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ORGANIZATION DE L'UNION  
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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON DECOLONIZATION



REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON DECOLONIZATION

The Secretary-General has the honour to submit this Report on Decolonization to the Thirty-seventh Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers covering the period July 1980 to June 1981.

2. The period under review has been characterised by rising hopes and expectations on one hand, and uncertainties, frustrations and despair on the other. Perhaps the experience gained in the decolonization process would make some less concerned observers view the developments that have taken place as nothing out of the ordinary. Admittedly, there had been frustrations and disappointments in the past, but the point to note here is that Africa is now confronted with the most callous, the most deceitful and undoubtedly the most formidable settler colonial power whose avid desire for domination, exploitation, and suppression has no peer; a racist colonial regime whose contempt of and total disregard for the international community has been repeatedly demonstrated.

3. Thus it is that, for good four years the international community has become a captive to the machinations of the racist regime, and appears incapable of restoring legality to Namibia, a territory the racist regime has occupied illegally. The people of South Africa still groan under the pangs of apartheid,

unable to determine when they, as a people, would be regarded as part of the human race. Bolstered up by the recent adverse developments in the Western Hemisphere, the apartheid machinery of oppression appears to be thoroughly overhauled and lubricated for increased acts of barbarism and brutalities.

#### NAMIBIA

4. It will be recalled that during the Thirty-fifth Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers in Freetown, the two major developments that preoccupied the Council were the setting up of the puppet Ministerial Council in Namibia and the tendentious South Africa's letter of May 12, 1980, to the Secretary-General of the UN.

5. The Council of Ministers realizing the designs behind the creation of the Ministerial Council, strongly condemned it and urged the international community not to accord any form of recognition to or cooperate with the illegal Ministerial Council. Since then, the so called Ministerial Council has been roundly condemned by the international community, including the five Western Contact Group. On that score, the racist regime has suffered yet a major diplomatic set-back in its scheme of things.

6. But it is in the nature of the racist regime not to accept defeat, the failure of one scheme leads inexorably into the adoption of another scheme. Not it is the impartiality of the UN that has been called into question, the equal treatment of all parties and the so-called lack of confidence and trust, is the latest ploy by South Africa to buy time.

7. Being so conversant with the dilatory tactics of the racist regime, the Council of Ministers at its Session in Freetown instructed the African Group at the UN to request the immediate convening of the Security Council to impose comprehensive and mandatory sanctions, including an oil embargo against the Pretoria regime. In the likely event of the Security Council not able to invoke the provisions of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Council of Ministers decided to meet in an extraordinary session.

8. But soon after Freetown, developments seemed to take a positive turn towards the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978). With these developments, it became necessary for the African Group to withhold its mandate, and the UN General Assembly also suspended its deliberations on Namibia pending the outcome of the initiatives then in force.

9. The first development was the continued exchange of correspondence between the UN Secretary-General and the Pretoria regime culminating in a UN Mission to Pretoria. The second

development was an agreement by all the parties to attend a Pre-implementation Meeting in Geneva from 7 to 14 January, 1981 under the auspices of the UN.

10. In the exchange of correspondence between the UN Secretary-General and the Pretoria regime in August and September 1980, the racist regime persistently harped on the UN's partiality and lack of equal treatment of all parties that one was left with the inescapable impression that South Africa would go along with the implementation of Resolution 435 only when the UN accorded recognition to the "internal parties." Allied to these was the question of the so-called lack of confidence and trust. In spite of UN's assurances on its impartiality once an agreed time-frame for the implementation of Resolution 435 was reached, it became increasingly clear that the main thrust of the racist regime's diplomatic offensive was geared towards the de-recognition of SWAPO and not so much to the creation of the necessary climate for the implementation of Resolution 435. It was against this background that the UN despatched a Mission to Pretoria to facilitate the speedy implementation of Resolution 435.

#### UN Mission to Pretoria

11. A UN top Official delegation led by Mr. Brian E. Urquhart, Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, had a five day talk with officials of the Pretoria regime from 21 to 26 October, 1980.

12. Following this Mission, the UN Secretary-General submitted his Report to the Security Council, the concluding parts of which are as follows:

"18. It is of vital importance that the independence of Namibia should be achieved in 1981, in accordance with Security Council resolution 435 (1978). In order to achieve this aim a date for the cease-fire and a start of implementation should be set in the early part of 1981.

