ferocious conspiracy aimed to carryout its schemes through measures designed to beguiling world public opinion to this effect. It has worked out plans

to proclaim a sham independence in our country and is maneuvering to set a date for the so-called independence.

The French Colonial Government is endeavouring to elude world opinion by depicting this sham independence as if it were a fruit of genuine free will of the people of the Somali Coast, through undertaking a pseudo-referendum and elections similar to that of the Legislative Council run by France through its tools in an attempt to preserve its Military base by means of pseudo-independence.

The above-mentioned conclusions are based on facts that cannot be denied and established after long study and accurate assesement of the French Government's recent measures to re-enforce its position.

The above-mentioned conclusions are based on facts that cannot be dinied and established after long study and accurate assesement of the French Government's recent measureas to re-enforce its position. The area of which we list the following:-

1. Mounting of concentrated diplomatic offensive to elude the world opinion in the name of consultation,
2. Increase of the French Armed Forces in Djibouti from 6000 to 12000 men,
3. Re-enforcing of the electrified barbed wire-Fence and mine field around the Capital Djibouti.

4. Stepped up the mass termination of the national from work and enforcing of the emergency law and the increasing of the repressive measures, imprisonment, intimidation of the population.
5. Mass issue of identification documents to foreigners.
6. The unwillingness of the French Government to enter into negotiations with the true representatives of the Somali Coast such as the FLCS and L. P. A. I.

In the light of the forgoing the only conclusion that could be drawn is that the French Government is manoeuvring to transfer power to its puppets and proclaim the country's independence using as usual a rigged referendum.

The above state of affairs is an indication of France's intention to impose a solution on our people in the interest of its neo-colonial policy, the FLCS therefore warns the French Government that such a policy cannot produce a just and durable solution to the problem, on the contrary it would only invite violence at an unprecedented level in that part of the world. We therefore reject the present French Government Policy towards our country.

The Front for the Liberation of the Somali Coast urges France to adopt clear policy lines in order that our country accedes to independence by first and foremost satisfying the following conditions:--

1. The Referendum as proposed by France to be dropped.
2. The So-Called Local Government and the Legislative Council to be dissolved.
3. The electrified barbed wire and Mine field surrounding Djibouti be removed.
4. All political prisoners be released.
5. All deportees to be returned to the Somali Coast.
6. The emergency law to be lifted.
7. Normal Civil Rights to be restored.
8. Constitutional conference should be held at a venue agreeable to all parties with the participation of the FLCS and LPAI.

We are mindful of the necessity to maintain cultural and economical ties with France, as we are aware of the fact that our country's independence is entangled with the colonial power rivalry in the Red Sea Area, but the only logical and durable political solution to the problem is to proceed with un-impeded process of the de-colonization whereby suitable political atmosphere is created for the people to exercise their rights.

It may be worth mentioning that this fact Finding Mission could very well be last opportunity for the OAU to have a say in the question of independence for our country, we therefore appeal to the Honourable Members of the Commission

to place principle of the colonization in the foremost consideration in order to avert another Angola situation.

In the absence of a clear and positive policy on the part of France that will lead our country to true and un-conditional independence; the FLCS will be left with no alternative but to continue relentlessly, its policy of arm struggle which will not permit the French Colonialists an honourable dis-engagement from the area and prevent any form of stability to the Status-quo. France is desperately endeavouring to create in the country.

We have the greatest hope that African love of freedom will prevail above all other considerations.

Thank you

F. L. C. S.

SOMALI DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

FRENCH SOMALILAND
DESTINY OF A PEOPLE
ON THE BALANCE.

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Ever since its attainment of independence in 1960, Somalia has spared no effort in championing the just cause of the people of French Somaliland in their noble struggle to attain immediate and unconditional independence. This unqualified support for the true independence of the territory stems partly from Somalia's commitment to African liberation in conformity with the OAU Charter, and partly from the close historic traditional bonds of common destiny shared by the people of Somalia and the people of French Somaliland.

Following the so-called "wind of change" which swept over the African continent in the Sixties, many African countries liberated themselves from colonial bondage and emerged as independent sovereign states. The momentous birth of the Organization of African Unity in 1963 did not only lay down a solid basis for continental unity and cooperation but served as an effective weapon in the combat against colonial and racial domination. It is indeed a source of inspiration and jubilation for us to have witnessed the victorious progress of African liberation struggle which, through the years, had been gaining in scope and momentum leading to the final and complete liquidation of Portuguese colonialism. Indeed not only have the major part of Africa been freed from colonial subjugation but we are approaching the final stage where, united as we stand in our Organization, the total liberation of our continent from the last vestiges of colonialism is a forgone certainty. Apart from Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa, the only country which today remains under white colonial rule is French Somaliland.

The case of French Somaliland is closely linked with the general current trend of events in Africa, and indeed throughout the whole world, where progressive liberation forces are successfully waging

a just struggle against colonial oppression and racial discrimination. Since the popular and mass uprising staged against France in the 1958 referendum and the injustices of French colonial authorities, the people of the territory had publicly and fearlessly demonstrated both in words and deeds their strong opposition to French colonialism. In the 1967 infamous referendum, the people had shown once again their will and determination to reject French colonial policy and demanded their legitimate right to self-determination and independence. Rather than responding favourably to the just demands of the people, France continued in its brutal and rigorous application of strict colonial measures including the initiation of unjust colonial laws aimed at disenfranchising the majority of the inhabitants; the encirclement of the City of Djibouti by a barbed electric wire; mass arrests, detention and deportation as well as other oppressive methods of the worst colonial type.

The brutalities and injustices inflicted upon the people of the territory by the French colonial authorities failed to halt their determined march towards freedom and independence. Their commitment to the sacred cause of liberation remains firm and unshakeable. With the establishment of the opposition Party, LPAI, constituted by the progressive elements within the territory and the intensification of the armed struggle by the FLCS, a veritable war of liberation was launched against French colonialism. The impact of the liberation struggle, reinforced by international diplomatic pressure upon France, finally led them to declare their intention to prepare the people for independence and freedom. This was reflected in the formal statement read by the French Delegation before the 4th Committee of the United Nations General Assembly during the 30th Session. The statement in question "promised plans for the progressive evolution of the territory towards independence".

In its declaration of 31st December, 1975, the French Government publicly announced its intention to grant independence to the people of the territory, in the following terms:

"Aware of having participated by its presence in Djibouti in the peace and equilibrium of this part of Africa, France considers that it must ensure the accession of the territory to international sovereignty by maintaining the integrity of its frontiers, by insuring its security and by preserving the dignity of its people". Its Communique issued on 10th February 1976, on the future of French relations with the State-to-be similarly refers to a clear out position "with regard to respect for the frontiers of the future state".

Both official French pronouncements impose the condition of continued French military presence in the territory for granting independence to the people of French Somaliland, under the paternalistic and seemingly benevolent justification of guaranteeing the internal and external security of the new state and "preserving the dignity of its people".

On 23rd February 1976, the French Ambassador in Cairo informed the General Secretariat of the Arab League States of his Government's declared intention to grant independence to the territory and indicated that a referendum towards this end will be held in the near future. The French Government furthermore added that it will hold consultations on the territory's future with all political parties and movements representing the people of the territory, as well as the governments of the two neighbouring countries and the Headquarter States of the OAU and the Arab League.

Soon after the Loyado aggression of February 4th, 1976 which clearly demonstrated to the international community the brutal and

the aggressive nature of French colonialism, the French Government recognised the weakness and unpopularity among African, Arab, other third world and progressive states of its position regarding the maintenance of a French land, air and naval base in the territory after independence. It subsequently modified its previous stand by claiming that it will no longer insist on the maintenance of its military forces in the territory as a pre-condition to independence. Continued French military presence will be subject to agreement with the new government which will take over the reins of power immediately after independence.

Mr. Jean Francois Poncet, the French Vice-Minister at the Quai D'Orsay has recently embarked on a tour to Ethiopia, Uganda and Somalia in order to acquaint their governments with the French plan for leading the people of the territory to independence and at the same time acquire first hand information on their respective positions and reaction to French policy. Mr. Poncet is expected to soon depart for Saudi Arabia, North Yemen, South Yemen and the Sudan on a similar mission.

The Somali Government in the beginning entered into the talks with the French side with ample goodwill, sincerity and the seriousness of mind demanded by the crucial nature of the issues at hand.

During the process of the talks, involving detailed examination of the major issues in question, the French plans, ostensibly conceived to lead the people of the territory to independence by "application of full democratic processes", were shown for what they were worth; general undefined commitments which, if given the proper democratic framework, could insure progress to genuine independence, but which if applied in the context of present day realities in French Somaliland, as planned by the French authorities, could only serve the interests of the colonial power and their servants.

The current situation in the territory is not conducive to the free exercise of democratic rights. The oppressive colonial laws and regulations in force, the existence of the so-called Local Government and the presence of a sizeable military force, would certainly impose serious limitations on the application of the peoples right to self-determination and independence. So long as these limitations exist, the proposed referendum and round-table conference will only serve as convenient tools for French designs on the territory. Under circumstances where all the odds are against the majority and their true representatives, the international supervision of the proposed referendum by OAU, Arab League and United Nations observers will only serve to further France's diabolical plan to give legitimacy and international sanction to their ill conceived designs which are calculated to deprive the people of their God-given right to independence.

During the course of discussions of March 30th and 31st, 1976, the French delegation was fully briefed on the necessary pre-requisite for a genuine, true, honest and democratic decolonization which should enable the people of the territory to realize their just aspiration to independence.

