



**ORGANIZATION OF  
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**ORGANISATION DE L'UNITE  
AFRICAIN**

Secretariat  
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REPORT OF THE MISSION OF THE COMMITTEE OF TEN TO  
BOTSWANA, MOZAMBIQUE AND ZAMBIA

10 - 20 April 1978



CMO 885

MICROFICHE

EXPLANATORY NOTE

The report contained herein is a summary of the various discussions held between the Governments of Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia and the members of the Sub-Committees of the Committee of Ten on Assistance to Frontline States.

2. The annexes are brief outlines of the economic and financial needs of the countries visited as submitted by their respective governments.

3. The arms and defence requirements submitted by Mozambique and Zambia are deposited with the OAU Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa and shall be made available to Member States on the explicit authorisation of the Council of Ministers.

4. This decision was made by the General Secretariat after due consideration was given to the top secret nature of the said documents and for exercising maximum precaution so that the same may not fall into wrong hands.

REPORT OF THE MISSION OF COMMITTEE OF  
TEN TO BOTSWANA, MOZAMBIQUE AND ZAMBIA

10 - 20 April 1978

Pursuant to the decisions of the Committee of Ten on assistance to Frontline States, adopted at its second session (Cairo, 26 November 1977) and at its third session (Tripoli, February 1978), the Sub-Committee on Political and Financial Affairs and the Military Sub-Committee visited Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia from 10 to 20 April 1978.

2. The purpose of the mission, as decided at the Committee's various sessions was to enable Egypt, Guinea-Bissau and Togo to carry out an indepth study on the material, economic and financial aspects of the problem, and Algeria, Cameroon and Liberia to study the military requirements to enhance the defence capabilities of the three Frontline States and to make a symbolic donation of US\$1 million as decided by the Thirtieth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers.

3. The Sub-Committees were composed as follows:

I. TOGO

1. H.E. Mr. EDEM KODJO - Chairman of the Committee of Ten  
Minister of Foreign Affairs
2. Mr. A. Dagba  
Director of Information  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

II. GUINEA-BISSAU

1. H.E. Mr. VICTOR S. MARIA  
Minister of Foreign Affairs
2. Mr. A. Cabral  
Director of African Department  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

III. ALGERIA

1. H.E. Mr. M. SAHNOUN  
Ambassador
2. Major Y. Rhal
3. Capt. S. Kitouni

IV. EGYPT

1. H.E. Mr. A.A. HATATA - Rapporteur  
Ambassador

V. LIBERIA

1. H.E. Lt. General HENRY K. JOHNSON  
Chief of Staff, Liberian Armed Forces

VI. CAMEROON

1. Mr. A.K. SANDY-ATANGANA  
Counsellor

In attendance:

VII. GENERAL AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARIATS

1. Mr. L. Oyaka  
Ambassador, Asst. Executive Secretary  
Liberation Committee
2. Mr. Dawit G. Egziabher  
Chief, Decolonisation Section  
General Secretariat
3. Major T. Dangwe  
Military Expert  
Liberation Committee.

PART I: MOZAMBIQUE: 10 - 13 APRIL 1978

4. The Sub-Committee held an informal meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mozambique to decide on the organization of work. It was then agreed that a plenary session to be attended by the members of the Committee and the Mozambique appropriate authorities be held on 11 April 1978.

5. Consequently, a plenary meeting took place at Government Office at 10.30 a.m., 11 April 1978.

Mozambique was represented at the meeting by:

- |     |   |          |
|-----|---|----------|
| 1.  | H.E. Mr. JOAQUIM A. CHISSANO<br>Minister of Foreign Affairs | - Leader |
| 2.  | H.E. Mr. Mario MACHUNGO                                     | - Member |
| 3.  | Mr. Pedro JUMA  | "        |
| 4.  | Mr. Ngid OSMAN  | "        |
| 5.  | Mr. Alberto SITHOLE   | "        |
| 6.  | Mr. Feliciano GONDANA                                       | "        |
| 7.  | Mr. Erasto MOLEMBWE   | "        |
| 8.  | Mr. Goar AFAIDE   | "        |
| 9.  | Mr. Garlos VELOSO   | "        |
| 10. | Mrs. Josefina PALAIO  | "        |

6. In his opening address, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mozambique welcomed the OAU Sub-Committees and, after extending to them President Samora Machel's greetings, assured the Sub-Committees that the Mozambique Government was prepared to provide them with all the necessary information they required. He emphasized that the Sub-Committees arrived at a particularly crucial and decisive

moment, as the enemy was trying to perpetrate through a so-called internal settlement its aggression and weaken the struggle being waged by the Patriotic Front.

7. The Foreign Minister further stated that it was absolutely necessary to intensify the armed struggle at that crucial moment because armed struggle was not only a means of liberating Zimbabwe, but also a means of preventing neo-colonialism from being established in the territory. In this regard, he declared that the armed struggle would strengthen the position of the Patriotic Front during the next negotiations to be held in Dar-es-Salaam on 15 and 16 April 1978.

8. In conclusion, the Minister stated further that Mozambique was ready to supply all the information necessary to enable OAU to assist Mozambique to recover for the losses it had incurred as a result of the aggression, face the serious social problem of its people, and assess Mozambique's needs so as to strengthen its defence capabilities. He also urged the OAU and the international community to take concrete and immediate actions.

9. In his reply, H.E. Mr. Edem KODJO, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Togo and Chairman of the Sub-Committees did not fail to state that he was always happy and pleased each time that he was in Mozambique. He however remarked that these joy and pleasure were marred by the continued and persistent raids carried out by the racist regime of Ian Smith and the natural disasters caused by the recent floods. The gallant people of Mozambique, united under the banner of FRELIMO and under the able leadership of brother Samora Machel did not deserve these additional sufferings.

10. Mr. Kodjo then emphasized that the aggressors in their brutality would, in the final analysis, be the victims, because these courageous people would continue to inflict heavy losses on them. The Committee's visit was in itself symbolic. It was also a manifested conviction, in that it was a constructive

and that it demonstrated Africa's concrete desire to stand by the brotherly people of Mozambique and the fact that Africa should support the Frontline States which had relentlessly supported the struggle being waged for the attainment of freedom and the fundamental values that had been denied them.

11. The Foreign Minister of Togo further declared that, under these circumstances, the presence of the OAU was necessary to sustain the efforts being made by these countries. The Committee's visit to Maputo should therefore enable the OAU to pursue its aims by determining Mozambique's needs necessary to accomplish the latter's objectives.

12. Mr. Kodjo, after declaring that he was deeply touched by the honour done him and the members of the Committee, on behalf of the OAU handed over to the Government of Mozambique a cheque for US.\$500,000 in accordance with the decision taken by the Thirtieth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers.

13. Accepting the cheque for US.\$500,000, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mozambique thanked the OAU for its gesture of solidarity. He also thanked the Committee for thus setting the ball rolling which should enable the realisation of concrete assistance. The Minister declared that, as far as Mozambique was concerned, that gift was not only considered symbolic, but it was a weapon capable of furthering the struggle. He assured the Committee that the gift would be better utilised for African liberation.

14. Before the end of the plenary session, it was decided that the Military Sub-Committee would carry out its task with the help of the officials of the Ministry of Defence of Mozambique, while the Economic Sub-Committee would continue its meeting with the delegation of Mozambique led by the Minister of Industry and Trade.

15. At the first meeting of the Economic Sub-Committee, the Minister of Industry and Trade of Mozambique made a statement to analyse the grave economic and social consequences provoked by the total sanctions decided by the UN against the British colony of Rhodesia and repeated aggressions perpetrated against Mozambique by the illegal minority regime of Ian Smith.

16. He declared that the economic losses suffered by the People's Republic of Mozambique compromised the full execution of the country's national reconstruction programme. He further declared that the constraints imposed on the national reconstruction programme resulted in the reduction of the defence possibilities of Mozambique. The serious economic situation on the other hand led to the worsening of the balance of payments situation.

17. According to the Minister of Industry and Trade and in accordance with the Resolution CM/577(XXX) which he quoted, priority should be given to the need of obtaining crude oil at the rate of 500,000 tons to satisfy immediate requirements, followed by the need to supply the essential foodstuffs, more especially for the people living at Tete, Mainca, Gaza who were directly affected by the aggression. Finally, he recalled that it was urgent to implement the above mentioned OAU Resolution concerning the creation of African Solidarity Fund. (The full text of the Minister's statement together with the list of the needs of Mozambique is attached as annex).

18. Deliberations lasting the whole day followed the Minister's intervention, and enabled the participants to obtain clarifications and gather details on the economic requirements indicated by Mozambique in economic and social areas.

19. After an indepth study, the two parties arrived at a conclusion which would enable the urgent needs of Mozambique to be determined according to the following order of priority:

- a) aid in the supply of crude oil which would help indirectly to alleviate the balance of payments deficit burden;
- b) supply of foodstuffs as primary necessity; and
- c) supply of sophisticated military hardware.

20. In the afternoon of 12 April 1978, H.E. President Samora Machel received the Leaders of delegation of Member States serving on the Sub-Committee. The President took the opportunity to expose the political situation in Southern Africa in general and in Zimbabwe in particular. He thanked the OAU and the Committee of Ten for the financial assistance given Mozambique.

ZAMBIA: 13 - 16 APRIL 1978

21. The first session of the meeting between the Committee of Ten for assistance to Frontline States and the Zambian Government was held in the Office of the Prime Minister at 3.30 p.m. on 14 April 1978.

22. The Leader of the Zambian delegation welcomed the members of the Committee present at the Prime Minister's Office and, recalling the statements made by the Zambian Foreign Minister when he met the Committee Members on their arrival in Lusaka, he expressed the hope that the Committee's stay in the Republic of Zambia would be an enjoyable one.

23. The Leader of the Zambian delegation then introduced members of his team to the Committee. It was composed of:

1. H.E. Mr. P.F.J. LUSAKA  
Minister of Energy, Transports and  
Communications and Acting Minister of  
Foreign Affairs
2. H.E. Mr. G.B. SILWIZYA  
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
3. Mr. H.M. MZUNGA  
Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign  
Affairs
4. Mr. I.G. MWANANBALE  
Senior Economist, Ministry of Finance
5. Ambassador M. LISWANISE  
Chief of Protocol
6. Mr. B.C. HAMALUBA  
Assistant Secretary, Cabinet Office
7. Mr. F.K. KABAMBE  
Director of Research and Information  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
8. Mr. L.K. MTOSA  
Director of Africa and Middle East Affairs
9. Mr. J. CHINAMBU  
Assistant Secretary, Home Affairs
10. Mr. H.M. KATSWALA  
Defence Division, Office of the President.

24. H.E. Mr. Edem Kodjo, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Togo and the Committee's Chairman thanked the Zambian Authorities sincerely for the welcome and the usual hospitality accorded the Committee since its arrival in the Zambian territory. Referring to the authority upon which the Committee of Ten was set up,

namely the Resolution on Mozambique adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at Libreville, Gabon, he stated in general terms that the task of the Committee was to study and identify the problems and difficulties facing Frontline States following repeated aggressions perpetrated by Smith Regime.

25. He then introduced members of his delegation and explained to the Zambian side that in terms of a decision taken at its Second Session in Cairo, Egypt, the Committee of Ten was functioning through two sub-committees entrusted with responsibility of considering specific aspects of the problems facing Frontline States. The political and economic Sub-Committee and the military Sub-Committee should study specific problems of their areas of competence so as to propose concrete recommendations to the supreme organs of the OAU on the need of providing economic as well as military aid to Frontline States. In this regard, Mr. Kodjo stated that the sub-committees were hoping to obtain all the relevant information which would enable them to take a satisfactory decision.

26. In conclusion, Mr. Kodjo declared that it was an honour for himself and for the Committee of Ten to hand-over to the Zambian Government, on behalf of the OAU, a cheque for US.\$200,000 as a symbolic of the solidarity and commitment of Africa in favour of Zambia's fight against racism and colonialism in Southern Africa. He assured the Zambian delegation that the armed struggle being waged by the Frontline Countries was a true African struggle.

27. Accepting the cheque, the Acting Foreign Affairs Minister and Leader of the Zambian delegation, Mr. Paul Lusaka, declared, on behalf of the President of the Republic of Zambia, the Party and Government of Zambia, that he was deeply touched by and extremely grateful to the OAU for its gesture. He further stated that though the Committee could describe this as a symbolic act, it was indeed, to his memory, the first concrete aid Zambia was receiving as a Frontline State from Africa for the cause of the liberation struggle.

28. The Acting Foreign Minister then intimated that the cheque would be handed over to his Head of State and that he would explain to him the concrete efforts the Committee had deployed in securing this aid for Zambia. Giving his assurance that Zambia would pursue the struggle until the total eradication of racism, colonialism and fascism from Africa, he informed the Committee that his delegation was prepared to enter into discussions in specific areas of concern to the Committee.

