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**REPORT OF H.E. MR. ERNEST BAI KOROMA, PRESIDENT OF THE  
REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE AND CHAIRPERSON OF THE  
COMMITTEE OF TEN ON THE UN REFORMS**

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THE COMMITTEE OF TEN ON THE UN REFORMS**

**SUMMARY**

The report covers the period 20 January 2012 to 5 July 2012. The remainder of the Eighth round of inter-governmental negotiations (IGN) was dedicated to an in-depth evaluation of the five major member states and interest groups initiatives submitted in September 2011 namely: the G-4 draft resolution on enlargement of the Council and working methods; the UfC proposal dealing with the enlargement of the Council in the non-permanent only as contained in the Italy/Colombia paper; the L-69 proposal on enlargement of the Council and working methods as the basis of further discussion of the reform process; the Committee of Ten (C-10) submission of the African common position contained in the Ezulwini and Sirte Declarations; and the S-5 draft resolution on the working methods of the Council.

The exchanges on these five initiatives provided member states and interest groups an opportunity to have a better knowledge and understanding of the five major initiatives on the reform of the Security Council and also an attempt to give impetus to the reform process. However, the debates revealed that member states and interest groups were still very much divided on the question of Security Council reform. There seems to have been no real shift in positions as interest groups and member states continue to reiterate entrenched positions.

The divisions among interest groups and stakeholders on most of the key clusters such as the size, veto, and categories of a reformed Council continue to be contentious with the membership divided and holding onto their respective positions. All member states and interest groups initiatives continue to be on the table.

The process continues to gain momentum and to be membership driven with the various member states initiatives continuing to dominate discussions; and relegating consideration of the Facilitators Rev. 3 process to the background as a last possible alternative. Strong political will is required at this stage to move the reform process forward into real negotiations.

There is general concern that the process has yet to go into real negotiations involving tradeoffs and compromise of the various positions on the table; but at the same time genuine interest in continuing the IGN process abounds to the extent that the membership in general supports a roll-over of the process to the 67th Session building on the gains achieved in this session.

Many delegations and interest groups including Africa remain supportive of a comprehensive approach in accordance with decision 62/557 and opposed to any piecemeal approach, as evident from the failure of the S.5 draft resolution

resulting into its withdrawal from the formal plenary of the General Assembly on 16 May 2012. In other words, agreement on both substance and procedure remain critical to the reform process. Lessons learned from the fate of the S-5 draft resolution, underscore the need for adequate consensus building through the IG process as a prerequisite to the tabling of any member state initiative draft resolution in the formal plenary of the General Assembly for voting.

The dynamics of the process of the reform process clearly indicates that the P-5 remains major stakeholders in the reform process and real negotiations would not commence without their genuine commitment and political will.

The interaction between Africa and the L.69 continues to evolve. Decisive progress to build on the gains already emerging from this interaction would depend on if and when the L-69 decides to review and amend its position in the Compiled Text to conform with other pronouncements of its members in support of the African common position.

Support for the African common position on Security Council reform continued to gain momentum with member states and interest groups unanimous on the need to have an enhanced African representation on the Council. However, divergent views on how to achieve an increased representation of Africa continue. Furthermore, there were questions on the identity of Africa's candidates to be elected to the permanent membership of the Council. Some members perceive the continued dual membership of some African member states in the L-69 as a division within the African Group. The Africa opposition to streamlining or merging the text without agreeing first on principles, criteria and substance vis-a-vis the negotiables and variables in the negotiations is supported by some other delegations.

It is therefore crucial that all African countries to remain unified and firmly committed to the African common position, irrespective of their membership of other interest groups and to continue to promote the interest of Africa within such interest groups in order to give Africa enhanced representation in both the permanent and non-permanent categories as contained in the Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration, and build on the support it continues to receive in that regard.

## I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its Fourth Extraordinary Session in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia on 4 August 2005, the Assembly of the African Union by its **Decision Ext/Assembly/AU/DEC.1(IV)** established the Committee of Ten (C-10) Heads of State and Government (two per region) to be coordinated by the President of Sierra Leone with the mandate: "To present, advocate and canvass support for the African Draft Resolution to all the regions of the world as well as interested groups with a view to achieving the provisions of the Ezulwini Consensus as well as the Sirte Declaration and Resolution and submit a Report and appropriate recommendations thereon to the Chairperson of the Assembly."

