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منظمة الوحدة الأفريقية  
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**ORGANISATION DE L'UNITE  
AFRICAIN**  
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REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON  
DECOLONISATION



INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The present Report on Decolonisation covers the period June 1976 to May 1977. Though the period under consideration has not been one in which Africa had to witness the accession to independence and national sovereignty of any of the territories under colonial and racist domination, it was indeed one whereby the prerequisites for gaining independence i.e. the waging of diplomatic offensive in international politics and the intensification of the armed struggle has been gaining momentum.

In Zimbabwe a futile attempt has been made through the exercise of the Geneva Constitutional Talks of October-December 1976 although its promoters knew very well Smith and his intransigent henchmen were adepts at thwarting agreements and breaking their own words. It only serves to promote concern and mistrust on the part of the Western World when the members of the so-called free world refuse to understand the realities and dare to hold the Rhodesian bull by its horns. The Zimbabwean nationalists have so many times extended their hand of negotiation to the illegal regime to solve the problem of their territory peacefully. But their efforts, as was indeed the case in Geneva have always been in vain. Every time an attempt is made at peaceful negotiations the racist regime which is not only so confident but is also encouraged and strengthened by the British Crown against which it had rebelled, backed out using pretexts of one reason or another.

In Namibia racist South Africa and her Western allies spearheaded by the United States have been extremely busy during the period under review to provide a so-called

With regard to the So-called French Somaliland (Djibouti) the two liberation movements of the territory recognised by the OAU, the FLCS and LMD and the political parties and groups have exerted enough pressure over the colonial power during the period under review and as a consequence they are assured of independence for their country by June 27, 1977. Thanks to the relentless effort extended by the Government of Ghana and the members of the OAU Fact Finding Mission to the territory during the Round Table Conference held in Accra, Ghana, from March 28 to April 1, 1977, an atmosphere of rapprochement has been created for the political life of the territory.

ZIMBABWE

During the period under review the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe has been dominated by two basic factors i.e. the abortive Geneva Constitutional Conference, October/December, 1976, and the underlying intensification of the armed struggle. The intensification of the armed struggle and not the Kissinger advent in Southern Africa, as the world may want to believe, forced rebel leader Ian Smith to come to terms and announce his capitulation. On September 24, 1976 Smith announced the following six points, which he claimed he had agreed upon with Mr. Kissinger, for black majority rule in the territory:

- a. acceptance of the principle of majority rule within two years;
- b. formation of an interim government by the current Rhodesian government representatives and African leaders to last until majority rule;
- c. the interim government to comprise two bodies:
  - (i) a Council of State made up of an equal number of members of blacks and whites; and
  - (ii) a Council of Ministers. The Council of State would be led by a white chairman who would have no special vote. The Council of Ministers would have a black majority of ministers and a black Prime Minister. The Council of State would draft the Constitution and supervise elections for majority rule. The Council of Ministers would be responsible for

Government departments; but the Ministries of Defence, Law and Order would remain in white hands;

- d. Britain to legislate to permit the election for majority rule and transition to independence;
- e. termination of the UN economic sanction against Rhodesia and cessation of guerrilla activities upon the formation of the interim government; and
- f. substantial economic assistance to be made available by the international community to provide assurance to Rhodesia's economic future.

2. These so-called principles which have during the whole period of the Geneva talks been referred to as the package deal by Smith, have been dismissed at the outset by the Presidents of the Frontline States. In a press conference the Chairman of the Frontline States, President J. Nyerere stated that Smith had no mandate to issue details of the settlement plan and that what was acceptable was the urgency for the formation of a provisional African majority government and the subsequent independence of Zimbabwe within the next two years. The President further stated that the mandate to work out details of an independent Zimbabwe should be left to Britain and the legitimate and authentic representatives of Zimbabwe.

3. In line with these new developments and the introduction of details by Smith before matters left the ground, the Frontline States called on Britain as the colonial power, over the territory, to call a Constitutional Conference in a neutral territory to discuss ways and means for the installation

of the transitional government to lead the territory to independence on the principles of black majority rule. Britain accepting her colonial and constitutional responsibilities organised the conference by appointing its Chairman and establishing its venue and date for its convening. Thus the meeting was held in Geneva and had its first session on October 28, 1976 under its appointed Chairman, Mr. Ivor Richard, Britain's Permanent Representative at the United Nations elevated to the rank of Minister for the purpose as Chairman of the Geneva Constitutional Conference.

4. On their part the African nationalists, while welcoming the Smith decision of September 24, 1976, in which he accepted the principle of majority rule, went to Geneva to witness the process of the independence of Zimbabwe through the machinery of the transfer of power from the illegal minority regime to the legitimate majority. The nationalists had made it clear long before the convening of the Geneva talks that they were neither going to entertain nor dwell upon the so-called six-point principles of Smith since they did not participate in their creation or formulation.

5. The details that have been set forth were the works of Smith alone and when presented to Kissinger at the time of their meeting, the former Secretary of State accepted them as only a "basis for negotiation" and not as rigid principles. Smith refused to change his pretentious attitude even when both the American and British governments reminded him that the proposals were meant to be a basis for negotiations and not a contract. Kissinger, on his September 24, 1976 statement, said that the plan for the progressive transfer of power in Rhodesia was more a basis for negotiation than a definite formula. He denied that he ever said the plan was a non-negotiable formula to solve the Rhodesian problem.

6. During the September 1976 Kissinger-Smith meeting, the former American Secretary of State produced a summary of three sets of U.S. intelligence reports about Rhodesia's military position. The Defence Intelligence Agency, the Intelligence and Research Bureau of the State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency agreed on the broad issues while differing over estimates of the time before Rhodesia's military and economic position finally collapsed. These reports were confirmed by the military evaluation of the South African intelligence service BOSS. It was, facing this bleak situation that on the request of Smith, Kissinger who introduced what was termed as the Anglo-American Settlement Plan, an elaboration of the terms laid down by Mr. Callaghan<sup>in</sup> the British Parliament on 22 March, 1976.

7. The first stage of this four-point plan included acceptance of majority rule; election for a majority controlled government within 18 to 24 months no independence before majority rule and no long drawn out negotiations. Once these pre-conditions had been met the second stage of negotiating the actual terms of an independence constitution could begin including talks about a financial settlement to provide investment funds for the new State of Zimbabwe and a compensation fund for the white Rhodesians who might wish to emigrate. These broad points formed the essential basis of the agreement, with one important addition: arrangements for an interim government to be set up immediately. At the end of the talks Kissinger handed Smith a written version of these proposals which had been cleared with the African Frontline Presidents.

8. As such, these facts clearly indicate that the details for the setting up of an interim government were the works of Smith alone and neither making part of the

Kissinger-Smith accord, nor endorsed by the Presidents of the Frontline States. Indeed Smith accepted his defeat and gave way for majority rule on September 24, 1976, but it was obvious that it was by no means a genuine acceptance of that principle, even in relation to his firm supporters, the British and the Americans. During the whole period of Kissinger's advent in Southern Africa, Smith, in his usual manner, had been planning to find ways and means to sabotage his apparent acceptance of the principle of majority rule.

9. It was precisely for this reason that he injected the details for the interim government into the broad lines of agreement entered between himself and Kissinger. He knew exactly what he was doing when, among the details he included the retention of the Ministries of Defence and Law and Order in white hands for the interim period. The African nationalists as well as Smith knew very well that these two ministries were of cardinal importance for either promoting the process of majority rule or obstructing it to the point of returning to the present situation of white minority rule.

10. Smith being an extremely unreliable, deceitful and slippery person tried to provoke the nationalists by bringing forward such unacceptable issues in anticipation that they would walk out of the conference thereby gaining for himself a degree of respectability in the eyes of the Western World. Both ways he planned to gain. If the nationalists were to accept the allocation of the ministries of Defence and Law and Order then, as it was revealed by the Sunday Times of London on October 31, 1976, and quoting Mr. Sutton Price, Minister in Smith's Cabinet "Parliament would only go into recess under the Kissinger plan and not

dissolved. If the agreed constitution was not liked after two years, Parliament would be recalled to reject it. At the worst Rhodesia would be in a better position to fight the war than at present. It would have two years of trading on the open market with sanctions lifted. The economy would be revamped with the \$2,000 million development fund and with two years to build the arms and war material for the armed forces".

11. On the other hand if the nationalists were to be provoked by his intransigence and walk out of the conference, Smith thought that the nationalists would be the defaulters and the West would have sympathy with his regime. To substantiate his misconceptions he stated in a press conference the following: "If we entered this agreement and it collapsed because of what the black Rhodesians had done, as opposed to myself and my government, I was absolutely certain that we would get a great deal more sympathy from the free world and also tangible assistance".

12. Yet the question of the allocation of these ministries was only one of the many hurdles Smith prepared to sabotage the Geneva Conference if not rally its outcome towards his complete satisfaction and at the expense of years of ardent struggle of the nationalists for freedom and independence. Smith had maintained that majority (responsible) rule should come to Rhodesia within 23-25 months and refused to commit himself to a given date. The nationalist leaders (Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe supported by Rev. Sithole) insisted on 12 months for the life of the interim government and independence being declared by December 1, 1977 and Bishop Muzorewa accepted the British proposal of 15 months but with no specific date for independence. Finally and at the insistence of the Patriotic Front the British Government committed itself to March 1, 1978, and if possible to an earlier date, for the independence of Zimbabwe. To-date the British Government remains with its former commitment in that

independence for the territory should come by 1978.

