

**AFRICAN UNION**

**الاتحاد الأفريقي**



**UNION AFRICAINE**

**UNIÃO AFRICANA**

---

Addis Ababa, Ethiopia

P. O. Box 3243

Telephone: 5517 700

Fax: 5517844

Website: [www.au.int](http://www.au.int)

---

**EXECUTIVE COUNCIL**  
**Thirty-Fourth Ordinary Session**  
**07 - 08 February 2019**  
**Addis Ababa, Ethiopia**

**EX.CL/1104(XXXIV)iii**  
Original : English

**REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON MULTILATERAL  
COOPERATION**

## Introduction

1. During the period under review, the Sub-Committee of the Whole on Multilateral Cooperation (SCWMC) under the Chairmanship of the Republic of Djibouti focused on the consideration of the implementation of Executive Council Decisions that ranged from the preparation of the African Union– Turkey Ministerial Review Conference held in Istanbul, Turkey, on 11<sup>th</sup>-12<sup>th</sup> February 2018; the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) Ministerial Meeting held in Tokyo, Japan, on 5<sup>th</sup> - 7<sup>th</sup> October 2018; the organization of the 11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> Meetings of the Senior Officials of the African Union-League of Arab States Partnership Coordination Committee held respectively on the 24<sup>th</sup> of April 2018, at the League of Arab States Headquarters in Cairo, Egypt, and 24<sup>th</sup> August 2018, at the Headquarters of the African Union Commission in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and the 2<sup>nd</sup> African Union – Korea Policy Consultation Meeting held on 10<sup>th</sup>-11<sup>th</sup> October 2018; as well as the finalization of the Evaluation Report on Strategic Partnerships.

2. In accordance with paragraph 20 of the Abidjan Declaration, which “*requested the two Commissions to develop an Action Plan, within three months of adoption of the Declaration, which would involve the holding of working level meetings to identify projects and programs within the AU-EU Joint Priority areas of cooperation that both sides agree to implement, and to establish a joint follow-up mechanism*”, the Sub-Committee undertook a review of the Draft Joint Priority Projects submitted by the Commission.

3. Although the Sub-Committee was not actively involved in the preparation of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), it is important to indicate that the FOCAC Summit and its preparatory meetings were held in Beijing, China, from 1<sup>st</sup> to 4<sup>th</sup> September 2018.

4. In line with the Recommendations of the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC) Retreat held on 13<sup>th</sup>-14<sup>th</sup> December 2017, in Cairo, Egypt, the Sub-Committee proceeded to a review of the Evaluation Report of African Union Strategic Partnerships.

5. This Report, which is divided into two parts summarizes the issues discussed and conclusions reached at these meetings. The first part addresses general issues related to Strategic Partnerships, while the second part summarizes the deliberations regarding each Strategic Partnership.

## Part I. Evaluation of Strategic Partnerships

6. The Sub-Committee on Multilateral Cooperation organized a retreat on 7<sup>th</sup> – 8<sup>th</sup> May 2018, in Flic-en-Flac, Mauritius, under the Chairmanship of H.E. Mr. Mohamed Idriss Farah, Ambassador of Djibouti.

7. The objectives of the Retreat were as follows:

- i. To contribute to the update of the Report on the Evaluation of the Strategic Partnerships as directed by the PRC at its Cairo Retreat held on 13<sup>th</sup> - 14<sup>th</sup> December 2017;
  - ii. To address key concerns related to the identification of the core competencies of the existing African Union (AU) Strategic Partnerships, in order to ensure that all engagements of the AU with its strategic partners are guided and oriented by well-defined objectives, goals and targets in line with AU Agenda 2063 priority areas and its First Ten Year Implementation Plan.
8. The meeting proposed a definition for AU Strategic Partnerships as follows:
- a) “A Partnership that concretely contributes to the attainment of development and integration strategic objectives of the African continent through the mobilization of collective efforts built around specific objectives and goals that are long term in nature with the ability to deliver short term successes, first with African self-interest at heart in line with the AU Constitutive Act, the Solemn Declaration of the 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the African Union, Aspiration No.7 of AU Agenda 2063 and the AU Flagship Programmes and Projects”.
  - b) “Such Partnership will be based on: Partners’ readiness and abilities to engage in identified multilateral areas of cooperation, equality, inclusivity, mutual respect, accountability and ownership, and then with an extended prospect of win-win outcomes for mutual political, social and economic benefits, structured around defined priorities, outcomes, outputs and impact indicators articulated in a smart manner with clearly defined implementation, follow up, monitoring and evaluation, and reporting mechanism”.

### Recommendations:

9. The PRC Sub-Committee of the Whole on Multilateral Cooperation proposes that the PRC recommends to the Executive Council to:
- (i) **Take Note** of the Report of the Permanent Representatives’ Committee (PRC) on the Evaluation of the Strategic Partnerships and endorse the recommendations thereon<sup>1</sup>;
  - (ii) **Recall** its Decision No.: EX.CL/942(XXX) taken during its Thirtieth Ordinary Session held on 25<sup>th</sup> – 27<sup>th</sup> January 2017, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, which calls for the strengthening of the institutional capacity of the Commission (Partnerships Management and Coordination Division);
  - (iii) **Reaffirm** its Decision No.: EX.CL/Dec.986(XXXII) taken during its Thirty-second Ordinary Session held on 25<sup>th</sup>-26<sup>th</sup> January 2018, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,

---

<sup>1</sup> The Kingdom of Morocco expresses reservation on the inclusion of this Decision

requesting “the Commission to build internal systems and capacity for partnerships management by upgrading the Partnerships Division under the Bureau of the Chairperson to a Directorate, which treats in a holistic manner functions of Partnerships management, coordination and resources mobilization; fulfills the ability to analyze and negotiate partnerships scopes; develops the vision for Africa’s role in the world; and enhance Africa’s voice and representation”;

- (iv) **Recall** Assembly Decision 131 (VII) taken in Banjul, Gambia, in 2006, and Assembly Decision, Dec. 635(XXVIII), taken in January 2017, concerning holding of partnership Summits between Africa and certain States and the establishment of a mechanism for participation in such Summits;
- (v) **Reaffirm** Executive Council Decisions; (EX.CL/Dec.986(XXXII)) of January 2018, (EX.CL/Dec.942(XXX)), of January 2017, (EX.CL/Dec.899(XXVIII)) of January 2016 and (EX.CL/Dec.877(XXVII)) of June 2015, concerning the right of all Member States to participate at meetings involving Partners, which should be implemented in line with the relevant African Union Decisions;
- (vi) **Further reaffirm** Executive Council Decision; (EX.CL/Dec. 942(XXX) A5) of January 2017, which decided that all Member States that do not comply with the provisions of the abovementioned decisions will be deprived of the privilege of hosting the meetings in accordance with Article 23 of the Constitutive Act;
- (vii) **Reiterate** Executive Council Decision; EX.CL/Dec.986(XXXII) (20), of January 2018 and EX.CL/Dec.942(XXX)<sup>2</sup> of January 2017, which instructed the PRC in collaboration with the Commission, to design mechanisms for the full involvement of the African Union in the effective management of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC); and to **Further Direct** the PRC in collaboration with the Commission to engage with the Government of China and Government of Japan to design and agree on mechanisms for the full involvement of the African Union in the effective management of FOCAC and TICAD, in line with the criteria identified in the evaluation report on the African Union Strategic Partnerships and the guiding principles established in the African Union Outline Framework for Strategic Partnerships adopted by the PRC;
- (viii) **Further Reiterate** the need to approach all engagements with the African Union Strategic Partnerships in a more robust, purpose-driven and result-oriented manner and in that regard, **Call upon** the PRC in close collaboration with the Commission to undertake a study on the establishment of a Partnerships Fund with contribution from AU Member States as proposed in the AU Agenda 2063 and its First Ten Year Implementation Plan and to report at the January 2020 Summit.
- (ix) **Adopt** the nomenclature of “African Union – *Name of the Partner*” for the following Partnerships<sup>3</sup>:

---

<sup>2</sup> The Kingdom of Morocco expresses reservation on the inclusion of this Decision

<sup>3</sup> The Kingdom of Morocco expresses reservation on the adoption of the new nomenclature

- a) African Union – European Union Partnership
  - b) African Union – League of Arab States Partnership
  - c) African Union – South America Partnership
  - d) African Union – India Partnership
  - e) African Union – Korea Partnership
  - f) African Union – Turkey Partnership
- (x) **Take Note of** the classification of AU Partnerships in three categories, namely:
- A. **Strategic Partnerships:** In line with the definition of the African Union Strategic Partnerships as captured in the Report of the Evaluation of the Strategic Partnerships, the following Partnerships would be categorized as strategic or potentially strategic, taking into consideration their ability to meet the criteria as identified in the said evaluation report and the guiding principles established in the African Union Outline Framework for Strategic Partnerships adopted by the PRC:
    - a) African Union – European Union Partnership
    - b) African Union – League of Arab States Partnership
    - c) African Union – South America Partnership
    - d) African Union – India Partnership
    - e) African Union – Korea Partnership
    - f) African Union – Turkey Partnership
    - g) Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)
    - h) Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD)
  - B. **Institutional Dialogue:** Includes other Partnerships through strategic dialogue and multilateral cooperation, such as the High Level Dialogue between the African Union Commission and the U.S. Government through the U.S. Department of State.
  - C. **Emerging Partnerships:** Such new Partnerships to be proposed by the PRC in collaboration with the Commission, based on the criteria identified in the Evaluation Report on the African Union Strategic Partnerships and the guiding principles established in the Outline Framework adopted by the PRC.
- (xi) **Request** the PRC to further review the criteria for the classification of the African Union Partnerships and to report to the January 2020 Summit.
- (xii) **Approve** the qualification of “African Union Strategic Partnerships” when the relationship with a Partner is considered strategic. Otherwise, the qualification of “African Union Partnerships” should be used in other cases where the relationship is not considered strategic. In both cases, it is the African Union that will act on behalf of Africa in representing its collective interests with the Partners.

- (xiii) **Call upon** the PRC in collaboration with the Commission to develop a mechanism with Member States, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), AU Organs and AU Specialized Agencies, African Union Development Agency (AUDA-NPCA), the Private Sector, Academia and Civil Society, to formalize collaboration modalities for interactive and effective coordination of partnerships activities;
- (xiv) **Request** the PRC in collaboration with the Commission to engage with the existing strategic partners with a view to restructuring the Framework of Cooperation for all African Union Partnerships, in line with all relevant AU decisions to ensure that partnerships are based on the principles of equality, ownership, accountability, inclusivity, mutual respect, efficiency, consistency, value addition and comparative advantage;
- (xv) **Further Request** the Chairperson of the Commission to engage Partners on the content of all AU Decisions in order to ensure their full implementation, especially in relation to the full participation of all Member States in line with the relevant Decisions of the AU<sup>4</sup>;
- ,
- (xvi) **Decide to Upgrade** the Partnerships Management and Coordination Division under the Bureau of the Chairperson to a Directorate, in accordance with the mandate given by the Assembly on matters related to structures within the ongoing Institutional Reform.

## Part II. Partnerships Specific Issues

### 2.1 AU – EU Partnership

10. Executive Council Decision No.: EX.CL/Dec.986 (XXXII) of January 2018, requested “*the PRC, in close collaboration with the Commission, to negotiate and agree with the EU on the Projects and programmes within the AU-EU Joint Priority areas of cooperation that both sides agree to implement and to report on the outcome of this engagement to the June/July 2018 AU Summit*”.

11. Following the above-mentioned Decision, the two Commissions engaged at various levels to elaborate and submit for consideration by the Sub-Committee a Joint Priority Projects based on the four (4) priority areas as agreed in the Abidjan Declaration, namely: **1) Investing in people – education, science, technology and skills development; 2/ Strengthening Resilience, Peace, Security and Governance; 3/ Mobilizing investments for African structural sustainable transformation; 4/ Migration and Mobility.**

---

<sup>4</sup> The Kingdom of Morocco expresses reservation on the inclusion of this Decision

12. At its meeting held on 12<sup>th</sup> April 2018, the Sub-Committee considered the first proposal of the Joint Priority Projects submitted by the Commission and rejected it because the proposal did not contain any concrete commitment from the European side for Africa's Economic Development, but instead emphasized on political, governance and human rights issues. The Sub-Committee directed the Commission to renegotiate the document with the European Commission and revise the Joint Priority Projects.

13. A revised version of the 5<sup>th</sup> AU-EU Summit Joint Priority Projects was submitted for the consideration of the Sub-Committee during its meetings held on 14<sup>th</sup> June, 12<sup>th</sup> July, 25<sup>th</sup> October and 10<sup>th</sup>-11<sup>th</sup> December, 2018. The Sub-Committee reviewed the proposals and agreed to adopt the Draft Joint Priority Projects for discussion with the EU side, at the upcoming Ministerial Meeting to be held on 21<sup>st</sup>-22<sup>nd</sup> January 2019, in Brussels, Belgium.

### **Recommendations:**

14. The PRC Sub-Committee of the Whole on Multilateral Cooperation proposes that the PRC recommends to the Executive Council to:

- (i) **Endorse** the 5<sup>th</sup> AU-EU Summit Joint Priority Projects for the period 2018-2021;
- (ii) **Call upon** the two sides, to speed up the implementation of the priority projects and to report on the progress made to the 2020 January Summit.
- (iii) **Request** the PRC in collaboration with the Commission to develop a comprehensive follow-up mechanism of the African Union – European Union Partnership in consultation with the European side, which allows both sides to assess in an efficient and effective manner the implementation of the agreed areas of cooperation.

## **2.2 African Union – League of Arab States Partnership**

15. The 11<sup>th</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> Meetings of the Senior Officials of the African Union – League of Arab States Partnership Coordination Committee were held on 24<sup>th</sup> April 2018, at the League of Arab States Headquarters in Cairo, Egypt and on 28<sup>th</sup> August 2018, at the African Union Headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The meetings discussed various issues concerning the Partnership, and the implementation of the 4<sup>th</sup> Africa-Arab Summit Resolutions.

16. Present at both meetings on the African side were, the Republic of Rwanda (Current Chair of the African Union), the Republic of Guinea (Past Chair of the Africa Union), the Arab Republic of Egypt (Incoming Chair of the African Union), the Republic of Djibouti (Chair of the African Union Sub-Committee of the Whole on Multilateral Cooperation), as well as the Republic of Equatorial Guinea (Host Country of the Fourth Africa-Arab Summit), while participating on the Arab side were the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Chair of the Arab League and designated host of the 5<sup>th</sup> Africa – Arab Summit),

the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Immediate past Chair of the Arab League) and the Republic of Tunisia (Incoming Chair of the Arab League).

**17.** The meetings were co-chaired by the Republic of Rwanda representing the African side and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, representing the Arab side. The meeting deliberated on, but not limited to the following issues; Progress report and update on the AU-LAS partnership meetings and implementation of the Decisions adopted by the Malabo 2016 Summit; Ongoing AU-LAS projects; the Joint Action Plan and Resolution 10 which talks about the Criteria and Principles for Participation in the meetings of the Partnership; the African Union-League of Arab States efforts regarding Palestine and preparations for the 5<sup>th</sup> Africa-Arab Summit in Saudi Arabia.

**18.** Both sides agreed on all points of discussion and the following recommendations were adopted:

- That both sides should complete and consolidate the Joint Action Plan, which was submitted by the African side during the 11<sup>th</sup> meeting held on 24<sup>th</sup> April 2018, in Cairo, in accordance with Resolution 7 of the 4<sup>th</sup> Africa-Arab Summit held in 2016, as a step towards adopting it by an Extraordinary Session of the Joint Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which convenes for that purpose during the 1<sup>st</sup> quarter of 2019.
- The preparatory Committee for the 5<sup>th</sup> Africa – Arab Summit scheduled to be held in 2019 in Saudi Arabia, (composed of the AUC, LAS, and the host country of the Summit), to meet at the earliest opportunity, to commence preparations for the Summit including the drafting of a concept note.
- On Resolution 10, as adopted by the Africa-Arab Summit of 2016 in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, on the Principles and Criteria for participation in meetings and events of the Africa-Arab Partnership, both sides agreed for the issue to be discussed at higher political levels rather than the technical level as it was beyond the mandate of the Coordination Committee to pronounce itself on such matters due to the importance and sensitive nature of the issue.

**19.** The meeting agreed to convene the 13<sup>th</sup> Senior Officials Meeting of the Coordination Committee in Cairo, Egypt in February 2019. The exact date and format will be agreed upon between the two sides.

**20.** The 6<sup>th</sup> Ministerial Meeting of the Coordination Committee of the Africa-Arab Partnership was held on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly in New York on 27<sup>th</sup> September 2018. The meeting was co-chaired by H.E. Mr. Mahmoud Ali Youssouf Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Djibouti and Mr. Abdallah Y. al-Mouallimi, Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations, (the current Chairs of the African Union Sub-Committee on Multilateral Cooperation and the Arab Summit, respectively).



21. The Progress Report of the Senior Officials of the Coordination Committee on the AU-LAS Partnership and the implementation of the Resolutions of the 4<sup>th</sup> Africa-Arab Summit was considered and adopted.

22. The 7<sup>th</sup> AU-LAS Ministerial Meeting of the Coordination Committee will be held during the Extraordinary Session of the Joint Council of Ministers meeting scheduled to be held in March 2019, in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

### **Recommendations:**

23. The Sub-Committee of the Whole on Multilateral Cooperation proposes that the PRC recommends to the Executive Council to:

- (i) **Recall** its Decision No.: EX.CL/Dec.942 (XXX) of the Thirtieth Ordinary Session of the Executive Council, on 25<sup>th</sup>-27<sup>th</sup> January 2017, Addis Ababa, which directed the Commission, in accordance with the principles and decisions of the AU, and in collaboration with the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States, to coordinate and follow up on the timely implementation of the Resolutions of the 4<sup>th</sup> Africa-Arab Summit especially Resolution 7, which called for the convening of an Extraordinary Session of the Joint Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, within a period of six (6) months from the date of this Resolution to adopt the joint Africa-Arab Action Plan, and **Request** the Commission to expedite the organization of the Extraordinary Session of the Joint Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

### **2.3 Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD)**

24. The activities focused on the follow up of the implementation of the TICAD V Action Plan (2013-2017) and TICAD VI Implementation Plan (2016-2019), and the preparation for the upcoming TICAD VII Summit to be held in Yokohama, Japan in August 2019.

25. Following the endorsement by the AU July Summit of the dates of 6<sup>th</sup>-7<sup>th</sup> October 2018, for the TICAD VI Ministerial Follow up and TICAD VII Preparatory Meeting, and of 28<sup>th</sup>-30<sup>th</sup> August 2019, for the TICAD VII Summit, in Yokohama, Japan, the 2018 Ministerial Meeting was held on the above-mentioned dates. The meeting adopted the 2018 TICAD Report on the implementation of the TICAD V Action Plan and TICAD VI Implementation Plan and elaborated on the Strategic Direction in the lead up to the upcoming TICAD VII Summit. It also underscored the importance of advancing the dialogue on Africa with Africans at the center, which is in line with the TICAD philosophy of 'African Ownership' and 'International Partnership,' working in close synergy.

### **Recommendations**

**26.** The PRC Sub-Committee of the Whole on Multilateral Cooperation proposes that the PRC recommends to the Executive Council to:

- (i) **Express appreciation** to Japan for hosting the TICAD VI Ministerial Follow up and TICAD VII Preparatory Meetings, in Tokyo, Japan, on 6<sup>th</sup>-7<sup>th</sup> October 2018;
- (ii) **Reaffirm** to Japan the need to respect AU Decisions on participation in all partnerships meetings, events and activities of which AU is part, in the lead up to the TICAD VII Summit.
- (iii) **Direct** the PRC in collaboration with the Commission to take necessary steps for the successful holding of the upcoming TICAD VII Summit.

#### **2.4 African Union-Turkey Partnership**

**27.** In line with the follow up of the implementation plan for 2015-2019, the second Africa-Turkey Ministerial Review Conference was held on 11<sup>th</sup>-12<sup>th</sup> February 2018 in Istanbul, Turkey.

**28.** The Ministerial Meeting adopted a Joint Communiqué, in which both sides identified the need to enhance cooperation at the multilateral level.

**29.** The Second Turkey-Africa Economic and Business Forum was held in Istanbul, Turkey, on 10<sup>th</sup>-11<sup>th</sup> October 2018.

**30.** The Forum was honored by the presence of H.E. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, President of the Republic of Turkey, Rt. Honorable Dr. Edouard Ngirente, Prime Minister of the Republic of Rwanda on behalf of H.E. Paul Kagame President of the Republic of Rwanda and current Chairperson of the African Union and H.E. Mulatu Teshome, President of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. The Commission was represented by H.E. Victor Harrison, Commissioner for Economic Affairs.

**31.** The Forum was organized by the African Union Commission and the Ministry of Trade of the Republic of Turkey.

**32.** The Forum was attended by more than 3000 participants including Officials from forty two (42) African Countries, Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) financial Institutions from Turkey and Africa as well as the Private Sector Institutions and Representatives.

**33.** The Forum concluded with the adoption of a joint Communiqué and with the following recommendations:

- (i) The participating countries to take necessary measures to encourage Turkish and African enterprises as well as financial institutions to expand investment and participate in infrastructure projects through various means, such as Public-Private Partnership (PPP) and Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT).
- (ii) Private sector investment in agriculture, electricity production, transmission and delivery facilities and services, aviation, maritime, education and health should be considered as priority areas, especially in small and medium scale enterprises development.

## Recommendations

34. The PRC Sub-Committee of the Whole on Multilateral Cooperation proposes that the PRC recommends to the Executive Council to:

- (i) **Call Upon** the PRC in collaboration with the Commission to engage with the Turkish side to agree on the dates for the African Union-Turkey Summit to be held in Istanbul, Turkey in 2019, and work together towards identifying concrete implementable areas of cooperation that would enable the two sides enhance cooperation at the multilateral level.

### 2.5 African Union – Korea Partnership

35. The second African Union – Korea Partnerships Policy Consultation Meeting was held in Seoul, Korea, 9<sup>th</sup>-11<sup>th</sup> October 2018, immediately after the TICAD Ministerial Meeting held in Tokyo, Japan.

36. The annual African Union – Korea Partnership Policy Consultation meeting has been established as an annual follow-up mechanism of the partnership after the 4<sup>th</sup> Africa–Korea Ministerial Forum held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 6<sup>th</sup>-7<sup>th</sup> December 2016. During the said Ministerial Forum, at the request of the African side, it was decided that, the cycle of the Ministerial Forum, which until then was held on a three-year cycle, be for a period of five years in accordance with relevant decisions of the Executive Council.

37. Consequently, both sides agreed on the need to meet every year at Senior Officials level (Chair of PRC, Chair and Rapporteur of the Sub-Committee of the Whole on Multilateral Cooperation and the Commission) to maintain necessary dialogue and to ensure that the Decisions of the Forum are fully implemented.

38. The objectives of the 2<sup>nd</sup> African Union – Korea Policy consultation meeting were to:

- (i) Strengthen the African Union – Korea Partnership through regular dialogue;
- (ii) Follow-up on the implementation of the outcomes of the 4<sup>th</sup> Ministerial Forum, in particular, the implementation of the Framework of Cooperation 2017-2021;
- (iii) Advocate and mobilize the Korean leadership to support Africa's development through the implementation of the AU Agenda 2063 and its First Ten Year Implementation Plan.

39. The meeting acknowledged that significant progress has been made in the implementation of peace and security programs and projects, particularly with regard to the deployment of the Level II Hospital in Gao, Mali as well as Korea's contribution to the African Union's Peace Fund. However, the African side noted that in other development-oriented areas, efforts remain to be made.

### 2.6 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)

40. The Sub-Committee of the Whole on Multilateral Cooperation has not been involved in the preparatory process related to the FOCAC. However, the Sub-Committee was informed that the Government of China and South Africa, the African side Coordinator in the FOCAC mechanism, agreed to hold the FOCAC Summit in Beijing, China, on 3<sup>rd</sup>- 4<sup>th</sup> September 2018.

**41.** The FOCAC Summit was effectively held as scheduled in Beijing, China, at Heads of State and Government levels. The FOCAC Summit adopted the Beijing Declaration “Towards an even stronger China-Africa Community with a shared future” and the FOCAC Beijing Action Plan (2019 – 2021).

**Recommendations:**

**42.** The Sub-Committee proposes that the PRC recommends to the Executive Council to:

- (i) **Request** the PRC in close collaboration with the Commission to follow-up with the Chinese side on the implementation of the FOCAC Beijing Action Plan 2019 – 2021 and to report on the progress made.