2. The Committee's mandate continues to be reviewed and renewed in response, as the reform process evolves, and by **Assembly Decision Assembly/AU/Dec.409(XVIII)** taken at the 18<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session held at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 29 – 30 January 2012, the Committee was further mandated to "... continue to build on and intensify its efforts directed at forging alliance in support of the African common position with diverse interest groups engaged in the intergovernmental negotiations, and to seek any further guidance if necessary, in furtherance of its mandate" and to also "...continue to intensify efforts at advocating, canvassing and promoting the African Common position as well as to endeavour to reach out at the highest political levels for the purpose of garnering and galvanizing the necessary political will in support of the African common position" and for it to "remain seized of this matter until Africa achieves its objectives on the reform of the UN Security Council, and to report to the Assembly on progress made at the next Ordinary Session of the Assembly in June/July 2012".

3. This report is accordingly submitted in compliance with the African Union Summit Decision **Assembly/AU/Dec.409 (XVIII)** taken during the 18<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 29 - 30 January, 2012.

4. The report covers the period 20 January, 2012 to 5 July, 2012, building on the Tenth Report Submitted by the Committee of Ten Heads of State and Government on the reform of the United Nations Security Council to the 18<sup>th</sup> Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the African Union.

## II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

5. During the reporting period the remainder of the Eighth round of the intergovernmental negotiations in the informal plenary was dedicated to the Facilitator's Programme of Work outlined in his letter dated 29 December 2011, containing a comprehensive timetable aimed at facilitating an in-depth discussion and evaluation of initiatives submitted by interest groups in response to his letter of 18<sup>th</sup> August 2011. Proponents of such initiatives were offered the opportunity to

present the merits of their proposals for Security Council reform and how to operationalize them, with the wider membership having the opportunity to evaluate as well as weigh in their views thereon. The C-10 actively participated in all of the five meetings held in the informal plenary of the inter-governmental negotiations and also held several consultations with the L.69, the Uniting for Consensus (UFC), the S.5 Group and some members of the G.4. The wider membership of the African Group was briefed by the C-10 of the outcome of these consultations.

6. The informal plenary of the IGN to discuss the five member states initiatives commenced with discussion and evaluation of the G-4 initiative on 26 January, 2012 and continued with the: “Uniting for Consensus” held on 21 February, 2012, the L-69 group on 13 March, 2012, the C-10 on 10 April, 2012 and the S.5 on 2 May, 2012.

7. Another key development was the move by the S.5 group to table a draft resolution at the informal plenary of the General Assembly with the intention to have it voted on by the membership. The draft resolution A/66/L.42/Rev. 1 was after its introduction by Switzerland, the S-5 coordinator, withdrawn in response to procedural concerns and objections raised during the s-5 consultations, one major concern being that the draft resolution was considered as a piecemeal approach in contradicting decision 62/557.

8. On 2<sup>nd</sup> July, the Facilitator convened another meeting as part of the eighth round of the IGN aimed at collectively drawing conclusions from the series of five exchanges on the initiatives, which could be the basis to chart the path forward for the membership-driven intergovernmental negotiations.

***The Eighth Exchange of the Inter-governmental Negotiations (IGN) on the member states initiatives - The G.4 Initiative – 26 January 2012***

9. The short draft resolution reintroduced by the G-4 calls for expansion of the Security Council in both the permanent and non-permanent categories as well as improvement of the Council’s working methods. Whilst supporting enhanced representation of Africa and developing countries in both the permanent and non-permanent categories, the G.4 suggested that election of new permanent members should take into account the ability to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. The G.4 also continues to support the further streamlining of the Compiled Text. Consequently, they have been reaching out to other member states that their draft resolution resonates well with many other reform positions and proposals, in particular the draft resolution of the African Group (L-67) proposed in 2005. In that regard, they further claimed that about 80 member states have expressed support in writing for their initiative and many others have offered strong commitment to the draft resolution, to the extent that they believed, their proposal enjoying such wide support should be considered as the basis for future discussion in the inter-governmental negotiations.

