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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON DECOLONIZATION

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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON DECOLONIZATION

This Report, which covers the period July 1981 to June 1982 is submitted to the Thirty-ninth Session of the Council of Ministers for consideration. It is hoped the issues raised, as well as comments and observations would as usual, receive the careful appraisal of the Council.

2. The period under review has witnessed a continuing stalemate on negotiations leading to Namibia's independence and a growing repression and intimidation in South Africa. The front-line states, as usual have not been spared the wrath of the racist regime, whose invasion and occupation of the territory of Angola introduced another dimension to the repeated acts of aggression against the frontline states. The racist regime has become more arrogant, boisterous and defiant largely because of the open support it is now enjoying from Washington as well as the traditional covert support it receives from the West.

3. Thus it is, that the period under review, has witnessed no significant development in the field of decolonization. Expectations continue to soar only to be dashed to pieces the next moment. The following exploration in the various fields and its examinations will indicate what progress has been made or the lack of it; and the constraints and difficulties and what needs to be done, however small, to advance the struggle to total decolonization of the continent.

A. NAMIBIA

The efforts of the Reagan Administration to subvert Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) became the focal point of discussion by the Council of Ministers in Nairobi. The anger and frustrations generated by the abortive Geneva Pre-

implementation talks earlier in January 1981 had not subsided. It was against this background that the machinations of the Reagan Administration were viewed. It was becoming increasingly clear that the US, as a sop to the racists in South Africa, was prepared to work for the dilution of Resolution 435, if not to abort it altogether.

5. Partly for this disquieting development, the Council decided to send a Ministerial delegation to the Member States of the Western Contact Group to express the feelings of Africa on the so-called efforts to "strengthen" Security Council Resolution 435 (1978). The Council made it clear that Resolution 435 was neither modifiable nor amendable. The Ministerial delegation, led by the Foreign Minister of Kenya, who was then the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, has already reported to Council the outcome of its mission.

6. This diplomatic initiative, no doubt, might have contributed to the toning down of US schemes. It will be recalled that the new French Administration threatened to pull out of the Contact Group if no serious efforts were made to break the deadlock in the implementation of Resolution 435. Other members of the Contact Group became concerned with the new initiatives that were issuing from Washington. Thus, for a time, it seemed that cracks were appearing on the wall of the Group.

7. The situation needed urgent attention. It was for this reason that a series of meetings were held in Ottawa, London, New York, Rome and Paris. The purpose of these consultations was "to formulate proposals to carry forward the settlement process in consultation with all parties concerned. The proposals formulated by the Group have already been submitted to the Council in document CM/1155/Part II, Report of the Secretary-General on

the activities of the Organization. The proposals are a set of constitutional principles which the Group believes would promote confidence among the parties concerned and facilitate the speedy implementation of Resolution 435.

8. The month of November witnessed the diplomatic offensive of the Group as the members of the Group tried to sell the ideas contained in their proposals to all the parties, namely, SWAPO, the Frontline States and Nigeria and Kenya, as well as South Africa and their puppets in Windhoek.

9. For ease of reference, avoidance of doubt and also for the records, the proposals entitled "Principles Concerning the Constituent Assembly and the Constitution for an Independent Namibia"; are reproduced in full.

PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY AND THE CONSTITUTION FOR AN INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA

A. CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

1. The Constituent Assembly should be elected so as to ensure fair representation in that body to different political groups representing the people of Namibia;

2. The Constituent Assembly will formulate the Constitution for an Independent Namibia in accordance with the principles in Part B below and, will adopt the Constitution as a whole by a two-third majority of all its members.

B. PRINCIPLES FOR A CONSTITUTION FOR AN INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA

1. Namibia will be a unitary, sovereign and democratic State;

2. The Constitution will be the Supreme Law of the State. It may be amended only by a designated process of either the legislature or the votes cast in a popular refrendum;

3. The Constitution will provide for a system of government with three branches: an elected executive branch which will be responsible for the passage of all laws; and an independent Judicial branch which will be responsible for the interpretation of the Constitution and for ensuring its supremacy and the authority of the law. The executive and legislative branches will be constituted by periodic and genuine elections which will be held by secret vote;

4. The electoral system will ensure fair representation in the legislature to different political groups representing the people of Namibia, for example, by proportional representation, or by appropriate determination of constituencies, or by a combination of both;