**AFRICAN UNION**

**الاتحاد الأفريقي**



**UNION AFRICAINE**

**UNIÃO AFRICANA**

---

Addis Ababa, ETHIOPIA

P. O. Box 3243

Telephone: 517 700

Fax: 5130 36

Website: [www.au.int](http://www.au.int)

---

**EX.CL/1104(XXXIV)iii Annex 1**  
**Original: English**

**REVISED REPORT OF THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES' COMMITTEE (PRC)  
ON THE EVALUATION OF THE STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS**

## Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION/BACKGROUND .....	1
PART A: OVERALL CHALLENGES IN ENGAGING PARTNERS.....	9
The Appropriate Nomenclature for the Partnership.....	9
Recommendations:.....	10
Definition of a Strategic Partnership.....	11
Recommendations:.....	14
Cycle of Partnership Meetings and their Venue .....	14
Recommendations:.....	15
Participation all Member States in meetings organized within the framework of Strategic Partnerships.....	16
Recommendations:.....	17
Adoption of an African Union Strategic Partnership Policy and Strategy Framework and determining what Africa wants in line with the AU Agenda 2063 .....	17
Recommendations:.....	18
PART B: CASE STUDIES AND ANALYSIS OF SPECIFIC PARTNERSHIPS WITH RESPECTIVE RECOMMENDATIONS .....	20
African Union (AU)-European Union (EU) Partnership .....	20
Legal / Institutional framework .....	20
Policy and Strategy Framework .....	20
Institutional, governance and management set-up .....	21
Relevance.....	21
Outcomes .....	22
Implementation level of Activities .....	22
Socio-economic transformational impacts .....	22
Effectiveness and Efficiency .....	23
Value addition of the Strategic Partnerships.....	23
Conclusion:.....	23
Contentious Issues and Weaknesses.....	<b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b>
Recommendations:.....	<b>Error! Bookmark not defined.</b>

African Union-South America Cooperation Forum (ASACOF) .....	24
Legal / Institutional framework .....	24
Policy and Strategy Framework .....	25
Institutional, governance and management set-up .....	25
Outcomes .....	25
Implementation level of Activities .....	25
Socio-economic transformational impact .....	26
Effectiveness and Efficiency .....	26
Value addition of the Strategic Partnerships .....	26
Conclusion and Recommendations .....	26
African Union - Arab Partnership .....	28
Legal / Institutional Framework .....	28
Policy and Strategy Framework .....	29
Institutional, governance and management set-up .....	29
Relevance .....	29
Outcomes .....	29
Implementation level of Activities .....	30
Socio-economic transformational impact .....	31
Effectiveness and Efficiency .....	31
Value addition of the Strategic Partnerships .....	31
Conclusion and Recommendations:.....	31
African Union - India Partnership .....	33
Legal / Institutional Framework .....	33
Policy and Strategy Framework .....	33
Institutional, governance and management arrangement .....	34
Relevance .....	34
Outcomes .....	34
Implementation level of Activities .....	34
Socio-economic transformational impact .....	34
Effectiveness and Efficiency .....	35
Value addition of the Strategic Partnerships .....	35

Conclusion and Recommendations: .....	35
Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) .....	36
Legal / Institutional framework .....	36
Policy and Strategy Framework .....	36
Institutional, governance and management set-up .....	37
Relevance .....	37
Outcomes .....	37
Implementation level of Activities .....	38
Socio-economic transformational impact .....	38
Effectiveness and Efficiency .....	38
Value addition of TICAD .....	39
Conclusion and Recommendations: .....	39
Recommendation on M&E mechanism:.....	40
Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) .....	41
Legal / Institutional framework .....	41
Policy and Strategy Framework .....	41
Institutional, governance and management set-up .....	42
Relevance .....	42
Outcomes .....	42
Implementation level of Activities .....	42
Socio-economic transformational impacts .....	42
Effectiveness and Efficiency .....	43
Value addition of the Strategic Partnerships .....	43
Conclusion and Recommendations: .....	43
African Union-Korea Partnership .....	45
Legal / Institutional framework .....	45
Policy and Strategy Framework .....	46
Institutional, governance and management set-up .....	46
Relevance .....	46
Outcomes .....	47
Implementation level of Activities .....	47



Socio-economic transformational impact .....	47
Effectiveness and Efficiency .....	48
Value addition of the Partnership .....	48
African Union-Turkey Partnership .....	49
Legal / Institutional framework .....	49
Policy and Strategy Framework .....	49
Institutional, governance and management set-up .....	49
Outcomes .....	50
Implementation level of Activities .....	50
Socio-economic transformational impact .....	50
Effectiveness and Efficiency .....	50
Value addition of the Strategic Partnership .....	51
Conclusion and Recommendations .....	51
African Union Commission-US High Level Dialogue .....	52

[PART C: RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE ENHANCEMENT OF THE INSTITUTIONAL STATE OF THE AU COMMISSION TO DRIVE THE AFRICAN UNION'S ENGAGEMENTS WITH PARTNERS](#)

AU- Level Challenges in the Management of Strategic Partnerships .....	53
Enhancement of the institutional state of the AU Commission to drive the African Union's engagements with Partners .....	60
<b>CONCLUSION .....</b>	<b>63</b>

List of Acronyms

AACI	Africa-Arab Cultural Institute
ACBF	African Capacity Building Foundation
ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
ADC	African Diplomatic Corps
AfDB	African Development Bank
AGA	African Governance Architecture
AIDA	Accelerated Industrial Development for Africa
AMV	Africa Mining Vision
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
ARC	African Risk Capacity

AU	African Union
AUC	African Union Commission
AUDA-NPCA	African Union Development Agency-NEPAD Planning and Coordination Agency
AU-MS	African Union Member States
AU-SA	African Union South America Partnership
BADEA	Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa
BIAT	Boosting Intra-African Trade
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme
CADF	China-Africa Development Fund
CSO	Civil Society Organization
EIP	European External Investment Plan
EPC	Engineering Procurement and Construction
EU	European Union

FDI	Foreign Direct Investments
FOCAC	Forum on China Africa Cooperation
HLD	High Level Dialogue
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
ITEC	Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Program
ITF	Africa-EU Infrastructure Trust Fund
JAES	Joint Africa-EU Strategy
JEGs	Joint Expert Groups
JETRO	Japan External Trade Organization
JICA	Japan International Cooperation Agency
KIAD	Korean Initiative of African Development
LAS	League of Arab States
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding

OAU	Organization of African Unity
-----	-------------------------------

ODA	Official Development Assistance
OGM	Oil, Gas and Mining
PACCI	Pan African Chamber of Commerce and Industry
PAWO	Pan African Women Organization
PIDA	Programme for infrastructure Development in Africa
PMCD	Partnerships Management and Coordination Division
PMIS	Partnerships Management and Information System
PPP	Public Private Partnership
PRC	Permanent Representatives Committee

PSO	Private Sector Organization
REC	Regional Economic Community
SCMC	Sub-Committee on Multilateral Cooperation
SMART	Specific Measurable Achievable Relevant and Time-bound
SME	Small and Medium Enterprise
SMI	Small and Medium Industry
SPFPG	Strategic Partnerships Focal Points Group
STI	Science Technology and Innovation
TICAD	Tokyo International Conference on African Development
TVET	Technical, Vocational and Educational Training
UN	United Nations
UN SDGs	United Nations Sustainable Development Goals
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNOSAA	United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Africa
WTO	World Trade Organization
YALI	Young African Leadership Initiative

## Introduction/Background

1. The dawn of a new era within the African polity began at the establishment of the African Union (AU) in 2002. The establishment of the African Union did not spell a total departure from the objectives of its preceding and successful continental body, known as the Organization of the African Unity (OAU), established in 1963.

2. While the main objectives of the OAU included a holistic pursuit to totally liberate the continent from colonization and apartheid; promote unity and solidarity among African States; coordinate and intensify cooperation for development; safeguard the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Member States and stimulate international cooperation within the framework of the United Nations (UN), the objective of the AU in turn reinforces the intent and purposes of the OAU, but with a greater thrust to accelerate the process of continental development and integration, and where necessary, collaborate with the international community, with a view to rightfully play its role in the global economy.

3. As part of the mandate of the African Union, the drive for continental development and integration required that the continental body builds synergy with other parts of the world focusing on where maximum mutual benefits would be derivable. It is in this spirit that the AU, soon after its establishment began to consolidate, strategize and diversify its engagements with the other parts of the world to seek cooperation aimed at advancing the process of achieving its development and integration agenda. This motivation resulted in the establishment of relationships with various international bodies and groups, countries, and continents.

4. The significant socio-economic and political development that Africa witnessed at the turn of the century ignited a renewed interest among the major global players. The interest shown in Africa by emerging economic powers such as China, India, Brazil, Turkey, may have also triggered a renewed interest from longstanding global powers such as United States of America (USA), Europe and Japan. Therefore, the strategy to adopt in dealing with Africa's Partners should be premised on a significant degree of inter-dependability that achieves parity between Africa and its partners. Hence, there is a need to ask the following questions:

- What defines a strategic partnership and how do we ensure that a partnership is strategic?
- What do partners want from Africa and what does Africa want from the partners?
- Is there an African resource that more than one of the partners want? If so, how can Africa strategize or engage in negotiations in a manner that optimizes its gains?
- Is there a resource that Africa needs that more than one of the partners can provide? If so, how can Africa negotiate with the others to minimize costs?

- Is there a need that Africa has, which may be too overwhelming for one Partner to undertake? In that case, how can Africa build a Consortium around such a need?
- Are there areas of common interest and experience that Africa can share and replicate?
- How does the African Union establish new partnerships?

5. However, due to a lack of proper guidelines and a systematic approach on how to engage in meaningful and strategic relationships with the—other parts of the world, meant that an increasing number of requests for partnerships from the International Community, coupled with enthusiasm by the African Union/African Union Commission (AU/AUC) led to the aforementioned proliferation in agreements and Memorandum of Understandings (MoUs) without prior study. Africa's needs were not properly identified on the outset. In addition, the Partners' areas of core competences were not understood before embarking on the Partnerships. As a result, there were convoluted activities that have featured myriad areas of cooperation. This meant that Africa engaged its Partners in numerous areas, without clear focus or objectives, thereby achieving little.

6. Based on the enumerated shortcomings and the resultant illogicality, the Executive Council, at its 12<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session held in Addis Ababa in January 2007, adopted decision EX.CL/Dec.318 (X)<sup>5</sup>, which among other things, requested the AU Commission to deploy necessary efforts to develop a new type of partnerships in order to maximize mutual benefits and to earmark adequate resources in the budget<sup>6</sup> for that purpose. This policy was premised on the growing number of partnerships with other parts of the world and the continued requests from prospective Partners to establish new partnerships with the African Union.

7. Therefore, with the nine Partnerships already in existence, and the growing number of those under consideration, as well as those to be initiated, the Executive Council, at its 19<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session held in Malabo in June 2011, adopted decision EX.CL/Dec.646 (XIX)<sup>7</sup> on Structural reforms and decided to create the Division of Partnership Management and Coordination in the Office of the Chairperson of the Commission. Following this Decision, the Division was created in 2012.

---

<sup>5</sup>EX.CL/Dec.318 (X) para 3: REQUESTS the Commission to deploy necessary efforts to develop a new type of partnership of a horizontal nature in order to maximize mutual benefit

<sup>6</sup> EX.CL/Dec.318 (X) para 7: REQUESTS the Commission to earmark resources in its budget, for the review, assessment and follow-up of Africa's strategic partnerships with the Emerging Powers of the South

<sup>7</sup> EX.CL/Dec.646 (XIX), para 2: DECIDES to create the Division of Strategic Partnerships in the Office of the Chairperson of the Commission, with the following structure: One (1) Head of Division (P5) ☐ Four (4) Senior Policy Officers (P3) ☐ Five (5) Policy officers (P2) ☐ One (1) Secretary (GSA4) ☐ One(1) Mail Runner (GSB6)

8. In compliance with the Executive Council Decision EX.CL/Dec.397 (XII)<sup>8</sup> an evaluation of the Strategic Partnership was carried out by AUC with the technical and financial support of United Nations Development Programme Regional Service Centre for Africa (UNDP RSCA). A Report entitled “Evaluation of Africa’s Strategic Partnerships” was submitted to the Sub-Committee on Multilateral Cooperation (SCMC)<sup>9</sup> in November 2014.

9. The evaluation targeted the AU’s approach towards building and managing partnerships within the ongoing Reform Process, as well as how AU has fared on the existing nine (9) so called “strategic partnerships” entered into by Africa through OAU/ AU namely:

- African Union - League of Arab States– established in 1977
- African Union-European Union – established in 2000
- African Union-South America – AU-South America – established in 2006
- African Union-Korea Partnership – established in 2006

African Union-India – established in 2008

- African Union- Turkey – established in 2008
  
- Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) – established in 1993
- Forum for China - Africa Cooperation Forum (FOCAC) – established 2000
- African Union Commission-United States High-level Dialogue – established in 2013

10. Consequently, Executive Council Decisions EX.CL/Dec.877 (XXVII)<sup>10</sup> of June 2015, EX.CL/Dec. 899(XXVIII)<sup>11</sup> of January 2016, EX.CL/Dec. 942(XXX)<sup>12</sup> of January 2017, EX.CL/Dec. 967(XXXI)<sup>13</sup> of July 2017, requested the PRC to hold in-depth discussions on all aspects of strategic partnerships and ensure that negotiations of substantive issues with respect to partnerships be guided by the outcome of the Evaluation of the Strategic Partnerships.

---

<sup>8</sup> EX.CL/Dec.397 (XII), para 8: REQUESTS the AU Commission to follow-up on this process and undertake a global review of all existing partnerships in order to effectively implement strategies and action plans agreed upon between Africa and its international partners, rationalize the number of Summits, and identify criteria for such partnerships to ensure coherence between and within these partnerships and make necessary recommendations to Council and the Assembly

<sup>9</sup> Also referred to as “Sub-Committee”

<sup>10</sup> EX.CL/Dec.877 (XXVII), para 11 (i): the PRC to ensure that discussions and negotiations on substantive issues with respect to partnerships be guided by the outcome of the Evaluation of the Strategic Partnerships and to submit recommendations regarding the said Evaluation to the January 2016 Summit;

<sup>11</sup> EX.CL/Dec. 899(XXVIII), para 18: DECIDES that the PRC will take the lead in representing Africa before the Partners, while soliciting the views of the Africa Groups accredited to the Partners concerned;

<sup>12</sup> EX.CL/Dec. 942(XXX), para 2: DIRECTS the PRC, in collaboration with the Commission and the RECs, to hold special sessions within the next six months (February-July) to allow for an in-depth discussion and analysis of all aspects of Strategic Partnership in order to formulate appropriate proposals and recommendations to be submitted to the July 2017 Summit

<sup>13</sup> EX.CL/Dec. 967(XXXI), para 8: RECALLS EX.CL/Dec.942 (XXX) of the 30th Ordinary Session of the Executive Council, 25 - 27 January 2017, Addis Ababa, which DIRECTED the PRC, in collaboration with the Commission and the RECs, to hold special sessions within six months to allow for an in-depth discussion and analysis of all aspects of Strategic Partnership in order to formulate appropriate proposals and recommendations.

11. However, the Sub-Committee on Multilateral Cooperation (SCMC) recognized a number of key limitations outlined in the initial 2014 evaluation document, namely the following:

- a) The views of Regional Economic Communities (RECs), African Union Development Agency/NEPAD Planning and Coordination Agency (AUDA/NPCA), Member States, and partners were not considered in this document, as the consultant was not able to visit those important stakeholders due to budgetary and time constraints;
- b) The consultant was not able to meet more members of the Sub-Committee to consolidate the very informative and directive feedback received from the Chair of the Sub-Committee and the Chair of the African Union before submitting the 2014 document;
- c) Most partnership data and information collected fail to differentiate between continental/regional cooperation and bilateral cooperation.

12. Hence, taking into account the outcomes of the aforementioned 2014 document on Evaluation of Strategic Partnerships, and its key limitations, the Sub-Committee on Multilateral Cooperation under the Chairmanship of Egypt, on 29<sup>th</sup> June 2015 embarked on the consideration of the Report entitled: "Evaluation of Africa's Strategic Partnerships" and put forward recommendations in an overall evaluation report entitled "Report of the Sub-Committee on Multilateral Cooperation on the Evaluation of the Strategic Partnerships." to PRC, which considered it during its retreat held in Cairo, Egypt, from 13 to 14 December 2017, and made a number of concrete recommendations, namely:

- The PRC in collaboration with the Commission should update the evaluation report taking into account actions and progress made in 2017 and to report to the June/July 2018 Summit as requested by the Executive Council Decision No.: EX.CL/Dec.967(XXXI)<sup>14</sup> taken at its Thirty -First Ordinary Session held from 27 June to 1 July 2017 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. In so doing, review of the nine strategic partnerships should be clearly articulated;
- Members of the PRC and/or the Commission can propose new partnerships based on the criteria identified in the evaluation report and the guiding principles as indicated in the outline Framework adopted by the PRC. In this regard, PRC emphasized the need to approach all engagements with the African Union Strategic Partnership in a more robust, purpose-driven and result-oriented manner. It recognized the need for the African Union to be self-oriented and proactive rather than being reactive in its engagements with Partners;
- The Sub-Committee on Multilateral Cooperation to become a Sub-Committee of the whole with immediate effect.;
- The Partnerships Management and Coordination Division (PMCD) to be upgraded to a Directorate in line with the AU institutional reform process, strengthened in terms of human and technical capacities, relevant skills and competences, which treat in a

---

<sup>14</sup>EX.CL/Dec.967(XXXI), para 9: MANDATES the Commission, in collaboration with the PRC, to undertake an in-depth evaluation of all partnerships and submit concrete recommendations in July 2018



holistic manner functions of partnerships management, coordination and resource mobilization;

- The consultation with wider stakeholders (RECs, Organs, civil society, diaspora, private sector, etc.) should be undertaken and their contributions be taken into account while ensuring strategic engagement with partners;
- Plans for enhancing capacity of the Partnerships Management and Coordination Division, Office of the Secretary General, Office of the Legal Counsel, should be elaborated through the appropriate channels, in line with the evaluation recommendations and the ongoing reform process.

**13.** The PRC agreed that the strategy for engaging with Partners and developing frameworks for cooperation as well as determining areas of cooperation should be premised on mutual needs and interests of Africa and its partners. In that respect, it was resolved that time has come for Africa to first identify its needs and gaps that may exist, which require the support of Partners, and then further identify the Partners that have such competences to assist.

**14.** Within that context, the PRC considered the Report of the Sub-Committee on the Evaluation of the nine Strategic Partnerships, in order to develop the recommendations for the attention of the Executive Council. As part of this exercise, the PRC proposed the areas of cooperation with Partners and documents entitled “African Union (AU) Outline Framework for Strategic Partnerships”<sup>15</sup> and “Existing Structures and Formalized African Strategic Partnerships: African Aspirations and Core Competencies of the Partners”<sup>16</sup>.

**15.** The report of the PRC, as presented below has been classified in three categories, namely:

- *Part A: **Overall Challenges on partnerships***
- *Part B: **Analysis of the existing partnerships with respective recommendations***
- *Part C: **Enhancement of the institutional state of the AU Commission to drive the African Union’s engagements with strategic Partnerships***

---

<sup>15</sup> Refer to Annex 1

<sup>16</sup> Refer to Annex 2

## PART A: Overall Challenges on Partnerships

**16.** In the process of evaluating “Strategic Partnerships”, the PRC identified several overall challenges that are cross-cutting when engaging Partners, namely the following:

- a. The appropriate nomenclature for the Partnership;
- b. Definition of a Strategic Partnership;
- c. The cycle of Partnership meetings and their venue;
- d. Participation of Member States in meetings organized within the framework of Partnerships;
- e. An African Union Policy and Strategy Framework on Partnerships.

**17.** Continued heated debates on the aforementioned challenges within the African Union Policy Organs and with the Partners, have significantly hindered the capacity of the African Union to adequately act on behalf of Africa in advancing its collective interests with the Partners. Hence, consideration of these challenges and any recommendations therein, are with a view to facilitating an effective, efficient and result-oriented engagement and management of the African Union Partnerships, ultimately for the betterment of the relationship as a whole.

### a. The Appropriate Nomenclature for the Partnership

**18.** The Executive Council requested the PRC in collaboration with the Commission to determine the appropriate nomenclature for Strategic Partnerships given the current variances in this regard, as some Partnerships use the term “Africa”, whereas others use the term “African Union” (Paragraph 11(IV) of EX.CL/Dec. 877(XVIII))<sup>17</sup>.

**19.** The AU membership now encompasses all the 55 African countries. In this regard, Decision EX.CL/Dec. 967(XXXI)<sup>18</sup> of July 2017, and Decision EX.CL/Dec. 986 (XXXII)<sup>19</sup> of January 2018, of the Executive Council approved the nomenclature for the partnership with the European Union as follows: “African Union (AU) – European Union (EU) Partnership” instead of “Africa – EU partnership”. Based on the above-mentioned Decision, which clearly

---

<sup>17</sup> EX.CL/Dec. 877(XVIII) Para 11(iv): the PRC, in collaboration with the Commission, to determine the appropriate name for the Strategic Partnerships and report back to the next session of the Executive Council in January 2016;

<sup>18</sup> Decision EX.CL/Dec. 967(XXXI), para 12 (ii): Approves the nomenclature for the partnership with the European Union to be: “African Union (AU) – European Union (EU) Partnership” instead of “Africa – EU partnership”<sup>1</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Decision EX.CL/Dec. 986 (XXXII), para 4: REITERATES Executive Council Decisions; (EX.CL/Dec.942(XXX)), of January 2017, (EX.CL/Dec.899(XXVIII)) of January 2016 and (EX.CL/Dec.877(XXVII)) of June 2015, referring to the right of all Member States without distinction to participate in all meetings, activities and events organized within the context of partnerships of which the AU is part, which should be implemented in line with the relevant Assembly decisions

reaffirmed the centrality of the AU as the legitimate representative of Africa's interests, it is imperative for consistency reasons and in line with relevant decisions, that the nomenclatures of all the partnerships be: "African Union – Partner's Name" except in the case of FOCAC and TICAD<sup>20</sup>.

**20.** AU Summit decisions on the AU Reform have consistently pointed to the need for all African Union Member States to remain firmly committed to preserving Africa's unity and to continue to speak with one voice at the international arena.

## Recommendations

**21.** The PRC recommends that:

- a. For all the partnerships with the other part of the world the nomenclature of "African Union – Partner" should be used<sup>21</sup>;
- b. The qualification of "African Union Strategic Partnerships" should be used when the relationship with a Partner is considered strategic. Otherwise, the qualification of "African Union Partnership" should be used in other cases where the relation is not considered strategic. In both cases, it is the AU that will act on behalf of Africa in representing its collective interest with the Partners;
- c. African Union Strategic Partnerships/African Union Partnerships be guided by the following basic principles:
  - Partnership with respective partners should focus on specific areas, after conducting an assessment on the prospective Partners' abilities and their willingness to engage in identified areas of cooperation;
  - Determination of areas of cooperation with Strategic Partners should be aligned with what Africa wants and in line with the Aspirations of the AU Agenda 2063 and its First Ten-Year Implementation Plan (2014-2023);
  - The areas of cooperation should not be ambiguous. It should be understandable, implementable, specific and result-oriented;
  - All documents to be developed in preparation for the strategic engagements with partners should reflect the African Union's strategic objectives, the comparative advantages of Partners and their ability to support AU objectives, and elaborate

---

<sup>20</sup> The Kingdom of Morocco expressed strong reservation on paragraph 19

<sup>21</sup> The Kingdom of Morocco expressed strong reservation on paragraph 21, a) and b).

- on what Africa can offer in return both in terms of its resources, technical capacities, political leverage, among other comparative advantages of Africa;
- Preparation, negotiation, and implementation of partnership scopes shall ensure consistency with regard to the concerns of all AU Member States, AU Organs, AU agencies, AURECs as well as other relevant African stakeholders;
  - The African Union should strive to originate all documents relating to the identified areas of cooperation and enable Africa to speak with one voice in negotiation of its interests with partners;
  - The development of Declarations for all Forum/Summit pronouncements should maintain a flow that is in sync with the identified areas of cooperation. It should be reader-friendly and precise. Representatives of both sides should endorse the Declaration so adopted, in order to preserve its authenticity;
  - There would be a need to ensure that the targets are set and systems for monitoring and evaluation are put in place in order to enable adequate tracking of results and feedback into strategy and decision making;
  - All activities undertaken within the framework of the partnership should be conducted in the spirit of trust, equality, inclusivity, mutual respect, transparency and confidence building; efficiency and consistency, comparative advantage and value addition.