10. Some delegations reiterated support for the G.4 and the inclusion of its members as well as African representation in an enlarged permanent category of the Council. Questions were raised about the intent and purpose of the G.4 proposal which fell short of addressing the issue of the Veto, the size of an enlarged Council, and regional representation. The draft G.4 resolution was in that regard deemed to be a piece meal approach and therefore not in accord with the comprehensive reform of the Council as outlined in General Assembly decision 62/557, the lodestar of the inter-governmental negotiations. Further questions were raised on the credibility of the G4's assessment of support for its initiative. Some interest groups considered the G-4 initiative as being divisive and could lead to a stalemate in the intergovernmental negotiations.

***The Uniting for Consensus (UfC) Group initiative - 21 February 2012***

11. The UfC presented the so-called Italy/Colombia paper of 2009 which the group considered as a "visible step forward and an indication of flexibility and compromise" from its 2005 position. They reiterated that an enlargement of the Security Council should take place in the non-permanent category only, which in their view would create a more representative, accountable and accessible Council. In furtherance of this objective, the UfC proposed, in addition to the expansion of regular non-permanent seats, the creation of a new category of seats with a longer mandate of up to 6 years. Subject to negotiation, the UfC suggested either a 3-5 year term without the possibility of immediate re-election or a 2 year term with the possibility of up to two immediate re-elections. To be eligible for re-election, member states would have to give a break equivalent to the consecutive period served on the Council. The longer term seats would be allocated to the regional groups, while "the regular non-permanent seats would be allocated to small states and medium-sized states". Regarding the veto, the UfC proposed that it should either be abolished or its scope should be limited.

12. In Recognition of the need to treat Africa as a special case and on priority basis, the UfC proposed that 2-3 of the longer term seats should be allocated to Africa on a rotational basis.

13. Several delegations questioned the UfC about their sincerity and commitment towards correcting the historical injustice suffered by Africa, which the UfC had had submitted to the Facilitator as **part of** their initiative in response to his letter of 18 August 2011 as an outcome of the Rome Ministerial Meeting.

***The L.69 Group initiative – 13 March 2012***

14. The meeting was devoted to the reform initiative of the L.69, a diverse group of some countries from Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific some African countries. The L.69 had submitted to the Facilitator, a draft resolution similar to the G-4 proposal. They believed that reform of the Security Council should include expansion in both the permanent and non-permanent categories and improvement of its working methods, and that this should be the direction for

further negotiations. The group argued that it introduced its initiative in March 2011 to break the impasse created at the seventh round of the inter-governmental negotiations with the aim of moving the process forward.

**15.** Reiterating their previous statements, the L.69 proposed that for a comprehensive reform of the Security Council, it was necessary to expand the Council membership from the present 15 to 25/26 with the inclusion of new permanent and non-permanent members, and that the new permanent members should have the same responsibilities and privileges as the existing permanent members including the veto right. This proposition was believed to be in compliance with the Ezulwini Consensus, and to that end expressed support for Africa's aspirations for permanent membership. The L.69 further proposed that a reformed Council should have representation from developing countries, including small island developing states. Some delegations called for clarification of the L.69's claim to this initiative, which the G.4 had also presented with similar claims of support. Concerns were also raised about the L.69 group's open pronouncements on the issue of the veto which was not in conformity with its position in the Compiled Text. Several delegations reiterated their commitment to a comprehensive reform of the Council in line with decision 62/557 and remained opposed to any piece meal or step by step approach as proposed by the L.69.

#### ***The C-10 of the African Group initiative – 10 April 2012***

**16.** The fifth exchange was devoted to the reform initiative of the C-10 of the African group. Africa's demand to "redress the historical injustices" done to the continent without representation in the permanent category of the Council and also under represented in the non-permanent category as presently constituted was reiterated.