5. There will be a declaration of fundamental rights, which will include the rights to life, personal liberty and freedom of movement; to freedom of conscience; to freedom of expression, including freedom of speech and a free press; to freedom of assembly and association, including political parties and trade unions; to due process and equality before the law; to protection from arbitrary deprivation of private property or deprivation of private property without prompt and just compensation; and to freedom from racial, ethnic, religious or sexual discrimination. The Declaration of Rights will be consistent with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Declaration of Rights will be enforceable by the courts, at the instance of an aggrieved individual;

6. It will be forbidden to create criminal offences with retrospective effect or to provide for increased penalities with retrospective effect;

7. Provision will be made to secure equal access by all to recruitment to the public service, the police service and the defence services. The fair administration of personnel policy relation to these services will be assured by appropriate independent bodies;

8. Private cultural, social, health and educational institutions will be open to all without discrimination;

9. Provision will be made for the establishment of elected councils for local and regional administrative and fiscal purposes.

10. The Frontline States, SWAPO, Nigeria and Kenya met in Dar-es-Salaam on November 17, 1981, at Ministerial level to consider the above proposals. The conclusions of their deliberations constituting counter proposals, are reproduced for seasons same as above.

PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY AND THE CONSTITUTION FOR AN INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA

A. CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY

1. Elections will be held to select a Constituent Assembly which will adopt a Constitution for an independent Namibia. The Constitution will determine the organization and powers of all levels of the State. Every adult Namibian will be eligible, without discrimination or fear of intimidation from any source, to vote, campaign and stand for election to the Constituent Assembly. Voting will be by secret ballot, with provisions made for those who cannot read or write. The date for the beginning of the electoral campaign, the date of elections, the electoral system, the preparation of voters rolls and other aspects of electoral procedures will be promptly decided upon so as to give all political parties and interested persons, without regard to their political views, a full and fair opportunity to organize and participate in the electoral process. Full freedom of speech, assembly, movement and press shall be guaranteed;

2. The Constituent Assembly will formulate the Constitution for an Independent Namibia in accordance with the principles in Part B below and will adopt the Constitution as a whole by a two-thirds majority of its total membership.

B. PRINCIPLES FOR A CONSTITUTION FOR AN INDEPENDENT NAMIBIA

1. Namibia will be a unitary, sovereign and democratic State.

2. The Constitution will be the supreme law of the State. It may be amended only by a designated process of either the legislature or the votes cast in a popular referendum.

3. The Constitution will determine the organization and powers of all levels of the State. However, we note that most States are structured on the basis of an elected executive; a legislature elected by universal and equal suffrage which is responsible for the passages of all laws; an independent judiciary which is responsible for the interpretation of the Constitution and for ensuring its supremacy and the authority of the law; and that the executive and legislative branches are constituted by periodic and genuine elections which are held by secret vote.

4. The electoral system will be consistent with A (I) above.

5. There will be a declaration of fundamental rights, which will include the rights to life, personal liberty and freedom of movement; to freedom of conscience; to freedom of expression, including freedom of speech and a free press; to freedom of assembly and association, including political parties and trade unions; to due process and equality before the law; to protection from arbitrary deprivation of private property without just compensation; and to freedom from racial, ethnic religious or sexual discrimination. The Declaration of Rights will be consistent with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Declaration of Rights will be enforceable by

the courts, at the instance of an aggrieved individual after proven breach of these rights.

6. It will be forbidden to create criminal offences with retrospective effect or to provide for increased penalities with retrospective effect.

7. Provision will be made to secure, equal access by all to recruitment to, and balance restructuring of, the public service, the police service and the defence services. The fair administration of personnel policy in relation to these services will be assured by appropriate independent bodies.

8. Private cultural, social, health and educational institutions will be open to all without discrimination.

9. Provision will be made for the establishment, by an Act of Parliament, of elected Council for local administration."

11. The reactions to the proposals by the various parties were considered by the Contact Group and they re-submitted what seemed to them to be consensus on the reactions of the parties. The Frontline States met in Lusaka to consider the new proposals. The Frontline States, SWAPO, Nigeria and Kenya could not accept the multiple or combination electoral system proposed by the Contact Group because it is too complicated and unfair; a much simpler electoral system such as proportional representation was preferable. For better appreciation of these issues, the information supplied to the Thirty-eighth Session of the Council by the Foreign Minister of the United Republic of Tanzania is attached as an annex.