13. Smith needed badly the 23-24 months of transitional period to enable him prepare his unmasked plans for the objectives as stated in the preceding paragraphs. He ostensibly refused to commit himself to a fixed date for independence and instead preferred to leave the transitional period loose ended. This scheme would undoubtedly assist him to frustrate the smooth transition of the territory into independence and revert the Zimbabwean situation to its former status if the transitional government were to be installed. The nationalists and in particular the Patriotic Front refused to give in easily on the question of the date for independence. Their insistence was not based on the snatching of two or three months of independence period from the British. It was purely based on their revelation of Smith's plans if the period for the transitional government was prolonged and the date for the territory's independence was not fixed. Their suspicions were more than justified and by doing so they refused to provide Smith the loopholes he so much needed.

14. With so much of intransigence on the part of Smith the conference could not proceed as scheduled and the Chairman had no alternative but to adjourn the conference on December 15, 1976, to resume its deliberations on January 17, 1977. During the period of its adjournment, the Chairman visited Southern Africa to try and break the deadlock. During his mission he discussed Zimbabwe with the Presidents of the Frontline States, the South African Prime Minister and Smith. Towards the end of his mission, the Chairman presented the Smith regime with a British proposal for an interim government.

15. The British proposal was totally rejected by Smith and immediately after the British Government promptly called off the Geneva Conference which was supposed to reconvene on January 17, 1977. The British proposal has never been either presented to the African nationalists nor discussed between them and its promoters. Yet the British government considered Smith's rejection of their plan good enough to call off the meeting that was meant to solve the problem of the territory. The British government's behaviour has been rather curious as by so behaving have made Smith relevant and the African nationalists irrelevant on the question of Zimbabwe.

16. Meanwhile the Heads of State of the Frontline States have been meeting constantly to review the question of the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. During one of their regular meetings which was held in Lusaka, Zambia, from January 7 - 9, 1976, the Heads of State of the Frontline States made an important decision with regard to the question of Zimbabwe and the struggle for its liberation. The Heads of State of the Frontline States decided to give maximum political, material and diplomatic support to the Patriotic Front as established by the Maputo Document of September 1976, through the alliance of ZAPU led by Mr. J. Nkomo and ZANU led by Mr. R. Mugabe and that the other nationalist leaders had to prove their possible relevance in the extent they contributed towards the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe. They further decided to approve the continuation of the armed struggle in Zimbabwe as long as the racist regime in the territory was prevailing with its policy of white minority supremacy and racial discrimination.

17. The decision made by the Heads of State of the Frontline States to give maximum political, material and diplomatic support to the Patriotic Front only was subjected

to prolonged discussion at the 28th Session of the Liberation Committee in Lusaka, January 29 - February 3, 1977. With the intention of shedding light as to how and why the Frontline States made such a decision, the then Foreign Minister of Tanzania stated:

- a. that the Frontline States were not imposing and had no wish to impose leadership on the people of Zimbabwe. The Frontline States were merely endeavouring to create conditions that would enable the people of Zimbabwe to participate in the running of their country in freedom and democracy;
- b. that in their actions, the Frontline States were being guided by the Lusaka Manifesto, the Dar-Es-Salaam Declaration and other relevant documents which guided the Liberation Committee;
- c. that the Liberation Committee was a War Committee and not a Committee of politics. This being the case, it was necessary to channel aid to the fighting cadres rather than to the politicians quarelling over leadership;
- d. that the Frontline States, like any other state, had responsibility over the security, economy and well-being of their own people;
- e. that there was need to build one strong army that would wage the liberation war in Zimbabwe until final victory; and
- f. that the Frontline States would not be deterred by unfounded and groundless criticism. They

are committed to the cause of the total liberation of Africa and they would continue their effort until the final goal was achieved.

18. The 28th Session of the Liberation Committee having discussed the issue constructively and at length adopted the following recommendations for consideration by the 28th Session of the Council of Ministers of the OAU. In its operative paragraphs the recommendation states:

1. Decides to endorse the decision of the Front-line States to give full political, material and diplomatic support to the Patriotic Front. However, the door should remain open to all groups of Zimbabwean nationalists fighting for majority rule in their country to join the Patriotic Front. All other fighting forces aiming at eliminating the rebel clique in Salisbury should be considered part and parcel of the Patriotic Front;
2. Urges the nationalists of Zimbabwe to desist from condemning each other, unite their forces under the Patriotic Front and direct their concerted attention at the enemy;
3. Appeals to all the people and cadres inside Zimbabwe irrespective of their political affiliations to contribute to the intensification of the armed struggle till total victory is achieved;
4. Declares its commitment to give assistance and support to all fighting cadres of Zimbabwe inside and outside through the Patriotic Front;

5. Decides that henceforth the Liberation Committee shall concern itself mainly with finding ways and means of prosecuting the armed struggle more effectively;
6. Appeals to all member states to motivate and mobilise the masses and the youth of Africa to understand that the struggle for the liberation of the continent is the responsibility of all and that its salvation lies in our own hands;
7. Calls upon the International Community not to recognise any negotiated settlement between the racists and any puppet in Zimbabwe;
8. Pays tribute to the Frontline States for all they have sacrificed and continue to sacrifice in support of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa.

19. This recommendation was presented to the 28th Session of the Council of Ministers of the OAU at Lome, Togo, as part of the report of 28th Session of the Liberation Committee. Zimbabwe having been given its due importance was discussed at length. Since some member states could not accept all of the recommendations of the Lusaka meeting, it was decided to refer it to the 14th Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government for decision. Meanwhile the Patriotic Front, following the meeting of the Heads of State of the Frontline States in Lusaka, Zambia, 17 - 18 April, 1977, decided to establish its Headquarters in Dar-Es-Salaam, Tanzania, with regional offices in Lusaka and Maputo.

20. Meanwhile the Zimbabwean liberation struggle suffered a tragic set back with the killing by a parcel bomb of Jason Moyo, Second Vice-President of Mr. Nkomo's ANC and head of its external wing. Comrade Moyo was a central link-man in the signing of the Maputo Document which substantiated the initial acts of unification of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) to which he belonged and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). During the funeral services which took place in Lusaka, Zambia in January 1977 and attended by President K. Kaunda of Zambia, Zimbabwean nationalists and delegations to the 28th Session of the Liberation Committee, Comrade Moyo was remembered as an unassuming and quiet patriot who towered above partisan prejudices and devoted considerable energy towards forging unity among the Zimbabwean Liberation Movements. Comrade Moyo was buried with full military honours that a hero and a patriot rightly deserves.

21. With the collapse of the Geneva exercise, the only option left for the Smith regime, therefore, is to face defeat on the battlefield. The Patriotic Front with ZIPA under its control and command must, by the logic of the situation, emerge as the decisive and determinant political force in the process of the liberation struggle. It has since long declared repeatedly that the top priority now is Smith's military defeat. The war which did not decrease its tempo during the period of negotiations is to be escalated and operational areas widened and increased. In this regard ZIPA has been deploying thousands of its guerrilla fighters inside Rhodesia and has been steadily training many more in its training centres for infiltration into the enemy area. The plan to increase the guerrilla war effort has been augmented by the steady flow of Zimbabwean students, peasants and workers into the Frontline States with the determination of getting enough training in warfare to enable them to return and liberate their homeland. The

case of the 400 students who defected from Rhodesia through Botswana in February 1977 is worthy of mention.

22. To counter this healthy development in the liberation process of the territory, the illegal minority regime has embarked upon what it describes as an "internal solution". First hinted at by Smith during the Geneva Conference, the internal solution entails the unilateral implementation of the Kissinger plan with the collaboration of some Rhodesian puppets which will enable Smith to win international legitimacy as well as external support in the war against the guerrillas. The first steps towards the implementation of this sinister plan emerged at the end of December 1976 when a new African political group, the Zimbabwe United People's Organization (ZUPO) (made up of puppet chiefs) was unexpectedly formed.

23. ZUPO exposed itself to its realities right from the day of its formation when its architects traditional chiefs Kaiser Ndweni and Jeremiah Chirau stated that it was a moderate body committed to majority rule though not to the principle of "one man one vote" for that would be like "counting sheep". Both Ndweni and Chirau were, until the formation of ZUPO, members of Smith's Cabinet, a factor which clearly suggests that ZUPO was an offshoot of the Rhodesian Front Party and that it was fostered by it so that the internal solution could be facilitated.

24. An assessment of the military situation in Rhodesia suggests that the racist regime will not sustain the war much longer. The army is spread across four operative areas i.e. the North-West, the North and North-East, the East and the South-East. These four fronts have placed considerable strain on the manpower resources of the regime, with some 20,000 regular forces, whose morale is reportedly low, to cope

with a sustained offensive. In a futile attempt to correct the situation the regime has now extended the military call-up to include men over 38 years of age who up to now have been exempted from the four-months-a-year tour of duty. The war is indeed adversely affecting the economy with white workers being constantly called up for security duties. Defence spending for 1976-77 is estimated at \$350 million and as the war intensifies it is certainly expected to increase.

NAMIBIA

25. SWAPO the sole and legitimate representative of the Namibian people revealed through its "Namibia News" of October/November 1976 issue, the real plans of Vorster for Namibia and the strategy through which the Turnhalle talks should be conducted. According to the racist regime of South Africa, its interests over the international territory of Namibia have to be safeguarded through the following three cardinal points:

- a. that South Africa has to keep its control over Namibia by any means possible;
- b. that Namibia is of great strategic importance to South Africa - to lose Namibia would be to lay open vital inroads in the Republic; and
- c. that the future political structure of Namibia must be based on the continued manipulation of the notion of ethnicity. Separate governments must be set up. Talk of setting up a so-called 'unitary state' was acceptable as long as it was understood that ethnic fragmentation within the whole would guarantee the power of the whites.

26. Turnhalle must indeed be viewed and examined against the realities of the above mentioned three points. The Vorster regime has no intention of abandoning Namibia with its abundant mineral resources, its farmlands and its vast potential as a source of nuclear and electrical energy.