To this end, the Somali Government made the following concrete proposals with utmost sincerity, honesty and seriousness of purpose to the French side, in order to create on the one hand an atmosphere conducive to the realization of a true decolonization of the territory in question as well as to remove the existing obstacles to the promotion of understanding and friendly relations between the Somali Democratic Republic and the Republic of France in as much as the issue of French Somaliland constitutes an obstacle to the development of such understanding:

I. To convene a Constitutional Conference (not consultative) in which all the political forces of the territory, who enjoy significant following, shall be permitted to participate with the objective of formulating a just and sound procedure that would lead the people of the territory to genuine independence. Members of the so-called Local Government should not be allowed to attend the Conference in their official capacity.

2. To permit the repatriation of all deportees expelled from the territory since 1966 to-date. Within the territory of the Somali Democratic Republic there is presently a sizeable refugees community from French Somaliland. As happens before every anticipate referendum the rate of people being forcibly thrown out of the country is increasing at an alarming proportion.

3. That the French indentity papers should by no means constitute the deterring criteria for the right to vote in the proposed referendum as well as subsequent elections. According to the existing laws and procedures, the right to vote is conferred upon non-indigenous elements and foreigners including members of the French Army, while the true nationals of the territory are arbitrarily denied their electoral rights. Even these who may validly possess their identity papers are often liable to have them destroyed by French colonial authorities. This inherently unjust and undemocratic system should be reformed and the right to vote be granted to all persons of voting age indigenous to the territory without discrimination.

Some of the basic regulations governing the civil status of the people are oppressive and had been enacted solely to serve French colonial interests. For example, the citizenship law now in force does not provide for the transmission of nationality rights neither to the wife nor to the children of marriage. This invariably leads

to the tragic consequence whereby wives, sons or daughters are arbitrarily denied citizenship and could therefore be liable to deportation from the territory. Hence the cruel application of this legislation may result in the separation of husband from wife, or sons or daughters from the legitimate father whose nationality may be recognized as proper and legal. On many occasions the citizenship of persons from the indigenous populations may be arbitrarily denied or their nationality put in doubt. The phrase "Nationality undetermined" appearing in the passes granted by the High Commissioner's Office demonstrate explicitly the arbitrariness and discriminatory nature of the nationality laws and procedures enforced by the French authorities. These should be abolished before holding the proposed referendum and elections.

4. That the public order authorities including the national army should be composed solely and exclusively of nationals of the territory and that the French colonial forces such as the Army, Foreign Legionaires, Para-troops and French mobile Gendarmes should in no way be entrusted with the responsibility of maintaining law and order in as much as they constitute an object of terror and moral and psychological violence to the national population of the territory. The presence of units from French Armed Forces, rather than keeping the peace, could get involved in the systematic application of suppressive measures against the nationalist and pro-independence elements.

5 To dissolve the so-called Local Government and to repeal all the colonial repressive legislations and measures, particularly the so-called Electoral Law in force within the territory. The basic electoral law now in force in the territory is, in view of the unjust and irregular procedures it entails, clearly undemocratic and colonial oriented and as such cannot constitute a valid legal basis for the proposed elections in the territory.

6. To remove the land mines and the electrified barbed wire surrounding the city of Djibouti.

It is significant to note in this connection that a ship "Banftas" called at Djibouti on 2nd April, *976 and unloaded 243 tons of barbed wire which is clearly intended for use by the colonial authorities to further reinforce the already existing fence.

7. The unconditional release of all political prisoners.

8. To recognise the fundamental and inalienable right of the nomadic population to exercise their full political rights and insure their re-integration into society.

The French colonial system weighs heavily against the nomadic population who are invariably subjected to constant fear, intimidation, arbitrary detention and mass deportation. They are, above all, denied their legal right to vote on elections and referenda. The French colonial authorities do not recognize the nomadic population as indigenous although they constitute an integral part of the people and have no other home except French Somaliland. It is also important to observe that the nomadic people are strictly prohibited to reside or live in Djibouti as if Djibouti was the capital of a foreign country. One wonders aren't the nomadic people the original founders of the city of Djibouti?

9. To stop the existing practices of allowing the entry into the territory of foreigners in large numbers.

The colonial laws in force permit the conferring of the privilege of nationality on certain ethnic groups domiciled outside the territorial limits of French Somaliland. This resulted in the influx of a large number of foreigners from a neighbouring country into the territory. Their settlement in the territory is made conditional upon the acquisition of membership in the Pro-French Party led by head of the so-called Local Government.

10. That the foreigners residing in the territory, including all French troops, should not be allowed to participate in the proposed referendum as well as subsequent political elections.

As happened in the previous referenda of 1958 and 1967 and in subsequent elections, the French troops as well as other privileged foreigners will be allowed to exercise their voting rights unless the relevant legal provisions are abolished. Since the number of French troops presently serving in the territory is significant in proportion to the total population, their participation in the proposed referendum and subsequent election will have a negative impact on the exercise of the right of self-determination by the people of the territory. This should again serve as an additional justification for the withdrawal of all French forces prior to holding the proposed referendum.

The French Government, as evidenced in their reaction to the proposals stated above, is totally unprepared to consider, let alone accept, to institute the necessary changes in the legal and administrative machinery so as to create a climate conducive to the full exercise of the peoples democratic right which alone can ensure the realization of their legitimate aspirations.

Instead of addressing themselves to these fundamental issues which are basic to the free and unfettered exercise of the peoples inalienable right to self-determination, the French Government has embarked on a concerted effort to create a false impression on OAU and Arab League countries that the territory's independence could be at stake in the absence of French protection. This has in turn set in motion an active diplomatic campaign by France and others on the need for an international guarantee aimed at "safeguarding the security of territorial integrity" of the would be sovereign state.

The French Government's call for an international guarantee is nothing but an eye-wash purposely engineered to occupy international efforts on false issues and divert them from real substantive issues to which the colonial power should address itself in effecting and accelerating the process of immediate decolonisation of the territory. The French search for guarantees neither stems from the existence of a real danger or threat to security of the people of the territory on the part of Somalia nor is it in response to the express desire of the people of the territory nor, for that matter, is this French move consistent with relevant OAU and United Nations Resolutions calling upon France to grant immediate and unconditional independence to the territory. It has, as its sole objective, the creation and propagation of a non-existent fear aimed at perpetuating French presence in the territory. A threat exists and indeed will continue to prevail in the territory as long as France persists in maintaining her military presence, thereby posing a danger not only to the peace and stability of the people of the territory by forcible denial of their basic human rights but also to regional and international peace and security.

Within a very short period, France almost doubled the strength of her military force in French Somaliland with concomitant augmentation of its sophisticated military weapons, communication systems and logistic material. French naval fleet in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean comprise over a dozen ships of varying classes including an aircraft carrier with Mirage planes on board; a Missile carrying ship and two Submarines. These massive military preparations by France is a clear demonstration of her colonial designs and long term strategic plans on the territory. We are confident that all the states in the Region which had been approached or are to be approached by the French Government on the so-called "Guarantee Issue" will no doubt appreciate the serious danger posed by this sizeable French military involvement in the territory, which is aimed primarily to create confusion in Africa, Arab and international circles in an attempt to cover up and camouflage the real source of tension and conflict in the area.

In view of what has been stated above, the Government of the Somali Democratic Republic is convinced that, France with the collusion of other interested parties, is deliberately misleading international and French public opinion on the issue of the decolonisation of French Somaliland, by professing on the one hand her intention to grant independence to the people of the territory through her application of "full democratic processes", while on the other, pursuing a pre-determined policy calculated to install in power a non-representative puppet regime, which will continue to safeguard French colonial interests. As has already been amply demonstrated, the true realities of the situation in the territory, characterised as it is by the intensification of colonial repressive measures namely, reinforcements of French air, land and sea forces, the extension and strengthening of the electric barbed wire, mass deportation, the opening of Nazi-type torture centres, the keeping in full force and effect of the repressive and archaic colonial laws and regulations, mass distribution of identity cards to foreigners etc, can by no stretch of human imagination be viewed as the application of "full democratic processes" and the preparation of the people of the territory for independence.

The Somali Democratic Republic is fully confident that the OAU Fact-Finding Mission will objectively and realistically appraise itself of the current situation prevailing in the territory. We sincerely trust that members of this Committee, who by virtue of their profound wisdom and dedicated service in the field of liberation and decolonization in our great continent, will spare no effort to give their full and unqualified co-operation and assistance to the people of French Somaliland to ensure their attainment of immediate and unconditional independence in conformity with the terms and provisions of the Charter and the OAU Resolution on French Somaliland adopted by the OAU Kampala Summit in 1975.

Mogadishu, 27 April, 1976.

Statement by the forcibly deported Refugees
of the Somali Coast, living at Borama District of the
Somali Democratic Republic to the O.A.U. Fact Finding
Committee for the Independence of the Somali
Coast.

Distinguished Delegate,

We, the forcibly deported Refugees of the Somali Coast, respectfully have the honour to submit to you this Statement, explaining to you our deplorable conditions and begging you too kindly to consider our pitiable cases and advocate for our returning to motherland.

We are illegally deported Refugees, we have been uprooted from our legitimate houses by the French Colonialist Authorities, we are wretched, punished and dispersed people of the Somali Coast. French Colonialist have imposed upon us all brutalities and barbaic treatments by separating us from our families, thus separating daughter from her dear mother, son from his beloved father and husband from his wife, the crime we have committed, if it is a crime was our resistance to the French Colonialist Government for the purpose of gaining our National Freedom and Independence. Could you possibly determine our woeful situations and find a solution for our returning to motherland and reuniting with our forcibly separated "DEAR" families?