19. One of the main obstacles to progress in the negotiations hitherto has been acute mutual distrust and lack of confidence. The mission was informed by the South African Government that this problem in itself affects the setting of a date for implementation. It was also informed that, if this obstacle can be overcome, the end of 1981 would be a realistic target date for the independence of Namibia.

20. A means of facilitating agreement and of creating the necessary climate of confidence and understanding would be a pre-implementation multi-party meeting in which the parties concerned in the envisaged election would be included. There is general agreement that this meeting should be held under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

21. There have recently been a number of initiatives and approaches from various quarters for such a meeting based on the United Nations plan, in conformity with Security Council resolution 435 (1978) and other practical proposals. Such a meeting could facilitate the implementation of that resolution by discussing relevant aspects of implementation with the purpose of securing the co-operation of all concerned. In this connexion it will be recalled that, under the settlement Proposal, the task of drawing up and adopting a Constitution is the function of the Constituent Assembly.

22. It would be understood that the proposed meeting would be held in the context of an agreed time-frame, with a view to the parties themselves assisting in resolving difficulties created by

distrust and lack of confidence, South Africa having reaffirmed its continuing role as the interlocutor under resolution 435 (1978).

23. In the expectation that the problem of confidence can be overcome by holding of such a meeting, and subject to a satisfactory arrangement concerning the composition of UNTAG, I would, on the basis of the discussions recently held in Pretoria and after the necessary consultations, propose March 1981 for the commencement of implementation of resolution 435 (1978).

24. Accordingly, the intention would be to hold a pre-implementation meeting from 7 to 14 January 1981 under the auspices and chairmanship of the United Nations. The basis of the meeting would conform to the formula agreed upon during bilateral discussions held earlier this year on the question of "direct talks". Accordingly, South Africa and SWAPO have been contacted concerning the composition of the respective delegations that would participate in the meeting. I have also contacted the Frontline States and Nigeria, the OAU and the Contact Group of Five Western States about the sending of observers."

#### UN Pre-implementation Meeting on Namibia

13. Following the submission of the Report referred to, the Pre-implementation meeting was convened in Geneva from 7 to 14 January, 1981 "to attain the independence of Namibia in 1981 in accordance with resolution 435 and, to achieve this aim, to set a date for the cease-fire and a start of implementation in the early part of 1981".

14. In attendance as observers were the representative of the Frontline States, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, OAU and the Contact Group of Five Western States. The Secretary-General personally led the OAU delegation.

15. The pre-implementation meeting generated both fear and hope in Africa and the rest of the international community because "most people feared that the meeting would not succeed, but they dared to hope that it might ...". The meeting was therefore to provide the opportunity for South Africa to demonstrate its willingness to cooperate in the implementation of the UN Plan.

16. Regrettably the Meeting failed to produce an agreed time-frame for the commencement of the implementation of the UN Plan, due entirely to the usual obstructionist tactics of the racist regime. The Pretoria regime saw the meeting as a God-sent platform for public relations exercise and for launching virulent attacks, couched in intemperate and unprintable language, against SWAPO. Indeed the Conference Chairman, Mr. Brian Urquhart, had this to say in the course of the deliberations: "... Regrettably, some of the comments were expressed in terms, which, measured by any international standards, left much to be desired."

17. On its part, SWAPO displayed such political maturity and sense of responsibility that might have impressed even its adversaries. Completely disregarding the insults, SWAPO announced to the meeting and to the whole world, that it was ready to sign a cease-fire agreement there and then. It became evident which of the two parties present in Geneva, SWAPO and the Pretoria regime, was more responsible. The accolade of SWAPO, as the sole and authentic representative of the people of Namibia assumed greater credence.

18. Even though the reputation of and respect for SWAPO was greatly enhanced in Geneva, the painful truth of the matter is that Geneva failed to achieve its objective. The obvious question that has been agitating the minds of many is, after Geneva, what next?