Secondly and since the advent of an independent government in Angola, Namibia has taken an important strategic significance for Pretoria's military experts as a buffer zone between South Africa and the countries to the north and as a base for the apartheid regime's aggressive military build-up.

27. In the face of the mounting pressures of international opinion, and in particular, the expiry on 31 August 1976 of the deadline set by the United Nations Security Council for its withdrawal from Namibia, South Africa has been forced to make unacceptable face saving concessions. Through the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference, South Africa is aiming to set up an interim government in Namibia, composed of people who do not only pay allegiance to the South African authorities but also are prepared to succumb to Pretoria's directives. But what is this constitutional conference now being held in Turnhalle?

28. Since 1964, when the Report of the Odendaal Commission of Inquiry into South West African Affairs was published, Namibia's black population was formally split up by South Africa into eleven 'native nations'. On Odendaal's recommendations, about 40% of the territory most of it in the north, with some smaller areas south of Windhoek, was set aside to form the basis of separate self-government reserves or homelands for each of the black nations with the exception of the coloureds. The remaining land, including all the most fertile agricultural regions and productive mineral deposits, was to be reserved for the use of whites.

29. The ultimate purpose of the Odendaal masterplan, which has continued to form the basis of South Africa's Namibian policy ever since, was to ensure a continuing supply

of migrant labour for white owned farms, mines and industries in the wealthy central position of the country, while maintaining the black nations in the status of economically weak client states. In each of the homelands Pretoria has taken steps to set up the administrative machinery of so-called government, drawing to the extent that they exist, and are prepared to collaborate on traditional lines with tribal chiefs and headmen, thereby promoting the emergence of leaders sympathetic towards South Africa.

30. Following the decision of the Nationalist Party Executive in September 1974 to convene the talks, representatives were invited from all eleven black population groups or homelands. Once the Ovahimba delegates from north-western Namibia had been amalgamated with the representatives of the Herero, ten black delegations attended the talks alongside the whites. On this basis the South African government claims to have brought the genuine representatives of all the peoples of Namibia together for joint discussions on the country's future. In fact under Pretoria's rules black political parties such as SWAPO, whose membership does not spare homelands and ethnic boundaries have been automatically excluded from the very beginning.

31. At the close of the first plenary session of the Turnhalle on 12 September 1975, a Declaration of Intent was adopted by delegates committing them to drafting a constitution for Namibia within a period of three years. Nothing much further happened until the following March, 1976, when a 36-man Constitutional Committee drawn from all eleven delegations was appointed. Five months later, as the deadline of 31 August, 1976, set by the Security Council for South Africa to withdraw from Namibia drew closer,

delegations hurriedly settled on 31 December 1978 as the target date for Namibia's independence.

32. For almost the whole of the first year of the talks, much of the debate was devoted to discussing wide range social and economic questions through the medium of four committees which have reported back at intervals to the full conference. A large number of resolutions and recommendations on equal pay for equal work, uniform taxation, pension schemes, the establishment of a multiracial university, improved housing, sporting facilities, education and others have been adopted by the conference and by June 1976, about 50 of them were reported to have been referred to the South African Government.

33. Most of the resolutions of this fake gathering have, however, little prospect of ever being implemented in the absence of either an appropriate machinery empowering the Turnhalle to introduce new legislation or a willingness on the part of the South African authorities to release the necessary funds. A financial committee set up at the March 1976 plenary session to work out priorities for the implementation of the conference decisions reported back in June with the claim that Namibia was already an economic liability to South Africa and that nearly 500 million pounds would be needed over the next 10 years to realise the Turnhalle's decisions.

34. Meanwhile controversial issues, such as the involvement of political parties in the talks alongside the ethnically based delegations, have failed to reach the agenda or have been evaded for as long as possible. A proposal put by the coloured delegation to the plenary session in June that SWAPO should be invited into the Turnhalle, was shelved

without ever being discussed. Nevertheless SWAPO has consistently refused to participate in the talks or deal with the Turnhalle delegates. SWAPO argues that the ethnic complexion of the conference, its sponsorship by South Africa and the entire framework of its deliberations are clear designs for continued South African presence on Namibian territory. Further SWAPO states that any discussion on the future of Namibia must, of necessity, be between the illegal administrator of the territory and the liberation movement, SWAPO. This stand is indeed endorsed by the OAU and the United Nations.

35. As the domestic and international pressures upon racist South Africa built up, something of a sense of urgency had to be injected into the usual dragging proceedings of the Turnhalle. At a meeting in November 1976, in which the members of the Constitutional Committee met the henchmen of apartheid in Pretoria, delegates were warned by Vorster that if Turnhalle failed to come up with an acceptable formula, South Africa would take up steps to impose her own choice of constitution upon the territory. Since this ultimatum, the practical task of drafting constitutional proposals for ratification by the full Turnhalle Conference was placed in the hands of the legal advisors to the Turnhalle delegations, all of whom were in the pay, directly or indirectly, of the South African government.

36. The legal advisors worked out what was to be known as a Political and Administrative formula. The interim government was to be set up along the following lines:

- a. Namibia will be administered during the interim period through a three-tier system of government. The multi-racial central government will consist

of a President, to be appointed by South Africa and the interim government's representatives appointed by each of the 11 ethnic groupings attending the Turnhalle talks; a National Assembly elected on a tribal basis; and an appeal court under South Africa's jurisdiction.

- b. The South African Government will retain legislative and executive powers during the interim period over defence, foreign affairs, transport, monetary affairs and foreign exchange, internal security, posts, telecommunications and broadcasting. The South African army, police and security forces will remain in Namibia.
- c. The second tier of the interim government, the Provincial Government, will be composed of the representative authorities of the eleven ethnic groupings in Turnhalle. The Provincial Government will have authority to deal with matters relating to their respective ethnic groups.
- d. The third tier of Municipal or Local Government would include separate local authorities for all existing towns in Namibia and Headmen's councils dealing with strictly local matters.
- e. There will be a Bill of Rights under which, among other things, Marxist-Leninist parties will be prohibited as hostile to the state.

37. From the above mentioned arrangement for the interim government presented by the paid legal advisors, it can, with absolute certainty, be determined that the maintaining of the South African armed forces in Namibia during the period for the interim government will legitimise Vorster's present and future military occupation of Namibia. Further the creation of the second tier government is precisely to fit the designs of racist South Africa to create bantustans in line with the proposals of the 1964 Odendaal Commission.

38. SWAPO however while refusing to be part and parcel of the Turnhalle shameful acts aimed at frustrating genuine independence for the territory and only aimed at facilitating South Africa's continued occupation, made it clear, and repeatedly, that it was ready to talk to the racist regime anytime and anywhere provided the following sacred conditions were accepted:

- a. South Africa must accept the right of the Namibian people to self-determination and national independence.
- b. South Africa must respect Namibia's territorial integrity as one, indivisible and a united entity.
- c. South Africa must withdraw all its troops, police and security forces from the Namibian soil.
- d. South Africa must release all political prisoners currently illegally held on Roben Island, other South African prisons, detentions, restrictions and concentration camps in Namibia.

- e. South Africa must recognise SWAPO as the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people.
- f. Any constitutional talks or elections to be held in Namibia must be under the International supervision and control of the United Nations Council for Namibia which is the legal authority over the territory.
- g. Talks between SWAPO and South Africa must be under the Chairmanship of the United Nations.

39. This clear stand with regard either to the Turnhalle conference or conditions for negotiations have been clearly reaffirmed by the internal wing of SWAPO during its Walvis Bay Congress held from 29 to 31 May 1976. At the end of its Congress it stated that "the present South African organised Turnhalle talks are a farce and harmful shame to world civilization. It is the exhibition of barbarity to the last degree which South Africa has done in Namibia. Those who have accepted these talks are stooges scrapped from the streets to claim to represent the Namibian people. If South Africa doubts our (SWAPO) representatives' nature, this Congress challenges South Africa to hold national elections in the nearest future under the international supervision and control". It further stated that "this Congress rejects in no uncertain terms these scandalous and treacherous talks", and reiterated its conditions, as stated in the preceding paragraphs, which should be met by South Africa before any meaningful talks.

40. On the international scene, the Security Council of the United Nations was seized with the question of Namibia.

during October 1976. At the end of its discussions, the Security Council failed to adopt a draft resolution sponsored by Benin, Guyana, Libya, Pakistan, Panama, Romania and Tanzania which called for a mandatory United Nations arms embargo against South Africa. It was defeated because of the negative votes cast by three permanent members of the Council namely, the United States, the United Kingdom and France. The proposal asked the Council to determine under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter that "the illegal occupation of Namibia and the war being waged by South Africa constitute a threat to international peace and security".

41. The Council should have, according to the draft resolution, demanded again that South Africa withdraw from the territory, and transfer power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations. The Council was also asked:

- a. to condemn South Africa's failure to comply with the terms of the resolution adopted unanimously by the Council on 30 January 1976 on this question, including its provision for free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations for the whole of Namibia as one political entity;
- b. to reaffirm its support of the struggle of the people of Namibia for self-determination and independence;
- c. to decide that all states "shall cease and desist from any form of direct or indirect military consultation, co-operation or collaboration with South Africa" and prohibit their nationals from engaging in such activities; a

- d. to decide that all states should prevent the supply of arms to South Africa, including ammunition, aircraft, vehicles and other military equipment or materials for their manufacture and maintenance in South Africa regardless of existing contracts or arrangements.