12. According to the Contact Group, the on-going negotiations are divided into three phases. Phase One deals with consideration of constitutional principles which would guide the Constituent Assembly in its task to work out a constitution for Independent Namibia. Phase Two encompasses all issues and questions relating to the emplacement of the United Nations Transitional Assistance

Group (UNTAG), while Phase Three deals with the actual implementation of Resolution 435 (1978). Phase One which was to have ended in December, last year, is presently deadlocked over the electoral system. In view of the sensitive nature of the negotiations and in deference to those member states involved in the negotiations, comment is for the time being reserved.

Emergency Special Session of UN General Assembly

13. It would be recalled that in its Resolution CM/Res.853 (XXXVII) adopted in Nairobi, the Council reiterated its "call for the convening of an Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly on the independence of Namibia, during the first week of September, 1981..." The Emergency Special Session of the UN General Assembly was accordingly convened on or about the first half of September 1981 and adopted a resolution, six operative paras out of 18 are particularly instructive.

> "9. Reaffirms that Security Council resolution 435 (1978) of 29 September 1978 in which the Council endorsed the United Nations plan for the independence of Namibia, is the only basis for a peaceful settlement;
>
> 10. Firmly rejects the latest manoeuvres by certain members of the Western Contact Group aimed at undermining the international consensus embodied in Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) and depriving the oppressed Namibian people of their hard-won victories in the struggle for national liberation;
>
> 11. Demands the immediate commencement of the unconditional implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 (1978) without any prevarication, qualification or modification and not later than December 1981;
>
> 12. Strongly urges the Security Council in the light of the serious threat to international

peace and security posed by South Africa, to respond positively to the overwhelming demand of the international community by immediately imposing against that country comprehensive mandatory sanctions as provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter;

13. Calls upon all states, in view of the threat to international peace and security posed by South Africa, to impose against that country comprehensive mandatory sanctions in accordance with the provisions of the Charter;

14. Also strongly urges states to cease fortwith, individually and collectively, all dealings with South Africa in order totally to isolate it politically, economically, militarily and culturally".

14. It is comforting to have had the UN to endorse OAU's position with regard to the immutability of resolution 435 and to demand its immediate implementation without modification or qualification. It is also comforting for the UN to reject the latest manoeuvres by certain members of the Western Contact Group to undermine resolution 435, and more importantly to call on all states to impose comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa. The resolution is indeed a great morale booster, it has echoed all the sentiments and feelings of the OAU. To that extent, one is inclined to view the results of the Emergency Special Session as a success for African diplomacy.

15. But if the Emergency Special Session was convened so that a particular course of action could be taken, then one is inclined to view the results with some amount of disappointment. So far the OAU has succeeded in having selective sanctions against the racist regime of South Africa, in such fields as arms and armament, oil and sports. What the OAU has been desperately fighting for during the last few years is the imposition of comprehensive mandatory sanctions in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The

Council of Ministers decided to submit the question to the Security Council and further decided that in the event of a veto in the Security Council, then an Emergency Special Session of the UN General Assembly should be convened. As expected the Security Council failed to take a decision because of the capricious use of the veto. The next alternative was the Emergency Special Session. But what was it supposed to do and what was it capable of doing?

16. In the light of the alternatives provided by the Council, the answer to the first part of the question should be obvious; the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly was supposed to impose comprehensive and mandatory sanctions against South Africa in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter. If this was not the case, then there would have been no need for the alternative. Admittedly General Assembly resolutions do not normally have binding force, they have moral, and what is termed, persuasive force. But under the uniting for peace resolution, the decisions or resolutions of the General Assembly do have binding force. There are of course political difficulties invoking the uniting for peace resolution.

17. The point to note here is that the convening of the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly generated so much hope that the outcome of its deliberations must be a shocking disappointment to many. It does look as if the Security Council, inspite of the fact that the issue has been referred to it, would not be able to invoke the provisions of Chapter VII against South Africa due to the attitude of some Western Powers.

18. Comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa have for long been viewed as a major weapon in the struggle to free Namibia and against apartheid. But since this is out of the question for the time being, it would seem that the current negotiations being conducted by the Western Contact Group offer the best hope for the independence of Namibia. This is without prejudice to the other form of the struggle, i.e. the armed struggle.