19. For the OAU and SWAPO, the option is clear, the stepping up of the armed struggle. The Liberation Committee did a commendable job at its Thirty-Sixth Ordinary Session in January 1981, by coming up with a Plan of Action on Namibia which has been endorsed by the Council of Ministers at its Thirty-Sixth Ordinary Session.

20. The Plan of Action on Namibia represents the unequivocal response of the Member States of the OAU to the Geneva fiasco. By it, Member States have pledged to make the final sacrifice for the liberation of Namibia by mobilising financial, material and diplomatic support both within and outside the continent for SWAPO. It is hoped that Member States would energetically pursue all aspects of the Plan, especially the contribution to the Emergency Namibian Liberation Fund. The successful implementation of the Plan of Action would be a litmus test for the Organization's ability and the Member States' determination to free Namibia.

21. On the diplomatic front, the Council of Ministers during the 36th Session instructed the African Group at UN to proceed with its mandate to request the convening of the Security Council in April, 1980, to impose comprehensive and mandatory economic sanctions, including an oil embargo, against the Pretoria regime. Significantly, the UN General Assembly and the Non-aligned Movement have also requested the Security Council to invoke the provisions of chapter VII of the UN Charter against South Africa. From all indications, it looks certain that the Security Council would not be able to invoke the provisions of chapter VII of the UN Charter, because of the vested interests of the Western Permanent Members of the Security Council. In that event, the Council instructed the African Group to request the convening of an Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly to consider the question.

22. It is a matter of great interest on what the General Assembly shall do and how effectively it can implement its decision. Be that as it may, the OAU, in spite of its own Plan on Namibia, should continue to press the UN to adopt all measures to speed up the independence of Namibia without further vacillation.

#### COMMENTS

23. The prospect for the independence of Namibia continues to rise and fall with the result that Namibia today, is no nearer independence than when the UN Plan was first mooted.

One pretext after another has become the strategy of the racist regime to frustrate all attempts for peaceful solution of the Namibian problem.

24. By sabotaging the Geneva Pre-implementation Meeting, the racist regime has clearly demonstrated its preference for the armed struggle. In fact a compulsory military conscription of all able-bodied persons is currently being vigorously pursued in Namibia. The apartheid war machinery seems poised for a show-down. Already criminal acts of aggression have been directed against Angola and Mozambique designed to force these states to crack down on SWAPO and ANC bases. The real intention is to make it impossible for these countries to continue to offer the necessary support that the liberation movements need.

25. The Plan of Action on Namibia, as pointed out in the preceding paragraphs, represents Africa's determination to end the struggle in Namibia. Its successful implementation will no doubt produce the desired result. All efforts must be made to prevent the Plan becoming yet another monstrous paper tiger. The credibility of the Organization and its Member States is at stake, and the least that could be done by each Member State is the faithful implementation of the Plan of Action.

26. In an effort to implement some aspects of the Plan, Member States may wish to consider mobilising its people, especially the articulate groups such as the organised labour movements, students, etc., to play leading role in those aspects

of the plan where pressure is to be exerted on the collaborators of the racist regime. Every African must be given a chance to make a contribution to the decolonization process, however modest that contribution may be.

27. The role of the mass media in this exercise cannot be overemphasised. Regrettably, press coverage of liberation matters have been limited, sketchy, and usually hidden in some obscure corners of the newspapers. Very few national dailies run editorials on events taking place in the field of decolonization. Even the decisions of the Council of Ministers and the Assembly do not escape being relegated to the background.

It is therefore not surprising that the majority of the people in Member States are not sufficiently aware of developments that take place in the field of decolonization. This regrettable situation, it is submitted, must of necessity, be rectified.

28. It is also considered necessary that Member States could do more to inform their nationals on developments that take place in the field of decolonization by taking advantage of certain landmarks such as the OAU Day. Without appearing to

prescribe a uniform format for the observance of the OAU-DAY, Member States may wish to consider the following in addition to their own standard arrangements:

- (a) Ceremony for the hoisting of OAU flag;
- (b) Seminar, Symposium or lecture on the Liberation struggle. Invitations to the National Liberation Movements, the Executive Secretariat of the Liberation Committee or the General Secretariat of the OAU to participate in the discussions. The event should be given Radio and T.V. coverage;
- (c) fund raising activities, such as the sale of OAU special badges, football matches etc. the proceeds of which must go to the Liberation Movements through the Executive Secretariat of the Liberation Committee;
- (d) demonstrations of solidarity with the freedom fighters.