**17.** To that end, C-10 emphasized that Africa's demand for two permanent seats in the Council with the same rights as existing permanent members as well as two additional non-permanent seats as contained in the Ezulwini Consensus and the Sirte Declaration should be redressed without further delay. Africa maintained that the veto should be abolished, but should, as a matter of common justice, be extended to new permanent members as long as it continued to exist. On the selection of Africa's candidates, C-10 reiterated that it will be a matter for Africa to decide. Africa remains opposed to any piecemeal approach, as well as any streamlining or merging exercise without first agreeing on the principles and criteria of the five key negotiable.

**18.** Most delegations and interest groups taking the floor expressed support for the African common position. However, concerns were raised on the African group's relationship with the L. 69, a group perceived by some delegations to be more inclined to promote the G.4 position than the African common position. Questions were also raised on the identity of the countries that would occupy Africa's seat and the selection criteria with emphasis that the new permanent members should be countries that have demonstrated the commitment and have

the capacity and ability to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and Security.

***The S.5 Group – 2 May 2012***

**19.** The fifth exchange was devoted to an in-depth discussion and evaluation of the S-5 (Jordan, Liechtenstein, Costa Rica, Singapore and Switzerland) initiative on improving the working methods of the Security Council.

**20.** The S.5 reiterated its position that working methods of the Council should be dealt with independent of the other 4 clusters; and in that regard believed that adopting a resolution on improving the working methods of the Council would not require any amendment to the Charter. Furthermore, their proposal was not about a future Security Council, rather it was about improvement of the Council's methods of work in its current composition. Linking the veto to working methods, the S.5 argued that the veto was undemocratic and should not be extended to new members. In their view, the initiative was part of a parallel process aimed at improving the current practice in the Council, an apparent justification for placing it under agenda item 117 and not under item 122. They insisted that the requirement for action by the General Assembly on their draft was a simple majority and not two-thirds majority as required by General Assembly resolution 53/30.

**21.** Many delegations raised concern about the procedural approach of the S.5 which many believed had the potential to undermine the intergovernmental negotiations process. The draft resolution was also considered by some delegations to have gone beyond the scope of working methods to include the relations between the General Assembly and the Security Council and the issue of the veto. Many delegations were therefore apprehensive that it would have negative impact on the on-going efforts within the IGN process. Furthermore, the wider membership favoured a comprehensive reform and not a "piece meal approach", an approach that will single out one of the five clusters for fast tracking, contradicting decision 62/557. Many delegations and interest groups including the C-10 stressed the interconnectedness of the five clusters and pointed out that if any is detached for the purpose of fast tracking, it would potentially undermine the reform process and the legitimate aspirations of some interest groups. Also, the veto was considered to be a standalone negotiable in the IGN and therefore should not be considered as part of the working methods; and that enlargement in both categories was directly linked to the issue of the veto. It was the view of the Five permanent members (P-5) that improving the working methods was work in progress and that the Council was master of its own procedures, hence its prerogative over its rules of procedure.

**22.** On 4 April 2012, the S.5 drew the attention of the membership to its draft resolution contained in document A/66/L.42/Rev. 1 entitled "Enhancing accountability, transparency and effectiveness of the Security Council" containing a set of recommendations on improving the working methods of the Security Council. However, on the 16 May 2012, when introducing the draft resolution in the General



assembly plenary session, the S-5 in response to immense pressure from many delegation for procedural reasons, withdrew their text.

### ***The Inter-governmental Negotiations Meeting of 2 July 2012***

**23.** This was a wrap-up session for the five exchanges. At the start of the meeting, authors of each of the five initiatives were given an opportunity to share their views on what they learnt from the series of meetings and how they intended to operationalize their respective initiatives. The wider membership also took the opportunity to share with all delegations their conclusions regarding the viability of the different initiatives as well as their ideas on the way forward. At this meeting, the Chair announced that he was in receipt of a letter from Singapore that it had officially ceased to be a member of the S.5 group.

**24.** The debate that followed shed some light on the broad views of the membership on the reform of the Security Council with majority of member states and interest groups expressing support for an expansion in both the permanent and non-permanent categories; enhanced African presence in both the permanent and non-permanent membership of the Council; the need to reform the Council to reflect contemporary realities; securing the representation of small states; a modest expansion advocated by a few, whilst others preferred expansion in the mid-twenties; and the need to improve on the working methods of the Council and its relationship with the General Assembly. The UfC also continued to project the Italy/Colombia paper as a compromise solution, and an invitation to negotiate. The Facilitator, in closing, promised sharing his views on the exchanges in due course.