## **b. Definition of a Strategic Partnership**

**22.** AU Agenda 2063 rooted in Pan Africanism and African Renaissance, provides a robust framework for addressing past injustices and the realization of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century as the African Century and also captures the essence of improving livelihoods of African people. It accommodates the interests of individual Member States as well as the continental values that would galvanize the general thrust of the continental development and integration agenda.

**23.** In that regard, it becomes important to examine the modalities for engaging with Partners with a view to determining whether the Union is heading towards a multilateral Partnership that enables achievement of higher level results under Agenda 2063. To achieve this harmony requires that Africa speaks in one voice. In this context, the issue of when a partnership qualifies as a Strategic Partnership is called into question. Several criteria have been proposed to that effect, namely the following:

- a.** The age of the partnership indicates how long the partnership relationship has stood the test and challenges of time and results achieved;
- b.** If a Partner wants to engage with Africa as a continent, there must be a regional/continental dimension beyond its bilateral relationship with individual Member States. This may also be examined by determining the amount of resources

earmarked by the Partner to the African Union for continental engagements, and the amount of resources dedicated for bilateral purposes. This is important in order to forestall any potential competition between individual Member States and the AU for the same pool of resources;

- c. The extent to which a partnership is supporting the African Union in implementing Agenda 2063, whether in a bilateral or a regional/continental context should be result based. It must have specific objectives and goals, first with African Self Interest in line with the AU Constitutive Act, AU Agenda 2063 and the AU Flagship Programmes and Projects. The higher the level of Agenda 2063 results achieved, the more strategic the partnership is considered. It is worth noting that domestication of Agenda 2063 is required to avoid the dichotomy between national and regional plans. This entails the full implementation of a road map to domesticating Agenda 2063, notwithstanding that this matter remains a sovereign decision for each Member State, given that it is up to each Member State to decide on the means of achieving the objectives enshrined in Agenda 2063. Hence, pending the full domestication of Agenda 2063, whereby national projects are fully aligned accordingly, the bilateral element in the Partnership shall remain independent of the multilateral element in such a relationship;
- d. The partnership must be long-term in nature with ability to ensure short term successes;
- e. The partnership must showcase prospect of win-win outcomes for mutual political, social and economic benefits as well readiness of the Partner to support AU in implementing Agenda 2063;
- f. It must be based on the principles of equality, inclusivity, mutual respect, accountability, ownership, efficiency, consistency, value addition and comparative advantage;
- g. It must be based on defined priorities, outcomes, outputs and impact indicators articulated in a Specific Measurable Achievable Relevant and Time-bound (SMART) manner with clearly defined implementation, follow up, monitoring and evaluation, and reporting mechanism;
- h. The degree of coordination between the Partners on one hand, and between the various bodies in the African Union and the African Ambassadors accredited to the Partner on the other hand. Taking into consideration the relatively limited scope of African diplomatic representation to Partners, compared to the African Union, it is worth noting that the Executive Council decided “that the PRC will take the lead in representing Africa before the Partners, while soliciting the views of the African Group of Ambassadors accredited to the Partners concerned” (Paragraph 17(IV) of EX.CL/Dec. 899(XXVII Rev.2)<sup>22</sup>);

---

<sup>22</sup> Decision EX.CL/Dec. 899(XXVII Rev.2, para 18: DECIDES that the PRC will take the lead in representing Africa before the Partners, while soliciting the views of the Africa Groups accredited to the Partners concerned;

- i. The degree of involvement of the African Union in the management of the Partnership relationship. Currently, the role of the African Union varies between a mere observer and a full partner. In addition, there appears to be some confusion regarding who represents the African Union in the relationship with the Partner, whether AU leadership or AUC or both. In this context, the presence of AU as an observer would not be possible in a Strategic Partnership. It is envisaged that in a Strategic Partnership, AU leadership (not AUC or the host country) would be co-chairing Partnership meetings.

**24.** Therefore, based on the above criteria, African Union Strategic Partnerships in its unique form could be defined as:

*“A Partnership which concretely contributes to the attainment of development and integration strategic objectives of the African continent through the mobilization of collective efforts built around specific objectives and goals, that are long term in nature with ability to deliver short term successes, first with African self-interest at heart in line with the AU Constitutive Act, the Solemn Declaration of the 50<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the African Union, Aspiration No.7 of AU Agenda 2063<sup>23</sup> and the AU Flagship Programmes and Projects.”*

*“Such Partnership will be based on: Partners’ readiness and abilities to engage in identified multilateral areas of cooperation, equality, inclusivity, mutual respect, accountability, ownership, efficiency, consistency, value addition and comparative advantage and then*

*with an extended prospect of win-win outcomes for mutual political, social and economic benefits, structured around defined priorities, outcomes, outputs and impact indicators articulated in “SMART” manner with clearly defined implementation, follow up, monitoring and evaluation, and reporting mechanism.”*

**25.** The aforementioned criteria would together assist in assessing whether various Partnerships would qualify as Strategic or not. Consequently, should a Partnership qualify as Strategic, this entails that it merits clear visibility for both the Partner and the African Union. Hence:

- a. The Chair of the African Union should be co-chairing the meeting with the Partner, notwithstanding the right of the Representative of the host country – if African – to deliver a welcome speech during the opening session and to be seated on the panel with the co-chairs, in a similar format that prevails during various AU Summits;

---

<sup>23</sup> Aspiration No. 7 of AU Agenda 2063: “Africa as a strong, united, resilient and influential global player and partner”.

## Recommendations

The PRC recommends to adopt the aforementioned criteria and definition of African Union Strategic Partnerships<sup>24</sup>.

### Cycle of Partnership Meetings and their Venues

#### *Frequency and cycle of Meetings:*

**26.** It has been noted that several Summits and other Partnership meetings were held while the comprehensive review of the various partnerships relationships has not yet been concluded as requested by the Summit. This situation posed an additional challenge, as preparation for such meetings hindered the completion of the envisaged comprehensive review. In fact, some Member States requested a moratorium on Partnership meetings until the comprehensive review is complete, in order to base the interaction with the Partners on clear guidance from the Summit. Others opposed such a moratorium, based on the need to respect current obligations in this regard.

**27.** In addition, it has been noted that most partnerships are on a three year cycle while some are on a five year cycle. In this regard, the Sub-Committee underscored the need to streamline the process of scheduling Partnership meetings, with a view to ensuring uniformity and allowing the accommodation of adequate preparatory processes for all Partnership meetings, while maintaining an adequate level of attendance by Heads of State and Government.

**28.** In this regard, in its Decision EX.CL/Dec.899(XXVIII)<sup>25</sup>, the Executive Council:

- a.** Encouraged Partners or designated host countries to ensure that other Partnership Summits' meetings (Senior Officials and Ministerial Meetings) are held at the same venue and immediately precede respective Partnership Summits;
- b.** Approved a five (5) year cycle, whereby two (2) partnership meetings are organized per year as from 2017 for all Strategic Partnerships, and requested the Commission to adopt its gradual implementation taking into consideration the need to reschedule previously adopted Partnership meetings accordingly, including at the Summit level, and in consultation with the respective Partners and host countries.

---

<sup>24</sup> The Kingdom of Morocco expressed strong reservation on this Recommendation

<sup>25</sup> A) EX.CL/Dec.899(XXVIII), para 19: ENCOURAGES Partners or designated host countries to ensure that other Partnership Summits' meetings (Senior Officials and Ministerial Meetings) are held at the same venue and immediately precede respective Partnership Summits;

B) EX.CL/Dec.899(XXVIII), para 20: APPROVES a five (5) year cycle and to organize two (2) partnership meetings per year as from 2017 for all Strategic Partnerships and REQUESTS the Commission to adopt its gradual implementation taking into consideration the need to reschedule previously adopted Partnership meetings accordingly, including at the Summit level, and in consultation with the respective Partners and host countries;

**29.** Consultations with Partners indicate the possibility of considering the application of a five year cycle to all partnerships as of 2017 with the exception of TICAD, whereby this cycle could be applied as of 2019 due to a previous commitment by Japan to hold the Summit for the first time in Africa (Kenya) in return for reducing the periodicity of the Summits from its original five (5) year cycle to its current three (3) year cycle. Reverting back to the five (5) year cycle requires agreement regarding the venue of the Summits and their Preparatory Meetings, in a manner that ensures adequate domestic visibility for both Partners. It is worth noting that any amendment in the partnership cycles requires endorsement by the Partners in their first upcoming Partnership Summits respectively.

**30.** Following completion and approval of evaluation of individual partnerships, the Executive Council may decide on a different cycle for specific partnerships, depending on the frequency of strategic decisions needed to be made.

**31.** In case the ongoing proliferation of Strategic Partnerships exceeds the capacity of the African Union to manage each of them independently within the approved 5 year cycle (two Partnership Summits per year, totaling 10 Strategic Partnerships over five years), then new modalities may be required to enhance the effective and efficient management of such partnerships. In line with Assembly Decision No. Assembly/AU/Dec. 635(XXVIII)<sup>26</sup> of January 2017, on the AU Institutional Reform, the AU is required to enhance the effectiveness of partnership summits. Therefore, Summits would only be held where issues of strategic nature are to be discussed and decided upon. Accordingly, there may be a need to amend the prevailing modalities, from single partnership management to collective partnership management, whereby an Annual Partnership Summit involving all Strategic Partners may be a substitute for the current single country/continent to continent Summit meetings.

## Recommendations

**32.** The PRC recommends:

- a. To continue the gradual implementation of the Executive Council Decision No.: EX.CL/Dec.899(XXVIII), on the five-year cycle for all Partnerships;

---

<sup>26</sup> Assembly/AU/Dec.635(XXVIII), para 5 (v): Partnership Summits convened by external parties shall be reviewed with a view to providing an effective framework for African Union partnerships. Africa will be represented by the Troika, namely the current, incoming and outgoing Chairpersons of the African Union, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, and the Chairpersons of the Regional Economic Communities as well as the Chairperson of the NEPA



b. To consider diversifying the prevailing modalities for scheduling of Partnerships meetings. Examples of alternative modalities include:

- Collective Partnership management, where groups of partners are gathered in collective meetings, if possible. This could be applied where the partnership scopes are complementary or issues of common interest would be discussed<sup>27</sup>;
- Inviting the partner to brief the PRC.
- Delegating some partnerships to the Commission to manage through strategic dialogues, such as the case of the United States, where issues to be discussed are of an implementation nature, do not create additional commitments on Member States, and do not require Heads of States attention.

**Venues:**

**33.** The Executive Council “encourages Partners or designated host countries to ensure that other Partnership Summits’ meetings (Senior Officials and Ministerial Meetings) are held at the same venue and immediately precede respective Partnership Summits” (Paragraph 19 of EX.CL/Dec.899(XXVIII) Rev.2).

**34.** However, given the need to extend the cycle of most Partnership meetings from a three year cycle to a five year cycle, it is worth considering that the modality for allocation of venues of meetings, should be such that when Partnership Summits holds in one Partner region, the preparatory meetings of that Partnership would hold in the hosting region and counterpart’s region, in order to promote ownership and necessary awareness.

Recommendation:

**35.** The PRC recommends that, when it comes to Africa, in particular, venues of Partnerships Meetings will be determined based on regional considerations, and where it would not be possible to host meetings in a particular region or country, the headquarters of the African Union would play host to such meetings.

**Participation of all Member States in meetings organized within the framework of Strategic Partnerships**

---

<sup>27</sup> The Kingdom of Morocco expressed strong reservation on this Recommendation

**36.** The Executive Council “requests the PRC in collaboration with the Commission to comply with and implement Paragraph 10 of Decision EX.CL/Dec. 877(XXVII) of June 2015, and Executive Council Decisions EX.CL/Dec.899(XXVIII)) of January 2016, (EX.CL/Dec.942(XXX)) of January 2017 and EX.CL/Dec.986(XXXII)) of January 2018, reaffirming the right of all Member States without distinction to participate in all meetings, activities and events organized within the context of partnerships of which the AU is part”. Yet, the scope and nature of participation in Partnership meetings is often called into question.

**37.** At their Summit in Banjul, Gambia, in 2006, the Assembly of Heads of States decided on a formula for participation in partnership summits, which later became known as the “Banjul Formula.” The practice in applying this formula has been that for partnership summits held between Africa and a single partner country, Africa has been represented by its current and outgoing Chairs, Chairperson of the Commission, the Chair of each of the RECs, Chairperson of the NEPAD implementing committee and the five founding members of NEPAD. At continent-to-continent partnerships meetings, all Member States participated.

**38.** Later in 2015, the Executive Council re-affirmed the right of all Member States without distinction to participate in all meetings, activities and events organized within the context of partnerships of which the AU is part. This decision did not annul or supersede the Banjul formula, which continued to be practiced for partnerships with single countries.

**39.** Re-affirming the importance of efficient participation of Africa in summits, in January 2017, Assembly Decision, Dec. 635(XXVIII), stated that: “Partnership Summits convened by external parties shall be reviewed with a view to providing an effective framework for African Union partnerships. Africa will be represented by the Troika, namely the current, incoming and outgoing Chairpersons of the African Union, the Chairperson of the AU Commission, and the Chairpersons of the Regional Economic Communities as well as the Chairperson of the NEPAD”.

**40.** The Executive Council, as a matter of practice, has issued an individual decision for every partnership summit, confirming its date, venue, title and theme, as well as confirming the participation formula. In some cases, it was found by the Executive Council beneficial to adapt the participation formula in order to maximize the benefit of the partnership and the outcomes of the Summit in question without prejudice to the key principles of inclusivity, equal rights of all States, effectiveness, and Africa speaking with one voice as a united integrated continent.

### **Adoption of an African Union Policy and Strategy Framework on Partnerships**

**41.** The African Union Agenda 2063 has defined the strategic direction which Africa would adopt to attain its development and integration agenda and more directly align its strategic engagement with its Partners.

**42.** The Sub-Committee developed an Outline Framework with the technical content that highlighted the core competencies, comparative and competitive advantages of Partners as well as the needs and gaps of the African Continent. The Outline Framework will guide the African Union in engaging with its Strategic Partners and practically provide guidance on the baselines and approach that underpin the identification of areas of cooperation and development of working documents for the Partnerships, which the African Union is engaged in, taking into consideration what Africa wants to achieve in accordance with the priorities stipulated in the AU Agenda 2063 First Ten Year Implementation Plan. The Sub-Committee also developed a Matrix that outlines the areas the Union could focus attention upon in relation to the areas the Partners command core competences. The two aforementioned reviewed documents have been attached as annexes 1 and 2. A third document is yet to be reviewed by the Sub-Committee prior to recommending it for adoption, namely the 'Partnership Strategy Framework' prepared by the UNDP Consultants and the Commission.

**43.** These documents have therefore been developed to ensure that proposals advanced for discussion and negotiations with African Union's Partners are self-oriented, demand-driven and strategically focused towards Africa's development and integration agenda, as expressed in the AU Agenda 2063 and its First Ten Year Implementation Plan. The new approach will enable understanding of the areas of cooperation with Partners, guarantee ownership of the agreed areas of cooperation and stimulate confidence during the process of negotiations and implementation. While applying the merits of the proposed guidelines, it would be important to ensure that the agreed areas of cooperation be well defined in scope to enable delivery on results and attainment of measurable impacts.

**44.** In determining the areas of core competencies, comparative and competitive advantages of Partners, the Sub-Committee in collaboration with the Commission will continue to engage the existing Partners and agree on those areas that are limited in scope and directed to where optimum benefits could be derivable based on identified abilities. These efforts will also be extended to prospective Partners. The three annexes will provide the necessary guidelines when initiating, formulating and negotiating Strategic Partnership and due consideration should be given to the specialization of those partnerships, based on partners' comparative advantage and economic/financial capacity, and the meaningful nature of what the partner can contribute to Africa. This will help to overcome the practice where attempts are made to cover the same long list of cooperation areas with every Partner.

## Recommendations

**45.** The PRC recommends to:

- a.** Continue to engage Partners and other relevant stakeholders in the aforementioned Matrix on Areas of Cooperation, with a view to verifying the identified areas of competencies for the partnership relationship;

- b.** Develop a Policy and Strategy Framework on Partnerships in line with the outline framework document for consideration by the Policy Organs in February 2020 Summit;
- c.** Ensure the alignment of the African Union Program Budget jointly funded by Partners, according to the priority areas identified in the First Ten Year Implementation Plan.

## **PART B: ANALYSIS OF THE EXISTING PARTNERSHIPS WITH RESPECTIVE RECOMMENDATIONS**

**46.** The PRC reviewed the specific Partnership evaluation and aligned its findings to the work done by the Consultants as follows:

### **African Union (AU)-European Union (EU) Partnership**

#### Assessment and Findings

##### **Legal / Institutional framework**

**47.** The African Union-EU partnership was initiated through the 1<sup>st</sup> Africa-EU Summit in Cairo in 2000. However, the strategic partnership became structured and fully operational after the 2<sup>nd</sup> Africa-EU Summit of Lisbon in December 2007 with the articulation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES). Subsequent Summits included the 3<sup>rd</sup> Africa-EU Summit in Tripoli, Libya, in November 2010, the 4<sup>th</sup> Africa-EU Summit in Brussels, April 2014, and the 5<sup>th</sup> AU-EU Summit held in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire in 2017.

**48.** The JAES is the overall cooperation framework that governs the strategic partnership between AU and EU. But, from a programmatic point of view, four successive action plans have been agreed upon for implementation by the two parties under the JAES. The AU-EU institutional framework is to be improved significantly; in particular, more work is needed in improving the follow-up mechanism of the partnership. Coordination and preparation of meetings and other events need to be enhanced significantly.

**49.** The JAES comes to an end in 2020, together with the Cotonou Partnership Agreement. Executive Council Decision endorsed the draft African Common Position outlining the basic principles that should govern a Post-Cotonou Agreement, namely:

- A united and interdependent Africa which speaks with a single voice;
- A single framework for cooperation from Union to Union/continent to continent, independently of the ACP – EU framework;
- The preservation and strengthening of the agreements made between States, regions and the European Union, and their extension to all the other States of the Continent.

**50.** Until 2020, the Declaration and Priority Action Plans emanating from the fifth AU-EU Summit in Abidjan would be the framework for development cooperation. Those include Continental and sub-regional projects, as well as bilateral projects that contribute to Agenda 2063.

## **Policy and Strategy Framework**

**51.** From a policy perspective, EU has strategic partnership-specific policy instruments which guide their partnership with Africa. From a strategic perspective, this partnership is based on EU Partnerships strategy towards Africa. This had initially put the Continent and the African Union in a disadvantaged position, especially during the negotiation phase, the definition of priorities and action plans as well as the effective and efficient management of its strategic partnerships for results. Having adopted the African Union Agenda 2063 and its First Ten Year Implementation Plan, beginning 2013, the African Union Assembly of Heads of States and Government defined its strategic direction towards its continental development and integration. The Assembly therefore decided that the partnership shall be henceforth labelled as AU-EU partnership. In that light, within the context of the AU Agenda 2063, a collective partner-specific strategy for the management of Africa's strategic partnership with the EU would be developed.

## **Institutional, governance and management set-up**

**52.** The AU-EU Partnership displays depth and maturity in terms of institutional, governance and management and follow-up mechanisms; the partnership is articulated and grounded on meaningful and "SMART" outcome and impact indicators. Monitoring and evaluation framework needs to be improved in view of the fact that : 1) there is still a thin line between multilateral and bilateral relationship when it comes to nationally-implemented programs or projects; 2) there is still misunderstanding between the two parties as to the meaning of Strategic Partnership; 3) reporting and coordination mechanisms between the various couples (AU-Partner, AU-RECs, AU-MS, AUDA/NPCA) have not yet been articulated, discussed and agreed upon in clear terms.

## **Relevance.**

**53.** The AU-EU partnership is certainly meaningful in terms of scope (infrastructure, social development, peace and security) but there is room for improvement in more meaningful transformational benefits in several areas including, but not limited to, industrialization and technology transfer/acquisition, given the potential presented by the EU in those areas. In addition, the EU political agenda seems to be different, and at same time, not in alignment with the African one (witness EU-backed interventions in Libya, International Criminal Court (ICC) for sitting Heads of States, etc.). However, the AU-EU partnership has delivered relatively more balanced development agenda and impacts, namely, in social, sustainable

and inclusive development, at bilateral level, but not at the level of political governance and regional stability, at continental level.

## **Outcomes**

**54.** It is worth stressing that, despite its comprehensive nature, the AU-EU partnership is more biased towards political dialogue and peace and security than the deeper economic (trade, investment and industrialization) cooperation that Africa is calling for. Despite the fact that the EU is Africa's largest trading partner, and, together with its member states, has supplied over

50% of overseas development assistance coming to Africa, there is still room for improvement in technical assistance programs in the areas of private sector development and industrialization/technology transfer/acquisition at regional and continental levels.

## **Implementation level of Activities**

**55.** With regard to this partnership, the implementation of planned activities in the various action plans is on track; implementation is good in political governance and regional stability; as well as private sector development. More effort is needed in economic infrastructures and industrialization. In the past, the EU was perceived to emphasize more the political aspects of the partnership, including political Dialogue, while dialogue, Africa needed a deeper economic partnership. The 5<sup>th</sup> AU-EU Summit (Abidjan 2017) addressed those imbalances by, 1) emphasizing the importance of the African agenda in political dialogue, e.g. by openly supporting Africa's interests in the United Nations as well as the AU's need for financial sustainability; 2) launching the European External Investment Plan (EIP), which seeks to mobilize investments and create jobs.

## **Socio-economic transformational impacts**

**56.** The Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) is the overall cooperation framework that governs the strategic partnership between AU and EU. However, from a programmatic point of view, four successive action plans have been agreed-upon for implementation by the two parties under the JAES. Through the implementation of the JAES action plans, EU supported the implementation of some African Union Flagship programs, such as Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA), African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), Accelerated Industrial Development of Africa (AIDA) and African Governance Architecture (AGA), and provided support to African institutions such as AUC, AUDA/NPCA and RECs. Although, AU and EU Cooperation Agreement has yielded significant results on the political, social and the socio-economic front at some bilateral

level, the strategic partnership is yet to develop significant socio-economic transformational impact in Africa.

### **Effectiveness and Efficiency**

**57.** The AU-EU strategic partnership has displayed a fairly consistent level of effectiveness.

### **Value addition of the Strategic Partnerships**

**58.** The AU-EU partnership in particular, has delivered specific value addition in the areas of regional integration (through its dedicated institutional support to the AUC), peace and security (through its various support mechanisms to the AU, through the African Peace Facility Framework), and political governance (via its support to transparent electoral processes across the continent). Value addition in socio-economic development is very marginal if not minimal within this framework.

### **Contentious Issues and Weaknesses**

**59.** A number of weaknesses in the implementation arrangements were identified (example: in the Joint Expert Groups (JEGs)) and there is need for immediate corrective measures in order to improve implementation performance. Areas of concerns include: common understanding of the nature of the partnership, implementation challenges (institutional architecture and lack of a comprehensive result framework), involvement of stakeholders; financing mechanisms; coordination, Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) and reporting mechanisms and private sector/small and medium enterprises development.

**60.** The AU-EU Partnership is not working to its full potential. The AU-EU Partnership still appears as a donor-recipient relationship. Current funding model of the partnership is not sustainable. Co-funding from the African side is very weak. The AU-EU Partnership is largely compliant and procedure-driven; the timing of disbursement has been problematic. The AU-EU Partnership lacks a comprehensive and efficient partnership governance system, and especially an appropriate M&E mechanism. Conclusion

**61.** In concluding on this Partnership, it is worth saying that, through the AU Support Program, the EU has provided support for capacity building of the AU institutions, notably the AUC, and assist in the institutional reform process. The support has enabled the AUC to effectively play its role as driver of the African integration process and to facilitate the deepening of the partnership between Africa and Europe. Worthy of mention that the EU over the life of JAES has supported about 40% of the AU programme budget, including peace support operations. This proportion is now declining thanks to the Financing the Union Initiative.

**62.** EU also provided technical and financial support in the implementation of number of high-profile institutional support projects, which led to the improvement of the AUC financial, procurement and human resource management systems. The EU through a series of facilities



has also supported AU's flagship programmes such as PIDA, CAADP, AIDA, and AGA. As part of this support, the AUC presently has 50 short-term staff paid under the AU Support Programme of the EU. This is a drop from over 70 staff members two years ago, which is in tandem with the drop in proportion of EU funding in the AU budget 35% from over 50%.