29. All these, within the framework of the implementation of the Plan of Action, would serve a dual purpose, getting the people directly involved in the liberation struggle and providing additional financial and material support to the National Liberation Movements.

has not been held. The Council may find time during

the present session to address itself to the necessary financial, material

and diplomatic support as envisaged in the Plan of Action, the

only in this light would it be justifiable to demand concrete

evidence of the armed struggle. It is the expectation that

SWAPO would prove equal to the task. It is the expectation that

31. Elsewhere in the Report, a reference has been made to

the persistent acts of aggression against the Frontline States

by the racist regime, culminating in considerable loss of life

and property. Admittedly, the question of assistance to the

Frontline States is the sole prerogative of the Committee of 19

which is expected to submit a comprehensive Report on the issue.

However, the two issues, the liberation struggle and assistance

to the Frontline States are so closely inter-related that treat-

ment of one without reference to the other leaves a big gap in

the whole presentation. It is the expectation that

32. Plans and Strategies may be formulated for the liberation

struggle but, if there were to be no rear-guard bases for the

armed struggle, the Plans and Strategies would become completely

useless. Plans to support the Liberation Movements must there-

fore be backed by another plan to support those Frontline States

whose economies continue to be disrupted by the unprovoked acts

33. It is pertinent to recall here the contribution of H.E. the Foreign Minister of Angola to the formulation of the Report of the OAU Mission to Angola at the 15th Session of the Council of Ministers. After he had provided additional information contained in the Report, the Foreign Minister wondered how long Angola can continue to shoulder the burden practically alone, for the independence of Namibia. That observation deserves serious reflection and timely action. Without prejudice to the Report of the Committee of 19 on Assistance to the Frontline States, it is a matter of great regret that the holding of a Pledging Conference to assist the Frontline States has not been held. Perhaps the Council may find time during the present session to address itself to this problem.

34. There is no moral justification to solicit external assistance when the Member States themselves seem to do nothing about the problem. The principle of collective self-reliance has been accepted by all the Member States, and charity, it is said, begins at home. It is our serious approach to the issue that will make others take us seriously.

35. The explosive situation being created in the Southern African region is altogether another development that the Council has to address itself to. Emboldened by the pronouncements coming from the White House and the State Department, the arrogance and defiance of the racist regime continue to amount, so also will be

its designs to destabilize the States in that region be vigorously pursued. These disquieting developments in the United States compelled the Current Chairman of the OAU, Dr. Siaka Stevens, President of the Republic of Sierra-Leone, to address a letter to President Reagan. Copies of the letter and President Reagan's reply are attached to this report as Annexes I and II.

#### SOUTH AFRICA

36. Within the period under review, mass demonstrations by students protesting against Bantu Education system, and increasing industrial lock-outs and strikes by workers, have been and continue to be the hall-mark of resistance of the black majority against the inhuman policy of Apartheid, created, nurtured and sustained by the white minority bolstered by their supporters in the West. Side by side with the strikes and demonstrations, has been in intensification of the call for the release of Nelson Mandella. Increasingly the Voice of the Churches in South Africa have become more strident in its attacks on the racist regime.

37. The racist regime's reaction to the above has been predictable, ruthless and brutal. Students and even school pupils have been hauled into jails; some have been tortured and maimed, others have simply paid the supreme sacrifice with their lives. The Kangaroo Courts of the Apartheid regime have yet again pronounced death sentences on Ncimbithi Johnson Lubisi,

Petrus Tsep Mashingo, and Naphtali Manana in the so-called Silverton trials. Six others have been sentenced to various terms of imprisonment on trumped-up charges.

38. Thus, the oppression continues in a frightening intensity, seeking as it does, to ensure the perpetuation of the inhuman policy of Apartheid. But no system, however, monstrous and inhuman, can for ever stem the tide of a people's desire to be free. The writings are clearly on the wall.