29. In answer to a question by Mr. Kodjo as to Zambia's financial, material and social needs, and more particularly problems affecting the implementation of projects due to the repeated acts of aggression, the Zambian delegation stated that its major problem as identified, was the one created 13 years ago by the unilateral declaration of independence in Rhodesia. This, in the view of the Zambian delegation, necessitated the rerouting of goods which brought about transportation problems resulting in an unnecessary balance of payments burden.

30. When UDI was declared, the Acting Foreign Minister further stated, Zambia had to airlift everything including oil and that the country had not since recovered from the financial blows inflicted upon it. The other difficulty recently created, the Minister said, was the presence of 700 coaches and locomotives stranded in Angola, which could not be retrieved at present for political reasons. China had assisted tremendously by constructing the TANZAM railway which at the moment was the only operational line. Its services were however reduced by shortage of coaches, redeployment of railway workers as well as shortage of spare-parts for which Zambia could not raise much foreign currency as the price of copper was no more favourable to Zambia.

31. The other area of concern for Zambia, the Minister said, was the refugee problem. Because of the political situation in the

area, the number of refugees in Zambia had been increasing daily and Zambia had to-date spent 456,892,137 Kwacha for refugee assistance, money which could have been spent on development projects. In view of these problems and Smith's persistent aggressions, Zambia had to postpone the implementation of its third five-year development plan.

32. In conclusion, the Acting Foreign Minister conveyed to the Committee the Zambian Prime Minister's gratitude and appreciation for the donation made by the OAU. He stated that the gesture was a demonstration of OAU's participation in the liberation struggle and assured the Committee that Zambia would not be deterred from its present course of action until Southern Africa was totally liberated. The detailed discussion of the issues, the Acting Minister suggested, could be based on the comprehensive document he had submitted to the Committee (See annex).

33. H.E. Mr. E. Kodjo, Foreign Minister of Togo and Chairman of the Committee of Ten thanked the Zambian delegation for the information it had supplied and assured it that the Committee and the OAU would spare no effort in securing the assistance required by Zambia.

34. On April 15 1978, H.E. Dr. K.D. Kaunda, President of the Republic of Zambia received all the members of the Committee at the State House and offered a banquet in their honour. Present at the reception were Mr. G. Zulu, Secretary-General of UNIP, the Acting Foreign Minister and other senior Party and Government officials. At the banquet, H.E. President Kaunda made a statement on the situation in Africa in general and Southern Africa in particular. He stated that even though the world had made considerable social progress in the last few decades, the political inequalities and the situation, in particular, in Southern Africa had not improved.

He stated that even though the OAU had been facing numerous social problems in addition to its political priorities ever since its inception, it was the only successful continental organisation of which Africa should be very proud. The presence of the Committee, an important organ of the OAU, the President stated, was of great importance to Zambia because the former had not come to Zambia merely to express OAU solidarity but to deliver concrete assistance from the Organization. Analysing the geopolitical situation in Southern Africa, H.E. the President observed that on the accession to independence of Zimbabwe and Namibia, countries such as Swaziland, Mozambique, Botswana, Lesotho, Zimbabwe and Namibia would become Frontline States against South Africa and that the OAU should start considering the provision of assistance to these Frontline States.

35. Foreign Minister Edem Kodjo thanked H.E. the President for the honour bestowed on the members of the Committee by receiving them at the State House and offering a banquet in their honour. He remarked that most of the members of the Committee were well aware of the facts exposed by the President about the situation in Africa and particularly in Southern Africa. These facts therefore constituted the basis of the Committee's work on Southern Africa. The additional guidelines the Committee had been fortunate enough to receive today, Foreign Minister Kodjo further stated, would definitely enhance its approach to the problems at present faced by Zambia, Mozambique and Botswana. In conclusion, Foreign Minister Kodjo assured H.E. the President that the members of the Committee would bring the guidelines issued by the President to the attention of their respective Governments.

36. Although the mission of the Committee of Ten in Zambia was a success, the press, for unknown reasons, distorted the facts by deliberately misquoting the statement made by President Kaunda

at the State House. By its very irresponsible act, the press, gave the whole world the impression that H.E. the President was out to criticise and attack the Committee in particular and the OAU in general. The incident was brought to the attention of the appropriate authorities of the Zambian Government. Since it was an African Head of State who was wrongly quoted, the Committee insisted that the necessary clarifications be published without delay.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Zambia gave the Committee the necessary assurances to this effect.

BOTSWANA: 16 - 18 APRIL 1978

37. The Committee started its work in Botswana by paying a courtesy call on H.E. Sir Seretse Khama, President of the Republic of Botswana, who received members of the Committee in his Office in the morning of April 17, 1978.

38. Welcoming the Committee, H.E. the President, stated that Botswana had been impatiently looking forward to the Committee's visit and that it was a sense of satisfaction and encouragement for the Government and people of Botswana to have the members of the Committee on their soil. The President recalled that in the past Botswana had received missions of other International Organizations which had come to assess the needs of the territory but that it was sad to note that there had so far been no practical follow-up.

39. In the views of H.E. the President, the mission of the OAU Committee of Ten was a different and serious one and that its presence in the territory at such a moment was timely in that Botswana was being attacked, its territorial integrity violated and its people subjected to sufferings. For these reasons, the news of the Committee's visit was very encouraging for Botswana as it showed that Africa had now started to take up the problems of the Frontline States seriously.

40. The Chairman of the Committee, H.E. Mr. Edem Kodjo, expressing appreciation for the honour bestowed on him and the members of the Committee for having been received by the President, registered his gratitude for the warm welcome and fraternal reception accorded the Committee members since their arrival in Gaborone. With reference to the Resolution establishing the Committee of Ten, the Chairman stated that it was an act of determination on the part of the OAU to consider the problems of the Frontline States practically. The Committee hoped that the Sub-Committee would accomplish their mission under satisfactory conditions. Pursuant to the said Resolution, the Sub-Committees ~~were~~ mandated to make the necessary contacts with the Frontline States and to hand-over to the Government of Botswana, on behalf of the OAU a cheque for a symbolic sum of US.\$300,000.0

41. Foreign Minister Kodjo underscored the struggle Botswana was waging for the cause of freedom and liberty in Africa and, in this connection he admitted that the amount was far from meeting Botswana's needs but that its purpose was to serve as an indication of Africa's commitment to engage herself in securing concrete assistance for the Frontline States. Foreign Minister Kodjo assured H.E. the President that Africa was behind Botswana in her continued struggle for freedom.

42. H.E. Sir Seretse Khama declared that Botswana did not want to think that she was alone in the forefront together with the Frontline States but that Africa as a whole should be in the forefront to exert concerted pressure. The problems Botswana was facing were not natural to the territory but created as a result of its commitment to the liberation struggle. Finally, H.E. the President expressed his gratitude for the financial assistance given by the OAU and the effort the Committee of Ten was making on behalf of the OAU. Present during the courtesy call were the Hon. A.M. Mogwe, Minister of External Affairs, Hon. D.K. Kwelagobe, Minister of Public Service and Information and other senior Government officials.

43. The meeting of the Political, Economic and Financial Sub-Committee with the authorities of Botswana was held in the National Assembly at 10.30 a.m. on April 17, 1978. The Botswana delegation was composed of the following:

1. Hon. Dr. Q.K.J. MASIRE  
Vice President of Botswana and Minister of Finance  
and Development Planning
2. Hon. A.M. MOGWE  
Minister of External Affairs
3. Hon. D.K. KWELAGOBE  
Minister of Public Service and Information
4. Hon. W.M. SEBONI  
Asst. Minister of Finance and Development
5. Mr. L.M. MPOTOKWAME  
Secretary for External Affairs  
Office of the President
6. Mr. M.C. TIBONE  
Administrative Secretary  
Office of the President
7. Mr. T.D. MOGAMI  
D/Secretary for External Affairs  
Office of the President
8. Mr. P. SEKWABABE  
External Affairs Officer  
Office of the President
9. Mr. K. MATAMBO  
Senior Planning Officer  
Ministry of Finance and Development Planning
10. Mr. O.P. NAYER  
Railways Adviser  
Ministry of Works and Communications
11. Mr. K.A. SOLBERGSE  
Transport Adviser  
Ministry of Work and Communications.

44. After the usual exchange of welcoming statements and greetings between the Vice President of Botswana and Foreign Minister Edem Kodjo, the Botswana Foreign Minister took the floor and expressed his satisfaction at the fact that Botswana was speaking to people who understood the problem. The Botswana Foreign Minister stated that the problem had a long history for the British always had in mind that Botswana as well as Lesotho and Swaziland would one day be part of South Africa and so nothing was done in the field of infrastructure development. Whatever existed at the moment, the Minister stated, had been done by Botswana and since its accession to independence.

45. In the view of the Botswana Government, the main problem was centred around the question of transport and communications. In this regard and recalling the various missions conducted by the UN, the Botswana delegation stated that conclusions had been reached on the estimates of Botswana's requirements for the implementation of various projects. These estimates were now considered to be far below the realities because of the increasing inflationary effects, and the delegation had requested a review of the estimates which had been submitted to the UN.

46. The delegation highlighted the fact that Botswana's development programmes, for its trade with the outside world and for its ordinary imports and exports it was totally dependent on a single railway line which linked Rhodesia to South Africa through Botswana and was totally owned by Rhodesia.

47. Since the railway line was owned and run by Rhodesia, the Botswana delegation explained it could be cut off at any moment by a situation either under Rhodesia's control or beyond its control. Accordingly, the delegation continued, it was appropriate that Botswana became independent in the running and maintenance of the railway as soon as possible. Taking into account that all the

locomotives as well as the entire rolling stock belonged to Rhodesia, the delegation further stated that it would need approximately US.\$80 million for the running of the railway including the purchase of the rolling stock, training of personnel and the construction of the necessary maintenance workshops.

48. The delegation went on to say that it was now the policy of the Government to reduce dependence on the railway as much as possible. Accordingly, construction of a number of airports was envisaged for which Botswana would need assistance to the tune of US.\$17 million. Botswana also intended to construct new roads and repair the damaged ones and would need an assistance of US.\$15 million. The delegation explained that Botswana was importing all her petroleum requirements through South Africa and that it had been studying ways and means of reducing this dependence. In this regard, it urged the Committee to do everything possible in securing the 500,000 tons of crude oil to Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia.

49. With regard to the possibility of securing funds from other sources, the Vice President intimated that in view of the repeated acts of aggression from Rhodesia, Botswana had now decided to establish an adequate defence force to guarantee the security and territorial integrity of the State. This decision, the Vice President continued, had forced Botswana to divert funds earmarked for development projects to the needs of the defence forces. In order to fill the vacuum created by the re-allocation of funds and to reduce Botswana's dependence on the Rhodesian railway line, Botswana had submitted requests for assistance for the railway project to ABEDA and for the airport projects to Saudi-Arabia, Kuwait and other friendly countries. The Vice President urged the Committee to approach the OAU Committee of Twelve to make the necessary recommendations to ABEDA to facilitate the use of the Bank's Emergency Fund by African countries.

50. On the question of the constant aggravating refugee situation in Botswana, the delegation indicated that it was in a dilemma for a number of reasons. In the views of Botswana, programming for refugee services was difficult because the Government could not know how and when they would be coming. The frequency and magnitude of movements of refugees depended mostly on the political situation of the refugees countries of origin. At the moment the number of South African refugees was not high especially when compared with refugees from Zimbabwe whose number increased daily at the rate of 150 to 400.

51. It was true that most of these Zimbabwean refugees were in transit to Zambia but since transfer into Zambia was on a selective basis, very often Botswana was left with a high refugee population or refugees with doubtful backgrounds or both. Referring to the recently organised charter flights by the UNHCR for the transportation of 3,000 refugees to Zambia and the consequences of the termination of the operation, the Botswana delegation appealed to the OAU Member States to assist and share the burden with it.

52. Refugees from South Africa, the delegation explained, were mostly young and consequently the provision of vocational training facilities or other facilities should be considered. Botswana had plans to integrate the South African refugees into its educational institutions and that the UNHCR had promised to assist in this regard. Nevertheless the delegation brought to the attention of the Committee that Botswana's resources were limited and that it could not handle the problem all alone.

53. The delegation informed the Committee that a number of African countries had indicated their willingness to grant scholarships to refugees but insisted that upon the accomplishment of their training the refugees should return to Botswana. This was, in

the view of the delegation, unacceptable for although the refugees were in Botswana, they should be regarded as being only on transit and should by no means be considered as residents of Botswana. The delegation reaffirmed that Botswana was ready to share its responsibilities in resettling African refugees with other African countries.

54. In conclusion the Botswana delegation informed the Committee that it would submit to it documents dealing with specific development projects for the consideration and transmission to the policy making bodies of the OAU. (These documents were hereto attached as annexes).

55. Mr. Edem Kodjo thanked the Botswana delegation for the succinct information it had supplied the Committee and assured the members of the delegation that the Committee would be a reliable emissary of Botswana in explaining the difficulties its country was facing as a result of its commitment to the cause of liberation struggle in Africa. Mr. Kodjo informed the delegation that he was convinced that envoys from African countries would visit Botswana to practically assess the extent of the problem. He further informed it that he would bring the problem to the attention of the Committee of Twelve on Afro-Arab Co-operation and all other possible donor organisations.