### ***The President of the General Assembly's (PGA's) Retreat – 30<sup>th</sup> to 31<sup>st</sup> March, 2012***

**25.** In a bid to move the reform process forward, the PGA organized a brainstorming session exclusively for Permanent Representatives in New York with a view to providing the opportunity for member states to engage in an informal, constructive dialogue on Security Council reform. The discussions focused mainly on addressing the following key issues vis-à-vis the reform process, in particular, the different member states initiatives and proposals:

- i) The current state of the reform and progress achieved so far;
- ii) What is expected from states and groups to move the process forward within the IGN;
- iii) How to galvanize the required momentum to foster the necessary political will to reach a solution with the widest possible acceptance as well as available options for the way forward of the IGN during the current session and beyond.

26. 26. The retreat, organized under the Chatham House Rule did not produce any outcome document. Matters arising under the discussions revolved around the idea of a straw poll to test the viability and support enjoyed by each of the initiatives. Doubts were expressed vehemently on the credibility of such a process and many delegations opined that the introduction of a straw poll at this time was not a realistic proposal and called into question a lot of unanswerable.

### ***C-10's Consultations with Interest Groups***

27. In keeping with the Assembly's decision of the last summit encouraging the C-10 to continue to forge alliance in support of the African Common Position, consultations were held with interest groups such as the L. 69, the UfC, and the S.5 together with briefings of the wider membership of the African Group on the reform of the UN Security Council.

### ***The L-69***

28. Consultations between the C-10 and the L.69 on the reform of the Council both on substance and process are on-going on an informal basis. In response to the proposed draft MoU by L.69, the C-10 submitted a Non-paper reflecting the African Common Position as contained in the Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declarations to form the basis of future engagement on Security Council reform. The L.69 acknowledged and accepted the text with few amendments made thereto and agreed, in principle, to amend its position in the compiled text to be in full compliance with the Non-paper.

29. On June 3, the C-10 received a letter from the L.69 dated 29 May 2012, forwarding text of a proposed draft resolution entitled "Reform of the Security Council" under agenda item 122 "Question of equitable representation on and increase in the membership of the Security Council and related matters". The C-10 responded with a letter dated 29<sup>th</sup> June, 2012 expressing its preparedness to continue to engage with the L.69 with a view to narrowing down and bridging any difference between their respective positions; but at the same time apprehensive of any time limit to the finalization of the draft given that sufficient time was required to undertake consultations within the wider membership of the African Group, and when necessary the relevant organs of the African Union. The letter further expressed the view that a meeting of experts of both Groups may be necessary to discuss the text and come up with a joint text for further consideration. The letter also reminded the L.69 about the common understanding between their two groups that the L.69 had expressed its readiness and willingness to change its position in the compilation text in order to be on the same page with the African Group's position before the emergence of a joint L.69/African Group draft resolution.

### ***The Uniting for Consensus (UfC)***

30. At a number of consultations between the UfC and the C-10, the UfC restated its position as contained in the Italian/Colombian Paper of 2009. They

believed that their proposal was a viable and logical compromise that addresses African specificities through: Charter recognition, size, and greater allocation of new seats, and that 40% of their proposed enlargement would go to Africa, especially the longer term seats. The C-10 reiterated its opposition to any form of the intermediate approach including the model proposed by the UfC and in that light, preferred a comprehensive approach that was supported by the wider membership and also in conformity with Decision 62/557. C-10 also expressed disappointment over the failure by the UfC to concretize pronouncements made at the Rome Conference of 15 May 2011.

### ***The Small 5 (S.5)***

**31.** During consultations with the S.5 on 26 April 2012, the S-5 dealt with two issues relating to their presentation to be held on 2 May 2012 at the IGN and their amended draft resolution on improving the working methods. The C-10 in reaction raised concerns about the potential difficulties associated with a piecemeal approach as all the 5 clusters were inter-connected. Concerns were also raised about how the S.5 resolution addresses the demands of Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declarations. C-10 recalled the calls by world leaders at the 2005 World Summit for a comprehensive reform of the Security Council that will make it broadly representative, transparent, legitimate and accountable.