39. The racist regime however thinks that it can stem the tide by the so-called reforms Botha and his fellow-travellers have initiated since coming to power. In furtherance of this illusion, a Consultative Assembly has been set up composed of Whites, Indians and Chinese representatives but as is to be expected, excluding black representatives. South Africa was due to go to the polls on April 29, 1981. One of the key issues in the election is the so-called reforms initiated by the Botha regime which are vehemently opposed by Hertzog Nationale Party (HNP) also known as the "verkrampste". The outcome of the results, Botha or Hertzog makes no difference.

40. The position of the OAU on the so-called reforms is unambiguous; the so-called reforms have been rejected because at best they are indisputably superficial and cosmetic. In reality, it is a deceptive plan designed to protect and to preserve apartheid while the international community is made to

understand that changes are taking place. Indeed, no one can be deceived except the willing ally. Any reform which ignores the fundamental issue of the representation of the black majority cannot be acceptable. The attempt to have a separate Council for the Africans was rightfully rejected by the African leaders, as such a move was only designed to bolster apartheid. The OAU remains convinced that it is not possible to reform the evil system of apartheid. It must be totally dismantled and eradicated.

#### The Struggle in South Africa

41. The Nationalist struggle in South Africa against alien settler domination is perhaps the oldest nationalist struggle in Africa. Certain historical landmarks in the nationalist struggle are more than enough attestation to the determination, courage and bravery of the people of South Africa to confront the enemy. The events of Bulhoek in 1921, Sharpeville (1960), Soweto (1976) among many other similar occasions when the people of South Africa risked their lives in total defiance of the settler regime, come readily to mind. Students and workers continue to keep the struggle alive with the form of resistance or the other. Occasionally, revolutionary acts of sabotage such as on SASSOL, do take place. It is expected that such heroic acts will intensify as the revolutionary climate continues to improve.

42. But by and large these heroic acts, occurring at long intervals, do not seem to be making the desired impact. Serious questions are being asked as to how effectively the people's determination and energies are being channelled into a co-ordinated, concerted and sustained acts of resistance. Suggestions of one form of resistance as supplement to the other forms are now being made openly by well-meaning African personalities. Perhaps the problem deserves to be studied more closely by the Liberation Committee in co-operation with the National Liberation Movements.

President Ronald Reagan  
The White House  
Washington, D.C.  
United States of America

Mr. President:

It is with a great sense of responsibility that I address this letter to you, in my capacity as the Current Chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), on a subject about which all the Member States of the OAU are deeply concerned. It is a subject that has also aroused a great deal of anxiety in the rest of the International Community. This subject, is the question of Namibia, in particular, and peace and security in Southern Africa in general.

Mr. President, it is not my intention to belabour the point on the preoccupation of the OAU with problems of decolonization, nor to espouse the principle of self-determination. This principle is well-known and recognized internationally. But permit me, nevertheless, to underline the fact that the people of Africa, animated by the ideals which motivated the glorious American Revolution are determined that liberty and independence, shall not be denied them, even if it means securing it with their blood, just as your patriotic founding fathers did. In that regard, it continues to be the ardent expectation of the African peoples that they could count on the unqualified support of the Government and the People of the United States of America for this common cause.

That hope, Mr. President, still holds good, inspite of certain twists and turns that have recently occurred among the Western Five Nations closely involved on the question of Namibia, as evident in the recent debate at the UN General Assembly.

The Namibian question, has been on the Agenda for quite a long time. South Africa's arrogant defiance of the International Community has become proverbial. But South Africa's intransigence and defiance could not have been so blatant without what appears to be the tacit support of the Western Powers.

It is our belief, that Your Excellency, representing the great people of America, have both the will and the resources to compel the Pretoria regime to go along with the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435(1978) without further delay. We express the hope that the long suffering people of Namibia will receive the positive support of the United States Government for a speedy accession to independence.

Mr. President, on behalf of my colleagues in the OAU and on behalf of the Peoples of Africa, I appeal to you to exert maximum pressure on the Government of South Africa, to ensure that the Security Council Resolution 435(1978) is implemented without any further delay. We also hope that the sacred principle of self-determination should not be compromised on the altar of global strategic consideration.

Your Excellency, please accept, the assurances of my highest consideration.