42. It is not a matter for debate that the racist regime continues to adopt its disgraceful attitude of defiance towards Africa and the International Community and perpetuates its policy of repression in South Africa and Namibia though not without the complicity and active collaboration of certain Western States. The last behaviour of the United States, Britain and France in the exercise of their veto powers to thwart the aforementioned Security Council resolution which was meant to rectify the injustices suffered by the majority were clear enough to indicate that the continuation of the apartheid policy, which in turn guaranteed handsome returns from their investments, had precedence over human justice. For racist South Africa such acts from the part of these Western States are considered as the grant of certificates of respectability and an encouragement to pursue its present policy.


43. Meanwhile the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Fourth Committee, discussed the question of Namibia at length and in conclusion adopted a relevant resolution whereby it, among other things, reaffirmed the inalienable right of the people of Namibia to self-determination, freedom and national independence in a united Namibia in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the legitimacy of their struggle by all means at their disposal against the illegal occupation of their territory by South Africa.

44. It further condemned strongly South Africa for its persistent refusal to withdraw from Namibia and for its manoeuvres to consolidate its illegal occupation of the territory. The resolution further condemned strongly South Africa for organising the so-called constitutional talks at Windhoek, which seek to perpetuate the apartheid and homelands policies as well as the colonial oppression and exploitation of the people and resources of Namibia by misrepresenting the genuine aspirations of the Namibian people for self-determination, freedom and national independence in a united Namibia. The resolution indeed condemned strongly the activities of all foreign corporations operating in Namibia under the illegal administration of South Africa which are exploiting the human and natural resources of the territory and demanded that such exploitation cease forthwith.

45. All this did not however desist racist South Africa from promoting her own plans for Namibia and in gross defiance of the world community has been increasing her grip over the territory by reinforcing her arms of occupation. By September 1976 and according to a UN research paper, it was estimated that a total of 48,000 South African troops were deployed in Namibia including 12,800 specialised counter insurgency forces, a motorised infantry brigade of 5000 men, three anti-aircraft batteries, paratroops and 3000 air commandos with a squadron of Mirage fighters at their disposal.

46. SWAPO in reply to South Africa's Turnhalle, will mount a war of liberation across the whole territory now and on the eventual setting of the black puppet regime. SWAPO's strength and influence inside the country is growing daily. Over the past year six major political groups inside Namibia - the Rehoboth Volks Party, the Namibian African

People's Organisation and four important Nama groups in the South have decided to disband to join forces with SWAPO in the fight for freedom. In a statement announcing their decision the Namas declared "Now there are only two platforms left: the national movement SWAPO and Turnhalle. Today we have arrived at this crossroad and our choice is clear: we join unconditionally in the genuine nationalist platform of SWAPO created by our fellow countrymen and not Turnhalle, the platform created by our enemy, the South African government".



APARTHEID - SOUTH AFRICA

47. The uprisings in South Africa since 16 June 1976 against apartheid, racial discrimination and the brutal massacres perpetrated by the South African regime against African school children and others, represented a new style in the struggle of the South African people for freedom and an inescapable challenge to the international community. Though the immediate cause of the demonstrations by the African students was the arbitrary imposition by the apartheid regime of Afrikaans as the language of instruction in African schools, they reflect in fact, African resistance to apartheid in all its aspects.

48. It is precisely for this noble reason that both Sharpeville and Soweto have been firmly imprinted in the history of Africa and the South African people's struggle for national liberation. The two names have come to symbolise the brutal overreaction of an insecure white minority, desparately defending its position of dominance and the determination of the black majority to be free.

49. When Verwoerd, the late racist Prime Minister of the territory, unleashed his police against Black South Africans in Sharpeville in 1960, he and his government were responding to the challenge of the protest movement that had gathered momentum over a decade. Its cause can be dated from the adoption of the Programme of Action by the African National Congress at its annual conference of 1949. This new programme put forward Black majority rule as its key and cardinal political slogan and the mobilisation of Black South Africans as the strategy to achieve it.

50. In 1955, the Freedom Charter adopted at the Kliptown Conference, elaborated upon the Programme of Action and set out a series of structural changes in the South African economy that would necessarily have to accompany majority rule. The racist regime responded by wide range arrests on charges of treason on the basis that the ANC had since 1949 organised a number of campaigns aimed at overthrowing the apartheid regime. These campaigns included the Defiance Campaign of 1951-52, the pound-a-day campaign of 1958 and participation in a number of bus boycotts and resistance to Pass Laws.

51. Nevertheless the wide range of arrests and campaigns of terror failed to halt the drive of the black people of South Africa in their drive towards freedom. In a futile attempt to alter the course of history South Africa acted in Sharpeville and the response of the black people was immediate and appropriate. A general strike paralysed industry and commerce, the docks were dogged with goods waiting for transport, foreign capital fled and Western investment started to lull. In a desperate attempt to save the situation the South African army encircled black townships while the police conducted house to house searches to drive the black work force back to their jobs. Following this the government declared a state of emergency and banned the African National Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania.

52. With this historical perspective as a background, Soweto is the opening of another chapter in the continuing process of struggle for liberation by the people of South Africa. It is not caused merely by the negation of the language of the settler white minority; it was caused because of the negation of the entire concept of apartheid

and all that it entails. Soweto is part of the rebellion against the racist regime and a continuation of the struggle for the supreme cause of justice and freedom.

53. The political domination of the African people living in South Africa, the expropriation of their land, their confinement to specified areas of land remote from the areas of white settlement and their enforced participation in the money economy through wage-labour were the main characteristics of nineteenth century colonialism in South Africa. The origins of the present day so-called Bantu homelands must be sought in the concept imposed upon the country by colonial conquest and rule.

54. Since the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 and more specifically since the Bantu Land Act of 1913, as modified by the Bantu Land and Trust Act of 1936, the distribution of land as between whites and Africans has remained basically the same with the whites arrogating to themselves some 87 per cent of the land and confining Africans to the remaining 13 per cent. Indeed, the Vorster regime has gone out of its way to emphasize that in designating the boundaries of the homelands, it is adamantly determined not to exceed the land allocations of 1936. This continuity of policy demonstrates that the bantustan programme is not a tactical manoeuvre of the South African regime but a long standing strategy which is an essential condition for the maintenance of white supremacy.

55. Thus, successive South African governments since 1936 have consistently maintained the basic pattern of land distribution arrived at by colonial conquest and have no less consistently denied Africans all political rights in the area called White South Africa. In the remaining

13 per cent tribalism rather than nationalism is to be the basis of statehood for the very notion of a united African nation poses a threat to white South Africa.

56. In line with this evil school of thought the artificial Bantu homelands were to achieve their sham independence on the sole consideration of political separation. According to the architects of the apartheid policy the programme did not envisage the complete separation of the races. Blacks should continue to serve the whites in the economic areas. The dismemberment of the South African economy would rob the whites of the sources of their wealth and privilege. The Bantustans must continue to supply white South Africa with labour and they must be compelled to do so by being made small, fragmentary, overcrowded and underdeveloped.

57. Further and in recent years, South African government spokesmen have clearly indicated that economic viability is not regarded as a pre-condition for the independence of the Bantustans. In other words, the Bantustans are to begin life as mini-states in conditions of economic subordination to South Africa from which they will never escape. If the Bantustans were capable of providing employment and wealth sufficient to support themselves then they would cease to be pools of migrant labour supplying the apartheid economy of white South Africa. It is therefore an essential pre-condition of their existence that they are and remain underdeveloped and reliant on the export of manpower for bare survival.

58. Another development within the Bantustan programme is the growth of the repressive powers and apparatus of the state in these areas. The Pretoria regime has readily conferred upon the homeland leaders powers of the type itself

possesses in abundance and which guarantee that the rule of law will be non-existent in the homelands when they attain their sham independence. One of the most important of the new measures is the Second Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1974 which empowers the homeland government to assume extensive banning powers similar to those in the Suppression of Communism Act. Although these powers duplicate existing repressive legislation, their active opposition in the homelands to the governments approved by Pretoria will be treated as illegal or at least subversive.

59. Against these factual realities the Bantu homelands of Transkei was granted its sham independence on October 26, 1976. This artificial state which is composed of nothing but a flag and a national anthem is not recognised by the world community save South Africa - its architect. The very act of granting independence to this artificial state has forced 1.3 million Xhosa to either be citizens of the Transkei, a territory they have never been to or opt for remaining stateless. Apart from the lofty crimes that are being committed by racist South Africa by deliberately disintegrating a unitary state, the determination of Africans to be foreigners or stateless in the country of their birth remains an evil act that has never been preceded in the history of man.

60. Economically, the Transkei is not at all viable. Over a third of its economically productive males are now living in white South Africa to earn their daily bread. Of those who remain in the Transkei more than half will be unemployed and will at the same time be lacking the required legal status to work in white South Africa. Every year about 26,000 workers enter the labour market in Transkei and several thousands are prohibited to enter white South Africa so as to swell the unemployment of the Transkei population.

Those who leave the Transkei are the most able-bodied and skilled section of the population. They contribute three quarters of the gross national income of the Transkei in the form of remittance sent to their families who do not accompany them to their place of work.

61. Racist South Africa committed naked aggression against the Republic of Zambia and the People's Republic of Angola thereby causing several human and material losses and damages. In the wake of this naked aggression the racist regime's forces killed 24 people while wounding seriously 45 in the village of Sialola, Zambia. This indeed has been one of the provocative attitudes the racist regime has been conducting ever since its shameful losses in Angola and the intensification of the armed struggle in Zimbabwe and Namibia.

62. At the request of the Government of Zambia, the Security Council took up the matter in July 1976 and after discussing the case exhaustively adopted a resolution strongly condemning South Africa for the attack against Zambia in flagrant violation of the latter's sovereignty.

63. The resolution further called on South Africa to respect scrupulously the territorial integrity of Zambia and to desist from using the Territory of Namibia as a base for armed attacks against Zambia and other frontline African states for their support of the people of Namibia in their liberation struggle and declared the liberation of Namibia and Zimbabwe to be necessary along with the elimination of apartheid in South Africa for the attainment of justice and lasting peace in the region.