**63.** The EU also supported Africa for the APRM's programme; the Africa Peace facility; the ERASMUS+ Programme in Education and Training and the Africa-EU Infrastructure Trust Fund (ITF), the European External Investment Plan (EIP), as well as the Neighborhood Investment Facility.

**64.** Because this partnership has shown a certain level of consistency in the areas of: Legal, Policy, Institutional, Governance and Management, and value addition level frameworks, and despite the contentious issues and the shortcomings evidenced, in relevance and implementation levels it is recommended that this partnership should continue.

### **Recommendations**

**65.** Restructure the partnership in "SMART" terms, with the view to aligning it with African Union strategic priorities as expressed in the various AU's Medium Term Plan of Action, African Union Agenda 2063 and African Union Strategic Partnerships Policy and Strategy Framework. The starting point would be to ensure that priority projects emanating from the 5<sup>th</sup> AU-EU Summit (Abidjan 2017) are structured in SMART terms, and that implementation of those projects meets the planned targets.

**66.** In that case, there is a need to deepen transformational benefits of the partnership through promoting cooperation in four priority areas as indicated in the outcome document of the 2017 Abidjan Summit Declaration, namely, Investing in People – Education, Science, Technology and Skills Development; Strengthening Resilience, Peace, Security and Governance; Migration and Mobility; Mobilizing Investments for African Structural Sustainable Transformation.

**67.** In leveraging the Strategic Partnership due attention should be given to the enhancement of an AU-EU social component that will include a number of social development areas such as: the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), education, health systems, social safety net and areas relating to environment and climate change. Such component would also address unemployment issues, especially among youth and women, which should be given the highest level of priority given its potential.

### **African Union (AU)-South America (SA) Partnership**

#### Assessment and Findings

#### **Legal / Institutional framework**

**68.** The partnership was initiated through the commitment of former President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria and former President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, on the African side, and Former President Lula Da Silva of Brazil and Late President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, on the South-American side (In the absence of any formal decision), Nigeria and Brazil are the (current) coordinators of the Forum, while the tasks of the ad hoc Secretariat rest with the host country of the respective AU-SA Summit. The first AU-SA Summit was held in Abuja, Nigeria in November, 2006, and the latest was held in Malabo in 2013. The challenges facing the partnership include the need to distinguish between the processes of bilateral and multilateral engagements of Africa with its South American partner, a lack of institutional, organizational and follow-up mechanisms, amidst a lack of political and financial commitment.

### **Policy and Strategy Framework**

**69.** The South American part, like the African side, is yet to adopt a collective partner-specific strategy, for the management of this partnership. This shortcoming also affects negatively the progress and success of the partnership.

### **Institutional, governance and management set-up**

**70.** The African Union-South America Partnership is relatively a new partnership that is not yet grounded on strong institutional and political commitments. Twelve years after its inception in November 2006, not much has been achieved; attempts are currently being made to put in place the necessary mechanisms that would ensure the effective implementation of the governance/management mechanisms and the projects agreed upon.

### **Relevance**

**71.** The African Union-South America partnership requires further negotiation and structuring work as its action plans are defined loosely with no transformational benefits to the African continent; its implementation level is low and the implementation and follow-up mechanisms are relatively weak.

### **Outcomes**

**72.** The African Union-South America partnership generated only marginal outcomes, if not at all, in terms of scale and depth; the action plans and/or scope cover the same long list of cooperation areas as the partnerships with Korea, Turkey and League of Arab States. A number of regional joint projects have been initiated, but have not yet materialized.

### **Implementation Level of Activities**

**73.** The implementation of activities contained in the operational plans of action of this partnership is very low to nil. To implement the Joint Implementation Plan that was approved

by AU-SA Ministers in September 2010 in New York, the following priority projects were selected for implementation: 1) In Television, the South-South Broadcasting Network; 2) In Investment, the South-South Development Bank; 3) In Education, the South-South University. No implementation has taken place so far due to a combination of coordination, financing and leadership issues over the activities of the partnership.

### **Socio-economic transformational impact**

74. The African Union-South America Partnership generated only very limited development impacts due to its limited scale and level of implementation, or simply the limited implementation of action plans that occurred. It is worth mentioning that no implementation has taken place so far due to a combination of coordination, financing and leadership issues over the activities of the partnership. Therefore, this Partnership is yet to produce concrete socio-economic transformational impact on Africa's development Agenda.

### **Effectiveness and Efficiency**

75. The African Union-South America Strategic Partnership, due to all reasons stated above, is yet to display any level of effectiveness and efficiency; projects agreed upon are not implemented and follow-up mechanisms put in place are not functioning.

### **Value addition of the Strategic Partnership**

76. The African Union-South America partnership has not delivered value addition as implementation level is still low or insignificant. If the three major projects agreed upon under the 2010 – 2015 Action Plan are materialized, the value addition will be very significant for Africa; these are: - the South-South Broadcasting Network; - the South-South Development Bank; and - the South-South University.

### **Conclusion**

77. The African Union-South America Strategic Partnership bears specific benefits for Africa, namely:

- ;
- Political benefits are potentially important given the total number of countries involved in it;
- Capitalizes on the relations between the peoples of Africa and South America, with special emphasis on African diaspora;
- Offers an opportunity for technical cooperation and learning by Africa from specific success cases in South America, such as Brazil in the field of agriculture and agro-industries, Chile on economic governance, and several countries on poverty alleviation;

- Offers an opportunity for learning and benchmarking between the two processes of regional integration.

**78.** However, the Partnership needs more efforts from both sides for it to be grounded on solid institutional and political commitments. For these reasons not much has been achieved since its inception. While the AU is striving to lead the process on the African side, leadership roles on the partners' side is unclear.

**79.** Overall, dialogue needs to be re-established with the partner, including with Brazil, who is the coordinator of the Partnership from the South American side, and with Ecuador, which was

to be the host of the last Summit that was cancelled. There is need to keep an open mind and consider different models that would be sensitive to the political dynamics of South American integration, while reaping the aspired benefits for Africa.

#### Recommendations

**80.** The Partnership could potentially be a model of South-South cooperation, which promotes sharing of experience and enables the partners to work as a bloc in promoting multilateralism in the world. With the above in mind, it is recommended that the following key issues be addressed as a matter of priority to ensure continuation of this partnership:

**81.** The PRC, in collaboration with the AUC, should implement the Executive Council (Decision EX.CL/Dec.986(XXXII)<sup>28</sup> of January 2018 para 18)<sup>29</sup> and (EX.CL/Dec.786 (XXIV)<sup>30</sup> of January 2014) which calls for them to engage with the South American partners: 1) to urgently finalize work towards jointly establishing an AU-SA Financing Mechanism and Fund for the implementation of agreed-upon specific projects, namely, projects that would attract benefits to the two sides; and 2) to agree on the modalities for the functioning of the AU-SA Strategic Presidential Committee.

---

<sup>28</sup> The Kingdom of Morocco expressed strong reservation on the inclusion of this Decision

<sup>29</sup> EX.CL/Dec.986(XXXII), para 18: RECALLS its Decision EX.CL/Dec.942(XXX) adopted at its 30th Ordinary Session held on 25 - 27 January 2017 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, requesting the Commission in collaboration with the PRC to engage in consultations with the South American side with a view to proposing new dates for the African Union-South America Summit, and REQUESTS the PRC, in collaboration with the Commission, to finalize consultations in that regard and report on the outcome to the June/July 2018 AU Summit.

<sup>30</sup> A) EX.CL/Dec.786 (XXIV), para 11, 12 and 13: REQUESTS the PRC and the Commission, in consultation with the South American side, to urgently finalize work towards jointly establishing an ASA Financing Mechanism and Fund for the implementation of agreed specific projects;

B) ALSO REQUESTS the PRC and the Commission, in consultation with the South American side, to take urgent steps for the implementation of concrete projects that would attract benefits to the two sides;

C) FURTHER REQUESTS the PRC and the Commission, working closely with the South American side, to agree on the modalities for the functioning of the ASA Strategic Presidential Committee.

**82.** The PRC, in coordination with the AUC, should engage a high-level consultation process with the South American Partner to agree on the restructuring of the current format of the partnership into a more manageable and less ambitious format that should nevertheless be grounded on a comprehensive and resourceful coordination, follow-up and reporting mechanism.

**83.** AUC and the South American side should identify and formalize a coordination mechanism. The identified mechanism shall ultimately forestall any competition for leadership within the Partnership.

**84.** Both parties should agree on a format with more modest deliverables from a socio-economic and political perspective. To that effect, the three major projects agreed upon under the 2010 – 2015 Action Plan should constitute the major pillars for this Partnership, namely, the South-South Broadcasting Network, the South-South Development Bank and the South-South University. This will also include Programmes of Cultural and Sports activities.

### **African Union (AU) – League of Arab States (LAS) Partnership**

#### Assessment and Findings

#### **Legal / Institutional Framework**

**85.** The cooperation was institutionalized through a Declaration and Programme of Action adopted by the historical 1<sup>st</sup> Africa-Arab Summit held in Cairo, Egypt in March 1977. An Africa-Arab Partnership Strategy was adopted by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Africa-Arab Summit (2010 in Libya). The Legal/Institutional Framework also includes the Kuwait Declaration and Resolutions, adopted by the 3<sup>rd</sup> Africa-Arab Summit (2013, in Kuwait), and the Malabo 4<sup>th</sup> Africa – Arab Summit

**86.** The day to day activity of the African Union-League of Arab States Partnership is coordinated jointly by the Commission and the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States, under the guidance of the Coordination Committee of the African Union-League of Arab States Partnership at Ministerial and Senior Officials levels. The Coordination Committee is composed of the Troika of the African Union, the Chair of PRC, the Chair and the Rapporteur of the PRC Sub-Committee on Multilateral Cooperation and the Commission on the African side, and the Troika of the Arab League and the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States on the Arab side. A Preparatory Committee composed of the Co-chairs of the previous Summit, the Host Country, the Commission and the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States is established to deal with the logistical aspects of African Union- League of Arab States Summits. The Preparatory Committee reports to the Coordination Committee. The African Union Permanent Delegation to the League of Arab States based in Cairo, Egypt and the Diplomatic Mission of the League of Arab States to Ethiopia and AU/ United Nations Economic Commission

for Africa (UNECA), based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia play supportive role and serve as communication channels between the two sides.

### **Policy and Strategy Framework**

**87.** Although this partnership started as a cooperation framework between the Arab world and the African side as a solidarity undertaking between the two parts, the Arab side, like the African side, is yet to adopt a collective partner-specific strategy for the management of this partnership; it should be recalled, as stated above, that the two parties have adopted an Africa-Arab Partnership Strategy to consolidate this cooperation.

### **Institutional, governance and management set-up**

**88.** The specific joint mechanisms and structures that were created or needed to be created to facilitate the implementation of the series of Joint Action Plans (2011-2016, and 2017-2021) were not put in place. The mechanisms that were envisaged by the Plan include the establishment of a Confederation of Africa-Arab Chambers of Commerce and Industry, sectorial Working Groups and Technical Committees, and a Financing Mechanism for the Joint action plan. The involvement of Private Sector Organizations (PSOs) and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in the partnership was also agreed-upon from both sides respectively; but these are yet to be implemented. The 4<sup>th</sup> Africa –Arab Summit Declaration as well as the resolutions adopted in Malabo in 2016 have also not been implemented. The two sides are yet to adopt an Action Plan following the 2016 Summit.

### **Relevance**

**89.** The long-standing Africa-Arab Cooperation is now being further developed. This therefore requires further negotiation and structuring work as the action plans will have to be re-defined in “SMART” terms, with transformational benefits to the African Continent. This partnership should be considered as a partnership between two highly intermingled peoples bound by historical, geo-political, economic, religious, cultural, linguistic and other factors. 70% of Arabs are Africans and nine (9) out of the twenty two (22) Members of the League of Arab States are also members of the African Union. Hence, the African Union-League of Arab States Partnership could be regarded as a naturally compelling one and relevant for both sides.

### **Outcomes**

**90.** As one of the oldest cooperation arrangement that Africa entered into with the external world, the cooperation was institutionalized in 1977 in Cairo, Egypt. Such arrangement has now evolved into a formal Strategic Partnership in 2010 at the Africa-Arab Summit in Libya, following the adoption of the Africa-Arab Partnership Strategy, which defines the principles and objectives of the Partnership and elaborates the long term strategy, focusing on four main areas of

cooperation namely Political Cooperation, Economic, Trade and Financial Cooperation, Cooperation in Agriculture and Food Security and Socio-cultural Cooperation. The Strategy also contains the Implementation and Follow up Mechanisms. The Strategy calls for the human and financial capacity of Department/Units dealing with African Union-League of Arab States Partnership in both the African Union Commission and the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States to be substantively enhanced to enable them to play their assigned roles in implementation and follow-up of the Joint Africa-Arab Partnership Strategy and its action plans.

**91.** The African Union-League of Arab States Partnership, which is now the successor of the Afro-Arab Cooperation, took advantage of the ongoing activities and built upon them. Therefore, the outcomes generated in terms of scale and depth, although through a new action plan is yet to be materialized. Besides, the action plan covers the same long list of cooperation areas like the case of some other new Partnerships.

### **Implementation level of Activities**

**92.** Implementation levels of resolutions of the Malabo 2016 Summit, as follows:

a) Resolution (1) on ongoing activities:

- The resolution called for a comprehensive study to activate and strengthen the AU-LAS Partnership Mechanisms in all sectors and domains of mutual interest, which was not done;
- The resolution called for expediting the process of establishing Joint Africa-Arab Fund for Disaster Response, for which a study was conducted but the fund not established;The resolution called for expediting the process of establishing an African Arab Centre for the exchange of information on migration, for which a study was conducted but the fund not established;
- The resolution called for establishing Working Group between the African Union Commission and the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States on coordinating the implementation of the Social aspects of the Sustainable Development Goals, which was accomplished and the group now operational.

b) Resolution (2) calling for establishment of a financing mechanism for joint projects was not implemented.

c) Resolution (4) on agriculture and food security is making good progress, but facing financing limitations for the projects they agreed upon;

d) Resolution (5) on the Africa-Arab Cultural Institute (AACI) is on track for implementation as the AU paid its contribution for 2018, but the other part of the decision requesting a study on the implementation of joint cultural activities, mobilizing voluntary financing, and developing stronger engagement between the Institute and Member States of both sides.;

- e) Resolution (7) calling for development of a robust joint action plan is delayed as the action plan is still under consideration. The resolution called for it to be concluded and adopted at a joint Ministerial meeting six months after the Malabo Summit;
- f) Resolution (9) calling for lifting of American sanctions on Sudan was successfully implemented;
- g) Resolution (10) calling for the two Secretariats to jointly define mutually acceptable and binding principles and criteria for participation in joint meetings of the Africa-Arab Partnership in a way that reflect their mutual interests and the potential of their strategic relations.

### **African Union-League of Arab States Socio-economic transformational impact**

**93.** This long standing partnership had established Joint Institutions and Joint Projects on the basis of which it has been operating, as described above. Due to the nature and scope of those above, their implementation will take quite a long time before materializing some socio-economic transformational impacts; this is not the case for the moment.

### **Effectiveness and Efficiency**

**94.** The African Union-League of Arab States Partnership has displayed a certain level of effectiveness, though it can and should be improved from a planning and reporting point of view. AU should establish as a matter of urgency a Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism together with a Reporting framework for effective and efficient follow-up and reporting purpose.

### **Value addition of the Strategic Partnership**

**95.** To some extent, the African Union-League of Arab States partnership has delivered a fair level value addition through; the Africa-Arab Cooperation in the areas of Peace and Security (joint meetings of the African and Arab Peace and Security Councils); the continuous increase in the Arab financing of African Development through the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) and other national and regional financial institutions in the Arab World (BADEA's allocations for the Seventh Five-Year Plan (2015 - 2019), stood at US\$ 1.6 billion, representing an increase of US\$ 600 million compared to the Sixth Five-Year Plan (2010 – 2014); the Africa-Arab Trade fair and cooperation through the Africa-Arab Cultural Institute in Mali.

### **Conclusion:**

**96.** The Executive Council at its 16<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session held on 25<sup>th</sup>-29<sup>th</sup> January 2010, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, decided "*to transform the Afro-Arab Cultural Institute into the Afro-Arab*



*Institute for Cultural and Strategic Studies*” (Dec. EX.CL/Dec. 535(XVI)<sup>31</sup>. The objective was to identify and address issues of strategic importance to the African Union-League of Arab States Partnership. The Africa-Arab Partnership Strategy, adopted by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Africa-Arab Summit, also requested the two sides to “*revitalize and further strengthen the newly transformed Africa-Arab Institute for Culture and Strategic Studies, which will develop a detailed action plan to enhance socio-cultural cooperation through networking with similar African and Arab institutions*” (Para 55). There is therefore a need to facilitate the implementation of the decision on the transformation of the Institute.

**97.** The African Union-League of Arab States Partnership is a partnership between two highly intermingled peoples bound by historical, geo-political, economic, religious, cultural, linguistic and other factors. 70% of Arabs are Africans and nine (9) out of the twenty two (22) Members of the League of Arab States are also members of the African Union. Hence, the African Union-League of Arab States Partnership could be regarded as a naturally compelling one. Taking into account the above, and because of its uniqueness it is therefore recommended that this partnership should continue.

**98.** Overall, despite its great potential, the partnership, in its present format, has some challenges both in its structure and the implementation of the Joint Action Plans. It is therefore important to take into account the following recommendations:

#### Recommendations

**99.** The two sides should pursue a meaningful economic and financial cooperation, combining the huge financial and economic potential in the Arab world with the nearly untapped human and natural resources in Africa. The financial cooperation that exists at bilateral level between Arab national and regional financial institutions and African countries should also be further strengthened and be used to assist the integration efforts of the African continent, through making it focus on financing the African Union Flagship Programmes; and through the necessary multilateral trade facilitation mechanisms to be put in place.

**100.** Joint Action Plans should be streamlined and should contain a limited number of projects which are realistic and achievable, in “SMART” terms. Only activities that have reliable sources of funding, and which are to be handled at the level of the two coordinating Organizations, should be included in the programmes. The activities that could be implemented by the financial institutions, the private sector and civil society and do not fall within the strategic arrangement should be implemented at bilateral level.

---

<sup>31</sup> EX.CL/Dec. 535(XVI), para 5: DECIDES to transform the Afro-Arab Cultural Institute into the Afro-Arab Institute for Cultural and Strategic Studies

**101.** The joint mechanisms which were envisaged in the Africa-Arab Partnership Strategy to strengthen the African Union-League of Arab States Partnership should be established without further delay; and the capacity of the coordination mechanisms in the two Institutions, as envisaged by the Africa-Arab Partnership Strategy should be strengthened, in order to enable them effectively discharge their responsibilities.

**102.** There are a number of Arab National and Regional Financing Institutions/Funds created to assist Africa.. To this end AU should:

- Implement the MoU signed with the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA), which could play a significant role in coordinating the efforts of the Funds;
- Use part of these funds to feed into the overall Partnerships Trust Funds (to be created), while the strategic partnership should limit itself to the ongoing programmes, projects and activities of the current Action Plan and other overlooked opportunities.

## **African Union - India Partnership**

### Assessment and Findings

#### **Legal / Institutional Framework**

**103.** The African Union - India strategic partnership officially started in 2008 with the Delhi Declaration. However, some key instruments would need to be leveraged under this partnership, such as: ITEC (Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation Program) dated back 1963 as a bilateral cooperation instrument. This Strategic Partnership suffers lack of transparency from the part of the Indian side, because, most of the activities mutually agreed upon have been negotiated and implemented directly at the Member States by India without the strategic involvement of the AU side (Telemedicine Programme for example). The initiation of this engagement at the continental level was in response to Africa's own aspirations for Pan-African institutions and development programmes. The African Union-India Strategic Partnership was jointly established by the two parties through the first India Africa Forum Summit held in New Delhi on 8 - 9 April 2008. The participation from the African side was on the basis of the AU Banjul Formula.

#### **Policy and Strategy Framework**

**104.** From a strategic perspective, India's implicit strategy, as an emerging partner, is more or less based on: 1) securing access to Africa's Oil, Gas and Mining (OGM) and natural resources - forestry and agriculture – for its fast growing economy; 2) securing Engineering

Procurement and Construction (EPC) contracts; 3) accessing the expanding consumer market and industrial market of the African continent.

**105.** From a policy perspective, the Partnership is based on the use of a combination of India's bilateral policy instruments and strategic Partnership-specific ones in the management/implementation of its strategic Partnership with Africa.

### **Institutional, governance and management arrangement**

**106.** In terms of institutional, governance and management and follow-up mechanisms, the African Union-India Partnership requires more work. However the action plan of the Partnership appears quite robust, although the Monitoring and Evaluation framework remains particularly weak. Since then two Action Plans have been adopted and their activities being implemented and the implementation is largely under-target with good potential in technology transfer/acquisition, Technical, Vocational and Educational Training (TVET).

### **Relevance**

**107.** The scope, potential transformational benefits, depth and "SMART" nature of the action plans are meaningful for the African Union-India Partnership which, though potentially interesting, is yet to register meaningful level of transformational benefits due to the low level and the short term of its implementation.

### **Outcomes**

**108.** The African Union-India Partnership is also interesting from a TVET and other Regional Centers of Excellence point of view. There is still room for improvement in other development areas including but not limited to trade and industrialization.

### **Implementation level of Activities**

**109.** The two Action plans adopted during previous Summits suffered low implementation due to very strong bilateral bias of this Partnership. The main projects such as the regional centers of Excellence and TVET centers were not implemented as a result of a lack of clear mechanism of coordination between Africa and India. With respect to the Regional Centers of Excellence, MoUs were signed for some of them, however, the African side found it difficult to abide by some provision therein. With regard to TVET Centers, both sides did not reach an agreement on how to get them implemented.

### **Socio-economic transformational impact**

**110.** Beyond its resource sector and economic cooperation, India is also engaged with Africa in a number of areas including development assistance, human capital development, peace and security, Science and Technology and Information and Communication Technology (ICT)

(E-Network Project and TVET Project), as well as Pharmaceutical industries. As these are only operated at modest levels for now, the African Union-India Partnership generated only very limited development impacts due to the limited implementation of action plans and activities that have been adopted. Beyond business sector activities and economic cooperation, the African Union-India Partnership has potentials for expansion to other activity sectors, and for evolving into an effective Partnership.

### **Effectiveness and Efficiency**

**111.** The African Union-India Partnership has not yet been fully effective as implementation levels remain very low despite the commitments made. In this case, the problem lies on both sides. While the African side delayed in responding to the offers made, the Indian side was not very clear about the implementation mechanism.

### **Value addition of the Strategic Partnerships**

**112.** As mentioned above, the African Union-India Partnership has not also delivered value addition as implementation level is still low. A good number of valuable projects have been approved. Out of the cooperation areas agreed upon under this Partnership as also mentioned above, a number of four (4) Centres of Excellence, ten (10) Vocational Training Centres and ten (10) Human Settlement Centres should have been implemented. There has been delays from both sides on the implementation.

### **Conclusion**

**113.** The African Union-India Partnership has potentials for expansion and for evolving into an effective Partnership. The commitments made under the Partnership are capable of delivering substance to the people of the two sides and should be fully implemented as they have been backed with concrete projects and earmarked funding.

### **Recommendations**

**114.** Continuation of this Partnership is strongly recommended with the following recommendations to enhance its effectiveness and development impacts for both parties:

- a.** Out of the seven areas of cooperation agreed upon in the current Action Plan, the following should be pursued for delivery of tangible results: 1) Incomes, jobs and decent work 2) poverty, inequality and hunger 3) social security and protection

including person with disabilities 4) modern and livable habitat and basic quality services 5) Education and Science Technology and Innovation (STI) skills driven revolution;

- b.** As recognized by both parties, there is an urgent need to address the issue of low level of implementation of agreed upon projects; and as a matter of priority, engage

in the implementation of the TVET institutions and other Centers of Excellence projects earmarked for implementation by the two parties;

- c. It is recommended that the African Union-India Partnership institutionalizes a comprehensive enhanced coordination, follow-up and reporting mechanism that addresses, in a more systematic way, projects implementation and management challenges faced by the Partnership.