We also used to follow neatly the O.A.U. fruitful resolution concerning to the deteriorated Political Situation of the Somali Coast and its highly needed Independence of the same, we also remember well that the UN, General Assembly, and U.N. decolonization Committee, the A.A.P.S.O. the ISLAMIC CONFERENCE, the ARAB LEAGUE, all the International Organizations and all the peace loving Peoples of the World have unservedly supported the immediate and unconditional Freedom and Independence of the Somali Coast.

Therefore, we wonder and it is, 'of course', one wonder of the wonders why French Colonialist Government is always turns to a deaf ear and refuse to accept and implement the famous resolutions issued and passed by the above-mentioned Supreme organs of the World and still dominates our fatherland, at where following points were also contained:

- (a) That French should grant immediate and unconditional Freedom and Independence to SOMALI COAST.
- (b) That French should release all the Political Prisoners.
- (c) The French should accept the return of all deported Refugees.
- (d) That French should take off the deathly and Mined Barbed-Wire encircling D'JIBOUTI.
- (e) That French should stop the illegal Deportations.
- (f) That French should allow the people to form freely their Political Parties and express freely their aspirations.
- (g) That French should stop the arbitrary arrests and illegal condemnations, etc., etc. But unfortunately as you are well aware the French Imperialist Government is still maintains its dirty colonial Policy and quite contrary to the above quoted resolutions imposed upon us, and our Freedom and peace people of the Somali Coast every brutalities and barbaric actions.

Regarding the Independence which the French Colonialist Government has promised now after long and repeated pressures caused by the World's U Supreme organs and mostly by the O.A.U. which you distinguished Delegate have the honour to represent here to-day and empowered you as a "FACT FINDING COMMITTEE" to investigate the problems of the Somali Coast in order that a peaceful solution should be found for the long awaited and highly needed Independence of the Somali Coast.

We, the forcibly deported Refugees of the Somali Coast residing here in the Borama District, wish to announce loudly that we accept and welcome the French Colonialist Government announced Freedom and Independence of our Somali Coast, but we wish to ask what kind of Independence which French Colonialist is prepared to grant; is it a real Independence or is it a so-called one?! If it is a real one as we expected we shall accept with pleasure and with open hands, and therefore, we only ask that thing should go into the proper hands of the legal Political parties under the justful system of the "MAJORITY RULE."

In conclusion we unfortunate refugees of the Somali Coast, request you Distinguished Delegate of the O.A.U. to do your utmost preparation and judgement to advocate for an immediate and unconditional Independence of our Motherland in order that we Refugees would be able to return freely to our Legitimate homeland.

Distinguished Delegate, while we are thanking you in anticipation for your justful judgement, we the oppressed punished and dispersed illegally deported Refugees of the Somali Coast are earnestly awaiting for your timely and positive decisions for our returning to homeland, regaining and reuniting with our unjustly separated Families.

GOD and history will record and remember your justful judgement!

LONG LIVE THE AFRICAN UNITY! long live the justice.

BOORAMA, 29/4/1976

WE ARE THE FORCIBLY DEPORTED
REFUGEES OF THE SOMALI COAST.

Honourable Members of the OAU Delegation,

Dear Guest,

Thanks be to God, who gave us this nice opportunity to address you on behalf of the rest of my Somali Brothers who were beaten out of their homes in Djibouti and exiled to Somalia. I have to thank your Delegation in return, who are shouldering this great responsibility to witness with your own eyes those innocent citizens who lost their home and their property in their struggle for independence and in their right to be free.

Dear Guests: I cannot express in more words how cruelly and how foolishly the french imperialist had tortured us, but I should say in short the French Government acted savagely and relentlessly as the NAZI and FASCIST regimes of the 1940-S. I was a member of 5,000 or more refugees which the Legiens of France had deported from Djibouti and had put them in the frontier Somali in 1967 at March 21st on behalf of all those homeless Somali Refugees I have to tell you that we have been received Medical Care and different professions to support our Living.

I have to mention in here, that we did not loose our hope to go back to our Native land and try it hard several times, but I assure you that many of us had be mutiliated to death by mines, many had died on daggers point by merciless mercenaries and indeed many others had been arested and put to jail never to see the sunshine anymore.

Furthermore, the French imperialist had tried the utmost level of its effort to deceive the world opinion that the majority of the Somali Coast People were in favour of the French Rule and every while this fabricated news was followed by another contradicting event. At last this colonial power tried to import foreign settlers so then he could gain majority of the coming so-called Referendum and in this respect it had supplied birth certificates to thousands of Ethiopian people demanding for them that they were born in Djibouti. Why couldn't this happen before? Dear Guests the answer behind this intention and during the recent Political turmoil as follows:

- 2 -

1. To gain the majority vote in his favour
2. To create problems between the Ethiopian and Somali Government so that he could stage to the world the France is staying in Djibouti for the welfare and safety of the Djibouti citizens.
3. To fix deep rootedly a legacy of enmity between Somali and Ethiopia if at all his efforts to stay in our Coast becomes futile.

Dear Honourable Delegation, we know that history had taught us that freedom cannot be denied and that Human Rights can never be alienated by a more colonial power, and although victory lies behind a long perilous journey, we demand before the OAU delegation that our grievances should be considered deeply, and that our right should be guarded by the African brothers who tested all how bitter is colonialism we demand the following grievances;!

1. All Political Prisoners should be freed.
2. We have the right to be taken back to our native home in Djibouti.
3. The French imperialist should stop the illegal referendum.
4. The Barbed Iron Wires around Djibouti should be eradicated.
5. Down with the Ali Arif Puppet.
6. The French imperialist should stop importing foreign settlers in the Somali Coast.
7. The French Mercenaries should quit our Somali Coast.
8. Without any conditions, the French Government should leave our Coast.

LONG LIVE THE AFRICAN SOLIDARITY - DOWN WITH THE FRENCH
IMPERIALIST AND DOWN WITH THE ALI ARIF PUPPET REGIME!!!!

THE EXILED CITIZENS OF THE SOMALI COAST.

AFRICAN PEOPLE'S LEAGUE FOR INDEPENDENCE - L.P.A.I.

DJIBOUTI 29 April 1976.

To the Chairman,
CAU Fact-Finding Mission,
DJIBOUTI.

Mr. Chairman,
Members of the Fact-Finding Mission;

The presence of your Mission in Djibouti constitutes a great victory for our people in their struggle for national liberation. It is also a victory for your Organization in its duty to liberate our Continent. It bears testimony to the fact that the last phase of the liquidation of the clannish French colonialism has really begun.

The French Government, aware of the inevitable liquidation of the clannish colonialism, has expressed her readiness to lead our nation to independence. This statement has not yet been backed up by any practical application. One is therefore led to believe that France does not intend to agree to withdraw her colonial and imperialist presence, but only wishes to change the form of that presence. She expects to succeed in this change, purely in form, with the complicity of local elements won to her side for many years now and also with the diplomatic support she expects to get from outside.

The active and enthusiastic complicity of the so-called territorial government has now enabled the French administration in our country to:-

- (1) establish new brigades of the gendarmerie specialised in breaking into homes and in fierce witch-hunting for our youths considered to be potential freedom fighters;
- (2) bring in a continuous stream of weapons and war materials through the Djibouti harbour and airport;

- (3) increase the numerical strength of the French troops in order to have a firm grip on our country, dominate our people and pose a threat to our neighbours;
- (4) intensify the oppression, imprisonment of politicians, mass expulsions and deportations;
- (5) strengthen the mined barbed wire fence made more impassable and more deadly to prevent any covert return of the deportees;
- (6) import from Israel fantastic quantities of barbed wires to strengthen further the old fence or build a new one. The latest delivery of barbed wires was taken on 2nd April, 1976, aboard a British cargo ship, S/S BENFTAS, coming from Eilat.

The increasing isolation of her protégé, the so-called territorial government, the increasingly resolute ~~and determined~~ struggle of our people and the growing and constant pressure exercised by States and Organisations which support our cause, have compelled the French Government to seek diplomatic support in Africa and in the Arab countries with a view to reducing the pressure and making her policy succeed.

It is with this design in mind that the French Government is making moves to prove her readiness to seek peaceful and democratic ways and means for our country to accede to independence.

To this end:

- (1) she has undertaken to negotiate with the States of our region whereas we are the primary and only party concerned with whom she should have, for that matter, initiated negotiations on our independence - we who have always asked for negotiation with her, but she has always refused. We do not see, therefore, how the French Government plans to associate our people with the outcome of the negotiations, without our involvement, between her, the coloniser who does not want to negotiate with us, and third-party States which are not colonised by her and do not colonise us, but are our neighbours geographically;

- (2) she professes to have agreed to a constitutional conference, but in practice refuses to convene it and recognise its real role. The French Government contends illogically that the colonized people themselves must meet to choose together their rightful representatives while making empty statements about her role to lead the country to independence under agreed conditions;
- (3) The French Government intimates that she intends to hold a referendum and agrees to the supervision by the OAU and the Arab League to ensure orderly voting.

That is a real plot aimed at perpetuating the present structures by "legalizing" them through the usual parody of referendum. The obvious peculiarity about this future referendum is that the French Government is holding it out as a simple formality intended to give her a "legal withdrawal" in compliance with her constitution and to have "YES" votes, for independence by a people who have already opted for independence.