DR. S. P. STEVENS  
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF  
SIERRA LEONE AND CURRENT CHAIRMAN  
OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY

March 13, 1981

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

His Excellency Siaka Stevens  
Current Chairman of the Organization of African  
Unity and President of the Republic of Sierra Leone

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I wish to reply to your letter of March 13, 1981, concerning Namibia. Bringing peace and independence to that Territory is clearly one of the more important international issues which we face today.

The United States and its Western allies in the Contact Group, the United Nations, and African States have attempted to obtain a Namibian settlement. My administration currently is studying ways in which we may move this process forward. I believe that a solution should be achieved by peaceful means. I also believe that only by obtaining the cooperation and agreement of all those States and political parties concerned can a peaceful and stable future for Namibia be assured.

The United States considers that the Namibia negotiations can still be successfully concluded if they are pursued persistently and imaginatively. In our view, other courses of action cannot substitute for negotiation. Confrontation with South Africa would only be likely to make that country less cooperative in seeking a solution and would also damage those States neighbouring on South Africa.

The problem of Namibia is a complex one that is related to other problems in South Africa. As the United States reviews its policies towards the countries of the area, I want to assure you of our dedication to the principles of justice, self-determination and racial equality. I can also assure you that the United States does not and will not support policies counter to these principles.

Officials of my administration will soon be consulting with those parties who have been involved in seeking a Namibia settlement. We will keep you informed of our efforts and hope to have your cooperation. In the meantime, I hope that you will encourage all concerned to refrain from steps which would make a solution more difficult and to avoid premature actions and prejudgments.

Thank you for expressing your views which I know also express the deeply-felt attitude of many member states of the Organization of African Unity. I also hope that you will understand the sincere commitment of the United States to work for an internationally acceptable settlement for Namibia.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

April 3, 1981

Washington, D.C.

## SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING ON NAMIBIA

21-30 APRIL 1981

INTRODUCTION

In the light of the breakdown of the Geneva Pre-implementation talks due to South Africa's intransigence as well as South Africa's refusal to comply with UN resolutions, the resumed session of the 35th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, in conformity with its Resolution 227A, inter alia, called upon the Security Council to convene urgently to impose comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa, as provided for under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity at its 36th Ordinary Session also adopted a resolution on Namibia in which it, inter alia, mandated the African Group at the United Nations to call on the Security Council to urgently convene a meeting of the Council to take effective enforcement measures against the racist South African regime by the imposition of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, including an oil embargo, in view of the racist regime's continued defiance of Security Council Resolution 435(1978) and 438(1978) and its refusal to co-operate with the UN Secretary-General in the implementation of the UN

Plan for the independence of Namibia. In Resolution CM/Res.823 which the Council of Ministers adopted in the same session, it mandated the Current Chairman of the OAU Council of Ministers, the Foreign Ministers of the Frontline States, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Niger, Tunisia, Togo and Uganda to participate in the Security Council Debate on Namibia.

3. The Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries which took place in New Delhi in February also called on the United Nations Security Council to consider the situation in Namibia with the view to adopting a comprehensive mandatory sanction against racist South Africa under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Similar decision was also taken at an Extraordinary Ministerial Meeting of the Co-ordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries, when it met in Algiers in April 1981 to consider the situation in Namibia. The Bureau of the Non-Aligned Countries, in its declaration also mandated the Foreign Ministers of the following countries to represent the Non-Aligned Movement at the proposed Security Council debate: Algeria, Cuba, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kuwait, Liberia, Panama, Senegal, Sri Lanka and Yugoslavia.

#### Preparation by the African Group


4. In pursuance of the instruction which it received from the 36th Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers of the Organization of African Unity, the African Group held several

meetings to draw up African strategy for the Security Council Meeting which will consider the question of Namibia in the light of South Africa's refusal to comply with Security Council Resolutions. In one of these meetings, the African Group mandated its Chairman to write to the President of the Security Council to ask for a meeting, and to indicate to the Chairman, orally, African Group's desire that the Council begins its debate on the question on 21st April, 1981.

5. In preparation of this debate the African Group prepared five resolutions which cover all aspects of a comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa.