56. H.E. Sir Seretse Khama, President of the Republic of Botswana, gave an official reception at State House in honour of the visiting Committee. The reception which was attended by the entire diplomatic corps, resident representatives of International Organisations and dignitaries, gave a unique opportunity to the members of the Committee to exchange views and ideas.

PART II: MILITARY ASSISTANCE  
MOZAMBIQUE

57. In accordance with the Resolution and Decision adopted by the Committee of Ten, at its last meeting in Tripoli, Libya, on 25 February 1978, the Military Sub-Committee went back to Maputo, Mozambique, on 10 April 1978.

58. The Military Sub-Committee composed of delegates from Algeria, Liberia and Cameroon, held a meeting with the authorities of the National Defence of Mozambique on April 11 1978, during which the military situation prevailing on Mozambique borders as well as a document containing the needs in arms and military equipments necessary for the People's Army of Mozambique to defend and strengthen itself and enable it to face the permanent threats and aggressions from the Armed Forces of the racist regime of Ian Smith.

59. The statements made before the Military Sub-Committee could be summed up as follows:

- Apart from the practical assistance Mozambique was giving the Liberation Movements in Southern Africa and especially apart from the anti-imperialist inclination of the regime in power, it is facing continuous attacks from its enemy, Rhodesia, which was actively supported by South Africa. These attacks aimed at destroying and disorganising the economic and military potentialities of the country. Civilian populations and refugees were not spared by these deadly raids and indiscriminate bombings. There were systematic air reconnaissance activities and infiltration of the enemy's agents in preparation of enemy's attacks, thus emphasising the fragile nature and vulnerability of the borders of Mozambique in TETE, MANICA and GAZA provinces.

60. To defend its territory, its long-stretched land and sea borders as well as its Revolution, Mozambique only had at the moment the People's Forces formed during the resistance against the Portuguese colonisation, militia and the will of its people.

61. The concerns of the Chief of Defence Staff of the People's Army of Mozambique centred mainly on the organization of regular mechanised forces, equipped with effective and sophisticated weapons, especially, anti-aircraft, anti-tank and particularly with great mobility so as to increase their ability to fight back.

62. The creation of an air force and navy was necessary for the defence of the air space and the patrolling of the sea coasts.

63. After this statement, a document containing the list of the military requirements of Mozambique, was handed over to the Military Sub-Committee. The following were the observations and remarks made after the Sub-Committee had examined and analysed this document:

64. (a) The requirements were perfectly in line and agreed with the military and operational preoccupations of authorities of the National Defence of Mozambique. The nature and type of weapons requested conformed with the desire to resist and the strategic and tactical objectives of the Chief of Defence Staff of the People's Army of Mozambique.

65. (b) The military might of the enemy, its objective and effective alliance with South Africa on the one hand and the extensive nature of the borders of Mozambique and the present phase of the reorganisation of his army on the other, made the Military Sub-Committee to believe that the needs expressed were insufficient as compared with the present situation on the country's borders.

66. (c) The Military Sub-Committee wanted to know the possibilities of the People's Army of Mozambique, especially as regards staff and their training, to meet the requirements and make use of the equipments requested. The authorities of the National Defence of Mozambique assured us that there was an adequate and extensive defence strategy which very naturally took care of the problems of staff training.
67. (d) The superiority of the enemy's tactical offensive resulted from the superiority in the field, especially with regard to its equipment.
68. It is logically time that as soon as the People's Army of Mozambique started implementing its defence plan including adequately arming itself with modern weapons, the enemy would react by using the most sophisticated forces and means so as to maintain its superiority.
69. The Military Sub-Committee which already believed that the requirements were inadequate vis-a-vis the present situation, feared that this state might become worse during the expected escalation as the enemy would always try to maintain the preparation of the operational forces in its favour.
70. (e) The document submitted to us for consideration did not mention in concrete terms the basis of an additional and indispensable logistic support. The use of some of the facilities asked for fighters, naval ships, armoured cars called for the determination of a technical and logistic location which should necessarily be included in the document.
71. Finally, the Military Sub-Committee thought it necessary to stress the urgency of the problem and recommended that the proposed assistance be given practical expression as early as possible.

72. Present at the meeting were representatives of countries recommended to be visited by the Military Sub-Committee of the OAU Committee, presided over by His Excellency Mr. E. Kodjo, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Togo.

REPORT OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE OF THE OAU  
COMMITTEE OF TEN FOR ASSISTANCE TO FRONTLINE STATES  
- ZAMBIA -

73. The Military Committee comprising Algeria, Cameroon and Liberia, a Sub-Committee of the OAU Committee of Ten for Assistance to Frontline States established under OAU Resolution 577(XLIX) in Libreville to study ways and means of rendering assistance to Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia which had been victims of repeated aggression by the racist regimes met in Lusaka, Zambia, from 14 to 16 April 1978.

74. At that meeting, the Committee met both military leaders and defence authorities led by Major General M.M. MASHEKE of the Zambian Defence Forces who briefed them on the military situation and the related problems facing Zambia, occasioned by the repeated criminal aggression perpetrated against it by the enemy. Against this background, the Zambian Defence team re-submitted the list of Zambia's critical requirements which would enable the Zambian Defence Forces, the PF(Z), the South West African People's Organization and the ANC(SA) to strengthen their defence position and repel the repeated criminal aggression perpetrated against them by the enemy.

75. After carefully listening to the briefing and examining the overall military situation as was so far presented, the Military Committee, would like to make the following observations:

- a. The enemy uses the strategy of area bombardment and constant raids on defenceless civilian targets utilising combat planes, helicopters, armoured cars, tanks, small arms, artillery and trucks, aimed at the

destruction of lives and property and disruption of normal life thereby causing fear and loss of confidence among the civilian population.

- b. The enemy had the advantage of high mobility and absolute superiority in the air, thereby enabling it to strike deep in friendly territories with impunity and quickly returning to bases or safety before friendly forces could react.
- cc. The Zambian Defence Forces, PF(Z), SWAPO and ANC(SA) lacked the equivalent high mobility, air power, effective air defence capability and modern weapons.
- d. According to the briefing, they had substantially ready trained manpower within their organizational structure to take immediate advantage of all equipments if and when supplied.
- e. From all indications and assurances given, there was no immediate need for OAU troop requirements.

76. The Military Committee, even though seriously limited in knowledge of the actual military situation and the terrain in the areas of battle as they were not fully covered during these briefings by the Zambian Defence Forces, considered the ~~defence~~ requirements very moderate and in line with the three organisations' sincere efforts to build up their defence position to repel the repeated criminal aggression perpetrated against them by the racist minority regimes taking into account the formidable enemy they were to grapple with.

77. The Military Committee having carefully analysed the military situation and scrutinised the inventory of requirements submitted which were considered to be moderate and in line with the critical needs of the Zambian defence forces, the Patriotic

Front; SWAPO and the ANC(SA), recommended:

- a) That the inventory contained in annexes I-IV be seriously examined and speedily supplied by the OAU;
- b) That since the inventory contained in annex V (though highly essential) was not of immediate military nature it should be considered in the report of the Political and Economic Committee;
- c) That particular precaution be taken by the OAU to prevent the introduction of such highly sophisticated weapon system such as the ground to ground missile which would increase the risk of intensification and internationalization of the conflict in Southern Africa.

78. Pursuant to the resolutions adopted at the Libreville Summit in connection with the political and military situation prevailing in Southern Africa, due to the repeated savage acts of aggression being perpetrated by the racist and minority regime of Ian Smith against the African countries (Mozambique, Zambia, Botswana) which share common boundaries with Zimbabwe.

79. In accordance with the practical proposals formulated by the Committee of Ten at its last meeting held on 25 February 1978, in Tripoli, concerning the material and financial assistance to be given to the countries which were victims of the military attacks of the racist and minority regime of Ian Smith.

80. The Military Sub-Committee composed of delegates from Algeria, Liberia and Cameroon including an Officer appointed by the OAU as observer, visited Gaberones, Botswana, on 17 April 1978, where it held an extraordinary meeting with the national defence authorities of Botswana, in the presence of Hon. A. Mogwe, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Botswana.

81. At its meeting with Botswana's military experts, the Military Sub-Committee studied and analysed the ever worsening military situation on the Southern (KASANE) and eastern (FRANCISTOWN) borders of the country, due to the constant raids and infiltration of military units and commandos of the SALISBURY army, resulting in an exodus of people and influx of refugees who at present could not be contained by Botswana's administrative and socio-economic infrastructures.

82. This difficult situation was worsened by Botswana's geo-strategic position in Southern Africa, seeing that it is engulfed in a hostile, political and military surroundings armed through the complicity of Pretoria and Salisbury whose armed forces, were positioned around Botswana along all its national frontiers.

83. To this geographical position should be added Botswana's vast areas, its low population and especially the absence of armed forces having their own tradition and qualification as far as military tactics and operations were concerned.

84. The country's defence capability was dependent on a national guard (territorial police) which was practically transformed into an offensive army since 1977 but whose material acquisitions (weapons, equipment, communication facilities) were rather inadequate to meet the operations of the enemy units and ensure an effective control of the national frontiers.

85. Thus, compared with the other countries suffering from aggressions, Botswana occupies a particular position with no strategic military bases. Its armed forces had barely come into being and its offensive capability could only be said to be limited, whereas the military situation prevailing especially in KASANE demanded urgent solutions through corresponding material assistance (military equipment) and a considerable and permanent logistic support.

86. It then became clear to the Military Sub-Committee that the needs formulated by the Chief of Staff of the Botswana Army and those expressed, for practically the same reasons, by the Mozambican Army, were inadequate, first because of the type of weapons requested and secondly because of their quantity. The latter had certainly followed the views expressed on military operations by the military authorities of Botswana, who requested for only materials they were capable of manipulating or using.


87. However, the military position of the enemy in Rhodesia, only continued improving as far as the superiority of their strength and military operational initiatives were concerned (i.e. the recent fights). In the light of the above, it was necessary to include in the list of requirements, adequate materials and equipment for automatic weapons, transport vehicles, combat, signals and communications facilities as well as radars. The types of aircraft should also be changed into more offensive ones than those of the enemy and thus providing the Botswana air force with greater counter-attack capability and grounds support. (helicopters, alpha-jet cobras, missiles).

88. In conclusion, Botswana needed this military assistance since the "EHG" of its army is aware of the need for a defence strategy to face the Rhodesian challenge and give practical support to the freedom fighters in accordance with the principles of the Frontline States of which Botswana is one.

89. Besides, such a scientifically planned and progressive strategy should be supported by proper staff recruitment and training alongside the acquisition of military materials and equipment. However, considering the peculiar nature of Botswana's borders, this assistance was not only necessary and urgent, but

was also based on Army's acquisition of effective signal facilities and self-reliant combat capability to enable it increase its mobility and strengthen its control over the country's particularly fragile and vulnerable borders..

90. The mission of the Committee of Ten for Assistance to the Frontline States completed its assignment in the evening of 17 April 1978.



INTRODUCTION

1. In performing its international duty and implementing the decisions taken by various international organs, by the United Nations Security Council in particular, the People's Republic of Mozambique decided a full application of the sanctions against the British Colony of Southern Rhodesia.

2. The country's economy was affected to some extent by the application of these sanctions. The direct damages done to the economy was estimated by a United Nations mission, for the first twelve months, at an amount between 140 and 165 million dollars and at an amount between 130 and 135 million for the subsequent years.

The aid given so far by the various nations hardly amounted to 100 million dollars.

3. These damages are still worsened by the constant aggressions of Smith's rabble which, not only destroys human life, but attempts also to destroy economic and social objectives.

4. Although the first estimates of the direct damages caused by these aggressions range between 14 and 16 million dollars, recent United Nations missions to our country estimated our needs at over 86 million dollars out of which about 56 million would be needed to meet the situations created by the aggressions of Ian Smith's regime (see Annex 2)

5. As a result of the economic damage done to the People's Republic of Mozambique, the latter cannot fully undertake its task of national reconstruction.

6. In fact, the available means which, in normal times, should be used in financing development projects, are used in paying for the damages caused by the present situation, since the aid given by the various nations is inadequate.

7. The situation thus created not only checks national reconstructions but has also negative effects on the defence capacity of the People's Republic of Mozambique. The shortage of resources prevents the country from strengthening its defence capacity, a task to which priority must be given, considering the situation prevailing in Southern Africa today.

The defence capacity of the People's Republic of Mozambique is also limited by its present state of economic development since this capacity varies in terms of the economy whose development is hindered by the damages mentioned above.

8. All the action is therefore conditioned by the aid the international community would be able to give to increase the defence capacity, either by providing us with military equipment or by making up for the economic damages, thus creating a situation of normal economic development.