The issue is much more serious and subtle than a simple referendum, and these are the reasons:

Referendum means voting, and voting is done on the basis of an electoral roll, ballot papers, identity or nationality cards. In a nutshell, it means one must be a full citizen of the country whose destiny is involved and whose nationality must be established for the enjoyment of its rights and the discharge of its duties.

Up till now, however, our country has never had its own nationality. It is French nationality that substitutes for citizenship of the country.

The right to French nationality has developed over five distinct periods:

1st period	-	1885	-	1937
2nd	"	-	1937	- 1953
3rd	"	-	1953	- 1963
4th	"	-	1963	- 1972
5th	"	-	since 1972	.

We do not want to describe, examine or comment on each period as was done by Mr. Michel BOUCHET in July 1974, in a mimeographed document of 46 pages. This officer who has been dealing with nationality issues for 20 years states in his document that the issue involves a complexe and retrograde legislative change which has today resulted in the establishment of a too-tight a system of determining nationality ... Citing still Mr. Bouchet, Director of the Department of State for Population and Nationality Affairs: "...However, since 1951, the application of universal adult suffrage has made it necessary to determine who is French and can therefore vote. He then conducted an extensive census campaign and issued French identity cards ... With the development of electoral rolls, the quest for French nationality became increasingly keen. In principle in Djibouti, only those with French identity cards were registered on the rolls. In the countryside, however, few or no cards at all were issued. Exception was made of those coming to Djibouti and had been registered on the recommendation, somewhat verified, of the traditional chiefs. It was quickly realized that this procedure for ascertaining French nationality was infinitely extensive and dangerous, and by 1960 (when Somalia acceded to independence) efforts were being made, at least, to seek every possible negative interpretation for the enacted legislation, but care being taken not to jeopardise the already existing situation ... It was then, in particular, that it was realized that there was an astonishing situation in the territory whereby almost all the nationals had dual nationality" at least under control. However, the indigenous people who were not assimilated were denied naturalisation. The process was continued to give French nationality to a chosen few.

"In 1953, a decree was first issued to abrogate this procedure for acquiring French nationality, followed by a major event, that is the Law of 8 July 1963, cancelling the mode of acquiring or granting French nationality by jus Solis in the territory".

"The Law of 8 July 1963 is the brutal result of a retrograde change as evidenced by the following examples:

"An indigenous person born in 1943 in FTAI of parents not likely to justify their French nationality:

- is virtually a French subject at birth (decree 16/6/43)
- is citizen "under control" as at 1st June 1946 (Law of 7/5/46);
- is a foreigner on 1st July 1953 (decree of 24/2/1953); but can possibly become French at the attainment of adulthood (article 44 of the Nationality Code) if he continues to reside in the territory between the ages of 16 and 21;
- is a foreigner on 1st August 1963 (Law of 8 July 1963) and loses all prospects of acquiring French nationality.

Many families in Djibouti are divided: the elder children born before 1st August 1942 are generally French but the younger ones born after the same date, and whose birth had been recorded under the Law, are still foreigners ... The Law of 8 July 1963 which affects those whose parents had no birth certificates or identity papers could only turn to be aliens in the country. Evidently the entry control instituted after the events of August 1966 posed the problem of free movements of people without identification papers in the southern part of the territory. The Law of 2 June 1972 on civil status also tended to complete the closure of avenues for acquiring nationality (by marriage) since every type of marriage, be it civil or conducted before the Imam of Charia, was subject to prior authorization by the Representative of the State, if such marriage was intended for the acquisition of nationality.

We shall append to this Memorandum the document referred to here, and end the quotation from the eminent jurist, which shows that a deliberate and systematic policy was being applied to rid our country of its true citizens through mass deportations and retrograde laws on nationality.

By proposing to hold a referendum under such conditions, France is seeking to perpetuate a fait accompli which has upset all the political, demographic and human realities of our country.

She is also seeking by this means to set up with the approval, permission or collaboration of the OAU and the Arab League, the retrograde and repressive structure that we have just pointed out (quotation from the official document) to be headed by men and institutions who have asked and have been allowed or have been given the cover to legally rid our people of their citizenship and deport them en masse from their country.

The people deported have always attempted to come back home but each of these attempts has been considered by the French Government as an infiltration of hostile elements bent on breaking peace and order in the country at the instigation of the Somali Democratic Republic, the neighbouring country where, to begin with, our citizens had been deported or expelled to.

After this projected referendum intended to settle the question of the right to vote, in other words the question of citizenship of our country, the attempts to return home by the deportees already regarded as "undesirable elements", shall now be considered as "aggression" against an independent African State by another independent African State.

The French Government proposes therefore to create, with the permission of the OAU and the Arab League, a conflict in a region of Africa, between two African peoples, by maintaining a military and strategic base to arbitrate and fan the flames of the conflict.

This is why we strongly oppose the holding of the referendum based on unjust laws. This is why we oppose the presence of foreign troops who can only create troubles and insecurity in the region and engender the risk of intervention by the big powers in that same region which prays for peace and prosperity for Africa and the Arab countries.

The French Government and her protege tell us that the French troops must remain in the country to "feed" our people who would, according to them, "die of hunger" if ever the French army left.

As far as we are concerned, we accept nothing more and nothing short of national liberation. Although it is true that we are a small country, we cannot for that matter accept a small independence mutilated by the presence of foreign military bases.

The foregoing is a general survey of the prevailing situation which, in our view, hopefully reflect objective realities.

Our stand on the independence process is as follows:-

- (1) Convening of a Constitutional Conference involving all the political groups representing the people's aspirations.

The Conference shall be presided over by a neutral and competent personality who does not belong to any political group.

The Conference shall have the power needed to identify and decide on all present controversial issues, including in particular, the question of nationality, electoral rolls and ballot papers. It must be the only body empowered to hold elections with or without international observers. French officials may be present to ensure strict and scrupulous application of the electoral code.

Obviously the families disintegrated by the retrograde laws on nationality must be reunited by bringing back those expelled and deported to their homes and country of birth. Obviously also our fellow countrymen living in the country without the legal means to shape their own destiny and that of their country must recover those natural rights by being issued with authentic citizenship certificates. They are our nationals.

If we consider that the convening of a Constitutional Conference involving all the political groups is absolutely needed to lead our country to independence, it is because our people have never been governed by a government elected by popular consensus or by universal adult suffrage. We attach to this Memorandum the official documents, not written by us, which prove that the so-called Government of the country was brought to power through fraud and violence.

For the rest of the situation, we hope that your short stay here will enable you to grasp all the objective realities.

We wish you warm welcome and successful mission for our freedom and for the liberation of Africa.

DOCUMENTS ATTACHED HERETO

- Paper by Michel BOUCHET on French Citizenship in the FTAI. Laws and Comments - see page 10.
- Document by Jacque MAHANT, former Manager of the Government Printing Press in Djibouti, Chairman of the Electoral Office, describing the rigging of the votes which brought Ali Aref to power.
- Minutes proving that the opposition was barred from travelling by sea to Ali Aref's constituency.
- Document submitted to the Council of State proving how the registration of voters was faked in Ali Aref's constituency to eliminate every opposition so that he could be returned unopposed.
- Document showing the deportation to Ethiopia of our brothers qualified as Ethiopians with the consent of the Ethiopian authorities.

P.S. This document which is the barest minimum submitted, does not include press cuttings, news agency reports or political comments.

M E M O R A N D U M

addressed to Messrs the Delegates of the Organization of
African Unity

by

the National Union for Independence Party

As its name suggests, our Territory is really the mother country of the Afars and Issas. These people, and these people only, were here when the Frenchmen arrived and of course it is with them they negotiated for their settlement.

The French presence has for its starting-point the treaties of 4th March 1862, 14th December 1884, 2nd January 1885, and 26th March 1885, concluded with Afars and Issas tribes.

The French had founded their administrative headquarters and the center of commercial activities in Obock. They thought later that "Ras Djibouti", which was then a desert and an uninhabited peninsula, offered a better site to create a port, and above all, to bind connections with Ethiopia, of which the harbour was to become the natural outlet.

Thus they transferred their centre of activities to Djibouti where gradually administrative and commercial activities of the port were extended. So Djibouti became first a big village (5,000 inhabitants in 1895), then a little town, and at last the city of 130,000 inhabitants we know to day.

This urbanization gave rise to the arrival of many foreigners (Somalis, Arabians, Europeans, Sudanese, Pakistanis, Hindus, and others) who were absorbed into the town of Djibouti where the different ethnical and religious communities cohabited in good understanding during three quarters of a century, with very few exceptions.

If we recall these basic facts, undisputed by anyone, it is not to conclude that foreigners, and especially Somalis and Arabians who constitute the strongest minorities, are undesirable in our country. On the contrary, they are our brothers, and citizenship was conferred on many of them. Through marriages and kindred, blood has tied us and we could not think of questioning the presence of Somalis and Arabians in our country. They have now gained the right to live here as much as we.

But Afars and Issas will never have another fatherland outside what is today their Territory, and what should become tomorrow their independent State. As a matter of fact the area of habitation of Issas concerns T.F.A.I., Somaliland and Ethiopia, the Afar one extends in T.F.A.I. and Ethiopia. Wherever they are, in Somaliland or in Ethiopia, both of them will merely be more or less unconsidered minorities. In this Territory only can they hope to find a mother country. So they want this Territory to become a really independent Nation, since they refuse to be colonized by one or the other of the two neighbour States.

That is the reason why our Party objects to the former name of the Territory, called in 1896 "French Somaliland". This appellation is the legacy of the world's division between the colonial states, it was assigned by the French colonialists with reference to the British settlement in the "British Somaliland". When in 1967 the independent destiny of the Territory became clearly evident, France restored truth by giving to our country the name of its native inhabitants, Afars and Issas.