19. The armed struggle could be effectively prosecuted only when the necessary ingredients are supplied in appreciable quantities. Both the Liberation Committee and the Council have been informed of the great difficulties facing SWAPO in terms of food and other essential supplies. The disturbing information that SWAPO can only afford one meal a day for its combatants should command the serious attention of the Council. A soldier cannot fight on an empty stomach. Furthermore, the destruction of nearly 80% of SWAPO's transportation, should similarly receive the serious attention of the Council.

20. Supplies have been running out largely because Member States have not been meeting their obligations. Time and again the Liberation Committee has reported on the mounting arrears in contribution. Yet the situation shows no sign of improving. Contribution to the Special Fund represents the minimum contribution that a Member State makes towards the liberation of the continent. Failure to meet this minimum contribution therefore would be to suffocate the liberation struggle. What is even more, Member States are expected to do a lot more than merely meeting their minimum contributions. The Arusha Plan of Action formulated by the Liberation Committee has been endorsed by the highest organs of the OAU. That implies extra responsibilities.

Arusha Plan of Action on Namibia

21. It would be recalled that following the abortive Geneva preimplementation talks on Namibia, the Liberation Committee drew up a Plan of Action on Namibia at its Thirty-sixth Session held in Arusha, Tanzania, in 1981. By it, Member States pledged to make the final sacrifice for the liberation of Namibia by mobilizing financial, material and diplomatic support both within and outside the continent for SWAPO. It represents Africa's determination to free Namibia from the illegal occupation of the racist regime of South Africa.

22. The Executive Secretariat in Dar-es-Salaam is expected to report in detail to the Liberation Committee on how far the Plan has been implemented. However, it is important to note that apart from the initial pledges made by a few Member States, the response from the others has not been encouraging, to say the least. By adopting the Plan of Action on Namibia, Member States resolved on three main things, namely:

"2 (a) Direct military assistance and supplies from OAU Member States;

3 (a) Calling on all OAU Member States to meet their minimum obligations to the Special Fund of the Liberation Committee in order to facilitate an increase in the normal budgetary allocation for SWAPO;

(b) The establishment of an Emergency Namibian Liberation Fund and calling on all OAU Member States to contribute generously."

23. These, apart from the normal diplomatic pressure that Member States are expected to exert on the Western Contact Group, are the direct responsibilities of Member States arising under the Plan of Action. The Liberation Committee has mounted two or three missions to various capitals of Member States, but the results have not been very encouraging. In the Report submitted to the Thirty-seventh Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers held in Nairobi, Kenya, contained in Document CM/1124 (XXXVII) Rev.1, the following observation was made:

" ... All efforts must be made to prevent the Plan becoming yet another monstrous paper tiger. The credibility of the Organization and its Member States is at stake, and the least that can be done by each Member State is the faithful implementation of the Plan of Action."

24. It is perhaps a little too early to pass judgement but it is also necessary to remind ourselves that our performance so far has not been encouraging. The observation is made not without full knowledge of the enormous economic difficulties facing the Member States. It is a case of sacrificing a little for the credibility of the Organization.

25. It must be conceded that the Organization has not often applied its decisions, resolutions, plans and strategies with the resoluteness with which they are formulated. This basic weakness should be acknowledged in order to rectify it. Its continued existence would only serve to be exploited by the detractors of the Organization whose main aim is to seek it.

26. All said and done, South Africa would take the negotiations seriously only when the military option she has chosen, no longer become credible as a result of costs involved. That stage would be reached only when SWAPO is able to increase the tempo and enhance its operational activities in the battlefield. SWAPO can enhance its operational activities only when it is adequately supplied. South Africa can toy with the negotiations for as long as she holds sway in the battlefield. SWAPO combatants deserve commendation, for as ill-equipped and supplied as they are, they continue to confront the enemy. But, how long must they continue in this fashion? That is the challenge for the Member States of the Organization.

Aggression Against Frontline States

27. Side by side with the racist regime's policy of oppression and suppression at home has been a policy of intimidation, terror and downright aggression against the Frontline States. The aim of this policy no doubt is to make it extremely difficult for these countries to continue to support the armed struggle. Thus it is, that Angola, Mozambique and Zambia have been subjected to repeated acts of aggression, but at no point has any of them yielded to the policy of intimidation.

28. Eventhough the policy of intimidation is not a new phenomenon, at no point has it assumed such dangerous proportions as when in August 1981 the racist regime invaded Angola. The invasion began on 23 August with aerial bombardments. Some 5,000 troops were involved in the invasion while over 40,000 troops were concentrated along the Namibian border. Indiscriminate bombings, carnage and pillage then followed. The aim of the invasion was quite clear - to create a buffer zone and pressumably install puppet UNITA within that zone.