9. The economic situation was worsened by the events mentioned above. The People's Republic of Mozambique is experiencing much difficulty in its external balance of payments, its import volume of the goods necessary for the people and the country's economy is thus reduced. Priority should therefore be given to the aid likely to remedy this situation.

Resolution 577(XXIX) of the OAU Council of Ministers and priorities (a) aid in crude oil.

10. Taking into consideration the plan drawn up by the Committee of Ten, it is necessary to study, in this context the possibility of an immediate supply of 500,000 metric tons of crude oil to our country, since this item is increasingly weighing on our imports and since 630,000 tons of crude oil amounting to US-\$ 70 million will be needed by our country in 1978. This amount is however below that spent in 1973 or 1974, while Mozambique imported 800,000 tons of crude oil. Besides, oil is an indispensable item in military strategy and tactics. Without it, all the mobile means of combat and transport cannot be used.

11. The aid in crude oil has the double advantage of releasing the scanty resources in foreign currency for other uses or of producing Mozambican escudos to be used in increasing the defence budget or in meeting some urgent needs resulting from aggressions. The crude oil in which we are interested in the Es - Lider of Lybia, but we can accept any other type of crude oil which can be changed through bilateral agreement.

a) Aid in foodstuffs and other essential goods.

The aid in foodstuffs is very important since our country is compelled to import a large quantity of foodstuffs, owing to a rise in people's consumption and to a fall in production.

The country's needs in foodstuffs in 1978 for the population as a whole ~~is indicated in Annex B.~~ In Annex C can be seen the items needed in order to support the people of Tete, Manica and Gaza directly affected by the aggressions.

These estimates were made by a United Nations missions which visited the country in July 1977 and should be actualized in terms of new aggressions. At any rate, the amounts indicated may be considered as the minimum.

b) Financial support

The US.\$ 30,000,000 African solidarity fund envisaged by the Twenty-ninth Session of the OAU Council of Ministers therefore becomes necessary, for, room must be made for immediate and unforeseeable needs.

12. Negotiations are going on at bilateral level for the financing of long term development projects. Government organs therefore maintained close contacts with the African Development Bank ((ADB)). The Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (ABEDA) and, to a certain degree, the Arab Fund especially with Kuwait, Abu Dhabi and Qatar.

The projects under discussion are indicated in Annex D.

The road is presently constructed to a gravel standard but because of heavy vehicles running on the road, transporting various supplies to Zambia it has been decided that it should be tarred. The cost of tarring the road is estimated to be US \$18 million. The European Community has provided US \$10m and an additional US \$8 million is still required.

#### 4. Oil Storage Project

A project memorandum is attached. The Federal Republic of Germany has agreed to finance the purchase of oil tanks but Botswana is required to meet the cost of oil itself from its resources. The OAU Committee of Ten recommendation for a supply of 500,000 tons of oil to Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia is very relevant to this project.

All the abovementioned projects are equally important but as the Vice President and the Minister of Foreign Affairs have indicated the highest priority is attached to Railway project; followed by the Airport.

#### Foot and Mouth Disease

The Committee has also been briefed on Botswana's problems following the outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease. As a result of this outbreak Botswana is not able to export its beef to its only profitable market, namely the European Community; mainly the United Kingdom. Beef is Botswana's second major export and the ban of beef imports by the European Community means a loss of revenue for Botswana and an adverse effect of the Balance of Payments because of loss of foreign exchange.

Ministry of Finance and Development Planning

Gaborone

BOTSWANA.

B. Efforts towards the mobilization of these forms of assistance:

- In Africa
- Outside Africa

At that same meeting, the Committee thought that, to enable it make practical recommendations covering the global requirements of the three countries, it was necessary to listen to the Heads of Delegation of the three countries. It was so decided and then the second meeting of the Committee was devoted to listening to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Mozambique and Botswana and the Deputy Head of delegation of Zambia. These personalities did not only give a general description of the situation in their respective countries but also a detailed account, with figures, of their countries requirements. The Committee recorded the following from these statements:

Mozambique

A. The enemy's strategy. The enemy carries out air attacks by using planes, helicopters and reconnaissance planes. On the ground the attacks are carried out with tanks, armoured cars and heavy duty trucks. These attacks are concentrated along the boarder which is over 1,000 kms. long and directed by Portuguese mercenaries, formerly of Mozambique and veterans of the colonial war who know the ground very well.

These attacks have caused very serious damages, to both human life and to property. The records of the last twelve months show, 1,432 dead and 525 wounded. As for material damages, they were caused mainly in the Gaza, Manica and Tete provinces involving systematic destruction of schools, railway stations, locomotives, crops, live-stock, clinics and bridges valued at 15 million dollars for the three provinces.

In addition to all this is the loss Mozambique has suffered on account of the application of UN sanctions against the Ian Smith regime.

According to UN experts Mozambique needs 200 million dollars per year to face the situation besides the 16 millions already mentioned. Mozambique has received about half of this amount from UN and OAU Member States.

B. Requirements: They are of 3 types

Material - in the face of the mobility of the enemy troops Mozambique must also increase the mobility of her troops. To do this she will require armoured vehicles, tanks, lorries and heavy duty jeeps, transport aircraft and helicopters. She also needs heavy armaments, tanks, anti-tanks, anti-aircraft defence equipment (D.C.A.) and even missiles since the Rhodesians are using mirages. She also needs oil which is the sinews of war.

Financial - Mozambique has financial needs on account of the extent of the damage done but it also needs experts for the reconstruction of the country: agricultural, industrial, transport and veterinary experts, as well as experts in mining and energy, fishing and civil engineering, etc.

As regards troop requirements, Mozambique will make the necessary contacts on a bilateral terms when the time comes.

Botswana

In this country three types of problems arise as a result of the repeated aggression from Rhodesia.

A. Problem of Refugees - With the intensification of the liberation war, there is an exodus of refugees from Botswana. Up to now there are only two refugee camps in Botswana with a capacity of 250 and 200 respectively

These two camps had to accommodate 1,900 people. This poses all kinds of problems requiring immediate solution. One of Botswana's major problems is how to transport the refugees not only to other countries but also away from the border. In addition to these Rhodesian refugees, there are now refugees from South Africa.

B. National Defence Problem: Faced with Ian Smith's acts of aggression, incursions and provocations, Botswana, which hitherto had only a police force, has decided to establish an army for its defence. This project is expected to cost 28 million dollars and will cover a three-year period. In this connection, any assistance by way of training and equipment would be welcome.

C. Economic Problems: Botswana has considered closing the Rhodesian railway line which passes through its territory. But this would create greater problems for it than for Rhodesia since 100% of Botswana's imports and exports are routed along that line, Rhodesia on the other hand, has a secondary line along which it is already routing 20% of its trade. Maintaining the line alone would cost Botswana about 16 million dollars a year, if it were to bear the cost all by itself.

The OAU can and must help Botswana in such priority projects as the protection of livestock which is the mainstay of the country's economy as well as road infrastructure and the setting up of grain reserves.

UN experts have estimated Botswana's global requirements at about 54 million dollars out of which it has been promised only 1 million 430,000 dollars.

Zambia - As a land locked country, one of its major problems is transport. It urgently needs oil and to buy this she is asking for a loan of 30 million dollars through the OAU. There is also the problem of refugees whose numbers increase the aid to be given to the freedom fighters.

10. CALLS UPON the Security Council to take effective measures particularly those provided for under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter in order to bring to a speedy end the prevailing situation in Zimbabwe which is the source of instability and insecurity which constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security;
11. FURTHER CALLS upon the Security Council to adopt measures facilitating prompt and effective assistance by the international community to the Peoples Republic of Mozambique in order to enable it to strengthen its defence capabilities as well as overcome the tremendous material loss incurred as a result of the series of aggression and devastation committed by the illegal racist minority regime;
12. MANDATES the following countries: Algeria, Nigeria, Gabon, Tanzania and Lesotho to assist Mozambique along with the African Group during the Consideration of the matter at the forthcoming meeting of the Security Council of the U.N.;
13. REQUESTS the Administrative Secretary-General of the OAU to convene, as soon as possible, the meeting of the Defence Commission with a view to recommending the appropriate measures for the settlement of the important question of repeated aggression of IAN Smith's Administration against Frontline Countries in particular and all victims of such aggression in general;
14. DECIDES on the creation of an Ad Hoc Committee composed of Algeria, Cameroon, Liberia, Chad, Guinea Bissau, Egypt, Lesotho, Uganda, Mauritius which shall recommend all forms of appropriate assistance to Mozambique, Botswana and Zambia.

unshakeable resolve to defend their national sovereignty and territorial integrity and carrying out their African and International obligations, in support of the Liberation struggle in Zimbabwe;

6. URGES all OAU Member States in the spirit of the OAU Mauritius Resolution AHG/Res.80 (XIII) to provide the people of Mozambique with effective assistance particularly that geared to strengthen her defence capabilities;
7. REITERATES the unqualified commitment of the OAU in its determination to step up its material and financial assistance to the freedom fighters of Zimbabwe to enable them to vigorously execute the armed struggle which is the only option left in the liberation of Zimbabwe in the colonialist and racist regime of Southern Rhodesia determined to suppress the majority of the people of Zimbabwe and to harass those countries opposed to racist minority rule in Southern Africa;
8. INVITES Member States of the OAU to assist Frontline States victims of aggression by the racist minority regimes by committing themselves to come to the aid of those countries whenever they are attacked or threatened by the racist regimes of Southern Africa;
9. APPEALS to all Member States of the U.N. and indeed all governments and organizations to give immediate and substantial practical assistance to enable the government of Mozambique to meet the challenges arising out of systematic acts of aggression committed against her through the invasion and threats to its national sovereignty and territorial integrity;

Indignant at the provocative and arrogant attitude of the rebel regime in attacking Member States of the OAU neighbouring on Southern Rhodesia, namely Mozambique, Botswana and Zambia in a desperate effort to cow them from supporting the legitimate liberation cause of the territory,

Expressing appreciation for Mozambique's courage in repelling the forces of aggression of the illegal racist regime of Southern Rhodesia,

Noting with satisfaction the stepped up execution of the national liberation war in Zimbabwe and the support rendered to the nationalist forces by the Frontline States who have had to make unlimited sacrifices towards this cause,

Reiterating the firm commitment of the OAU to the liberation of the people of Southern Rhodesia from the illegal minority rebel regime, the establishment of majority rule and exercise of the right to self-determination by the people of Zimbabwe.

1. STRONGLY CONDEMNNS rebel Rhodesia's naked war of aggression against Mozambique backed by artillery and aircraft and the subsequent massacres of hundreds of innocent civilians;
2. CONDEMNNS South Africa for collusion in the rebel regime's invasion of Mozambique;
3. CONGRATULATES the people of Mozambique for their undaunted courage in repelling the forces of aggression and their unwavering commitment to the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe;
4. COMMENDS the Zimbabwe Liberation movements for stepping up the liberation war in their country thus causing panic in the ranks of the rebel regime;
5. REAFFIRMS the OAU's total support for and solidarity with the Government and people of Mozambique in their

RESOLUTION ON THE REBEL RHODESIAN INVASION  
OF PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF MOZAMBIQUE

The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity meeting in its Twenty-Ninth Ordinary Session in Libreville, Gabon from 23 June to 3 July, 1977,

Having considered the report of the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of Mozambique on the recent invasion of Mozambique and continuous incursions by the rebel regime of Ian Smith,

Recalling the Mauritius Resolution AHG/Res.80 of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government which inter-alia:

- a) Declares that any attack by the racist regime on any Frontline State shall be considered as an attack against the whole of Independent Africa,
- b) Decides that in the event of such an attack Member States of the OAU will grant all possible support to repel the aggression against an independent Member State,

Recalling the relevant OAU Resolutions on Southern Rhodesia,

Recalling further U.N. General Assembly and Security Council Resolutions calling on U.N. Member States to apply strictly economic, political and other sanctions against Southern Rhodesia with a view to ending racism and rebellion in the territory,

Recalling the decision of the Government of Mozambique of 3 March 1976 to close its borders with Southern Rhodesia and strictly apply sanctions against Southern Rhodesia in conformity with UN and OAU Resolutions aimed at toppling the illegal rebel regime in Salisbury,

CM/885(XXXI)

Annex X

RESOLUTION ON THE REBEL RHODESIAN INVASION OF PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC MOZAMBIQUE



B. In the long term: This aspect of the Committee's recommendations concerns the development plans of the three countries. The Committee recommends that ADB, ABEDA, ECA and the other agencies of the United Nations' family be asked to give priority to economic and development projects submitted by the three countries. To this end, it is proposed that all the feasibility studies be submitted to the OAU General Secretariat which will quickly inform the possible sources of finance. The Committee further recommends the personal intervention of the Current Chairman with the sources of finance.

GENERAL RECOMMENDATION:

The Committee feels the success of this plan will depend to a great extent on OAU's credibility in this sphere. And for the OAU to be credible it should give concrete expression to its determination to help the three countries by getting Member States to really contribute to the Fund.