## **Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD)**

### Assessment and Findings

#### **Legal / Institutional framework**

**115.** TICAD process started in 1993 as a policy platform on Africa's Development with a bilateral cooperation perspective to promote a high-level political dialogue between Africa and its development partners and to mobilize support for African-owned development initiatives. This drive began after the end of the Cold War when 'aid fatigue' had set in among donor countries. The move was therefore critical in stimulating strong donor interest in Africa. Since its launch in 1993, TICAD has held six summits: TICAD I in 1993, TICAD II in 1998, TICAD III in 2003, TICAD IV in 2008, TICAD V in 2013 and TICAD VI in 2016. The first three summits were held in Tokyo; the following two in Yokohama and the last one in Nairobi, Kenya. In the first place the AUC had an observer status then became a co-organizer of TICAD in 2010 contributing to the articulation of action plans through comments on the initial work prepared by Japan. Since then, the TICAD process has grown into a major global forum to promote development on the continent under the principles of African "ownership" and international "Partnership". Since the readmission of Morocco in 2017, the format of participation is all African Union Member States. However, it is worth indicating that the participation of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic has been at stake.

**116.** Unlike other African Union Partnerships, TICAD has the specificity of a Partnership with five stakeholders called co-organizers, namely the Government of Japan, the African Union Commission (AUC), and United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (UNOSAA), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and World Bank.

**117.** The TICAD process also involves other multi stakeholders, including Japanese related governmental organizations such as Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), some Asian countries, RECs, AUDA/NPCA, donor countries and international organizations and agencies.

#### **Policy and Strategy Framework**

**118.** From a strategic perspective, the TICAD process is based on Japan's explicit and implicit strategy towards Africa. In fact, created in 1993 as a bilateral mechanism, TICAD is not a Partnership as such but rather a policy forum. From a policy perspective, the Partnership is guided by the use of a combination of Japan's bilateral policy instruments and strategic Partnership-specific ones; (such as the TICAD framework). Since then the TICAD process has grown into a major global forum to promote development on the continent under the principles of African "ownership" and international "Partnership".

### **Institutional, governance and management set-up**

**119.** In the area of Partnership governance, the TICAD process has not displayed depth and maturity in terms of institutional, governance and management and follow-up mechanisms. The monitoring and evaluation framework has not been inclusive. The initial cycle of TICAD Summits was five (5) years. However, based on the acceptance of the principle of rotation of the holding of Summits between Africa and Japan at the TICAD V Summit held in June 2013, the TICAD V Follow-up Ministerial Meeting held in Yaoundé, Cameroon agreed to reduce the cycle of the TICAD Summits from five (5) to three (3) years.

**120.** From the TICAD IV Summit held in 2008, the TICAD process adopted the following three tiers follow up mechanism:

- Joint Secretariat: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, AUC, UNOSAA, UNDP and World Bank;
- Joint Monitoring Committee: Japanese Government and related governmental Organizations, TICAD Co-organizers, Permanent Representatives Committee of the African Union (PRC), African Diplomatic Corps in Tokyo (ADC), AUDA/NPCA, International Organizations and donor countries;
- Follow-up Meetings: Annual Senior Officials Meetings and Annual Ministerial Meetings and Summits (every three years) with Japanese government and related governmental organizations, African countries, some Asian Countries, TICAD co-organizers, RECs, AUDA/NPCA, donor countries and international organizations.

### **Relevance**

**121.** The scope, potential transformational benefits, depth and "SMART" nature of the action plans are meaningful for this Partnership. The TICAD IV, for example, has already delivered transformational benefits for Africa in economic terms according to data provided by the Japanese side.

### **Outcomes**

**122.** The TICAD presents more Official Development Assistance (ODA)-backed traditional development cooperation content, namely, in areas such as, health, education and human

capital development, and private sector development. However, trade and investment-related outcomes remain below potential.

### **Implementation level of Activities**

**123.** Since its inception, the TICAD process has adopted six action plans. Only the last three namely, TICAD IV, TICAD V and TICAD VI action plans fall under the strategic Partnership. The implementation of activities contained in those plans is good in overall social infrastructure, agriculture and peace and security, and fair in economic infrastructure; this is because TICAD process has first been launched outside the ambit of the African Union, and that the three action plans are very recent: 2008 – 2013 for TICAD IV, 2013 – 2017 for TICAD V, and 2016-2019 for TICAD VI.

### **Socio-economic transformational impact**

**124.** AUC became a co-organizer of TICAD Summits, Ministerial and Senior Officials' meetings in 2010, and has participated in the drafting of TICAD V Yokohama Plan of Action (2013-2017) and the TICAD VI (2016-2019). Before that, TICAD has been implementing four Action Plans namely, TICAD I; TICAD II; TICAD III; and TICAD IV, all based on initial TICAD philosophy as a bilateral Japan support to African countries development. According to the reports of the implementation of the Action Plans prepared by TICAD, the implementation of the four Action Plans has produced tangible (socio-economic transformational impacts) in the agriculture and food security areas through support to CAADP (irrigation projects).

**125.** Projection of progress in the construction of primary and secondary Schools (1,000 Schools; 5,500 classrooms) accumulated since April 2008, with training of 100,000 primary and secondary schools teachers. Japan's Assistance Package for Africa, under TICAD V and TICAD VI, is presented in the form of result-oriented quantified deliverables, and is quite robust in terms of outcomes (financing facilities and technical assistance programmes) in the areas of ODA, commercial finance, investment promotion, infrastructure development, industry and private sector development, social development, environmental sustainability, and peace and stability. Hence, the evaluation of these Action Plans, for the time being, will evolve around the relevance and robustness/depth of its outcomes. To date, it is not possible to assess the outcomes of TICAD VI in terms of impacts as the report of implementation is still work in progress until adopted by the TICAD VII Summit (Implementation of TICAD V and TICAD VI Action Plans).

### **Effectiveness and Efficiency**

**126.** TICAD Partnership has displayed a fairly consistent level of effectiveness, due to the initiative and leadership role of the partner. In particular, the TICAD process, which has been operating mostly on bilateral level, is built around a comprehensive follow-up mechanism that conditions and determines the ability of the Partnership to meet its stated objectives.

## Value addition of TICAD

**127.** TICAD has delivered a significant level of value addition to Africa, especially on the bilateral level. Furthermore, the TICAD package encompasses a balanced developmental offer of industrialization and private sector development, social development, environmental sustainability, and peace, security and political governance support backed by strong financial offers in both ODA and commercial finance terms.

**128.** ODA disbursement commitments to Africa by Japan were largely met. Indeed, in the 1990s, Japan spent around US\$ 1 billion a year on ODA to Africa. This amount increased greatly from 2000 onwards in line with TICAD III plans to double ODA disbursements, up from US\$ 1.226 billion in 2000 to US\$ 2.596 billion in 2006<sup>32</sup>. The Partnership would have to focus more on African Union Strategic Vision, and be based on support to the African Union Agenda 2063 and its flagship programmes and projects.

**129.** Progress reports on TICAD have shown that while ODA disbursement is on track, investment mobilized under TICAD is lagging behind targets. Since ODA was partly meant to serve investment mobilization and creation of jobs, the upcoming TICAD summit in 2019 should focus more robustly on the latter objective.

## Conclusion

**130.** TICAD process was designed outside the African Union Framework, on Japan's own initiative, as a bilateral Development Plan for Africa. TICAD Action Plans I, II, III, and IV were implemented as such. It was only when AU came on board that some components of TICAD, especially TICAD IV Plan of Action incorporated African Union strategic concerns. Therefore, the Yokohama TICAD V Action Plan (2013-2017) indicated three (03) pillars and six (06) strategic approaches and TICAD VI (2016-2019) implementation plan indicated three pillars, which could accommodate some of the AU's Flagship Programmes/Projects such as, PIDA, Boosting Intra-African Trade (BIAT), peace and security issues and other integration programmes.

**131.** Japan's Assistance Package for Africa, under TICAD V and TICAD VI, is quite robust in terms of outcomes (financing facilities and technical assistance programmes) in the areas of ODA, commercial finance, investment promotion, infrastructure development, industry and private sector development, social development, environmental sustainability, and peace and stability. Furthermore, the package is presented in the form of result-oriented quantified deliverables.

---

<sup>32</sup> The source for these information is: JICA 2012. A study on TICAD V Strategic Action Plan for Africa. By MURC. November 2012.



## Recommendations

**132.** Based on the above facts, it is strongly recommended that without possibly disrupting the TICAD process and establishing a new singular African Union-Japan Partnership, the TICAD Process may continue as a global framework for promoting policy dialogue and coordinating activities on African issues, while reinforcing the current format of this Partnership to promote the essence of an African Union – Japan Strategic Partnership. In line with the approved Decisions of the African Union Heads of State and Government, the following recommendations are made:

- a. Promote equal roles between African Union and Japan and then, agree on the involvement of other stakeholders to include additional co-organizers (such as the African Development Bank (AfDB) to complement the roles of the other co-organizers currently in place from the Japanese side;
- b. With the African Union on an equal footing with Japan in the TICAD process, where Africa and Japan are in the driving seat of the process<sup>33</sup>:
  - Issues relating to Co-chairing of the meetings and Summit within TICAD would be the joint responsibility of the African Union and Japan and not host countries co-chairing with Japan;
  - Decisions on matters relating to the TICAD process, and as affecting the African side, would be made by the African Union;
  - With respect to the initiation of Summit documents such as the Summit Declaration, Action Plan, etc., both African Union and Japan would independently initiate such documents and subsequently meet to negotiate them for finalization;
  - Selection process for the hosting of meetings of TICAD by African countries would be considered by applying the principle of rotation under the relevant AU procedures.
- c. Urgently formulate a mechanism that would deal with the support of Japan to Africa in a manner that promotes African Union strength to Japan for mutual relationship and benefits. This means that most of the resources allocated to Africa in a multilateral context, and within the framework of TICAD will be passed through the AU. AU will receive and conveniently manage these resources as agreed upon by the two sides<sup>34</sup>;
- d. Stress the regional integration aspect in the Partnership in line with the AU Agenda 2063 and its First Ten Year Implementation Plan;
- e. Develop more robust mechanisms to improve progress made on investment mobilization and job creation under TICAD and report on progress at the 2019 Summit in Yokohama.

---

<sup>33</sup> The Kingdom of Morocco expressed strong reservation on this recommendation

<sup>34</sup> The Kingdom of Morocco expressed strong reservation on this recommendation

**133.** Institutionalize a comprehensive enhanced joint coordination, follow-up and reporting mechanism that addresses, in a more systematic way, projects implementation and management faced by the Partnership.

## **Forum on China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)**

### Assessment and Findings

#### **Legal / Institutional framework**

**134.** FOCAC was launched in October 2000 in Beijing as a triennial collective dialogue platform for cooperation between China and Africa. It has held four ministerial conferences and two summits at the level of heads of states and governments. The Forum has gradually become an important platform for collective dialogue and an effective mechanism for enhancing practical cooperation between China and African countries and has provided the political umbrella in which bilateral relations have thrived. FOCAC started first as a bilateral Partnership framework between China and African countries with AUC being an observer. AUC became a full member of FOCAC in 2012.

**135.** FOCAC is a forum for South-South cooperation set up to address development issues of mutual concern between China and African countries. The Forum has operated as a bilateral relationship, where African countries champion their individual interests. It has been a strong bilateral-based Partnership, which has operated for over a long period of time and no doubt has great potential to support the advancement of the course and purposes of the African continent and China, especially in areas with political dimension, infrastructure development, utilization of available market and the business opportunities that could be harnessed by both sides. It statutorily holds at the Ministerial level and has been hosted in the past as follows:

- 2000 – FOCAC I, Beijing, China
- 2003 – FOCAC II, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
- 2006 – *1<sup>st</sup> FOCAC Summit (FOCAC-III), Beijing, China*
- 2009 – FOCAC IV, Sharm El Sheikh, Egypt
- 2012 – FOCAC V, Beijing, China
- 2015 – *2<sup>nd</sup> FOCAC Summit, Johannesburg, South Africa*
- 2018 – *3<sup>rd</sup> FOCAC Summit, Beijing, China*

#### **Policy and Strategy Framework**

**136.** From a strategic perspective, FOCAC is based on China's explicit and implicit strategy towards Africa, which include, among others: 1) securing access to Africa's Oil, Gas and Mining (OGM) and natural resources, forestry and agriculture, for China's fast growing

economy; 2) Securing Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) contracts; 3) Accessing the expanding consumer market and industrial market of the African continent. From a policy perspective, the Partnership is guided by the use of a combination of China's bilateral policy instruments and strategic Partnership-specific ones; (such as China-Africa Development Fund (CADF) framework).

### **Institutional, governance and management set-up**

**137.** FOCAC displays depth and maturity in terms of institutional, governance and management process. Monitoring and evaluation framework remains particularly weak; accessing M&E data on FOCAC projects has been difficult as there is no formal FOCAC mechanism or System (i.e. a joint AU/China System) that follows-up, monitors, evaluates and reports on its activities. Apparently the Chinese side has its own mechanism of capturing and reporting on project outcomes and outputs; but the AU does not.

### **Relevance**

**138.** The scope, potential transformational benefits, depth and "SMART" nature of the action plans are meaningful for FOCAC. FOCAC Partnership has already delivered some transformational benefits in economic terms for the African Continent. While Africa's share in Chinese foreign direct investment is negligible, figures indicate that Chinese investment in Africa has at least doubled since the Johannesburg Action Plan was launched in 2015.

### **Outcomes**

**139.** FOCAC 10-point plan (the Johannesburg Action Plan) is balanced between priorities towards political cooperation, social cooperation and exchange programs, and economic cooperation, particularly in the areas of trade, industrial investments in OGM, infrastructure and manufacturing with highly visible transformational benefits over the last decade during which FOCAC was operating on bilateral basis with African countries. FOCAC evolved into a Partnership that started providing support to regional integration activities, only when AUC became a full member of the FOCAC process.

### **Implementation level of Activities**

**140.** Within the framework of the implementation of the series of FOCAC action plans to date, China started providing support to Africa for regional integration and multilateral Cooperation. Therefore, the implementation level of activities is particularly good in infrastructure and resources sector investment, but merely fair in technology transfer and other sectors activities.

### **Socio-economic transformational impacts**

**141.** Since FOCAC started first as a bilateral cooperation framework between China and African countries, and like in the case of TICAD above, it is not possible to quantify achievement of the FOCAC process in term of socio-economic transformational impacts, as a Strategic Partnership. The results obtained could only be accounted for on the basis of a pure bilateral cooperation point of view.

**142.** FOCAC is now implementing FOCAC 2016-2018 Action Plan. The question for Africa is therefore: is Africa benefiting in a meaningful way from this Partnership, namely; from a socio-economic transformation point of view? Do Chinese investments in Africa maximize local content and technology transfer for Africa? Do Chinese operations in Africa promote and benefit local SMEs and the ordinary citizen? In the short timeframe allocated to this study, it could not look into such issues; but a thorough study needs to be undertaken in that direction for all the Strategic Partnerships. In the FOCAC 2016-2018 Action Plan both parties agreed to work together in areas of: 1). Agriculture and Food Security; 2). Science and Technology; - 3) Human Resource Development, including support to TVET programme; 4) Health; 5) Support to Continental and Regional Integration; as well as 6) Support to Peace and Stability. If activities in support to those areas are built around AU flagship programmes, then impact could be assessed in few years' time.

### **Effectiveness and Efficiency**

**143.** FOCAC has also displayed a certain level of effectiveness though it can and should be improved from a planning and reporting point of view. FOCAC, like TICAD has also been operating since its inception on a bilateral basis. The shift to a strategic Partnership framework will make it more effective and more efficient through a dedicated M&E and Reporting mechanism.

### **Value addition of the Strategic Partnerships**

**144.** FOCAC has delivered a significant level of value addition to Africa. In other words, the benefits recorded would not have occurred without the Partnership, particularly from a bilateral point of view. FOCAC needs to consider the continental dimension by aligning itself more with the AU Vision and strategic priorities as contained in AU's flagship programmes, which will add more value to the FOCAC process.

### **Conclusion**

**145.** FOCAC is a strong Partnership, which has developed over a long period of time. It has resulted in a win-win situation for both sides. The bold and result-oriented nature of the Partnership as well as the scale of the cooperation has resulted in increasingly meaningful transformational benefits to Africa in industrialization, infrastructure and in more general socio-economic areas. The

Partnership has the potential of bringing even more transformational benefits to the African side if its limitations are addressed as articulated in the recommendations below.

## Recommendations

**146.** It is therefore recommended continuing with this Partnership, and take all necessary measures, from both sides and jointly, to promote equal roles between the African Union and China and upgrade the Partnership to the level of a Strategic Partnership with the AU, with a view to serving better the strategic goals and objectives of the African Union as enshrined in the Agenda 2063 and the Agenda 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

**147.** To that effect, and to make the FOCAC process more relevant to addressing African Union strategic objectives, it is recommended that the African and the Chinese sides agree on a mechanism whereby the African Union contribute to the articulation of implementable Action Plans around challenges and objectives identified by the AU, and to ensure the inclusiveness of all Member States in the preparatory process. This would correct the current situation whereby FOCAC Action Plans are inspired and defined by the Chinese side with little or no African contribution.

**148.** China should pay due attention to local content development in China's financed and executed projects. In particular, the AU and China should institutionalize, as part of the FOCAC process, a "Business Linkage and Local Content Development Compact" with a view to making sure that a minimum level of local content and a systematic technology transfer process is effected at senior management, middle management and worker's level at a ratio of 65% to 80% minimum; this is to ensure effective technology transfer in the implementation of all FOCAC related Programmes/Projects activities.

**149.** AU to invite China to systematically consider local processing of oil, beneficiation of mining products and the transformation/processing of other raw materials in Africa, instead of exporting them as raw materials to China; this will contribute to the much needed industrialization of Africa, to the maximization of value addition and to the creation of jobs.

**150.** AU and China should discuss and agree on a comprehensive industrialization Partnership around: -1) AU continental industrialization programs such as Accelerated Industrial Development for Africa (AIDA), Resource-based African Development Strategy (RADS), Africa Mining Vision (AMV) and African Productive Capacity Initiative (APCI) on one hand; 2) capacity building in modern manufacturing tools and techniques, industrial technology, mineral beneficiation technology; and 3) Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), Joint Venture and investment support, including for Small and Medium Enterprises/ Small and Medium Industries (SMEs/SMIs) sector; namely, in special economic zone-like format in the forms of industrial, manufacturing, agro-processing and mining beneficiation platforms; and 4/ cooperation in agriculture and related areas.

**151.** AU should seize the offer made by China for an "Infrastructure Partnership" and discuss its implementation around four mechanisms at least: 1) Policy, regulatory, legal and institutional frameworks for Public Private Partnership (PPP)/infrastructures; 2) Infrastructure project development and financial funding in the context of PIDA; 3) EPC capacity building through Joint Venture namely, in technology transfer; and 4) Renewable energy project cooperation.

**152.** Both sides should institutionalize a joint coordination, follow-up, monitoring and reporting mechanism that involves not only China and AU, but also RECs, Member States, Private Sector and Civil Society Organizations.

**153.** While business and social perception of China cooperation with Africa is largely positive, there are a number of areas where China's business practices on Africa need improvement. For an effective and efficient Partnership to gain momentum and operate at its maximum, it is recommended that the following Africa's concerns and issues be addressed in a systematic manner, and in accordance with previous commitments undertaken by both sides:

- a. Negative impact on small African traders and wholesale African traders; 1) negative impact on small African businesses; 2) de-industrialization of Africa and negative impact on Africa's export capacity; 3) limited employment benefits; 4) limited technology transfer, local content and employment creation for Africa in China Turnkey projects;
- b. Barriers that prevent effective coordination and impede decision making that results in delayed decision-making or lack of decision;
- c. Proper coordination of the various FOCAC Summits and Ministerial meetings;
- d. Proactivity on FOCAC Action Plans implementation matters, to avoid delays.

## **African Union-Korea Partnership**

### Assessment and Findings

#### **Legal / Institutional framework**

**154.** The African Union – Korea Partnership was launched in Seoul, Korea, in November 2006 as a follow-up mechanism of the Korean Initiative of African Development (KIAD) announced by the Korean President Roh Moo-hyun during his visit to three African countries, Egypt, Algeria and Nigeria in March 2006. Envisaged as a Ministerial Conference, the first Africa-Korea Forum was, however, attended by five African Heads of States, President Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of Congo in his capacity as Chairperson of the AU, President John Agyekum Kufuor of the Republic of Ghana, President Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete of the United Republic of Tanzania, President Boni Yayi of the Republic of Benin, Ban Ki-Moon, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Korea and Prime Minister Hang Myeong Sook of Korea.

**155.** The outcome documents adopted during the first Africa – Korea Forum, namely the “Seoul Declaration 2006” and the “Action Plan 2006 – 2009”, acknowledged that the first Forum: “laid the foundation for a framework of friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between Korea and the African Countries” and also agreed that the Africa – Korea Forum should be held regularly, on a three year cycle, to serve as a mechanism for substantive cooperation.

After the first Forum held in 2006, two others were organized in Seoul, Korea, respectively in 2009 and in 2012. The last Africa – Korea Forum was held in Africa for the first time in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 6<sup>th</sup>-7<sup>th</sup> December 2016, as approved by the Executive Council Decision No. EX.CL/Dec. 877(XXVII)<sup>35</sup>, adopted at its Twenty-Seventh Ordinary Session 7<sup>th</sup> –12<sup>th</sup> June 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa. Though, the first 2006 Forum was entirely driven by Korea in terms of modalities of participation, invitations and the development of the Action Plan adopted, the 2009, 2012 and 2016 Fora were organized according to the Banjul Formula and the African Union took the lead on the African side.

### **Policy and Strategy Framework**

**156.** From a strategic perspective, this Partnership is based on Korea’s explicit and implicit strategy towards Africa, which include, among others: 1) securing access to Africa's OGM and natural resources - forestry and agriculture – for Korea fast growing economy; 2) securing EPC contracts; 3) accessing the expanding consumer market and industrial market of the African continent, at a lesser stage. From a policy perspective, the Partnership is guided by the use of a combination of Korea’s bilateral policy instruments and strategic Partnership-specific ones.

### **Institutional, governance and management set-up**

**157.** The African Union-Korea Partnership requires more work in this area; the Partnership's institutional arrangement, governance and follow-up mechanisms are not yet comprehensively articulated and grounded on meaningful and "SMART" outcome and impact indicators. Monitoring and evaluation framework remains particularly weak, as there is still a blurred line between multilateral and bilateral relationship. This relates to the fact that the Partnership was established outside the AU.

### **Relevance**

**158.** The various Action Plans of the African Union-Korea Partnership are not useful in relation to their significance in terms of scale and transformational benefits, nor are they articulated in "SMART" terms from a strategic point of view.

---

<sup>35</sup> EX.CL/Dec. 877(XXVII), para 23: APPROVES the offer of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia to host the 4th Africa-Korea Forum and its preparatory meetings;

## **Outcomes**

**159.** The African Union-Korea Partnership, which puts emphasis on bilateral arrangements generated only marginal outcomes in terms of scale and depth, and its Action Plans and/or scope cover the same long list of cooperation; this is understandable since this relationship was first, based on bilateral cooperation between Korea and African countries.

## **Implementation level of Activities**

**160.** Taking into account the above, one could easily understand that the implementation level of activities for this Partnership is quite marginal in terms of significance to Africa. After its inception in 2006 by Korea's own initiative, this Partnership recognized the full involvement of the AU only in 2009. It is worth stressing that the basic plan for development cooperation with Africa for 2009-2012 was in fact the Korea bilateral cooperation program for Africa.

**161.** The respective African Union – Korea Partnership Action Plans adopted in 2006, 2009, 2012 and 2016 have not delivered significant level of implementation of projects and activities identified, from a regional or continental perspective. The progress report of the implementation of the 2013-2015 Action Plan, for example, sent to the Commission was developed only by the Korean side in 2014 and represents a compilation of programs and projects financially supported by Korea and implemented in specific African countries.

**162.** On a continental or regional basis, the respective African Union-Korea Partnership Action Plans have not been effectively implemented. The Partnership remains more focused on bilateral projects. Both sides are now making efforts to strengthen multilateral cooperation and to expand Partnership at a continental level in accordance with various Seoul Declarations and the 4<sup>th</sup> African Union – Korea Framework of Cooperation 2017-2021. However, some efforts and decisions made by both sides may now strengthen the multilateral component and expand the Partnership at a continental level. These efforts consist mainly, on one hand, in the agreement reached in 2009 on the representation of Africa by organs of the African Union and the application of the Banjul Formula when it comes to participation at the Forum. On the other hand, the acceptance of the principle of rotation between Africa and Korea concerning the venue of the Forum is an important step for the African side to advance the continental agenda within this framework.

## **Socio-economic transformational impact**

**163.** The African Union-Korea Partnership generated only very limited development impacts due to its limited scale and level of implementation, or simply the limited implementation of action plans that occurred, associated with the lack of appropriate M&E mechanism.