29. International reaction to above was predictable. The invasion has been roundly condemned by the international community. The OAU Secretary-General and the UN Secretary-General both strongly condemned the invasion and appealed to the international community to prevail over racist South Africa to withdraw its troops from Angola. Naturally, the Security Council was seized with the problem. Regrettably the US once again prevented the Security Council from taking any action; even condemnation of the invasion.

30. The OAU Secretary-General, the UN Secretary-General and the Current Chairman of the OAU despatched separate missions to Angola to gather first hand information and to determine the nature of assistance required. The Report of the OAU Team has already been circulated to Member States.

31. The Frontline States met in an Emergency Session in Lagos on September 11 and issued the following communique:

"1. The Head of State and Government of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Nigeria, and the President of SWAPO, met in an Emergency Summit in Lagos, Nigeria, on Friday, 11th September, 1981 and held talks in a most cordial and friendly atmosphere;

2. They reviewed the grave situation in Southern Africa generally and in particular the recent invasion as well as the occupation of parts of the People's Republic of Angola by the racist and fascist regime of South Africa. They also considered the current development concerning the independence of Namibia;

3. In considering the recent invasion and occupation of parts of Angola, they unequivocally condemned the series of aggressive acts launched against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Angola as well as other Frontline States. They demanded the immediate unconditional, complete and total withdrawal of the racist troops from Angolan territory;

4. They highly commended the people and government of Angola for their unflinching support for the liberation struggle. Through the Current Chairman of the OAU, they appealed to all Member States of the OAU to extend, as a matter of urgency every possible assistance, and in particular military aid, as requested by the People's Republic of Angola in its efforts to drive out the racist invaders and to repulse further aggression, in defence of its sovereignty and Africa's integrity;

5. The Heads of State and Government also appealed to the International Community to give, and step up, any assistance in any field to the People's Republic of Angola for the defence and reconstruction of their country;

6. In this connection also, they expressed dismay at the veto exercised by the USA against the recent Security Council resolution condemning racist South Africa's invasion of the People's Republic of Angola, and demanding the complete withdrawal of South Africa's invading forces. The Heads of State and Government strongly condemned the support being given by the Reagan Administration to the South African white minority racist regime, thereby encouraging that regime to be more daring in the perpetration of its heinous criminal acts against Angola and the other neighbouring independent states as well as its obstinate defiance of the International Community;

7. On the issue of the independence of Namibia, they re-affirmed their faith in the UN Security Council Resolution 435 as a completely satisfactory basis for settlement. They rejected any attempt to revise, delete or add to the terms of the said resolution;

8. The Heads of State and Government welcomed the stand of the European Economic Community during the current session of the UN Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly on Namibia, in their condemnation of racist South Africa's attitude to the Namibian independence issue;

9. They again affirmed their full support for SWAPO as the only genuine and sole authentic representative of the oppressed people of Namibia and commended it for its heroic resistance to the forces of colonialism, racism and oppression. They appealed to all true lovers of human freedom and dignity in the world to intensify support for SWAPO in its just struggle;

10. Finally, the Heads of State and Government re-affirmed their resolute determination to continue to work collectively and co-ordinate their strategies until victory is won for the oppressed black people of Namibia and South Africa."

32. Determined to cripple the economy of Angola, the racist regime sponsored an attack on the oil refinery installation in Angola on November 28, 1981. Extent of damage is not yet known, but the

havoc can well be imagined. The OAU General Secretariat has, in a press statement, vehemently condemned this dastardly and criminal act. Since then a series of cheeky incursions have been made and continue to be made into the territory of Angola. Angola has become the playground for the military adventurism of the racist forces in their mad desire to carve out a buffer zone between Namibia and Angola.

33. Scarce resources which should go into much needed development projects are being siphoned off into defence requirements. For as long as the Namibian question remains unresolved, the threat to the security and territorial integrity of Angola would ever be present. Expressions of solidarity with and pronouncements of support for the government and people of Angola are doubtlessly a necessary function of the liberation struggle. They however need to be expressed in concrete material terms.

34. The period under review has also seen the destructive hand of the racist regime on Lesotho. On a number of occasions, dissident elements aided and abetted by the racist regime have launched mortar attacks on institutions and establishments, including an oil depot, The Report of an OAU Mission on this matter has already been circulated to Member States.