The direct intervention of the OAU will also reduce possible opposition based on political or ideological considerations.

The Committee deems it desirable that the three countries provide information on the present sources of finance to avoid confusion.

Lastly, it appeals to all States, especially African States and those of the non-aligned group and the Arab League to intensify the boycott of Rhodesia in order to tighten the application of sanctions.

For the time being, Zambia does not need African forces to defend its territory; it needs money to buy arms and ammunition for its armed forces to increase their defence capability.

Zambia's requirements have been estimated by United Nations experts at more than 100 million dollars per year.

After these statements the Committee came to the following conclusion.

- a) The needs of the three countries are considerable.
- b) The OAU should not make promises it cannot keep, as this will be detrimental both to the countries concerned and the OAU itself.
- c) However African countries can and should help through efforts whose import will transcend the scarcity of resources.
- d) Certain African countries have the means, particularly in the military field, and should be encouraged to intervene on the side of the three countries.
- e) The OAU should inform ABEDA and ADB that priority should be given to urgent projects and programmes submitted by these three countries.
- f) The OAU should use its good offices with non-African countries to obtain the maximum aid for these three countries.
- g) To this end, the current Chairman should be authorised to contact the Arab States and all other countries, including the non-aligned countries, who are likely to give aid.
- h) Ministerial missions should also be mandated to non-African countries likely to provide aid.

In view of the foregoing, the Committee of 10 makes the following recommendations.

- There are two aspects of the assistance to the three countries concerned: the short term assistance requiring immediate, or failing that, earliest intervention and the medium or long term assistance.

A. As regards short term assistance, the Committee of 10 proposed a three-point plan:

1. Financial

a) The need to set up an African Solidarity Fund with an initial sum of 30 million dollars from voluntary contributions of member states.

b) Non-African resources:

A Ministerial mission shall be authorized by the Committee of 10 to seek and mobilize additional resources from the Arab World, non-aligned countries, and countries and organizations likely to provide aid. This Ministerial mission should accomplish its task by 7 October and report to the current Chairman.

2. Assistance in kind

a) Immediate supply of 500,000 tons of oil to the three countries. To this end, the OAU shall officially approach CPEC; this effort will be supplemented and bolstered by bilateral action of Member States.

b) Food Aid: On the basis of specific requests submitted by the three countries, the OAU shall approach international organizations, African and non-African States which have

- c) Means of Transport: African and non-African countries which have means of transport should help by providing cargo planes and ships.
- d) Technical Assistance and Co-operation : Once the three countries have clearly identified and specified their needs, the Secretary-General should approach Member States to provide enough top-level man-power to the three countries.

3. Military:

- a) The Current Chairman should be authorised to get in contact with all African and non-African countries which could help in order to obtain the necessary arms and ammunition including armoured cars, air facilities and even missiles.
- b) The dispatch of the ministerial mission of the Committee aided by military experts to countries that are likely to provide assistance should also be envisaged.
- c) Member States of the Committee should appoint military experts to make a list of arms requirements in consultation with the military experts of the three countries.
- d) Military troops: At the request of the countries concerned, any Member State called upon should respond positively to the appeal for man-power assistance from any of the three countries. This will be done through bilateral arrangements.

INITIAL APPRAISAL OF INVESTMENT REQUIREMENTS

	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>PM</u>
Locomotive and Rolling Stock		
(a) Locomotives	30	15.9
(b) Wagons	767	20.0
(c) Cabooses and Guards Vans	18	0.5
(d) Coaches	40	7.5
(e) Tarpaulins	-	15
Sub-Total		<u>44.05</u>
Mechanical Plant and Equipment		
		<u>.56</u>
Sub-Total		<u>.56</u>
Civil Engineering Plant and Equipment		
(a) Track Maintenance and Renewal Machines		1.24
(b) Plant and Tools		.26
(c) Renewal Programme (10 Years)		24.00
Sub Total		<u>25.50</u>
Operating Equipment		
(a) Signalling		
(b) Radio		0.85
(c) Telecommunications		
Buildings and Sidings		
(a) Headquarters		1.20
(b) Exchange Sidings		.15
(c) Maintenance Depots and Stores		1.50
(d) Staff Accommodation		2.90
(e) Miscellaneous		.10
		<u>5.85</u>

	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>PM</u>
Road Vehicles		
(a) Land Rovers	6	.05
(b) Lorries	32	.48
(c) Cars and Vans	11	.05
		<hr/>
Sub-Total		.58
Stores		
(a) General		.30
(b) Telecommunications		.0
(c) Civil Engineering		1.0
(d) Mechanical and Electrical Engineering		1.13
		<hr/>
Sub-Total		2.43
		<hr/>
Grand Total		<u>79.82(say 80)</u>

B.

The total excludes estimates for Radio and Telecommunications.

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Annex IX

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF TEN

OAU COMMITTEE OF TEN ON ASSISTANCE TO FRONTLINE STATES

1. Algeria
2. Cameroon
3. Chad
4. Egypt
5. Guinea-Bissau
6. Lesotho
7. Liberia
8. Mauritius
9. Togo (Chairman)
10. Uganda.

It is incumbent upon the Committee to translate its programme of action into concrete material assistance as the situation in these countries has become even more pressing. Africa must be the first to give concrete assistance to these countries before turning to external sources. Therefore it is imperative that the Committee should have a well defined course of action to meet the present challenge. The Chairman then called upon the Heads of delegation of Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia to furnish the Committee with any supplementary information in the latest developments of the situations in their respective countries.

5. The Head of the Mozambique delegation thanked the Committee for the opportunity accorded to his delegation to address it. He stated that he did not have any substantive additions to make to the submission made by the Mozambique Foreign Minister in Libreville spelling out Mozambique's requirements both short-term and long-term. He however informed the Committee that since Libreville, Mozambique had suffered continuous aggressions, as many as 34 since then. He then gave a break-down of casualties and material damage to properties. It was against this background that he called upon the Committee to take account of the grave situation facing Mozambique for which she needs immediate and concrete assistance. He underlined that the request Mozambique has made is the least she can expect from independent Africa, and was hopeful that the OAU Member States would respond favourably to Mozambique's request. In this connection he also expressed the hope that the Committee would find a suitable formula to bring this situation to the attention of our Arab brothers from whom he expected a sympathetic response especially within the context of Afro-Arab Cooperation.

6. In his statement to the Committee the Botswana Foreign Minister thanked the Committee for its efforts to raise assistance to the Frontline States. He recalled the UN Report on Assistance to Botswana copies of which had been sent to the OAU, BADEA, ADB and potential sources of finance. In view of the detailed account

of Botswana's requirements which had been given at the Libreville meeting, the Minister did not think it necessary to go over the same details again. Nevertheless he promised to forward, at a later date, any such statistical details as the Committee might require.

7. The Botswana Minister further referred to Rhodesian aggressions which have continued unabated and in fact on an increased scale despite Rhodesian denials of such aggressions which they sometimes blame on Zambia though they know this is untrue. It is because of constant Rhodesian aggression that Botswana has had to establish its new defence force even though this has meant diverting funds which had been earmarked for development projects for which Botswana could not easily find alternative sources of finance.

The Botswana Minister drew the Committee's attention to the complexion of the problem of refugees from South Africa, many of whom, once in Botswana, are reluctant to leave the country for other countries of asylum. They insist that facilities be extended to them in Botswana and are, for instance, reluctant to go to Ghana or Nigeria where there are educational opportunities. These refugees are posing a new social problem which is of serious concern to the Botswana Government.

8. After the statements made by Heads of delegation of Mozambique and Botswana the Committee exchanged views on how best to approach the problem and thereafter made a number of concrete proposals in implementation of their programme of action. The Committee agreed on the following recommendations:

- a) The creation of a Committee of 6 member states to visit Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia.

- Egypt, Guinea-Bissau and Togo to assess their material, financial and economic requirements; and
- military experts from Algeria, Cameroon and Liberia to study the military aspects.

- b) To request the OAU Current Chairman to launch an appeal for raising the US\$30 million Solidarity Fund agreed upon by the 14th OAU Summit.
- c) To ask the OAU Committee of 12 to take up the matter with the Afro-Arab Committee of 24 in respect of projects for Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia with a view to having them accorded priority treatment.
- d) To follow up the question of the 500.000 tonnes of crude oil requested by the 3 countries.
- e) To send a message of solidarity to the President of Mozambique following the recent act of aggression by the rebel Rhodesian regime.

MEETING OF OAU COMMITTEE OF TEN ON ASSISTANCE TO FRONTLINE STATES

CAIRO, EGYPT - 26 NOVEMBER 1977

The OAU Committee of Ten on Assistance to Frontline States established under resolution CM/Res.577 (XXIX) to study ways and means for raising assistance to Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia, victims of repeated aggression by the neighbouring racist minority regimes, met in Cairo on 26 November, 1977 under the chairmanship of His Excellency Mr. Edem KODJO, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Togo. Cameroon was elected Rapporteur of the Committee.

2. Present were the following eight member states of the Committee: Algeria, Cameroon, Chad, Egypt, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritius and Togo. Absent were Lesotho and Uganda. Present as observers were Botswana, Gabon, Mozambique and Zambia.

3. The Head of the Egyptian delegation, Dr. Boutrus Ghaly welcomed the Committee to Cairo and reiterated Egypt's commitment to the search for peace in the Middle East and to the liberation struggle in Southern Africa.

4. The Chairman, in his introductory remarks, expressed his appreciation to the Egyptian Government for the reception accorded to the delegations and for accepting to host the Committee's meeting. He underscored the urgent need for the Committee to work out a concrete programme of action to speed up assistance to Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia who are victims of minority aggression as a result of their commitment to the liberation struggle in Southern Africa. He then summarised the Committee's programme of action as adopted in Libreville, July, 1977. He referred to the submissions then made by Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia detailing both their immediate and long-term requirements for which they needed assistance within and outside the OAU family.

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REPORT OF THE MEETING OF OAU COMMITTEE OF TEN  
ON ASSISTANCE TO FRONTLINE STATES

CAIRO, EGYPT - 26 NOVEMBER, 1977

CM/885(XXXI)

Annex VIII

REPORT OF THE MEETING OF CAU COMMITTEE OF TEN ON ASSISTANCE  
FRONTLINE STATES

Cairo, Egypt - 26 November 1977

MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE OF TEN ON ASSISTANCE  
TO FRONTLINE STATES

The Committee of Ten on Assistance to Frontline States met in its 3rd Session at the People's Hall, Tripoli, Libya on February 25, 1978.

The Session was declared open at 15:45 hrs. by its Chariman H.E. Mr. Edem KODJO, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Togo. The Chairman recalling to the decisions made at its first and second sessions held in Libreville and Cairo and through which Political and Military and economic Sub-Committees were established informed the Committee that the object of the present session was to establish the time table for visiting the Frontline States namely, Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia.

After a brief exchange of views the Committee agreed to visit the said Frontline States during the first half of April 1978. The Committee further decided that its members meet in Maputo, Mozambique on April 10, 1978 to commence its work.

The Committee considered and approved a proposal made by a delegation with a view of granting the three Frontline States an amount of US\$1m from the Special Fund of the Liberation Committee. The breakdown of this grant will be \$500,000 for Mozambique, \$300,000 for Botswana and \$200,000 for Zambia.

CM/885(XXXI)

Annex VII

MEETING OF THE COMMITTEE OF TEN ON ASSISTANCE TO FRONTLINE STATES

ANNUAL COST OF PERSONNEL

FUNCTION

	No.	P	C
1. <u>Headquarters</u>			
number of staff	121		
Paid by Republic of Botswana		362,000	
assessed additional expatriate cost			150,000
2. <u>Traffic</u>			
number of staff	569		
paid by Republic of Botswana		1,202,600	
assessed additional expatriate cost			125,000
3. <u>Finance</u>			
number of staff	50		
paid for by Republic of Botswana		273,000	
assessed additional expatriate cost			125,000
4. <u>Technical</u>			
number of staff	673		
paid for by Republic of Botswana		1,550,000	
assessed additional expatriate cost			391,000
5. <u>Total</u>			
number of staff 1413(say 1400 including 200 expatriates)		3,387,600	
paid for by Republic of Botswana			
assessed additional expatriates			901,000
6. <u>Cost</u>			
Grand Total Cost	( Say P 4.3m)		<u><u>P4,288,600</u></u>

Hereunder follows information on the Strategic projects that were discussed in the briefing session and for which financial assistance is required.

### 1. Railway Project

Attached is a detailed status report on the project. Botswana submitted a request for funding from the Emergency Fund of BADEA to the OAU Secretary-General last November in Cairo. The OAU Secretary-General was to consult his counterpart in the League of Arab States with the view to recommending a contribution to the project from the BADEA's Emergency Fund. Botswana awaits the results of the consultations.

### 2. Airport Project

The present estimated cost of the project is P17 million (US \$20,4 million). A loan has been raised from the African Development Bank in Abidjan to finance the feasibility and detailed design studies. The project has been discussed with and submitted to BADEA, Kuwait Development Fund and the Saudi Development Fund but no firm commitment has been made. Possibilities of co-financing by the institutions mentioned above should be explored.