64. In the field of arms build-up the French-South Africa deal has as usual been in the lead. The French sale in 1976

of two 950 megawatt nuclear power plants to the apartheid regime of South Africa was the latest manifestation of France's defiance of the call for peace and justice by Africa and the peace loving nations. Since 1961, France supplied the South African Airforce 91 Mirage jet fighters, 30 Mystere jets, 10 Transall transport aircraft and eight Atlantic anti-submarine planes. In addition to this France has also supplied the racist regime 56 Alouette, 16 Super Frelon and 20 Puma helicopters.

65. The South African army was equipped entirely with French armoured vehicles and tanks including the Panhard transport carriers, long range motorised artillery and the AMX series of tanks when it invaded Angola. South Africa with the French firm of Thompson-CSF, jointly financed the development of the crocodile ground-to-air missile, as well as the air-to-air Exoset and Marta missiles. South Africa's naval forces have also been good customers in France. Pretoria bought three Defence submarines, two missile patrolers, two Agosta submarines and two Aviso despatch vessels.

66. The French government's declaration of three successive arms embargoes to South Africa have been the apex of gross fallacy. Each embargo declaration was made more to impress international opinion than to strike against South Africa's military potential followed the same pattern. To start with France sold to South Africa weapons sufficient enough to supply its armed forces, following this she sold the manufacturing licenses to enable South Africa to produce similar weapons locally, before declaring the embargo. What then are the services of the embargoes if care has already been taken as to the needs and requirements of the racist regime.

67. In 1963 France refused to sell arms which could be used for repression. But the decision came after the sale of a fabrication licence for the AMX 60 and 90 tanks as well as several varieties of machine guns. In 1970 using the same system France refused to sell helicopters to Pretoria whereas the racist regime had already stocked enough French helicopters and bought the necessary fabrication licences. In 1975 the French President stated that henceforth the arms embargo would extend to cover all air and ground weapons while naval weapons would be excluded from the black list.

68. Despite the repeated denials on the part of the West German authorities, the following facts reveal the astonishing reality of West Germany's active collaboration with the racist regime in the field of arms build-up:

- a. By the end of 1976 four large 'Airbus' transport planes with military version were delivered to South Africa from Toulouse, France. West Germany holds 45% share on the construction of these planes.
- b. Four Corvettes are being built at the Bazan Shipyard in Cartagena, Spain for South Africa. They are being built after construction plans and equipment were supplied by shipbuilders in Hamburg under NATO codification system furnished by the West German Army.
- c. In Haifa, Israel, four speed boats are completing construction for South Africa on the basis of construction data of a shipbuilding company in Bremen. Special engines for these boats were supplied by West Germany.

- d. The Rheinstahl company of Dusseldorf is presently constructing tanks for South Africa.
- e. Milan, the anti-tank rocket which for most of its parts is built by the Blohm Company of Munich has since long been supplied to South Africa and in large quantities.
- f. Daimler-Benz of West Germany has for years been the main supplier of all heavy duty military trucks and vehicles.
- g. West Germany supplied South Africa with a complete plant for construction of armoured vehicles.

69. The arms arsenal of the racist regime of Pretoria as stated in the 1976-77 annual report of the International Institute of Strategic Studies can be indicated as follows. Its 38,000 man army is equipped with 141 Centurion heavy tanks, 20 Comet medium tanks, 1000 AMX armour vehicles, 250 Sarecens, 230 Scout cars, 18 surface-to-air Cactus missiles and 54 Tigercats. The South African Navy has at its disposal 3 Daphne submarines, 2 Destroyers, 5 anti-submarine frigates, 3 missile carrying gunships and 6 Coverttes equipped with surface-to-surface Gabriel missiles from Israel. The South African Airforce is equipped with some squadrons of Canberra and Buccaneer bombers, 4 fighter squadrons, 1 reconnaissance and 1 interceptor squadrons all using various models of mirage. The helicopter fleet consists of 4 squadrons two of which have 40 alouettes, one having 25 Pumas and the fourth consisting of 15 superfrelons. On order are 32 Mirage F-1 fighter bombers, 30 Impalas, 37 kudus from Israel and those which are being built in various places on West German authorization.

70. In another development racist South Africa increased the period of compulsory military service from one to two years. This new scheme of militarization in South Africa takes effect as of January, 1977. The racist regime further decided to establish a new airforce base on the territory's northern border with Mozambique. The establishment of this airforce base was not in line with South Africa's operational necessities, as stated for the purposes of justification but to facilitate her acts of suppression of the black nationalists and her aggression of independent African States. To enable it finance its ever increasing military expenditure, the racist regime, has, for the new fiscal year, allocated a defence budget of over 2.000 million dollars, an increase of 21.3% over the one expended during the previous year.

71. The General Assembly of the United Nations discussed the question of South Africa exhaustively during its last session. During its debate, the General Assembly expressed its utmost consternation at the continued massacres and other atrocities by the racist regime of South Africa against school children and other peaceful demonstrators against apartheid and racial discrimination. It also expressed its concern about the military and other activities of the racist regime of South Africa and, in particular, about the nuclear collaboration aimed at the establishment of nuclear installations and the transfer of nuclear technology to South Africa.

72. In a resolution which was adopted by 108 in favour, 11 abstentions and 22 opposing, the General Assembly of the United Nations reaffirmed that the Liberation Movements of the territory recognised by the OAU, the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania were the authentic representatives of the overwhelming majority of the South African people. It also reaffirmed the legitimacy

of the struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa and their Liberation Movements by all possible means for the seizure of power by the people and the exercise of their inalienable right to self-determination. It further recognised that the consistent defiance of the racist regime of South Africa of U.N. resolutions on apartheid and the continued brutal repression, including indiscriminate mass killings, by the racist regime left no alternative to the oppressed people of South Africa but to resort to armed struggle to achieve their legitimate rights.

The resolution also called upon the Government of France, the United Kingdom and the United States to:

- a. desist from misusing their veto power in the Security Council to protect the racist regime of South Africa,
- b. enable the Security Council to determine the existence in South Africa of a threat to peace and to exercise its responsibilities under the Charter, and
- c. facilitate instead of obstructing the adoption of a mandatory arms embargo and other indispensable measures, under Chapter VII of the Charter, to deal with the grave situation in South Africa.

THE SO-CALLED FRENCH SOMALILAND (DJIBOUTI)

73. Although by the time this report comes to the attention of the Council of Ministers the territory will have been independent, it is essential for record purposes to recapitulate the course of events leading to this historic end. Between the 27th and 28th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers a rapid succession of developments took place in the Territory.

74. In July 1976 the French National Assembly passed a nationality law for the Territory. The main elements of this law were that persons born in the Territory and who came of age prior to the promulgation of the law could claim French nationality provided one of their parents was born in the territory or provided they could give justification for their residence during five years preceding their coming of age. On the basis of this law registrations were carried out between December 1976 and January 1977 and identity cards were issued. This raised the registered electorate from 40,000 (1973 figure) to just over 90,000. It was envisaged that the completion of the issue of identity cards would then open the way to a referendum and elections.

75. In the latter part of 1976 also, a new administration headed by the Hon. Abdallah Mohamed Kamil as Chief Minister was sworn in after the demise of the Aref administration. The main task engaging the new administration at that time was the revision of the electoral register on the basis of the new nationality law of July 1976.

76. In February and March 1977 the French Government invited all the political parties and the two liberation movements recognised by the OAU to a constitutional conference in Paris. However, MLD, MPL and the leadership of UNI boycotted the Paris talks on the grounds that the Paris Conference was designed to put a stamp upon French neo-colonialism in Djibouti and that it should have taken place after a common political platform had been adopted by all the parties and liberation movements of the Territory. However, during the talks in Paris, it was agreed between France and those delegates from the Territory who attended that:

1. The referendum and elections should be held simultaneously on 8 May, 1977.
2. The Territory should accede to independence on 27 June, 1977.
3. The House of Deputies should consist of 65 members elected as follows:
  - a) 29 for Djibouti City.
  - b) 12 for Tadjoura.
  - c) 12 for Dikkil.
  - d) 6 for Ali Sabiet.
  - e) 6 for Obock.

77. During its 28th Ordinary Session the Council of Ministers repeated its call for all the liberation movements and political parties to attend a round-table conference on neutral ground as called for by resolution CM/Res.480(XXVII). The government of the Republic of Ghana had earlier offered

her good offices for this conference to be held in Accra.

78. All the political parties and liberation movements of the Territory responded positively to the generous invitation extended by the government of the Republic of Ghana. The round-table conference was accordingly held in Accra, Ghana, from 28 March to 1 April, 1977. The conference was marked by a frank exchange of views and resulted in the adoption of the following Declaration:

#### DECLARATION

79. The Round-Table Conference of the Liberation Movements and Political Organisations of the So-called French Somaliland (Djibouti), was held in Accra, Ghana, from 28 to 31 March, 1977, under the Chairmanship of Colonel R.J.A. FELLI, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs of Ghana and attended by the representatives of the following parties and movements:

- a) Government delegation.
- b) Parliamentary majority.
- c) National Independence Union (UNI).
- d) Front for the Liberation of the Somali Coast (FLCS).
- e) African People's Independence League (LPAI).
- f) Movement for the Liberation of Djibouti (MLD).
- g) Popular Liberation Movement (MPL).

80. Present also at the conference were representatives of the host country, Member States of the Fact-Finding Mission to Djibouti, namely: Mozambique, Egypt, Senegal, Guinea (C),

Uganda, Liberia, Tanzania and Zaire. Also present was a representative of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Zambia who is the current Chairman of the Liberation Committee.