Such is the doctrine of our "National Union For Independence" and it is what opposes us to L.P.A.I., which is nothing but the executive arm of Somali Democratic Republic.

Of course L.E.A.I. will take care not to drop the mask about its real intentions early, but everybody here knows perfectly well that its leaders receive their instructions and huge financial means from Mogadiscio, and that the Somali annexation plan is based upon three means of action :

- the Somali army, strongly equipped by the Soviet Union, and which could if necessary be opposed to the Ethiopian Army.
- the F.L.C.S. (Somali Coast Liberation Front), based in the Somali Democratic Republic, and charged to activate terrorist actions in Djibouti ; this Front tried on three occasions to kill President AREF.
- in the Territory, the L.P.A.I. who will delude the People by pretending they work, as we do, to build an independent State, and which will drop the mask, when the time comes to become the instrument of Somalian colonization.

This is what opposes us fundamentally to L.P.A.I. of course this Party will say they are an internal opposition Party to the Government of Mr. ALI AREF BOURHAN. But this is not the whole truth. They are, rather, the tool for the realization of the Grand Somaliland dream. If their aims came to success, Afars and Issas would be deprived of their land, and after the bloody struggles between their two neighbours in their country, they would return to the condition of everlasting wanderers, to inherit regression and maybe eventual disparition.

Our Party, the "National Union for Independence", will be strongly opposed to this perspective of genocide. We want our Territory to become our fatherland and we place all our hopes in the Organization of African Unity to reach this purpose. The O.A.U. only can obtain from the Somali Democratic Republic promises of the same nature as the ones Ethiopia has already given toward us.

It is the future of our People which is concerned and we earnestly beg the Liberation Committee of Africa and the Organization of African Unity to help us in protecting our survival and our liberty.

HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

The evolution of the 2nd half of the 20th Century is characterized by the collapse of the colonial system, imperialism and the impetuous development of national Liberation Movements of peoples struggling for liberty. It is an irrevocable process taking place all over the world.

Imperialism constitutes the last stage of capitalism which is the most heinous system of exploitation, oppression and slavery that history has ever known.

Colonialism does not only mean absolute power for some administration and their indigenous stooges, but also the establishment of capitalism as a means of production and the introduction of the commercialization of human relationships. It is by such people and for such people that colonialism has developed in Africa.

If colonialism after having seized by force vast African countries had maintained itself in power thanks to an unspcakable violence it was to impose these capitalist relationships Since 1885 (Berlin Conference) to the 2nd World War, capitalism held undivided sway. In the wake of this war, the formation of a world socialist system, the deterioration of the general capitalist crisis and the increasingly bitter contradictions between imperialism and the colonized countries have given an unprecedented impetus to the national liberation movement.

The oppressed peoples especially those of Africa who had largely contributed to the victory over Hitlerite fascism were decided not to accept any move to be bound by the same

chains that they had just broken elsewhere. Imperialist and colonialist forces emerged from this war enormously weakened. In Africa especially, the peoples enslaved for centuries, and subjected to the relentless colonial whip, organized themselves in clubs, associations, unions, political parties and through mass mobilizations intensified the struggle for national independence.

If by the sixties, European colonialism, especially the French, granted formal independence sometimes by force (Senghor?) it was because, on the one hand there was complete political, economic and social submission and on the other the irreversible will of the African people for liberation had to be complied with.

Thus the colonialists have been able to stem the African peoples' movements, contain them and defraud them of what they had achieved through struggles to the benefit of indigenous valets with neocolonial independence.

No longer able to maintain their domination directly, the colonialists adopted a new masked approach to perpetuate their hold in African in a different manner: ~~the~~ neocolonialism.

- By the installation of indigenous bourgeois forces (former local valets) to manage their sordid interests.

- By using these antipopular forces to liquidate and diversify and thereby sap the strength of all popular and revolutionary forces.

- By organizing aggressive military blocks and installing military bases.
- By including these so called independent countries in economic blocks of an imperialist nature (LEE OCAM).

We were saying then that France by the sixties had hurriedly set up republics and pretended to pack off her traps under the violent thrust of African mass movements.

In fact these formal independences aimed only at depriving the masses who had struggled against colonialism of powers to the benefit of local valets and imperialist powers.

Colonialism: Still alive.

The rivalry between French imperialism driven to the wall in a most reactionary manner, the U. S. A. which have just widened their zone of influence in the region and the Soviets preoccupied by the American break-through on the Horn of Africa and the two sides of the Red Sea, has now turned Djibouti into a zone on which the future of the whole region depends.

The collapse of the maribond Kingdom of Haile Selassie, the development of the Erythrean liberation struggle on the one hand, the outbreak of Anglo-US offensive for Dhoffar and the Popular Republic of South Yemen on the other, have ushered in a new phase in the struggle between imperialist powers and distorted the reality of western banditry. Consequently this phase, as far as these powers are concerned, would result

in a distortion of facts concerning the real situation of our territory more in conformity with the new balance of power that would set in.

The danger on the one hand of a political vanguard snatching independence in Djibouti and placing it in the hands of popular masses, and on the other the possibility of the Erythrean Liberation Movement seizing power in the regions they are claiming would lead to the closure of all possible outlet to the sea for Ethiopia.

This, clearly enough for us, explains why in such conditions, a tough struggle led by pro-US imperialist elements is going on with a view to removing Djibouti from French colonial authority and placing it under Ethiopian protection.

At the head of these pro-imperialist elements is the puppet AREF who, according to all probabilities, would be ready to change master. A parallel situation however exists in the Soviet strategy which aims at annexing Djibouti to the Republic of Somalia thereby checkmating American expansion.

In both cases, the imperialist moves of the two super-powers have one immediate result: the threat to the maintenance of French colonialism.

The operation was already well on the way; while the colonial status of Djibouti was, as far as the various powers are concerned, at worst a feeble reference in moralizing discourse

The political changes that occurred in Ethiopia and in all the region have resulted in a spectacular hue and cry

on the part of all OAU amphitryous who seized by a liberation fever, began to clamour for the independence of Djibouti.

Hence, the question of toppling French colonial authority was already contemplated even before the popular revolutionary forces had time to seize the matter, to raise the flag of struggle and impose their conditions as the element to be reckoned with in this matter.

It is no longer, as we are aware, a matter of pursuing the struggle of 1959. At that time all the imperialist powers, with the approval of the French authority in the territory, were exerting pressures for the maintenance of colonial status, while isolating the nascent popular movement and bringing its bourgeois elements to tag their hopes to the integration of the status of overseas territory while the nationalists were largely oppressed-(Mr. Harbi).

Today the neocolonialist bourgeois forces speaking as future puppets intend to forestall the popular movement and have very quickly made up their mind to change their former stance adopting the language of champions of independence. The LPAI has already changed its stand a year ago. The mercenary Aref and the Djibouti democratic and commercial bourgeoisies did the same only two months ago.

Under such conditions, it is evident that the term "independence", used by the opportunist leaders of LPAI or the puppet clique of Aref who is on the payroll of settlers, is going to become if it is not already so, the most ambiguous most sullied and most deceitful rallying cry

These forces have already embarked upon this campaign to win popular support and assume control of all possible action

coming from popular forces. The legitimate but still not fully developed struggle of our people (expressing themselves in a categorical though disorganized manner and often spontaneous does not in any way affect French colonialism and its creeping creatures who mean appropriate total power to serve the same interests. Hence the puppet Aref seem to have be won over with great difficulty to the idea (and he has taken much time to do so) of an eventual change of form being assured that he is to preservehis matters and their protection.

This change of form will remain absurd in the light of the evil we have to combat and which the puppet Aref and his UNI (which he has set up on the advice of a certain Foccart) are not in a position to assess objectively.

However it is the same with the LPAI (that speaks a somewhat democratic language) which has not only forestalled the Aref clique but also an eventured popular movement militating for true independence; and has decided with great speed for a 'total' independence with scarcely any political programme. This independence which would prove to be "Vital for us, honourable for Africa and prestigious for France", the LPAI pretends to claim from France but also with the same France.

This reformist organization has played a role which is not negligible in the internationalization of the Djibouti question; inspite of its limited perspective due essentially to the interests of its opportunist leaders.

But in fact, the ~~Thiou~~ of Djibouti and the LPAI represent the same danger for the popular masses which they were prepared to use to integrate the neo-colonialist project and were on the point of winning to their manoeuvre a considerable

section of the population (had we not been on our guard), specially those who precisely see only the form and the illusory character of the nominal independence.

What the Aref clique and the LPAI are claiming for the territory is not so much the genuine independence to which almost all our people aspire as a vast mirage meant to mislead a whole nation with the complicity of some estate owners.

DEMARCATIION POLITICAL TASKS

In fact, for all anti-colonialist popular force in Djibouti, the question of its capacity to organize the masses, to define the political contents independence, to lead the struggle politically, to contemplate of along with the question of independence the concomitant deep rift with colonialism and its valata on the one hand and the local bourgeois forces on the other, is not an abstraction but a concrete reality. This rift is to be confined to the concrete questions concerning the political contents of independence, the clearly outlined organization of the interests of the oppressed people, and the denunciation of the neocolonialist and imperialist strategy.