### 3. Botswana-Zambia Road

This is a road linking Botswana with Zambia. The objective is to develop a link with the North and reduce dependence on South-African routes.

## REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF TEN

The Council will recall that at the end of the consideration of the situation created in Mozambique as a result of the repeated aggression by Rhodesia against this country, it took two decisions.

- a) Send a five members Ministerial delegation to participate in the debates of the Security Council on Mozambique's complaint.
- b) Establish a Committee of Ten to study ways and means of allowing OAU Member States to give concrete and effective assistance to Mozambique, Botswana and Zambia, which are all victims of the repeated aggression by the racist regime of which they are neighbours.

Composition: The Committee is composed as follows:

Algeria, Cameroon, Chad, Guinea Bissau, Egypt, Lesotho, Liberia, Mauritius, Senegal and Uganda.

The Committee met under the Chairmanship of His Excellency the Togolese Minister of Foreign Affairs, the whole day of 28 June and continued its deliberation on 29 and 30 June. At its first meeting, the Committee decided to define its terms of reference as follows:

- A. Identify the various forms of assistance these three countries require:
  - Financial assistance
  - Material assistance
  - Military assistance.

1.3 Following the Canac report the Canadian government was approached for full-fledged team but it was the view of that government that any further study should be confined to contingency transport planning only. In view of the rapidly changing political situation in Southern Africa the Government of Botswana agreed with the Canadian government that contingency planning should have precedence over long-term take-over planning. Therefore, with Canadian aid once again another study was mounted by Trimac. The study completed in June 1977 concluded that in a contingency situation Botswana must rely on rail transport to sustain its economic activity. It recommended that Botswana must create a capability to manage and operate the rail system and towards this end, gave its estimates of personnel and physical resources required.

1.4 During the period the Trimac was carrying out its study, the United Nations sent out a mission to Botswana to assess the requirements of the country in the face of a mounting tension on the northern border. The mission, known as Farah Mission, also held that there was an immediate need for creating a skeleton capacity for emergency operation of railways which would also serve as an initial step towards the ultimate take-over.

## 2.0 CAPITAL COST ESTIMATES

2.1 There are varying estimates of the capital cost of the equipment and facilities required for the take-over based as they are on differing assumptions.

2.1.1 Canac estimated the cost of an orderly take-over as about P 55 million and an emergency take-over as P 43 million. This excludes interest and recovery of capital as well as compensation to Rhodesia Railways. While in the orderly take-over situation all Botswana goods traffic, one passenger train and 40 percent of the transit traffic was assumed, in the emergency situation Botswana goods traffic only was taken into planning.

Study	No. of <u>locos</u>	No. of <u>Wagons</u>	No. of <u>Coaches</u>	Personnel
(i) Canac: (orderly take-over)	24	1182	40	2334
(Emergency take-over)	14	1992 <sup>+</sup>	-	1571
(ii) Trimac	9	443	-	1511
(iii) Farah Mission	10	542	-	Not estimated

+ Assuming non-availability of rolling stock from R.S.A.

## 5.0 THE AREA OF AGREEMENT

5.1 While the estimates of costs and physical resources have differed there has been a general agreement on the strategy to be adopted. This is broadly reflected in the Trimac study and Farah Mission report both of which stress the advisability of creating a capability that will enable Botswana to meet a contingency situation at the same time forming a basis for the eventual and gradual take-over. At the heart of this strategy lies the creation of a management team which will not only refine the requirements but also undertake simultaneous implementation of agreed actions.

## 6.0 GOVERNMENT'S DECISION

6.1 Government of Botswana, appreciating the report of Farah Mission and accepting the broad recommendations of Trimac, has decided to prepare for the take-over. In order to be in a position to do so, the Government has engaged a team of railway experts made available by Transmark under aid agreement between the Governments of the U.K. and Botswana. The team is composed of five long-term experts and can call upon the services of

2.1.2 Trimac estimated the cost of various equipments and facilities as P 33 million catering for Botswana goods traffic only (i.e. excluding passenger and transit traffic).

2.1.3 Farah Mission recommended an immediate aid of P 14 million to enable Botswana purchase equipment and construct facilities to take care of 60 percent of Botswana goods traffic only. The Mission, however, emphasised that further assistance would no doubt be needed to progress the project to cater for 100 percent of Botswana traffic as well as for the long-term take-over.

### 3.0 ESTIMATES OF OPERATING COSTS

3.1 Estimates of operating costs and revenue in respect of operating of railway by Botswana are very rough indeed.

3.1.1 Canac estimated that the system would incur a loss of P 1.7 million per annum excluding interest and debt repayment. (in a long term take-over situation)

3.1.2 Trinac estimated the operating loss as P 2.8 million per annum excluding interest and depreciation (in a contingency situation).

### 4.0 ESTIMATES OF PHYSICAL AND PERSONNEL RESOURCES

4.1 As in the case of estimates of capital costs, the estimates of physical resources and personnel required also differ mainly because of varying assumptions. The following table presents a few items by way of illustration.

adequate number of short term experts as and when the situation warrants. The team will formulate and implement all that is considered necessary for effecting the rail take-over. Starting as a nucleus of the management team it shall in due course expand into the top management of an independent Botswana Railway.

## 7.0 JOINT DISCUSSION WITH RHODESIA RAILWAYS

7.1 While certain actions independent of Rhodesia Railways are possible and desirable, an orderly take over can take place only with its cooperation. Appreciating this, the Government of Botswana and Rhodesia Railways set up a joint working committee in July 1977 to plan for an orderly take-over. The Committee has completed the first phase of its work and its report is now with the Government for consideration before the next stage can be taken up. In the first phase the Committee has recommended an approach to the process of change over but detailed planning to implement the approach will be done in the next phase of its work. With the availability of the Transmark team it would now be possible to implement decisions of the Committee simultaneously with its deliberations wherever possible.

## 8.0 OTHER ACTIONS TO CREATE CAPABILITY

### 8.1 LOCALISATION AND TRAINING

8.1.1 In September 1975 Rhodesia Railways started training of Botswana citizens in certain categories with a view to localise its staff. Training is being given in the categories of checkers, commercial clerks, shunters and plate layers. As a result of this effort, the number of Rhodesian staff on the Botswana portion of the line has come down from about 150 to 100.

8.1.2 At present all train crews are Rhodesians, based at Bulawayo. As a step towards localising this category, locomotive drivers are being trained in Malawi. The first batch of 8 trainees has been under training since September 1977 and a further batch of 10 is likely to be sent shortly. The training programme consists of one and a half years of training in Malawi Railway School followed by one year under Rhodesia Railways in Botswana.

8.1.3 Twenty trainees have been sent to Kenya Railways Training School at Nairobi for training as artisans on a four-year course. Being trained as diesel electricians and diesel mechanics, they should be useful in manning maintenance facilities to be created in due course. In addition, twelve trainees will be sent shortly for technicians course at Kenya Polytechnic.

## 8.2 PURCHASE OF WAGONS

Forty-seven high sided bogie wagons are under order. The delivery is expected to begin in mid-April and will be completed by the end of June 1978. These wagons will be leased to Rhodesia Railways for running in closed-circuit between Morupule and Selebi-Phikwe, carrying coal.

## 9.0 FINANCING STRATEGY

9.1 Whether the Government is successful in taking over the operation of the railway depends on the extent to which the international community is prepared to assist. If the Government is to meet recurrent costs of the magnitude expected, the bulk of the capital funds must come from external sources. At the present moment the prospects of international support are as follows:

<u>Source</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Application</u>
U.K.	£ 3.0 million	(i) Transmark team (ii) Residual for U.K. equipment.
U.S.A.I.D.	\$ 8.0 million	likely to be available for years 1978/79 for purchase of locomotives.
Germany (FRG)	DM 7.0 million	To be appraised by K.F.W. for expenditure on equipment.
Denmark	P 1.2 million	Wagon purchase under Danish State Loan II if prices affordable.
EEC	P 1.0 million	47 wagons for coal traffic - under construction.
IBRD	\$ 5.0 million	Depends on the Bank Playing a coordinating role.

Preliminary approaches have also been made to the Saudi Development Fund and BADEA.

9.2 Little progress can be made to firm up these prospects until an operational plan is ready. Key elements are procurement strategy linked with a financing plan. The Transmark team has therefore taken up the task of preparation of an operational plan in hand.

01/12/77

Sinazongwe

at approximately 21.00 hours enemy aircraft violated  
Zambian air space around Sinazongwe.

The rebel aircraft was flying without lights.

06/12/77

Sinazongwe

At 21.00 hours a rebel aircraft violated Zambian  
air space at Sinazogwe in Southern Province.

08 11/77

Sinazongwe

On 8th December 1977 at approximately 15.00 hours  
enemy aircraft violated Zambian air space over  
Sinazongwe from South to Eastern direction.

15/12/77

Feira

At 09.00 hours enemy spotter plane violated  
Zambian air space in Feira. The aircraft was  
flying very high. A similar aircraft violated  
Zambian air space at 15.30 hours on the same day.

15/12/77

Maamba, Southern Province

Enemy aircraft (Beaver) violated Zambian air  
and water spaces around Nchete Island opposite  
Sinazongwe Boma.

17/12/77

Victoria Falls

Rebel Forces opened fire on our troops position  
at Victoria Falls using 81 mm Mortars. Zambian  
troops returned fire using 60 mm mortars. The  
exchange of fire started at 09.45 hours and  
lasted for approximately 45 minutes. One enemy  
mortar bomb landed into our troops tent but  
did not explode.

There were no casualties on Zambian side.

20/12/77

Livingstone

At 12.05 hours enemy stationed at Camp opposite Livingstone Game Park fired onto Zambian territory. Zambian troops returned fire silencing the enemy.

There were no casualties on our side.

21/12/77

Chakwenga

At approximately 11.00 hours rebel soldiers attacked a freedom fighter patrol on Zambian soil. One Freedom Fighter was killed.

The rebel soldiers fled living foodstuffs and a field cooker on the spot.

21/12/77

Chakwenga

at approximately 12.15 hours two enemy helicopters violated Zambian air space. One of them landed on the place of incident while the other was hovering above the scene of incident. The helicopters flew back after some time.

It is believed the helicopters were uplifting the rebel soldiers.

13/01/78

Livingstone

A speed boat fitted with a machine gun violated Zambian water space. The boat was carrying four (4) rebel soldiers and came within reach of Livingstone Game Park. On locating Zambian troops on the banks of the Zambezi River, rebel soldiers opened machine gun fire. Our men returned fire using small arms killing two rebel soldiers who dropped into the Zambezi River.

REPUBLIC OF ZAMBIAA. Cost of Development projects necessitated by the situation in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa

	<u>Project</u>	<u>Foreign Component</u>	<u>Local Component</u>	<u>Total Cost</u>
		<u>K</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>K</u>
(i)	Conversion from coal to heavy furnace oil in the Copper Mines			
	(a) R.C.M. converted to HFO in 1966 and reverted to use of coal in 1970	-	-	15,000,000
	(b) N.C.C.M. (Rokana Mine) began to use HFO in 1970	-	-	54,400,000
(ii)	Construction of the oil pipe-line from Dar-es-Salaam	40,067,000	28,000,000	68,067,000
(iii)	Construction of the Kafironda Explosives	6,479,000	2,718,000	9,197,000
(iv)	Nitrogen Chemicals of Zambia (Fertilizer Plant)	17,387,300	3,598,700	20,986,000
(v)	Kapwe Industrial Fabrics (Polypropylene bags)	5,130,000	3,500,000	8,630,000
(vi)	Zambia Clay (Brick-fields)	4,500,000	3,000,000	7,500,000
(vii)	Kapiri Glass Product (Bottle Glass Plant)	4,750,000	1,907,000	6,657,000
(viii)	Construction of the Kafue Power Scheme	138,004,000	44,180,000	182,184,000
(ix)	Development of Maamba Collieries	-	-	42,000,000
(x)	Improvement of the Kazungula/Livingstone Road	-	-	2,062,711

		Total Cost							
		in US \$	ADB	ABEDA	KUWAIT	SAUDI ARABIA	QATAR	ABU DHABI	
1.	Pequenos Linbonbos Dan	37 500 000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2.	Water supply to Maputo	10,000 000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
3.	Earth road programmes	60 000 000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
4.	Rembeluzi Inigration Project	10 000 000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
5.	Alto Ligonha a Alto Moleme Raid	10 000 000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
6.	Litunde/Montepuez Road	56 000 000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
7.	Inigration of 12 hectares in Limpopo	20 000 000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
8.	Saw mill Project	35 000 000	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

41. 18/01/78            Kazungula, Southern Province  
at about 13.40 hours enemy troops opened fire at our troop position using small arms and mortars. Zambian troops returned fire neutralising the enemy. There were no casualties on our side, but the pontoon was slightly damaged.
42. 18/01/78            Katombora  
At 16.30 hours rebel soldiers opened fire onto our troops using small arms and mortars. Zambian troops returned fire silencing the rebel soldiers.
43. 26/01/78            Kafwambila (Kalomo), Southern Province  
At 16.00 hours rebel ground forces supported by 3 helicopters assaulted and demolished Siampondo, Siamakuru and Mubunu villages inside Zambia killing five Zambians including Women and children. Rebel soldiers used 3 helicopters to bomb the area and six helicopters to uplift their soldiers back into Rhodesia.
44. 31/01/78            Siameja, Kalomo District, Southern Province  
At 09.45 hours at Siameja village near Siampondo a Police landrover detonated a landmine planted by rebel soldiers inside Zambia. A total of 7 Zambians were killed and three others sustained serious injuries.
45. 02/02/78            Siampendo, Kalomo  
at approximately 09.30 hours, a civilian benz truck detonated a landmine near Siampondo area in Kalomo District.  
One Zambian was killed on the spot, 12 others were injured.