81. The Round-Table Conference heard statements by all the representatives of the groups and parties mentioned above on the one and only item of its agenda contained in Resolution CM/Res. 480(XXVII) of the Council of Ministers held in Port Louis (Mauritius) and endorsed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, namely, ADOPTION OF A COMMON POLITICAL PLATFORM BEFORE INDEPENDENCE.

Deliberations:

82. After detailed discussions, consultations and negotiations, the Round-Table Conference considered the following points as results and conclusions emerging from its deliberations:

1. All the Liberation Movements and political organizations of the So-called French Somaliland (Djibouti) agree that there is need for a common political platform before their territory accedes to independence.
2. They agree in principle to form a "United Patriotic Front" comprising all political and liberation movements of Djibouti.
3. They reiterate their resolute will to work together for the national independence of the Territory of Djibouti without external interference and for the respect of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of their country. They pledge to resist and fight

together against any attempt from outside to undermine these attributes after the territory has acceded to national sovereignty.


4. The Liberation Movements and political organisations of the So-called French Somaliland (Djibouti) have agreed to the points below:
  - a) The holding of the referendum on Independence of Djibouti on 8 May, 1977.
  - b) The accession of the Territory to independence on 27th June, 1977.
  - c) Election of a Legislative Assembly shall be held about one year following the referendum and the elections of the Constituent Assembly and after the drafting of the Constitution and an electoral legislation for the new state.
5. They call for the immediate termination of French military presence in the territory after independence.
6. They reaffirm their agreement to the presence of observers from the Organisation of African Unity during the referendum and elections.

83. The Liberation Movements and Political Organisations carefully examined the proposed measures to be taken and arrangements to be made for the fair and faithful implementation of the decisions referred to above.

84. They have taken those measures and made those agreements in order to allay any fears and remove any uncertainties which any group might have from now up to the date of independence of the territory. On the one hand they are intended to forestall the creation of conditions that might strengthen tribal sentiments, and on the other, avoid the elimination of some political groups or tendencies through the adoption of an electoral majority system with a single national list of candidates elected in a single poll.

85. The Liberation Movements and political organisations of Djibouti have, therefore, decided to set up the following institutions and organisations:

- A Political Co-ordinating Committee, a new political party which embraces all the present political parties.
- The duties of this national political co-ordinating committee are:
  - to strengthen and enlarge the base of the political unity achieved.
  - to study and work out solutions to all the problems of distribution of French identity cards so as to correct the errors which might have been committed during distribution.
  - to prepare the referendum and elections so that they take place in peace and harmony.
  - to work out the basic principles underlying the preparation of common lists of candidates in the different regions and one list to assure just representation of other parties.



- to establish specialized commissions, if necessary, with definite tasks to perform.

86. The Liberation Movements and Political Organisations of Djibouti together commit themselves to the creation of the moral and objective conditions for their political unity in the accomplishment of the important tasks which they will have to carry out, on their country's achievement of independence.

To this end they have expressed their willingness:

- to collectively resolve all the levels of the Political Co-ordinating Committees United Front as well as within sub-organs yet to be created, the problem of the representation of the political groups based on a just assessment of the respective strength of their representation;
- the political groups and parties undertake to convene the meeting of their respective bodies to approve the decisions stated above before 10 April, 1977;
- to envisage right from now the necessity of directly associating some representatives of all the movements and political parties with the structure and the working of the organs of the future of the independent state both on the governmental level and the ministries. This exercise will be based on the respective strengths of their representation.

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED  
NATIONS ON THE QUESTION OF SOUTHERN RHODESIA

A

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of Southern Rhodesia  
(Zimbabwe),

Having examined the relevant chapters of the report  
of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the  
Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence  
to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Having heard the statement of the representative of  
the administering power,

Taking into account the report of the Ad Hoc Group  
established by the Special Committee at its 1029th meeting on  
1 April 1976,

Recalling the Declaration on the Granting of Indepen-  
dence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in its  
resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, and the programme of  
action for the full implementation of the Declaration, contained  
in its resolution 2621 (XXV) of 12 October 1970, as well as all  
other resolutions relating to the question of Southern Rhodesia  
adopted by the General Assembly, the Security Council and the  
Special Committee,

Bearing in mind that the Government of the United Kingdom  
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as the administering power,  
has the primary responsibility for putting an end to the critical  
situation in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) which, as repeatedly  
affirmed by the Security Council, constitute a threat to inter-  
national peace and security,

Reaffirming that any attempt to negotiate the future of Zimbabwe with the illegal regime on the basis of independence before majority rule would be in contravention of the inalienable rights of the people of the Territory and contrary to the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and of resolution 1514 (XV),

Taking note of the declared position of the administering power that there shall be no independence before majority rule in Zimbabwe,

Reaffirming also its endorsement of the relevant provisions of the Dar-Es-Salaam Declaration on Southern Africa, adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at its ninth extraordinary session, held from 7 to 10 April 1975,

Endorsing the relevant provisions of the Political Declaration adopted by the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Colombo from 16 to 19 August 1976, relating to Southern Africa,

Taking note of the convening of the conference on Zimbabwe at Geneva,

Condemning the illegal racist minority regime for its intensified oppression of the people of Zimbabwe, the arbitrary imprisonment and detention of political leaders and others, the illegal execution of freedom fighters and the continued denial of fundamental human rights, including in particular the wanton beating, torture and murder of innocent villagers, arbitrary criminal measures of collective punishment and measures designed to create an apartheid state in Zimbabwe,

Commending the firm determination of the people of Zimbabwe, under the leadership of their national liberation movement, to achieve freedom and independence,

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination, freedom and independence and the legitimacy of their struggle to secure by all the means at their disposal the enjoyment of that right as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and in conformity with the objectives of the General Assembly resolution 1514(XV);

2. Reaffirms the principle that there should be no independence before majority rule in Zimbabwe and that any settlement relating to the future of the Territory must be worked out with the full participation of the people of Zimbabwe and in accordance with their true aspirations;

3. Strongly condemns the illegal racist minority regime for its continued brutal and repressive measures perpetrated against the people of Zimbabwe and in particular the wanton killings of Africans carried out by the regime within and outside Zimbabwe;

4. Further strongly condemns the illegal racist minority regime for its systematic acts of aggression against neighbouring African states;

5. Calls upon the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in the discharge of its primary responsibility as the administering power, to take all effective measures to enable Zimbabwe to accede to independence in accordance with the aspirations of the majority of the population and not under <sup>any</sup> circumstances to accord to the illegal regime any of the powers or attributes of sovereignty;

6. Commends to the administering power for appropriate action the relevant sections of the report of the Ad Hoc Group established by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, at its 1029th meeting, on 1 April 1976;

7. Firmly supports the people of Zimbabwe in their struggle to achieve majority rule;

8. Demands:

(a) The termination forthwith of the executions of freedom fighters being carried out by the illegal Smith regime;

(b) The unconditional and immediate release of all political prisoners, detainees and restrictees, the removal of all restrictions on political activity and the establishment of full democratic freedom and equality of political rights, as well as the restoration to the population of fundamental human rights;

(c) The discontinuance forthwith of all repressive measures, in particular the brutality committed in the "operational area", the arbitrary closure of African areas, the eviction, transfer and resettlement of Africans and the creation of so-called protected villages and the persecution of Christian missionaries supporting the cause of the liberation of Zimbabwe;

(d) The cessation of the influx of foreign immigrants into the Territory and the immediate withdrawal of all mercenaries therefrom;

9. Calls upon all states to take all necessary and effective measure to prevent advertisement for, and recruitment of, mercenaries for Southern Rhodesia;

10. Requests all states, directly and through their action in the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations System of which they are members, as well as the non-governmental organizations concerned and the various programmes within the United Nations, to extend, in consultation and co-operation with the Organization of African Unity, to the people of Zimbabwe and their national liberation movement all the moral, material, political and humanitarian assistance necessary in their struggle for the restoration of their inalienable rights;

11. Invites all Governments, the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system, the United Nations bodies concerned and non-governmental organizations having a special interest in the field of decolonisation, as well as the Secretary-General, to take steps, as appropriate, to give widespread and continuous publicity through all the media at their disposal to information on the situation in Zimbabwe and on the relevant decisions and actions of the United Nations, with particular reference to the application of the sanctions against the illegal regime;

12. Expresses the hope that the conference on Zimbabwe at Geneva will succeed in establishing the conditions for early independence on the basis of majority rule, in accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by the United Nations;

13. Requests the Government of the United Kingdom, in keeping with its expressed readiness to do so, to co-operate with the Special Committee in the discharge of the mandate entrusted to the latter by the General Assembly, and to report thereon to the Special Committee and to the Assembly at its thirty-second session;

14. Requests the Special Committee to keep the situation in the Territory under review as a matter of priority and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session.