Assistance to Frontline States

35. The need to offer assistance to the Frontline States has long been realized. Numerous resolutions and decisions on the matter have been made. A Special Committee of Nineteen Member States was formed specifically to stimulate the flow of assistance to the Frontline States. Regrettably neither the resolutions nor the endeavours of the Committee have produced much positive result. The Committee of 19, partly out of frustration, has had to recommend its own dissolution. The Council at its last session accepted the

recommendation. The Committee has been dissolved but the purpose for which it was set up has not been abandoned. The resolutions and decisions still remain in force. The dissolution of the Committee of Nineteen therefore does not affect the subject for which it was set up. The linkage between the liberation struggle and assistance to the Frontline States has been recognized as being two sides of the same coin. Action on one side demands a corresponding action on the other side.

B. SOUTH AFRICA

36. The period under review has witnessed increased acts of repression at home and banditry abroad. True to its avowed aim of perpetuating white supremacy, the Botha regime contrary to its claim to reform the system, is indeed poised to enhance that pernicious system by virtue of the increased acts of repression in South Africa. Workers and student organizations and unions continue to be proscribed and uprooting of populations into arid and barren lands is being vigorously pursued.

37. The bogus and fraudulent policy of Bantustanization continues to be implemented with determination. Ciskei, an arid, barren territory of 270 sq. miles (345 sq. km.), whose budget is almost entirely financed by South Africa and whose revenue comes entirely from the wages of its migrant workers in South Africa (95%) was supposed to have attained its bogus independence on December 4, 1981. This brings to four the numbers of locations that have been pronounced independent. The other three are Transkei, Bophuthatswana and Venda.

38. The OAU has consistently rejected policy of Bantustanization as preached by the High Priests of Afrikanerdom. It is at once repugnant to good conscience as it is to all accepted norms of civilized behaviour. The international community has rightly rejected the sham independence of these Bantustans; not a single

one of them has received international recognition, Ciskei will not be an exception.

39. The disturbing thing about this event is that people are being ruthlessly uprooted from their ancestral lands and thrown into the boer-created homelands. The anguish of the dispossesed people of South Africa can be imagined when forced to leave perhaps a birth place to the so-called homelands.

40. In spite of these brutal acts, the people of South Africa continue to defy the racist regime in an ever increasing manner. Revolutionary acts of sabotage is on the increase. Hardly a week passes by without the South African press, especially the Star, reporting an attack on a police station or the destruction of a bridge or an economic establishment.

41. It is also refreshing to note that the diverse groups inside South Africa committed to the liberation struggle are now showing greater signs of solidarity. Helga Brandt of the Sunday Mail of Salisbury reported on October 11 that "... observers are pointing to signs of increasing political convergence and greater solidarity being forged in action. Communities supporting workers on strike, students supporting communities in their fights against bus fare and rent increases, and parents supporting their children's demands in the classroom are all now a common feature of the South African struggle."

42. Another development worthy of note is the endorsement of the Freedom Charter by the Indian Congress at a Conference in Durban during the first week of October. The Congress with all its affiliates, is reported to have a membership of well over 300,000.

43. Externally, the racist regime continued to support counter-revolutionaries, renegades and puppets so as to destabilize the neighbouring countries. Thus it is that dissident elements in

Mozambique, Angola, Lesotho and Zimbabwe have been carrying out acts of banditry and economic sabotage against these countries.

44. On July 31, the Pretoria regime sent its murderous hirelings to Zimbabwe. Its single mission was to assassinate the ANC representative in that country. Comrade Joe Nzingo Gqabi, therefore paid the supreme sacrifice with his life so that his fellow compatriots and countrymen would one day be free. Similarly the fascist Pretoria Police kidnapped Peter Lengene, a political refugee from South Africa and resident in Gaberone, Botswana and took him back to South Africa.

45. These acts of international terrorism calculated to intimidate the Frontline States and demoralise the freedom struggle in South Africa, should galvanize the freedom fighters and indeed the people of Africa for a concerted and sustained assault on apartheid.

46. Serious questions are being asked and suggestions of one form of strategy as supplement to the other forms are now being made openly by well-meaning African personalities. It is the expectation that the national liberation movements will take advantage of the healthy climate, review its tactics where necessary, so as to increase the momentum and tempo of the struggle.

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