46. 04/02/78

Sinazongwe, Southern Province

At about 14.00 hours enemy boats violated Zambian water space around Nchete Island opposite Sinazongwe Boma.

47. 06/02/78

Livingstone

At approximately 09.00 hours rebel forces opened fire at Zambian troops at the Livingstone Game Park. Own troops returned fire and neutralised the enemy.

48. 11/02/78

Mweemba, Southern Province

A landrover registration No. ATA 277 driven by Mr. Maxwell Beyani, M.P. for Sinazongwe was blown up by a landmine killing 2 kids and a women on the spot. The incident took place 20 Km along Sinakoba road in Chief Mweemba's area around Siabayi Village.

Mr. Beyani sustained serious injuries.

49. 13/02/78

Kariba

Rebel soldiers ambushed 2 vehicles at 09.08 hours along the Kariba road inside Zambia.

There were no casualties but the windscreens of vehicles got damaged.

50. 20/02/78

Sinazongwe

Enemy jets violated Zambian air space around Nchete Island on Lake Kariba opposite Sinazongwe.

51. 26/02/78

Kavulamanja, Feira District

Two enemy jets violated Zambia air space around Kavulamanja for 10 to 15 minutes.

52. 27/02/78

Kamwi School, Mukuni, Livingstone

On 27th February 1978 at approximately 17.00 hours rebel soldiers were dropped by two helicopters on Zambian soil. The rebel soldiers laid an ambush along the road killed 2 Zambians and injured two others.

53. 27/02/78

Kavulamanja, Luangwa District

The enemy fired mortars and small arms onto villages in Kavulamanja.

There were no casualties on the Zambian side.

54. 05/03/78

Imusho

At about 10.00 hours two Zambians were blown up by an anti-personnel landmine along Imusho/Sesheke Boma road.

One died on the spot and another was seriously injured.

55. 06/03/78

Kavulamanja, Luangwa District

At approximately 09.45 hours Kavulamanja was raided by Rhodesian jet fighters. After bombing villages and our troops base, approximately 70 rebel para-troopers were dropped into the area by helicopters. These swept the villages and a school killing innocent Zambians. The enemy raid spread to Luangwa and was still ragging. A lot of property has been destroyed in the area.

Eight rebel aircrafts were gunned down by  
Zambian Forces during the raid.

56. 06/03/78

Simonga, Livingstone

One enemy helicopter violated Zambian air space  
at Simonga at approximately 20.22 hours.  
Helicopter flew over Zambian territory for five (5)  
minutes only.

Possible aerial reconnaissance of the area in  
preparation for a similar attack as that of  
Kavulamanja.

57. 07/03/78

Chiawa, Lusaka Province

Heavy firing was heard around 16.00 hours inside  
Rhodesia opposite a Freedom Fighter Camp. At  
approximately 17.00 hours two rebel jets crossed  
into Zambia and were circling the camp at a very  
high altitude. At 17.30 hours two rebel  
helicopters crossed into Zambia and fired rockets  
directed at a Freedom Fighters' Camp. The rebel  
helicopters attacks continued until 18.30 hours  
when both the jets and helicopters flew back  
into Rhodesia.

58. 07/03/78

Kavulamanja, Luangwa District

At 18.00 hours enemy jets kept on hovering over  
Kavulamanja. No firing took place. A number  
of civilians had lost their lives. A lot  
of vehicles were destroyed.

REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA  
OAU COMMITTEE OF TEN BRIEFING

Here-under follows a summary of matters discussed with the members of the OAU Committee of Ten which is investigating forms of assistance to Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia:

Following Botswana's appeal to the United Nations in February 1977 in connection with repeated attacks by the security forces of Rhodesia the UN Secretary-General despatched a Mission to Botswana to come and assess Botswana's financial and other needs on the ground. In their report the UN Mission concluded that Botswana needed assistance from the international community in the amount of US \$54 million for the following:-

(a) an amount of US \$28 million to refinance the funds that Botswana had diverted from the normal development projects and programmes for use in the establishment of a modest Defence Force. (It should be noted that for a long time Botswana had always decided against the establishment of an army but was eventually forced by circumstances to take this decision).

(b) an amount of US \$26 Million to undertake a number of emergency and Strategic projects to safeguard the economy in the light of the deteriorating political situation in Southern Africa and in particular Botswana's geopolitical situation. Many of the emergency and strategic projects were neither planned nor budgetted for.

As of                      pledges from a number of countries total 50% of the original requirement of US \$54 million. What should be noted is that project costs are rising rapidly because of inflation and therefore the figures quoted by UN mission are fairly outdated by now.

22. 29/10/77

Katombora and Kazungula, Southern Province

Rebel soldiers opened fire at Zambian troops at Katombora and Kazungula simultaneously. Firing started at approximately 24.00 hours and lasted up to 11.00 the following morning.

There were no casualties on the Zambian side but the rebel forces damaged Zambian property.

23. 02/11/77

Seshoke, Western Province

At about 11.00 hours enemy aircraft violated Zambian air space. Zambian troops opened fire at it. Enemy ground forces responded with rapid mortar, artillery and anti-tank gun fire. Exchange of fire on both sides continued until one artillery chopper (Augusta Bell) which was directing artillery fire was shot down by our Forces. Enemy shells landed heavily in Nakatindi Village and around the air strip. Two little children were hit by a shell and died on the spot. Three other adults were critically injured and six others slightly injured.

24. 03/11/77

Simonga, Southern Province

Rhodesian soldiers opened fire at Zambian troops position using 60 mm mortars, MGS and rifles. They were supported by aircraft. One heaver and a jet fighter.

Our troops returned fire, casualties on either side.

<u>Project</u>	<u>Foreign Component</u>	<u>Local Component</u>	<u>Total Cost</u>
(xi) Construction of Lusiwasi Power Scheme	2,845,000	1,873,000	4,718,000
(xii) Great North Road	-	-	12,562,961
(xiii) Great East Road	-	-	22,771,859
<del>(xiv)</del> Katete/Bene Road (Mozambique)	-	-	155,606
	<u>219,162,300</u>	<u>88,776,700</u>	<u>456,892,137</u>

B. Cost of Administering Refugees in Zambia

(a) 1977 Government Expenditure: Project 736

	<u>K</u>
Administrative costs (Salaries, Allowances etc.)	133,200
Storage clearance (World Food Project)	4,000
Drugs and Medicines	5,000
Education (School Uniforms)	5,000
Transportation Costs:-	
(i) Railway charges	1,000
(ii) Airfares (Airlifting of Rhodesian and South African students)	1,341,481 *
(b) Commission for Refugees; Government subsidy (salaries)	43,056
(c) Government grant (miscellaneous expenditure)	<u>50,000</u>
	<u>2,582,737</u>
(d) <u>Rural Refugee per capita cost</u>	

It is not easy to actually work out the rural refugee per capita cost because of the following reasons:-

\*That figure is up to 31st December, 1977. By January, 1978 an additional amount of K38,037 had been incurred.

- (i) It is difficult to determine accurately the rural refugee population and quantity in monetary terms all the forms of assistance rendered to refugees by various international organizations, whose contribution is mainly in form of material aid. For instance most of the commodities shown below are supplied by the World Food Programme to each refugee per day without indicating prices of each item:-

Maize meal	-	500gm
Corn soya milk	-	40gm
Vegetable oil	-	20gm
Stock fish	-	40
Beans	-	

- (ii) The Government allocates a 5 hectare piece of land to each and every self-supporting refugee kept at Maheba and Mayukwayukwa Camps. This aspect is difficult to quantify in monetary values.

For information, it is pertinent to mention that the refugees population in the Government refugee camps, as at 31st December, 1977, was estimated as follows:-

Maheba	-	12,761
Mayukwayukwa	-	1,266
Urban refugees	-	166
		<hr/>
TOTAL		14,193

In addition, there exists a Zimbabwean refugee centre called Victory Camp, with an estimated population of 3,000 under the administration of ZAPU.

C SNDP Projects which could not be taken up during the Plan period

<u>Project</u>	(K million) <u>Estimated cost as in SNDP</u>
1. Maamba Thermal Power Plant	25.0
2. Maamba Collieries Expansion	3.0 (20.0)
3. Kansanshi Copper Mine	10.0
4. Cobalt Recovery Plant - Chingola	6.0
5. Copper Processing Plant	40.0 (80.0)
6. Several maize mills and stockfeed mixing plant	5.0
7. West Bank Saw Mill (Zambezi Saw Mills)	3.0
8. Expansion of Kafue Textiles	9.0
9. Pulp and Paper Mill	25.0 (80.0)
10. Rural Industries	1.5
11. Fish Processing Plant	1.2
12. Kitwe-Ndola Road	3.8 (17.0)
13. Kalongola-Kalabo Road	3.2 (24.0)
14. Ndola Airport Terminal Building	<u>1.0</u>
	136.7 (282.7)*

D. Examples of incursions or aggressions carried out by  
armed forces of the illegal Rhodesian regime on Zambia

<u>Date</u>	<u>Area</u>
1. 02/09/77	<u>Chakwenga, Lusaka Province</u>

The Zambian patrol troops discovered some food left overs in an area 15Km South of Chakwenga and 25Km inside Zambian territory. The tins containing foodstuffs had the Rhodesian Army emblem on them. This proved the presence of rebel soldiers on Zambian soil. The rebel soldiers were suspected to have been in the area towards the end of August.

\* Figures shown in brackets indicate latest cost estimates.

2. 02/09/77

Chiawa, Lusaka Province

Six rebel soldiers were spotted by a Zambian around Mushokantende at about 06.50 hours. The rebel soldiers fired at the Zambian and hit him in the ankle. Sigola, the Zambian, managed to limp back and reported the presence of rebel soldiers on Zambian soil to our forces in the area.

The rebel soldiers were picked up by two helicopters before our troops got to the area. However, their radio antenna was found on the spot.

3. 04/09/77

Seshoko, Western Province

Local villagers spotted landmines planted by South African soldiers along the bush paths used by locals and our forces.

Landmines were cleared by Zambian troops in the area.

4. 07/09/77

Maamba, Southern Province

At approximately 04.00 hours an armed White Rhodesian Soldier was seen around a bar in Maamba by locals. The White Soldier disappeared under cover of darkness. The same White man was seen again around the market in Maamba during the day time. He is reported to have bought scones worth K2.00 and went away.

The White man disappeared and has not been seen again.

COUNCIL OF MINISTERS  
TWENTY-NINTH ORDINARY SESSION  
LIBREVILLE, GABON  
23 - 30 June 1977

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF TEN

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5. 13/09/77

Feira (Luangwa) Lusaka Province

Enemy soldiers opened fire on Zambian troops position in Feira. Firing started at 14.15 hours. Zambian troops returned fire damaging the enemy water tank at Kanyomba Camp. The enemy used 81 mm and 102 mm Mortars, Ferret Scout cars and GPMGS.

There were no casualties on the Zambian side. The exchange of fire lasted for 30 minutes.

6. 13/09/77

Sinazongwe, Southern Province

Two enemy spotter planes violated Zambian air space around Kafwambila and Siampondo area in Sinazongwe.

The aircraft flew back into Rhodesia.

7. 16/09/77

Feira (Luangwa) Lusaka Province

At approximately 11.40 hours Rhodesian soldiers fired on our troops position in Feira using 60mm 81 mm, 102 mm Mortars GMPG and Ferret Scout cars. Zambian troops returned fire using mortars and small arms to neutralise the enemy's provocative fire. The exchange of fire ceased at 11.55 hours.

There were no casualties on the Zambian side.

8. 16/09/77

Kacholola, Feira

A Rhodesian aircraft violated Zambian air space at Kacholola. The aircraft flew over Mozambique into Zambia. It was believed to have been taking aerial photographs of the area.