B

The General Assembly,

Having adopted resolution 31/154 A of 20 December 1976 on the question of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe),

Strongly deploring the increasing collaboration, in violation of Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations and of the relevant decisions of the United Nations, which certain States, particularly South Africa, maintained with the illegal racist minority regime, thereby seriously impeding the effective application of sanctions and other measures taken so far against the illegal regime,

Seriously concerned at the continued importation of chrome and nickel into the United States of America from Southern Rhodesia, in violation of the relevant decisions of the Security Council and in disregard of the related resolutions of the General Assembly,

Deeply disturbed at recent reports of widespread violations of the United Nations sanctions, including the operation of Southern Rhodesia aircraft for international passenger and cargo traffic, as well as the continued functioning of information and airline offices of the illegal regime outside Southern Rhodesia and the resultant influx of foreign tourists into the Territory,

Considering that developments in the area call in particular for positive, concerted international action with a view to imposing maximum isolation on the illegal regime,

Reaffirming its conviction that the sanctions will not put an end to the illegal racist minority regime unless they are comprehensive, mandatory and effectively supervised, enforced and complied with, particularly by South Africa,

Noting with appreciation the decision of the Government of Mozambique to close its borders with Southern Rhodesia and to impose sanctions against the illegal racist minority regime in compliance with the relevant decisions of the Security Council,

1. Strongly Condemns those Governments, particularly the racist regime of South Africa, for their policies which, in violation of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations and in open contravention of their specific obligations under Article 2, paragraph 5, and Article 25 of the Charter of the United Nations, continue to collaborate with the illegal racist minority regime, and calls upon those Governments to cease forthwith all such collaboration;
2. Condemns all violations of the mandatory sanctions imposed by the Security Council, as well as the continued failure of certain Member States to enforce those sanctions strictly, as being contrary to the obligations assumed by them under Article 2, paragraph 5, and Article 25 of the Charter;
3. Condemns the continued importation of chrome and nickel from Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) into the United States of America, and calls upon the Government of the United States to repeal speedily all legislation permitting such importation;
4. Calls upon all Governments which so far have not done so:
  - (a) To take stringent enforcement measures to ensure strict compliance by all individuals, associations and bodies corporate under their jurisdiction with the sanctions imposed by the Security Council and to prohibit any form of collaboration by them with the illegal regime;

(b) To take effective steps to prevent or discourage the emigration to Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) of any individuals or groups of individuals under their jurisdiction;

(c) To discontinue any action which might confer a semblance of legitimacy on the illegal regime, inter alia, by forbidding the operation and activities of Air Rhodesia, the Rhodesian National Tourist Board and the Rhodesian Information Office, or any other activities which contravene the aims and purposes of the sanctions;

(d) To invalidate passports and other documents for travel to the Territory;

5. Highly commends the action taken by the Government of Mozambique in closing its borders with Southern Rhodesia and imposing total sanctions against the Smith regime, and considers that that action constitutes an important contribution in support of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe and towards the maximum isolation of the illegal regime;

6. Requests all States, directly and through their action in the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system of which they are members, and the various programmes within the United Nations system to extend to the Government of Mozambique all forms of financial, technical and material assistance in order to enable it to ~~overcome~~ any economic difficulties in connection with its application of economic sanctions against the illegal regime;

7. Further requests the Security Council to undertake a periodic review of the question of economic assistance to the Government of Mozambique as well as to the Government of Zambia;

8. Reiterates its conviction that the scope of the sanctions against the illegal regime must be widened to include all the

~~measures envisaged under Article 41 of the Charter and requests the Security Council to consider taking the necessary measures in that regard as a matter of urgency;~~

9. Requests the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples to follow the implementation of the present resolution and invites the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia to continue to co-operate in the related work of the Special Committee.

Adopted on 20th December, 1976.

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED  
NATIONS ON THE SITUATION IN NAMIBIA

The General Assembly,

Having examined the report of the United Nations Council for Namibia and the relevant chapters of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Having heard the statements of the representative of the South West Africa People's Organization, who participated in an observer capacity in the consideration of the item by the Fourth Committee,

Recalling its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Recalling in particular, its resolutions 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966 and 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967 and subsequent resolutions of both the General Assembly and the Security Council relating to the question of Namibia, as well as the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971, delivered in response to the request addressed to it by the Council in its resolution 284 (1970) of 29 July 1970,

Taking into consideration the relevant resolution adopted by the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at its twenty-seventh ordinary session, and subsequently endorsed by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of

the Organization of African Unity at its thirteenth ordinary session, held at Port Louis in July 1976,

Also taking in to consideration the political declaration and the resolution relating to Namibia adopted by the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Colombo in August 1976,

Reaffirming that the Territory and people of Namibia are the direct responsibility of the United Nations and that the Namibian people must be enabled to attain self-determination and independence within a united Namibia,

Strongly deploring South Africa's continued refusal to comply with the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations, its continued illegal occupation of Namibia, its brutal repression of the Namibian people and its persistent violation of their human rights, as well as its efforts to destroy the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia;

Strongly condemning attempts by South Africa, through the convening of a so-called constitutional conference, to perpetuate its colonial exploitation of the people and resources of Namibia by misrepresenting the genuine aspirations of the Namibian people,

Gravely concerned at the militarization of Namibia by the illegal occupation regime of South Africa, its threats and acts of aggression against independent African countries and the forceful removal of Namibians from the northern border of the Territory for military purposes,

Strongly deploring the policies of those states, which, despite the relevant decisions of the United Nations and the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971, continue to maintain diplomatic, economic, consular and other relations with South Africa, purporting to act on

behalf of or concerning Namibia, as well as military or strategic collaboration, all of which has the effect of supporting or encouraging South Africa in its defiance of the United Nations,

Recognizing that the situation in Namibia constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

Noting with satisfaction the opposition of the Namibian people to South Africa's illegal presence in the Territory and to its oppressive racist policies and, in particular, the progress of their struggle in all its forms for national liberation under the leadership of the South West African People's Organization,

Strongly supporting the efforts of the United Nations Council for Namibia in the discharge of the responsibilities entrusted to it by the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly,

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of Namibia to self-determination, freedom and national independence in a united Namibia, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and as recognised in resolution 1514 (XV) and 2145 (XXI), as well as subsequent resolutions of the General Assembly relating to Namibia, and the legitimacy of their struggle by all means at their disposal against the illegal occupation of their Territory by South Africa;
2. Recognises that the national liberation movement of Namibia, the South West African People's Organization, is the sole and authentic representative of the Namibian people;
3. Supports the armed struggle of the Namibian people, led by the South West African People's Organization, to achieve self-determination, freedom and national independence in a united Namibia;

4. Appeals to all States Members of the United Nations to grant all necessary support and assistance to the South West African People's Organization in its struggle to achieve independence and national unity for Namibia;
5. Requests all specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system to prepare, in consultation with the United Nations Council for Namibia and within their respective spheres of competence, programmes of assistance to the people of Namibia and their liberation movement, the South West African People's Organization;
6. Decides to increase the financial provisions in the budget of the United Nations Council for Namibia to finance the office of the South West African People's Organization in New York, in order to ensure the due and proper representation of the people of Namibia through the South West African People's Organization at the United Nations;
7. Decides to continue to defray the expenses of a representative of the South West African People's Organization, whenever the United Nations Council for Namibia so requires;
8. Strongly condemns South Africa for its persistent refusal to withdraw from Namibia and for its manoeuvres to consolidate its illegal occupation of the Territory;
9. Strongly condemns the illegal South African administration for its aggression against the Namibian people and their national liberation movement;
10. Strongly condemns the illegal South African administration for its massive repression of the people of Namibia and their liberation movement with the intention of establishing, among other things, an atmosphere of intimidation and terror for the purpose of imposing upon the Namibian people a bogus constitutional

~~structure aimed at subverting the territorial integrity and~~  
unity of Namibia and perpetuating a ruthless policy of racial  
segregation;

11. Strongly condemns South Africa for its military build-  
up in Namibia, its threats and acts of aggression against  
independent African countries and the forceful removal of  
Namibians from the northern border of the Territory for  
military purposes;

12. Strongly condemns South Africa for organizing the so-  
called constitutional talks at Windhoek, which seek to perpetuate  
the apartheid and homelands policies as well as the colonial  
oppression and exploitation of the people and resources of  
Namibia by misrepresenting the genuine aspirations of the  
Namibian people for self-determination, freedom and national  
independence in a united Namibia;

13. Urgently calls upon the international community,  
especially all States Members of the United Nations, to refrain  
from according any recognition to, or co-operation with, any  
authority which the illegal occupation regime may install  
under the current fraudulent constitutional talks or any  
other circumstances in Namibia;

14. Strongly condemns the activities of all foreign  
corporations operating in Namibia under the illegal administration  
of South Africa which are exploiting the human and natural  
resources of the Territory, and demands that such exploitation  
cease forthwith;

15. Reaffirms that the activities of those corporations  
are illegal;

16. Decides that any independence talks regarding Namibia must be between the representatives of South Africa and the South West African People's Organization, under the auspices of the United Nations, for the sole purpose of discussing the modalities for the transfer of power to the people of Namibia;
17. Requests all Member States to co-operate fully with the United Nations Council for Namibia in discharging the mandate entrusted to it under the terms and provisions of General Assembly resolution 2248 (S-V);
18. Condemns South Africa for its persistent refusal to comply with the pertinent resolutions of the Security Council, in particular resolution 385 (1976) of 30 January 1976;
19. Demands that South Africa put an end to extending apartheid in Namibia and to its policy of "bantustanisation" of the Territory, aimed at destroying the national unity and the territorial integrity of Namibia;
20. Demands that South Africa release all Namibian political prisoners, including all those imprisoned or detained in connection with offences under so-called internal security laws, whether such Namibians have been charged or tried or are held without charge and whether held in Namibia or South Africa;
21. Declares that, in order that the people of Namibia shall be enabled freely to determine their own future, it is imperative that free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations be held urgently in the whole of Namibia as one political entity;
22. Demands that South Africa accord unconditionally to all Namibians currently in exile for political reasons full facilities for their return to their country without risk of arrest detention, intimidation or imprisonment;

23. Reiterates that the illegal occupation of Namibia and the war being waged there by South Africa constitute a threat to international peace and security;
24. Declares that the continued illegal occupation of Namibia by South Africa constitutes an act of aggression against the Namibian people and against the United Nations as the legal authority to administer the Territory until independence;
25. Urges the Security Council to take up again the question of Namibia, which is still in its agenda, and in view of South Africa's failure to comply with Council resolution 385 (1976), to impose a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa;
26. Requests all States to cease and desist from any form of direct or indirect military consultations, co-operation or collaboration with South Africa;
27. Requests all States to take effective measures to prevent the recruitment of mercenaries for service in Namibia or South Africa;
28. Requests all States to take steps to ensure the termination of all arms licensing agreements with South Africa and to prohibit the transfer to South Africa of all information relating to arms and armaments;
29. Requests all States to cease and prevent:
- (a) Any supply of arms and ammunition to South Africa;
  - (b) Any supply of aircraft, vehicles or military equipment for the use of the armed forces and paramilitary or police organizations of South Africa;

(c) Any supply of arms and ammunition to South Africa;

(d) Any supply of so-called dual-use aircraft, vehicles or equipment which could be converted to military use by South Africa;

(e) Any activities in their countries which promote or are calculated to promote the supply of arms, ammunition, military aircraft or military vehicles to South Africa and the supply of equipment or materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in South Africa and Namibia;

(f) Any co-operation or activities by public or private corporations in conjunction with South Africa in the development, directly or indirectly, of nuclear technology, including the development of a nuclear capability by the racist regime in South Africa;

30. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session on the implementation of the present resolution.