## **Effectiveness and Efficiency**

**164.** The African Union – Korea Partnership in its current bilateral formulation has not yet been fully effective as implementation level of activities contained in the approved Action Plans remains very low despite the commitments made. For this Partnership to display some level of efficiency and effectiveness, the commitments made would have to be fully honoured and translated into actions.

## **Value addition of the Partnership**

**165.** The African Union-Korea Partnership value addition has not met the expectations on the continental level, as the projects approved for implementation are those that would have been implemented under the bilateral cooperation channel.

## **Conclusion**

**166.** It is worth stressing that the basic plan for development cooperation with Africa for 2009-2012 was in fact the Korea bilateral cooperation program for Africa. The implementation of various African Union – Korea Partnership Action Plans since 2006 are yet to report on a significant achievement at a continental or regional perspective. The Partnership remains more focused on bilateral projects. Both sides are now making efforts to strengthen multilateral cooperation and to expand Partnership at a continental level, in accordance with various Seoul Declarations and the 4<sup>th</sup> African Union – Korea Framework of Cooperation 2017-2021.

## **Recommendations**

**167.** Since 2009, AU's role in the coordination of the Partnership has been strengthened as AU has been recognized as the coordinator of the African side. The second Forum took place from 23<sup>rd</sup>-25<sup>th</sup> November 2009 under the new format and with the full involvement of the AU. This Forum holds the prospect of mutual benefits for both sides and should continue and be vigorously pursued. It is therefore recommended that:

- a.** AU Member States take a final decision as to how to respond to Korea's strategy of advancing only its bilateral cooperation through the African Union – Korea Partnership and whether the Partnership should be treated as strategic. If considered strategic, it is important to determine what areas it should cover and how Africa will be represented. A Partnership with Korea at the continental level will, of course, be beneficial to Africa particularly if it is focused and conforms to AU's Strategic Vision

as expressed in the African Union Agenda 2063 and the Banjul formula or as it may be re-configured;

- b. The Action Plan of the reconfigured Partnership to be restructured towards fewer priority areas, and be made more comprehensive in terms of Action Plan definition in "SMART" terms around meaningful transformational benefits with regard to: - Industrialization, SME development and technology transfer through TVET and industry-specific technical skills development and in accordance with areas of competence of Korea as mutually recognized by both sides; - As well as the definition of a comprehensive coordination, follow-up and reporting mechanisms on the activities of the Partnership.

## **African Union-Turkey Partnership**

### Assessment and Findings

#### **Legal / Institutional framework**

**168.** The first Africa-Turkey Cooperation Summit was held in Istanbul, Turkey, in August 2008. During that Summit two outcome documents were adopted: the Istanbul Declaration and the Partnership Framework Agreement for cooperation.

#### **Policy and Strategy Framework**

**169.** From a strategic and policy perspective, this Partnership is based on Turkey's explicit and implicit strategy towards Africa, which include, among others: 1) securing access to Africa's OGM and natural resources - forestry and agriculture – for Turkey's fast growing economy; 2) securing EPC contracts; 3) accessing the expanding consumer market and industrial market of the African continent, at a lesser stage. The Partnership is also guided by the use of an ambiguous combination of Turkey's bilateral policy instruments and strategic Partnership-specific ones that does not respect the unity of Africa.

#### **Institutional, governance and management set-up**

**170.** The African Union-Turkey Partnership requires more work in this area. The Partnership's institutional arrangement, governance and follow-up mechanisms are not yet comprehensively articulated and grounded on meaningful and "SMART" outcome and impact indicators. Monitoring and evaluation framework remains particularly weak, as there is still a blurred line between multilateral and bilateral relationship. This is the result of long-standing bilateral cooperation between Turkey and many African countries.

#### **Relevance**

171. For the African Union-Turkey Partnership, its Action Plans are not as useful or significant in terms of scale and transformational benefits for Africa, and are not articulated in "SMART" terms.

### **Outcomes**

172. The African Union-Turkey Partnership generated only marginal outcomes in terms of scale and depth, with action plan and/or scope covering the same long list of cooperation areas as Korea. In order to generate meaningful outcomes the plan has to be arranged in a "SMART" manner, and go away from the usual bilateral cooperation areas.

### **Implementation level of Activities**

173. The first joint Implementation Plan 2010 – 2014 (Istanbul) and the second joint Implementation Plan 2014-2019 (Malabo) of the AU -Turkey Partnership have witnessed low level of implementation. Following the Malabo Summit, a Senior Officials meeting was held from 17<sup>th</sup> to 22<sup>nd</sup> of March 2015 in Ankara, Turkey in order to negotiate the required Funds for the agreed upon activities on the Matrix of the key Priority projects which was adopted during the 2014 Malabo Summit.

174. To that end, Turkey has provided One Million USD, earmarked for six Priority Areas. Although the issue of the delayed implementation is due to the fact that Turkey is providing the Funds when the AU Budget is already adopted, this situation makes it difficult to use the funds. Therefore, in addressing this issue, the Commission had requested the Turkish side to formalize the allocation of the Funds on an annual y basis, which will inform the AUC in its Budget Planning.

175. In the same vein an African Union-Turkey Senior Official's Meeting took place on 19<sup>th</sup> June 2017 at the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The purpose of that meeting was to review and assess the implementation level of the agreed priority areas.

### **Socio-economic transformational impact**

176. For the same reasons as TICAD, FOCAC and Korea, as stated above, the African Union-Turkey Partnership generated limited development impacts due to its initial bilateral nature, its limited scale and level of implementation and the nonexistence of adequate M&E framework.

### **Effectiveness and Efficiency**

177. The African Union – Turkey Partnership has not yet been fully effective as implementation level of activities contained in the approved Action Plans remains very low despite the commitments made. For this Partnership to display some level of efficiency and

effectiveness, the commitments made would have to be fully honoured and translated into actions, and the activities to be implemented would have to move from those of bilateral cooperation.

### **Value addition of the Partnership**

**178.** The African Union-Turkey Partnership has not delivered value addition to socio-economic development at multilateral level as implementation has remained low. However, African countries long-standing bilateral cooperation with Turkey has certainly yielded value addition. The 2014 Malabo Summit decided to reduce the sixteen submitted projects to six priority projects for implementation over the 2014 – 2019 period.

### **Conclusion**

**179.** Like the case of the African Union-Korea Partnership, the African Union-Turkey Partnership has some potential; but its slow rate and limited scope of implementation will need to take off as not much progress has been made in terms of the implementation of the 2014 Malabo Joint Action Plan as of now, despite the fact that this is a Partnership operating on a bilateral basis.

**180.** The current form of this Partnership does not qualify as a Strategic Partnership. Yet, the Partnership may have the potential to become Strategic. In order to transform this Partnership into a Strategic Partnership, if necessary, it is recommended that the Partnership qualifies as “Strategic” according to the threshold previously identified in this report. This calls for a comprehensive review of this Partnership to allow for its continuation on a solid basis.

### **Recommendations**

**181.** In the interim, it is therefore recommended that the joint Implementation Plan should be restructured towards fewer priority areas, and made more comprehensive in terms of:

- a.** Re-scoping of the joint Action Plan into a limited number of agreed implementable projects;
- b.** Redefinition of the Action Plan in "SMART" terms around meaningful transformational benefits in terms of: 1) Incomes, jobs and decent work 2) Poverty, inequality and hunger 3) Social security and protection including Persons with Disabilities 4) Modern and livable habitats and basic quality services 5) Education and STI skills driven revolution 6) Sustainable and inclusive economic growth 7) STI driven manufacturing/industrialization and value addition 8) Economic diversification

and resilience; setting up a Partnership coordination, financing, follow-up and reporting mechanisms..

**182.** In addressing the issue of low level of implementation of the joint Action Plans as recognized and agreed upon by both parties, the issue should be addressed as a matter of urgency and priority, and the two parties should engage in the implementation of the projects identified by them.

### **African Union Commission-US High-Level Dialogue**

**183.** The African Union Commission and the United States Department of State signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2013. The MoU formalized cooperation on issues including peace and security; democracy and governance; economic growth, trade and investment; and promotion of opportunity and development. To date, five High-Level Dialogues have been held with the recent one in December 2018 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The U.S. and the African Union Commission hold an annual high level dialogue, during which cooperation on flagship projects is discussed and agreed upon.

**184.** More than 90% of U.S. resources directed towards Africa are directed to bilateral programs, or regional projects implemented bilaterally (e.g. Power Africa, YALI, etc.). At the same time, financial contributions from the United States to the continental level have been negligible. In addition, the U.S. has taken stands that are not conducive to the AU's independence and financial sustainability, such as obstructing the Financing the Union decision at WTO, and co-financing peace support operations with the United Nations at the latter's meetings.

### **Recommendation**

**185.** Due to the potential of this Dialogue, and the fact that the United States works so far on a bilateral basis with African countries, it is, therefore, recommended:

**186.** that the AU holds discussions with the United States in order to enable more conducive American foreign policy for Africa's integration and development, as well as explore the possibility of bringing this Dialogue under the framework of African Union Partnership.

## **PART C: ENHANCEMENT OF THE INSTITUTIONAL STATE OF THE AU COMMISSION TO DRIVE THE AFRICAN UNION'S ENGAGEMENTS WITH PARTNERS**

### **I. AU- Level Challenges in the Management of Strategic Partnerships**

**187.** The management process of African Union strategic partnerships has encountered a number of challenges and constraints that need to be addressed in a comprehensive manner, with a view to delivering results effectively and efficiently. These include the following:

- a) Absence of a Partnership Policy and Strategy framework
- b) Lack of AU-level technical capacity, procedural and knowledge gaps
- c) African side coordination and communication issues
- d) AU-level financial resource constraints
- e) Perceived institutional weaknesses of the AUC
- f) Stretched capacity of the AUC in the management of strategic partnerships
- g) Fragmentation of functions pertaining to management of partnerships
- h) Challenges of AU Partnership, Management and Coordination Division (PMCD):
  - Deficit in the institutionalization, sustainability, follow-up mechanisms and continuity in the management of strategic partnership at AU level;
  - Weaknesses in the monitoring/follow-up, review, reporting and evaluation mechanisms.

### **The Need for Partnership Policy and Strategy Framework**

Adoption of a Comprehensive AU Policy and Strategy Framework for the establishment and management of strategic partnerships:

**188.** While most African Union strategic partners have their strategy towards the Continent, Africa, on her side, has not yet adopted an overall Partnership Policy and Strategy Framework for the management of its Strategic Partnerships. Obviously, a one-size fit all approach to the structuring of the partnerships and their action plans does not reflect the relative complexities of the different partnerships and the specific opportunities they bring to the African continent. In addition, many partners don't have a clear understanding of AU continental priority programmes and the way they are supposed to contribute to their implementation.

**189.** The value of a result-oriented and strategic approach to the management of strategic partnerships needs to be considered at the African Union Commission for better delivery in the management and coordination of the partnerships. Since the inception of these

partnerships, their management activities have been scattered among the various operational departments with less or no coordination among them. Each one has also been operating without a clear partnership policy and strategy framework. There has been some improvement

since 2012 when the Partnership Management and Coordination Division (PMCD) was established under the Bureau of the Chairperson of the AUC.

Initiation and structuring of partnership:

**190.** On the African Union side, in the absence of a clear Partnership Policy and Strategy Framework, the initiation of partnerships is yet to be based on a set of clear criteria and pre-determined objectives and goals both in developmental and political terms. Furthermore, the quasi totality of partnerships attempt to cover the same long list of cooperation areas without a differentiation based on partners' specific advantage(s) and the meaningful nature of what the partner can contribute to Africa. Lastly, what Africa brings to the table is not clearly articulated and neither valued. Not all partnerships should look alike in terms of cooperation areas. Obviously, a specialization of partnerships, based on partners' comparative advantage and economic/financial capacity, should be considered.

Reactive approach to the management of strategic partnerships:

**191.** A Partnership Policy and Strategy Framework will help AU shift from reactive to proactive approach with the partners. It will also improve the level of preparedness, the technical and financial capacity gap of the AUC and/or the deficient internal coordination of the AU with other African stakeholders such as RECs, Private Sector organizations, etc. Trade and investment programs require the involvement of African private sector which is not yet fully associated in the planning, implementation and management of the African Union strategic partnerships in a systematic way.

**AUC-level Technical Capacity, Procedural and Knowledge Gaps**

**192.** The management of strategic partnerships from initiation/negotiation to full implementation and reporting involves a combination of diplomatic skills, functional program/project management skills, thematic development assistance/cooperation related skills and commercial project development, structuring and implementation skills. These need to be developed at AUC level within the framework of PMCD, whose current limited structure undermines the capacity of the African Union to manage the various partnerships relationship in an efficient and effective manner.

**African-side Coordination and Communication Issues**

**193.** The lack of institutionalized working relationships between AUC, and AU organs and other stakeholders such as RECs, AUDA/NPCA, Private Sector, CSOs. Additionally, their non-involvement in the partnership management process of the AU- inter alia - affect negatively the ability of the AU to negotiate relevant partnerships and influence their structuring and implement their action plans in a timely manner.

**i. AUC-RECs**

**194.** AUC and RECs communication and information flows suffer on three fronts. First, AUC engages in strategic partnerships which implementation requires active involvement of RECs, but the partnerships are designed without inputs from RECs. Secondly, RECs themselves negotiate partnerships on their own with the same strategic partners as the AU, giving room for possible redundancies. Thirdly, although the RECs, which are supposed to implement part of the African Union strategic partnership, are somehow involved in the process of establishing their own strategic partnerships, they do not necessarily have the budget to engage in planning and implementation activities.

**ii. Member States and the Commission**

**195.** Member States and the Commission communication and information flow suffer on three accounts:

- a.** The overall AU's vision of strategic partnership should be one that leads to the implementation of continental and regional programs and projects. However some Member States tend to put their national interest first;
- b.** Significant gaps/differences have been noted between AU continental programmes and the action plans defined within the framework of strategic partnerships that tended to be articulated in a bilateral project format with no link to the regional/continental agenda. These gaps are widened by the lack of an adequate delineation between the data provided by Partners in their support of Member States in the bilateral and multilateral contexts;
- c.** Position coordination issues have arisen in many meetings where consultations between Member States and AUC have been deficient. Additionally, the Banjul Formula on participation in Continent to Country Summits has proven to be controversial <sup>36</sup>.

**iii. PRC- AUC**

---

<sup>36</sup> This matter has been addressed extensively in part A of the Report (paragraphs 40-42)



**196.** At times, it is not clear to the PRC who, between the PMCD and technical departments, leads the way in the preparation and organization of consultations with partners. The multiple engagements of the AUC in the management of partnership relationship, has often translated into communication gaps between AUC and the PRC.

#### **iv. AUC-AUDA/NPCA**

**197.** The AUC and AUDA/NPCA have failed to work together in order to send a strong signal to partners that the two structures are complementary. The synergy between them will contribute to higher levels of implementation.

#### **v. AUC-Partners**

**198.** The shortcomings of the Commission to coordinate the implementation of decisions on partnerships, as well as the partners' lack of awareness of the AU decision making process push the latters to often by-pass PMCD and engage directly with technical departments and/or AUC Chairperson or Deputy Chairperson Offices. As a result, this undermines the Commission; but it also results sometimes in contradictory and/or uncoordinated approaches between AUC and the partners.

**199.** Partners have reported situations where feedback received from the Chairperson office were not known to the technical department in charge of the specific issue; causing delays and misunderstanding in the implementation of the anticipated project.

**200.** It is worth noting that there is a need to revise the cost implication of a partnership, and the amount of resources dedicated to its execution, in order to ensure that they all correlate to envisage value and anticipated outcome of the partnership.

#### **vi. PMCD-Technical Departments**

**201.** PMCD, SCMC and even some partners have deplored the many delays or even absence experienced in the technical departments' inputs/contributions to the partnership management process due to a combination of low priority given to partnership issues, bureaucracy, workload, amidst a lack of adequate decision making processes in the absence of Departments' Heads . It is worth noting that the specificities of the Department of Peace and Security sometimes lead to a lack of coordination in this regard. Moreover, it is to be recalled that the limited structure of PMCD is not adequate to support the management of the African Union partnerships in an efficient and effective manner.

**202.** With Technical Departments, it is also known that there are established procedures for signing legal instruments, such as MoUs, which obliges all Departments to get clearance from

the Chairperson of the Commission before any agreement is signed. However, this seems not always observed; and PMCD was not always involved when some agreements with partners are signed. This has created dysfunctions, and made follow up difficult.

**203.** Furthermore, it was observed that some AUC Departments have unilaterally submitted requests for funding the same programmes within their mandate, to different partners, without adequate coordination with other AUC Departments to avoid redundancy in such requests. This situation puts partners in difficult and uneasy positions and makes them hesitant in accepting the proposals.

### **AU Financial Contribution Issues**

**204.** The African Union will not be able to influence successfully partnerships nor contribute significantly to the implementation of action plans if AU internal financial resource mobilization agenda is not addressed decisively and funding, in-kind and technical contributions to implement agreed-upon programmes and projects put in place. One should not forget that these are Strategic Partnerships based on win-win undertaking; and their implementation needs financial input/contribution from the African side.

### **Perceived Institutional Weaknesses of the AUC**

**205.** There are current deficiencies in the internal governance, management and control system of the AUC, particularly in the areas of strategic planning and programming, as well as financial and human resources management. The continuation of such deficiencies shall create a confidence deficit that would negatively impact the ability of the AU to mobilize financial and technical assistance from both strategic and traditional development partners as financial limits and non-flexible disbursement might be imposed on the AUC to hedge against such deficiencies.

### **Stretched Capacity of the AUC and Cost to the AUC**

**206.** Each partnership comes with its string of consultation and coordination mechanisms including: heads of states summits, ministerial meetings, coordination and/or follow-up mechanisms, technical committees, preparatory meetings, Action Plans and frameworks for cooperation. The preparation and participation of/into these multiple instances, committees and meetings, the various requests for technical inputs as well as the coordination meetings with the PRC, cause significant drain in financial and staff time in terms on the personnel of the AUC without tangible results for most Partnerships.

**207.** Furthermore, there are currently too many objectives in certain Partnerships which not only stretches the capacity of the AU Commission in the implementation phase, but also results

in Partnerships not delivering to their full potential as resources are spread over a wide area of intervention; and implementation is not focused.

### **Challenges of the Partnership Management and Coordination Division**

**208.** The African Union (AU) pursues three types of Partnerships, namely (i) Continent to Continent Partnership, (ii) Continent to Country Partnership and (iii) Organization to Organization Partnerships (Institutional Partnerships). Before the establishment of the PMCD, the management of all these partnerships was scattered, and handled by various Departments of the Commission. This situation had made it difficult for AUC to have a comprehensive overview of the management process and challenges of all Partnerships with the view to developing a common policy and strategy for the Partnerships. This shortcoming has prompted the establishment, in the Office of the Chairperson, of the Partnership Management and Coordination Division (PMCD).

**209.** The Executive Council Decision (EX.CL/Dec.646 (XIX)<sup>37</sup> taken at its 19<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session held in June 2011, in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, decided to establish PMCD. The Mandate of PMCD<sup>38</sup> is to coordinate the various Partnerships entered into between Africa and other parts of the World and to:

- Manage the activities relating to those Partnerships;
- Propose and implement actions for the operationalization of the Frameworks and/or Plans of Action supporting the various Partnerships;
- Follow-up on the implementation of activities resulting from those instruments;
- Service the meetings of the PRC and the Sub Committee on Multilateral Cooperation under the various Partnerships;
- Assess the various outcomes of activities and documents resulting from various meetings of the Partnerships and make proposals for actions and follow-up;
- Liaise with various Departments/ Units of the Commission for coordination purposes as they relate to each Partnership;
- Ensure synergy between and among the various Partnerships.

**210.** Within this mandate, the Role, Functions and Activities of PMCD were defined and approved. The Commission was requested to implement this Decision gradually by recruiting staff for the Structure over a period of three years starting January 2012.

**211.** The position of Head of Division of PMCD which is P5 is too low when compared to Directors heading Departments on the one hand, and with high level diplomats and senior officials from partners on the other hand. These asymmetric relations have had negative

---

<sup>37</sup> EX.CL/Dec.646(XIX), para 2: DECIDES to create the Division of Strategic Partnerships in the Office of the Chairperson of the Commission, with the following structure

<sup>38</sup> See annex 3 for PMCD 2011 Mandate

bearing during various exchanges and negotiation process with partners that now have the tendency of by-passing the PMCD. This situation generates significant communication and information flow problems for the Division and partners alike. It is important and of utmost

urgency to operationalize a fully staffed and equipped PMCD with a view to making it responsive and up to the task.

### **AU-level Causes of Low Level of Implementation**

**212.** Since its establishment in 2012, the PMCD has coordinated a number of high level and technical meetings and consultations with various partners. PMCD has also worked closely with PRC and line Departments to draft implementation matrixes for Action Plans. However, the capacity of the Commission to transform most of the action plans into implementable projects has been relatively weak as a result of many factors summarized as follows:

- AUC-level coordination problem: The low level of coordination within the Commission has been raised in relevant sections above. The full operationalization of PMCD at all levels and with the full backing of the leadership will put an end to such a situation;
- Host country default: Failure of African host-countries to meet their part of the obligations in the implementation of identified projects, such as, Regional Centers of Excellence, has been a major cause of low level of implementation namely, in the case of the African Union-India partnership that proposed the setting-up of no less than a dozen of such projects;
- The issue of financial resources contribution from Member States to t AUC, to allow it implement fully, efficiently and effectively the various frameworks that have been established for the management and coordination of the Strategic Partnerships, has also been raised in above sections; when resources are made available and the established mechanisms operationalized, AUC will be in a better position to implement those partnerships in all their components;
- Lack of project formulation/development capacity;
- Weak technical back-up System at PMCD level.

### **Weaknesses in the Follow-up, Review, Monitoring and Evaluation and Reporting Mechanisms**

**213.** Partnerships have been very rarely evaluated from the African side. Most Reports of Monitoring and Evaluation of the activities of all the Partnerships have been prepared by the Partners without the involvement of the AU Structures. In situations where the relationships have been on bilateral basis, the Commission has had no access or mechanism to get involved to contribute in necessary monitoring, evaluation and reporting activities.