6. The resolutions are as follows:

- (i) The first draft resolution, contained in Security Council document S/14459 is an umbrella resolution designed to embrace the full scope of comprehensive and mandatory sanctions, including economic and political sanctions, an oil embargo and an arms military embargo;
- (ii) The second resolution contained in document S/14460 covers general economic and political sanctions, including all aspects of diplomatic, consular and trade relations;



- (iii) The third draft, contained in document S/14461 proposes a comprehensive oil embargo including the direct and indirect supply of petroleum and petroleum products to South Africa and occupied Namibia;
- (iv) The fourth draft resolution (S/14462) covers proposal for arms embargo with specific reference to the situation in and around Namibia and without prejudice to the provisions of resolutions 418 (1977) and 421 (1977) which the Council had adopted in 1977, when the Security Council considered the policies and acts of the racist regime within the territory of South Africa. The arms embargo, being proposed in the draft resolution would include the sale or transfer of weapons, ammunition, military and paramilitary equipment, military and paramilitary vehicles and their spare parts;
- (v) The fifth draft (S/14463) provides for the machinery of monitoring the implementation of the aforementioned substantive resolutions by establishing a Security Council Committee for that purpose.

7. The African Ministers who were mandated by either the Organization of African Unity or the Non-Aligned Countries joined the African Group few days before the resumption of the Security Council debate to prepare for an effective strategy for the debate. Moreover, the Ministers and representatives of the Non-Aligned Movement were also consulted in the preparation. The five resolutions that emerged after these consultations, and which were outlined in the preceding paragraph, were the result of careful and collective preparation of the African Group, in close consultation with the representatives of other Non-Aligned countries.

#### Security Council Debate

8. At the beginning of its debate, the President of the Security Council informed the members of the Council that he had received a letter from the representatives of France, United Kingdom and the United States in which the three delegations were requesting the Council to invite representatives of the so-called Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) to participate in the Council debate. The Non-Aligned members of the Council promptly opposed the participation of the D.T.A. representatives because allowing them to participate in the debate will contravene the Security Council's own decision in resolution 439 (1978) in which it declared the elections organized by South Africa in Namibia and their results null and void and stated

that no recognition would be accorded either by the United Nations or any Member State to any representatives or organs established by that process. The Council ultimately decided by taking vote. The result of the vote was as follows: six votes in favour of the proposal (France, Japan, Ireland, Spain, United Kingdom and United States) and nine votes against. The proposal of the three western powers were, therefore, rejected by the Council.

9. Similar recommendation was made to the Security Council by the three African members of the Council (Niger, Tunisia and Uganda) in respect of SWAPO's participation in the debate. This was accepted unanimously by the Council, and consequently SWAPO participated fully in the debate.

10. The Foreign Ministers designated by the Organization of African Unity and the Non-Aligned Movement attended and participated in the debate. In their statements to the Council, they eloquently and forcefully articulated the concern of Africa about the present situation.

11. They recalled the colonial history of Namibia before the United Nations. They effectively exposed, before the Council, South Africa's consistent and persistent defiance of the will of the international community and, in particular, the decisions and resolutions of the Security Council. In their statements

the Ministers also referred to the recent Geneva debacle which is another testimony of South Africa's unpreparedness for a negotiated solution.

12. It was for these reasons and many others that the Non-Aligned representatives who participated in the debate called for a comprehensive mandatory sanction against South Africa as a peaceful measure to get her to implement United Nations decisions on the independence of Namibia.

13. At this juncture, it is relevant to say that in their statements, the so-called western five (Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, France, United Kingdom and the United States) informed the Council that time was not ripe for the imposition of a mandatory sanction. They also informed the Council that their representatives had met in London on 22 and 23 April, 1981, to review the situation concerning Namibia after receiving the complete report from the United States Secretary designate for African Affairs on his visit to some African States. They all agreed that Security Council Res. 435(1978) "continues to provide a solid basis for a transition to independence in Namibia. They considered possibilities for strengthening the existing plan and agreed that expeditious progress toward a settlement would be enhanced by measures aimed at giving greater confidence to all the parties on the future of an

independent Namibia." They also stated that their Foreign Ministers will meet in Rome on 4 and 5 May to discuss the question of Namibia.

14. It is relevant to note, at this juncture, of the eloquent statement made by the Representative of Ireland who is also the President of the Council. His statement was a clear testimony that Ireland has joined the Scandinavian and Nordic countries in becoming reliable friends of Africa in Western Europe, as it concerned the solution of the Southern African problems.