In the present context no force claiming to be revolutionary can content itself only with the rallying cry for independence without being in a position to give it a concrete meaning for the popular masses of the Afars and the Somalis and if it is not in a position to offer them clear perspectives on those questions:

I. Political contents of Independence:

The fundamentally popular nature of our independence should be clearly brought out in the following elements:

- Social and Political transformations.
- Power of the People.
- Policy of Education.
- Policy of Health of Labour and Housing
- Status of Women.
- Development of Cultural heritage of the two nationalities.
- Regulation of Commerce.

II. Place of two Nationalities in the Struggle for independence:

- AFFIRMATION without ambiguity of the existence of two nationalities.
- Restitution to each one of them of identity, history and national culture.
- Complete opposition of the interests of each one of them those of colonialism and local bourgeoisie of whatever nationality.

- Recognition of the national rights of each component. We set the affirmation and the defence of these national rights as one of the components of the struggle of the entire popular masses.

These elements correctly appreciated in conjunction with the necessity of the struggle for independence would no doubt favour the active participation of the two nationalities in the fight against colonialism and its solutions.

POLITICAL PLATFORM

- Awareness of the daily humiliation and exploitation of our people.
- Awareness of the "divide and rule" policy of French colonialism and their local valets.
- Awareness of the present neocolonial project calculated to deceive our people with a view to keeping them in social, economic and intellectual poverty.
- Conviction that it is only the contents of independence that matter
- Conviction that the local valets cannot incarnate the legitimate aspirations of the people.
- Determination to fight French colonialism and its neocolonialist solutions.

That is why we have organized assemblies in a van guard political party called: "The People's Liberation Movement".

This party, leading organ of the people, will operate under the enlightened leadership and anti-imperialist elements of the country.

I. The party must struggle to liberate our country from colonial yoke to bring about a democratic national revolution and build up a progressive state.

II. Djibouti is a binational territory which must remain united. The nationalists should have equal rights and duties.

All nationalists must have the freedom to use their spoken and written language.

The party will fight the hegemony of one culture over another

III. Will abolish all ethnic discrimination and all forms of exploitation of man by man.

IV. Will abolish tribalism and the domination of one tribe by another to increase and develop national conscience.

V. Will abolish all laws and customs which degrade women and will work for the Liberation of women against family, social and political oppression.

VI. Will ensure full employment, guarantee equal wage for equal work, establish a social security scheme to protect workers in case of old age, invalidity, loss of work and that under the

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control of trade unions.

Will take in charge of families and children by providing family allowances to all no productive members of the family and will set up a system of price control.

Djibouti 27 April 1976

The Chief Minister,

Sir,

The debate which determines the future of the territory opposes today the supporters of a supposed "non-alignment policy" strongly inspired and supported by communist regimes to those who, like me, are in favour of a liberal society well disposed towards the West and working in a spirit of cooperation with France.

This debate has no doubt a marked political aspect but it also involves major choices of an economic nature, because on the outcome of it depend not only the institutions and the regime of the future state but also the standard of living and the welfare of its inhabitants.

In addressing this letter to you today, I am appealing not so much to the citizen as to the cadre and the consumer that you are, in order to see together with you the economic consequences of the political choices you will soon be called upon to make.

This reflection cannot but be based on facts. What are these facts? The first is that the territory produces nothing. It has absolutely no source of energy (petroleum, coal or river). There is no agricultural or industrial production whatsoever. Independence will not change in anyway the situation. Some good apostles are incriminating "colonialism", which supposedly has deliberately slackened the exploitation of the country's resources to perpetuate oppression and preserve the market for European products. And yet people, according to the LPAI report of March 25, 1976 speak of gypsum, salt, diatomites, or obock lime deposits which will bring about prosperity. Who would digest this type of absurdities? And why has not the famous colonialism, and by nature for profit, exploited this supposed wealth for its own benefit?

It is better to look at the situation clearly: these potentials resources, granted that they exist, are not economically viable. Their exploitation would entail enormous investments, considerable technical and material difficulties all this for an insignificant output. Who would approve such a senseless effort? Is it Somalia which has one of the lowest standards of living in the world and which is now competing with Bangla Desh for the record of under-development? Is it Ethiopia which is wallowing in an almost similar situation? Or is it the Socialist countries which are lagging 30 years behind Europe in accumulation of capital and in consumption? Or is it the oil producing countries which,

though undoubtedly rich, are however parsimonious: in their generosity towards the third world? Let us not delude ourselves with dreams. Whatever may be the team that assumes power, whatever may be the regime, the territory will remain one of the most underprivileged countries of the planet.

Colonialism can at least claim the credit for having created here out of nothing an economic infrastructure. It has since 60 years constructed a railway line from Djibouti to Ethiopia, a commercial port which is being constantly modernized, and an airport so situated as to be a good stop-over between Europe and the Indian Ocean; and between Africa and the Arab Peninsula and India. Lastly, thanks to a privileged monetary regime granted by France, a commercial and banking sector has developed despite political changes. Through patents, direct and indirect taxes it pays, this sector is contributing largely to the resources of the territory. All these achievements will benefit the future state. But we always have to come back to truths: An economic infrastructure has not meaning except in a liberal regime. In a state of "socialist" inspiration, banks cease to function, societies and companies fold up business, armaments change home port; general economic activity comes to a stand still. We cannot refrain from citing the example of Aden which before 1963 was a flourishing country and which became a dead city when communists came to power. Another truth to be considered is that although an economic infrastructure has an undoubted employment capacity, the number however is limited. Everybody knows that the harbour, the railway and the airport cannot in themselves cater totally to the needs of the town. If the standard of living has reached its present level, it is because other resources have being brought in. These complementary resources came from a strong european minority of about 10,000 people, in Djibouti, who have a high purchasing power and who consist mainly of army people. The household expenditures of these europeans largely feed, through internal taxes on purchase of goods, the budget of the territory. These taxes presently bring in 38.5% of ordinary revenues. Their revenue in turn is subjected to a solidarity tax to which they are the main contributors. This tax levied on their salaries and wages, brings in 380 Millions, that is 6.7% of our revenues. Lastly they constitute initially the source of a considerable number of jobs some directly such as house servants or indirectly such as commercial and building employees etc.

Furthermore, the French Armed forces have integrated in their ranks hundreds of indigenous people of the territory who are now assured of permanent employment with decent salaries.

In total 85% of the revenues of the territory come from the french armed forces stationed here, from officials and commercial companies of metropolitan origin. In our country where the budget is dedicated almost exclusively to the running of services, that is, the emoluments of civil servants and other staff, ~~from the european minority~~ ^{without these revenues}, local administration would have no alternative but to close its offices and sack its personnel. It is enough to look at what happened in the Comoro islands where owing to the irresponsibility and the rashness of the leaders, the officials have not been paid since six months.

The high standard of living that we have reached in the territory thanks to the presence of an economic sector, both administrative and military of metropolitan origin, has moreover made it possible to establish a social scheme without parallel in the third world, and which caters for those who retire from service on grounds of age, gives free medical service to wage and salary earners and their dependents, family allowances, and compensation in the case of accidents occurring in service. Such a large covering of social hazards is possible only thanks to the contributions paid by the business concerns, administrations and the household expenditures. It therefore also depends on the level of economic activity and on a liberal regime.

I am quite aware that this situation is far from being idyllic, that there is an important unemployment problem in Djibouti, that vast problems remain to be tackled, in connection with lodging, town-planning and education. I would like an important fact in this connection be given due attention: through the influx of foreigners, the inhabitants of Djibouti increase by 8,000 every year. Which european only could cope with such a constant pressure? And what to say of those irresponsible persons who, dictated by foreigners, are promising the return of 30,000 "refugees", a number of political manoeuvres without any connection with our country, but which would not fail to make life unbearable to all, including the indigenous people. Lastly, to complete my argument, I will add that french colonialism in taking under its wing our economic and social equipments is completing its action in favour of our territory.

Annex X

The assistance from FIDES, the cooperation of the Treasury and direct financing of the state have made it possible to set up the essential infrastructures which the territory through its own resources would by no means have been able to do. The South breakwater of the harbour, the new air terminal, the ministerial city, to mention a few, are gracious gifts from France. To this we may add the french aid in running our services, the direct assumption of the responsibility of our secondary education, and the struggle against tuberculosis, which has spared the territory considerable expenses.

In this long list, which I could still have developed further I have tried to prove to you that our independence if it chimes in with a political necessity felt by all, has no economic sanction and that the relative prosperity of the territory depends upon external assistance.

We shall now try to see together the economic aspects of the two concepts of independence which the African Peoples league for independence (LPAI) has brought up against my government.

The African people's league for Independence (LPAI) has not shown in a clear manner the economic tenor of its programme. It has recently set up an Economic Committee whose reports have not yet come out. But its leaders have dropped some hints here and there as to their ideas in that direction. Its sources of inspiration are equally revealing: supported openly to the point of interference by the Somalian Communist regime, the league enjoys the sympathy of the so-called progressive countries in Africa, and, in France, the support of the Communist party and the socialist party, bound together in the famous leftist "common programme", claims to be non-aligned. That is to say, its choices are a priori diametrically opposed to all economic liberalism, and are going towards a controlled economy and the consequences that ensue therefrom: nationalisation of means of production, control of external commerce, exchange control and capital movement, authoritarian planification of development. Such a system, which has already proved to be disastrous in developed countries, would here shortly lead to a catastrophe.

The league can no doubt challenge this analysis, but will it then justify itself to its friends if not by keeping silent or indulging in ambiguities as usual. It can equally pretend that after its accession to power through democratic means, it will resume on its own accord cooperation with outside countries especially with France. This however, would be taken because the league has already refused to cooperate with France.