II. Enhancement of the institutional Capacity of the AU Commission to drive the African Union's engagements with Partners

**214.** There is a need to empower the Partnership Management and Coordination arm of the Commission to enable it discharge efficiently and effectively its functions and duties. To that effect, the following recommendations are hereby made:

- a. Restructure PMCD within the ongoing Institutional Reform process, in conformity with its newly envisaged role, functions and duties, by operationalizing the decision to upgrade the Division into a Directorate;
- b. The role of PMCD will be maintained as clearly indicated in its Terms of Reference, which include; to coordinate and manage the partnerships entered into by the African Union through the Commission and ensure that the terms and conditions of the financing of the projects are fully met;
- c. PMCD should work in close collaboration with line Technical Departments that are responsible for initiating and implementing the programs and projects to be supported by the partners and ensure a close coordination and synergy between it and the Departments;
- d. Formalize the establishment of a Strategic Partnerships Focal Points Group (SPFPG) made up of Focal Points designated by the relevant AUC Departments, Directorates and Units,/NPCA, Organs, RECs, African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF), African Risk Capacity (ARC), Pan African Women Organization (PAWO), AfDB, etc. to provide necessary support to PMCD in promoting understanding and better working relationship with Departments/Directorates;
- e. Provide technical skills requirements for the Partnerships Management and Coordination Division and SPFPG, together with clearly defined operational and administrative systems, as well as supporting operational manuals and other knowledge tools that will assist PMCD and SPFPG to properly manage and coordinate the Strategic Partnerships;
- f. Consider establishing presence at the Capitals/cities of countries/regions where the African Union has Strategic Partnership. At the minimum, consider stationing staff in such respective locations that are found critical or have need to advance the Partnership process, to follow up on all Partnership activities;
- g. PRC should be capacitated in administrative, logistical and technical terms, to enable it engage effectively in providing guidance to the Partnership management process. This could be achieved by engaging in orientation through Executive Seminars both for PRC and AUC at the highest leadership level for a common understanding of the role of each one with respect to the Strategic Partnerships;
- h. Put in place a Partnerships Management and Information System (PMIS) that enables partners to communicate systematically all activities and projects funded under a Strategic Partnership framework and commits all AU Member States, RECs, AUDA/NPCA, ACBF and AfDB to communicate systematically all activities and

projects undertaken under African Strategic Partnership framework. AU is encouraged to develop and use an

online system for data entry, from which annual reports on the status of all Strategic Partnerships would be generated and presented to AU policy organs;

- i. Unless the Executive Council decides otherwise on a case-by-case basis, harmonize the follow up mechanisms for all Strategic Partnerships in line with the 5-year cycle alongside a uniformed model for ease of implementation and follow up through a single and same format, as follows:
  - Summit level meetings;
  - Ministerial level meetings (preceded by *follow up and preparatory* meetings for *Summits*)
  - Senior Officials level meetings (preceded by biennial Senior Officials Meetings)
  - Technical level meetings: should be held as necessary.
- j. Strengthen joint planning, implementation, follow-up, M&E framework and reporting for each partnership;
- k. Promote synergy between AU and the African stakeholders, such as:
  - Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs)
  - African Union Development Agency (AUDA)/NEPAD Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA)
  - United Nation's Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)
  - Africa's Financial Institution- AfDB
  - African Capacity Building Foundation (ACBF)
  - Private Sector Organizations and their respective umbrella Chamber of Commerce and Industry, The Pan African Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PACCI), the academia as well as the diaspora.
- l. The African Union should implement its Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.605 (XXVII)<sup>39</sup> on financing the Union to ensure predictable and sufficient resources, which will enable it to play its role as a true partner, not as a recipient of aid, in the implementation of projects under Strategic Partnerships. In that regard, operational budgetary allocations should be made available to PMCD and AUC relevant departments, as well as RECs, NEPAD, and other relevant AU organs and agencies to enable them to play their role in delivering on strategic partnerships;
- m. Establish and operationalize an appropriate delivery Mechanism/Framework, between Member States, AUC/AUDA/NPCA, RECs, and other African stakeholders such as AU Organs, Private Sector Organizations (PSOs) and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in the

---

<sup>39</sup> Assembly/AU/Dec.605 (XXVII), para 1: REAFFIRMS its determination to ensure that the African Union (AU) is financed in a predictable, sustainable, equitable and accountable manner with the full ownership by its Member States;

management process of Africa's Strategic Partnerships. Within such framework, the PMCD, as the overall AU Partnerships management and coordination body, will coordinate policy guidelines as approved by AU policy organs on Partnership issues and technical support in the negotiation of Partnerships involving RECs and Organs; the PSOs and CSOs. In consultation with RECs and AU Organs, PMCD will participate in their monitoring, evaluation and reporting activities and capacity building activities of their Partnership coordination and management structures;

- n. A proposed framework for RECs engagement includes:
  - In process of developing Partnerships outcome documents, request RECs to prepare their own status reports on the Partnership at RECs level, and propose their own inputs into the Action Plans. AU should provide standard templates to ensure that RECs contribute homogenously;
  - Invite RECs to participate in Partnership meetings and to report on activities and results.
- o. For PMCD to better manage and coordinate the various Partnerships, the following tools and frameworks should be considered, in addition to the AU Partnership Policy and Strategy Framework, a Matrix on Partners areas of core competences and a Partnership Monitoring and Evaluation and Reporting Framework.

## CONCLUSION

**215.** In general, Partnership is a voluntary collaborative agreement between two or more parties in which all participants agree to work together to achieve a common purpose or undertake a specific task and to share risks, responsibilities, resources, competencies and benefits<sup>40</sup>. Synergy is the power behind Strategic Partnerships, as it leverages assets, in terms of resources, core competences, capabilities, amongst others, for all the parties involved for their mutual benefits. It is by sharing and purpose-driven cooperation that we can direct our collective resources and capabilities to those projects we consider most important.

**216.** A review of the report entitled “Evaluation of Africa’s Strategic Partnerships” has been conducted and concluded with clear recommendations expected to be adopted by the African Union Policy Organs, and effectively and efficiently implemented at all levels.

**217.** Having noted that adopting a focused thrust and strategic direction in relationships engaged by the Union with the other parts of the world has become urgent and necessary, three reference documents, namely: *African Union Outline Framework for Partnerships; Matrix on areas of cooperation and core competences*, which are expected to give guidelines on how the Union engages in Partnerships, maintains successful Partnerships, manages transition as and when necessary, have been proposed for adoption by the Policy Organs. A third document is yet to be reviewed by the Sub-committee prior to recommending it for adoption, namely the *Partnership Policy and Strategy Framework prepared by UNDP and the Commission*.

**218.** Great emphasis has been made on developing an inclusive Monitoring and Evaluation/Follow-up framework, to complement existing M&E documents. In that regard, the Commission in collaboration with the PRC Sub-Committee on Multilateral Cooperation, together with relevant stakeholders and Partners would have to mobilize such existing efforts in M&E to come up with a strong and binding Monitoring and Evaluation Framework that would ensure sustainability in following up on the implementation of agreed areas of cooperation.

**219.** It is believed that the empowerment of the Partnerships Management and Coordination Division will enable it to fulfill its mandate. Such empowerment will give a new meaning and impetus to Africa’s relationship with other parts of the world and support the African Union efforts towards addressing the challenges faced by Africa and its people in their strive to attain economic development and integration; focusing on the long-term strategic and sustainable relationships with evident short-term successes, in line with the AU Agenda 2063.

---

<sup>40</sup> UNECA Definition of partnership



**220.** As the world transforms towards greater sustainable growth, and rapidly striving to improve the living standard of its vast population, the 21<sup>st</sup> century offers unique opportunities for Africa. Africa has since embraced this reality and has unarguably made clear its resolve to embark on result-oriented endeavors towards this end, hence the adoption of its Agenda 2063. The African Union Agenda 2063 and its First Ten Year Implementation Plan features a grand design to inter alia transform Africa's economy through the development of technological capabilities and value addition to its natural endowments, as well as promote transformation at the political, social and cultural arena, while allowing for greater solidarity and cohesion, in the face of the challenges of globalization.

**221.** It is in this spirit that Africa engages with the other parts of the world in building sustainable Partnerships, with the view to forging better relationship in the form of Strategic Partnerships, not only with its traditional partners, but also with emerging partners. The African Union will remain the pivot and serve as levers and guarantors in the initiation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of these Partnerships, in accordance with the guidelines and criteria laid down by the Policy Organs and as contained in the three reference documents. These Partnerships must be based on solid and effective structures, built on the principles of equality and mutual respect capable of promoting a win-win relationship.



**DRAFT Rev 3**

# **AFRICAN UNION (AU) OUTLINE FRAMEWORK FOR STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIPS**

**Partnerships Management and Coordination Division  
(PMCD)**

## **Draft African Union Outline Framework for Partnerships**

### **Background**

1. At its meeting of 29<sup>th</sup> June 2015, in the Caucus Meeting Room 21 of the African Union Commission New Conference Complex, the Working Group of the Permanent Representative Committee Sub-Committee on Multilateral Cooperation (PRC-SCMC), under the Chairmanship of Egypt, requested the Commission to develop a template in the form of an outline framework for Partnership. The meeting agreed on the need to approach all engagements with the African Union Strategic Partnership in a more robust, purpose-driven and result-oriented manner. It recognized the need for the African Union to be self-oriented and proactive rather than being reactive in its engagements with Partners.

2. The resolve to adopt this dynamic approach stemmed from the need to deviate from the status quo that has maintained overtime, where the African Union Partners have been allowed the prerogative to develop concepts that guide relationships between both parties, that ordinarily should have been joint efforts, spelling out the areas of needs for both sides.

3. The strategy to adopt in engaging with Partners and developing frameworks for cooperation as well as determining areas of cooperation should be premised on the fact that Africa needs something from Partners and Partners need something from Africa. In that respect, time has come for Africa to first identify its needs and gaps that may exist which require the support of Partners, and then further identify the Partners that have such competences to assist.

### **Rationale for the Development of the Outline Framework Document**

4. The purpose of this Outline Framework document is to develop a template which will guide the African Union in engaging with its Strategic Partners and practically provide guidance on the baselines and approach that underpin the identification of areas of cooperation and development of working documents for the Partnerships, which the African Union is engaged in, taking into consideration what Africa wants to achieve in the next three to four years in accordance with the priorities stipulated in the AU Agenda 2063 First Ten Year Plan.

5. In undertaking this exercise, the following African Union reference documents were used, namely:

- (i) Constitutive Act of the African Union

- (ii) Decisions and Declarations of AU Policy Organs
- (iii) Agenda 2063 First Ten Years Plan: 2013-2023;
- (iv) African Union Commission Strategic Plan 2014-2017
- (v) Approved Budget Program for 2016.

In addition to these documents, a Report on the Evaluation of Africa's Strategic Partnerships has been provided to the Sub-Committee for its consideration.

6. The Partnerships Management and Coordination Division (PMCD) was also required to liaise with the various African Union Commission (AUC) technical Departments in order to collect their views as their involvement in the partnership process is critical.

7. A more detailed Outline Framework or prototype with the technical content that will highlight the core competencies, comparative and competitive advantages of Partners as well as the needs and gaps of the African Continent would be developed after receiving inputs from AUC technical Departments and after the process of evaluating the Strategic Partnerships has been completed and recommendations adopted. It is believed that this generic Outline Framework document will guide future development of all Strategic Partnerships documents, namely Declaration, Action Plan, etc.

### **Africa's Priority areas during First Ten-Year Plan of the AU Agenda 2063**

**Aspiration 1:** A Prosperous Africa Based on Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development

8. *There are six goals under this aspiration: 1-7*
- (1) A High Standard of Living, Quality of Life and Well Being for All
  - (2) Well Educated Citizens and Skills revolution underpinned by Science, Technology and Innovation
  - (3) Healthy and well-nourished citizens
  - (4) Transformed Economies and Jobs
  - (5) Modern Agriculture for increased productivity and production
  - (6) Blue/Ocean Economy for accelerated economic growth
  - (7) Environmentally sustainable climate and resilient economies and communities

**Aspiration 2:** An Integrated Continent, Politically united and based on the Ideals of Pan Africanism and Vision of African Renaissance

9. *There are three goals under this aspiration: 8 -10*  
(8) United Africa (Federal or Confederate)  
(9) World Class Infrastructure crisscrosses Africa  
(10) Decolonization

**Aspiration 3:** An Africa of Good Governance, Democracy, Respect for Human Rights, Justice and the Rule of Law

10. *There are two goals under this aspiration: 11-12*  
(11) Democratic values, practices, universal principles of human rights, justice and the rule of law entrenched  
(12) Capable institutions and transformed leadership in place at all levels

**Aspiration 4:** A Peaceful and Secure Africa

11. *There are three goals under this aspiration: 13 - 15.*  
(13) Peace Security and Stability is preserved  
(14) A Stable and Peaceful Africa  
(15) A Fully functional and operational APSA

**Aspiration 5:** Africa with a Strong Cultural Identity, Common Heritage, Values and Ethics

12. *There is only one goal under this aspiration: 16.*  
(16) African Cultural Renaissance is pre-eminent

**Aspiration 6:** An Africa Whose Development is people driven, especially relying on the potential offered by its Youth and Women

13. *There are two goals under this aspiration: 17 -18.*  
(17) Full Gender Equality in All Spheres of Life  
(18) Engaged and Empowered Youth and Children

**Aspiration 7:** Africa as a strong and influential global partner

14. *There are two goals under this aspiration: 19 - 20.*  
(19) Africa as a major partner in global affairs and peaceful co-existence  
(20) Africa takes full responsibility for financing her development.

### **Africa's Priority areas under Strategic Plan 2014-2017**

15. *The African Union Strategic Plan 2014-2017, centers around five pillars, namely:*
- (i) Peace and Security;
  - (ii) Social, Economic & Human Development;
  - (iii) Integration, Cooperation & partnerships;
  - (iv) Shared Values; and
  - (v) Institutions, Capacity Building and Communication.
16. These pillars have been designed to enable the African Union achieve the overall goal, namely: “Accelerate progress towards an integrated, prosperous and inclusive Africa, at peace with itself, playing a dynamic role in the continental and global arena, effectively driven by an accountable, efficient and responsive Commission”.
17. These five pillars are already reflected in the Agenda 2063.

### **Africa's Priority areas as aligned with the Budget Programme**

18. Africa's priority areas as indicated in the approved yearly Budget of the African Union have been subsumed under the AU Strategic Plan, 2014-2017, and the First Ten-Year Plan of the AU Agenda 2063.

### **Involvement of stakeholders**

19. In order to ensure coherence and effectiveness, the need to involve all African Union Member States, AUC, Other AU Organs, NEPAD and Regional Economic Communities have been underscored.

### **Guiding Principles on Partnerships**

20. It is observed that some of the African Union Partners seek visibility and would readily accept to engage cooperation in various areas that may fall outside their core competencies. In that regard, Africa should focus its partnership with respective partners on specific areas, after conducting an assessment on the prospective Partners' abilities to engage in identified areas of cooperation. This will ensure that partners actively and effectively deliver on the agreed areas of cooperation.

21. Africa's needs have been identified and enumerated in the AU Agenda 2063, and further clustered into five implementation phases of which the First Ten-Year Plan has been adopted for implementation. Determination of areas of cooperation with Strategic Partners should therefore be aligned with what Africa wants and in line with the Aspirations of the First Ten-Year plan of the AU Agenda 2063.

22. Africa's priorities areas for implementing the 20 goals outlined under the aforementioned seven aspirations are as follows:

1. Incomes, Jobs and decent work
2. Poverty, Inequality and Hunger
3. Social security and protection Including Persons with Disabilities
4. Modern and Livable Habitats and Basic Quality Services
5. Education and STI skills driven revolution
6. Health and Nutrition
7. Sustainable and inclusive economic growth
8. STI driven Manufacturing / Industrialization and Value Addition
9. Economic diversification and resilience
10. Agricultural Productivity and Production
11. Marine resources and Energy
12. Ports Operations and Marine Transport
13. Sustainable natural resource management
14. Bio-diversity, conservation, genetic resources and eco-system,
15. Water Security Climate Resilience and Natural Disasters preparedness and prevention
16. Framework and Institutions for a United Africa
17. Financial Institutions
18. Financial and Monetary Institutions
19. Communications and Infrastructure Connectivity
20. Democracy and Good Governance
21. Human Rights, Justice and The Rule of Law
22. Institutions and Leadership
23. Participatory Development and Local Governance
24. Maintenance and Preservation of Peace and Security
25. Institutional structure for AU Instruments on Peace and Security
26. Fully operational and functional APSA Pillars
27. Values and Ideals of Pan Africanism
28. Cultural Values and African Renaissance
29. Cultural Heritage, Creative Arts and Businesses
30. Women and Girls Empowerment

31. Violence & Discrimination against Women and Girls
32. Youth Empowerment and Children
33. Africa's place in global affairs.
34. Partnership
35. African Capital market
36. Fiscal system and Public Sector Revenues
37. Development Assistance

**23.** In addition to the principles enshrined in the African Union Constitutive Act, there is a need to further identify guiding Principles that are expected to establish the platforms necessary to provide guidelines on the baselines and approach that underpin the identification of areas of cooperation, development of framework for cooperation and necessary working documents for the Partnerships that the African Union is engaged in. This outline framework document would act as a template for each Strategic Partnership, and will attempt to bring ownership, assertiveness and uniformity in the way Declarations, Framework for Cooperation and Action Plans are prepared.

**24.** Accordingly, the guiding principles on partnership will include:

*i. Strategic focus*

All documents to be developed in readiness for the Strategic engagements with Partners should provide insight into the African Union's strategic objectives, and how those objectives relate to the ability of Partners to give support; It should be able to create and sustain outcomes aimed at making better the lives of the African people, and elaborate on what Africa can offer in return both in terms of its resources, technical capacities, and so on.

*ii. Stakeholder inclusiveness*

All the identified areas of cooperation for consideration towards advancing the objectives of the Strategic Partnerships shall include the collective interest of all AU Member States, African Union Commission, other organs of the African Union NEPAD, and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) that readily includes the buy-in of Member States.

*iii. Conciseness and reliability*



Determination of areas of cooperation should not be ambiguous. It should be understandable and implementable. It should be specific and result-oriented.

*iv. Self-Reliance on Initiation of Concept and Funding*

Africa should strive to originate all documents relating to the identified areas of cooperation and be firm in negotiation of Africa's interest.

*v. Development of Strategic Partnerships Forum/Summit Declarations*

The development of Declarations for all Forum/Summit pronouncements should maintain a flow that is in sync with the identified areas of cooperation. It should be reader-friendly and precise. Representatives of both sides should endorse the Declaration so adopted, in order to preserve its authenticity.

*vi. Monitoring and Evaluation*

There would be a need to ensure that the parameters for monitoring and evaluation are put in place so that commitments are honored.

All activities undertaken within the framework of the partnership should be conducted in the spirit of trust, equality, mutual respect, transparency and confidence building.

*vii. Future outlook*

There should be conscientious examination of the identified areas of cooperation with a view to ascertaining the opportunities that exist as well as challenges and uncertainties that may be encountered in the course of attempting to achieve the set objectives.

**A Matrix indicating the existing structured/formalized AU Strategic Partnerships; Current areas of Cooperation; Priority areas to focus and Justifications.**

(See attached table)

It is envisaged that this Matrix will guide the formulation of the African Union Program Budget.

**Concluding Thoughts**

**25.** The draft Outline Framework document has been developed to ensure that proposals advanced for discussion and negotiations with African Union's Partners are self-oriented, demand-driven and strategically focused towards Africa's development and integration agenda, as expressed in the AU Agenda 2063. The new approach will enable understanding of the areas of cooperation with Partners, guarantee ownership of the agreed areas of cooperation and stimulate confidence during the process of negotiations and implementations.

**26.** While applying the merits of the proposed guidelines, it would be important to ensure that the agreed areas of cooperation at every given time would be limited in scope to enable delivery.

**Matrix of Partners' areas of core competences;**  
**Current Areas of Cooperation, Aspirations, Goals and Priority Areas to focus and Justifications**

Existing Strategic Partnerships			Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations, Goals and Priority Areas during the 1 <sup>st</sup> 10-year Implementation Plan of AU Agenda 2063				Justifications-Partners Capacity to support/Core Competencies
Strategic Partners	Inception/ Important Date	Follow-Up Mechanisms	Current Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas	Pillars	
African Union-European Union	2000, Cairo 2007, Lisbon 2010, Tripoli 2014, Brussels, 2017, Abidjan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ College to College (C2C)</li> <li>▪ Senior Officials</li> <li>▪ Ministerial</li> <li>▪ African Union-European Union Summit (3/5 years)</li> <li>▪</li> </ul>	Investing in people - education, science, technology and skills development	[	(1) A prosperous Africa, based on inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development	(1) A High Standard of Living, Quality of Life and Well Being for All Citizens	1. Incomes, Jobs and decent work 2. Poverty, Inequality and Hunger 3. Social security and protection Including Persons with Disabilities 4. Modern and Liveable Habitats and Basic Quality Services	2. Social, Economic and Human Development	<i>Education, Science and technology;</i>  <i>Public and Private sector Investments</i>  <i>Industrialization</i>  <i>Peace, Security and Governance;</i>
			Strengthening Resilience, Peace, Security and Governance			(2) Well educated citizens and skills revolution underpinned by Science, Technology and innovation	5. Education and STI skills driven revolution		
			Migration and Mobility						
			Mobilizing Investments for African structural sustainable transformation						

Existing Strategic Partnerships			Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations, Goals and Priority Areas during the 1 <sup>st</sup> 10-year Implementation Plan of AU Agenda 2063				Justifications- Partners Capacity to support/Core Competencies
Strategic Partners	Inception/ Important Date	Follow-Up Mechanisms	Current Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas	Pillars	
						(4) Transformed Economies	7. Sustainable and inclusive economic growth  8. STI driven Manufacturing / Industrialization and Value Addition  9. Economic diversification and resilience		
					(3) An Africa of Good Governance, Democracy, Respect for Human Rights, Justice and the Rule of Law	( 11) Democratic values, practices Universal principles of Human Rights, Justice and the rule of law entrenched	(20) Democracy and Good Governance Human Rights,  (21) Justice and the Rule of Law	4. Shared values	
					(4) A Peaceful and Secure Africa	APSA Roadmap 2016-2020	Peace and Security and stability is preserved	Peace and Security	

Existing Strategic Partnerships			Areas of Cooperation	Aspirations, Goals and Priority Areas during the 1 <sup>st</sup> 10-year Implementation Plan of AU Agenda 2063				Justifications- Partners Capacity to support/Core Competencies
Strategic Partners	Inception/ Important Date	Follow-Up Mechanisms	Current Areas of Cooperation	Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas	Pillars	
African Union-South America	2006, Abuja 2009, Nova Sparta 2013, Malabo	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Snr. Off. Meeting</li> <li>▪ Ministerial Summit (3/5 years)</li> </ul>	Cooperation in Multilateral Issues Cooperation to fight crime and other related matters Peace and Security Democracy, Governance, Human Rights and Political Issues Agriculture, Agribusiness, Rural Development and Water Resources Economy, Trade, Investment and Tourism Combating Poverty and Hunger Infrastructure development Energy and solid minerals Social issues and Sports	1) A Prosperous Africa, based on Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development	(1) A High Standard of Living, Quality of Life and Well Being for All Citizens  (2) Well Educated Citizens and Skills revolution underpinned by Science, Technology and Innovation	1. Incomes, Jobs and decent work 2. Poverty, Inequality and Hunger 3. Social security and protection Including Persons with Disabilities 4. Modern and Liveable Habitats and Basic Quality Services 5. Education and STI skills driven revolution	2. Social, Economic and Human Development	In general, Africa and South America can work together on people to people/cultural/education exchange and on issues related to art, tourism and sports  Brazil, Chile, have

Existing Strategic Partnerships			Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations, Goals and Priority Areas during the 1 <sup>st</sup> 10-year Implementation Plan of AU Agenda 2063				Justifications- Partners Capacity to support/Core Competencies
Strategic Partners	Inception/ Important Date	Follow-Up Mechanisms	Current Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas	Pillars	
			Science, Technology and Informational and Communication Technologies Education and Cultural issues Environment Institutional development, Exchange of information and Shared Views on Appropriate Practices  (None of the above areas of cooperation is active)		5) Africa with a Strong Cultural Identity Common Heritage, Values and Ethics	16) African Cultural Renaissance is pre- eminent	27. Values and Ideals of Pan Africanism  28. Cultural Values and African Renaissance  29. Cultural Heritage, Creative Arts and Businesses	4. Shared values	competences in Agriculture; Renewable Energy;  Cuba commands great competence on medical expertise
African Union- League of Arab States	1977, Cairo 2010, Tripoli 2013, Kuwait 2016, Malabo	Coordination Committee at Senior Officials level  (Coordination Committee at Ministerial)	Collective global political influence  Agricultural development  Transformed economies		1) A Prosperous Africa, based on Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development	(1) A High Standard of Living, Quality of Life and Well Being for All Citizens	1.Incomes, Jobs and decent work  2.Poverty, Inequality and Hunger  3.Social security and protection Including	2. Social, Economic and Human Development	

Existing Strategic Partnerships			Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations, Goals and Priority Areas during the 1 <sup>st</sup> 10-year Implementation Plan of AU Agenda 2063				Justifications- Partners Capacity to support/Core Competencies
Strategic Partners	Inception/ Important Date	Follow-Up Mechanisms	Current Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas	Pillars	
		Senior Officials Ministerial Summit (3/5 years)	Infrastructure connectivity Political and Investment and trade Social and cultural issues				Persons with Disabilities 4.Modern and Liveable Habitats and Basic Quality Services		
						(4) Transformed Economies	7. Sustainable and inclusive economic growth 8.STI driven Manufacturing / Industrialization and Value Addition 9.Economic diversification and resilience		Huge savings that can support: infrastructure development and private sector engagement
						5) Modern Agriculture for increased productivity and production	10. Agricultural Productivity and Production		Africa's Agricultural Developments could be bolstered through corporate and investment banking of the Arab World

Existing Strategic Partnerships			Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations, Goals and Priority Areas during the 1 <sup>st</sup> 10-year Implementation Plan of AU Agenda 2063				Justifications- Partners Capacity to support/Core Competencies
Strategic Partners	Inception/ Important Date	Follow-Up Mechanisms	Current Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas	Pillars	
					5) Africa with a Strong Cultural Identity Common Heritage, Values and Ethics	16) African Cultural Renaissance is pre- eminent	27.Values and Ideals of Pan Africanism 28.Cultural Values and African Renaissance 29.Cultural Heritage, Creative Arts and Businesses	4. Shared values	Informal close cooperation since time immemorial and nearly three decades of formal cooperation speak in favour of exchange in values and ideals;  Inter-relations where about 60% of Arab population and 10 out of 22 members of the LAS are Africans also promotes the justification for stronger ties.