9. 29/09/77 Kariba  
Rhodesian soldiers fired upon Freedom Fighters who were moving on the Zambian side of the Zambezi River. They used small arms and two mortar shells which landed on Zambian soil. The enemy fire started at 07.00 hours and stopped at 10.00 hours. Zambian troops were not involved as the incident took place at a distant locality.  
No one was hurt on the Zambian side.
10. 30/09/77 Feira (Luangwa)  
Enemy violated our air space with helicopters during patrols along the border area.  
There was no reaction from our side.
11. 11/10/77 Kazungula, Southern Province  
at approximately 09.30 hours, rebel soldiers fired four rounds at Zambian troops position at Kazungula using small arms. Zambian troops did not return fire.  
No casualties were inflicted.
12. 11/10/77 Victoria Falls  
A Rhodesian spotter plane violated Zambian air space at the Victoria Falls.  
Aircraft was white in colour and looked similar to those used by Tourist Organizations.
13. 11/10/77 Maamba  
Two White Rhodesian Soldiers were seen at Maamba by a school boy at approximately 10.00 hours. The presence of the rebel soldiers was reported to Zambian troops in the area who searched the area but to no avail. At approximately 23.00 hours

the same rebel soldiers approached a constable in Maamba and requested to know the location of the Zambia Army Camp. The constable moved away and reported the matter to our troops in the area. The troops searched the area in darkness but could not find the rebel soldiers.

14. 12/10/77

Kazungula, Southern Province

Enemy troops attacked our border post at Kazungula. There were no casualties, but the pontoon operations were interrupted for the whole day.

15 16/10/77

Lusitu

At approximately 08.00 hours rebel soldiers attacked a Freedom Fighters' Camp. The shooting started at 08.00 hours using small arms only. The intermittent enemy fire continued until 10.00 hours. The freedom Fighters shelters were damaged.

16. 16/10/77

Lusitu, Siavonga

At approximately 18.30 hours on the same day the the rebel soldiers opened fire on a Freedom Fighters' landrover as it was just entering a Camp. The vehicle carrying three Freedom Fighters was coming from Begasa Primary School in Lusitu. A Freedom Fighter and driver of the landrover were killed on the spot. Bullets went through the air vent of the landrover and hit the two through the chest. Freedom Fighters returned fire and this lasted for 30 minutes.

B. Urgent development projects necessitated  
by the present situation

<u>Project</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount</u> ( <u>millions of United</u> <u>States dollars</u> )
	<u>1. Transport system</u>	
MOZ/T.09/77	Centre-North-East highway; construction of Alto Molocué - Alto Lingonha section (100 Km)	10.00
MOZ/T.10/77	Road construction and maintenance equipment for Gaza, Manica and Tete Provinces	7.00
MOZ/T.11/77	Reserves of Bailey bridge components at Chimoió and at Tete, for emergency use	0.58
MOZ/T.12/77	Reactivation of Chindozi airport	<u>0.13</u>
	<u>Subtotal</u>	<u>17.71</u>
	<u>2. Telecommunications</u>	
MOZ/TC.02/77	Microwave link to the United Republic of Tanzania	3.00
MOZ/TC.03/77	Microwave link to Zambia	1.32
MOZ/TC.04/77	Beira-Dar-es-Salaam aeronautical communications	0.14
MOZ/TC.05/77	Beira-Tete radio-teletype link	<u>0.19</u>
	<u>Subtotal</u>	<u>4.65</u>
	<u>TOTAL, Section B</u>	<u>22.36</u>

Recapitulation of Mozambique's requirements to  
overcome the effects of acts of aggression

A. Requirements arising from losses  
resulting from aggression

<u>Project</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount</u> ( <u>millions of United</u> <u>States dollars</u> )
<u>1. Resettlement of displaced population</u>		
MOZ/H.01/77	Relief requirements (for six months) (food, clothing and temporary shelter)	5.05
MOZ/H.02/77	Human settlement (10,000 families)	8.44
MOZ/H.03/77	Agricultural development to support resettlement	4.37
MOZ/H.04/77	Reconstruction of Mapai, Mavonde and Chioco and other places	5.30
	<u>Subtotal</u>	<u>23.16</u>
<u>2. Restoration of the transport system</u>		
MOZ/T.01/77	Reconstruction of destroyed bridge at Pungué	0.83
MOZ/T.02/77	Replacement of damaged engines and waggons, Southern Railway	1.94
MOZ/T.03/77	Reconstruction and repair of damaged installations and equipment, Mabalane- Chicualacuala section, Southern Railway	1.17
MOZ/T.04/77	Reconstruction of bombed airstrips at Mapai and Espungabera	0.02
MOZ/T.05/77	Construction of Donbe-Espungabera road to all-weather standards	3.87
MOZ/T.06/77	Replacement of destroyed civilian transport vehicles and road maintenance plant	2.12
MOZ/T.07/77	Replacement of destroyed inland waterway vessels	0.13
MOZ/T.08/77	Reconstruction of destroyed Messurize Bridge	<u>0.21</u>
	<u>Subtotal</u>	<u>10.29</u>
<u>3. Restoration of telecommunications system</u>		
MOZ/TC.01/77	Restoration of telephone and telex link between Maputo and Beira (a)	2.00
	<u>TOTAL, section A</u>	<u><u>35.45</u></u>

(a) to be financed by BAD

MEANS OF TRANSPORT

<u>Type</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Cost (in escudos)</u>
Trucks	80	30 000 000
Jeeps	39	9 000 000
Autocars	39	35 000 000
Boats	8	24 000 000
		<u>99 000 000</u>

Needs in articles of clothing

<u>Type</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Cost (in escudos)</u>
Blankets	100 000	45 000 000
Clothing material	60 000	13 000 000
Trousers	40 000	16 000 000
Shorts	40 000	4 800 000
Shirts	40 000	12 000 000
Canvas shoes	50 000	<u>7 508 000</u>
		98 508 000

Farming implements

<u>Type</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Cost (in escudos)</u>
Axe	10 000	1 200 000
Cutlass	10 000	570 000
Axe	39 000	1 590 000
Plough	9 000	4 500 000
		<u>7 790 000</u>

Houses

<u>Type</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Cost (in escudos)</u>
Provisional (tents)	8 400	235 200 000
Permanent	8 400	126 000 000
		<u>361 200 000</u>

IMPORTS OF FOODSTUFFS FOR 1978In Metric tons

Wheat	140,000	
Maize	138,000	
Rice	69,000	
Potatos	15,750	
Onions	1,800	
Meat	3,500	
Fresh fish	30,000	
Dry fish	4,720	
Milk powder	-	US \$ 6,000,000
Milk powder for industry	2,409	

The total amount of foodstuffs to be imported is estimated at about US \$ 85,000,000. Some orders have already been made; the aid in foodstuffs should therefore bear mainly on:

Wheat  
Maize  
Fish  
Meat

Needs of the people directly affected by the aggressions  
urgent needs in foodstuffs.

<u>Products</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Cost (in esudos)</u>
Maize	4562 (metric tons)	28 003 400
Wheat	2730 "	16 428 900
Rice	1825 "	24 637 000
Beans	1825 "	51 100 000
Sugar	918 "	7 760 000
Salt	183 "	549 000
Milk	10950 000 lts.	98 590 000
Oil	102 500 "	9 387 592
Tea	183(metric tons)	2 287 500
		<u>235 622 400</u>

## C. Development projects of particular importance to Mozambique

<u>Project</u>	<u>Item</u>	<u>Amount</u> <u>(millions of United States dollars)</u>
	<u>1. Agricultural development</u>	
MOZ/A.01/77	Strengthening of agricultural marketing Services	2.50
MOZ/A.02/77	Preparation of integrated river basin development projects	0.70
	<u>Subtotal</u>	<u>3.20</u>
	<u>2. Development of production and export of coal (under study)</u>	<u>Por memoria</u>
	<u>3. Transport system</u>	
MOZ/T.13/77	Highway No. 1; repair of flood damage	1.70
MOZ/T.14/77	Angonia region; road construction and surfacing	12.80
MOZ/T.15/77	Training of operating personnel for ports and railways	0.50
MOZ/T.16/77	Road construction and maintenance equipment	3.00
	<u>Subtotal</u>	<u>18.00</u>
	<u>4. Telecommunications</u>	
MOZ/TC.06/77	Development of aeronautical telecommunications facilities	0.98
	<u>5. Manpower training</u>	
MOZ/MP.01/77	Buildings and equipment for training programmes	1.78
	TOTAL, section C	<u>23.96</u>
	<u>D. REFUGEES</u>	
MOZ/R.01/77	Refugee's needs for foods, services equipment and materials,	5.24
	GRAND TOTAL	<u>87.01</u>

Infrastructure

<u>Type</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Cost (in escudos)</u>
Wells	500	5 000 000
Console tables	8 400	5 040 000
Plates	50 000	1 350 000
Chair	8 400	3 350 000
		<hr/>
		14 750 000

Fuel

<u>Type</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Cost (in escudos)</u>
Diesel	1 971 000 lts.	7 888 000

17. 17/10/77

Sesheke, Western Province

A South African aircraft violated Zambia air space at approximately 19.45 hours. The aircraft was flying very high, without lights and came deep inside Zambia.

18. 19/10/77

Chirundu

At 20.00 hours rebel soldiers attacked our border post at Chirundu using small arms and mortars.

Three Zambians were killed and a lot of damage caused to Zambian property.

19. 24/10/77

Lusitu, Siavonga, Southern Province

Rebel soldiers crossed into Zambia and attacked in Lusitu area. The soldiers used three helicopters fitted with machine guns, one mortar boat and a dinghy. The strength of the enemy was estimated at three platoons.

Thirteen Zambian villagers were killed.

20. 24/10/77

Siavonga

At approximately 14.00 hours a rebel jet aircraft violated Zambia air space in Siavonga. The aircraft was flying from Zambian territory into the Rebel Colony.

21. 24/10/77

Lusitu, Siavonga

At 12.30 hours a landrover detonated a landmine planted by rebel soldiers.

One Zambian was killed and seven others sustained serious injuries.

25. 12/11/77            Sinazongwe, Southern Province  
At approximately 20.00 hours an enemy boat belonging to Rhodesian Army violated Zambian water space passing through Nchete Island opposite Sinazongwe.
26. 12/11/77            Ngwezi, Western Province  
On 12th November 1977 a South African aircraft violated Zambian air space at Ngwezi in Western Province.
27. 15/11/77            Livingstone  
At approximately 15.15 hours the rebel Forces fired on the Zambian side near the Livingstone Game Park. There were no casualties.
28. 15/11/77            Sinazongwe, Southern Province  
Enemy spotter plane violated Zambian air space at Sinazongwe Boma.
29. 21/11/77            Feira, Lusaka Province  
At about 17.30 hours the Rebel Forces opened fire at our troops in Feira. Our troops opened fire neutralising the enemy.  
There were no casualties on the Zambian side.
30. 22/11/77            Feira, Lusaka Province  
At 09.16 hours enemy troops opened fire on our troops position from the left side of our Camp. Zambian troops returned fire and completely silenced the enemy.  
No casualties on Zambian side.

10.0 TRANSMARK TEAM'S INITIAL APPRAISAL

10.1 Transmark team has been charged with the task of preparing and implementing a strategy for the take-over of the railway. The team arrived in Botswana on 17th January 1978 and has been acquainting itself with the factual data and the background material. It has not yet been able to address itself to substantial issues. Nevertheless, the team has made a very rough and initial assessment of the physical and personnel resources required for the task.

10.2 Transmark estimates capital expenditure of P 80.0 million on various equipment and facilities, the details of which are given in Annexure 1.

10.3 The team estimates a total of 1413 personnel required for Botswana Railway. Of these about 200 are expected to be expatriates. The details are given in Annexure 2.

MINISTRY OF WORKS & COMMUNICATIONS  
REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA

S WC 13/11

Dated 13 March, 1978



S E C R E T  
REPUBLIC OF BOTSWANA  
RAILWAY TAKEOVER - CURRENT STATUS, REPORT

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Government of Botswana's intention to take over the line of rail in Botswana from Rhodesia Railways was enunciated in a statement by His Excellency the President in September 1974 when he said

"..... I am therefore pleased to announce that my Government has decided that we must plan to run the railway line in Botswana ourselves as soon as necessary arrangements can be made ....."

1.2 As the line is owned and operated by Rhodesia Railways it was necessary to examine the implications of this decision. With the aid from C I D A, therefore, a study was undertaken by Canac. Completed in August 1975, the study examined various possible approaches to the process of take-over and also estimated the requirements of physical and personnel resources. The underlying assumption was that the take-over would be an orderly one, with Rhodesia Railways cooperation.

1.2.1 While the study was being carried out, the likelihood of disruption of rail services became apparent because of the changing political scene in Rhodesia. The team was therefore requested also to examine the implications of a take-over in a contingency situation. Canac could make but a very rough assessment of such a take-over and recommended a further detailed study to work out and dovetail long term and contingency plans. The Study was to be undertaken by a team of experts in various facets of railway management and operation whose presence would have also assured their ready availability in a contingency situation.

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# Report of the Mission of the Committee of Ten to Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia 10-20 April 1978

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