In this connection I refer to the despatch No. 102 of Agence France Press, dated 13 April, which indicates that Mr. DIVI declared that the (LPAI) does not approve the maintenance of a French base in Djibouti and does not even want any cooperation agreements to be signed. What will our future state be without such agreements? Who is going to guarantee our economy? Who is going to give it the financial assistance indispensable for its development and daily survival? Once the "colonialists" are gone, who is going to ensure our economy? Who is going to invest here? who will dare trust leaders who openly give rent to their socialist leanings if not their xenophobia?

I have made, since long, and most clearly, a sounder proposal. I said that I was in favour of maintaining ties of friendship and cooperation with France, while publicly opting for a liberal system, largely open to foreign capitals and investments, based on a moderate fiscal policy, and in which the state would in no measure renounce its prerogatives and its sovereignty, but would work, in close collaboration with a private sector secure in its rights and activities, for the progress and welfare of its inhabitants. Since January 1976 at Paris, french cooperation has solicited and favourable prospects for the conclusion of future agreements emerged.

Behind these prospects there looms reasonable hope of negotiated collaboration with liberal Europe.

We have now reached the end of this reflection on our future.

Over and above the political questions of the moment, I have tried to expose to you the essence of the debate, which boils down to a choice of system: either the maintenance and development of a liberal system, which will ensure the development of our future nation, or social and economic regression organised in the context of totalitarian collectivism. Such is the nature of the real problem: I am sure that you will not fail to appreciate the gravity of this problem for our country.

I request you, Sir, to accept the expression of my highest consideration.

Ali Aref Bourhan.

PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITIONMEMORANDUM

The objective assessment of the general situation in our country on the eve of its national independence, was made by the Parliamentary opposition during a debate in our Assembly on 17 April 1976, on the motion of censure tabled against the Government of Mr. AREF.

We are forwarding to you important extracts from the records of the debate to give an accurate picture of the situation, and wish to point out that the motion was supported by a majority made up of sixteen deputies, with only twelve indigenous deputies voting for the Government which has managed to cling to power with the four votes cast by the deputies of metropolitan France and eight other votes by minister deputies and members of the Government censured who had to vote for their own survival. This shows that the so-called majority government is supported only by a minority of deputies in the Assembly.

We hope that, in regard to popular support, you have seen for yourselves the magnitude of the isolation of Mr. AREF's government which does not represent the country's interests or its aspirations.

To delude you into thinking that it enjoys popular support, Mr. Aref's Government has asked the Ethiopian Government to infiltrate thousands of supporters in the Territory to chant "long live Aref" and protest against another foreign neighbouring country. This obviously creates an ominous tension which borders on provocation at this time of your visit to our country. The debate on the motion of censure shows clearly also that the present Government holds on to power through acts of provocation and that it is prepared even to cause a civil war.

This is why its resignation is necessary if we are to achieve national unity and independence.

We are convinced that your visit to our country shall help establish detente, understanding and national unity and bring about independence in stability, justice and reciprocal co-operation.

We hope that France will heed your advice and withdraw her support for the Government with civil war instincts.

The Parliamentary Opposition proposes:

1. The resignation of Aref's Government.
2. The suspension of the projected referendum for self-determination in order to give us time to make better preparation for it.
3. The abrogation of the present laws on citizenship and their re-drawing up.
4. The revision of the electoral law, and its electoral rolls and registers.
5. The formation of a Coalition Government comprising all the political forces of the Territory.
6. The setting up of a Constitutional Committee chaired by a neutral personality.
7. The conversion of the present House of Deputies into a Constituent Assembly in order to avoid any political machination likely to falsify the realities.
8. The holding of a referendum to approve the Constitution of the future State.

30 April 1976.

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MOTION OF CENSURE

- The House of Deputies of the FTAI,
- Considering that the historical phase reached by the Territory and in the light of the atmosphere of tension and mistrust prevailing within all the ethnic groups and all the political groups,
- Noting that the present Government is incapable of creating the atmosphere of confidence needed for concord,
- HAS tabled this motion of censure aimed at overthrowing it and making room for the formation of a Coalition Government in which all the political trends will be represented.

Which honourable members would like to speak?

MR. BOURHAN KANANO DAQUD mounts the rostrum.

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Deputies,

Before I speak about the Motion of Censure tabled before us, I would like to speak about myself. I did not ask to become a Deputy, but when it was proposed to me, I agreed to it in protest, but I agreed to it all the same.

The electorate which elected me would like to know how I have fulfilled the mandate they have entrusted to me.

I have been a member of this Assembly for nearly seven months. Elected without excessive electoral promises, I have tried to discharge my duties normally as a Deputy by seeking to bring the Government, not to satisfy individuals, but to work without prejudice for the general interests of the country particularly the youth who represent the future of the nation and the hope of the country.

Since I could not influence the action of the Government in favouring its clients and punishing the rest of the nation, the region and the people, I have had to withdraw from it.

I have given the reasons for withdrawing from the group that gives support to the Government in a message broadcast over the radio on 29 March, which was contradicted by the same radio station under circumstances that called into play the authority and prestige of the traditional chiefs.

My political conviction and concern over the general interests have not changed since I joined the opposition group.

I shall vote for the Motion of Censure and call on my colleagues to do the same - (applause).

MR. YOUSOUF ALI YOUSOUF:

Mr. Speaker, Honourable Deputies, look around you in this hall! You will see policemen armed with pistols and machine-guns and you will see the plain-clothed body guards armed with pistols

All this frightful army in the Assembly Hall is to protect the body and life of Chief Minister AREF.

Why, Mr. AREF, do you need constant protection, at home, in the office and in the streets? It is because you are afraid. You are afraid because you are aware that the people do not like you. Because you have turned hatred into a national feeling, tribalism into political doctrine and have chosen provocation as your method of action.

The people aspire to brotherhood, friendship and civil peace. You are the main enemy. That is why, day and night, you live in a besieged residence, covered by machine-guns and pistols. No Head of Government worthy of the name, anywhere in the world, governs a people he hates and is hated by under such conditions. The machine-guns and pistols will not win you popular support, They will not protect you from inevitable but ignominious political defeat. You must resign while there is still time. You will not die of hunger. You have already taken precautions in this regard.

The corrupt administration which serves you, dares not tell you the magnitude of the discomfiture of your regime. The few corrupt individuals around you cannot tell you the extent of your impopularity. You have become synonymous with all that is not acceptable and your actions, as the Head of this country, engender a feeling of repulsion among the majority of the people.

Honourable Deputies,

This man is too dangerous for our country since his slogan is Power or Death! He tells our people: "either you elect me or there will be civil war." He is another Suleiman Frangie creating another Lebanon here.

Let us preserve the integrity of our country and the unity of our people by getting rid of this man who is psychologically and politically irremediable. Let us censure him in the general interest of the country!

The general interest means, first of all, unity - that is unity of the people living in our country. Thus unity is necessary and ineluctable.

In order to hold on to power, Mr. AREF tells the Afars that they will be annexed and exterminated by Somalia. This is obviously far from the truth, for Somalia is a neighbouring Republic, African and brotherly, militating for the independence of Djibouti, but a separate and foreign State which will not annex us.

The Afars and Somalis living together here, shall together build a fraternal and egalitarian State which ensures peace at home and sovereignty abroad and enjoy independence in full integrity of the national territory - (applause).

ALI AREF did not conjure up the Afar people. The Afar people shall not disappear with the fall of the AREF Government - (applause).

It is the mistrust and hatred created by AREF among the people which will disappear with the fall of the malevolent government. Let us vote for the disappearance of that regime by voting for this Motion of Censure - (applause).

MR. IBRAHIM AHMED BOURALE:

Mr. Speaker, Dear Colleagues,

We have come to a moment of our history when our future is more than ever before at stake.

In such circumstances, it is difficult, but it is the duty of each of us in particular and each citizen in general, Honourable Deputies, to assume his responsibilities.

As you are aware, the days and months to come will be decisive for the destiny of our country and I am convinced that you already see the scope and importance of the decisions that we are being brought to take, let alone their consequences for the country.

The clannish politics have outlived their term; national unity must take precedence over any other interest.

A policy of understanding and unity must replace a policy of discord practised for more than fifteen years by the AREF Government to the detriment of our country and our people.

Indeed, at this time when our accession to international sovereignty is imminent, it is necessary for us to transcend our internal squabbles and tribal differences.

The time has not come a day too soon to remove from the shapping of the destiny of our country, one man whose policy would inevitably lead us to ruin.

To do this two conditions must necessarily be fulfilled so that our independence may not become a myth:

- Dissolution of the Government of AREF;
- Formation of a Coalition Government in which all the political groups will be represented.

In voting for this Motion of Censure, you are saving our children, our brothers, our sisters. You are sparing our country the danger posed by an anachronic and blind policy.

Thus, I ask you all to vote for this Motion - (applause).

MR. ABDOUL KADER WABERI ASKAR:

Since our last meetings in November - December, 1975, we have come a long way, we have made several contradictory statements. Manoeuvres have been made to cling to power. The Territorial Government does not bow to anything. All that yields good results is good. But the Chief Minister is aware that he is only prolonging the government's agony, for the people as a whole are determined to get rid of the Government which is kept in power by promises, intimidation, acts of horror, in brief by the gun, not to mention the bayonettes.

If the security of the territory depended only on you and your Government, Mr. Chief Minister, the Territory would have been on fire, there would have been bloodshed. But thank God, you are not fully in control and we do not intend to entrust all to you.