**32.** The S-5 admitted that the draft resolution did not address the demands of Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declarations and it is confined strictly to improving the Council's working methods which they believed did not require any amendment of the Charter and should not be held ransom to progress on the enlargement issue.

### ***The African Group of the Whole***

**33.** During the reporting period, the C-10 briefed the wider membership of the African Group in New York on three occasions: to assist the Group to form an informed decision on a letter from the L-69 requesting a meeting with the African Group of the Whole on Security Council reform; to liaise with the Group before the presentation of the African Group's initiative to the membership at the IGN to evaluate the African common position scheduled for 10 April 2012; and to discuss with the Group of the Whole with a view to arriving at a common position on the S-5 draft resolution which was to come for voting at the formal plenary of the General Assembly. Irrespective of the diverse points of view expressed by members of the Group on various issues, there was a keen sense of appreciation for the Group to demonstrate cohesiveness and unity by speaking with one voice and to actively participate in the on-coming exchanges.

## **III. OBSERVATIONS**

**34.** The Facilitator's programme of work dedicated to an in-depth evaluation of each member state driven initiative provided member states and interest groups

the opportunity to have a better knowledge and understanding of the five major initiatives on the reform of the Security Council and also an attempt to give impetus to the reform process. However, the debates revealed that member states and interest groups were still very much divided on the question of Security Council reform. There seems to have been no real shift in positions as interest groups and member states continue to reiterate entrenched positions.

**35.** There is general concern that the process has yet to go into real negotiations involving tradeoffs and compromise of the various positions on the table; but at the same time genuine interest in continuing the IGN process abounds to the extent that the membership in general supports a roll-over of the process to the 67th Session building on the gains achieved in this session.

**36.** The divisions among interest groups and stakeholders on most of the key clusters such as the size, veto, and categories of a reformed Council continue to be contentious with the membership divided and holding onto their respective positions.

**37.** The G-4 draft resolution on the enlargement of the Council and working methods continue to be on the table. It is in tandem with the L-69 proposal. These initiatives continue to be considered as piecemeal approaches and therefore contradict General Assembly decision 62/557.

**38.** The UFC remain opposed to enlargement of the Council in the permanent category but claim to have similarities with the African common position both on substance and process. It also continues to claim flexibility as well as acknowledges the need to correct the historical injustice done to Africa but yet continues to offer Africa longer term seats without veto within the context of the Italy/ Colombia paper of 2009. This proposal fails to address the key demands of the Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declarations, and the much acknowledged need to correct the historical injustice done to the African continent by not being represented in the permanent category of the Council.

**39.** The L.69 seems to be increasingly reaching out to the African common position. They continue to express support for Africa's aspiration for two permanent seats and two additional non-permanent seats and subscribing to the view that the new permanent members should have the same rights and prerogatives as the current permanent members including the right of veto.

**40.** Accepting the non-paper as the basis of engagement between the L.69 and the C-10 is indicative of intention of the two groups to adopt a common platform in the reform process. However, the L-69 have yet to modify their position in the Compiled Text to be in compliance with the African common position. Until then, the L-69 is seen as a strong platform to promote and canvass support for the G.4 draft resolution/proposal which they presented at the IGN meeting devoted to their initiative. This has created a sense of disconnect between their open pronouncement at the IGN and their position in the Compiled Text.

**41.** Some members of the P.5 seem to be supportive of a modest expansion in the size of the Council; with some strongly opposed to any proposal that changes the current structure of the veto. There is however, expressed support among the P.5 for an enhanced inclusion of Africa into the permanent and non-permanent categories of the Council.

**42.** 42. The Compiled Text still remain as the true reflection of formal written positions of member states and interest groups. Division among the membership streamlining the Text and merging language continued unresolved. However, support for further developing Rev. 3 in order to accommodate the concerns of the membership and to fully unlock its potential for the negotiation process was expressed by a number of delegations.