15. It is also important to record the important contribution and support which the Non-Aligned Group received from the Socialist States during the debate.

#### Consultation on the Draft Resolutions

16. When the five draft resolutions were distributed to members of the Security Council for consultation, France, UK and the USA refused to discuss them. They maintained that in principle they opposed sanctions and as such they were unable to discuss the five draft resolutions. Instead, they appealed for patience until they were able to finish their consultations on the question, one of which was the proposed meeting in Rome from 4 to 5 May 1981.

17. In an attempt to bring the two sides together, the President of the Council presented a draft resolution in a form of a working paper in which the Council will request the Secretary-General to continue his endeavours to secure the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 435 and 439 and to report to the Council not later than 31st May 1981. The Council would also in the light of this Secretary-General's report consider appropriate measures which it should take in order to ensure full implementation of its decisions.

18. The three permanent Western members and particularly the United States outrightly rejected the Irish draft. In contrast, when the draft was presented to the African side, they informed that the Irish draft, fell short of the minimum which they will accept as a resolution, to postpone debate until a later date. The African Group, therefore, insisted that the draft resolution should contain at the minimum the following points:

- (i) A time-frame for South Africa to implement the Security Council Resolution 435 (1978);
- (ii) Reaffirmation by the Council that Res. 435 (1978) cannot be amended;
- (iii) Determination by the Security Council that the situation in Namibia constitutes threat to international peace and security in the event South Africa fails to comply with Resolution 435;

- (iv) Imposition of sanctions against South Africa if it fails to comply with Resolution 435.

19. The President of the Security Council could not pursue consultation on his paper since he found that the western permanent members of the Security Council had rejected his paper and that paper fell short of the minimum commitment required by the African Group from the Security Council in order to agree to the postponement of the voting on the five draft resolutions.

#### Security Council Vote on Draft Resolutions

20. At the end of the debate when it became known that the three western permanent members of the Council were not prepared to discuss the five draft resolutions, and were not ready to give certain commitments to enable the Council to postpone its debate to a later date, the resolutions were submitted for voting by the Council. The Council could not adopt any of the draft resolutions because they all received the negative votes of France, United Kingdom and the United States: all permanent members of the Security Council, which have the power to veto. The pattern of the voting on each resolution was as follows:

- (i) The first draft resolution (S/144459) received nine votes in favour, three against and three abstentions (Ireland, Japan, and Spain);

- (ii) The second draft resolution (S/14460) received the same nine votes in favour to 3 against with 3 abstentions;
- (iii) The third draft (S/144461) received eleven votes in favour to 3 against with one abstention (Japan);
- (iv) The fourth text (S/144462) received 12 votes in favour to 3 against with no abstention;
- (v) The fifth draft resolution (S/144463), which would have created a machinery monitoring the implementation of the other resolutions, was not put to a vote since it was contingent on adoption of the four other resolutions.

Aftermath of the Security Council Debate

21. The African Group met after the adjournment of the Security Council debate in order to review the debate and to consider the second mandate given to it by the Organization of African Unity Council of Ministers to request for the convening of the Emergency Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, in the event of failure by the Security Council, so as to adopt appropriate measures in this regard so as to expedite the independence of Namibia.



22. The consensus reached by the African Group debate was that despite the 12 vetoes of the 3 western permanent members of the Security Council, the Security Council debate was very useful since it helped to put certain pressure on the western powers. We have also learnt from the Security Council debate that there is the need to continue putting this pressure on them, especially at the proposed extraordinary session of the United Nations General Assembly.

23. With regard to the timing of the extraordinary session of the General Assembly, the African Group felt that more time was required for reflection and the Group also stressed the importance of keeping the momentum in order to create, during the proposed extraordinary session, a climate similar to the one that obtained at the Security Council. For this reason, the Group found it imperative that elaborate preparations be made for the extraordinary session and to ensure that African representatives at the session be at Ministerial level and that the number of Ministers attending be not less than the number which attended the Security Council debate.

24. Lastly, the African Group, having taken into consideration the calendar of meetings of both the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations, was of the opinion that the extraordinary session of the General Assembly can only be held after the Nairobi Meeting of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity.

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