On 28 March, it was one of your Ministers who in District 7 boasted about the destruction of BALBALA and had threatened the inhabitants of District 7 with a similar act. You told a journalist of "Le Figaro" yourself on 2 February 1976 that nobody lived at BALBALA because you had decided to raze the area with bulldozers, whereas there were 7,500 inhabitants there.

Thank God, we have seen, before it becomes too late, a sample of what you envisage as your future State. The cold-blood murder of innocent people at Arthur Rainbaud Square on 18 December 1975. The destruction of BALBALA, the armed attack on the C.E.T. and the TADJOURA Lycee. And you dared say when leaving Matignon that "if my fellow countrymen return me to power, I shall be at the head of the future State. Fortunately you said "if".

Internally your Government has only aroused hatred and rancour. You have always played one ethnic group against another. The tribal leaders who came from the countryside to see you were themselves shocked at the statements you made during your talks with them as part of your methods to cling to power. As far as you are concerned, a Deputy is a tool, he is someone you can keep around you through promises or intimidation or through tribal affiliation and kinship.

I said the elders were shocked by your statements because they realized that you had a different language for each ethnic group. Is that the unity on which the future State will be built?

If the Deputies were free and were not afraid to injure the pride of their tribes - the tribes you have yourself put on alert - two thirds of the House would have voted against you.

Honourable Deputies, you see that we shall be the future leaders of the future State. It devolves on us therefore to assume our responsibilities!

Mr. Chief Minister, you want to change the FTAI at will. You have been abroad to attempt to mislead world public opinion, but you must dispel your own illusions, for you deceive no one but yourself!

The OAU and Arab Missions which shall visit the territory will only confirm that the people of the FTAI do not want you and that these people, contrary to your sermons and those of your agents at the various Ministries in Paris, are not anti-French but anti-AREF and oppose your Government. You are the only obstacle to friendship between the Territory and France.

You have certainly read some of the passages of the reports of the UDR-RI Mission led by Mr. DEPREMCND. You are certainly going to make us believe that that was a confirmation of your good policies. In brief, so much the better if it satisfies everybody. However, you must certainly have said: "The time for close-knit politics has passed", that sums up everything.

Mr. Chief Minister, all your speeches delivered from the rostrum of this House have always smacked of wickedness vis-a-vis the Republic of Somalia. Are you allergic to the name 'Somalia'? Is this how you intend making friends with Somalia? Do you realize that your majority government comprises Somalis? Is this the neutral policy that will place the two neighbouring States - Ethiopia and Somalia - on an equal footing? Or, are you simply trying to strike a balance, because before November 1975, you were openly anti-Ethiopia - (applause).

This is not surprising, you usually travel on sailing-boats driven by the wind.

You said in your speech at the Plenary Session of 15 April, that: "France had also proposed that the talks be held in Paris with all the various political groups of the Territory".

It is true that on 31 December 1975, France made that statement, but who has thwarted it? Is it not you, who, under cover of the territorial institutions for which your Government has constantly shown no respect; is it not you who vetoed at Rue Oudinot, that the various political groups must be put aside and that you declared yourself the only legitimate negotiator on the destiny of this Territory? Do not accuse the others!

Still from your speech of 15 April 1976, you talked about "freedom of expression", but the only weekly newspaper in the Territory, "Reveil" is constantly censored, sabotaged by your Government, thus creating great difficulties for the journalists who would have much liked to discharge the duties worthy of their profession.

In conclusion, the people of the Territory are sick and tired of your demagoguery and are expressing their mistrust through their elected representatives because they are fully aware that your 16-year rule has not improved the destiny of the Territory. The people who were united under the classical colonial rule from 1863 to 1960 are now totally divided because of your misrule, and you are saying that you count on them to entrust you with the responsibility to shape the future State. They are asking you, before it is too late to see the realities in their true perspective. - (Applause).

Djibouti, 26 April 1976

To: The Consul General of
Ethiopia, Djibouti.

Ligue Populaire Africaine
pour l'Indépendance

Your Excellency,

During our political struggle for national independence we defined and clearly specified the dimensions of that independence.

We believe we have said all there is to say on the subject, before national and international bodies and during official talks we have held at the appropriate time with the appropriate authorities of your country.

The details and clarifications we have given are more than sufficient to know exactly where we stand as an African state in the concert of Nations and the Non-Aligned Group. They are also sufficient to allay the fears, if any, of those who have interests in our country because of its geographical position. We have formally undertaken to respect and protect those interests without prejudice to our sovereignty and our independence.

The assistance and support we have requested from regional and international organizations and from all peace and freedom-loving countries falls necessarily and strictly within the framework of the charters governing those organizations and of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states.

According to those principles, each country is free to assist or not to assist us; by virtue of those same principles and depending on its alliances, sympathies or interests, any country is also free to be openly hostile to us because each nation is free to choose its friends.

If we have so far tolerated, without protest, a number of characterised acts of interference by your country in our internal affairs, it is because such interference could not change the course of events in our country and because we wished to leave the way open for good neighbourly relations in future.

We are now compelled to take a stand because of the magnitude and gravity of your interference in our internal affairs.

Indeed, since a few days, the attempts made by thousands of your nationals to cross our borders illegally with instructions to disguise themselves as our nationals constitute an act of aggression to which we demand an immediate end.

These thousands of citizens of yours are transported to our borders by 18 Mercedes lorries which go to and from and belong to the Ethiopian Army which had previously distributed automatic rifles to them; one thousand five hundred have gone to the border post, under the command of Habib Mohamed Yayo and Mohamed Saad, saying that they want to enter the territory by force to assist Ali Aref.

No external aid can replace the support of the people which Ali Aref lacks; your interference will achieve absolutely nothing and is obviously detrimental to future bilateral relations between us.

Please accept, Your Excellency our high consideration.

Signed: Hassan Gouled Aptidon
President

DELEGATION OF FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE
SOMALI COAST (FLCS)

1. Dr. Saleh Nur - President of Political Bureau
2. Mr. Abdullahi Ardeye - Deputy to President
3. Mr. Dahir Ibrahim Issa - Member of Political Bureau
4. Mr. Omer Osman Rabe - Member
5. Mr. Hashi Abdullahi Orrax - Member
6. Mr. Omer Ahmed Yusuf - Member
7. Mr. Ali Hussein Buh - Member
8. Mr. Mohamed Jama Galombi - Member
9. Mr. Musse Ali Idle - Military Section
10. Mr. Abdi Hussein

LIST OF SOMALI DELEGATION

1. Dr. Abdurahman Jama Barre - Director-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
2. Mr. Abdillahi Said - Legal Advisor
3. Mr. Abdurahman Ahmed Ali - Somali Ambassador to Ethiopia
4. Mr. Hashi Abdalla - Somali Ambassador to Uganda
5. Mr. Hussein Haji Ali - Somali Ambassador to Kenya
6. Mr. Mohamed Ismail - Somali Ambassador to China
7. Mr. Hassan Abdille - Director- Foreign Affairs
8. Mr. Mohamed Sherrif - Director in Foreign Affairs
9. Mr. Hussein Hassan - Director in Foreign Affairs
10. Mr. Abdillahi Haji Aboker - Ambassador in Foreign Affairs.

DELEGATION OF LEAGUE POPULAR AFRICAN FOR INDEPENDENCE (LPAI)

1. Mr. Hassan Couled - Director
2. Mr. Ahmed Dini - Secretary-General
3. Mr. Ibrahim Harbi O Vice-President
4. Mr. Idris Farah - Political Secretary
5. Mr. Omar Kamil - Vice-President
6. Mr. Alimo Bel - Member Political Bureau
7. Mr. Said A. Haitah - Member Political Bureau
8. Mr. Saleh Ahmed - Member of Political Bureau
9. Mr. Omar Dabar - Member of Political Bureau
10. Mr. Mohamed Ahmed Isa - Secretary General

DELEGATION OF UNION FOR NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE(UNI)

1. Mr. Omar Farah Iltireh - President
2. Mr. Mohamed Abdoul Gamil - Vice-President
3. Mr. Mohamed Djama Elabe - Secretary-General, incharge of External Relations
4. Mr. Ahmed Youssouf - Secretary-General
5. Mr. Mohamed Aden
6. Mr. Chehem Daoud Chehem
7. Mr. Ismael Youssouf
8. Mr. Hassan Youssouf
9. Mr. El Haj Mohamed kamil
10. Mr. Abdillahi Ahmed God.
11. Mr. Sanad Farah Khaire
12. Mr. Amar Mohamed Kamil

LIST OF GOVERNMENT DELEGATION

1. Mr. Ali Aref Bourhan - President of Council of Government
2. Mr. Mohamed Djama Elabe - Minister of Public Works, Transport and Tourism
3. Mr. Hadji Mohamed Kamil - Minister of Interior and Moslem Affairs
4. Mr. Omar Mohamed Kamil - Minister of Education, Youth and Sports
5. Mr. Ali Arreh Khaire - Minister of Labour
6. Mr. Chehem Daoud Chehem - Minister of Public Health
7. Mr. Ahmed Aouled Ali - Minister of Public Offices
8. Mr. Hassan Mohamed Moyale - Minister of Rural Economy
9. Mr. Ismael Balaya Ragueh - Minister of Economic Affairs

NAMES OF MEMBERS OF OPPOSITION

DJIBOUTI-1/5/76

1. Mr. Barkat Gourat Hamadou - President
2. Mr. Abdelkader Waberi Askar - Vice-President
3. Mr. Alitaher Liban - Rapporteur
4. Mr. Saad Warsama Dirie
5. Mr. Djama Djilal Djama
6. Mr. Ibrahim Ahmed Bourale

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