Adopted on 20th December, 1976.

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS  
ON THE SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

The General Assembly,

Having considered the report of the Special Committee against Apartheid and its special reports,

Taking note of the national uprising of the oppressed people of South Africa against the apartheid regime,

Outraged by the continuing massacres and other atrocities by the racist regime of South Africa against school-children and other peaceful demonstrations against apartheid and racial discrimination,

Gravely concerned about the military and other activities of the racist regime of South Africa and, in particular, about the nuclear collaboration aimed at the establishment of nuclear installations and the transfer of nuclear technology to South Africa,

Conscious that mercenaries and their organizations are active in the territory of South Africa and participate in the acts of aggression of that country against the African peoples and states members of the Organization of African Unity,

Convinced that the situation in South Africa constitutes a grave threat to international peace and security,

Reaffirming that the policy and practice of apartheid constitutes a crime against humanity,



Welcoming the coming into force of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid,

Mindful of the special responsibility of the United Nations and the international community towards the oppressed people of South Africa and their liberation movements and towards those imprisoned, restricted or exiled for their struggle against apartheid,

1. Proclaims that the racist regime of South Africa is illegitimate and has no right to represent the people of South Africa;
2. Reaffirms that the national liberation movements recognised by the Organization of African Unity - the African National Congress of South Africa and the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania - are the authentic representatives of the overwhelming majority of the South African people;
3. Strongly condemns the racist regime of South Africa for its criminal policies and practices of apartheid, its massacres of black people, including schoolchildren, and its ruthless repression of all those struggling against apartheid;
4. Reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa and their liberation movements, by all possible means, for the seizure of power by the people and the exercise of their inalienable right to self-determination;
5. Recognizes in particular, that the consistent defiance by the racist regime of South Africa of United Nations resolutions on apartheid and the continued brutal repression, including indiscriminate mass killing by that regime leave no alternative to the oppressed people of South Africa but to resort to armed struggle to achieve their legitimate rights;

6. Declares that the situation in South Africa, resulting from the policies and actions of the racist regime, constitutes a grave threat to the peace, requiring action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations;
7. Demands the cessation of any form of military and nuclear co-operation with the racist regime of South Africa;
8. Condemns the racist regime of South Africa for encouragement of the activities of the mercenaries and their organization in its territory and for their use against the African peoples and states members of the Organization of African Unity;
9. Urgently appeals to all states to enact laws declaring the recruitment, financing, training, transit and assembly of mercenaries for the racist regime of South Africa in their territories a punishable crime and prohibiting their citizens from enlisting as mercenaries;
10. Calls upon the Government of France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, in particular:
  - (a) To desist from misusing their veto power in the Security Council to protect the racist regime of South Africa;
  - (b) To enable the Security Council to determine the existence in South Africa of a threat to the peace and to exercise its responsibilities under the Charter;
  - (c) Not to obstruct but to facilitate the adoption of a mandatory arms embargo and other indispensable measures, under Chapter VII of the Charter, to deal with the grave situation in South Africa;

11. Appeals to all states and organizations to provide all assistance required by the oppressed people of South Africa and their national liberation movements during their legitimate struggle, in the light of the recommendations of the Special Committee against Apartheid;
12. Further calls upon Member States and the specialized agencies, through emergency joint projects and financial assistance, to help Lesotho and other countries bordering South Africa to ensure the provision of educational facilities to the rapidly growing number of refugee students from South Africa;
13. Appeals to all Governments which have not yet done so to become parties to the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid;
14. Authorizes the Special Committee against Apartheid to take all appropriate steps to promote such assistance, including the establishment of a joint United Nations/ Organization of African Unity fund financed by voluntary contributions as recommended in paragraph 264 of its report, and to assist the African National Congress of South Africa and the Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania to maintain offices at United Nations Headquarters in New York;
15. Commends the anti-apartheid and solidarity movements and other non-governmental organizations which have taken action against apartheid and in support of the South African national liberation movements; provides for the provision of educational facilities to the rapidly growing number of refugee students from South Africa;
16. Condemns the racist regime of South Africa for its acts of aggression against neighbouring independent African States which have assisted the South African national liberation movements, and invites all Governments to provide those states, at their request with all necessary assistance for defence against aggression. Authorizes the Special Committee against apartheid



RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED  
NATIONS ON THE QUESTION OF FRENCH SOMALILAND

The General Assembly,

Having considered the question of so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti),

Having examined the relevant chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Recalling its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Recalling also its resolutions 2228 (XXI) of 20 December 1966, 2356 (XXII) of 19 December 1967 and 3480 (XXX) of 11 December 1975 on so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti),

Having heard the statement of the representatives of the liberation movements, the Front de liberation de la Cote des Somalis and the Mouvement de liberation de Djibouti,

Having also heard the statements of the President of the Government Council of the Territory, as well as those of the representatives of the political parties, namely, the League Populaire Africaine pour l'Indepondance, the Union Nationale pour l'Indepondance and the Mouvement Populaire de Liberation, and of a petitioner,

Taking note of the solemn declaration of the leaders of the delegations of Ethiopia and Somalia before the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at its twenty-seventh ordinary session, held at Port Louis from 24 June to 3 July 1976, and before the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, affirming that their respective Governments would recognise, respect and honour the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti) after its accession to independence,

Taking note also of the resolution on the question of so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti) adopted by the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Lima from 25 to 30 August 1975, and of the part regarding that question contained in the Political Declaration adopted by the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Colombo from 16 to 19 August 1976,

Having heard the statement of the representative of France, as the administering power, and in particular the expressed commitment of his Government to lead the Territory to independence in 1977,

1. Reaffirms the inalienable right of the people of so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti) to self-determination and independence;
2. Reaffirms also its unqualified support of the right of the people of so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti) to immediate and unconditional independence, in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV);

3. Calls upon the Government of France to implement scrupulously and equitably, under democratic conditions, the programme for the independence of so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti), as outlined by the representative of France in his statement before the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly, within the indicated time frame, (namely, the summer of 1977);
4. Urges the leaders of the Government Council of the Territory, as well as the representatives of the liberation movements, the Front de la liberation de la Cote des Somalis and the Mouvement de liberation de Djibouti, and of the political parties and groups to enter into the broadest possible discussions on neutral grounds, under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity, with a view to resolving their differences, and to agree on a common political platform before the holding of a referendum, in conformity with the resolution adopted by the Council of Ministers at its twenty-seventh ordinary session and subsequently approved by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its thirteenth ordinary session;
5. Further calls upon the Government of France to co-operate fully with the Organization of African Unity in its efforts to convene, in accordance with the decision of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, a round-table conference for the speedy implementation of the request contained in paragraph 4. above;
6. Requests the Government of France to consider the result of the referendum in its totality, thus respecting the territorial integrity of the future state;
7. Demands that the Government of France withdraw its military base from the Territory without delay;

8. Calls also upon the Government of France to allow and facilitate the return to the Territory of all refugees who are bona fide citizens of the Territory, in accordance with the Organization of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa of 10 September 1969 and the United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951;

9. Requests the Government of France, in order to ensure the implementation of the request contained in paragraph 8 above, to set up an ad hoc committee in accordance with the recommendations of the Fact-Finding Mission of the Organization of African Unity;

10. Reaffirms its resolution 3480 (XXX);

11. Endorses all resolutions adopted by the Organization of African Unity on the question of the so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti) and, in particular, resolutions CM/Res.431/Rev.1 (XXV) and CM/Res.480 (XXVII), as well as the declaration adopted by the Organization of African Unity Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa, as approved by the Council of Ministers at its twenty-seventh ordinary session and the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its thirteenth ordinary session, and welcomes the solemn declaration by the leaders of the delegations of Ethiopia and Somalia before the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity and before the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly that their Governments would recognize, respect and honour the independence and sovereignty of so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti) and its territorial integrity after its accession to independence;


12. Calls upon all states to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the Territory and to abstain from any action likely to impede or adversely affect the current process of the country's accession to independence;

13. Welcomes the statements by the representatives of the people of so-called French Somaliland (Djibouti) in which they declared that the Territory would become a member of the United Nations and of the Organization of African Unity immediately after independence;

14. Endorses the decision of the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations to send representatives to observe the referendum and all subsequent stages of the independence process to ensure that the principle of self-determination in the Territory is carried out smoothly and in the most democratic manner;

15. Urges all the Member States, the specialized agencies and other organizations within the United Nations system, in co-operation with the administering power, to render all possible moral and material assistance to the people of the Territory.

Adopted on 1 December, 1976.



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1977-06

# Report of the Administrative Secretary-General on Decolonization

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