**43.** There is indication that many delegations and interest groups including Africa are in favour of a comprehensive approach in accordance with decision 62/557 and opposed to any piecemeal approach, as evident from the outcome of the S.5 draft resolution. In other words, agreement on both substance and procedure is critical to the reform process.

**44.** The S.5 withdrew their draft resolution not only to avoid procedural and legalistic battles, but also due to considerable pressure from the P-5 who perceived that the draft resolution was divisive and confrontational. The overwhelming pressure on the S-5 which led to the withdrawal of their draft resolution have had adverse effect on its membership by the withdrawal of Singapore from the group and the possibility of further withdrawal from the Group.

**45.** The dynamics of the process of the reform process clearly indicates that members of the P-5 remain major stakeholders in the reform process and real negotiations would not commence without their genuine commitment and political will.

**46.** Support for the African common position on Security Council reform continued to gain momentum with member states and interest groups unanimous on the need to have an enhanced African representation on the Council. However, divergent views on how to achieve an increased representation of Africa continues. Furthermore, there were questions on the identity of Africa's candidates to be elected to the permanent membership of the Council. Some members perceive the continued dual membership of some African member states in the L-69 as a division within the African Group. The Africa opposition to streamlining or merging the text without agreeing first on principles, criteria and substance vis-a-vis the negotiables and variables in the negotiations is supported by some other delegations.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

**47.** The process continues to gain momentum and to be membership driven with the various member states initiatives continuing to dominate discussions; and relegating consideration of the Facilitators Rev. 3 process to the background as a last possible alternative. Strong political will is required at this stage to move the reform process forward into real negotiations.

**48.** On the process, Africa should remain opposed to any drafting exercise involving merging language in the Text and streamlining positions without agreeing first on the principles and criteria and substance vis-a-vis the negotiables in the five clusters in the negotiations.

**49.** The African common position as one of the most comprehensive of the member states initiatives continues to be valid and viable, and enjoy broad support and sympathy from the membership in general. There is encouraging space to continue to build alliances with all other reform-minded interest groups. Africa should therefore continue to intensify its efforts in building alliances and speak cohesively and with unity on all issues and aspects of the reform process.

**50.** 50. Africa should continue to engage in the intergovernmental negotiations rejecting any interim, intermediate or intermediary approach to the reform process and the creation of new category of permanent seats other than the current Charter provided categories.

**51.** The interaction between Africa and the L.69 continues to evolve. Decisive progress to build on the gains already emerging from this interaction would depend on if and when the L-69 decides to review and amend its position in the Compiled Text to conform with other pronouncements of its members in support of the African common position.

**52.** The UfC continues to show sympathy for the African common position but short of support for the common will to correct first of all the historical injustice done to Africa as expressed in the Rome outcome document. It is however encouraging to note that some members of the UfC have indicated intentions during the 2 July exchange of the Eighth round to make some adjustments to their position in the next Session, with the hope that others will feel inclined to respond likewise.

**53.** Lessons learned from the fate of the S-5 draft resolution, underscore the need for adequate consensus building through the IGN process as a prerequisite to the tabling of any member state initiative draft resolution in the formal plenary of the General Assembly for voting.

**54.** African member states should continue to tread carefully and to scrutinize any ambiguous position that appears to support the African Common position, but merely an expression of sympathy with no substantive support; and also of any piecemeal approach that may potentially harm the elements of the African

Common position and divide its membership and in the process, lose its core demands and undermine the gains made so far.

**55.** It is therefore crucial that all African countries to remain unified and firmly committed to the African common position, irrespective of their membership of other interest groups and to continue to promote the interest of Africa within such interest groups in order to give Africa enhanced representation in both the permanent and non-permanent categories as contained in the Ezulwini Consensus and Sirte Declaration, and build on the support it continues to receive in that regard.

**56.** It is necessary for the Committee of Ten on Security Council reform to continue to intensify its efforts in advocating, canvassing and promoting the African common position and to endeavour to reach out at high political levels for the purpose of garnering and galvanizing the necessary political will in support of the African common position.

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2012-07-16

# Report of H.E. MR. Ernest Bai Koroma, President of the Republic of Sierra Leone and Chairperson of the Committee of ten on the UN Reforms

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