Existing Strategic Partnerships			Areas of Cooperation	Aspirations, Goals and Priority Areas during the 1 <sup>st</sup> 10-year Implementation Plan of AU Agenda 2063				Justifications-Partners Capacity to support/Core Competencies
Strategic Partners	Inception/ Important Date	Follow-Up Mechanisms	Current Areas of Cooperation	Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas	Pillars	
Africa Union-India	2008, Delhi 2011, Addis Ababa 2015, Dehli	Snr. Off. Meeting Ministerial Review Conference Summit (5 years)	Economic Cooperation Peace and Security Trade and Industry Blue/Ocean Economy Education and skills Development Agriculture Health and pharmaceutical Infrastructure and Energy	1) A Prosperous Africa, based on Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development	(1) A High Standard of Living, Quality of Life and Well Being for All Citizens            (2 ) Well educated citizens and skills revolution underpinned by Science, Technology and innovation	1.Incomes, Jobs and decent work 2.Poverty, Inequality and Hunger 3.Social security and protection Including Persons with Disabilities 4.Modern and Liveable Habitats and Basic Quality Services 5.Education and STI skills driven revolution	2. Social, Economic and Human Development	India has attained a prominent global position in the Health and pharmaceutical sectors. And with a huge pool of scientists and engineers who have the potential to revolutionize the industry.  Trade and investment  Information technologies and communication (business process outsourcing industry)  Education (IT skills driven revolution, R&D and TVET)  Renewable energy

Existing Strategic Partnerships			Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations, Goals and Priority Areas during the 1 <sup>st</sup> 10-year Implementation Plan of AU Agenda 2063				Justifications- Partners Capacity to support/Core Competencies
Strategic Partners	Inception/ Important Date	Follow-Up Mechanisms	Current Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas	Pillars	
						(3) Healthy and well-nourished citizens	6.Health and Nutrition		
						(4) Transformed Economies	7. Sustainable and inclusive economic growth  8.STI driven Manufacturing / Industrialization and Value Addition  9.Economic diversification and resilience		
						(6) Goal 6: Blue/ ocean economy for accelerated economic growth	11. Marine resources and Energy  12. Ports Operations and		

Existing Strategic Partnerships			Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations, Goals and Priority Areas during the 1 <sup>st</sup> 10-year Implementation Plan of AU Agenda 2063				Justifications-Partners Capacity to support/Core Competencies
Strategic Partners	Inception/ Important Date	Follow-Up Mechanisms	Current Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas	Pillars	
							Marine Transport		
Tokyo Int'l Conf. on Africa Dev. (TICAD) <sup>41</sup>	1993, 1998, 2003, Tokyo 2008, 2013, Yokohama 2016, Nairobi	<p><u>Follow up meetings</u></p> <p>Co-organizers/ Joint Secretariat Meeting</p> <p>Joint Monitoring Committee Meeting</p> <p>Senior Official Meeting</p> <p>Ministerial Summit (3/5 years)</p>	<p>The 3 Pillars of TICAD V:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Robust and sustainable economy</li> <li>Inclusive and resilient society, and</li> <li>Peace and stability</li> </ol> <p>The 3 Pillars of TICAD VI:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Promoting structural economic</li> </ol>		1) A Prosperous Africa, based on Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development	(1) A High Standard of Living, Quality of Life and Well Being for All Citizens	<p>1.Incomes, Jobs and decent work</p> <p>2.Poverty, Inequality and Hunger</p> <p>3.Social security and protection Including Persons with Disabilities</p> <p>4.Modern and Liveable Habitats and Basic Quality Services</p> <p>5.Education and STI skills driven revolution</p>	2. Social, Economic and Human Development	<p><i>Influence global policies in Africa's favour</i></p> <p><i>Education and skills development</i></p> <p><i>Health and sanitation</i></p> <p><i>Private sector development, industrialization and investment</i></p> <p><i>Science, Technology and innovation</i></p> <p><i>Peace and Security</i></p> <p><i>Agriculture and Food Security</i></p>

<sup>41</sup> TICAD is different from other partnership. It is a framework agreement and there are other actors (co-organizers) in the process whose interest also needs to be reflected.

Existing Strategic Partnerships			Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations, Goals and Priority Areas during the 1 <sup>st</sup> 10-year Implementation Plan of AU Agenda 2063				Justifications- Partners Capacity to support/Core Competencies
Strategic Partners	Inception/ Important Date	Follow-Up Mechanisms	Current Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas	Pillars	
			<p>c transformation through economic diversification and industrialization: agriculture, Blue/Ocean economy, Private Sector and Human resources</p> <p>2. Promoting resilient health systems for quality of life: health system strengthening</p> <p>3.</p>			<p>(4) Transformed Economies</p> <p>(6) Blue/ ocean economy for accelerated economic growth</p> <p>7) Environmentally sustainable climate and resilient economies and communities</p>	<p>7. Sustainable and inclusive economic growth</p> <p>8.STI driven Manufacturing / Industrialization and Value Addition</p> <p>9.Economic diversification and resilience</p> <p>11. Marine resources and Energy</p> <p>12. Ports Operations and Marine Transport</p> <p>13.Sustainable natural resource management</p> <p>14.Bio-diversity, conservation, genetic resources and eco-system,</p>	<p>2. Social, Economic and Human Development</p>	<p><i>Productivity</i></p> <p><i>Disaster risk management</i></p>

Existing Strategic Partnerships			Areas of Cooperation	Aspirations, Goals and Priority Areas during the 1 <sup>st</sup> 10-year Implementation Plan of AU Agenda 2063				Justifications- Partners Capacity to support/Core Competencies
Strategic Partners	Inception/ Important Date	Follow-Up Mechanisms	Current Areas of Cooperation	Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas	Pillars	
			Promoting social stability for shared prosperity: maritime security, climate change, peacebuilding			15. Water Security Climate Resilience and Natural Disasters preparedness and prevention		
				4) A Peaceful and Secure Africa	(13) Peace Security and Stability is preserved	24. Maintenance and Preservation of Peace and Security	1. Peace and Security	
Forum for China-Africa Coop. (FOCAC)	2000, Beijing 2003, Addis Ababa 2006, Beijing 2009, Sharm el-Sheikh 2012, Beijing 2015, Johannesburg, South Africa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Senior. Official Meeting</li> <li>▪ Ministerial Conference (3/5 years)</li> <li>▪ Summit (held based on Decision of the Heads of States)</li> </ul>	Industrialization Agricultural modernization Infrastructure Financial services Green development Trade and investment facilitation	1) A Prosperous Africa, based on Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development	(1) A High Standard of Living, Quality of Life and Well Being for All Citizens	1. Incomes, Jobs and decent work 2. Poverty, Inequality and Hunger 3. Social security and protection Including Persons with Disabilities 4. Modern and Liveable Habitats and Basic Quality Services	2. Social, Economic and Human Development	<i>Influence global policies in Africa's favour</i>  <i>Industrialization</i>  <i>Infrastructure and Energy</i>  <i>Trade and Investment facilitation</i>

Existing Strategic Partnerships			Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations, Goals and Priority Areas during the 1 <sup>st</sup> 10-year Implementation Plan of AU Agenda 2063				Justifications- Partners Capacity to support/Core Competencies
Strategic Partners	Inception/ Important Date	Follow-Up Mechanisms	Current Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas	Pillars	
			Poverty reduction and public welfare						<i>People to people exchanges</i>  <i>Education and skills development</i>  Peace and Security
			Public Health			(2 ) Well educated citizens and skills revolution underpinned by Science, Technology and innovation	5.Education and STI skills driven revolution		
			People to people exchanges						
			Peace and Security						
			Social			(4) Transformed Economies	7. Sustainable and inclusive economic growth  8.STI driven Manufacturing / Industrialization and Value Addition  9.Economic diversification and resilience		

Existing Strategic Partnerships			Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations, Goals and Priority Areas during the 1 <sup>st</sup> 10-year Implementation Plan of AU Agenda 2063				Justifications- Partners Capacity to support/Core Competencies
Strategic Partners	Inception/ Important Date	Follow-Up Mechanisms	Current Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas	Pillars	
					2) An Integrated Continent Politically united and based on the ideals of Pan Africanism and the vision of African Renaissance	(10) World Class Infrastructure criss-crosses Africa	19.Communications and Infrastructure Connectivity	3. Integration, cooperation and Partnership	
African Union-Turkey	2008, Istanbul 2012, Istanbul 2014, Malabo	Senior Officials Meeting Ministerial Review Conference African Union-Turkey Summit of Heads of State & Government (every 3/5 years)	Peace & Security Trade and industry and Gender Human resources Science and Technology Social Affairs and Agriculture Infrastructure and Energy	Infra structure and Energy	1) A Prosperous Africa, based on Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development	(1) A High Standard of Living, Quality of Life and Well Being for All Citizens	1.Incomes, Jobs and decent work 2.Poverty, Inequality and Hunger 3.Social security and protection Including Persons with Disabilities 4.Modern and Liveable Habitats and Basic Quality Services	2. Social, Economic and Human Development	<i>Aviation and tourism Industry</i> <i>Textile</i> <i>Pharmaceutical industry</i> <i>Private Sector Development</i>

Existing Strategic Partnerships			Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations, Goals and Priority Areas during the 1 <sup>st</sup> 10-year Implementation Plan of AU Agenda 2063				Justifications- Partners Capacity to support/Core Competencies
Strategic Partners	Inception/ Important Date	Follow-Up Mechanisms	Current Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas	Pillars	
						(2 ) Well educated citizens and skills revolution underpinned by Science, Technology and innovation	5.Education and STI skills driven revolution		<i>Education and Skills development</i>
						(4) Transformed Economies	7. Sustainable and inclusive economic growth  8.STI driven Manufacturing / Industrialization and Value Addition  9.Economic diversification and resilience		
African Union-Korea	2006, 2009, 2012, Seoul, Korea 2016, Addis Ababa	Senior Official Meeting  Ministerial Forum (every 3/5 years)	Economic Cooperation  Human Resource Development,	-	1) A Prosperous Africa, based on Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development	(1) A High Standard of Living, Quality of Life and Well Being for All Citizens	1.Incomes, Jobs and decent work  2.Poverty, Inequality and Hunger  3.Social security and protection	2. Social, Economic and Human Development	Development of manufacturing Hubs (Engineering Technology/



Existing Strategic Partnerships			Areas of Cooperation	Aspirations, Goals and Priority Areas during the 1 <sup>st</sup> 10-year Implementation Plan of AU Agenda 2063				Justifications- Partners Capacity to support/Core Competencies
Strategic Partners	Inception/ Important Date	Follow-Up Mechanisms	Current Areas of Cooperation	Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas	Pillars	
			Science and Technology  Youth Development and Women empowerment  Peace and Security			Including Persons with Disabilities  4.Modern and Liveable Habitats and Basic Quality Services		Automobile, ICT, etc.)  Shipping Industry  Private Sector Development  Education and skills development  Peace and security
					(2 ) Well educated citizens and skills revolution underpinned by Science, Technology and innovation	5.Education and STI skills driven revolution		
					5) Modern Agriculture for increased productivity and production	10. Agricultural Productivity and Production		
					(6) Blue/ ocean economy for accelerated economic growth	11. Marine resources and Energy  12. Ports Operations and		

Existing Strategic Partnerships			Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations, Goals and Priority Areas during the 1 <sup>st</sup> 10-year Implementation Plan of AU Agenda 2063				Justifications- Partners Capacity to support/Core Competencies
Strategic Partners	Inception/ Important Date	Follow-Up Mechanisms	Current Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas	Pillars	
							Marine Transport		
						(7) Environmentally sustainable climate and resilient economies and communities	13. Sustainable natural resource management 14. Bio-diversity, conservation, genetic resources and eco-system, 15. Water Security Climate Resilience and Natural Disasters preparedness and prevention		
African Union Commission-US	MoU signed in 2013 established an annual high-level dialogue	1. Joint Technical working groups meetings 2. High Level Dialogue between the Chairperson of	Peace and Security Democracy and Governance Economic Growth, Trade	.	1) A Prosperous Africa, based on Inclusive Growth and Sustainable Development	(1) A High Standard of Living, Quality of Life and Well Being for All Citizens	1.Incomes, Jobs and decent work 2.Poverty, Inequality and Hunger 3.Social security and protection	2. Social, Economic and Human Development	Peace and Security Financial market

Existing Strategic Partnerships			Areas of Cooperation	Aspirations, Goals and Priority Areas during the 1 <sup>st</sup> 10-year Implementation Plan of AU Agenda 2063				Justifications- Partners Capacity to support/Core Competencies
Strategic Partners	Inception/ Important Date	Follow-Up Mechanisms	Current Areas of Cooperation	Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas	Pillars	
	.	the Commission and the US Secretary of State	and Investment (including trade, investment, energy, and agriculture)  Opportunity and Development (including youth, education, health and gender)			Including Persons with Disabilities  4.Modern and Liveable Habitats and Basic Quality Services		Trade and Investment  Entrepreneurship and private sector development
					(4) Transformed Economies	7. Sustainable and inclusive economic growth  8.STI driven Manufacturing / Industrialization and Value Addition  9.Economic diversification and resilience		Education (e-learning) and skills development
					(7) Environmentally sustainable climate and resilient economies and communities	13. Sustainable natural resource management  14. Bio-diversity, conservation, genetic	2. Social, Economic and Human Development	Health

Existing Strategic Partnerships			Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations, Goals and Priority Areas during the 1 <sup>st</sup> 10-year Implementation Plan of AU Agenda 2063				Justifications- Partners Capacity to support/Core Competencies
Strategic Partners	Inception/ Important Date	Follow-Up Mechanisms	Current Areas of Cooperation		Aspirations	Goals	Priority Areas	Pillars	
							resources and eco-system,  15. Water Security Climate Resilience and Natural Disasters preparedness and prevention		
					3) An Africa of Good Governance, Democracy, Respect for Human Rights, Justice and the Rule of Law	(11) Democratic values, practices, universal principles of human rights, justice and the rule of law entrenched	20. Democracy and Good Governance  21. Human Rights, Justice and The Rule of Law	4. Shared values	
					4) A Peaceful and Secure Africa	(13) Peace Security and Stability is preserved	24. Maintenance and Preservation of Peace and Security	1. Peace and Security	

Note:

This is a Reform Exercise aimed at ensuring that:

- 1) At all times, we should be able to account for the attainment reached on the goals and priority areas outlined in the AU Agenda 2063 (1<sup>st</sup> Ten-Year Implementation Plan);

- 2) We determine which goals we spend more energy, time and money upon, and more importantly expose areas that are over-funded/under-funded
- 3) Ultimately, we are informed and guided on where to direct our Partners attention for support and collaboration in order to build synergy:
  - The content of this matrix will be evolving, where further refinement and update would continue to ensue as studies on the potentials and comparative advantages/core competencies of each Partner would be embarked upon;
  - ;
  - Cross cutting issues under Goal number, 17 and 18 (Full Gender equality in all phase of life; Engaged and empowered youth and children) will be applicable to all partners;
  - Aspiration 7 (An Africa as a Strong, United, Resilient and Influential Global Player and partner), generally provides for Africa's resolve to take responsibility of its own destiny;
- 4) The Union through the Commission should construct a smart and coherent strategy to inform and guide Member States on their engagements with partners;
- 5) Over the time, it is been identified that there is a need to build and strengthen African institutional and human capacity that will accommodate transfer of skills and knowledge to meet the demands of labour market;

**DRAFT DECISIONS**  
**ON MULTILATERAL COOPERATION**

The PRC Sub-Committee of the Whole on Multilateral Cooperation proposes that the PRC recommends to the Executive Council to:

**A. On the Evaluation of the African Union Strategic Partnerships**

1. **Take Note** of the Report of the Permanent Representatives' Committee (PRC) on the Evaluation of the Strategic Partnerships and endorse the recommendations thereon<sup>42</sup>;
2. **Recall** its Decision No.: EX.CL/942(XXX) taken during its Thirtieth Ordinary Session held on 25<sup>th</sup> – 27<sup>th</sup> January 2017, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, which calls for the strengthening of the institutional capacity of the Commission (Partnerships Management and Coordination Division);
3. **Reaffirm** its Decision No.: EX.CL/Dec.986(XXXII) taken during its Thirty-second Ordinary Session held on 25<sup>th</sup>-26<sup>th</sup> January 2018, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, requesting “the Commission to build internal systems and capacity for partnerships management by upgrading the Partnerships Division under the Bureau of the Chairperson to a Directorate, which treats in a holistic manner functions of Partnerships management, coordination and resources mobilization; fulfills the ability to analyze and negotiate partnerships scopes; develops the vision for Africa’s role in the world; and enhance Africa’s voice and representation”;
4. **Recall** Assembly Decision 131 (VII) taken in Banjul, Gambia, in 2006, and Assembly Decision, Dec. 635(XXVIII), taken in January 2017, concerning holding of partnership Summits between Africa and certain States and the establishment of a mechanism for participation in such Summits;
5. **Reaffirm** Executive Council Decisions; (EX.CL/Dec.986(XXXII)) of January 2018, (EX.CL/Dec.942(XXX)), of January 2017, (EX.CL/Dec.899(XXVIII)) of January 2016 and (EX.CL/Dec.877(XXVII)) of June 2015, concerning the right of all Member States to participate at meetings involving Partners, which should be implemented in line with the relevant African Union Decisions;
6. **Further reaffirm** Executive Council Decision; (EX.CL/Dec. 942(XXX) A5) of January 2017, which decided that all Member States that do not comply with

---

<sup>42</sup> The Kingdom of Morocco expresses reservation on the inclusion of this Decision

the provisions of the abovementioned decisions will be deprived of the privilege of hosting the meetings in accordance with Article 23 of the Constitutive Act;

7. **Reiterate** Executive Council Decision; EX.CL/Dec.986(XXXII) (20), of January 2018 and EX.CL/Dec.942(XXX)<sup>43</sup> of January 2017, which instructed the PRC in collaboration with the Commission, to design mechanisms for the full involvement of the African Union in the effective management of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC); and **Further Direct** the PRC in collaboration with the Commission to engage with the Government of China and Government of Japan to design and agree on mechanisms for the full involvement of the African Union in the effective management of FOCAC and TICAD, in line with the criteria identified in the evaluation report on the African Union Strategic Partnerships and the guiding principles established in the African Union Outline Framework for Strategic Partnerships adopted by the PRC;
8. **Further Reiterate** the need to approach all engagements with the African Union Strategic Partnerships in a more robust, purpose-driven and result-oriented manner and in that regard, **Call upon** the PRC in close collaboration with the Commission to undertake a study on the establishment of a Partnerships Fund with contribution from AU Member States as proposed in the AU Agenda 2063 and its First Ten Year Implementation Plan and to report at the January 2020 Summit.
9. **Adopt** the nomenclature of “African Union – *Name of the Partner*” for the following Partnerships<sup>44</sup>:
  - g) African Union – European Union Partnership
  - h) African Union – League of Arab States Partnership
  - i) African Union – South America Partnership
  - j) African Union – India Partnership
  - k) African Union – Korea Partnership
  - l) African Union – Turkey Partnership
10. **Take Note of** the classification of AU Partnerships in three categories, namely:
  - D. **Strategic Partnerships:** In line with the definition of the African Union Strategic Partnerships as captured in the Report of the Evaluation of the Strategic Partnerships, the following Partnerships would be categorized as strategic or potentially strategic, taking into consideration their ability to meet the criteria as identified in the said evaluation report and the guiding principles established in the African Union Outline Framework for Strategic Partnerships adopted by the PRC:

---

<sup>43</sup> The Kingdom of Morocco expresses reservation on the inclusion of this Decision

<sup>44</sup> The Kingdom of Morocco expresses reservation on the adoption of the new nomenclature

- i) African Union – European Union Partnership
- j) African Union – League of Arab States Partnership
- k) African Union – South America Partnership
- l) African Union – India Partnership
- m) African Union – Korea Partnership
- n) African Union – Turkey Partnership
- o) Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)
- p) Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD)

**E. Institutional Dialogue:** Includes other Partnerships through strategic dialogue and multilateral cooperation, such as the High Level Dialogue between the African Union Commission and the U.S. Government through the U.S. Department of State.

**F. Emerging Partnerships:** Such new Partnerships to be proposed by the PRC in collaboration with the Commission, based on the criteria identified in the Evaluation Report on the African Union Strategic Partnerships and the guiding principles established in the Outline Framework adopted by the PRC.

**11. Request** the PRC to further review the criteria for the classification of the African Union Partnerships and to report to the January 2020 Summit.

**12. Approve** the qualification of “African Union Strategic Partnerships” when the relationship with a Partner is considered strategic. Otherwise, the qualification of “African Union Partnerships” should be used in other cases where the relationship is not considered strategic. In both cases, it is the African Union that will act on behalf of Africa in representing its collective interests with the Partners.

**13. Call upon** the PRC in collaboration with the Commission to develop a mechanism with Member States, the Regional Economic Communities (RECs), AU Organs and AU Specialized Agencies, African Union Development Agency (AUDA-NPCA), the Private Sector, Academia and Civil Society, to formalize collaboration modalities for interactive and effective coordination of partnerships activities;

**14. Request** the PRC in collaboration with the Commission to engage with the existing strategic partners with a view to restructuring the Framework of Cooperation for all African Union Partnerships, in line with all relevant AU decisions to ensure that partnerships are based on the principles of equality, ownership, accountability, inclusivity, mutual respect, efficiency, consistency, value addition and comparative advantage;



**15. Further Request** the Chairperson of the Commission to engage Partners on the content of all AU Decisions in order to ensure their full implementation, especially in relation to the full participation of all Member States in line with the relevant Decisions of the AU<sup>45</sup>;

**16. Decide to Upgrade** the Partnerships Management and Coordination Division under the Bureau of the Chairperson to a Directorate, in accordance with the mandate given by the Assembly on matters related to structures within the ongoing Institutional Reform.

## B. AU – EU Partnership

**17. Endorse** the 5<sup>th</sup> AU-EU Summit Joint Priority Projects for the period 2018-2021;

**18. Call upon** the two sides, to speed up the implementation of the priority projects and to report on the progress made to the 2020 January Summit.

**19. Request** the PRC in collaboration with the Commission to develop a comprehensive follow-up mechanism of the African Union – European Union Partnership in consultation with the European side, which allows both sides to assess in an efficient and effective manner the implementation of the agreed areas of cooperation.

## C. African Union – League of Arab States Partnership

**20. Recall** its Decision No.: EX.CL/Dec.942 (XXX) of the Thirtieth Ordinary Session of the Executive Council, on 25<sup>th</sup>-27<sup>th</sup> January 2017, Addis Ababa, which directed the Commission, in accordance with the principles and decisions of the AU, and in collaboration with the General Secretariat of the League of Arab States, to coordinate and follow up on the timely implementation of the Resolutions of the 4<sup>th</sup> Africa-Arab Summit especially Resolution 7, which called for the convening of an Extraordinary Session of the Joint Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, within a period of six (6) months from the date of this Resolution to adopt the joint Africa-Arab Action Plan, and **Request** the Commission to expedite the organization of the Extraordinary Session of the Joint Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

## D. Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD)

**21. Express appreciation** to Japan for hosting the TICAD VI Ministerial Follow up and TICAD VII Preparatory Meetings, in Tokyo, Japan, on 6<sup>th</sup>-7<sup>th</sup> October 2018;

---

<sup>45</sup> The Kingdom of Morocco expresses reservation on the inclusion of this Decision

**22. Reaffirm** to Japan the need to respect AU Decisions on participation in all partnerships meetings, events and activities of which AU is part, in the lead up to the TICAD VII Summit.

**23. Direct** the PRC in collaboration with the Commission to take necessary steps for the successful holding of the upcoming TICAD VII Summit.

**E. African Union-Turkey Partnership**

**24. Call Upon** the PRC in collaboration with the Commission to engage with the Turkish side to agree on the dates for the African Union-Turkey Summit to be held in Istanbul, Turkey in 2019, and work together towards identifying concrete implementable areas of cooperation that would enable the two sides enhance cooperation at the multilateral level.

**F. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)**

**25. Request** the PRC in close collaboration with the Commission to follow-up with the Chinese side on the implementation of the FOCAC Beijing Action Plan 2019 – 2021 and to report on the progress made.

**AFRICAN UNION UNION AFRICAINE**

**African Union Common Repository**

**<http://archives.au.int>**

---

Organs

Council of Ministers & Executive Council Collection

---

2019-02-07

# Report of the Sub-Committee on Multilateral Cooperation

African Union

African Union

---

<https://archives.au.int/handle/123456789/8140>

*Downloaded from African Union Common Repository*